Category: Shavuos

The Milky Way

The custom of eating dairy on Shavuos has a long history; certainly, we should review the topic of…

Does Chalav Yisrael Apply Today?

Question #1:

Shirley mentions to her friend: “I do not understand why some people keep chalav Yisrael today. Do they really think that someone is adding pig’s milk?”

Question #2:

Muttie inquires: “My friend quoted his rav that it is more important to keep chalav Yisrael today than it ever was before. How could this be?”

Chazal (Bechoros 6b) derive from this week’s parsha a rule that whatever comes from a non-kosher species, such as eggs or milk, is also non-kosher. Thus, milk of mares, camels, llamas, donkeys or sows are all non-kosher. Still, people find chalav Yisrael a perplexing subject matter. We have all heard various authorities quoted that today use of chalav Yisrael is only a chumrah, whereas others rule that consuming non-chalav Yisrael foods is a serious infraction of halacha. The mission of this article is to provide appreciation of the issues involved. So, let us start from the beginning of the topic by understanding the origins of this proscription and then explaining the different approaches why it does or does not apply today.

Before we even begin our halachic discussion, we need some biological and food production information. The definition of a mammal is an animal that nurses its young with mother’s milk. (The Modern Hebrew word for mammal is yoneik, literally, that which nurses, meaning that the young suckles mother’s milk.) Hashem, who provides for all His creatures, custom-developed a formula that provides the ideal nourishment for the young of each mammalian species. This supplies the perfect “food pyramid” balanced diet with all the proteins, carbohydrates, vitamins and minerals that a young growing foal, cub, kitten, puppy, kid, lamb, infant or calf need to thrive and mature until they are ready for an adult diet, which in many species is when they are ready to earn their own living.

There are thousands of species of mammals, yet each species’ milk is somewhat unique. The young of kosher animals require a certain protein, called casein, in higher proportions than do the young of non-kosher animals, and therefore Hashem made kosher milk with a higher proportion of casein. Non-kosher milk, of course, also contains significant amount of protein necessary for a young growing mammal, but most of this protein is categorized as “whey protein.” (When I use the term “non-kosher milk” in this article, I will be referring to milk from non-kosher species.) Kosher milk also contains whey protein, but in much smaller proportion to the casein.

The Origins of Chalav Yisrael

The Mishnah (Avodah Zarah 35b, 39b) proscribes consuming milk that a gentile milked, unless a Jew supervised the milking, a prohibition called chalav akum. The Gemara notes that we are not concerned that the gentile is misrepresenting non-kosher milk as kosher — milk from non-kosher species looks different from kosher milk, and this would be easily identified. Rather, the prohibition is because the milk may have been adulterated with milk of a non-kosher species. The Gemara subsequently discusses how closely must the Jew supervise the milking; it concludes that, when the gentile has both kosher and non-kosher animals that could be milked, the Jew may be sitting in a place where he cannot observe the milking, provided that, should he stand up, he could. Since the Jew can stand up at any moment, we may assume that the gentile would not risk milking his non-kosher animal and losing the Jew’s business. Therefore, this milk still qualifies as kosher chalav Yisrael, milk supervised by a Jew.

On the other hand, should the gentile have only kosher species in his herd, the Gemara implies that less supervision is necessary, but it does not define exactly how much. The milking still requires the attendance of a Jew, but halachic authorities dispute the reason and purpose of the Jew’s presence. This dispute is what underlies the controversy alluded to above.

The most lenient approach

The most lenient approach is that of the Pri Chadash (Yoreh Deah 115:15), who contends that there are concerns about chalav akum only when non-kosher milk is less expensive than kosher, or when non-kosher milk is obtainable but difficult to sell. However, when kosher milk is less expensive than non-kosher, halacha has no concern that non-kosher product may contaminate kosher milk. The Pri Chadash reports that, at the time that he wrote his commentary, he was living in Amsterdam, and the vast majority of the Torah community there accepted this interpretation and drank milk sold by gentiles. He adds that he himself relied on this approach and drank the milk. The Pri Chadash explains that halacha does not require that a Jew observe the milking, nor is there any requirement to verify that non-kosher milk was not added. The Mishnah and Gemara require a Jew to supervise the milking only when it is financially advantageous for the non-Jew to adulterate milk.

Chasam Sofer’s approach

On the other hand, the Chasam Sofer (Shu”t Yoreh Deah #107) opposed any lenience to use milk from gentiles. He maintained that Chazal required that a Jew actually supervise the milking, and that this sanction remains binding, even should its rationale no longer apply, until a more authoritative body retracts it (see Beitzah 5a). Since this has never happened, consuming unsupervised gentile milk remains prohibited. The Chasam Sofer requires that a Jew observe (or be able to observe) the milking, even when no incentive exists to adulterate the product.

Risk of snake bite

Chazal (Bava Basra 110a; Avodah Zarah 27b) invoke the verse uporeitz geder yishachenu nachash (Koheles 10:8) to mean thatsomeone violating a rabbinic injunction deserves to be bitten by a snake, indicating the importance of observing rabbinic prohibitions. The Chasam Sofer writes that someone who ignores the rabbinic prohibition of chalav akum and drinks milk, relying that the gentile would not add non-kosher milk, should be categorized as a poreitz geder deservant of the punishment of yishachenu nachash.

Furthermore, the Chasam Sofer contends that even should kosher milk be cheaper than non-kosher, since the Jewish people rejected the ruling of the Pri Chadash, unsupervised dairy products are prohibited because of the laws of nedarim, vows. Since Jews do not consume chalav akum even in places where non-kosher species are not milked, it is considered that they accepted a vow to prohibit unsupervised milk. As a result, the Chasam Sofer rules that it is prohibited min HaTorah, with the full stringency of a vow, to consume unsupervised milk.

A middle road

An approach between these two positions, that of Rav Moshe Feinstein and the Chazon Ish (Yoreh Deah 41:4), who contend that in a place where non-kosher milk commands a higher price than kosher milk, it is still prohibited to use non-supervised milk. However, Rav Moshe understands that the takanah did not require specifically that a Jew attend the milking, but that one must be completely certain that the milk has no admixture of non-kosher. When it is certain that the kosher milk is unadulterated, halacha considers the milk to be “supervised” (Shu”t Igros Moshe, Yoreh Deah 1:47).

How can one be certain? The Mishnah recommended the most obvious way: have a Jew nearby who may enter at any moment. Of course, we realize that even this method is not foolproof, but it is as thorough as halacha requires.

Is there another way that one can be certain? Someone runs laboratory tests on some unsupervised milk and concludes, with absolute certainty, that it is 100% sheep’s milk. Yet, no Jew supervised the milking. Is the milk kosher?

According to Rav Moshe’s analysis, this milk is certainly kosher since we can ascertain its source.

In his earliest published teshuvah on the subject, Rav Moshe explained that, when the government fines those caught adulterating cow’s milk, the fear of this consequence is sufficient proof that the milk is kosher. In later teshuvos, he is very clear that other reasons why we can assume that the milk is kosher are sufficient proof, including that normal commercial practice is that standard milk is bovine milk (Igros Moshe, Yoreh Deah 1:48, 49). One should note that the Chazon Ish agrees with Rav Moshe’s approach. We should also note that this heter applies only where the absolute assumption is that the milk is from kosher species, but not anywhere where camel’s milk, mare’s milk or milk from other non-kosher species is commonly sold or available.

Being Stringent

Rav Moshe concludes that, even where one can rely that the standardly available milk is kosher, and there is therefore no prohibition of chalav akum, a chinuch institution should use only chalav Yisrael products, even when all the children come from homes that do not use chalav Yisrael exclusively. He notes that this is an aspect of chinuch – to teach the importance of following a stricter standard than halacha necessarily requires.

Contemporary Problem

There is another reason why some poskim require use of chalav Yisrael today. This is because of the common occurrence in the contemporary world of a veterinary problem affecting dairy cows called displaced abomasums, which is often treated in a way that may render this cow’s milk non-kosher. I will discuss this topic a different time.

At this point, we can answer Shirley’s question: “I do not understand why some people keep chalav Yisrael today. Do they really think that someone is adding pig’s milk?”

Indeed, even in the time of the Gemara, it was probably unheard of for anyone to add pig’s milk or, for that matter, for anyone to use pig’s milk, since sows are almost impossible to milk. Although most non-kosher species do not allow themselves to be milked (have you ever tried to milk a cat?), camels, llamas, alpacas, donkeys, and mares can all be milked and produce a palatable product. Contemporarily, there is extensive research at Ben Gurion University about use of antibodies found in camel’s milk for treatment of autoimmune diseases. I have been asked about using this milk, which is clearly non-kosher, but is permitted in case of a life-threatening ailment.

To answer Shirley’s question succinctly: Although we can assume that the milk on your supermarket shelf is unadulterated cow’s milk, the Chasam Sofer still rules that Chazal prohibited consuming this milk. In his opinion, this prohibition is in full effect today, even when the reason for the takanah no longer applies. Furthermore, he suggests that the prohibition to use this milk might even be min haTorah . Other rabbonim have voiced other concerns about the kashrus of unsupervised dairy cows.

Stricter than Ever?

At this point, let us examine Muttie’s question: “My friend quoted his rav that it is more important to keep chalav Yisrael today than it ever was before. How could this be?”

One obvious reason for this rav’s position is that he holds like the Chasam Sofer that using non-chalav Yisrael incurs a Torah prohibition of violating vows. Furthermore, he may feel that since being lenient on this issue is so rampant, one must demonstrate the importance of this mitzvah. He also may be concerned about the displaced abomasums problem, and holds that this prohibits the milk min haTorah.

In Conclusion

Notwithstanding that the Chazon Ish writes several reasons why unsupervised milk is permitted, he never allowed its use. Rav Moshe similarly advocates being strict, and himself did not rely on the heter. It is also well known that Rav Eliezer Silver traveled across North America by train and took his own chalav Yisrael milk with him as he went. (I have no idea why it did not spoil en route.) In conclusion, I suggest clarifying with your rav whether you should rely on using non-chalav Yisrael milk.

Rus, David, and the Prohibition of Marrying Moavites

A critical feature of the Book of Rus is the question of whether Rus was allowed to marry into the Jewish people. The Torah prohibits a Moavite from marrying into Klal Yisroel to prevent damaging Klal Yisroel’s pristine moral nature by people who have inherited the disturbing character traits associated with the Moavite people:

An Ammonite or a Moavite should not enter the congregation of Hashem. Even the tenth generation should not enter the congregation of Hashem, forever. Because of the fact that they did not come forward with bread and water when you were on your way out of Mitzrayim and because of the fact that they hired Bilaam ben Be’or of Pesor, Aram Naharayim, to curse you (Devarim 23:4, 5).

Since there are no indications that the nation of Ammon participated in employing Bilaam, the Ramban (ad loc.) explains that each of the two reasons specified here applies to only one of the two nations involved: The Ammonites are excluded from marrying into Klal Yisroel because they did not provide food for the Jewish people, thus not demonstrating any hakaras hatov for the fact that Avraham Avinu had saved their ancestor Lot, and Moav is banned for hiring Bilaam.

The Mishnah (Yevamos 76b) rules Ammoni velo Ammonis, Moavi velo Moavis, that the prohibition of marrying into the Jewish people applies only to male Ammonites and Moavites and their male descendants. Thus, a male member of the Moavite people who converts to Judaism is still prohibited from marrying someone born Jewish. However, a female Moavite convert and all her descendants, and the female descendant of a male Moavite convert may freely marry within Klal Yisroel. It is for this reason that Boaz was permitted to marry Rus, who was a Moavite.

The Gemara explains that only Ammonite men are included in the ban, since only men would have been involved in going out to present food and drink to the Jews. The female Ammonites’ lack of involvement in this mitzvah may have been because of their extreme modesty – they never left their houses to be near unfamiliar men. Similarly, since we can assume that Bilaam was hired by the Moavite men, only they are prohibited from marrying into the Jewish people, not the women (see also Yerushalmi).

The Story of Rus

In addition to the above-quoted Mishnah, several other early sources discuss whether the prohibition preventing Moavites and Ammonites from marrying Jews is restricted to males or extends also to females. The first time we find this matter discussed is in the days of Rus. Megillas Rus tells us that Ploni Almoni, an uncle of Rus’s late husband Machlon, was concerned about marrying Rus pen ashchis nachalasi, lest I destroy my descendants (Rus 4:6), which Rashi explains to be a concern that his descendants born from Rus would not be allowed to marry other Jews, because of their Moavite ancestress. Rashi there explains that Ploni Almoni erred regarding the halachic rule of Ammoni velo Ammonis.

Yet, the comment of Ploni Almoni is peculiar. If he felt that female Moavites are prohibited from marrying Jews, why was he only concerned that his descendants would be banned and not about whether he himself was permitted to marry Rus? On the other hand, if he was willing to marry Rus because he knew that the prohibition is restricted to male Moavites, why was he concerned about his children? We will return to this question shortly.

The Story of David

The issue of whether Moavite women may marry Jews surfaced again concerning the lineage of King David, who was descended from Rus. A fascinating passage of Gemara describes an early halachic debate among several known Biblical personages – whom we see from this Gemara were exemplary Torah scholars. Doeig HaEdomi, a member of King Shaul’s retinue, and Avner ben Ner, Shaul’s chief-of-military-staff, debate the halachic issue concerning whether Moavite women may marry Jews. The discussion between them is what one expects from Talmidei Chachamim of the first order, vociferously debating a halachic issue in your local Beis Medrash. But first let us examine the historical context.

Background to the Story

After Shaul failed to destroy Amalek and he had been told that he would therefore lose the monarchy, Hashem commanded Shmuel to clandestinely anoint David, the youngest of Yishai’s eight sons, as the new King of Israel. Shmuel carried out this mission, but it had been kept a complete secret.

At this time, Shaul began suffering bouts of depression. Shaul’s advisers sought out someone who could play music and thereby help Shaul cope with his depression. One of Shaul’s attendants knew David and suggested him for the position. David tried out for the position and was very successful. Shaul then sent a message to Yishai, David’s father, requesting that David be allowed to assume this position permanently. David did fill the position, and Shaul loved David tremendously, and had David also assume the role of being the royal armor-bearer. Shaul sent a second message to Yishai, requesting that David remain with Shaul “for he has found favor in my eyes” (Shmuel I 16:14-23).

At this point, the Pelishtim (Philistines) waged war against the Jews. The Pelishtim had a giant warrior among them, Golyas (known in English as “Goliath”), who stood over six amos tall (well over ten feet!). Golyas would taunt the Jews with his powerful, terrifying voice. Golyas challenged the Jews to send one representative who would face off in battle against him, with the nation of the victor taking the members of the other nation as slaves. At the same time, Golyas screamed blasphemous declarations about Hashem. The Jewish troops were terrified of Golyas (Shmuel I 17:1-11).

At the time, David’s three oldest brothers served in Shaul’s army. Yishai, David’s father, who is described as zakein ba va’anashim, meaning a well known personage, sent David to bring provisions to his brothers at the battlefront (Shmuel I 17:12). David discovered that Shaul was offering a vast reward to whoever would vanquish Golyas.

David the Brave

David, after gathering information about the situation, volunteered to fight Golyas by himself. Shaul discouraged David, noting that Golyas was an experienced warrior, whereas David was not.

David replied that Hashem is the One who provides all salvation, and that Hashem often helped David fight lions and bears while he was tending his sheep. Shaul gave David his blessing.

Shaul’s armor was placed upon David, but David said that he could not move freely with the armor, and removed it. David then took five smooth stones from a stream and placed them in his shepherd’s bag.

When Golyas saw David, he taunted him, saying “I will offer your flesh to the birds of the heavens and the animals of the field,” to which David responded: “You come against me with sword, spear and javelin, and I come against you with the Name of Hashem, Master of Armies, the G-d of the troops of Israel.” At this point, David took his slingshot, shot one stone that struck Golyas on the forehead, and Golyas fell dead. David then took Golyas’s sword, chopped off his head and demonstrated to all the Pelishtim that their hero was dead. The Pelishtim fled, and on that day, the Jews vanquished their enemy.

Now we come to the strangest part of the story:

“And when Shaul saw David move forward against the Pelishti, he said to Avner, his general, ‘Avner, whose son is this lad?’ And Avner answered, ‘As you live, O King, I do not know.’ And the king responded, ‘Find out whose son is this lad’” (Shmuel I, 17:55-56).

This last part of the story is bizarre. Both Shaul and Avner certainly knew David well — David was Shaul’s armor-bearer and the one who played music to treat Shaul’s fits of depression. Furthermore, they were also familiar with Yishai, who was a well-known personage and with whom Shaul had negotiated twice for David’s employ.

The Gemara Passage

As we can imagine, we are not the first to ask these questions: They form the basis of a fascinating Talmudic discussion (Yevamos 76b-77a).

The Gemara asks why Shaul asked Avner who David and Yishai were; he knew them both, very well. The Gemara answers that he suspected that David might be the person who would be replacing him as king of the Jews. Shaul inquired whether David was descended from the branch of Yehudah that was destined to be the Jewish royal family. Thus, the question “Avner, whose son is this lad?” was not about David’s identity but about his genealogical roots.

At this point, Doeig HaEdomi piped up, “Rather than ask concerning whether he is appropriate to become king, you should ask whether he may marry into the Jewish people. After all, he is descended from Rus, the Moavite.” To this, Avner retorted that we know that the halachah is that only male descendants of Ammon and Moav are prohibited, and therefore Rus was permitted to marry into the Jewish people. Doeig, however, disputed the veracity of this ruling. A halachic debate ensued between Doeig and Avner, concerning whether one can prove from the verses that the prohibition against Ammon and Moav is limited to males, or whether it extends also to the female descendants. Doeig won the upper hand in the debate, producing irrefutable arguments that females are also prohibited.

What was Doeig’s Argument?

As explained by the Ritva (ad loc.), Doeig insisted that the prohibition against marrying Ammonites applies equally to men and women of this nation. In his opinion, the Ammonite women equally share blame for the discourtesy they showed the Israelites, since the Ammonite women should also have provided food and water. He disputes with excusing their not providing help as attributable to their extreme modesty, since the Ammonite women should have assisted the Jewish women.

But what about the Moavite women?

But wait one minute! This concern should not affect David, who was descended from Moav, not from Ammon, and the Moavite women cannot be accused of hiring Bilaam. However, Doeig contended that Moavite women are also prohibited. Although it may be true that Bilaam was hired by the men, since the prohibitions against marrying Moavites and Ammonites are mentioned together, just as female Ammonites may not marry Jews, the same applies to female Moavites (Rashba, Yevamos 76b).

When Avner was unable to disprove Doeig’s approach, Shaul referred the issue to the scholars who debated such matters in the Beis Medrash. These scholars also responded that the prohibition banning the marriage of Ammon and Moav applies only to males and not to females. Doeig then proceeded to demonstrate that their approach was incorrect, leading the scholars of the Beis Medrash to conclude that their previous assumption was wrong and that henceforth the halachah would be that female descendants of Ammon and Moav are prohibited from marrying into Klal Yisroel. This ruling would seriously affect David and all his family members. Boaz had married Rus assuming that the prohibition banning Moavites applied only to males, and now the scholars of the Beis Medrash were considering banning Moavite and Ammonite women and all their descendants.

Amasa to the Rescue!

They were about to conclude that this is the halachah, when another scholar, Amasa, who was also a general in Shaul’s army, rose and declared, “I have received a direct mesorah from Shmuel’s Beis Din that the prohibition relates only to male descendants and not to female ones.” This last argument apparently turned the entire debate back in favor of Avner’s original position, and it was accepted that David and all of Yishai’s descendants could marry within Klal Yisroel (Yevamos 76b-77a).

What did Amasa’s declaration change? In what way did this refute Doeig’s arguments?

Based on a halachic explanation of the Rambam (Hilchos Mamrim 1:2), the Brisker Rav explains what changed.

There are two basic types of Torah laws:

  • Those that are handed down as a mesorah from Moshe Rabbeinu at Har Sinai.
  • Those derived on the basis of the thirteen rules with which we derive new halachos, called in English the hermeneutic rules.

Let me explain each category by using examples:

Mesorah

We have a mesorah that the Torah’s requirement that we take “the fruit of a beautiful tree” on Sukkos refers to an esrog. No halachic authority in Klal Yisroel’s history ever questioned this fact, and for a very simple reason. We know this piece of information directly from the great leaders of Klal Yisroel who received this information from Moshe Rabbeinu, who heard it directly from Hashem (Rambam, Introduction to the Commentary on the Mishnah).

Logic

However, there are also Torah laws that were not taught with a direct mesorah from Har Sinai, but are derived through the hermeneutic rules of the Torah. For example, there is a dispute among tana’im whether a sukkah requires four walls to be kosher or whether it is sufficient if it has three. This debate is based on two different ways to explain the words of the Torah (Sukkah 6b).

Mesorah Versus Logic

Are there any halachic distinctions between the two categories of Torah-derived laws? Indeed, there are. The Rambam explains that when the position is based on logic, halachic authorities may disagree what is the halachah. Thus, there can be a dispute among tana’im whether a sukkah must have three walls or four. However, there can never be a dispute concerning a matter that Klal Yisroel received as a mesorah. Once a greatly respected Torah authority reports a mesorah from his rebbe,who in turn received this mesorah back to Moshe Rabbeinu, that a specific halachah or principle is true, no one can question this mesorah. Thus, any dispute about a halachah of the Torah can concern only something derived logically with hermeneutic principles.

There is another halachic difference between something taught by mesorah and something derived through logic. The final decider of all halachah in every generation (until the end of the era of the Talmud) was the Sanhedrin, also often called the Beis Din HaGadol, the supreme Beis Din. Once the great Torah scholars of Klal Yisroel participated in a debate in the Beis Din HaGadol, which then reached a decision, their conclusion is binding on all of Klal Yisroel (Rambam, Hilchos Mamrim 1:1; Comments of Ramban to Sefer HaMitzvos, Rule II).

There is a question whether a Beis Din HaGadol may overturn a ruling that had been decided previously, either its own decision or one made by an earlier Beis Din HaGadol. The answer to this question depends on whether the ruling involved was based on logic or whether it was taught by mesorah. When the original decision was reached by logic, then a later Beis Din HaGadol has the authority to reexamine the case, and, should it decide to, overturn the previous ruling.

However, this can never happen with a law whose source is mesorah. There can be no debate, no discussion and no overturning. Once a recognized scholar announces that he received this law as a mesorah from Sinai, this is accepted by all, and no debate or questioning of this mesorah may transpire.

Thus, it makes a tremendous difference in halachah whether something is a mesorah, which means it is not subject to argument or debate, or whether it is based on an interpretation of the hermeneutic rules, which is subject to argument and debate.

On the basis of these rules of the Rambam, the Brisker Rav (in his notes to the book of Rus in his Chiddushim on Tanach) explains why Amasa’s argument closed the debate in David’s favor. Doeig, Shaul, Avner, and the other members of Shaul’s Beis Medrash all assumed that limiting the prohibition of Ammoni and Moavi to males was based on hermeneutic exposition, and thus debatable. Furthermore, if Doeig demonstrated that his approach was logically correct, the long-established interpretation permitting Rus to marry into the Jewish people would be overturned. Indeed, the result of this ruling would be that Rus and all her descendants would be prohibited to marry into the Jewish people.

Amasa, however, explains the Brisker Rav, knew that the principle of Moavi velo Moavis, that female descendants of Moav could marry into Klal Yisroel, was a mesorah that Shmuel knew originated at Har Sinai. Thus, its basis was not a logical interpretation of the Torah, which can be refuted, but mesorah, which cannot. Therefore, a logical interpretation concluding otherwise was completely irrelevant.

At this point, we can return to an earlier question we asked about the story of Megillas Rus. Ploni Almoni, Machlon’s uncle, seems convinced that he may marry Rus, notwithstanding her Moavite origins, yet he was concerned that his descendants from her might not be allowed to marry other Jews. The Brisker Rav explains that Ploni Almoni assumed that the law permitting Moavite women to marry Jews was based on logic, which might at some time in the future be refuted, thus changing the accepted halachah. At that point, the ability of his descendants to marry Jews would be overturned. However, Ploni Almoni was incorrect, since the halachah that Moavite women may marry Jews is mesorah, and therefore irrefutable. There can and will never be a question as to whether the descendants of Boaz and David may marry Jews, notwithstanding their Moavite origins.

Conclusion

Besides the halachic issues regarding the pedigree of David, which are of supreme importance to us, since they are the basis of the lineage of Mashiach, we learn a very important lesson from the marital restrictions of the Moavites. One of the three identifying characteristics of the Jewish people is our quality that we are makir tov, we appreciate what others, and especially Hashem, have done for us and acknowledge that appreciation. From this mitzvah, we see how concerned we should be about developing the qualities that characterize the Jewish people.

Aliyah Laregel for Shavuos

Since we all hope to be in a rebuilt Yerushalayim in time for Shavuos, we need to start planning…

Aliyah Laregel for Shavuos

Question #1: No Aliyah Laregel

“Someone once told me that when the Beis Hamikdash is rebuilt, the mitzvah of Aliyah Laregel will be optional. How can that be?”

Question #2: Women and Yaaleh Veyavo

“If a woman forgot Yaaleh Veyavo in bensching of Yom Tov, does she repeat the bensching?”

Question #3: No Tachanun

“Why does my shul omit the reciting of Tachanun during the week following Shavuos?”

Question #4: Have I gone nuts?

What do these questions have to do with one another?

Introduction:

When Bilaam’s donkey challenges him for beating her, she uses the following words: Meh asisi lecha ki hikisani zeh shalosh regalim, “What have I done to you, that you struck me three times!” (Bamidbar 22:28). The donkey does not use the common word for “times,” pe’amim, but the word regalim, which is unusual, even for a donkey. The Midrash Rabbah, quoted by Rashi, notes that the donkey was hinting to Bilaam, You are trying to destroy a nation that celebrates every year three regalim, alluding to the three times a year, Pesach, Shavuos, and Sukkos, when the Jewish people will fulfill the mitzvah of ascending to the Beis Hamikdash grounds, referred to as the mitzvah of Aliyah Laregel. This same idea is also borne out by the posuk in Shir Hashirim (7:2), Mah yafu fe’amayich bane’alim bas nediv, “How beautiful are your footsteps when you wear sandals, daughter of nobles,” which the Gemara explains as referring to the beauty of Klal Yisroel ascending to Yerushalayim to fulfill the mitzvah of Aliyah Laregel (Sukkah 49b; Chagigah 3a).

This mitzvah is described several times in the Torah. In Parshas Mishpatim (23:17), the Torah says, “Three times during the year, all of your males shall be seen (yeira’eh) before the Face of the Master, Hashem.” This theme of “being seen” by Hashem is repeated twice in Parshas Ki Sisa (34:23-24). The first posuk is virtually identical to the one cited above, while the second one reads: “No person shall desire your land when you ascend to be seen (leira’os) before the Face of Hashem, your G-d, three times a year.” There is yet another posuk in Ki Sisa (34:20) that also mentions the concept of “seeing”: “They shall not be seen (yeira’u) before My Face empty-handed.” Hence, the name of the korban offered when one ascends to the Beis Hamikdash grounds is olas re’iyah.

The Rambam writes (Hilchos Chagigah 1:1) that there is a positive command to come to the Beis Hamikdash during the regel and bring the olas re’iyah. One who comes but does not bring this korban, does not fulfill the mitzvas asei, and also transgresses a lo sa’aseh, “they shall not be seen before My Face empty-handed.”

The Sefer Hachinuch (Mitzvah #88) explains the significance of bringing the olas re’iyah: He writes that it is not proper to come before the King empty-handed. Although Hashem Yisborach has no need for our gifts, nevertheless, it is meant to teach us that, just as a person who has an audience with a mortal king would certainly bring a gift, we must be cognizant that we are coming to stand before The King.

Details of the mitzvah

In addition to the olas re’iyah that we just mentioned, other offerings are offered, including those called shalmei chagigah. Both the olas re’iyah and the shalmei chagigah should be offered on the first day of Yom Tov, unless it is Shabbos. If one failed to bring them that day, it is permitted to offer them during chol hamoed or even the last day of Yom Tov. This is true even on Sukkos – meaning that, even though Shemini Atzeres is a Yom Tov separate from Sukkos, regarding the laws of offering the special Yom Tov korbanos, it is considered part of Sukkos. Therefore, one who failed to bring the olas re’iyah or the Chagigah on the entire Sukkos, could still offer it on Shemini Atzeres.

In the case of Shavuos, one who failed to offer these korbanos on the holiday itself fulfills the mitzvah if he offers the korban after Yom Tov, provided he does so within six days after Shavuos is over.

No Tachanun

Although we cannot observe Aliyah Laregel until the Beis Hamikdash is rebuilt, many halachic observances result from the laws associated with this mitzvah.

Some communities have the custom not to recite Tachanun during the week after Shavuos. Their logic is that since, at the time of the Beis Hamikdash, one would be able to offer shalmei simcha on these days, those who follow this custom consider it inappropriate to recite the solemn prayer of Tachanun on such a happy occasion, similar to the practice of skipping Tachanun on Rosh Chodesh and when a choson is in attendance. We can therefore now provide the answer to the third of our opening questions: “Why does my shul omit the reciting of Tachanun during the week following Shavuos?”

No Aliyah Laregel

At this point, let us examine the first of our opening questions: “Someone once told me that when the Beis Hamikdash is rebuilt, the mitzvah of Aliyah Laregel will be optional. How can that be?”

The person who contended this may have been basing himself on the following statement of Chazal: mefunak people are exempt from the mitzvah of Aliyah Laregel. Who qualifies as mefunak? Rashi explains that someone who usually walks with shoes is exempt from Aliyah Laregel, since one is not permitted to walk on Har Habayis while wearing shoes. The Rambam (Hilchos Chagigah 2:1) explains the Gemara a bit differently: someone who is unused to walking very far and, therefore, cannot climb to the Har Habayis is exempt.

It is possible that this person who contended that the mitzvah of Aliyah Laregel is optional felt that, according to Rashi, since today many people do not walk around without shoes, anyone who does not usually walk without shoes is exempt from the mitzvah of Aliyah Laregel.

Another possibility is that he was assuming that only someone who owns land in Eretz Yisroel is obligated in Aliyah Laregel (Pesachim 8b; see Mishneh Lamelech, Chagigah 2:1).

Either approach does not mean that the mitzvah of Aliyah Laregel will be optional, only that, many people will be exempt from fulfilling it should they not want to. There are and definitely will be people who own land in Eretz Yisroel, and there are also people who are capable of walking the way the Rambam describes. Furthermore, even should one want to follow Rashi’s broader definition that exempts someone who does not usually walk without shoes on, there are people who can and do walk around without shoes, and they will be obligated to fulfill the mitzvah of Aliyah Laregel.

Women

Women are exempt from observing the mitzvah of Aliyah Laregel, meaning ascending to the Beis Hamikdash and offering the korban olah, although they certainly will be permitted to observe it, similar to their observing sukkah, shofar, esrog and other timebound mitzvos from which they are exempt. It is a dispute in the Gemara whether they are required to be partners and participants in the offering of the shalmei simcha. Part of this question is whether women are obligated to observe the mitzvah of celebrating Yom Tov or if they are exempt from the requirements of making sure that they have these korbanos, while it is a husband’s responsibility to see that his wife enjoys Yom Tov. The Rambam and the Raavad appear to disagree which approach should be accepted as normative halacha. The Rambam rules that women are obligated in the mitzvah of celebrating Yom Tov while the Raavad rules that they are not (Hilchos Chagigah 1:1).

Women and Yaaleh Veyavo

At this point, let us examine the second of our opening questions: “If a woman forgot Yaaleh Veyavo in bensching of Yom Tov, does she repeat the bensching?”

Whether one is required to repeat bensching when one forgot Retzei on Shabbos, or Yaaleh Veyavo on Yom Tov is dependent upon whether halacha requires that one eat a meal including bread then. Since all authorities require that one eat a meal including bread for the first two meals of Shabbos, someone who forgot to recite Retzei at either of the first two meals of Shabbos, one at night and one in the daytime, is required to repeat the bensching in order to recite Retzei. On the other hand, since there is no requirement to eat a meal including bread on chol hamoed, someone who forgot to recite Yaaleh Veyavo when bensching on chol hamoed is not required to repeat bensching.

Rabbi Akiva Eiger (Shu”t Rabbi Akiva Eiger 1:1 and hashmatos) proves that, even according to those who conclude that women are obligated in the mitzvah of simchas Yom Tov, this does not require them to eat bread. There is a different mitzvah, a rabbinic requirement called kavod Yom Tov, that requires having a bread meal, not the mitzvah of simcha. Rabbi Akiva Eiger rules that although women are obligated in the mitzvah of kavod Shabbos, they are exempt from the requirement to observe the mitzvah of kavod Yom Tov. A ramification of this distinction is that a woman is exempt from the requirement to eat bread on Yom Tov, and, if so, a woman who forgot to recite Yaaleh Veyavo during the recital of birchas hamazon on Yom Tov should not repeat the bensching. Rabbi Akiva Eiger agrees that a woman who forgot to recite Yaaleh Veyavo on the first night of Pesach is obligated to repeat the birchas hamazon. Since she is required to fulfill the mitzvah of matzoh that night, the eating of “bread” is not optional, thus requiring one to recite birchas hamazon.

Not all authorities agree with Rabbi Akiva Eiger’s conclusion that women are exempt from eating bread on Yom Tov. An early authority who did not hold this way is the Pri Megadim (Eishel Avraham 325:11), who mentions, in passing, that both men and women are obligated to eat bread on Yom Tov. Other authorities who agree with this position understand that women are obligated in any and all mitzvos that Chazal established on Shabbos or Yom Tov to make these days special (Shu”t Shoeil Umeishiv, 2:2:55), which includes all the responsibilities of kavod Yom Tov, including eating a bread meal.

The dispute between these halachic authorities results in the following: Should a woman forget to recite Yaaleh Veyavo during the bensching after the Yom Tov meals, according to Rabbi Akiva Eiger she is not required to repeat the bensching, whereas according to the Pri Megadim and the Shoeil Umeishiv, she is.

Conclusion

In parshas Ki Sissa, the Torah notes: “Three times a year, all your males shall appear before Hashem, the Master, the G-d of Israel. When I drive out the nations from before you, and I broaden your territories, no man will covet your land when you ascend to see Hashem your G-d three times a year.” The Torah here provides a solemn promise. The mitzvah of Aliyah Laregel is one of the mitzvos that proves the Divine origin of the mitzvos. No human would dare create a mitzvah that requires all of a nation’s men to be together in one place at one time, and certainly not at an internal point of the country! Who will provide military security on the periphery, at the places where a nation is threatened by its enemies? Only Hashem could promise that when the Jews observe the Torah according to His instructions, none of our enemies will even think of creating difficulties for us, and certainly not consider performing any acts of terrorism or an invasion. Thus, indeed, we understand the beauty of what the donkey was explaining to Bilaam: “Do you understand the sanctity of this nation that you seek to curse? Do you understand the special relationship that they have with Hashem?” Indeed, it would behoove the nations of the world today to listen to the donkey!

 

Aliyah Laregel

This website contains many articles on a wide range of Yom Tov related topics that can be found under the headings Sukkah, Esrog, Yom Tov, Hallel, Chol Hamoed, Eruv Tavshillin. The enclosed article discusses a different aspect of Yom Tov observance, that of…

Aliyah Laregel

Question #1: Yizkor on Simchas Torah?

“Is there a reason why Yizkor is recited in Eretz Yisroel in the middle of the Simchas Torah davening?”

Question #2: No Aliyah Laregel

“Someone once told me that when the Beis Hamikdash is rebuilt, the mitzvah of Aliyah Laregel will be optional. How can that be?”

Question #3: Women and Yaaleh Veyavo

“If a woman forgot Yaaleh Veyavo in bensching of Yom Tov, does she repeat the bensching?”

Introduction:

Although we cannot observe the beautiful mitzvah of Aliyah Laregel until the Beis Hamikdash is rebuilt, many halachic observances and customs result from the laws associated with this mitzvah. The questions above reflect some of those practices.

The mitzvah of Aliyah Laregel

The mitzvah of Aliyah Laregel is mentioned several places in the Torah. In parshas Ki Sissa (Shemos 34:23), the Torah states: Shalosh pe’amim bashanah yeira’eh kol zechurcha es penei Ha’adon Hashem, Elokei Yisroel, “Three times a year shall all your males appear in the Presence of the Lord, Hashem, the G-d of Israel,” and a similar posuk appears in parshas Mishpatim (Shemos 23:17). In parshas Re’eih (Devorim 16:16), the Torah specifies that the three times are Pesach, Shavuos, and Sukkos. In this last place, the Torah concludes with the following statement: “Three times a year, all your males shall appear before Hashem, your G-d, in the place that He will choose, and you should not appear before Hashem empty-handed. Each man should bring with him according to the bounty that Hashem your G-d has provided you.”

This last verse teaches that the mitzvah is not only to ascend to Yerushalayim and to the Har Habayis (the “Temple Mount”), but also to bring korbanos when we come. It also states that a wealthier individual is obligated to spend more on his korbanos than a pauper (Mishnah, Chagigah 8b).

Three mitzvos

When the Tosefta (Chagigah 1:5) and the Gemara (Chagigah 6b) discuss the details of Aliyah Laregel, they refer to it as three mitzvos: “The Jewish people were commanded three mitzvos when they were oleh regel,” that is, traveling to the Beis Hamikdash grounds on Yom Tov required three specific mitzvah actions:

  1. From the words of the above-quoted posuk, “You should not appear before Hashem emptyhanded,” we derive that one is required to offer a korban olah when we appear in the Beis Hamikdash, called an olas re’iyah. This korban is completely consumed on the mizbeiach, except for its hide, which is given to the kohanim as one of the gifts that the Torah provides.
  2. The mitzvah of offering special korbanos shelamim in honor of the festival, called Chagigah or shalmei chagigah. Some of the meat of this korban goes to the kohanim, but most of it goes to the owners who serve it as part of their Yom Tov meals while in Yerushalayim. Any tahor Jewish person is permitted to eat from this korban.
  3. The mitzvah of simcha, which includes offering korbanos and eating their meat on each day of the festival, including chol hamoed. Since meat of korbanos may be eaten only in Yerushalayim, this means that, at the time of the Beis Hamikdash, the entire Jewish people spent the whole Yom Tov, including all the days of chol hamoed, in Yerushalayim.

One fulfills this latter mitzvah with any animal korban from which one is permitted to eat, including other korbanos that one must offer anyway (Mishnah, Chagigah 7b). In other words, one may wait to bring his other required korbanos, such as firstborn animals, maaser beheimah, donated shelamim offerings, and chata’os until Yom Tov, and offer them then, while one is in Yerushalayim anyway. When he offers them on Yom Tov, he may fulfill the requirement of consuming shalmei simcha with the meat of these korbanos. (In the case of chata’os and similar korbanos, this approach can be used only by kohanim, since no one else is permitted to consume them.)

Rules of Har Habayis

One is required to be completely tahor when ascending the Har Habayis and to do so with complete awe of the sanctity of the place, and to act appropriately. Among the specific laws that apply on Har Habayis is a prohibition against wearing shoes and of carrying one’s wallet or money belt.

Exempt from Aliyah Laregel

Notwithstanding the words of the Torah that all the males should ascend the Har Habayis three times a year, Chazal derive that there is a long list of men who are exempt from fulfilling the mitzvos of re’iyah. This list includes:

  1. Difficulty in walking

Anyone who has difficulty walking is exempt from the mitzvah of Aliyah Laregel. This includes the elderly, the ill, someone with a lameness or injury in his legs, and even those who are unused to walking without shoes, since one is prohibited from wearing shoes on the Har Habayis (Chagigah 4a). Someone who can walk there only because he uses a prosthesis is also exempt from the mitzvah (Chagigah 3a; 4a). Similarly, someone who has discomfort in one leg, even if he has no discomfort in the other leg and can still walk, is also exempt (Chagigah 3a).

  1. Vision impaired

Anyone whose vision is impaired is exempt from the mitzvah. This includes someone who can see out of only one eye (Chagigah 4b).

  1. Hearing impaired

Someone who cannot hear, but can speak, or someone who can speak but not hear is exempt from the mitzvah of re’iyah, although they are obligated in simcha and indeed all other mitzvos of the Torah (Chagigah 2b). Also, someone who does not hear in one ear is exempt from re’iyah (Chagigah 3a).

All three of these categories of people who are exempt from the mitzvah of Aliyah Laregel and of offering the olas re’iyah and the shalmei chagigah are still obligated in the third mitzvah mentioned above, of partaking in korbanos simcha (Rambam, Hilchos Chagigah 2:4, based on Gemara Chagigah 4a). This is, of course, assuming that they went to Yerushalayim for Yom Tov, because one may eat these korbanos only there.

  1. Tamei

People who are tamei are exempt from fulfilling the mitzvah of Aliyah Laregel (Gemara Chagigah 4b; Tosefta Chagigah 1:1). Someone who is tamei is required to make himself tahor in order to fulfill the mitzvah of Aliyah Laregel. However, if he did not purify himself or was unable to do so, he is now exempt from the mitzvah, since as long as he is tamei he may not enter the Beis Hamikdash grounds. Indeed, someone who is tamei cannot fulfill the mitzvah of Aliyah Laregel, since he is not allowed to enter the Beis Hamikdash grounds (Rambam, Hilchos Chagigah 2:1).

There is a major difference between the various categories of exemptions from Aliyah Laregel. People excused from the mitzvah for medical reasons may perform the mitzvah, and if they do so, they will be rewarded as einam metzuvim ve’osim, those who perform a mitzvah that they are not obligated to perform. However, someone who is tamei is forbidden to participate in Aliyah Laregel, since doing so would cause him to violate the sanctity of the Beis Hamikdash. He should try to make himself tahor as soon as possible.

  1. Uncircumcised

There are specific situations in which someone is not obligated to have a bris milah performed, because of the danger that is involved. Although such a person is exempt from the mitzvah of bris milah, he is still not circumcised, and, as such, he is exempt from several of the Torah’s mitzvos, including the mitzvah of Aliyah Laregel. Similar to the person who is tamei, this individual is forbidden to observe the mitzvah.

Children

Although a child is not required to observe any mitzvah, Chazal required the father to see to it that he observe most mitzvos, in order to acquaint himself with keeping them. In this context, we find a dispute between Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel. Both schools hold that a father is required to have his minor son accompany him on the mitzvah of entering the Beis Hamikdash on Yom Tov. The question is: From what age is the father obligated to do so? According to Beis Shammai, the father is obligated to do so from when the child is old enough to ride his father’s shoulders, when the father walks from Yerushalayim to the Har Habayis.

We should be aware that the responsibility of a father to train his child to perform a mitzvah is only when the child will be obligated to fulfill that mitzvah when he becomes an adult. Thus, regarding the mitzvah of Aliyah Laregel, should the child fit any of categories 1-3 above that exempt an adult from this mitzvah, the father is not obligated to bring the child with him when he is oleh regel (Rambam, Hilchos Chagigah 2:3).

Smelly professions

There are certain professions that leave their artisans with a malodorous odor. Tanners and copper smelters, for example, are surrounded by substances whose ill fragrance sometimes permeates their clothing and hair. Are they obligated in the mitzvah of Aliyah Laregel, or do we say that since their attendance might adversely affect other people required to observe the mitzvah that they are exempt? This question is discussed by the Gemara (Chagigah 4a). The Rambam (Hilchos Chagigah 2:2) concludes that they are required to clean themselves and their clothes fully and fulfill the mitzvah of Aliyah Laregel.

Yizkor and Aliyah Laregel

I mentioned previously the posuk from parshas Re’eih (Devorim 16:16), in which the Torah specifies that each person is obligated to donate according to the bounty that Hashem has provided him. At this point, I want to address one of our opening questions:

“Is there a reason why Yizkor is recited in Eretz Yisroel in the middle of the Simchas Torah davening?”

To answer this question, we need to explore the history of this prayer. Yizkor is a custom that began among Ashkenazim in chutz la’aretz and is recited four times a year: on Yom Kippur, the eighth day of Pesach, the second day of Shavuos and on Shemini Atzeres. Why specifically on these four days?

On all of these days, there was a custom to make donations to tzedakah, and, at one point, there became established an idea of reciting a prayer that the tzedakah donated should serve for the benefit of one’s departed parents and other relatives. On Yom Kippur, it is obvious why special donations were made to tzedakah, but why specifically on the three days of Yom Tov mentioned above, as opposed to the other days of Yom Tov?

The answer is that in chutz la’aretz, the reading for these three yomim tovim — the eighth day of Pesach, the second day of Shavuos and Shemini Atzeres — is in parshas Re’eih, and the last posuk of the reading states: “Each man should bring with him according to the bounty that Hashem your G-d has provided you.” Although the literal meaning of the posuk refers to the amount one should spend on the korban olas re’iyah, it certainly can be understood to include gifts for tzedakah, and indeed that became an accepted practice. The people made donations to tzedakah, but decided to have them as an iluy neshamah, an elevation for the souls of their departed relatives. (By the way, in some German communities, there was no minhag of Yizkor and instead, they observed a different practice on those days, called matanas yad.)

When the Ashkenazim began returning to Eretz Yisroel in the nineteenth century, they realized that in Eretz Yisroel, there is no eighth day of Pesach or second day of Shavuos, and the day that is called Shemini Atzeres in chutz la’aretz is called and observed as Simchas Torah, when we read parshas Vezos Haberacha and the beginning of Bereishis. Thus, parshas Re’eih is never read on Yom Tov.

Because people did not want to lose this beautiful minhag of reciting Yizkor, they continued to observe the practice on the day of Yom Tov closest to those days, that is, on the seventh day of Pesach, Shavuos, and on Simchas Torah.

Beloved servants

We have discussed some of the laws of the mitzvah of Aliyah Laregel, a topic that we will continue to discuss in a future article, when we will iy”H answer the remaining of our opening questions. Contemplating this special mitzvah of Aliyah Laregel should give every one of us chizuk. Consider that Hashem Yisborach commanded us to come to the Beis Hamikdash “in order to be seen.” The message here is that we are His beloved servants and He desires to see us, as it says in the Gemara (Chagigah 4b), “A servant whom his master desires to see.” Furthermore, the Gemara describes Klal Yisroel as “the servant whom the master desires to eat at his table.”

May we soon merit fulfilling this mitzvah in the third Beis Hamikdash, may it be rebuilt speedily, and that Hashem should look upon us favorably! Wishing all of our readers, together with all of Klal Yisroel, a good Yom Tov!

 

Bimah in the Middle

Prior to Shavuos is an excellent time to review some of the less-known halachos germane to kerias haTorah, including whether the Bimah needs to be in the middle of the shul.

Question #1: Small Shul

“We have converted a storage area into a temporary shul for our neighborhood. Must we put the shulchan in the middle when, as a result, we will have less seating capacity?”

Question #2: Reading from the Front

“May I daven in a shul where the bimah is in the front of the shul?”

Question #3: The Beis Medrash

“Must the bimah of a yeshivah be located in the middle of the beis medrash?”

Where is the bimah?

Although we find allusion going back to the time of the tanna’im concerning the proper location of the bimah and the shulchan in a shul, most of the halachic discussion about the topic is within the last two hundred years, for reasons that will soon be obvious. Let us begin by citing the early sources for this halachah, and then analyze some of the responsa on the subject.

Introduction:

When the Rambam records the laws germane to the proper construction of a shul, he mentions that a shul should have a raised platform in the middle, which we call the bimah (Hilchos Tefillah 11:3, see Kesef Mishneh). The Rambam explains that the bimah is used for two purposes: in order to read the Torah and to facilitate public speaking, the goal, in both instances, being to enable people to hear. He then adds that the shulchan upon which the sefer Torah is placed (which he calls a teivah) should be positioned on top and in the middle of the bimah. We thus see that there is a halachic preference, if not an outright requirement, (1) to have the shulchan placed in the middle of the shul, (2) to have it on an elevated surface.

Notwithstanding this ruling of the Rambam, the Kesef Mishneh (ad locum) notes that many shullen are not built this way. To justify the custom, he explains that, when constructing a large shul, one should place the bimah in the middle so that people can hear the reading, but when a shul is small, it may be more practical to have the Torah read from a place that is not centrally located.

When Rav Yosef Karo, the author of the Kesef Mishneh, wrote the Shulchan Aruch, he omitted the law requiring a bimah platform and that the bimah and the shulchan be in the center of the shul. This appears consistent with his opinion that the location of the bimah and the shulchan is not a requirement of shul design, but, rather, is a practical matter that is dependent on the construction and acoustics of the shul. However, both the Tur (Orach Chayim 150) and the Rema (ad locum) mention that the bimah should be in the middle of the shul.

Talmudic sources

The Gra cites Talmudic sources for the practice of placing the bimah in the middle of the shul (Glosses to Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 150). The Tosefta (Sukkah 4:4) and the Gemara (Sukkah 51b) describe the huge shul in Alexandria, which had a seating capacity of many thousands, and which had a wooden bimah in the middle. The Gra apparently holds that these allusions provided the Rambam with his source requiring a centrally located bimah. The question now is, if there is indeed a Talmudic source requiring the bimah to be in the middle, how can the Kesef Mishneh rule that there is no such requirement? Apparently, he feels that a large shul must have a centralized bimah in order to make it possible for the maximum number of people to hear the reading of the Torah, whereas a small shul does not require that its bimah be centrally located. On the other hand, the Rambam, the Tur and the Rema contend that a centrally-located bimah is an important aspect of shul design and construction.

The Chasam Sofer

We find little other literature on this subject until the nineteenth century. The earliest work of that era on this topic is a responsum from the Chasam Sofer, regarding a plan to increase seating capacity in a shul by relocating the shulchan to the front (Shu”t Chasam Sofer, Orach Chayim #28). The Chasam Sofer discusses the points raised by the Rambam, the Tur and the Rema that the shulchan should be in the middle, and the Kesef Mishneh’s comment that a small shul is not required to have its shulchan in the center, since people will easily hear the kerias haTorah from wherever it is read. The Chasam Sofer writes that the Kesef Mishneh’s reason applies only in a case of a shul that was built originally without the bimah in the middle, but once the bimah was built in the middle, one may not move it to a different location. Furthermore, the Chasam Sofer writes that if a small shul was expanded to accommodate a larger crowd, they will now be required to move the shulchan to the middle so that everyone can easily hear kerias haTorah.

The Chasam Sofer then writes an additional reason why one may not change the location of the bimah and the shulchan after they have been built. He notes a ruling of the Talmud Yerushalmi concerning the marking of the boards used in the construction of the mishkan. Since the boards of the mishkan were identical, why were they marked to designate each one’s proper location every time the mishkan was reassembled? What difference does it make where one puts any particular board?

The Yerushalmi explains that even if all the boards are identical and perfectly interchangeable, one is required to have each board returned to the same relative location. Each board acquires a specific sanctity because of its location, and this should not be changed. The Chasam Sofer then quotes the Maharil, who ruled that one should be careful to replace the planks of one’s sukkah in the same place year after year, for the same reason as we have just mentioned. Each board has a claim to its location, and one should return it to the spot it held the year before. Similarly, contends the Chasam Sofer, the part of the shul on which the bimah and the shulchan rested should remain as their location, and therefore, one may not relocate the bimah away from the central place that it has held.

As proof to his point, the Chasam Sofer notes that, although the second Beis Hamikdash was larger than the first, the location of the menorah, the mizbechos (the altars) and all the other vessels remained the same — they were not moved to accommodate the new, larger structure. This was because the site where the holy vessels were located should not be changed. Similarly, rules the Chasam Sofer, even according to the Kesef Mishneh’s approach that a bimah need not be centrally located, this ruling does not permit relocating a bimah that has already been placed in the middle.

Shulchan is like the mizbeiach

In addition to the reasons just cited, the Chasam Sofer provides another reason why the shulchan should be in the center of the shul. The shulchan serves in a role similar to that of the mizbeiach, the altar of the Beis Hamikdash. This is because of the concept – based on the words of the prophet Hoshea, U’neshalmah parim sefaseinu – our lips, meaning our reading of the Torah, replace the bulls that were offered in the Beis Hamikdash. (This idea is conveyed in a passage of the Gemara in mesechta Megillah 31b.)

When we read about the korbanos during kerias haTorah, it is as if those sacrifices are being offered. This reading, then, provides the shulchan with some of the sanctity of the mizbeiach, and the shul with some of the sanctity of the Beis Hamikdash.

This idea can be demonstrated from the hoshanos that we perform on Sukkos (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 660), which are reminiscent of the hoshanos procedure performed in the Beis Hamikdash, when the four minim were carried around the mizbeiach. The original service of the hoshanos could be performed only by circling around the mizbeiach. So too, when we perform hoshanos, we walk around the shulchan, which serves as a surrogate mizbeiach. Similarly, on Simchas Torah, we carry the sifrei Torah around the bimah (Rema, Orach Chayim 669:1).

The Chasam Sofer explains that since the mizbeiach was in the middle of the Beis Hamikdash, so too, the shulchan should be located in the middle of the shul.

Meishiv Davar

Another major posek who associates a centralized bimah with the mizbeiach is the Netziv, Rav Naftali Tzvi Yehudah Berlin, who was the Rosh Yeshivah of the yeshiva in Volozhin for many decades of the late nineteenth century. In a responsum (Shu”t Meishiv Davar #15), he notes that the shulchan is in the middle to parallel the mizbeiach, which explains why we blow the shofar on Rosh Hashanah from the bimah just as in the Beis Hamikdash they blew the trumpets at the time that the korbanos were offered. He rules that the shulchan must be exactly midway between the north and south parts of the shul, just as the outside mizbeiach was, but that it does not have to be midway between the east and west parts, because the outside mizbeiach was not located centrally in this axis.

The Netziv adds a few other reasons why it is prohibited to move the bimah — one of which is that people will assume that they can change other Jewish customs, without realizing that they are tampering with halachah.

Which mizbeiach?

When one reads the two responsa very carefully, that of the Chasam Sofer and that of the Meishiv Davar, one will notice that there is a bit of a dispute between them. Although both scholars compare the shulchan to the mizbeiach, the Chasam Sofer compares the shulchan to both the inner mizbeiach, which was made of gold and predominantly used for burning the ketores, the incense offered daily in the Beis Hamikdash, and also to the outside mizbeiach, whereas the Netziv compares it only to the outside mizbeiach.

The inner mizbeiach was located midway between the shulchan of the Beis Hamikdash, on which was placed the lechem hapanim (the showbread), and the menorah, which was kindled daily. The shulchan stood in the northern section and on the western side of the kodesh; the menorah stood opposite it on the southern flank, and the mizbeiach was exactly in the middle of the kodesh.

The outer mizbeiach, which was used all day long for the various offerings of the Beis Hamikdash, stood in the middle of the azarah, the courtyard of the Beis Hamikdash. Actually, there is a dispute among tanna’im exactly where the mizbeiach stood. All agree that on the orientation of east to west, it was in the middle of the azarah. The dispute is from a north-south perspective, whether it was exactly in the middle, or whether it was somewhat off center, either to the north or to the south. According to some authorities, this dispute might affect whether one should try to make sure that the bimah and the shulchan are exactly in the middle of the shul, or whether it is sufficient that they are near the middle, but they do not need to be perfectly centered, as is the prevailing custom.

It should be noted that, notwithstanding that the Chasam Sofer and the Meishiv Davar both explain that the bimah must be in the middle of the shul because of its comparison to the mizbeiach, Rav Moshe Feinstein writes that this is not a convincing reason for the practice (Shu”t Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 2:42).

Moving the bimah

According to what we have just said, one should not move the bimah in order to make more room to perform hoshanos. Although this seems to be the predominant approach among the halachic authorities, the Minchas Yitzchak (3:4) quotes from the Imrei Eish a justification of those who move the bimah in order to conduct the hakafos, on the basis that (1) there is no requirement to make the bimah represent the mizbeiach, and (2) even if there is such a requirement, the bimah does not need to be in the perfect center, and it is permitted  to move the bimah, provided it is not placed next to the aron, but in front of it. Nevertheless, all agree that both the hoshanos and the hakafos must go around the bimah, as expressed in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim, chapter 660) and the Rema (Orach Chayim, chapter 669).

Imitating idolic practice

Until now, the discussion regarding the proper location of the bimah and the shulchan has involved only the laws of building a shul. However, a completely new issue is discussed by a disciple of the Chasam Sofer, the Maharam Shik (Shu”t Maharam Shik, Yoreh Deah 165). In a responsum dated erev rosh chodesh Adar, 5616 (1856), to Rav Yisroel Dovid, the av beis din of Feising, the Maharam Shik introduces a new halachic issue: the Torah violation of imitating the practices of the gentiles. In the mid-1800’s, those who wanted to locate the bimah and the shulchan to the front of the shul were, in general, not motivated by space concerns, but because they wanted their shullen to look similar to the way non-religious congregations appeared, which, in turn, were made to appear like churches. Following gentile practices in the observance of our mitzvos involves the violation of several verses of the Torah, such as, Uvechukoseihem lo seileichu, Do not follow their laws (Vayikra 18:3), Velo seilechu bechukos hagoy, Do not follow the laws of the gentile (Vayikra 20:23), and Hishamer lecha pen tinakeish achareihem, Be careful lest you be attracted to them (Devorim 12:30). This general prohibition is quoted by the Rambam (Hilchos Avodah Zarah 11:1) and the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah, Chapter 178:1).

In the details germane to understanding the laws of Uvechukoseihem lo seileichu, there was a dispute between Rav Yisroel Dovid and the Maharam Shik. Rav Yisroel Dovid felt that this prohibition would exist even when the reason for moving the bimah was to make more seating room. The Maharam Shik disagreed, demonstrating that Uvechukoseihem lo seileichu is violated only when the intent is to mimic non-Jewish practices. The Maharam Shik also prohibits having the bimah in front or moving it there when someone might assume that the bimah is in front in order to mimic non-Jewish practices, even when this was not the intention of those who planned and constructed this shul. When it is clear that the purpose for moving the bimah and the shulchan is to create more seating capacity, it is not prohibited under the heading of Uvechukoseihem lo seileichu, but only because of the reasons mentioned by the Chasam Sofer.

Turned-down position

The Minchas Yitzchak (3:4) quotes a letter from Rav Shimon Sofer (a son of the Chasam Sofer, who ultimately became the rav of Cracow) written to a very prominent community that had offered him the position of chief rabbi. Rav Sofer wrote a letter to the community turning down the post, because the bimah of their main shul was not located in the middle of the sanctuary and, also, because the chazan’s amud was located at a high point in the shul, when, according to halachah, it should be at a low place.

In this context, we should quote the Mishnah Berurah, “With our great sins, in some places the custom of the early generations has been ignored and the bimah is constructed near the aron hakodesh, out of desire to follow the practices that the gentiles observe in their temples. Regarding these communities, one should say, And Yisroel forgot his Maker and he built temples [Hoshea 8:14]. The later authorities already cast aspersions on these people” (Biur Halachah 150:5, s.v. Be’emtza).

Entering the shul

Is there any halachic problem with entering a shul whose bimah is in the front?

The Minchas Yitzchak (3:5) quotes from different sources that prohibited even entering such a shul.

However, Rav Moshe Feinstein holds a more moderate approach to this last question (Shu”t Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 2:42.) Rav Moshe was asked whether one may daven in a shul that has its bimah in the front. The questioner had heard that in Hungary they had prohibited davening in such a shul, an approach that would indeed be reflected by the above-quoted Minchas Yitzchak. Rav Moshe responds that he was unfamiliar with such a prohibition. If it did exist, it was because they needed to stamp out Reform, and it has the halachic status of a hora’as sha’ah, a ruling established because of a temporary circumstance. However, in other countries one is permitted to daven in such a shul. Rav Moshe concludes that when there are two shullen in a town, one with its bimah in the middle and the other with the bimah elsewhere, one should daven regularly in the shul whose bimah is in the middle.

Beis Medrash

At this point, let us discuss the third question asked at the beginning. “Must the bimah in a yeshivah be in the middle of the beis medrash?”

This question is discussed by the Minchas Yitzchak (Shu”t Minchas Yitzchak, 3:6), who concludes that the rules governing the existence of a bimah and a shulchan and their location are germane only to a shul, but that there is no requirement to have a bimah in a beis medrash. The reason for this ruling is a topic for a different article. The Minchas Yitzchak writes that it is perfectly acceptable for a beis medrash to use a portable shulchan for kerias haTorah.

Conclusion

We all hope and pray that the day will soon come when we shall merit the third Beis Hamikdash. In the interim, we should be careful to treat our batei keneses and batei medrash with proper sanctity, including all their halachic details.

 

Making Dairy Bread II

breadQuestion #1: The Whey to Celebrate Shavuos!

“May I add dairy ingredients to bread that I intend to serve with a milchig meal on Shavuos?”

Question #2: English Danish

“Is one permitted to make pastry with butter when it will not be noticeable that the product is dairy?”

Question #3: Sour Cream Kugel

“As my daughter was preparing a kugel for seudah shlishis, she added sour cream to the dough. The kugel is too large to consume at one meal, even for our large family. Once it is removed from its oven tray, there will be no indication that it is dairy. May we eat it?”

Answer:

Each of the above questions is a shaylah that I have been actually asked, and each involves our understanding the prohibition created by Chazal against making dairy or meaty bread. In a previous article, we learned that it is prohibited to use milk as an ingredient in dough, and that if one added milk to dough, the bread produced is prohibited from being eaten at all, even with a dairy meal, because of concern that one may mistakenly eat the dairy bread together with meat. The Gemara rules the same regarding baking bread that contains meat ingredients or baking on a hearth that was greased with beef fat – it is prohibited to eat this bread, even as a corned beef sandwich (Pesachim 30a, 36a; Bava Metzia 91a; Zevachim 95b). If one greased a hearth with beef fat, one must kasher it properly before one uses it to bake bread.

Is one ever permitted to make dairy bread?

How much is a small amount?

In the previous article, I noted that Chazal did not prohibit producing small quantities of milchig or fleishig bread. What was not discussed was: how much milchig or fleishig bread is considered a “small quantity” that one may produce? One early authority, the Hagahos Shaarei Dura, rules that one may bake rolls that have absorbed meat for Shabbos meals, since they will certainly be eaten in the course of Shabbos.

Although both the Shulchan Aruch and the Rama quote this ruling of the Hagahos Shaarei Dura, a careful reading of their comments shows that these two authorities dispute exactly how much one may make. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 97:1) writes that a small amount is the amount that one would eat at one time, which implies that it is permitted to make only what one would eat at one sitting and not leave any leftovers (Pri Megadim, Sifsei Daas 97:1; Ben Ish Chai, II Shlach 17; Darchei Teshuvah 97:17; Badei HaShulchan, Tziyunim #49). Thus, when preparing dairy or meat bread, one may make only as much as one is certain that his family and guests will completely devour at the time the bread is served.

Take it a day at a time

On the other hand, the Rama rules that one may make milchig bread for Shavuos or fleishig bread for Shabbos, since this is called a “small amount.” When preparing bread for Shavuos or Shabbos, one is preparing more than what will be eaten at one sitting, but what will be eaten for a whole day. In another venue, the Rama states explicitly that it is permitted to make dairy or meat bread for a day at a time (Toras Chatas, 60:2). For this reason, the Aruch HaShulchan concludes that one may knead dough that is no more than what one’s family and guests will eat within 24 hours.

Some authorities expressly prohibit baking dairy bread for both days of Shavuos in advance of the Yom Tov (Darchei Teshuvah 97:33). They reason that baking for two days at a time is no longer considered a “small amount.”

We should note that although several authorities mention explicitly that the Shulchan Aruch and the Rama dispute whether one may make bread for only one sitting or for one entire day, other authorities imply that the Shulchan Aruch accepts the Rama’s more lenient understanding of a small amount (see Chavos Da’as, Biurim #4; Aruch HaShulchan 97:4).

All opinions agree that one must be careful not to produce so much that one expects there to be leftovers, unless one makes a heker in the bread (Bach; Darchei Teshuvah 97:34).

The whey to celebrate Shavuos!

At this point, we can address the first question asked above: “May I add dairy ingredients to bread that I intend to serve with a milchig meal on Shavuos?”

The answer is that, according to the Rama, one may prepare milchig bread in honor of the day, but only as much as will definitely be eaten in one day’s time. According to the way most authorities understand the Shulchan Aruch, a Sefardi should not prepare more than will definitely be eaten in one meal.

Dairy bread during “the Nine Days”

During the Nine Days, am I permitted to make dairy bread, since we are not eating meat anyway?”

I have not found any halachic authority who states that the custom not to eat meat during the Nine Days permits us to make dairy bread during these days. Perhaps the reason why no one mentions such a heter is because there are numerous situations when one may eat meat, such as when a person is ill, at a seudas mitzvah, or on Shabbos, and we still need to be concerned that one may mistakenly eat the dairy bread on one of these occasions.

However, the two general heterim mentioned above, either of preparing a small amount of bread or of making bread with an unusual shape, both apply. Therefore, if the questioner is a Sefardi who follows the Shulchan Aruch, he may make (without a heker) as much dairy bread as his family and guests would eat at one meal without any leftovers. If the questioner is an Ashkenazi, he may make as much dairy bread as his family and guests would eat in a 24 hour day, without having any leftovers.

What about pastry?

At this point, we can address the two remaining questions I quoted above:

“Is one permitted to make pastry with butter, when it will not be noticeable that the product is dairy?”

“As my daughter was preparing a kugel for seudah shlishis, she added sour cream to the dough. The kugel is too large to consume at one meal, even for our large family. Once it is removed from its oven tray, there will be no indication that it is dairy. May we eat it?”

The halachic authorities discuss whether the prohibition against bread containing dairy or meat applies also to items such as spices and pastry. The consensus is that one may add dairy ingredients to pastry that is ordinarily not eaten with meat, but is usually eaten either as dessert or together with coffee, but that one may not add dairy ingredients to foods, such as crackers or zwieback, that sometimes are eaten to accompany meat (Shu’t Maharit 2:18; Chachmas Adam 50:3). Others are lenient even regarding crackers and zwieback, contending that Chazal prohibited only regular bread (She’eilas Yaavetz #62; see Pri Chodosh, Yoreh Deah 97:1). According to both of these opinions, one may produce dairy cakes, cookies or doughnuts, even if they do not obviously look dairy.

There is a minority, late opinion that disagrees with the above and contends that one may not make dairy products that one may mistakenly eat for dessert after a meat meal (Yad Yehudah, Peirush HaKatzar 97:3). Following this approach, all dairy cakes, cookies or doughnuts must either be obviously dairy or be marked in a unique way that calls attention to their dairy status.

Distinguished bourekas

Based on this latter approach, common custom in Eretz Yisrael today is to make cheese bourekas in a triangular shape and pareve bourekas in square shapes. One could argue that since bourekas occasionally accompany meat, they should be prohibited from being dairy, even according to the opinions of the Shu’t Maharit and the Chachmas Adam, whom I quoted above. Since many authorities consider the Chachmas Adam to be the final authority in kashrus and other yoreh deah topics, this forms the basis for the current custom in Eretz Yisrael.

What if it happened by mistake?

What is the law if someone is in the process of making dough, and some milk spills into the dough? Is there a basis to be lenient, since the person was not trying to violate Chazal’s rules?

Crying over spilled milk

The answer is that the prohibition against eating dairy bread is not a penalty that Chazal imposed on someone who violated their ruling. It is a takkanah that they instituted to ascertain that no one err and mistakenly violate the laws of eating meat and milk together. Thus, the prohibition is in effect, whether or not the milk (or meat) was added intentionally or in error. When there was an unintended spill of meat or dairy and a major loss will result, the Chachmas Adam (50:5) permits giving many families one loaf of bread each for immediate consumption (see also Aruch HaShulchan, Yoreh Deah 97:8; Yad Yehudah, Peirush HaKatzar 97:4). This is permitted, because each person receives an amount that he will finish in one day.

Commercial bakery

There are authorities who permit a commercial bakery to manufacture a large quantity of dairy bread, as long as it is careful to sell to each individual or household only a small amount that he would be permitted to make for himself (Shu’t Kesav Sofer, Yoreh Deah #61). This logic would permit a kashrus agency to certify a company that makes dairy bread (under permitted conditions), even though they are making a large dough. However, an earlier authority, the Maharit, rejects this heter, as he is concerned that the baker may forget to tell customers that the bread is dairy (Shu’t Maharit 2:18).

Non-Jewish bakery

Does the prohibition apply only to a Jewish bakery, or even to a non-Jewish bakery? Chazal have the ability to prohibit only Jews from specific activities, but there is no mitzvah binding on a gentile to obey a ruling of Chazal. Thus, the question is as follows: If a gentile-owned bakery produces commercial quantities of dairy bread, may a Jew purchase small amounts of this bread — that is, enough for one meal or for one day? The Yad Yehudah (Peirush HaKatzar 97:7) discusses this issue, and prohibits it, only because of the problem of chalav akum, milk that was not supervised by an observant Jew. (I have written several articles on this topic in the past, and they can be accessed on RabbiKaganoff.com under the headings “milk” or “cheese.” Alternatively, I can send it to you in an e-mail.) According to those who permit contemporary produced milk, it would appear that one would be permitted to buy a small quantity of dairy bread – enough that one would consume either at one meal or in the course of one day, without any leftovers.

Conclusion:

The Gemara teaches that the rabbinic laws are dearer to Hashem than are the Torah laws. In this context, we understand the importance of this prohibition created by Chazal to protect the Jewish people from eating dairy and meat together. We should always hope and pray that the food we eat fulfills all the halachos that the Torah commands us.

 

Making Dairy Bread

The menu of what Avraham served his guests included both dairy and meat, provided an opportunity to discuss the question concerning whether one may prepare milchig bread.bread

Question #1: The whey to celebrate Shavuos!

“May I add dairy ingredients to bread that I intend to serve with a milchig meal on Shavuos?”

Question #2: No pareve bread in sight!

“Is one permitted to eat the local bread when everyone knows it is milchig?”

Answer:

Each of the above actual questions involves our understanding the prohibition created by Chazal against making bread containing either dairy or meat ingredients. In several places, the Gemara quotes a beraisa that prohibits using milk as an ingredient in dough, and states further that, if one added milk to dough, the bread produced is prohibited from being eaten at all, even as a cheese sandwich. This rabbinic injunction is because of concern that one might mistakenly eat the dairy bread together with meat. The Gemara rules the same regarding baking bread directly on an oven hearth that was greased with kosher beef fat – it is prohibited to eat this bread, even as part of a corned beef sandwich (Pesachim 30a, 36a; Bava Metzia 91a; Zevachim 95b). If one greased a hearth with beef fat, one must kasher it properly before one uses it to bake bread.

Is one ever permitted to make dairy or meaty bread?

The Gemara (Pesachim 36a) permits an exception – one may make dairy dough if it is ke’ein tora, “like a bull’s eye.”

Bull’s eye

What does the Gemara mean when it permits dairy or meaty bread made like “a bull’s eye?” Does this mean that some bakers double as excellent sharpshooters?

We find a dispute among early Rishonim as to what the Gemara means when it says that one can prepare a dough like a bull’s eye. Rashi explains it to mean that it is the size of a bull’s eye — one may bake a small amount of dairy or meaty bread that one would eat quickly. Since there will be no leftovers, we are not concerned that one may mistakenly use the dairy bread for a corned-beef sandwich or spread cream cheese on the fleishig bread.

Shapely bread

Other authorities explain that this refers to the shape of the dough. The Gemara means that if one shaped the dough like a bull’s eye or some other unusual shape, the heker (here, distinguishable appearance) accomplishes that no one will mistakenly eat it with meat or dairy (Rif, Chullin 38a in his pages; Rambam, Maachalos Asuros 9:22).

How do we rule?

Although these are clearly two different ways of explaining the Gemara, the authorities conclude that there is no dispute in halachah between these two approaches (Hagahos Shaarei Dura, quoted by Beis Yosef, Yoreh Deah 97; Shulchan Aruch ad loc.). In other words, although in general one may not make dairy or meat bread because of the above-mentioned concerns, one may prepare a small amount of dairy or meaty bread. One is also permitted to make dairy or meaty bread with an unusual shape.

All the bread is fleishig

The Maharit, one of the great halachic authorities of sixteenth-century Israel, discussed the following situation: A specific town was located at quite a distance from any source of vegetable oil. As a result, vegetable cooking oil was expensive, and the townspeople, therefore, used beef tallow for all their baking, cooking and frying. (Apparently, the local cardiologist felt that the populace had a cholesterol deficiency – no doubt because they observed the Mediterranean Diet.) Indeed, the people in town always treated their bread as fleishig, since they assumed that it always included beef fat as an ingredient. The Maharit first discussed whether this provided sufficient reason to permit consuming local bread in this town. Does the fact that all local residents know that their bread is fleishig preempt the takkanas chachamim prohibiting production of meaty bread?

Hometown advantage

The Maharit questioned whether this is sufficient reason to be lenient, since we still need to be concerned about visitors from out of town who are unaware that the local bread is fleishig. Indeed, some visitors had eaten local bread with cheese, not realizing that it contained a meat product. The Maharit concluded that local circumstances are insufficient grounds to permit fleishig bread – and that the local bread is permitted to be eaten only if it has a heker, or only if people make small quantities of bread (Shu’t Maharit 2:18). This means that commercially-made bread in this town would be made exclusively with unusual shapes.

However, a later authority disputed this conclusion of the Maharit. Rav Yonasan Eibeschutz, in his commentary on Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah (Kereisi 97:2), mentions that in his town and environs all the white bread was made with milk, and the accepted custom was to bake, purchase and use even large quantities of the bread without any heker. He notes that, according to the Maharit, this bread is prohibited, yet he concludes that, notwithstanding the Maharit’s opinion to the contrary, the bread is permitted, since everyone knows that the local bread is dairy and no baker in town produces pareve bread. He closes by mentioning that someone who is G-d fearing should not use the local dairy bread, although it is technically permitted.

Thus, whether one may permit milchig bread because all local bread is always milchig, or one may permit fleishig bread because all local bread is always fleishig is a dispute among prominent authorities.

Commercial bakery

A later authority, the Kesav Sofer, permitted a commercial bakery to produce milchig or fleishig bread, provided that the bakery sold only a small amount of bread to each customer. He contended that since the consumer only owns a small quantity of bread, we are not concerned how much the bakery actually produced.

Local bakery

In this context, I would like to share an anecdote. Many years ago, I was posed a question by a rav living in a small community that had no kosher bakery. He had the opportunity to provide a hechsher to a non-Jewish-owned bakery, which in his community would be very advantageous, since he would not need to be concerned about the bakery being open on Shabbos or on Pesach, or about hafrashas challah (all issues that I have discussed in other articles). The owner of the bakery was willing to meet all the ingredient requirements of the hechsher, and, in addition, was located within walking distance of the frum community, so that random inspections could take place even on Shabbos. The question germane to our topic was that the baker baked his white bread with milk, and the rav was uncertain whether and how to proceed with providing a hechsher to this bakery. According to the above-quoted Kesav Sofer, the rav could even provide a hechsher on the entire bakery, including the bread, and instruct people that they may purchase the milchig bread only in small quantities that would be eaten within a day.

However, according to the Maharit, the dairy bread should be treated as non-kosher. The rav’s decision was that the hechsher sign in the bakery would list which pastry items in the bakery are supervised as kosher/dairy, and which pastry and bread items are certified kosher/pareve, and that the sign would imply that the bakery sells breads that are not certified kosher because they are dairy.  In this approach, he followed common custom not to rely on the Kesav Sofer’s leniency.

Are you in shape?

I mentioned above that one may make dairy or meat bread if it has an unusual shape. How unusual must the shape be?

As we can imagine, we are not the first to ask this question. In his above-mentioned responsum, the Maharit discusses what type of heker the halachah requires. He notes that there are two ways to explain what the heker accomplishes. One possibility is that the heker is so that people who know the bread is fleishig won’t forget and mistakenly eat it with cheese. The second possibility is that the heker is necessary so that people from outside the area, who are unfamiliar with the fact that the bread is fleishig, will stop and ask why is this bread different from all the other bread in the rest of the world. In other words, according to the second approach, the heker must be sufficient to draw people’s attention to it, so that they ask why this bread looks so strange.

The Maharit subsequently demonstrates that this exact point, what is the reason for the heker, is the subject of a machlokes harishonim. The Tur explains that the reason for the heker is so that the person remembers that this bread is milchig or fleishig, meaning that he already knew that he has made milchig or fleishig bread, and the heker is so that he does not make a mistake and accidentally eat the milchig bread with meat or eat the fleishig bread with dairy. This type of reminder does not require a major heker that would cause someone to ask: “Why does this bread look so strange?”

This approach of the Tur is quoted by a later authority, when the Rama (in Toras Chatas 60:2) states that the heker is so that one does not forget that he made milchig or fleishig bread.

Why is this bread so different from all other breads?

On the other hand, the second approach is mentioned in even earlier sources. When discussing the heker necessary in making milchig or fleishig bread, the Rashba explains that the heker must attract attention, so that people will notice that the bread looks different.  The heker will cause people to ask, before eating, why the bread’s appearance is so unusual (Rashba, Toras Habayis Hakatzar, 3:4, page 86b). Other later authorities, such as the Levush (Yoreh Deah, 97:1) and the Chachmas Adam (50:3) quote the Rashba’s approach. To quote the Chachmas Adam, “One may make dairy bread if one changed the shape of the bread significantly, enough that one would not eat meat with it.”

Baked for sale

The Maharit notes that a difference in halachah results from this dispute between the Tur and the Rashba concerning whether an item with a minor heker can be sold. If the reason is so that people will ask, there would need to be a major heker. Otherwise, one would not be permitted to make the bread. If the reason for a heker is to remind people that this bread was made dairy, a minor heker will suffice, as long as these breads are not sold, since visitors will eat them as guests in the houses of people who will know to serve them only with fleishig meals.

Bread for Shavuos

In a different ruling, the Rama again demonstrates that the heker is so that someone not forget that the bread he made is dairy. The Rama rules that one may make challohs for Shavuos with dairy ingredients, since the challohs for Shavuos are shaped long whereas the regular Shabbos and Yom Tov challohs are round. According to the approach of the Rashba, this difference in shape would not suffice, since someone visiting would not ask why the challohs are shaped long, and would not notice anything unusual to attract his attention. However, according to the Tur, who holds that the heker is so that one not forget, this difference in shaping is sufficient.

We have thus learned some of the laws of producing dairy and meaty breads. Stay tuned for the continuation of this article, as we continue exploring this meaty topic!!

 

The Numbers Game

Because this article explains some basics of how Torah is taught by Chazal, I think it is appropriate to the week of Shavuos.

Question #1: Pie r squared

Yanki is supposed to be watching his weight and therefore needs to figure out how many calories are in the pie he beholds. To figure out how big the pie is, he measures the diameter of the pie, and divides it in half to get the length of its radius. He then multiplies the length of the radius by itself to get “r squared,” and multiplies the result by three so that he knows the area of the pie’s surface. Is there anything wrong with his calculation?

Question #2: Puzzled by the pasuk

“How can the pesukim tell us that the relationship between the circumference of a circle to its diameter is three-to-one, when simply taking a string and measuring around it demonstrates that it is noticeably longer?”

Question #3: Performing mitzvos accurately

“How accurate a calculation must I make when determining the size of an item to be used for a mitzvah?”

Introduction

In numerous places, both Tanach and Chazal approximate certain mathematical values, such as evaluating the ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter as three to one. The problem is that we can demonstrate mathematically that the ratio is greater than three and is almost 3 1/7. This leads to the following questions:

(1) Why would Chazal calculate using inaccurate approximations?

(2) When making halachic calculations, may we rely on these estimates, or do we need to be mathematically more accurate?

(3) A corollary question is: when providing an estimate, one must allow for a margin of error. Does halachah require a margin of error, and, if so, how much?

The Slide Rule versus the Calculator

Let me begin our discussion with a modern analogy, if something I remember can still be considered “modern.” When I first studied sophisticated mathematical estimates, I learned to use a slide rule, which today is as valuable to an engineer as an abacus. Relative to the calculator, a slide rule does not provide accurate measurements, and someone using a slide rule must allow a fairly significant margin of error in one direction or the other, depending on the situation.

Today, complex computations are made with calculators, which provide far more accurate results that can be rounded off, as necessary, to the nearest tenth, millionth, quadrillionth or smaller. Of course, using a calculator still requires one to round upward or downward, but because it is much more precise, the margin of error is greatly reduced.

How Irrational Are You?

Numerous halachic questions require mathematical calculations, involving what we call “irrational numbers.” An irrational number means one that cannot be expressed in fractional notation. Another way of explaining an irrational number is that its value can never be calculated totally accurately, but can only be estimated.

The two most common examples of irrational numbers that show up in Chazal are:

(1) Pi

The ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter, which we are used to calling by the Greek letter ∏ (pronounced like the word “pie,” and spelled in English “pi”). Since the 19th century, the letter pi has been used to represent this number, because the Greek word for peripheryis peripherion, which begins with the letter ∏. Hundreds of years earlier, the Rambam (Commentary to the Mishnah, Eruvin 1:5) noted that the ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter is an irrational number that can only be approximated, and that the scientists of his era used an estimate of 3 and 1/7, which is actually slightly greater than the value of ∏. The Rambam explains that since there is no accurate ratio, Chazal used a round number, three, for this calculation.

(2) The diagonal of a square

The length of a diagonal of a square, which is equal to the side of the square multiplied by the square root of two (√2). Chazal calculated the length of a diagonal of a square to be 1 and 2/5 times its side, which is slightly smaller than the value of √2. (Another way of expressing this idea is that the ratio between the diagonal and the side is 7:5.) The fact that Chazal’s figuring is somewhat smaller than the mathematical reality is already proved by Tosafos (Sukkah 8a s.v. kol).

Since both pi and the square root of two are irrational numbers, they can only be estimated, but can never be calculated with absolute accuracy.

Based on the above-quoted statement of the Rambam, we can already address one of our earlier questions: “Why would Chazal calculate using inaccurate approximations?” The answer is that any computation of the correlation of the circumference of a circle to its diameter will be an estimate. The only question is how accurate must this estimate be for the purpose at hand.

Chazal or Tanach?

Although the Rambam attributes the rounding of pi to Chazal, in actuality, there are sources in Tanach that calculate the ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter as three-to-one. Both in Melachim (I 7:23) and again in Divrei Hayamim (II 4:2), Tanach teaches that the Yam shel Shlomoh, the large, round pool or mikveh that was built in the first Beis Hamikdash, was thirty amos in circumference and ten amos in diameter, which provides a ratio of circumference to diameter of three-to-one. Thus, we can ask a question of the Rambam: Why does he attribute this ratio to Chazal, rather than the source for Chazal’s calculation, the pesukim?

In fact, the early commentaries to these verses already ask how the verse can make a calculation that we know is not accurate. The Ralbag suggests two options: either that the numbers used are intended to be a very broad estimate, or, alternatively, that the diameter is measured from the external dimensions of the mikveh, whereas the circumference is measured from its inside, which makes the estimate closer to mathematical reality.

According to the second approach of the Ralbag, no Biblical source uses an estimate of three-to-one as a substitute for pi. This will explain why the Rambam attributed the estimation of pi as three to Chazal, rather than to the Tanach. The Rambam was fully aware that one could interpret the verses according to the second approach of the Ralbag, in which case, there is no proof from the verse. He, therefore, attributed this estimate to Chazal.

Gemara Eruvin

The Ralbag’s approach reflects an earlier passage of Gemara. The Mishnah in Eruvin (13b) states that if the circumference of a pole is three tefachim, its diameter is one tefach, which means that the Mishnah assumes a ratio of three-to-one. The Gemara questions how the Mishnah knows that the ratio is three-to-one, and then draws proof from the above-quoted verse that the Yam shel Shlomoh was thirty amos around and ten amos across. The Gemara then debates whether the calculations of the Yam shel Shlomoh indeed result in a ratio of three-to-one, because one must also include the thickness of the poolitself, which offsets the computation. The Gemara eventually concludes that the verse was calculating from the inside of the pool, not its outside, and therefore the thickness of the pool’s containing wall is not included in the calculation (Eruvin 14a).

Nevertheless, this Gemara’s discussion leaves the mathematician dissatisfied, a question already noted by Tosafos. If the internal diameter of the Yam shel Shlomoh was ten amos, its circumference must have been greater than thirty amos, and if its circumference was thirty amos, then its internal diameter must have been less than ten amos.

A Different Question

The Rosh, in his responsa, is bothered by a different question, based on Talmudic logic rather than on mathematical calculation. He finds the Gemara’s question requesting proof for the ratio between a circle’s circumference and its diameter to be odd. The ratio between a circle’s circumference and its diameter is a value that one should calculate. By its nature, this is not a question that requires a Biblical proof or source.

In the literature that we have received from the Rosh, he asks this question in two different places. In his responsa (Shu’t HaRosh 2:19), we find a letter that he wrote to the Rashba, in which he asked the Rashba a series of questions that the Rosh notes bother him tremendously, and to whom he has no one else to turn for an answer. One of the questions the Rosh asks is: “Why does the Gemara ask for a Biblical source for a mathematical calculation?”

It is curious to note that a later commentary mentions that, in all the considerable literature that we have received from the Rashba, we have no recorded answer of the Rashba to this question of the Rosh (Cheishek Shlomoh to Eruvin 14a).

Another Comment of the Rosh

The Tosafos HaRosh commentary to Eruvin, which was published for the first time relatively recently, is the second place where the Rosh asks why the Gemara wanted a Biblical source for a mathematical calculation.  There, the Rosh provides an answer to this question:  Since the calculation of three-to-one is not accurate, the Gemara wanted a biblical source as proof that we are permitted to rely on this estimate.

(The Cheishek Shlomoh, whom I quoted above, provides the same answer to this question as does the Rosh in his Tosafos. The Cheishek Shlomoh never saw the Tosafos HaRosh, which had not yet been printed in his day.)

Curiosity about the Tosafos HaRosh

There is an interesting historical point that can presumably be derived from the fact that, in the Tosafos HaRosh, the Rosh answers the question that he raised and accredits this answer to himself. This should be able to prove which work the Rosh had written earlier, and also whether he ever received an answer to his question from the Rashba. This analysis is based on the following question: Why did the Rosh cite an answer in his Tosafos¸but not in his responsum, which was addressed as a question to the Rashba. There are three obvious possibilities:

(1) Although the Rosh wrote this answer in his Tosafos, he was dissatisfied with it, and therefore wrote a question to the Rashba. I would reject this answer because, if it is true, then, in his correspondence to the Rashba, the Rosh would have mentioned this answer and his reason for rejecting it.

(2) The Rosh indeed received an answer, either this one or a different answer, from the Rashba. I reject this approach also, because, were it true, the Rosh would have quoted the Rashba’s answer in his Tosafos and, if need be, discussed it.

(3) Therefore, I conclude that the Rosh, indeed, never received an answer to the question he asked of the Rashba and subsequently reached his own conclusion as to how to answer the question, which he then recorded in the Tosafos HaRosh. This would lead us to conclude that the Tosafos HaRosh was written later in his life than his responsa, or, at least, this responsum.

Mathematical Accuracy

At this point, we can address one of earlier questions.When making halachic calculations, may we rely on these estimates, or do we need to be mathematically more accurate? We might be able to prove this point by noting something in the Mishnah in Eruvin quoted above. The Mishnah there ruled that, under certain circumstances, an area that is fully enclosed on three of its sides and has a beam a tefach wide above the fourth side is considered halachically fully enclosed, and one may carry inside it. The Mishnah then proceeds to explain that if the beam is round and has a circumference of three tefachim, one may carry inside the area because, based on the calculation that the relationship of its circumference to its diameter is three-to-one, the beam is considered to be a tefach-wide. However, as the Rambam notes, a beam that has a circumference of three tefachim is actually less than a tefach in diameter, and therefore one should not be permitted to carry in this area!

The Aruch HaShulchan (Orach Chayim 363:22; Yoreh Deah 30:13) notes this problem and concludes that one may carry in this area. He contends that this is exactly what the Gemara was asking when it requested Scriptural proof for a mathematical calculation. “Upon what halachic basis may we be lenient in using this estimate of three-to-one, when this will permit carrying in an area in which the beam is less than a tefach wide? The answer is that this is a halachah that we derive from the verse.”

To clarify this concept, the Chazon Ish notes that the purpose of mitzvos is to draw us nearer to Hashem, to accept His reign, and to be meticulously careful in observing His laws. However, none of this is conflicted when the Torah teaches that we may use certain calculations, even if they are not completely mathematically accurate. In this instance, relying on these estimates is exactly what the Torah requires (Chazon Ish, Orach Chayim 138:4). As expressed by a different author, the Gemara (Eruvin 4a; Sukkah 5b) teaches that the measurements, the shiurim, required to fulfill mitzvos are all halachah lemoshe misinai, laws that Moshe Rabbeinu received as a mesorah on Har Sinai. Similarly, these estimates of irrational numbers mentioned above are all halachah lemoshe misinai that one may rely upon to fulfill mitzvos, whether or not they are mathematically accurate. The same Torah takes these calculations into consideration when instructing us which dimensions are required in order to fulfill specific mitzvos (Shu’t Tashbeitz 1:165).

In the context of a different halachah in the laws of Eruvin, the Mishnah Berurah makes a similar statement, contending that we can rely on Chazal’s estimates, even when the result is lenient. However, the Mishnah Berurah there vacillates a bit in his conclusion, ruling that one can certainly rely on this when the issue is a rabbinic concern (Shaar Hatziyun 372:18). In a responsum, Rav Moshe Feinstein questions why the Mishnah Berurah limits relying on this approach, and Rav Moshe rules unequivocally that one may rely on these estimates even when it involves leniency in de’oraysa laws (Shu’t Igros Moshe, Yoreh Deah Volume3 #120:5).

How Straight Are My Tefillin?

Personally, I find the context of Rav Moshe’s teshuvah very interesting. There is a halacha lemoshe misinai that requires that the boxes of the tefillin, the batim, must be perfectly square. Rav Moshe was asked whether there is a halachic preference to use scientific measuring equipment to determine that one’s tefillin are perfectly square. Rav Moshe rules that there is neither a reason nor a hiddur in measuring the tefillin squareness this accurately. Since Chazal have used the calculation of 1.4 or a ratio of 7:5, which we know is an estimate, to determine the correct diagonal of a square, there is no requirement to make one’s tefillin squarer than this, and it is perfectly fine simply to measure the length of each of the sides of one’s tefillin and its two diagonals to ascertain that the ratio between the diagonal and the side is 7:5.

In the above-cited responsum, Rav Moshe notes that he had heard that the Brisker Rav, Rav Yitzchak Zeev Soloveichek, had ruled that it was preferable to check one’s tefillin in the most scientific method available. Rav Moshe writes that he finds this suggestion very strange and disputes its being halachically correct (Shu’t Igros Moshe, Yoreh Deah Volume3 #120:5).

When making halachic calculations, may we rely on these estimates, or do we need to be mathematically more accurate?” The answer is that, indeed, the purpose of Chazal’s making these estimates was that observing halachah does not require that these calculations be mathematically precise, provided they meet the criteria that the halachah established.

An Alternate Approach

Although the majority of late authorities conclude that the calculations of Chazal are, indeed, part of the halachos of shiurim, this is not a universally-held position. The Tashbeitz, a rishon, wrote a lengthy responsum on the topic, in which he presents two ways to explain why Chazal used estimates that are not precisely accurate. His first approach reaches the same conclusion as we have already found in the later poskim, that these measurements are included within the halachos of shiurim that are part of the halachah lemoshe misinai.

The second approach of the Tashbeitz, however, differs with the above-mentioned halachic conclusion. In his second approach, he contends that all the above estimates were meant for pedagogic, but not halachic purposes. The rounding of pi to three and the diagonal of a square to 1.4 were provided to make the material easily comprehensible to all students, since every individual is required to know the entire Torah. Thus, when Chazal used these estimates in calculating the laws, their intent was to enable the average student to comprehend the halachic material, not to provide the most accurate interpretation. When an actual halachic calculation is made, it must be totally accurate. Any halachic authority involved would realize that he must use a highly accurate mathematical computation and then round either upward or downward as necessary for the specific application. (A similar position is held by Chiddushim Uviurim, Ohalos 5:6.)

Conclusion

Certainly, the majority of late halachic opinions conclude that the estimates of Chazal are meant to be halachically definitive and not simply pedagogic in nature. However, I leave it to the individual reader to ask his or her posek what to do when a practical question presents itself.

 

May I Take a Nice Hot Shower on Yom Tov?

Although the Torah prohibits performing melacha activity on Yom Tov, it permits preparing food. As the Torah states, Ach asher yei’ocheil lechol nefesh, hu livado yei’aseh lochem: “However, that which is eaten by all people, only it may be performed” (Shemos 12:16). (We will soon discuss what the Torah means by saying that something is eaten by all people.) This verse permits cooking and other food preparation on Yom Tov, but does not appear to permit melacha for non-food purposes. If so, how can we carry machzorim and push baby carriages on Yom Tov in an area without an eiruv? Before answering this question, let us explore a Mishnah that is vital to this topic:

“Beis Shammai says, ‘One should not heat water for washing one’s feet on Yom Tov unless it is appropriate for drinking, whereas Beis Hillel permit this. One may kindle a bonfire to warm oneself” (Beitzah 21b).

The Mishnah implies that both Beis Hillel and Beis Shammai forbid heating water on Yom Tov to bathe one’s entire body, and dispute only whether one may heat water to wash one’s feet. Beis Shammai rules that one may heat water on Yom Tov only for food purposes – to cook or to heat drinking water. In their opinion, if one needs to heat water on Yom Tov for washing, there is only one way: Prior to heating drinking or cooking water, one may place more water in the pot than one needs, planning to use the surplus hot water for washing (Tosafos, Beitzah 21b s.v. lo).

Why is this permitted?

MARBEH BESHIURIM

This action is permitted because of a law called marbeh beshiurim, literally one increases the quantities, which means that, while preparing food on Yom Tov, one may include a greater quantity with one’s action, provided no additional melacha act is performed. Based on this principle, one may place a large pot of water on the fire rather than a small one, since he is performing only one act of heating water. However, this is prohibited if one performs any additional melacha action. Similarly, one may not add extra water to a pot already on the fire, unless he needs more water for cooking purposes.

Here is an example:

One may not bake on the first day of Yom Tov for the second. However, one may fill a pot with meat on the first day of Yom Tov, even though he needs only one piece for the first day. Similarly, one may boil a large pot of water on the first day, even though he needs only one cup of hot water. On the other hand, under most circumstances one may not bake more than one needs for the day (Beitzah 17a).

Why is baking different? The difference is that adding water or meat before putting the pot on the fire simply increases the quantity cooked, but does not increase the number of melacha acts. However, preparing extra bread entails shaping each loaf or roll separately, thus increasing the number of acts performed.

HEATING WATER FOR WASHING

Similarly, Beis Shammai rules that one may only add water for washing to the drinking water before the water is placed on the fire, but not afterwards. They strictly forbid heating water exclusively for washing or bathing.

On the other hand, Beis Hillel permits heating water even on Yom Tov in order to wash one’s feet. Why may one do this? After all, this is not for food?

MITOCH – EXPANDING PERMITTED MELACHOS

Beis Hillel’s rationale to permit this is the legal concept called mitoch shehutrah letzorech, hutrah nami shelo letzorech, which means that once the Torah has permitted any specific melacha to prepare food on Yom Tov, one may perform this melacha even for Yom Tov purposes that are not food related (Tosafos, Beitzah 12a s.v. hachi; cf. Rashi). This is why one may carry a machzor to shul on Yom Tov, even in an area without an eiruv. Since one may carry to prepare food, one may carry for a different Yom Tov purpose, such as davening properly or taking the baby for a stroll, even though these activities have nothing to do with food.

The same reason permits building a fire on Yom Tov to warm oneself — once the melacha of burning is permitted for cooking, it is permitted for other Yom Tov reasons. (Note: one may not ignite a flame on Yom Tov but may only kindle from a preexisting flame. The reason for this prohibition is beyond the scope of this essay.)

Similarly, Beis Hillel rules that one may heat water to wash one’s feet on Yom Tov. Although this use is not food related, once one may heat water for cooking, one may also heat water for a different Yom Tov purpose.

Why does Beis Shammai disagree with Beis Hillel and prohibit heating water for the purpose of having a bath? Because Beis Shammai rejects the concept of mitoch; in their opinion, one may not perform any melacha on Yom Tov unless it is food preparatory. Indeed, Beis Shammai prohibits carrying on Yom Tov, except for food-related needs (Beitzah 12a). Our practice of carrying on Yom Tov for non-food needs is because we follow Beis Hillel’s opinion that accepts the concept of mitoch.

HEATING BATH WATER

Despite Beis Hillel’s acceptance of mitoch, they forbid heating water on Yom Tov to bathe one’s entire body (Mishnah Beitzah 21b). Why did Beis Hillel prohibit this activity if mitoch permits other Yom Tov activities? The answer to this question involves a fascinating dispute with major practical ramifications.

RAMBAM’S REASON

Chazal prohibited bathing in hot water on Shabbos, even if the water was kept hot from before Shabbos, out of concern that bathhouse attendants might heat water on Shabbos, claiming that it had been heated before (Shabbos 40a). This prohibition is called the gezeiras merchatz, literally, the prohibition on the use of a bathhouse, although it is not restricted to bathhouses, but includes almost all instances of bathing in hot water on Shabbos.

Similarly, the Mishnah (Shabbos 38b) describes how the residents of Teverya ran a cold water pipe through hot springs so that they could have hot bath water on Yom Tov. The Sages prohibited using this water for bathing, since it was warmed on Yom Tov, notwithstanding the fact that it was heated automatically.

The Rambam’s understanding is that Beis Hillel prohibits heating bath water on Yom Tov as an extension of the gezeiras merchatz, even though no Torah violation can possibly result on Yom Tov (Rambam, Hilchos Yom Tov 1:16). In his opinion, Beis Hillel’s prohibition against heating bath water on Yom Tov is rabbinic, whereas according to Beis Shammai it is forbidden min hatorah.

TOSAFOS’ REASON

Others dispute the Rambam’s conclusion, contending that heating bath water on Yom Tov is a violation min hatorah, even according to Beis Hillel (Tosafos, Beitzah 21b s.v. lo). This approach requires an introduction.

SHAVEH LECHOL NEFESH – EVERYONE APPRECIATES

Although the concept of mitoch sanctions non-food-preparatory melacha activity on Yom Tov, this authorization is limited to activities that most people appreciate, called shaveh lechol nefesh. However, mitoch does not sanction a benefit that only some people appreciate and others do not (Kesubos 7a).

Let me explain why this is so, and then provide some clarifying examples. When the Torah permitted melacha activity on Yom Tov, its words were: However, that which is eaten by all people, only it may be performed. By emphasizing by all (in Hebrew lechol), the Torah implied that only universally appreciated benefits are permitted. However, the Torah did not permit melacha activities not universally enjoyed.

A few examples will explain this concept. One may kindle fire on Yom Tov, because that is how people cook. As I explained above, the concept of mitoch authorizes burning wood to heat the house, since everyone appreciates being warm on a cold day (Mishnah Beitzah 21b). However, not everyone enjoys the aromatic fragrance of burning incense; it is not shaveh lechol nefesh. Therefore, one may not kindle incense on Yom Tov (Kesubos 7a).

Similarly, many contemporary poskim rule that smoking on Yom Tov desecrates the holiday [see Shulchan Shelomoh, Refuah Vol. 2 pg. 221; Nishmas Avraham, Vol. 1 pg. 278 ] (in addition to the other prohibitions violated for endangering one’s health and that of others). They contend that most people today do not appreciate the pleasures of smoking, and therefore, it is not shaveh lechol nefesh (see also Shaarei Teshuvah 511:5; Bi’ur Halacha 511:4).

DOESN’T EVERYONE BATHE?

How does this compare to bathing on Yom Tov?

Until fairly recently, frequent bathing was uncommon. Therefore, Tosafos explains that warming bath water is not shaveh lechol nefesh and is therefore proscribed on Yom Tov min hatorah, even according to Beis Hillel. As I explained above, the Rambam disagrees, maintaining that heating bath water is prohibited only miderabbanan, as an extension of the gezeiras merchatz.

Thus, these authorities dispute whether heating bath water on Yom Tov is forbidden min hatorah or only miderabbanan. Is there any practical difference between these two opinions?

HEATING BATH WATER BEFORE YOM TOV

There is indeed a practical difference between these two approaches: May one bathe on Yom Tov using water heated before Yom Tov? Let me explain.

Earlier, I mentioned the gezeiras merchatz banning bathing on Shabbos even with water heated before Shabbos, out of concern that the bathhouse attendants might desecrate Shabbos. Does the same concern exist on Yom Tov? The Ran (Beitzah 11a) explains that resolving this query depends on the dispute between Tosafos and the Rambam. According to Tosafos, heating bath water on Yom Tov violates Torah law; therefore, bathing on Yom Tov entails the same concerns as bathing on Shabbos. Just as Chazal banned bathing on Shabbos, they banned bathing on Yom Tov (Tosafos, Shabbos 40a s.v. lemotza’ei).

However, according to the Rambam, since heating bath water on Yom Tov is itself prohibited only miderabbanan, there is no reason to prohibit bathing on Yom Tov using water heated before Yom Tov. Indeed, the Rif (Beitzah 11a) and other early authorities rule explicitly that one may bathe on Yom Tov using water heated from before Yom Tov.

Thus, whether one may bathe on Yom Tov using water heated before Yom Tov is subject to dispute, the Rif and the Rambam permitting it, whereas Tosafos and others ban it. Since the Shulchan Aruch (511:2) rules like the Rif and the Rambam, a Sefardi may be lenient, whereas an Ashkenazi cannot be lenient, since the Rama rules like Tosafos.

As I mentioned above, all authorities prohibit bathing on Yom Tov with water heated on Yom Tov, even if the water was heated automatically.

WASHING PART AT A TIME

Although the Rama concludes that one may not bathe on Yom Tov, even using water heated from before Yom Tov, halachic consensus permits washing one’s entire body this way, provided one does not do so all at one time (Rashba, Ritva and Ran to Shabbos 40a; Elyah Rabbah 511:1; Mishnah Berurah 511:15, 18). This is called washing eiver eiver, one limb at a time. Thus, theoretically, one may stand in a shower stall —  not beneath the water flow — and place different parts of one’s body under the hot water, one after another. Ashkenazim may not stand directly under the water flow, because this washes most of one’s body at one time, but may splash water onto the body by hand. According to the approach accepted by the Sefardim, one may stand directly under the flow of hot water.

However, all of this is permitted only if both of the following specific conditions are fulfilled:

1. One must be certain that one is using only water heated before Yom Tov. As I mentioned above, all authorities prohibit bathing in water heated on Yom Tov, even if it was heated automatically.

Furthermore, hot water generally mixes with cold water before emerging from the faucet. If the hot water heats the cold water to yad soledes bo (for these purposes, usually assumed to be 113 degrees Fahrenheit), this involves heating bath water on Yom Tov, which is prohibited; and furthermore, one may not bathe in this water. Thus, one would need to guarantee that mixed water does not heat to this temperature.

Showering in a hotel or dormitory may be even more problematic, as most of these facilities use a coil system that heats the water as you turn on the faucet. This would be prohibited according to all opinions, because one is using water heated on Yom Tov and would involve a Torah prohibition according to Tosafos, since one is heating water to bathe one’s body.

2. Most North American household water heating systems operate with a boiler that automatically replaces hot water with cold, as you use it. This means that when one bathes or showers, one is heating cold water not for the purposes of Yom Tov use. There is a complicated rationale behind permitting heating of the new water. If the heating is indirect and unintentional, some permit it on Yom Tov (Tosafos, Beitzah 22a s.v. vehamistapeik; Shaar Hatziyun 514:31; however cf. Magen Avraham 514:5 and Mishnah Berurah 514:20. Also see dispute between Magen Avraham 314:5 and Terumas Hadeshen; see also Ritva, Eiruvin 88a).

WHAT ABOUT A COLD BATH?

According to what we have said until now, it should be permitted to take a cold shower or bath on Yom Tov. For that matter, what is wrong with taking a cold shower on Shabbos? Indeed, according to the conclusion of the Gemara, there is nothing wrong with bathing in cold water on Shabbos. However, early Ashkenazic poskim record a custom not to bathe in cold water on Shabbos due to a variety of reasons, including that one might carry (if one bathed outdoors in an area without an eruv) or squeeze water out of one’s hair or towel (Magen Avraham 326:8). This is established Ashkenazic custom: except for tevilah in a mikvah, one does not bathe on Shabbos. Sefardim never accepted this minhag, and may therefore take a lukewarm or cold bath or shower on Shabbos and certainly on Yom Tov. They should, of course, be careful not to squeeze out hair or a towel. Even following Ashkenazic practice, it is prohibited only to bathe all or most of one’s entire body, but one may wash less than half one’s body.

WHAT ABOUT A COLD SHOWER?

Even though Ashkenazim accepted the custom not to bathe in cold water on Shabbos, some poskim rule that the prohibition includes only bathing on Shabbos, but not showering. In truth, some of the reasons quoted by the Magen Avraham apply to cold showers also, since one might squeeze out one’s hair or the towel whether one is bathing or showering, whereas the other reason mentioned, that one might by mistake carry on Shabbos, applies only to someone who bathes outdoors, and applies less to someone who showers indoors.

In his teshuvah on the subject, Rav Moshe Feinstein concludes that, although some authorities may permit cold showering on Shabbos, one should not follow this leniency, since it violates accepted practice (Shu’t Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 4:75). However, one who is mitzta’eir may take a cold shower, since the custom mentioned by the Magen Avraham does not apply. Furthermore, Rav Moshe permits taking a cold shower on Shabbos during a heat wave (Shu’t Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 4:74: rechitzah: 3). Certainly, one may be lenient to take a cold shower on Yom Tov when one is uncomfortable. One should be careful not to squeeze one’s hair or the towel.

In practice, each person should discuss with his rav whether and how to take a hot shower on Yom Tov. Whatever your decision, I wish you all a happy, kosher, and comfortable Yom Tov.

Note: For insights into the permissibility of showering on Shabbos, see “May One Shower on Shabbos?”

Double-Duty Soups, Onerous Onions, and Nat bar Nat, or Preparing Milchig and Fleishig for Shavuos

There is a widespread custom to eat at least some milchig meals on Shavuos. A housewife asked me this question: since this year Shavuos follows on the heels of Shabbos, and she has no large pareve pots, is there a way for her to prepare side dishes or desserts that she may then serve with both her meat and her dairy meals? In response, I bring you:

Double-Duty Soups, Onerous Onions, and Nat bar Nat, or Preparing Milchig and Fleishig for Shavuos

Question #1:

Rachel asks her Rav:

“Someone told me that I may cook a pareve soup in my fleishig pot and then serve it with both milchig and fleishig meals. Can this possibly be true?”

Question #2: Reuven wants to know:

“May I eat the leftover kugel alongside my milchig lunch?”

Question #3:

Mrs. Goldberg calls with the following question:

“My neighbor, Mrs. Dwek, told me that she cooks her rice and other vegetables in her dairy pots and then serves them with either meat or dairy meals. I was taught that this is strictly forbidden. May I trust the kashrus in her house? She seems more knowledgeable and careful about halacha than I am.”

To answer these questions properly, we need to study the following halachic areas:

I.          What is the status of pareve food cooked in milchig or fleishig pots?

II.         The rules of pungent foods.

III.       Why we wait after eating fleishig before eating milchig.

We will also acquire a glossary of several halachic terms, such as nat bar nat, davar charif, and eino ben yomo. I will explain each of these terms as we come to them.

I.          What is the status of pareve food cooked in milchig or fleishig pots?

When the Torah prohibited eating meat cooked in milk, it also prohibited eating food that contains the flavors of both meat and dairy. For example, if one cooked meat and then dairy in the same pot on the same day, meat flavor goes into the dairy food – thus creating a prohibited mixture of meat and milk (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 93:1).

Chazal extended the Torah’s proscription against eating meat and milk cooked together to include eating meat and milk simultaneously, even when they are not cooked together (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 88:1). The issue that we will discuss is:

To what extent did Chazal prohibit the mixture of milk and meat? Did they prohibit eating pareve food cooked in fleishig pots together with dairy? To answer this question, we need to be introduced to the concept called nat bar nat.

NAT BAR NAT

The Gemara (Chullin 111b) states that, under certain circumstances, fish prepared in fleishig equipment may be eaten with dairy food. The poskim call this phenomenon nat bar nat, literally, a taste that is son of a taste. This means that since the meat taste has undergone two steps, first into the equipment (the first taste) and then back into the fish (the “son” of the taste), the residual “meat” taste is too insignificant to be considered meat. This rule also applies to the use of dairy equipment; that is, pareve food prepared in dairy equipment may be eaten with meat.

WHEN DOES THIS APPLY?

Most Rishonim contend that food cooked in a meat pot may be eaten with dairy, provided the meat equipment was clean from significant meat residue. Following their approach, a pareve soup cooked in a clean fleishig pot may be eaten together with dairy foods even if the pot was used to cook meat immediately before the pareve soup. Similarly, if one cooked dairy, emptied out the pot, and then immediately cooked vegetables in the same pot using exclusively pareve ingredients, these vegetables may be eaten with meat. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 95:1) follows this position, and this is the accepted ruling among Sefardim. However, many authorities rule that this is permitted only after the fact, but that one may not cook vegetables in a fleishig pot intending to eat or serve it with milchig food and vice versa.

Other authorities contend that nat bar nat applies only to pareve food placed in a kli sheni, that is, in a bowl in which hot meat had been placed after being removed from the fire. According to this approach, nat bar nat applies only if one cooked pareve food in a pareve pot and then emptied the very hot contents into a fleishig pot that was not heated or into fleishig serving vessels. However, fish or vegetables cooked in a pot in which meat was cooked the same day may not be eaten with dairy, nor can fish or vegetables cooked in a pot in which dairy was cooked the same day be eaten with meat (Rivan, quoted by Tosafos, Chullin 111b).

The Rama (ad loc.) follows this approach, ruling that one should not eat pareve food cooked in a meat pot together with dairy, or pareve food cooked in a dairy pot together with meat. However, the Rama accepts that one may eat such fish or vegetables which were cooked in a dairy pot on fleishig dishes and with fleishig utensils, and that one may eat them before and after eating meat. He prohibits eating these vegetables only together with meat. This is the approach followed by Ashkenazim.

MORE THAN 24

Even according to the Rama, pareve food cooked in a pot that was last used for meat more than 24 hours previously may be eaten with dairy. The reason for this is that, once 24 hours have passed, the meat flavor absorbed by the pot no longer imparts a pleasant taste – and, therefore, the flavor transmitted to the pareve food is no longer considered “meat.”

A vessel that has not been used for hot food for more than 24 hours is called eino ben yomo, which I will translate as not used today.

The authorities dispute whether one may lechatchilah cook pareve food in an eino ben yomo fleishig pot in order to eat it with milchig.

Let us now discuss Rachel’s question raised above: “Someone told me that I may cook a pareve soup in my fleishig pot and then serve it with both milchig and fleishig meals. Can this possibly be true?”

According to what we have said so far, if Rachel already cooked her soup, she could serve it at a milchig meal, but not at the same time that she has milchig food on the table. If she is sfardi, then most authorities rule that she could even have milchig food on the table. However, it is important to note that many authorities rule that one may not plan one’s menu this way, and that the heter of nat bar nat is only after the fact.

There is also another very important caveat that we will now explain – all this assumes that Rachel’s soup does not include any pungent ingredients that may already have become fleishig.

A PUNGENT EXCEPTION

Does the lenience of nat bar nat apply whenever one uses fleishig equipment to prepare pareve food? No, there are some exceptions. One major exception is that the rule of nat bar nat does not apply to what halacha calls a davar charif, a pungent food, such as radishes, onions, garlic and lemons. Pungent foods intensify flavor and therefore transmit flavor in ways that bland items do not. (For halachic purposes, we refer to any non-pungent food as “bland.”)

There are several ramifications to this law of pungent foods, as we will soon see.

A SHARP BACKGROUND

The Gemara (Chullin 111b) prohibits eating dairy together with a radish sliced by a knife that had previously been used to cut meat, but permits eating bland food sliced by the same knife. Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 96:1) rules that the radish is fleishig, because the meat flavor absorbed into the knife transferred into the radish and is still considered a strong meat flavor. We do not consider the knife to be a nat bar nat, notwithstanding the fact that the flavor of the meat was first absorbed into the knife and only then transferred from the knife into the radish. The reason is that pungent foods, such as radishes, intensify flavor, causing the meat flavor in the radish to remain strong enough to still be considered meat.

However, although one should not eat these pungent items together with dairy ingredients, they do not become so “meaty” as to require six hours after eating them. One should be careful not to eat them together with dairy, but one may eat dairy immediately after eating the onions or other pungent foods.

MORE THAN 24

Notwithstanding the fact that pareve food cooked in an eino ben yomo fleishig pot may be eaten with dairy, the Rama concludes that the lenience of eino ben yomo does not apply to pungent foods. Thus, someone who fried onions in an eino ben yomo fleishig pan must treat the onions as fleishig.

Therefore:

You sliced an onion or a lemon with a fleishig knife. Since these items are pungent, they have absorbed enough meat flavor to be considered fleishig and cannot be mixed with dairy.

COMMON KITCHEN MIX-UPS

From my experience, the most common type of kitchen mix-up involves the misuse of onions sliced with a fleishig or milchig knife. It is for this reason that I highly recommend a family kitchen policy of slicing all onions, lemons, radishes and garlic exclusively with pareve knives.

At this point, I want to return to Rachel’s question: All that we permitted Rachel to do assumes that she did not use pungent ingredients, such as onions or garlic, in her soup.

Should she want to add onions to her soup, she should be careful to slice them with a pareve knife. Should she want to sauté them first, and she has no pareve pot or pan large enough for the soup, she has the following option: she could first sauté her onions in a pareve pot. Once the onions are cooked, they lose their pungency; if they are now added to the bland ingredients in the fleishig pot, they will no longer absorb fleishig taste from the pot, and her soup will remain pareve. (Onions are interesting, because when raw, they qualify as davar charif, although they lose their pungency quickly when they are cooked.)

At this point, we can also answer the other two questions asked above:

“May I eat the leftover kugel alongside my milchig lunch?”

The answer is that if the pot in which the kugel was made was fleishig and ben yomo, then one should not eat the kugel at the same moment that one is eating actual dairy products, although one may eat it using dairy equipment.

“My neighbor, Mrs. Dwek, told me that she cooks her rice and other vegetables in her dairy pots and then serves them with either meat or dairy meals. May I trust the kashrus in her house?”

The answer is that what Mrs. Dwek is following a psak that, according to some authorities, is perfectly acceptable for Sfardim. An Askenazi should not do this lichatchilah. Either way, you may certainly trust her kashrus.

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