Some of the Laws of Seudah Shelishis

Question #1: Min haTorah or not?

Is eating three meals on Shabbos a Torah requirement?

Question #2: Shaloshudis?

Why do most people slur the word and pronounce it as shaloshudis? Should it not be called seudah shelishis?

Question #3: Three and over

What is required to be eaten for the third meal on Shabbos?

Answer:

The mitzvah of celebrating Shabbos is mentioned by the prophet Yeshayahu (58:13), in his famous words, vekarasa laShabbos oneg, “And you shall call Shabbos a delight.” Although this observance is not mentioned in the written Torah, many authorities rule that it has a halachic status of being min haTorah. It may be included in the Torah’s words mikra’ei kodesh (Vayikra 23:2, see Ramban, as explained by Shaar Hatziyun 242:1). Alternatively, it was originally a halacha leMoshe miSinai, meaning part of the Torah Shebe’al Peh without allusion in the written Torah, until Yeshayahu stated this requirement (Chasam Sofer, Shabbos 118a). The Gemara (Yoma 71b) instructs that some halachic rulings had been halacha leMoshe miSinai until the nevi’im taught them. As the Ramban explains (Notes to Sefer Hamitzvos, Shoresh II), since a navi may not add to the Taryag mitzvos, if this requirement was introduced by Yeshayahu, it would have the status of a takkanas chachamim introduced by the great Torah scholar Yeshayahu, who also happened to be a prophet.

The Chasam Sofer (Shabbos 118a) appears to be of the opinion that no early authority held that the mitzvah is only miderabbanan.  After mentioning that some poskim understand the requirement to celebrate the Shabbos not to be min haTorah, the Mishnah Berurah (Shaar Hatziyun 242:1) notes that people should not treat this mitzvah lightly. He suggests that, perhaps, it should be treated even more strictly than a Torah requirement.

Three meals

As part of the observance of oneg Shabbos, Chazal required that we eat three meals every Shabbos. Although the Mishnah never mentions directly a requirement to eat three meals on Shabbos, a beraysa from the era of the Mishnah does report it (Shabbos 117b). This beraysa records a dispute between the tanna kamma, who rules that three meals are required, and Rabbi Chidka, who requires that we eat four meals every Shabbos. The Gemara provides an extensive discussion regarding this dispute.

The famous amora, Rabbi Yochanan, explains that both tanna’im derive their ruling from seemingly extra words in the same pasuk that states, regarding the mann, “And Moshe said, eat it today, for today is Shabbos for Hashem. Today you will not find it (the mann) in the field” (Shemos 16:25). Rabbi Yochanan notes that the word hayom, today, is written three times in the pasuk, and refers each time to Shabbos. This is the midrashic source for eating three meals on “the day” — Shabbos. In other words, eating extra meals on Shabbos is a way to remind us that Hashem provided for us in the Desert.

The tanna kamma understands the pasuk to be requiring that three meals are eaten in the course of Shabbos, whereas Rabbi Chidka derives that the three meals must be consumed during the daytime of Shabbos.

Three meals or four?

Having established that the tanna kamma requires three meals each Shabbos, and Rabbi Chidka requires four, the Gemara discusses whether proof can be rallied from various Mishnayos regarding whether it held like either of these opinions or, perhaps, held a potential third position. In this context, the Gemara cites a Mishnah (Peah 8:7) that reports that there were many levels of tzedakah collection in the days of Chazal, among them was one called tamchuy (literally, plate or platter) and another called kuppah (literally, box). The tamchuy, which was what we call a soup kitchen, supplied meals for anyone who arrived in a Jewish community. Any pauper, whether resident or itinerant, was entitled to eat at the tamchuy (Tosefta, Peah Chapter 4). However, only those who did not have enough money or food for two meals were eligible.

The kuppah was restricted to the local poor (Tosefta, Peah 4:8). Itwas intended for those who were relatively well off –enough to provide at least for their next fourteen meals. The Mishnah assumes that a poor person is satisfied with two meals a day, one in the morning and one in the evening (no free lunch), and that the kuppah is for those who do not anticipate being able to support themselves and their families with minimal food requirements for the coming week.

Someone with sufficient financial resources to expect that he will have fourteen meals was not permitted to join either the tamchuy or the kuppah. Someone who had two meals, but not fourteen, was permitted to collect from the kuppah, but not from the tamchuy.

The question raised by the Gemara was that the Mishnah does not seem to agree with either the tanna kamma or Rabbi Chidka. According to the tanna kamma, since the requirement for participation in the kuppah was the ability to provide for yourself and your family for the next week, why does the Mishnah state that the minimal requirement for the tanna kamma is someone who has fourteen meals. Since there is a requirement to eat three meals on Shabbos according to the tanna kamma, and four according to Rabbi Chidka, the kuppah limit should be higher – fifteen meals according to the tanna kamma, and sixteen meals according to Rabbi Chidka, allowing for the extra meals required on Shabbos. Upon this basis, the Gemara suggests that the Mishnah represents a third opinion, which requires only two meals on Shabbos.

After a bit of discussion, the Gemara concludes that, indeed, the Mishnah’s ruling is not universally held. However, the author of this Mishnah is Rabbi Akiva (Pesachim 112a, 113a), whose dispute is not with the tanna kamma or Rabbi Chidka regarding the requirement to eat extra meals on Shabbos, but in a different subject. Rabbi Akiva rules that, although there is a requirement to eat extra meals on Shabbos, the requirement does not extend to someone who will require tzedakah funds to provide the extra meals (Shabbos 118a). The rishonim dispute whether we rule according to Rabbi Akiva or not (see Rambam, Hilchos Shabbos 30:9, who rules unlike Rabbi Akiva).

The Shulchan Aruch rules according to Rabbi Akiva, although he qualifies the ruling somewhat: “Even a person who is in need of financial assistance should exhibit his desire to honor Shabbos by minimizing what he eats during the weekdays, in order to be able to have a respectable Shabbos meal. The ruling [of Rabbi Akiva] that you should make your Shabbos as a weekday and not utilize tzedakah funds applies only to someone who is truly needy” (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 242:1).

Melaveh malkah

Although our article has been discussing exclusively the three meals of Shabbos, and not the motza’ei Shabbos meal of melaveh malkah, we would be remiss not to note the following discussion. In his commentary on this passage of Gemara, Rashi asks the following question: When the Gemara discusses whether the extra Shabbos meals are included in the qualifications for the kuppah, why does it not take into consideration the melaveh malkah meal that one should eat on motza’ei Shabbos (see Shabbos; Tur and Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 300)? Rashi answers that tzedakah funds are not used to provide for melaveh malkah (Shabbos 118a s.v. achlei). I am aware of two other approaches to answer this question.

1. The Magen Avraham explains that if you ate seudah shelishis late, there is no requirement to eat bread for melaveh malkah, but you can fulfill the mitzvah by eating fruit (Orach Chayim 300). Since the Tosefta (Peah Chapter 4) mentions that a poor person provided from the communal funds is also provided with fruits and vegetables, he can leave over from these for his melaveh malkah.

2. The Ba’eir Heiteiv (Orach Chayim 300:1) quotes from the Ohr Zarua that if you extend seudah shelishis into night, you thereby fulfill the mitzvah of eating melaveh malkah.

According to both of these approaches, someone can fulfill the mitzvah of melaveh malkah without needing extra support from the tzedakah funds.

Bread or not?

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 291:5) cites a four-way dispute among rishonim, whether the third meal of Shabbos must be a bread meal. He quotes the following opinions:

1. The third meal must be a bread meal (Mordechai, Shabbos #397, quoting Yerei’im and Maharam; Tosafos, Brachos 49b s.v. ei nami).

2. The third meal can be either mezonos or a bread meal (Tosafos, Sukkah 27a s.v. beminei; see also Tosafos, Yoma 79b s.v. minei).

3. The third meal can be meat or fish, and need not include bread (Mordechai, Shabbos #397, quoting Ra’avyah). Ra’avayah states that eating something that would be considered a delicacy fulfills the mitzvah of eating the third meal.

4. The third meal can be fruit (Ramban; Rashba; Ran all to Shabbos 118a).

It should be noted that all authorities agree that it is preferable to have a bread meal for seudah shelishis, and the other three approaches are to be followed only under extenuating circumstances (Bach; Mishnah Berurah).

Two other opinions

5. Among rishonim, we find yet a fifth, more lenient opinion, that of the Rashba, who contends that one can fulfill any of the three meals of Shabbos by eating fruit. It is possible that he is assuming, similar to the Ra’avyah quoted above, that it must be something unusual to demonstrate the kavod and oneg of Shabbos, and not just eating an apple. This position is not accepted by most authorities, who rule that only the third meal may have this lenience (Tosafos, Pesachim 101a s.v. te’imu; Tur Orach Chayim 274). Those who have difficulty eating grain products can explore with their rav or posek the possibility of relying upon the Rashba’s approach.

6. There is, possibly, yet a sixth opinion, quoted in the name of the Zohar (Parshas Emor), that Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai fulfilled the mitzvah of seudah shelishis on Erev Pesach by learning Torah. It is unclear if this Zohar is meant to be understood literally as a halachic opinion, and, even if it is, is it meant to reflect something specifically related to Erev Pesach. Nevertheless, since I have seen it quoted in a halachic context, I share this with our readers.

At this point, we can address one of our opening questions: What is required to be eaten for the third meal on Shabbos?

According to the accepted conclusion of Shulchan Aruch, the third meal of Shabbos for both men and women should include bread. By the way, it should also have two whole loaves on the table, lechem mishneh. This latter halacha applies equally to women and men (Ran, Shabbos).

Under extenuating circumstances, to be discussed with an individual’s rav or posek, it may be permitted to eat mezonos, meat, fish or fruit instead of a full seudah and thereby fulfill the mitzvah of seudah shelishis, which, as we noted above, might be a requirement min haTorah. Someone who has medical issues that preclude his consuming bread at the third meal of Shabbos, or on Erev Pesach, when having three bread meals presents a challenge, can discuss with his rav or posek what to do.

Shaloshudis?

We can also address, at this point, another of our opening questions: Why do most people slur the word and pronounce it as shaloshudis? Should it not be called seudah shelishis?

Indeed, the correct pronunciation of this meal is seudah shelishis, or, in Sefardic and Israeli pronunciation, seudah shelishit. The history of its being called shaloshudis appears to be as follows:

Although having three meals on Shabbos, one on Friday night and two on Shabbos day, should not be a difficult mitzvah to fulfill, many viewed eating bread to fulfill the third meal as a burden. They stated quickly, “we need to fulfill shalosh seudos,” a tongue twister, which easily slurs into shaloshudis. (Similar slurrings occur when people wish one another “a guten yontif,” instead of a guten Yom Tov, or when reading the posuk in Hallel as “ki le’olam chazdo,”instead of ki le’olam chasdo, as the posuk states.)

Kiddush bimkom seudah

It should be noted that a dispute similar to the machlokes rishonim I cited above regarding what one is required to eat for seudah shelishis, exists regarding kiddush bimkom seudah. This means that when one recites kiddush on Friday night or Shabbos morning, one fulfills the mitzvah of kiddush only when he intends to eat a meal at the same time and place (Pesachim 101a; Shulchan Aruch¸Orach Chayim 273 and 289:1). (The details of the laws of kiddush bimkom seudah are quite extensive and will be dealt with at a different time.) The question is: What constitutes a meal?

There are four major opinions:

1. A bread meal (Maasei Rav #122;see also Biur Halacha 273:5 s.v. kosvu).

2. Mezonos (Rabbi Akiva Eiger commentary to Shulchan Aruch Orach Chayim 273:

3. Wine or mezonos (Shulchan Aruch Orach Chayim 273:5; Magen Avraham 273:11).

4. Fruit (Shiltei Hagiborim, quoted by Magen Avraham 273:11; and accepted as definitive by Rav Yitzchak Elchanan Spector, Shu’t Ein Yitzchak, Orach Chayim #12).

We should note that the Shulchan Aruch quotes only the third opinion. Following this approach, standard practice on Shabbos morning is to recite kiddush and then eat mezonos to accomplish kiddush bimkom seudah. There are individuals who may wish to be stringent and follow opinion #1, and make sure to eat hamotzi when they recite kiddush Shabbos morning. This is mentioned by his disciples as the Vilna Gaon’s personal practice, but is a personal stringency that may be followed only in a completely unobstrusive way and only after discussion with a gadol baTorah. I refer the reader to the insightful statement of Rav Eliyahu Dessler, Michtav Mei’eliyahu, Volume III, page 294, regarding the status of observing personal chumros that are not halachically mandated.

The fourth, and very lenient, opinion is quoted by some major halachic authorities, but is not usually considered a halachic position on which one can rely. However, someone may receive a special dispensation from their rav or posek to rely upon this approach and eat only fruit and consider it to be kiddush bimkom seudah. This will certainly be understandable for someone suffering from celiac, a food allergy or other medical situation in which consumption of any grain product is counterindicated.

Women and three meals?

Are women obligated to eat three meals on Shabbos, when it is a time-bound mitzvah?

Although the Gemara teaches that women are exempt from time-bound, positive mitzvos, the early halachic authorities require women to eat three meals on Shabbos. Nevertheless, we find a critical dispute as to why this mitzvah is an exception to the rule. Rabbeinu Tam rules that women are obligated because of the principle, af hein hayu be’oso haneis¸ they were also the beneficiaries of the miracle that is the basis of this mitzvah observance, since they also received the mann, upon which the three meals of Shabbos are based. On the other hand, the Ramban and the Ran rule that there is a more basic reason why women should observe this mitzvah: the two different references to the observance of Shabbos in the two versions of the Aseres Hadibroszachor, remember,and shamor, observe –teach that in all mitzvos of Shabbos, men and women are equally obligated. In other words, we have a general principle that the laws of Shabbos are exceptions to the rule that women are not obligated in time-bound mitzvos. (There are practical halachic differences that result from this dispute. Those who would like to research them can look, for example, at Shu’t Rabbi Akiva Eiger #1.)

Conclusion

In reference to the pasuk from Yeshayahu, vekarasa laShabbos oneg, likdosh Hashem mechubad, “And you shall call Shabbos a delight, that day which is holy to Hashem should be honored”, the Ramban (Shemos 20:8) explains that observing Shabbos is not simply a day of rest, and it is certainly not intended to be a day of recreation. It is meant to be a day of holiness, where we draw our attention away from temporal and temporary involvement, ideas and values and, instead, provide pleasure for our bodies, lives and souls in the service of Hashem. This includes emphasizing Torah study, and spending time with Torah scholars, to hear what Hashem wants from us in our daily lives. As I explained at the onset of this article, celebrating Shabbos according to the Torah’s dictates is part of the Torah’s instruction for the proper observance of this Holy day.

Women and Reading Megillah

Question #1: Ba’alas Korei

May a woman be the ba’alas keri’ah of the megillah?

Question #2: Kiddush and Arba Kosos

The elderly Mr. Klein is fully alert, but, unfortunately, he has difficulty enunciating. May Mrs. Klein recite kiddush and the other brachos of the seder for him?

Foreword

Although there is a general rule exempting women from mitzvos aseih shehazeman grama, (time-bound requirements involving positive action), such as tefillin, sukkah and tzitzis, there are numerous exceptions to this rule. For example, women are required to observe mitzvos related to Shabbos and Pesach and to hear Megillas Esther on Purim, all topics that we will discuss.

Part of the miracle

In three places, the Gemara quotes an early amora, Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, who ruled that women are obligated to fulfill the mitzvos of megillah, ner Chanukah and the four kosos of seder night. Although these are all time-bound mitzvos aseih, women are obligated to observe these specific mitzvos because of a different rule, af hein hayu be’oso haneis, “they were also included in the miracle.” This rule means that, when Chazal created the mitzvos of kindling Chanukah lights, reading megillah on Purim or consuming the four cups on the first night of Pesach, they included women in the obligation, notwithstanding that they are usually exempt from mitzvos aseih shehazeman grama.

The rishonim dispute what the term af hein hayu be’oso haneis means. Is this emphasizing that they were saved by the miracle, or does it mean that they were involved in bringing about the miracle?

Rashi and the Rashbam (Pesachim 108b) explain that af hein hayu be’oso haneis means that women were involved in causing the miracle (think of Esther declaring that the Jews fast and do teshuvah, approaching Achashveirosh and setting Haman up for his execution). On the other hand, Tosafos (Megillah 4a s. v. She’af; Pesachim 108b s. v. Hayu) contends that it means that women, also, were saved by the miracle of survival, either physical or spiritual, that we celebrate in each of these observances.

Mitzvos min haTorah?

Note that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi applied his principle to three mitzvos, each of which is a requirement only miderabbanan. Is this coincidental, or is the principle of af hein hayu be’oso haneis a principle that Chazal created that does not apply min haTorah? This issue is disputed by two Ba’alei Tosafos. The first opinion cited by Tosafos contends that af hein hayu be’oso haneis is a rabbinic principle and will not create a Torah requirement (Tosafos, Megillah 4a s. v. She’af; Mordechai, Megillah #780). The disputant, Rabbeinu Yosef of Eretz Yisrael, rules that af hein hayu be’oso haneis applies even to mitzvos that are min haTorah.

Shomei’a ke’oneh

Prior to answering our opening questions, we need to understand a halachic principle called shomei’a ke’oneh, which translates, literally, as “hearing is like responding.” This principle means that when I hear someone recite a prayer, the megillah, kiddush or havdalah, it is considered as if I, myself, recited it.

I will explain this principle with an example that we utilize regularly: Except for heads of household, most of us fulfill the mitzvos of kiddush and havdalah by hearing someone else recite them. But the mitzvah is to recite kiddush and havdalah, not merely to hear them. So, how do we fulfill these mitzvos when we are only hearing them? The answer is that, because of shomei’a ke’oneh, it is deemed that we recited kiddush and havdalah ourselves.

Three conditions

For shomei’a ke’oneh to work, three conditions must be met:

(1) The individual performing the mitzvah must have in mind to be motzi the other people, meaning that he knows that he is acting on behalf of those listening.

(2) The individual performing the mitzvah must be required to observe this mitzvah. In other words, if a child (under bar or bas mitzvah) recites kiddush or havdalah on behalf of an adult, the adult does not fulfill the mitzvah, since the child is not obligated in this mitzvah min haTorah (see Brachos 20b).

(3) The listeners must have in mind that they are discharging their obligation to perform the mitzvah by hearing this recital.

Parshas Zachor

It is for this last reason that, immediately prior to Parshas Zachor, the gabbai announces that everyone should have in mind with the reading of the ba’al keri’ah to fulfill the mitzvah of remembering Amaleik’s dastardly deeds. Only the ba’al keri’ah actually reads the appropriate Torah portion. The rest of us discharge our obligation to observe this mitzvah by hearing the ba’al keri’ah, which, because of shomei’a ke’oneh, is considered as if we read it ourselves. In addition to Parshas Zachor, brachos, reading the Torah and the megillah, kiddush and havdalah, there are numerous other applications of shomei’a ke’oneh.

Not now!

We should note that, although the person being motzi others must be obligated by the Torah to fulfill the mitzvah, this does not require him to fulfill the mitzvah with this reading, by which he is being motzi others. He may recite kiddush or havdalah for someone else, even if he, himself, has already fulfilled the mitzvah, or if he intends to fulfill the mitzvah later with a different recital of kiddush or havdalah. That is why a ba’al keri’ah can read megillah many different times to be motzi other people, even though he has already fulfilled the mitzvah. This is also the reason why kiddush and havdalah are recited in shul, notwithstanding that the person reciting them plans to recite them again at home.

Ba’alas korei

At this point, I can present the halachic background behind our opening question: May a woman be the ba’alas korei or ba’alas keri’ah of the megillah?

Whether a woman may assume the role of ba’alas keri’ah is the subject of a fascinating dispute among rishonim, as we will soon see.

The Mishnah (Megillah 19b) states: Everyone is qualified to read the megillah except for a minor and someone who is not halachically responsible for his actions. The Gemara (Arachin 2b) asks: what is being added by emphasizing that “everyone” is qualified to read the megillah? The Gemara replies that women, who are usually not obligated in time-bound mitzvos, are obligated to read the megillah, to the extent that they may read the megillah to be motzi others. Rashi explains, explicitly, that this means that a woman may read the megillah to be motzi a man in his obligation. Thus, according to Rashi, a woman may be the ba’alas keri’ah of the megillah.

However, the Ba’al Halachos Gedolos (usually abbreviated as Bahag, the author of a halachic work from the era of the geonim) notes that the Tosefta, a halachic work dating back to the era of the Mishnah, disagrees. The salient part of the Tosefta (Megillah 2:4), as we have its text, reads: “All are obligated in the reading of the megillah… . Women… are exempt and cannot be motzi the public (rabbim) from their responsibility.”

Is there any way to resolve this contradiction between the Mishnah, as understood by the Gemara, and the Tosefta?

The Bahag presents an approach to explain the Mishnah and the Tosefta such that there is no conflict between the two positions. When the Mishnah implies, and the Gemara states explicitly, that a woman can be motziah (the feminine of motzi; plural motzios) someone else, it means that she can be motziah a woman, but not a man.

Why should this be true? The Bahag explains that there are two levels of mitzvah regarding the megillah:

(1) To read the megillah.

(2) To hear the megillah.

Ordinarily, a man fulfills both requirements when he hears the megillah from another man, since the person reading the megillah, who has both obligations, reads it for the purpose that the listeners fulfill all their megillah-related obligations. However, since a woman’s obligation is only to hear the megillah, but not to read it, it is not within her ability to be motzi someone who is obligated to read the megillah (Rosh, Megillah 1:4; note that Shu”t Avnei Neizer [Orach Chayim #511:4-5] and the Brisker Rav [Al Hashas, Inyanim #15] explain the Bahag’s approach slightly differently).

With this approach, the Bahag explains that the Mishnah refers to a woman reading the megillah for other women, which she can do, and the Tosefta refers to a woman reading the megillah for men, which is why it states that a woman cannot be motziah the public, which includes men.

The Tosefta according to Rashi

According to Rashi, either the text of this Tosefta is in error (as is not uncommon in our texts of the Tosefta) or it disagrees with the Mishnah as understood by the Gemara, in which case we rule according to the Mishnah and Gemara (both of these approaches are mentioned, in different places, by the Bach, Orach Chayim 689). We should point out that the texts that we have received of the Tosefta are notoriously unreliable, since copyists often made errors and, as a result, texts that were studied less frequently are often inaccurate. As an example, the rishonim who quote this Tosefta cite it with at least three significantly different texts.

Also, if, indeed, there is a dispute between the tanna who authored the Mishnah and the one who authored the Tosefta, the halacha follows the author of the Mishnah. Thus, either approach used to explain Rashi’s position is highly satisfactory.

Other rishonim?

Several authorities infer from the Rambam that he agreed with Rashi’s halachic conclusion (Magid Mishnah, Hilchos Megillah 1:2; Beis Yosef, Orach Chayim 689). The Beis Yosef and the Darkei Moshe quote other rishonim on both sides of fence: The Or Zarua rules like Rashi, whereas the Ra’avyah and the Mordechai (Megillah #779) rule like the Bahag. The Shulchan Aruch’s conclusion is unclear (Orach Chayim 689:2), whereas the Rema rules like the Bahag.

According to the Bahag’s opinion, some authorities contend that a woman hearing megillah when no male is fulfilling the mitzvah should not recite the brocha al mikra megillah, since she is not required to read the megillah, but to hear it. The Rema records that she should recite lishmo’a megillah, but others prefer that she should recite lishmo’a mikra megillah (Mishnah Berurah 689:8).

Getting a third opinion

Are there any other opinions? We actually find a few other opinions among rishonim, who present alternative ways of resolving the contradiction between the Mishnah and the Tosefta, with halachic results unlike either Rashi or the Bahag. Rabbi Moshe of Coucy (France), a ba’al Tosafos who wrote a halachic work based on the 613 mitzvos, usually called Sefer Hamitzvos Hagadol (abbreviated as Semag), agrees with the Bahag that a woman cannot be motziah a man, but disagrees with the reason why. In his opinion, just as Chazal ruled that a woman cannot fulfill the mitzvah of keri’as haTorah, because it is not kavod hatzibur for her to read for the community (Megillah 23a), she may also not read to be motzi a man in megillah (towards the beginning of Hilchos Megillah in the Semag). Tosafos (Sukkah 38a s. v. Be’emes at end) may agree with this opinion of the Semag.

With this approach, the Semag answers the contradiction between the Mishnah and the Gemara, on one hand, and the Tosefta, on the other, in a way similar to that of the Bahag. The Mishnah and Gemara teach that a woman may read the megillah for someone else; the Tosefta is ruling that she may not be the ba’alas keri’ah for a community.

There is yet a fourth approach to the issue, that of the Ba’al Ha’itur (Hilchos Megillah, page 110, column 1), but the details of his opinion are somewhat unclear (see Ran [Megillah 19b, 6b in the Rif’s pages]; Tur and Bach, Orach Chayim 689).

Three is a crowd

There is yet another opinion, contending that the Tosefta means that a woman should not read the megillah for more than one other woman (Korban Nesanel, Megillah 1:4:60, in explanation of Tosafos, Sukkah 38a s. v. Be’emes). According to this position, the Tosefta meant this when it said that a woman she should not read for the “public” (“rabbim” in the words of the Tosefta). The Mishnah Berurah quotes this approach as authoritative halacha (Shaar Hatziyun, 689:15). This opinion actually ends up with a stricter ruling, since, according to both Rashi and the Bahag, a woman may read megillah to be motziah other women, regardless as to how many there are, whereas this opinion allows her to be motziah only one other woman, not any more.

Kiddush

Does this principle of the Bahag apply to kiddush just as it applies to the reading of the megillah? Let us explore the halachic data on the subject.

The Gemara (Brachos 20b) states, unequivocally, that women are obligated in the mitzvah of reciting kiddush. Does this mean that a woman may recite kiddush to be motzi a man? Or, is this dependent on the dispute between Rashi and the Bahag?

Several early acharonim understand that the same dispute that exists between Rashi and the Bahag regarding women reading the megillah for men applies to women reciting kiddush for men (Maharshal and Bach, in their commentaries to Tur Orach Chayim 271). They conclude that a woman may recite kiddush for other women, but may not recite kiddush to be motzi a man in kiddush.

However, the Taz, who was the son-in-law of the Bach, disputes his father-in-law’s conclusion, contending that the Bahag’s opinion is limited to reading the Megillah, and does not apply to reciting kiddush. Since the Gemara concludes that women are obligated in kiddush min haTorah, it appears that they can be motzi men in kiddush. (This approach appears to be implied by the Gemara, Brachos 20b).

Kiddush according to the Semag

We noted above the opinion of the Semag that women cannot be motzios men in reading the megillah, just as they cannot be called up to read the Torah. This position should apply only to a woman reading the megillah, but not to reciting kiddush, which is usually not performed publicly, but recited at home.

Arba Kosos

At this point, let us explore one of our opening questions: The elderly Mr. Klein is fully alert, but, unfortunately, he has difficulty enunciating. May Mrs. Klein recite kiddush and the other brachos of the seder for him?

Chazal required that men and women have four kosos at the seder. It is difficult to imagine that someone can be motzi someone else in this requirement – drinking the four cups of wine it a mitzvah degufei, a mitzvah that is performed with one’s body, similar to matzoh, lulav and tefillin, which preclude one person performing the mitzvah for another. However, someone can recite the brachos that pertain to these kosos for someone else.

The Gemara states that each of the four kosos is associated with a different mitzvah of the seder, and, in fact, each of these mitzvos includes at least one brocha. We hold the kos while we recite these brachos.

1. The first kos is kiddush.

2. Over the second kos, we recite the brocha of Asher Ge’alanu, which completes the mitzvah of magid.

3. The third kos is used for birkas hamazon.

4. The fourth kos is the brocha upon the completion of Hallel.

Women are obligated in all the laws of the seder, which includes reciting the brachos associated with its four kosos. Does it say whether they can be motzios a man in these brachos? Would the Bahag’s opinion that they should not be motziah a man in megillah apply to these brachos? I did not find anyone who discusses this issue.

How do we pasken?

Having explained the understanding and ramifications of all these issues, let us present the halachic conclusions:

Most late authorities conclude that, regarding the reading of the megillah, we should follow the approach of the Bahag that women should not read megillah for men, and, also, we should follow the approach of the Semag that women should not read in public for a group of women. If no man is available who can read the megillah for her, a woman may read the megillah for herself, and she may also read the megillah for another woman.

Regarding the halachos of women being motzios men in kiddush, the later authorities do not accept the approach of the Maharshal and the Bach that the same ruling applies to kiddush. Instead, they contend that when there is a valid reason for a woman to make kiddush for her family, she should do so and be motziah the male members (Magen Avraham, 271:2 and later acharonim). Regarding the bracha of Asher Ge’alanu at the seder, my halachic conclusion is that Mrs. Klein may recite these brachos and be motziah Mr. Klein with them.

Conclusion

Why are women exempt from mitzvos aseih shehazeman grama? Most people, and certainly several commentaries, assume that this is because a woman’s family responsibilities should not be subject to other mitzvos that may conflict with them. However, not everyone agrees with this idea. Some note that there already is a halachic principle of oseik bemitzvah patur min hamitzvah, someone occupied with fulfilling one mitzvah is exempt from performing a different mitzvah, until the first mitzvah is completed. Thus, it would seem superfluous for the Torah to have established yet another rule, to exempt women from mitzvos aseih shehazeman grama, because of the exact same rationale.

Other authorities contend that Hashem, Who created all of our neshamos, knows which mitzvos our particular soul needs in order to thrive, and each individual’s neshamah needs different mitzvos. Following this idea, it is obvious that kohanim need certain mitzvos, but are excluded from others; men require certain mitzvos and cannot fulfill others, and so, also, with women. Each person’s neshamah has its own Divinely created formula for what it needs.

How Does a Heter Iska Work?

Andy Gross, a businessman who is proud that he is now observing mitzvos, is on time for his appointment. After a brief greeting, I ask him what brings him to my office on this beautiful morning.

clip_image002

“I recently learned that even though the Torah prohibits paying or receiving interest, there is something called a heter iska that legalizes it. How can we legitimize something that the Torah expressly prohibits?”

Indeed, Andy’s question is both insightful and important, and deserves a thorough explanation. Why don’t you join us!

I note that this week’s parsha discusses the prohibition of interest:

Do not collect interest from him, for you shall fear Hashem and allow your brother to live. Therefore, do not provide him money with interest (Chapter 25:36-37).

This verse teaches three different mitzvos:

1. Do not collect interest from him. This entails a prohibition on the lender against collecting interest (Bava Metzia 75b).

2. Allow your brother to live. From the words allow your brother to live we derive a positive commandment that one who did collect interest is required to return it (Bava Metzia 62a).

3. Do not provide him money with interest. This prohibits creating a loan that involves interest, even if the lender never collects it (Bava Metzia 62a). A lender who later collects the interest also violates the first prohibition, and if he subsequently does not return it, he violates the positive commandment.

Not only does the lender violate the prohibition against ribbis, but also the borrower, the witnesses, the broker, the co-signer, the scribe who writes up the loan document (Mishnah Bava Metzia 75b), the notary public who notarizes it, and possibly even the attorney who drafts a document that includes provisions for ribbis,all violate the laws of ribbis (Bris Yehudah 1:6). Thus, anyone causing the loan to be either finalized or collected violates the Torah’s law.

“The halachos of ribbis are quite complex,” I told Andy. “From my experience, even seasoned Torah scholars sometimes mistakenly violate the prohibition of ribbis. For example, having a margin account at a Jewish-owned brokerage, charging a Jewish customer for late payment, or borrowing off someone else’s credit line usually entail violations of ribbis. I even know of Torah institutions that ‘borrow’ the use of someone’s credit card in order to meet their payroll, intending to gradually pay back the interest charges.”

“Why does the last case involve ribbis?” inquired an inquisitive Andy.

“Let me present a case where I was involved. A Torah institution was behind on payroll, and had no one available from whom to borrow. The director asked a backer if the institution could borrow money through his bank credit line.”

“I still do not see any ribbis problem here” replied Andy, “just a chesed that costs him nothing.”

“To whom did the bank lend money?” I asked Andy.

“As far as they are concerned, they are lending money to the backer, since it was his credit line.”

“So from whom did the institution borrow? The bank did not lend to them. Doesn’t this mean that really two loans have taken place: one from the bank to Mr. Chesed, and another from him to the institution? The loan from the bank incurs interest charges that Mr. Chesed is obligated to pay. Who is paying those charges?”

“It would only be fair for the institution to pay them,” responded Andy.

“However, if the institution pays those charges, they are in effect paying more money to Mr. Chesed than they borrowed from him, since they are also paying his debt to the bank. This violates ribbis. The fact that the institution pays the bank directly does not mitigate the problem (see Bava Metzia 71b).”

Andy was noticeably stunned. “I have always thought of interest as a prohibition against usury – or taking advantage of a desperate borrower. Here the ‘usurer’ did not even lend any money, and thought he was doing a tremendous chesed for tzedakah; he did not realize that his assistance caused both of them to violate a serious prohibition!”

“What is even more unfortunate,” I continued, “is that one can convert most of these prohibited transactions into a heter iska that is perfectly permitted.

WHAT IS A HETER ISKA?

“A heter iska is a halachically approved way of restructuring a loan or debt so that it becomes an investment instead of a loan. This presumes that the investor assumes some element of risk should the business fail, which is one basic difference between an investment and a loan. An investor could potentially lose money, whereas a lender does not lose because the borrower always remains responsible to pay.

“One is permitted to create a heter iska even when the goal of both parties is only to find a kosher way of creating a transaction that is very similar to an interest- bearing loan (Terumas Ha’deshen #302). The words heter iska mean exactly that: performing an allowable business deal that is similar to a prohibited transaction. As we will see, the structure must still allow for an element of risk and loss as accepted by halacha, otherwise it fails the test of being an investment.

“There are several ways of structuring a heter iska, and, indeed, different situations may call for different types of heter iska. In order to explain how a basic heter iska operates, I must first explain an investment that involve no ribbis, so that we can understand how a heter iska was developed. For the balance of this article, we will no longer refer to “borrowers” and “lenders.” Instead, I will refer to a “managing partner” or “manager” and an “investor.”

Andy interrupts my monologue. “Was heter iska used in earlier generations?”

THE EARLIEST HETER ISKA

“The concept of heter iska is many hundreds of years old. The earliest heter iska of which I am aware is suggested by the Terumas Ha’deshen (1390-1460). His case involves Reuven, who wishes to invest in interest-bearing loans to gentile customers, but does not want to take any risk. Shimon, who is an experienced broker of such loans, is willing to take the risk in return for some of the profit on Reuven’s money.

“Reuven wants a guarantee that he will receive back all his capital regardless of what actually happens in the business venture. Essentially, this means that Shimon is borrowing money from Reuven and lending it to gentiles; this would result in a straightforward Torah prohibition of ribbis, since Shimon is paying Reuven a return on the loan. Is there any way that Reuven and Shimon can structure the deal without violating the Torah’s prohibitions against paying and receiving interest?”

At this point, Andy exclaims: “Either this is a loan, and Reuven’s money is protected, or it is an investment, and it is not. How can Reuven have his cake and eat it too!”

“Actually, all the attempts at creating heter iska are attempts to find a balance whereby the investor is fairly secure that his assets are safe, and yet can generate profit. In your words, to try to have his cake and eat it.

PIKADON – INVESTING

“Let me explain how a heter iska accomplishes both these goals, by developing a case: Mr. Sweat has a business idea, but he lacks the capital to implement it. He approaches Mr. Bucks for investment capital. If Bucks has sufficient confidence in Sweat’s acumen to build a business, he might decide to invest even without knowing any details about it, since Sweat knows how to provide handsome profits. None of this involves any ribbis issues since there is no loan and no one is paying to use the other person’s capital. This business venture is called a pikadon.

GUARANTEEING THE INVESTMENT

“Your model is highly theoretical,” Andy points out, “since it assumes that Mr. Bucks invests without much assurance. Few people I know would entrust someone with their money without some type of guarantee.”

“You have hit on a key point – let us see how halacha deals with this. Whenever an investor entrusts someone with funds, the Torah permits him to demand an oath afterwards that the manager was not negligent. Therefore, Bucks may insist that Sweat swears an oath that he was not negligent with the money, and also that he reported accurately how much profit Bucks receives. An agreement may even require that Sweat swears this oath by using G-d’s name and while holding a Sefer Torah in front of the entire congregation.”

“That should certainly get Sweat to sweat,” quipped Andy. “But then again, assuming Mr. Sweat is a frum Jew, is he going to want to swear any oath at all?”

“That is exactly the point that secures Bucks’ bucks, since observant people would pay a substantial sum of money to avoid swearing an oath. The heter iska specifies that the manager has the option of swearing the oath and paying only what the investor is entitled. However, the manager also has the option of substituting an agreed-upon payment for the oath. Since observant Jews would rather pay the fixed return rather than swear an oath, we accomplish that the investor is reasonably secure, although no loan and no ribbis transpired. The result is not a loan, but a cleverly structured investment.”

After waiting a few seconds and absorbing what he just learned, Andy continued:

“Is there anything else I need to know about a heter iska before I use one?”

“I need to explain one other very important detail that, unfortunately, people often overlook. Most forms of heter iska state that the investor paid the manager a specific sum of money, say one dollar, for his time involved in the business venture. It is vitally important that this dollar be actually paid; otherwise there is a ribbis prohibition involved. Yet I know that many people overlook this requirement and do not understand its importance.”

“Why is this important?”

STANDARD ISKA – A SILENT PARTNERSHIP

“The standard heter iska assumes that the arrangement is half loan and half pikadon. This means that if Mr. Bucks invests $100,000 with Mr. Sweat to open a business, Mr. Bucks and Mr. Sweat become partners in the business because half of the amount is a $50,000 loan that Mr. Sweat must eventually repay, and the other half is a $50,000 outlay that Mr. Bucks has invested in a business that Mr. Sweat owns or intends to open. Bucks may receive no profit on the $50,000 loan he extended — if he does, it is prohibited ribbis. However, he may receive as much profit on the investment part of the portfolio as is generated by half the business. As a result, Mr. Bucks and Mr. Sweat are both 50% partners in the business.

RECEIVING PROFIT FROM THE LOAN

“However, there is an interesting problem that we must resolve. Bucks invested a sum with Sweat, for which he received a profit, and he also loaned Sweat money, for which he may not receive any profit. However, the return on the investment was realized only because Mr. Sweat is investing his know-how and labor to generate profit for the partnership – know-how and labor for which Bucks did not pay. Why is this not payment for Mr. Bucks’ loan, and therefore ribbis?

“This concern is raised by the Gemara, which presents two methods to resolve the problem.

“One approach is that the investor pays the manager a certain amount for his expertise and effort. As long as both parties agree in advance, we are unconcerned how little (or much) this amount is (Bava Metzia 68b). However, there must be an amount, and it must actually be paid. Even if they agree to a sum as paltry as one dollar, this is an acceptable arrangement, similar to Michael Bloomberg’s accepting one dollar as salary to be mayor of New York.”

“I now understand,” interjected Andy, “why it is so important that this amount be actually paid. If Mr. Sweat receives no compensation for his hard work on behalf of Mr. Bucks’ investment, it demonstrates that he was working because he received a loan, which is prohibited ribbis.”

“Precisely. However, there is another way to structure the heter iska to avoid the problem; have the profit and loss percentages vary. This means that if the business profits, the managing partner makes a larger part of the profit than he loses if there is a loss. For example, our silent and managing partners divide the profits evenly, but in case of loss, our manager is responsible to pay only 30% of the loss, which means that he owns only 30% of the business. The extra 20% of the profits he receives is his salary for managing the business. He is therefore being paid a percentage of Bucks’ profits for his efforts, similar to the way a money manager or financial consultant is often compensated by receiving a percentage of the profits on the funds he manages. Personally, I prefer this type of heter iska, but the type I described previously is perfectly acceptable as long as Mr. Sweat receives some compensation for his effort and know-how.

“The heter iska I have seen used by the Jewish owned banks in Israel includes this method. The bank invests 45% in a “business” managed by the mortgage borrower, but the borrower is entitled to 50% of the profits. Thus, he is ‘paid’ five per cent of the profits to manage the investment.”

“Can you explain to me how the Terumas Ha’deshen’s money lender would use a heter iska?” inquired Andy.

“Actually, his heter iska varied slightly from what we use today. Using today’s accepted heter iska, Shimon, the manager, accepts the money with the understanding that he is borrowing part and managing the balance for Reuven. He is compensated for his efforts according to one of the approaches mentioned above, and agrees in advance to divide the profits. He also agrees that he will swear an oath guaranteeing that he was not negligent in his responsibilities, and the two parties agree that if he subsequently chooses to pay Reuven a certain amount he is absolved of swearing the oath. Thus, Reuven’s return is not interest on a loan, but the amount Shimon had agreed to pay rather than swear how much he actually owes Reuven.

“This approach has been accepted by thousands of halachic authorities as a valid method of receiving a return on one’s investment that looks like interest but is not. The Chofetz Chayim notes that if someone can lend money without compensation, he should certainly do so and not utilize a heter iska, because he is performing chesed (Ahavas Chesed 2:15). Heter iska is meant for investment situations, and should ideally be limited to them.

“I would like to close by sharing with you a thought from Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch about the reason why the Torah prohibited interest. He notes that if the Torah considered charging interest to be inherently immoral, it would have banned charging interest from non-Jews, and also would have prohibited only the lender and not the borrower. Rather, Rav Hirsch notes, the Torah’s prohibition is so that the capital we receive from Hashem is used for tzedakah and loans, thereby building and maintaining a Torah community. The Torah’s goal in banning the use of capital for interest-paying loans is to direct excess funds to chesed and tzedakah.”

Bedeviled by Stirring Events

Some Insights on the Melacha of Losh

I was recently asked the following question:

“My daughter was taught that we cannot make deviled eggs on Shabbos because adding mustard and shaping them is considered ‘kneading’ the yolks. But I remember my mother always mixed hard boiled eggs with minced onion and oil on Shabbos morning shortly before the meal. Could my mother have been wrong?”

As our readership is aware, the Torah prohibits melachos on Shabbos not because they are taxing, but because these activities are significant and important (Bava Kamma 2a). As the Yerushalmi relates, after toiling for three and a half years to understand all the prohibited activities of Shabbos, Rabbi Yochanan and his brother-in-law, Reish Lakish, concluded that each of the 39 major melachos (avos) has at least 39 sub-categories, tolados, which are also prohibited min haTorah (Yerushalmi, Shabbos, beginning of 7:2). As is clear from the passage, these eminent scholars realized that the Torah prohibited these types of significant activity. As Rav Shamshon Raphael Hirsch notes, the Torah does not prohibit avodah, which connotes hard work, but melacha, which implies purpose and accomplishment (Commentary to Shemos 20:10).

One of the melacha activities prohibited on Shabbos is losh, kneading (Mishnah Shabbos 73a). Although building the Mishkan did not involve kneading dough, dying the cloth used in its construction required kneading a thick paste (see Rashi, Shabbos 73a and Shabbos 156a). (Some Rishonim contend that we derive forbidden melachos also from activities performed for the service of the Mishkan and the Beis HaMikdash, and not only from the Mishkan’s construction. According to these opinions, the melacha of kneading could be derived from the meal offerings of the Mishkan that involved the kneading of dough [Rav Hai Gaon, quoted in introduction to Maasei Rokei’ach and by Eglei Tal].)

WHAT IS LOSH?

The concept of losh is to combine fine powders or similar small items into a unit by adding liquid (Shevisas Hashabbas). Thus, mixing clay for pottery, or cement and sand into concrete, violates the Torah prohibition of losh (see Rambam, Hilchos Shabbos 8:16; Rashi, Shabbos 74b). Similarly, mixing oatmeal or reconstituting instant mashed potatoes violates the Torah prohibition of losh (in addition to whatever prohibitions of cooking may be involved).

Similarly, preparing certain other food items might fall under the rubric of losh. For example, the Gemara discusses whether one may mix bran with water to feed one’s animals. Although bran and water do not form dough, this question is discussed because adding water makes the bran stick together (Shabbos 155b).

The Tanna’im dispute whether one may add water to bran on Shabbos to feed one’s animals, Rebbe prohibiting because he feels that this constitutes a Torah violation of losh, whereas Rabbi Yosi ben Rabbi Yehudah maintains that adding water to bran involves only a rabbinic prohibition and is permitted in order to feed one’s animals, if performed in an indirect way. This introduces a new concept in the laws of losh – that one may perform a rabbinically prohibited activity in an indirect way, in order to prepare food or feed on Shabbos (Shabbos 155b-156a). Performing a prohibited activity in an indirect way is called a shinui or kil’achar yad (literally, using the back of one’s hand), and is usually prohibited miderabbanan. However, under extenuating circumstances, Chazal relaxed the prohibition.

Losh applies only when mixing fine items that stick together to form a unit. It does not apply when adding liquid to large items even if they stick together, since they do not combine into one item (Taz, Orach Chayim 321:12). Therefore, one may use oil or mayonnaise to make a potato salad or tuna salad on Shabbos, if the pieces of potato or tuna are large enough to prevent the salad appearing like a single mass.

BATTER VERSUS DOUGH

The Gemara implies that there is a halachic difference between a belilah rakkah, the consistency of batter, and belilah avah, the consistency of dough. By “batter” we mean a mix that does hold together, so it is not a liquid, yet is fluid enough that one can pour it from one bowl to another (Chazon Ish, Orach Chayim 58:9). Creating a batter involves only a rabbinic violation, whereas mixing a consistency like dough, which is thick enough that one cannot pour it, has stricter rules, often involving a Torah violation.

If the mix does not hold together at all, then one may make such a mixture without any concerns because it is considered a liquid (Chazon Ish, Orach Chayim 58:9).

DEVILING THE EGGS

Based on the above discussion, it would appear that one may not mix egg salad or deviled eggs on Shabbos without a shinui, and possibly not even with a shinui. The mix created when making these foods cannot be poured, and therefore does not qualify as a “batter” but as “dough,” which may entail a Torah prohibition of mixing on Shabbos. Ordinarily, food preparation on Shabbos that involves a Torah prohibition is not permitted, even with a shinui.

However, a standard appetizer in many parts of Europe for the Shabbos day meal was to chop up and stir together hard-boiled eggs, onion and schmaltz, a dish called zwiebel eire or “eggs and onions” that required preparation immediately before serving. Was it permitted to mix “eggs and onions” on Shabbos or did this violate the prohibition against kneading on Shabbos, since the finished product was mashed egg and onion held together with fat? Although it would seem to be prohibited to prepare this food on Shabbos, this food was commonly prepared every Shabbos morning prior to serving. Does this mean that all these observant Jews were violating the Torah’s command? When we consider that this was the standard appetizer eaten by thousands of Jewish households every Shabbos for hundreds of years, it is difficult to imagine that millions of eggs and onions were prepared in violation of the laws of Shabbos!

Several halachic authorities raise this question, providing a variety of approaches to explain why one may blend eggs and onions on Shabbos. Could the reason to allow it apply to contemporary deviled eggs or egg salad?

Some contend that this was permitted only when the pieces of egg and onion were both large enough to prevent the mix from having a dough-like consistency, but rather looked more like large pieces stuck together. However, the prevalent approach was to chop the eggs and onions into a very fine consistency, in which case the above-mentioned leniency was not applicable.

Other authorities permitted mixing and stirring them together only with a shinui, although apparently the prevalent custom was to mix it without any shinui at all.

RAV SHELOMOH KLUGER’S APPROACH

Rav Shelomoh Kluger, a great luminary of nineteenth-century Poland, proposed a highly original reasoning to legitimize the preparing of the eggs and onions on Shabbos. Regarding various halachos of the Torah, predominantly the laws of tumah and taharah, only seven substances are considered liquids — wine, blood, olive oil, milk, dew, honey and water. Rav Kluger contended that the halachos of losh are also dependent on the use of one of these seven liquids to create the “dough” (Shu”t Ha’elef Lecha Shelomoh, Orach Chayim #139). According to this novel approach, no losh prohibition is involved if one uses mayonnaise or any oil other than olive oil, nor if one makes dough on Shabbos using only juice other than grape juice.

We should note that following this line of reasoning, not only may one prepare the famous eggs and onions mixture, but one may also prepare deviled eggs or egg salad on Shabbos, provided one does not use olive oil as the liquid. Although some may prefer use of olive oil for its cholesterol and other medical benefits, this would not justify violating the laws of Shabbos.

However, Rav Kluger’s approach is not without its detractors. For one thing, as he himself points out, his approach disputes the statement of a highly-respected earlier authority, the Pri Megadim (Mishbetzos Zahav 321:12), who contends that losh is violated when one mixes foods together with goose schmaltz (in his era, a common ingredient in European homes). This demonstrates clearly that any substance that causes items to stick together violates losh, at least according to some widely-accepted opinions. For the most part, later authorities have not accepted Rav Kluger’s contention limiting losh to the “seven liquids.”

Rav Shelomoh Kluger applied a second reason to permit the preparation of eggs and onions on Shabbos. He theorized that losh only applies to the earth itself or to items that grow from the ground — thus precluding eggs from the prohibition of losh. Although this approach only resolves the losh consideration germane to the eggs in the mixture but not to the onions, Rav Kluger further contended that the onions are also exempt from losh since the eggs are the main ingredient. He maintained that when mixing several items, of which losh applies only to some, halacha considers only the major ingredient and ignores the rest (Shu”t Ha’elef Lecha Shelomoh, Orach Chayim #139).

This second approach of Rav Shelomoh Kluger is also not without its detractors. Both the contention that losh applies only to items that grow from the ground, and the further supposition that one ignores the lesser item are challenged by later authorities (see Tzitz Eliezer 11:36:3, quoting Yad Yosef).

OTHER APPROACHES

Other reasons are quoted to permit making eggs and onions on Shabbos, including a suggestion that there is no losh prohibition to stir in an ingredient added for taste, even if it indeed causes the food to hold together. (This position is quoted by the Tzitz Eliezer 11:36 in the name of an anonymous great scholar; however, the Tzitz Eliezer rejects this argument.) According to this approach, one might argue that one may make deviled eggs on Shabbos since the mustard is primarily added for flavor. On the other hand, one could argue that one’s intent is to create a consistent filling, which is losh.

Others permit the mixing of eggs and onions because they do not form into a gush, that is, a single unit (Shu”t Be’er Moshe 6:44). According to this reasoning, deviling eggs is forbidden since one is indeed forming units of seasoned mashed egg yolk.

RAV SHELOMOH ZALMAN AUERBACH’S APPROACH

Rav Shelomoh Zalman Auerbach presents a different reason to permit mixing eggs and onions on Shabbos, which requires a small introduction. At the time of the Gemara, neither Post nor General Mills had yet cornered the market on breakfast cereal, and people were forced to prepare their own breakfast. The Cheerios of the day involved mixing a specialty flour called kali, made from toasted kernels, with oil, water and salt. The Gemara quotes an opinion that permits mixing kali on Shabbos, provided one uses a minor shinui while doing so (Shabbos 155b). Several authorities question why the Gemara is so lenient in this instance (Nishmas Adam; Biur Halacha). Allow me to explain the basis of their concern:

Usually, a shinui may be used on Shabbos in only one of two circumstances:

1. To prepare food that, without the shinui, involves only a rabbinic prohibition.

2. To prepare the food in a radically different way from how it is usually prepared. An example of this is crushing foods on Shabbos with the handle of a knife. Although it is prohibited min haTorah to chop items fine on Shabbos, since crushing with a knife handle is a very different method from mashing or grinding with mortar and pestle, Chazal permitted it (Shibbolei Ha’leket #92, based on Shabbos 141a).

Thus, we are faced with the following anomaly: The Gemara permits mixing kali on Shabbos, seemingly permitting a Torah prohibition of losh by means of a minor deviation from the normal method, which is usually not a sufficient reason to be allow it.

The Biur Halacha  (321:14 s.v. Shema) responds to this question with two different novel approaches to explain why this is permitted:

1. Mixing food that is already cooked or toasted, and therefore ready to eat, does not violate the prohibition of losh. Chazal prohibited doing so because it looks like kneading, and therefore it is permitted with a shinui, as are many other food preparations.

2. The Biur Halacha suggests an alternative approach: there is no violation of losh while one is eating. This is similar to a concept found by other melachos, notably selecting and grinding, that permits performing these activities immediately before consuming them. As such, preparing kali at breakfast time would be permitted.

This approach has its detractors, since no early authorities note that this lenience applies to losh, and logically there is a big distinction between selecting and grinding, which are processes that are absolutely essential to normal eating, and kneading, which is not essential (see Magen Avraham 321:24).

RETURNING TO EGGS AND ONIONS

Based on both approaches of the Biur Halacha, Rav Shelomoh Zalman Auerbach notes that preparing eggs and onions should be permitted because this food cannot be prepared before Shabbos, and becomes ruined if not prepared shortly before eating. A similar approach to explain the custom of mixing eggs and onions is presented by the Tehillah Le’David (321:25).

In addition, Rav Shelomoh Zalman Auerbach reasons that losh is a process that one does while eating, since one mixes food together in one’s mouth (Shulchan Shelomoh 321:16). This author does not understand the last statement of Rav Shelomoh Zalman Auerbach, since the processing of food that takes place in one’s mouth, chewing, reduces food to small particles and does not combine small particles into larger ones, which is the essence of losh.

According to Rav Shelomoh Zalman Auerbach’s approach, preparing eggs and onions requires a shinui, meaning that one should add the ingredients to the bowl in an inverted order than one usually does, and should also preferably stir the mix in an unusual fashion, such as not in normal circular strokes but with alternative crisscross motions instead.

However, the approaches mentioned earlier permit mixing eggs and onions without any shinui at all. When reading later halachic works, one finds many poskim who feel that one should avoid preparing eggs and onions on Shabbos, and certainly not without a shinui, whereas others are suspicious of those who question such a time-hallowed practice (Be’er Moshe; Tzitz Eliezer).

We should also note that the first approach presented by the Biur Halacha should permit not only the famous eggs and onions, but also preparing either egg salad or deviled eggs on Shabbos. Furthermore, according to his second approach, it is permitted to prepare them immediately before the meal, even though the egg salad or deviled eggs will not be served until much later in the meal, similar to the rules of boreir. Both of the Biur Halacha’s heterim require using a shinui while mixing the ingredients, i.e., by adding ingredients in a different order than usual and by not using the usual circular motions while stirring.

The Torah commanded us concerning the halachos of Shabbos by giving us the basic categories that are prohibited. Shabbos is a day that we refrain from altering the world for our own purposes. Instead, we allow Hashem’s rule to be the focus of creation by refraining from our own creative acts (Rav Shamshon Raphael Hirsch’s Commentary to Shemos 20:10). By demonstrating Hashem’s rule even over non-exertive activities such as kneading, we demonstrate and acknowledge the true Creator of the world and all it contains.

Between Yishtabach and Borchu

Since Az Yashir, which concludes pesukei dezimra, is in parshas Beshalach, this article about the conclusion of Pesukei Dezimra is most appropriate.

Question #1: Between Yishtabach and Kaddish

Avraham asks: “In the shullen in which I used to daven, during the aseres yemei teshuvah we always recited the chapter of tehillim,Shir hama’alos mima’amakim,’right after Yishtabach. Someone recently told me that the reason why I do not see this custom practiced any more is because it is a hefsek in the davening. Is this true?”

Question #2: Between Kaddish and Borchu

Yitzchak queries: “Because of my work schedule, I must daven at a very early minyan. At times, we begin davening when it is too early to put on talis and tefillin, so we put on talis and tefillin after Yishtabach. Someone told me that when we do this, we are creating a problem with reciting Kaddish after Yishtabach. Is this true? And if it is true, what should we do?”

Question #3: Between Borchu and Yotzeir

Yaakov inquires: “If I need to use the facilities during davening, may I recite the beracha of Asher Yatzar after answering Borchu, provided I have not yet begun to say the beracha of Yotzeir Or?”

Introduction: Pesukei Dezimra, Yishtabach and Borchu

All of the above questions deal with the same general issue: What are the laws about making an interruption, a hefsek, between completing the recital of Yishtabach and prior to reciting Birchos Kerias Shema, the blessings that are recited before and after the shema, which begin with the beracha of Yotzeir Or. Let me begin by explaining the reason why we recite Yishtabach in our davening.

The Mishnah recommends contemplation as an introduction to praying (Berachos 30b). This experience is reflected when we recite or sing the Pesukei Dezimra, literally, Verses of Song¸ prior to Borchu and Birchos Kerias Shema. To show how important this aspect of serving Hashem is, we find that the great tanna, Rabbi Yosi, yearned to receive the special reward granted to those who recite the Pesukei Dezimra daily (Shabbos 118b). Reciting Pesukei Dezimra properly helps elevate one’s entire tefillah to a completely different level. This has the potential to cause our prayer to soar!

Chazal established that we say two berachos, Baruch She’amar and Yishtabach, one before and one after Pesukei Dezimra. Baruch She’amar notes that we use the songs of David to praise Hashem. Since these two berachos are part of the Pesukei Dezimra introduction to our prayer, one may not converse from when he begins Baruch She’amar until after he completes the Shemoneh Esrei (Rif, Berachos 23a). This prohibition includes not interrupting between Yishtabach and the beracha of Yotzeir Or (Rabbeinu Yonah, ad locum, quoting a midrash).

The Tur (Orach Chayim 51), after citing this ruling, quotes the Talmud Yerushalmi that one who talks between Yishtabach and Yotzeir Or commits a sin serious enough that he loses the privilege of joining the Jewish army when it goes to war. According to halachah, prior to the Jewish army going into battle, a specially appointed kohen announces those who are exempt from warfare, which includes, according to this opinion, those who are concerned that their sins may cause them to become war casualties. The Jewish army is meant to be comprised of tzaddikim gemurim, the completely righteous, so that their merits will protect them on the battlefield. Those who are less righteous have no such guarantee, and the Torah therefore exempts them from fighting. Someone whose greatest sin is that he once spoke between Yishtabach and Yotzeir Or, and for which he has not performed full teshuvah, is too sinful a person to be allowed to serve in the Jewish army, out of concern that he might become a casualty.

Interrupting between Yishtabach and Borchu

As I mentioned above, the questions introducing this article all deal with the laws of interrupting between Yishtabach and the beginning of Birchos Kerias Shema. The details of these halachos are not discussed in the Gemara, and, therefore, in order to establish what are the rules related to them, the halachic authorities needed to compare these laws to those of Birchos Kerias Shema, which are discussed in the Gemara.

In general, it is prohibited to interrupt during Birchos Kerias Shema, although the Gemara mentions a few exceptions, including, at times, responding to a person’s greetings, so as not to offend him. The Rishonim dispute whether one may respond to Borchu, Kedusha, and Amen yehei shemei rabbah (in Kaddish) during Birchos Kerias Shema — the Maharam Rotenberg prohibited it, whereas his disciple, the Rosh, permitted it (Rosh, Berachos 2:5). The Maharam Rotenberg contended that these responses are prohibited during Birchos Kerias Shema because it is inappropriate to interrupt praise of Hashem in order to recite a different praise, even something as important as responding to Kaddish or Kedusha. The Rosh permitted this interruption because he held that responding appropriately to Hashem’s praises should not be treated more strictly than responding to the greeting of a person, which is permitted under certain circumstances.

The poskim follow the opinion of the Rosh, concluding that one may answer the following responses while reciting Birchos Kerias Shema:

(1) Kaddish: One may answer “Amen, yehei shemei rabbah mevorach le’olam ule’almei almaya,” and one may also answer “Amen” to the Chazzan’s da’amiran be’alma (at the point that we end what is called chatzi-Kaddish). However, one may not respond to the other places in Kaddish (Chayei Adam 20:4).

(2) Borchu: One may answer “Boruch Hashem hamevorach la’olam va’ed.”This is true whether it is the Borchu that the chazzan recites before Birchos Kerias Shema morning and evening, or whether it is the Borchu that the person receiving an aliyah recites prior to the Torah reading of his aliyah (Magen Avraham 66:6).

(3) Kedusha: One may respond “Kodosh kodosh…”and “Boruch kevod Hashem mimkomo” in Kedusha, but one may not respond to the other parts of Kedusha we traditionally say, even the sentence beginning Yimloch (Ateres Zekeinim).

(4) Amen to berachos: One may respond “Amen” to the berachos of Ha’Keil Hakadosh and Shema Koleinu (Rema 66:3), but not to other berachos.

Thundering applause

The poskim also dispute whether one should recite the berachos on lightning or thunder while in the middle of Birchos Kerias Shema. The Magen Avraham (66:5) rules that one should, whereas the Bechor Shor (Berachos 13a) disagrees, contending that one should not interrupt one praise of Hashem with another. The Chayei Adam reaches a compromise, ruling that one should recite the beracha on lightning or thunder if he is between the berachos of Kerias Shema, but not when he is in the middle of reciting one of the berachos. The dispute between the Magen Avraham and the Bechor Shor remains unresolved (Mishnah Berurah 66:19), and, therefore, someone who hears thunder while in the middle of Birchos Kerias Shema may choose whether to recite the beracha or not.

Between Yishtabach and Borchu

Now that we understand the accepted halachah concerning interrupting Birchos Kerias Shema, we can discuss the laws that apply between Yishtabach and Borchu. We should note that the interval between the completion of Yishtabach and the beginning of Yotzeir Or can be subdivided into three points:

(A) Between Yishtabach and Kaddish.

(B) Between Kaddish and Borchu.

(C) Between Borchu and beginning the beracha of Yotzeir Or.

Although one might think that Birchos Kerias Shema do not start until one begins reciting the words of the beracha, the early authorities rule that once one has said or responded to Borchu it is considered that he is already in Birchos Kerias Shema (Sefer Haminhag, quoted by Beis Yosef, Orach Chayim 57; Rema 54:3). Thus, one may not interrupt once one has recited Borchu, except for the list of four items mentioned above.

What interruptions are permitted?

Notwithstanding the fact that it is prohibited to speak between Yishtabach and Borchu, interrupting at this point is less severe than between Baruch She’amar and Yishtabach or during Birchos Kerias Shema. Therefore, under certain circumstances, some interruptions are permitted. For example, if one needs to recite a beracha, it is better to do so after completing Yishtabach before answering (or saying) Borchu than during the Pesukei Dezimra. For this reason, someone who did not have tzitzis or tefillin available before davening, and they become available during Pesukei Dezimra, should put them on immediately after Yishtabach and recite the berachos on them.

The authorities discuss several other instances of interruptions and whether they are permitted between Yishtabach and Borchu, even though none of these interruptions is permitted during Birchos Kerias Shema. All of the permitted interruptions qualify either as tzorchei mitzvah, mitzvah requirements, or community needs. To quote the Tur (Orach Chayim 54): “One may not interrupt between Yishtabach and Yotzeir if it is not for community needs or for someone who needs to be supported from charity.” Thus, the Tur rules that, even though it is prohibited to talk after Yishtabach, one is permitted to make an appeal for charity at this point. Although, as we will soon see, this position is not universally agreed upon, there were other early authorities who held this way (Rav AmramGaon, quoted by Tur; Beis Yosef quoting Kolbo #4).  The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 54:3) quotes this opinion, although he considers it to be a minority view (see also Hagahos Maimoniyos 7:70). In many places, it was customary to extend this leniency to include requesting personal assistance for other needs, as we will see shortly.

It is certainly permitted to recite the beracha upon hearing thunder between Yishtabach and Yotzeir, and most authorities permit one to recite Asher Yatzar at this point (Mishnah Berurah 51:8; however, see Chayei Adam [20:3], who prefers that one not recite Asher Yatzar until after Shemoneh Esrei).

At this point, we can answer one of the questions we raised at the beginning of this article: “If I need to use the facilities during davening, may I recite the beracha of Asher Yatzar after answering Borchu, provided I have not begun to say the beracha of Yotzeir Or?”

The answer is that one may recite Asher Yatzar before answering Borchu, but if one has already answered Borchu, he should wait until after Shemoneh Esrei before reciting it.

Before Kaddish or after?

In a situation when one may interrupt after Yishtabach, is it better to interrupt before reciting Kaddish, or after Kaddish and before Borchu? This exact question is discussed at length by the Darchei Moshe, the Rema’s commentary on the Tur (Darchei Moshe, Orach Chayim 54:1):

“The custom is to make a mishebeirach for the ill between Yishtabach and Yotzeir; and occasionally, someone cries out [at this point in the davening to call attention to the need] to bring someone to justice, and these are considered mitzvah needs. (The Rema codifies this last practice in his comments to Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 54:3.) However, I do not understand why the custom is to do so before Kaddish, and then after the interruption to recite Kaddish. Since this Kaddish refers back to Pesukei Dezimra, as I will explain in Chapter 55, we should not interrupt before it. Furthermore, one following this practice no longer has a basis to recite Kaddish afterwards, since it now no longer concludes the Pesukei Dezimra.” The Rema then quotes the Kolbo (6), who says that if one did, indeed, interrupt between Yishtabach and Kaddish, then one should say Borchu without Kaddish. The Kolbo suggests another option for someone who interrupted after Yishtabach — he should recite three or more pesukim of tehillim and then say Kaddish.

On the basis of this Kolbo, the Rema, with the agreement of other talmidei chachamim, changed the practice in his city and made a mishebeirach after Kaddish. However, he subsequently retracted this decision, because he found a more authoritative source that followed the original practice of interrupting before Kaddish rather than afterwards. The Or Zarua quoted a teshuvas ha’geonim that someone who began davening without a talis should stop after Yishtabach, recite the beracha, and put on the talis. However, if the community had already begun Kaddish, he should not recite the beracha. Thus, we see that if one needs to interrupt at this point in the davening, it is better to do so before Kaddish than afterwards. The Rema continues that this position is in line with the kabbalistic works that hold that one should not interrupt between Kaddish and Borchu. (By the way, the Rema himself was heavily steeped in Kabbalah, and authored a work on the topic.)

The Rema then concludes that it is best to avoid any interruption at all, and he cites that, in Prague, they had stopped all interruptions after Yishtabach. In a place where the custom is to interrupt, the Rema concludes that the best procedure is to interrupt after Yishtabach and before Kaddish. However, the chazzan should not interrupt between Yishtabach and Kaddish (Darchei Moshe, Orach Chayim 54:1; Rema, Orach Chayim 54:3).

At this point we can now answer Yitzchak’s question that we mentioned above:

“Because of my work schedule, I must daven at a very early minyan. At times, we begin davening when it is too early to put on talis and tefillin, so we put on talis and tefillin after Yishtabach. Someone told me that when we do this, we are creating a problem with reciting Kaddish. Is this true? And if it is true, what should we do?

The Rema concludes that everyone else should put on talis and tefillin after Yishtabach but the chazzan should put on talis and tefillin before Yishtabach so as not to interrupt between Yishtabach and Kaddish.

Kaddish before Musaf

There is a very interesting side point that results from this above-quoted Rema:

In a place where the rabbi delivers a sermon prior to Musaf, the custom is to do so before Kaddish. Is there any problem with reciting Kaddish before Musaf, although there is now a huge interruption between the recital of Ashrei and the Kaddish?

Whether the chazzan may immediately recite Kaddish should depend on the above-cited dispute between rishonim. Just as the Kolbo ruled that the chazzan may not recite Kaddish once he interrupted, unless he recites a few verses prior to saying Kaddish, here too, he would be required to recite a few verses prior to reciting Kaddish. According to the Or Zarua, an interruption after the recital of the verses of Ashrei does not pose any problem with saying Kaddish afterward.

Az Yashir after Yishtabach?!

Prior to addressing the final remaining question, we need to discuss a curiosity. The last Biblical passage cited as part of Pesukei Dezimra is Az Yashir, the Shiras Hayam that the Jewish people sang as praise to Hashem, after witnessing the miracles at the crossing of the Red Sea, the Yam Suf. The Tur (51) and the Avudraham explain that this passage is included immediately before Yishtabach because it contains fifteen mentions of Hashem’s holy Name, thus corresponding to the fifteen praises of Hashem that are stated in Yishtabach.

Others cite a different, but similar, idea: We complete Pesukei Dezimra with Shiras Hayam because the four-lettered name of Hashem is mentioned eighteen times between the words Vayehi Be’ashmores (that precede Az Yashir in the Torah) until the end of the Shiras Hayam. This adds up to a total of 72 lettersof Hashem’s name and, thereby, represents a very high level of kedusha (Beis Yosef, 51, explaining Orchos Chayim; he also explains why we begin from Az Yashir and not from Vayehi Be’ashmores).

By the way, these two allusions are not conflicting, but complementary. One explains Az Yashir as the introduction to Yishtabach, and the other makes it a representative of the entire Pesukei Dezimra that serves as an introduction to the Shemoneh Esrei.

Notwithstanding the fact that it is now standard practice to include Az Yashir, the earliest versions of Pesukei Dezimra did not include any recital of Az Yashir, and others recited it after Yishtabach. For example, the Rambam’s Seder Hatefillos (located at the end of Sefer Ahavah in his Yad Hachazakah) places Az Yashir after the recital of Yishtabach.

With this introduction, we can now address the question asked above:

“In the shullen in which I used to daven, during the aseres yemei teshuvah we always recited the chapter of tehillimShir hama’alos mima’amakim’ right after Yishtabach. Someone recently told me that the reason why I do not see this custom practiced any more is because it is a hefsek in the davening. Is this true?”

Here is the background: The Magen Avraham (54:2) quotes the Arizalthat during the aseres yemei teshuvah one should add Shir hama’alos mima’amakim after Yishtabach. The Magen Avraham then asks why this is not considered a hefsek. In response to this concern, the Dagul Meirevavah notes the Rambam’s placement of Az Yashir after Yishtabach; thus, it is curious to understand what was bothering the Magen Avraham. (One could also mention the Tur and others, who noted the custom of making charity and other communal appeals after Yishtabach, as proof that reciting Shir hama’alos should not be considered an interruption.)

Presumably, the Magen Avraham feels that adding Az Yashir is not a hefsek, since this is a praise of Hashem, which is the same theme as the entire Pesukei Dezimra. We may, therefore, add other praises to Pesukei Dezimra. However, Shir hama’alos is being added as a supplication, and the Magen Avraham considers this to be an interruption. And, although the Tur and the Rema mention a custom of interrupting for communal or mitzvah needs, today the prevalent practice is to not interrupt, as the Rema himself preferred. We could then conclude that although one may add quotations and passages from Tanach that praise Hashem both to the Pesukei Dezimra and immediately afterwards, one should not add passages that are being used as supplication, and that this is the reason why some did not observe the practice of reciting Shir hama’alos mima’amakim after Yishtabach. However, those who do maintain this practice are following the custom of the Arizal, and should continue to do so.

Conclusion

The Ramban (Commentary to Shemos 13:16) explains: “All that Hashem desires from this world is that Man should thank Him for creating him, focus on His praise when he prays, and that the community pray together with concentration. Mankind should gather together and thank the Lord who created them, announcing: We are your creations!

Gluten-Free, Sake, and Vegan

This week’s parsha, Bo, teaches about matzoh, which can be made only from the five types of grain that can become chametz (wheat, barley, spelt, rye, and oats). This gives us the opportunity to discuss kashrus issues related to gluten and non-gluten grains.

Question #1: Rice and Oats

What kashrus issues exist concerning oat-based or rice-based nutritional beverages?

Question #2: Eating Vegan

May I eat in a vegan restaurant?

Question #3: Sake

Is Japanese sake prohibited because of bishul akum or any other kashrus issues?

Question #4: Gluten-free Pastry

Does gluten-free pastry involve pas akum or bishul akum issues?

Introduction:

In parshas Chukas the Torah describes how Bnei Yisrael offered to support the completely non-Jewish local economy by purchasing all their victuals from Sichon and his nation (Bamidbar 21:21-25). Based on an implication in the pasuk, the Gemara suggests that Bnei Yisrael had offered to purchase only food that had not been changed by cooking. Cooked food would have become non-kosher because of bishul akum, the proscription against eating food cooked by a gentile,even when all the ingredients are kosher (Avodah Zarah 37b). Based on this, the Gemara infers that bishul akum was prohibited by the Torah. The Gemara ultimately refutes the suggestion that bishul akum is implied in chumash, concluding that bishul akum is a rabbinic interdiction that does not date all the way back to the time of the Torah. Nevertheless, some early authorities theorize that bishul akum must have been a very early enactment – how else could the Gemara entertain that bishul akum is alluded to already in the Torah (see Tosafos s.v. vehashelakos)?

Chazal instituted this law to guarantee uncompromised kashrus and to discourage inappropriate social interaction (Rashi, Avodah Zarah 38a s.v. miderabbanan and Tosafos ad loc.; Rashi, Avodah Zarah 35b s.v. vehashelakos). The four questions with which I opened our article all involve questions concerning the kashrus of ingredients and also of bishul akum. Since the halachos of bishul akum are indispensable in analyzing all four cases, I will discuss them first.

YUM

When Chazal prohibited bishul akum, they did not prohibit all gentile-cooked foods, but only foods where the cooking of the non-Jew provides significant pleasure to the consumer. Therefore, three major types of gentile-cooked foods are excluded from the prohibition of bishul akum. For pedagogic purposes, we can use the following convenient acronym: YUM, standing for Yisrael, Uncooked, Monarch.

Y. Yisrael – A Jew participates

If a Jew contributes to the cooking in a significant way, the food is permitted because it is now categorized as bishul Yisrael and not bishul akum. How much Jewish participation is necessary to avoid bishul akum? The answer is that this is one of the areas of halacha in which there is a difference in practice between Sefardim and Ashkenazim; Ashkenazim are more lenient in these laws than are Sefardim. Ashkenazim rule that to permit food as bishul Yisrael it is sufficient that a Jew ignite the fire being used to cook, or to add fuel to an already existing flame. Sefardim rule that the Jew must be involved in the actual cooking of the food, preferably by placing the food on the fire.

Another case in which Sefardim and Ashkenazim differ is if a gentile began the cooking and the food became minimally edible, which halacha calls kema’achal ben Derusa’i. Sefardim consider the food already prohibited because of bishul akum. Following this approach, if a gentile cooked the food until it was barely edible and a Jew then completes the cooking and makes it quite tasty, the food is still prohibited, unless there are extenuating circumstances (see Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 113:9). However, Ashkenazim rule that if a Jew cooked it past this point, it is permitted, since the product’s delicious taste was created by a Yisrael.

U. Uncooked – food edible raw

A food that is commonly eaten raw is exempt from the prohibition of bishul akum even when a non-Jew cooked it completely. This is because cooking such an item is not considered significant (Rashi, Beitzah 16a). For example, baked apples or fruit soup prepared by a non-Jew present no problem of bishul akum since the fruit is edible before cooking. Similarly, a fondue made of cheese, wine and butter would involve no bishul akum concerns, even though it is meant to be eaten with bread, because its ingredients are all edible without this cooking. However, cooked potatoes present a bishul akum concern, because most people do not eat raw potatoes (Chachmas Adam 66:4; cf. Aruch Hashulchan 113:18).

M. Monarch

Bishul akum applies only to food that one would serve on a king’s table alongside bread.  This is described as oleh al shulchan melachim lelafeis es hapas, literally, “would go on a king’s table to enhance the bread with it.” Chazal did not prohibit bishul akum when the food would not be served to a highly respected guest, because they were not concerned that inappropriate social interaction may result (Rambam, Hilchos Ma’achalos Asuros 17:15).

Rice and oats

Now that we have completed our basic introduction, let us analyze our opening questions. Our first question was: What kashrus concerns exist with oat-based or rice-based nutritional beverages?

The most common products I have seen are oat milk and rice milk, which, alongside almond, soy and coconut milk have become popular alternatives to cow’s and goat’s milk. Because all of these products, when available commercially, include ingredients that can be problematic from a kashrus perspective, they should be purchased only with a reliable hechsher. However, I will bring attention to the following question:

“My neighbor, who is not Jewish, brought me some of her homemade rice milk. She knows that we keep kosher, and therefore offered the following information. The equipment she uses for her rice and oat milk is never used for other items, and she provided me with her recipe for producing rice milk:

“Boil or steam the rice in hot water until the rice is soft, but still very raw — you should be able to snap a piece in half with your fingernail without much effort.

Add salt and any other flavoring ingredients you choose (usually dates and/or spices) and then blend.

“The instructions for the oat milk were fairly similar. May I drink her rice or oat milk?”

The raw materials here are very simple and should not present kashrus concerns. There is one possible kashrus issue here related to the rice milk and that is bishul akum. The oat milk should not present a bishul akum problem, since this is not a food that one would serve at a formal banquet. Although Cheerios and gluten-friendly menus have popularized oats as people food, I would be surprised to find oats in the respected kitchens of Buckingham Palace or the White House.

On the other hand, rice is definitely not edible raw, and, unlike oats, is oleh al shulchan melachim. Nevertheless, I call your attention to a critical point. The instructions said that the rice should be “soft but still very raw — you should be able to snap a piece in half.” This rice is inedible, and even the minimal definition of ma’achal ben Derusa’i is not met. Thus, this rice is heated, but not cooked sufficiently for it to be prohibited as bishul akum, whether you are Ashkenazi or Sefardi. Thus, this rice milk should not present a halachic problem.

Whether this factor is true in all factory-produced rice milk is something that should be researched. The hechsher should check out whether the rice is cooked to an extent that it might be prohibited because of bishul akum.

Vegan restaurant

Why can’t I eat in a vegan restaurant that does not have a proper hechsher?

Some people erroneously think that, since a vegan diet includes no meat, fish, eggs or dairy products, there can be no kashrus issues in a product labeled “vegan-friendly.” Unfortunately, this is not true for many reasons.

Vegan cooking may involve many non-kosher ingredients, including vegetables that need to be checked for insects, such as seaweed, which is notorious for containing small sea horses (I guess a vegan does not consider insects as a variety of meat). Also, non-kosher wine and wine vinegars often feature prominently in vegan cuisine. In addition, vegan fare usually includes ingredients that are manufactured on non-kosher equipment. There is, also, the known instance of a vegan restaurant whose chef, a Buddhist, was consecrating food to his gods, potentially prohibiting everything in the restaurant.

Aside from all the other potential problems, a vegan restaurant will probably be cooking food that is prohibited because of bishul akum. Thus, a hechsher on a vegan restaurant will need to supervise not only that all ingredients are kosher, but that its food is prepared in a way that it qualifies as bishul Yisrael.

Japan and sake

At this point, let us discuss our opening question: Is Japanese sake prohibited because of bishul akum or any other kashrus issues?

Sake is the national alcoholic beverage of Japan and is made by fermenting steamed rice. There are probably as many varieties of sake in Japan as there are varieties of whiskey in Scotland, beer in Germany and wine in France. We know that wine without a hechsher is presumably non-kosher, but most observant consumers use whiskeys and beers, even without a hechsher on the label. The question is whether these Jews may safely imbibe sake.

There are three major kashrus areas that require research, which was performed, a few years ago, by one of the major American hechsherim.

A. Are there kashrus concerns with any of the raw materials?

B. Might the equipment be used for non-kosher products?

C. Since rice is not edible raw, and its steamed variety is certainly served to royalty, is there a problem of bishul akum?

Sake production

So, let us explore how sake is produced. Rice is a starch, and will not ferment directly into alcohol. The starch first needs to be converted into sugar, which will ferment into alcohol. Sake production begins with steamed rice and Aspergillus oryzae, a fungus that converts rice starch to sugar. The fungus is mixed with water and freshly steamed rice and left until it forms a sweet, crumbly, dry material. This crumbly mash is then placed in a vat with additional rice and water. A variety of yeast, Saccharomyces cerevisiae, is added to the mixture, which then ferments for several weeks. More Aspergillus oryzae, steamed rice, and water are added to the vat, and fermentation continues for another week or two, at which point the sake is filtered, pasteurized, and bottled. Alcohol may be added if the sake is not as strong as desired. Some high-end sake producers “polish” their product by aging it afterward in used wine casks, but these companies usually advertise this, since this sake is considered a specialty product. There are also varieties of flavored sake, which add additional ingredients.

Now let us examine the three questions that we asked above:

A. Are there kashrus concerns with any of the raw materials?

Rice, on its own, does not present a kashrus issue, nor does the fungus, the yeast or the steam. The added alcohol can present a kashrus problem, since it may be produced from non-kosher wine or whey, or may be chometz she’avar alav hapesach, grain-based chometz alcohol that was owned by a Jew on Pesach. Flavored sake would require further research to determine the sources of the flavors, probably not a practical task unless the sake producer is interested in a hechsher on the product.

B. Might the equipment be used for non-kosher products?

Sake is a very popular product in Japan and is manufactured with specialized equipment. This makes it unlikely that any other products would be made on the same equipment.

Regarding aging or finishing the sake in used wine casks, we can assume that this is not done unless it is advertised as such. Whiskeys finished in wine casks is a lengthy halachic subject that I plan to discuss in the future.

C. Since rice is not edible raw, and its steamed variety is certainly served to royalty, is there a problem of bishul akum? Indeed, since steamed rice is definitely oleh al shulchan melachim, two of the obvious heterim for bishul akum that I mentioned above, Uncooked and Monarch, may not apply. An obvious way to produce kosher sake would be to make it bishul Yisrael by having a Jew steam the rice, but the available pool of mashgichim in Japan is not huge, rendering this solution impractical.

Nevertheless, sake maynot have a bishul akum issue. Many prominent authorities contend that bishul akum does not apply to commercial food production since social interaction between the person working on the factory floor and the consumer will not result (see Birkei Yosef 112:9, quoting Maharit Tzalon). Rav Moshe Feinstein (as reported to me personally by Rav Nota Greenblatt) ruled that there is no bishul akum under these circumstances.

Some authorities (see Darkei Teshuvah 113:16) contend that Chazal never included steamed products under the prohibition of bishul akum, because they categorize steaming as smoking, an atypical form of cooking that Chazal exempted from bishul akum. The Minchas Yitzchak (3:26:6) rules that one may combine these two above reasons and permit the finished product.

Another potential heter here is that rice steamed for sake is not cooked in a way that you would usually serve it, and thus, it is not oleh al shulchan melachim. Certainly, once the rice converts to sugar it is not a product that is consumed. Even at its earlier stage, before it becomes sugar, the rice is not steamed to the point that it is servable. Thus, for an Ashkenazi, sake should not be prohibited as bishul akum. I leave it for our individual readers to discuss this with their own rav or posek.

Gluten-free pastry

At this point, let us examine the last, and perhaps most interesting, of our opening questions:

Does gluten-free pastry involve pas akum or bishul akum issues?

Let me explain the actual question that I was asked. A non-Jewish owned and operated company manufactures a large variety of gluten-free pastries and is seeking a hechsher on its products. Does the hechsher need to be concerned about either pas akum or bishul akum?

Pas akum versus bishul akum

Halachically, the difference between pas akum and bishul akum is not that one item is baked and the other is cooked. Pas akum applies to items whose brocha is hamotzi, or to pas haba’ah bekisnin, items on which the brocha is hamotzi if a large amount is eaten, such as cake or crackers (Rema, Yoreh Deah 112:6; Taz, Pri Chadash, Darchei Teshuvah). Baked items other than bread may be considered bishul akum. Thus, we will need to examine whether gluten-free pastry is prohibited because of bishul akum.

What is gluten?

Gluten is a mixture of hundreds of different proteins found in the five grains on which we recite hamotzi when baked into bread: wheat, barley, spelt, rye and oats. Each of these grains has a different type of gluten. In wheat and spelt, one class of these proteins is called gliadin; in barley, it is called hordein; in rye, secalin, and in oats, avenin.

The gliadin in spelt has a different molecular structure than that of wheat. It is more water soluble, which makes it easier to digest, which is why many people who have difficulty tolerating wheat can comfortably consume spelt products.

The term “gluten” describes proteins that affect people with celiac disease. This is an autoimmune condition characterized by gastrointestinal symptoms. When people with celiac disease consume gluten, their body makes antibodies that attack gluten, causing damage to the small intestine. The inflammation and subsequent damage of the small intestine are responsible for the symptoms.

Non-celiac gluten sensitivity is a different medical condition which also is improved by excluding or limiting gluten from the diet and replacing it with grains whose composition is different.

Research has shown that avenin, the protein found in oats, is tolerable by the majority of people with celiac disease. However, approximately one in five people with celiac disease reacts to avenin. In addition, oats are prone to cross-contamination from gluten of the other cereal grains. For these reasons, New Zealand and Australia prohibit labeling products made with oats as gluten-free, only as gluten-friendly.

What is gluten-free?

Gluten-free recipes involve using starches that contain no gluten. I have seen formulae using the following types of starch to provide the consistency of gluten flours: quinoa, tapioca (cassava), rice, sorghum, amaranth, arrowroot, plantain, millet and buckwheat (kasha). I presume that there are others.

From a kashrus perspective, gluten-free pastry must have hashgacha, just as any other baked goods do, because of various non-kosher ingredients they could contain. But our question was specifically about whether there are pas akum or bishul akum concerns.

Above, I noted that some prominent authorities contend that bishul akum does not apply to commercial food production. In addition, other strong heterim may apply here in that oats, sorghum, amaranth, arrowroot, plantain, millet and buckwheat would, on their own, not qualify as oleh al shulchan melachim. In addition, there is another very important heter here: The non-gluten flours are not the primary taste factors in gluten-free pastry. They are included to provide consistency, but the flavor components are the sugar, oils and fruits, all of which are edible and quite tasty unbaked — the U of YUM (Shu”t Tashbeitz 1:89; 3:11; Pri Chadash). I leave the final decision to the rabbis of the kashrus organization involved.

Conclusion

The Gemara teaches that the rabbinic laws are dearer to Hashem than the Torah laws. In this context, we can explain the vast halachic literature devoted to understanding a prohibition such as bishul akum, created by Chazal to protect the Jewish people from major sins.

Chalav Yisrael and Powdered Milk

According to the midrash quoted by Rashi, the baby Moshe refused to nurse from non-Jewish women, although this is not the way we use the term Chalav Yisrael in this article.

Question:

Dr. Levy asks me the following: “Friends of ours keep chalav Yisrael, but they will use foods made with non-chalav-Yisrael powdered milk. But I know from my professional work that one can purchase powdered mare’s (female horses) and camel’s milk – they are considered specialty items. So, why is there any difference between using non-chalav- Yisrael powdered milk and non-chalav Yisrael fluid milk?”

The Mishnah (Avodah Zarah 35b, 39b) proscribes consuming milk that a gentile milked unless a Jew supervised the milking, a prohibition called chalav akum, out of concern that the milk may have been adulterated with milk of a non-kosher species. In a different article (The Milky Whey), I noted that there are several opinions as to how to define the prohibition. The most lenient approach is that of the Pri Chodosh (Yoreh Deah 115:15), who understands that one needs to be concerned about chalav akum only when the non-kosher milk is less expensive than the kosher variety, or it is difficult to sell. However, when kosher milk is less expensive, the Pri Chodosh contends that one does not need to be concerned that the gentile would add more expensive specialty non-kosher milk into regular, kosher milk.

On the other side of the spectrum, the Chasam Sofer maintains that the prohibition has a halachic status of davar shebeminyan, a rabbinic injunction that remains binding, until a larger and more authoritative body declares the original sanction invalid, even when the reason the takanah was introduced no longer applies (see Beitzah 5a). Since a more authoritative beis din never rescinded the prohibition on unsupervised gentile milk, consuming this milk involves a serious violation. The Chasam Sofer requires that a Jew must be able to observe the milking, and if not, the produced milk is completely non-kosher because of the rabbinic injunction, even when the non-Jew has no incentive to adulterate the product.

In between these two positions, there is the opinion of Rav Moshe Feinstein and the Chazon Ish (Yoreh Deah 41:4) that in a place where non-kosher milk commands a higher price than kosher milk, it is still prohibited to use non-supervised milk. However, Rav Moshe understands that the takanah did not specifically require that a Jew attend the milking, but that one is convinced that the milk has no admixture of non-kosher. However, whenever it is certain that the kosher milk is unadulterated, halacha considers the milk “supervised” (Igros Moshe, Yoreh Deah 1:47).

How can one be certain? The Mishnah recommended an obvious way: have a Jew nearby who may check at any moment. Of course, this method is not foolproof, but halacha did not require more.

Is there another way that one can be certain? Allow me to use my own example to explain Rav Moshe’s approach. Dr. Levy, our questioner, runs laboratory tests on a sample of unsupervised milk and concludes, with absolute certainty, that it is 100% sheep’s milk. However, no Jew supervised the milking. Is the milk kosher?

According to Rav Moshe’s analysis, this milk is certainly kosher, since we can ascertain its source.

In his earliest published teshuvah on the subject, Rav Moshe explained that when the government levies fines for adulteration of cow’s milk, the fear of this fine is sufficient proof that the milk is kosher. In later teshuvos, he is very clear that other reasons why we can assume that the milk is kosher are sufficient proof, including that normal commercial enterprises assume that standard milk is bovine milk (Igros Moshe, Yoreh Deah 1:48, 49).

Being stringent

Although Rav Moshe concludes that where one can rely that the standardly available milk is kosher there is no prohibition of chalav akum, he still rules in a different teshuvah that a chinuch institution should use only chalav Yisrael products, even if all the children come from homes that do not use chalav Yisrael exclusively. He contends that part of chinuch is to show children that one follows a stricter standard, even when halacha does not necessarily require one.

Powdered milk

We can now address the question mentioned above: “Friends of ours keep chalav Yisrael, but they will use foods made from non-chalav-Yisrael powdered milk. But I know from my professional work that one can purchase powdered mare’s and camel’s milk – they are considered specialty items. So, why is there any difference between using non-chalav- Yisrael powdered milk and non-chalav-Yisrael fluid milk?”

Those who allow use of non-chalav-Yisrael milk powder follow the opinion presented by Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank, Rav of Yerushalayim until his passing a little over sixty years ago and one of the greatest poskim of his era. Rav Frank assumed that the halacha follows the Chasam Sofer, who requires Jewish supervision to permit the non-Jewish milk, and did not accept the heterim of the Pri Chodosh, nor that of the Igros Moshe and the Chazon Ish. Nevertheless, Rav Frank permitted powdered milk from an unsupervised gentile source, for a very interesting reason.

The poskim permit using cheese that is gevinas Yisrael and butter, even when these products are made from unsupervised milk. (I discussed both of these topics in other articles — How Do We Make Kosher Cheese?, and The Great Cottage Cheese Controversy). Why did they permit this? Because non-kosher milk is low in casein, and, therefore, it does not curd, which is the first step in producing cheese. It is also low in milkfat (also called butterfat or cream), which makes it nonprofitable to make butter from non-kosher milk. (Those curious are invited to read the highly entertaining responsum of the Melamed LeHo’il, 2:36:2, on this topic.) For these reasons, even in the days of Chazal, one could assume that a gentile would not add non-kosher milk when he intends to produce either cheese or butter, and therefore, these items were excluded from the prohibition of chalav akum.

May powdered milk be treated like cheese and butter?

Rav Frank notes that there is a qualitative difference between cheese and butter, on the one hand, and powdered milk, on the other, in that there is an inherent difficulty with making cheese and butter from non-kosher milk, whereas one can easily powder any milk. (This is precisely Dr. Levy’s question I mentioned above.) Thus, one could argue that the leniency that applies to cheese and butter should not apply to milk powder.

However, Rav Frank quotes the Ritva (Avodah Zarah 35b) who pointed out that, technically, one could make cheese even from non-kosher species, but the cheese yield from these milks is very poor, and when the milk curds, most of it becomes whey. Thus, although it is theoretically possible to make cheese or butter from non-kosher milk, the halacha does not require one to be concerned about this. Rather, one may assume that a gentile would not adulterate this milk. It is indeed noteworthy that while researching milk and cheese made the world over, I discovered cheeses made from the milk of cows, sheep, goats, water buffalo and yak, all of them kosher species, and milk used from non-kosher mammals such as donkeys, mares, llamas and camels, but I found not a single populace making any variety of cheese from the non-kosher milk. Thus, although the Ritva attests that it could be done, it is simply not worthwhile.

Rav Frank concludes that what permits the unsupervised milk used in cheese and butter is not that it is impossible to use non-kosher milk but that it is unlikely. Thus, he reasons, although one can powder non-kosher milk, the prohibition of chalav akum was limited to fluid milk and other products available in the days of Chazal which could be made easily from non-kosher milk. Since powdered milk did not exist in the days of Chazal, and since we are certain that standardly available powdered milk is of bovine origin, the prohibition against chalav akum does not apply to milk powder, just as it does not apply to butter and cheese.

We should note that the Chazon Ish took strong issue with Rav Frank’s position treating milk powder differently from fluid milk. The Chazon Ish contends that the lenience that applies to cheese and butter applies only because these products, inherently, are not made from non-kosher milk, a logic that does not apply to milk powder.

Thus, Dr. Levy’s friends who keep chalav Yisrael but use foods made with non-chalav Yisrael powdered milk follow the conclusion of Rav Pesach Frank, whereas those who are strict regarding milk powder follow the Chazon Ish’s approach. In Eretz Yisrael, this has become one of the major defining factors for the difference between what is called mehadrin (stricter) kashrus standard, and non-mehadrin hechsherim. The regular hechsherim allow use of non-chalav Yisrael milk powder (imported from the United States), whereas the mehadrin hechsherim use only chalav Yisrael products. (By the way, no Eretz Yisrael hechsher allows the use of unsupervised fluid milk as kosher; all hechsherim, both mehadrin and non-mehadrin, have accepted the position of the Chasam Sofer.)

May a Kohen Go to the Dentist?

Yaakov Avinu blessed his sons with brachos appropriate to their future callings in life. They and their children after them for generations engaged in many different professions, some of them even becoming dentists…

Yankel Katz (*Names are fictitious) called me recently with a very surprising shaylah:

“I am scheduled to have a dental implant placed in my mouth. My dentist told me that the procedure may require the insertion of cadaver bone around the implant. Since I am a kohen, I immediately realized that I may have a serious halacha problem on my hands, or more accurately, in his hands and my mouth. May I have these products inserted? May I even go into the dentist’s office knowing he has these remains (parts of a corpse) on hand? Maybe I cannot even enter the building?”

I admit that I was more than a bit incredulous that human remains are commonly used today in basic dentistry and medicine. I did some research and discovered that indeed, Yankel’s information is accurate. Many forms of dental, oral, podiatric and other kinds of surgery utilize cadaver-derived products. Surgeons and dentists use these human products (typically bone, skin, and heart muscle) in various grafting procedures. Similarly, many podiatrists use human remains in the construction of foot implants. Because of this, most periodontists (gum specialists) and dentists specializing in implants store human muscle and bone in their offices. Thus, Yankel’s shaylah is realistic: May a kohen enter an office building knowing that there is probably a dental or foot clinic somewhere in the building that contains human remains? Does this prohibit a kohen from freely entering large office buildings?

Furthermore, a non-kohen who causes a kohen to become tamei will also be violating the Torah. Obviously, the ramifications of these shaylos are ominous, and the potential repercussions could be catastrophic for people employed in most cities. Because of these considerations, I researched this shaylah with utmost seriousness.

There are three potential halachic issues involved in this shaylah:

I. Benefiting From Human Remains (Issur Hana’ah)

II. The Mitzvah of Burial

III. Tumah.

To address these questions, we first need to gather some factual information. I began by asking Yankel’s dentist the following questions:

1) How extensively are cadaver bones and muscle used?

2) How much material does a dentist keep in his office?

I received the following answers:

1) Every periodontist and oral surgeon has this material in his office. In addition, many general dentists have it too if they perform gum surgery or implant surgery.

2) There is no practical way to answer this question accurately. Specialists such as oral surgeons probably have a lot. I keep between 2-10cc. They are usually stored in 0.5, 1, and 2cc bottles.

And now some background to the halachic shaylos involved:

I. BENEFITING FROM A CORPSE

May one benefit from a corpse or from human remains?

The Gemara rules that one may not benefit from a corpse (Avodah Zarah 29b). However, the Gemara does not discuss whether this prohibition applies only to the remains of a Jew or also to those of a non-Jew.

Why should it make a difference?

The Torah pasuk teaching that one may not benefit from a corpse refers to a Jew. Thus, many poskim conclude that the prohibition is restricted to the remains of a Jew (Tosafos and Rashba, Bava Kamma 10a; Nekudos HaKesef and Gra, Yoreh Deah 349; Shu’t Radbaz #741; Mishneh LaMelech, Hilchos Aveil 14:21). Others rule that remains of either Jews or non-Jews are equally forbidden (Shu’t Rashba 365; Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 349:1). Still others compromise between these two positions, contending that the prohibition to use a gentile cadaver is Rabbinic, whereas not using a Jewish corpse is prohibited min haTorah (Pischei Teshuvah ad loc.).

In a circumstance of pikuach nefesh one may of course benefit, as is true with virtually all mitzvos of the Torah. Although tooth replacement is not a life threatening urgency, it is important to use the best quality dental implant.

To quote Yankel’s dentist, himself an observant Jew:

“In my opinion, the severity of this halachic issue should hinge on the detriment caused by tooth loss. Clearly losing one tooth or even all the teeth will not result in death. However, tooth loss often results in dietary/nutritional issues. People who have a difficult time chewing will not have a proper diet. Although people who lose their teeth can still eat, they tend to eat soft foods, which are usually high in carbohydrates and low in protein, vitamins, and minerals. Foods that are high in protein, vitamins, and minerals, such as meat, poultry, grains, and fresh fruits and vegetables, tend to be harder to chew. Consequently, people who eat mainly soft foods may become undernourished. I have seen many cases where people receiving their first set of dentures lose a lot of weight due to the difficulty involved in learning how to use them. Some people adapt and those who do not often seek implants if they can afford it. The only thing preventing most people from having implants is the exorbitant cost, since insurance does not usually pay for them at this time.”

At this point, I think it is important to explain the difference between dentures and implants.

DENTURES VERSUS IMPLANTS

Dentures are removable appliances that replace some or all of the teeth. They are usually not firm enough to allow a proper bite and chew, and thus a patient using dentures usually regains only a very partial ability to chew. In addition, they are often uncomfortable.

To install dental implants, the dentist utilizes a surgical screw to which he cements crowns or bridges. Alternatively, he uses the implants as anchors to hold complete dentures in place. In either instance, the resultant bite is much stronger than dentures and allows the patient an almost total ability to chew a regular diet.

Dental researchers introduced implants in the ‘60’s, and they became mainstream practice in the ‘90’s. They are now usually considered the “standard of care” for tooth replacement.

Therefore, one can understand the practical importance of using high-quality implants, assuming, of course, that no compromise of halacha results for either the patient, the dentist, or kohanim in the vicinity.

USE OF HUMAN TISSUE

Rav Moshe Feinstein wrote a teshuvah concerning transplanting human remains in non-life-threatening situations (Shu’t Igros Moshe, Yoreh Deah 1:229, 230). Clearly, one may transplant such organs as kidneys, livers, and heart because of pikuach nefashos (life-threatening emergency). However, transplanting items such as bone, cornea, muscle, and ligament are not usually for life-threatening situations. As explained above, dental implants relieve a non-life-threatening emergency, although one could argue that these situations are considered choleh kol gufo, where halachic rules are somewhat relaxed. Nevertheless, treating a choleh kol gufo does not permit violating a Torah prohibition.

We noted above that there is a dispute whether one may use remains of a non-Jew; Rav Moshe concludes that, under extenuating circumstances, one may rely on the lenient opinions. A second question now presents itself, which is whether one may assume that the remains used are those of a non-Jew, since using remains of a Jew is certainly prohibited min haTorah. Again, here also Rav Moshe ruled leniently that one may assume that the remains are of non-Jewish source, since most people are not Jewish (Mishneh LaMelech, Hil. Aveil 3:1).

NOT THE NORMAL USE

Some poskim permit the use of human remains for non-life-threatening emergencies because of a different line of reasoning. The Gemara (Pesachim 25b) rules that someone who is ill, but does not have a life threatening condition, may apply a balm made from orlah fruit (that grew in the first three years of a tree’s growth), notwithstanding that the Torah prohibits benefiting from such fruit.

Why is this permitted where the situation is not life threatening?

This is because many prohibitions that are asur b’hana’ah (forbidden to benefit from), are prohibited min haTorah only when the prohibited item is used in its normal way. Smearing fruit on one’s skin is not a typical, normal use. Since orlah is prohibited min haTorah b’hana’ah only when used in its normal way, smearing orlah fruit as a balm involves only a rabbinic prohibition, which is relaxed for an ill person.

However, this leniency does not apply to all prohibitions. For example, the Torah prohibits using kilayim (forbidden fruit of a grapevine) even in an atypical way. For this reason, an ill person may not smear kilayim as a balm, even though he may smear orlah balm.

Where does the prohibition to use human remains fall? Is it like orlah, and is permitted for an ill person to use in an atypical manner, or like kilayim and prohibited.

The poskim dispute whether the prohibition not to use human remains applies to using them in an atypical way, Shu’t Radbaz #979 and Mishneh L’Melech, Hilchos Aveil 14:21 are lenient, whereas Rabbi Akiva Eiger (notes to Yoreh Deah 349) prohibits. If it is permitted, there is a basis to permit the use of human remains from a Jew for someone who is ill when the situation is not life-threatening.

Rav Moshe rules that min hatorah one may not use human remains in an atypical way, although other poskim are lenient (Shu’t Har Tzvi, Yoreh Deah #277). The latter approach might allow using muscle and bone for implants even from a Jewish cadaver.

However, since there are alternative sources for implants, such as bovine tissue, it is halachically unclear whether this justifies use of human implants. Although some dentists feel that the cadaver-based material is superior, others do not agree. Therefore, someone who is considering cadaver implants should ask a shaylah from his or her Rav, whether or not one is a kohen. In addition, although the dentist may have asked a shaylah and been told that he or she may use human implants, the patient’s Rav may feel otherwise. Thus I believe that a frum dentist who received a psak that he may use human tissue should advise his frum patients to ask their own shaylah.

II. THE REQUIREMENT TO BURY THE DEAD

Is one required to bury a small amount of human remains?

The poskim dispute how small an amount of Jewish remains requires the mitzvah of burying. Some contend that one must bury even an amount as small as a k’zayis (Tosafos Yom Tov to Shabbos 10:5). Others contend that one is required to bury only that which could represent an entire body (Mishneh LaMelech, Hilchos Aveil 14:21). However, it seems that all agree that there is no Torah mitzvah to bury the remains of a gentile, except due to tumah concerns. Thus, this question would not affect our shaylah once we assume that the remains involved are of a non-Jew.

III. TUMAH AND A KOHEN

A human cadaver (meis) of either Jew or gentile conveys tumah when a person touches remains or carries them. Although these halachos do not affect most Jews nowadays, a kohen is still forbidden to come in contact with human remains in a way that he will become tamei.

Jewish remains convey tumah through ohel, which means that a kohen may not be under the same roof or in the same room as the remains. However, if all the doors and windows in the room holding the remains are closed, the tumas ohel is probably contained within that room (see Nekudos HaKesef on Taz, Yoreh Deah 371:3; see also Shu’t Noda BiYehudah, Yoreh Deah #94). However, there is a lesser form of tumah, called sof tumah latzeis (lit., the tumah will eventually leave), that extends beyond the closed doors or windows, though only in the direction that one will eventually remove the tumah.

OHEL AND A NON-JEW

The poskim dispute whether non-Jewish remains convey tumah through ohel; i.e., does someone in the same room as non-Jewish remains become tamei? According to those who contend that non-Jewish remains convey tumas ohel, a kohen may not enter a room containing a gentile corpse or part of a corpse. Thus, a kohen should be careful not to enter any hospital except for a life-threatening emergency, since there is likely to be human remains somewhere in the hospital. Similarly, a kohen may not enter a museum without carefully verifying that it does not contain any human remains — an unusual circumstance. According to those who contend that non-Jewish remains do not convey tumas ohel, a kohen may enter a hospital when one may assume that it contains no Jewish remains.

The Shulchan Aruch rules that non-Jewish remains do not convey tumas ohel, yet a kohen should still be machmir not to be in the same ohel as gentile remains. Thus, a kohen should not visit someone in the hospital unless there is an extenuating reason, i.e., there is something important that only he may accomplish. Similarly, a kohen should not enter a museum without verifying that it does not contain human remains. [This discussion is limited to a case where the remains in the hospital are of a non-Jew. In a situation where there are likely to be Jewish remains in the hospital, a kohen would be allowed to enter the hospital only for a life-threatening emergency (pikuach nefashos).]

Thus, if we assume that the remains contained in the dental office are a non-Jew’s, then a kohen entering the office would not entail a halachic violation, but would be something that should be avoided (according to the above ruling of the Shulchan Aruch). However because of other halachic factors (too complicated to explain in this article), there is a basis to be lenient and allow a kohen to enter the dentist’s office and certainly the building. Personally, I would encourage the dentist to store the remains in a way that guarantees that there is no tumas ohel, a procedure that I will gladly explain to any dentist on an individual basis, but that is too complicated to elucidate in this article.

WHAT ABOUT YANKEL KATZ’S IMPLANT?

So far we have discussed whether one may use human remains as an implant and whether a kohen may enter the office. Assuming that Yankel’s Rav rules that he may rely on the remains being of a non-Jew and that one may use gentile remains, the shaylah is still not completely resolved. Because Yankel has the bone graft installed in his mouth, he will now be touching and carrying the remains, and a kohen may not touch or carry non-Jewish remains. Is there any possible solution to this issue, or must Yankel opt for a non-human product? The answer to this question lies in a different direction.

IS THERE A MINIMUM AMOUNT OF REMAINS THAT CONVEYS TUMAH?

Here the issue is, how small an amount still conveys tumah? Although the amount of flesh that conveys tumah is one k’zayis, the amount of human bone that conveys tumah in this situation may be as small as a k’se’orah, the size of a barleycorn, which is tiny (Ohalos 2:7; Rambam, Tumas Meis 4:4).

How big is a k’zayis? The estimates of the poskim range from as little as 3 cc. to as much as 25 cc. A dentist typically uses less than this amount in a patient, although sometimes he might use a larger amount. Thus, one should verify this information in order to ask a shaylah. However the amount of bone used is certainly greater than the size of a barleycorn, thus precluding a kohen from receiving a dental implant of human origin.

There is one other aspect about dental offices that one should know: Some dentists keep a human skull on hand for explanation and education. A kohen should clarify in advance before visiting a dentist whether he is a skull-bearer, and should make similar research before scheduling an appointment at the podiatrist and other physicians, who often also use human remains in their surgeries or have cadaver models on hand for visual explanations. A concerned practitioner will procure plastic replicas rather than genuine human parts to minimize difficult situations for a kohen.

A kohen has the privilege of blessing the people, in addition to serving in the Beis HaMikdash, may it be built speedily in our day. Concurrent with these privileges come many responsibilities, including the requirement of avoiding tumah. This necessitates an awareness of possible tumah situations and being aware of new developments in our constantly changing society.

Flavor and Fragrance – The Bracha on Fragrant Fruits

At the beginning of our parsha, Yosef is still a prisoner in Egypt. But remember, that when he was first sold into slavery to Egypt, it was to a caravan that carried pleasant smelling products….

This article will explain the halachos of the bracha Hanosein rei’ach tov ba’peiros “He who bestows pleasant fragrances in fruits.” Many authorities prefer that one recite the version Asher nasan rei’ach tov ba’peiros, in past tense, “He who bestowed pleasant fragrances in fruits” (Elyah Rabbah 216:5; Mishnah Berurah 216:9).

Here are some curious questions about this bracha that we need to resolve:

1.  Do we recite this bracha on a food that is not a fruit?

2. Assuming that we recite this bracha on any food, do we recite this bracha on a seasoning that is not eaten by itself, such as cinnamon or oregano?

3. If I am eating a fragrant fruit, do I recite a bracha when I smell it while I am eating it?

4. Do I recite this bracha when smelling a delicious cup of coffee or a freshly-baked pastry? After all, the coffee bean is a fruit, and the flour of the pastry is a grain, which is also halachically a fruit. As we will see, the answer to this question is not so obvious.

Origins of the BrachaHanosein Rei’ach Tov Ba’peiros

The Gemara (Berachos 43b) teaches that someone who smells an esrog or a quince should first recite Hanosein rei’ach tov ba’peiros.

Question: Why did Chazal institute a unique bracha for aromatic fruits?

Answer: Whenever one benefits from this world one must recite a bracha. Thus, Chazal instituted brachos that are appropriate for fragrances. However, all the other brachos on fragrance are not appropriate for smelling fragrant foods, since the other brachos praise Hashem for creating fragrances, whereas esrog and quince are not usually described as fragrances, but as foods that are fragrant. Therefore, Chazal established a special bracha for aromatic fruits (see Beis Yosef, Orach Chayim, end of Chapter 297).

It is noteworthy that even though quince is edible only when cooked, it is still considered a fruit for the purpose of this bracha. More on this question later…

Do We Recite This Bracha on Fragrant Foods That Are Not Fruits?

This leads us to a fascinating halachic discussion with a surprising conclusion.

A Bracha on Smelling Bread?

Several early poskim contend that one should recite a bracha before smelling hot fresh bread (Beis Yosef, Orach Chayim Chapter 297, quoting Avudraham and Orchos Chayim). However, when discussing what bracha one should recite, these poskim contend that mentioning besamim (such as Borei isvei or minei besamim) is inappropriate since bread is not a fragrance but a food. It is also inappropriate to recite on it Hanosein rei’ach tov ba’peiros, since it is not a fruit. They therefore conclude that one should recite Hanosein rei’ach tov bapas, “He who bestows pleasant fragrance in bread.” Indeed, one contemporary posek rules that someone who smells fresh cookies should recite Hanosein rei’ach tov ba’ugah, “He who bestows pleasant fragrances in cake.”

However the Beis Yosef and other poskim disagree, contending that one does not recite a bracha before smelling bread or cake, pointing out that the Gemara and the early halachic sources never mention reciting a bracha before smelling bread. These poskim contend that we do not recite a bracha on smelling bread because its fragrance is not significant enough to warrant a bracha (Beis Yosef, Chapter 297).

This question creates a predicament: according to the “early poskim,” one may not smell bread without first reciting a bracha;whereas according to the Beis Yosef, reciting a bracha on its fragrance is a bracha recited in vain! The only way of resolving this predicament is by trying not to smell fresh bread, which is the conclusion reached by the Rama (216:14).

(Incidentally, the Rama’s rulingteaches a significant halacha about the rule of safek brachos le’kula, that we do not recite a bracha when in doubt. Although one may not recite a bracha when in doubt, one also may not smell a fragrance or taste a food without reciting the bracha because that would be benefiting from the world without a bracha. This halacha applies in any case when someone has a doubt about reciting a bracha. Although he may not recite the bracha, he may also not benefit without finding some method of resolving the safek.)

The concept, introduced by the Beis Yosef, that one recites a bracha only on a significant fragrance is hard to define. The following is an example in which poskim dispute whether a fragrance is considered significant.

Wake Up and Smell the Coffee!

The Mishnah Berurah (216:16) rules that someone who smells fresh-roasted ground coffee should recite a bracha of Hanosein rei’ach tov ba’peiros. However, the Kaf Hachayim (216:86), one of the great Sefardic poskim, rules that it is uncertain whether the fragrance of coffee is significant enough to warrant a bracha. Thus, most Sefardim will not recite a bracha prior to smelling fresh-roasted coffee, whereas those who follow the Mishnah Berurah will.

As we have discussed, although some poskim (Avudraham and Orchos Chayim) limit the bracha of Hanosein rei’ach tov ba’peiros to fruits, other poskim contend that this bracha should be recited before smelling any fragrant food. This dispute influences the next discussion.

Do We Recite Hanosein Rei’ach Tov Ba’peiros on a Fragrant Seasoning?

The question here is what defines an edible fruit for the purposes of this bracha. Do we recite Hanosein rei’ach tov ba’peiros only on fruit or do we recite it on any edible item? Furthermore, assuming that we recite Hanosein rei’ach tov ba’peiros on any edible item, is a flavoring or seasoning considered a food for the purposes of this bracha?

Spices that are used to flavor but are themselves never eaten, such as bay leaves, are not considered a food. For this reason, there is no requirement to separate terumos and maasros on bay leaves, even if they grew in Eretz Yisrael (Tosafos, Yoma 81b; Derech Emunah, Terumos 2:3:32). A seasoning that is never eaten by itself, but is eaten when it is used to flavor — such as cinnamon, oregano, or cloves — is questionable whether it is considered a food. Therefore, we separate terumos and maasros on it without a bracha, and, if it is eaten by itself, we do not recite a bracha of borei pri ha’eitz or borei pri ha’adamah (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 202:16). What bracha do we recite before smelling a seasoning?

Cloves

A clove is the dried flower bud that grows on a tree; the clove is consumed only as a spice, but is not eaten on its own. The poskim dispute what is the correct bracha to recite before smelling cloves, there being a total of four opinions:

Hanosein rei’ach tov ba’peiros:The Shulchan Aruch (216:2) rules that this is the correct bracha to say before smelling cloves, despite the fact that cloves are never eaten alone (Taz 216:4). He contends that we recite Hanosein rei’ach tov ba’peiros on anything that is consumed, even if it is eaten only as a seasoning.

Borei atzei besamim:Many poskim rule that we recite Hanosein rei’ach tov ba’peiros only on items that are eaten on their own, but not if they are eaten solely as a flavoring. Cloves are therefore discounted as a food item and treated exclusively as a fragrance. Since the clove grows on a woody stem, these poskim rule that we should recite Borei atzei besamim before smelling the spice. This approach is followed by some Sefardic poskim (Yalkut Yosef 216:4).

Borei isvei besamim:In a different article, I pointed out that some poskim contend that one recites Borei atzei besamim only on a fragrance that grows on what is considered a tree for all other halachos. The stem of the clove is hollow, which according to some opinions precludes it being considered a tree. (In a different article, I pointed out that some poskim contend that the correct bracha before eating papaya is Borei pri ha’adamah because the papaya plant has a hollow trunk [Shu’t Rav Pe’alim Vol. 2, Orach Chayim #30].) Because of the above considerations, some rule that the clove is not considered a food or a tree, but a herbaceous (non-woody) plant upon which the correct bracha is Borei isvei besamim. This is the common custom among Yemenite Jews(Ohr Zion Vol. 2 pg. 136; Vezos Haberacha, pg. 174). (It should be noted that some varieties of forsythia also have a hollow or semi-hollow stem. According to the Yemenite custom, the bracha recited before smelling these would be Borei isvei besamim rather than Borei atzei besamim. However, non-Yemenites should recite Borei atzei besamim before smelling forsythia since it is a woody, perennial shrub.)

Borei minei besamim:Because of the disputes quoted above, many poskim rule that one should recite Borei minei besamim on cloves (Elyah Rabbah 216:9; Mishnah Berurah 216:16). This is the accepted practice among Ashkenazim and many Sefardic poskim (Birkei Yosef 216:5; Kaf Hachayim 216:34; Ohr Zion Vol. 2 pg. 136).

Is It Wood or Food?

Based on this last opinion, we can derive a different halacha. Assuming that there is a dispute whether the bracha on cloves is Hanosein rei’ach tov ba’peiros or Borei atzei besamim, why do we recite Borei minei besamim when we are in doubt?Shouldn’t the correct bracha be Borei atzei besamim, since it grows on a tree? From this ruling we see that Borei atzei besamim and Hanosein rei’ach tov ba’peiros are mutually exclusive categories. Either an item is a fragrance or it is considered an edible food that is fragrant, but it cannot be both. Thus, if the correct bracha is Hanosein rei’ach tov ba’peiros then it is considered to be a food, not wood, and the bracha Borei atzei besamim is in vain. On the other hand, if the correct bracha is Borei atzei besamim then we have concluded that clove is not food and the bracha Hanosein rei’ach tov ba’peiros would be in vain. For this reason, Ashkenazim and most Sefardic poskim recite the bracha Borei minei besamim whenever there is a question on what bracha to recite (Aruch Hashulchan 216:5; Elyah Rabbah 216:9; Mishnah Berurah 216:16; Birkei Yosef  216:5; Kaf Hachayim 216:39 and Ohr Tzion Vol. 2 pg. 136; compare, however, Yalkut Yosef 216:4).

Cinnamon, Spice and Everything Nice

What bracha does one recite before smelling cinnamon?

The Tur quotes a dispute between the Rosh, who contends that the bracha is Hanosein rei’ach tov ba’peiros, and the Maharam, who contends that one should recite Borei atzei besamim. In the Rosh’s opinion, cinnamon should be treated as a food. Thus, we may assume that he contends that the bracha before smelling all spices is Hanosein rei’ach tov ba’peiros, even though they are not eaten by themselves. We can also draw a conclusion from this Rosh that we recite the bracha Hanosein rei’ach tov ba’peiros even on the bark of a tree that is eaten, such as cinnamon. Thus in his opinion, the word ba’peiros in the bracha should be translated as food rather than as fruit. (In truth, the word pri in the bracha Borei pri ha’adamah should also not be translated as fruit, since we recite it on stems, roots, and leaves when we eat celery, carrots, and lettuce.)

On the other hand, the Maharam contends that Hanosein rei’ach tov ba’peiros  is inappropriate, presumably because cinnamon is usually not eaten by itself. Alternatively, the Maharam may hold that Hanosein rei’ach tov ba’peiros is inappropriate for cinnamon because it is a bark and not a fruit.

Either way, many Ashkenazi poskim rule it is a safek whether the bracha on cinnamon is Hanosein rei’ach tov ba’peiros or Borei atzei besamim and therefore one should recite borei minei besamim (Elyah Rabbah 216:9; Mishnah Berurah 216:16). Many Sefardim recite Borei atzei besamim before smelling cinnamon (Yalkut Yosef 216:4). Everyone agrees that the bracha before smelling cinnamon leaf is Borei atzei besamim.

And the Lemon Smells So Sweet!

But the fruit of the poor lemon is impossible to eat! Is the bracha before smelling a lemon Hanosein rei’ach tov ba’peiros because it is after all a fruit, or do we recite a different bracha since it is too bitter to eat by itself?

Some poskim rule that one should recite Hanosein rei’ach tov ba’peiros before smelling lemons (Ginas Veradim 1:42; Yalkut Yosef 216:7), whereas others contend that one should recited Borei minei besamim before smelling a lemon, treating the lemon as a safek as to whether it is considered a fruit or not (Ketzos Hashulchan 62:9 in Badei Hashulchan).

However, this latter opinion causes one to wonder why the bracha before smelling a lemon is different from the bracha before smelling an esrog? After all, the Gemara teaches that before smelling an esrog we recite Hanosein rei’ach tov ba’peiros, although an esrog is also too bitter to eat. Possibly, the esrogim in the days of Chazal were less bitter and were edible. This is implied by the Gemara (Sukkah 36b), which mentions that Rav Chanina took a bite out of his esrog, something difficult to imagine doing to a contemporary esrog.

An alternative approach is that an esrog is a fruit because it can be made edible by adding sugar. However according to this reason, a lemon should also be considered a fruit, since one can eat candied lemon, which I presume would require the bracha of Borei pri ha’eitz (Vezos Ha’beracha pg. 366). Similarly, some people eat the slice of lemon they used to season their tea, and lemon is also eaten as a pudding or pie filling. I presume that the bracha on these items when eaten alone would be Borei pri ha’eitz. The fact that lemon cannot be eaten unsweetened should not affect what bracha we recite before eating or smelling lemon just as the bracha before smelling fresh quince is Hanosein rei’ach tov ba’peiros even though it is also not edible raw.

Furthermore, we noted above that Chazal instituted the bracha Hanosein rei’ach tov ba’peiros on fragrant fruits and foods because one cannot recite a bracha on them by calling them fragrances. Few people would describe lemon as a fragrance, but as a fruit.

Because of these reasons, I believe the bracha before smelling a lemon should be Hanosein rei’ach tov ba’peiros, but I leave it for the individual to ask their rav.

Incidentally, the correct bracha to recite before smelling citrus blossoms or flowers is Borei atzei besamim, since the flower is not edible.

As a side point, one should be very cautious about eating esrog today. Esrog is not a food crop and it is legal to spray the trees with highly toxic pesticides. Because of the rule of chamira sakanta mi’isurah (the halachos of danger are stricter than that of kashrus), I would paskin that it is prohibited to eat esrogim today unless the owner of the orchard will vouch for their safety. However, this will get me into a controversial debate with many rabbonim who give hechsherim on esrog orchards, so I am not going to discuss this issue anymore. Simply — although Aunt Zelda may have a great recipe for making esrog jam, I suggest substituting lemon or lime instead.

Incidentally, the bracha on eating lemon jam should be Borei pri ha’eitz, which is additional evidence that the bracha before smelling a lemon is Hanosein rei’ach tov ba’peiros.

There is a major shaylah in halacha whether one may smell one’s esrog and hadasim during Sukkos. I have written a separate article on this subject.

Eating and Smelling a Fruit

If I am eating a fragrant fruit, do I recite a bracha before I smell it even though I am not deliberately trying to?

One does not recite the bracha on fragrance if one is picking up the fruit to eat and happens to smell it at the same time (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 216:2). However, if one intends both to smell the food and also to eat it, then it would seem to be a question of dispute whether one should recites both brachos, Borei pri ha’eitz and Hanosein rei’ach tov ba’peiros. This issue is dependent on a dispute between poskim whether one recites a bracha on a fragrant item that is intended to be used for another purpose. I analyzed this subject in a different article in which I discussed when one should not recite a bracha before smelling a fragrance.

Which Bracha Should I Recite First?

The poskim disagree as to whether one should first recite the bracha on eating the fruit because this is considered a greater benefit (Olas Tamid), or whether one should first recite the bracha on smelling it, since the fragrance reaches your nose before you have a chance to take a bite out of it it (Elyah Rabbah 216:6). The Mishnah Berurah (216:10) rules that one should recite the bracha on smelling the fruit first, although he also cites another suggestion: have in mind not to benefit from the fragrance until after one has recited the bracha on eating it and has tasted the fruit. Then, recite Hanosein rei’ach tov ba’peiros and benefit from the fragrance.

Many poskim state that the custom today is to not make a bracha on smelling a fruit unless it has a pronounced aroma (see Vezos Haberacha pg. 174). For this reason, some hold that one should not make a bracha when smelling an apple since apples are often not that fragrant, but one could recite a bracha when smelling guava which is usually much more aromatic. (However, note that Rambam and Mishnah Berurah [216:8] mention reciting a bracha before smelling an apple, although it is possible that the apples they had were more fragrant than ours.)

The Gemara (Berachos 43b) teaches “How do we know that one must recite a bracha on a fragrance, because the pasuk (Tehillim 150:6) says, ‘Every neshamah praises Hashem,’ – What exists in the world that the soul benefits from, but not the body? Only fragrance.”

Although the sense of smell provides some physical pleasure, it provides no nutritional benefit. Thus, smell represents an interface of the spiritual with the physical. Similarly, we find that we are to offer korbanos as rei’ach nicho’ach, a fragrance demonstrating one’s desire to be close to Hashem. We should always utilize our abilities to smell fragrant items as a stepping stone towards greater mitzvah observance and spirituality.

The author acknowledges the tremendous assistance provided by Rabbi Shmuel Silinsky for the horticultural information used in researching this article.

Some Light Chanukah Questions

Question #1: My sister invited our family for Shabbos Chanukah, and we will be sleeping at her neighbor’s house. Where do we set up the menorahs, particularly since I do not even know the neighbor?

Question #2: My husband has a meeting at work tonight and will not be home until very late. What should we do about kindling Chanukah lights?

Question #3: I will be attending a wedding during Chanukah that requires me to leave my house well before lighting time, and I will not return until very late. Can I kindle at the wedding, just like the lighting that takes place in shul?

Question #4: I will be spending part of Chanukah in a hotel. Where should I kindle my menorah?

Some Basics

Each individual has a requirement to light Chanukah lights, or to have an agent kindle the lights for him (see Rambam, Hilchos Chanukah 3:4). In places where the custom is that the entire household lights only one menorah, which is the predominant practice among Sefardim, the person who kindles functions as an agent for the rest of the family and the guests. (However, cf. Minchas Shelomoh 2:58:41 and 42, who understands this halacha differently.) Even in places where the custom is that each individual kindles his own menorah, as is common Ashkenazic practice, married women do not usually light, and most people have the custom that single girls also do not light (see Chasam Sofer, Shabbos 21b s.v. vehamehadrin, Elyah Rabbah 671:3,and Mikra’ei Kodesh #14 who explain reasons for this practice). In these instances, the male head of household kindles on behalf of his wife and daughters. A guest visiting a family for Chanukah can fulfill his or her obligation by contributing a token amount to purchase part of the candles or oil. By doing this, the guest becomes a partner in the Chanukah lights and fulfills his mitzvah when the host kindles them. An alternative way to become a partial owner of the Chanukah lights is for the host to direct the guest to pick up some of the oil or candles and thereby become a partial owner.

Eating in One House and Sleeping in Another

If someone is a guest and is eating at one house during Chanukah but sleeping in a different house, where should he light the menorah?

One should kindle where he is eating (Rema, Orach Chayim 677:1). In this situation, the place where one eats his meals is his primary “home.”

Many poskim contend that in Eretz Yisroel, the answer to this question depends on additional factors, including whether anyone else is staying in the house where the guest is sleeping. In their opinion, if no one else is kindling a menorah where the guest is sleeping, he should kindle the menorah there. Otherwise, he should kindle where he is eating.

The reason for this difference is that, in Eretz Yisroel, where the custom is to light outdoors when practical, someone walking through the street expects to find a menorah lit at every house. Thus, there is a responsibility to be certain that a menorah is kindled in every house that is occupied. In chutz la’aretz, since the menorah does not need to be visible outdoors to fulfill the mitzvah, a person walking outside the house and not seeing a lit menorah will simply assume that someone kindled indoors. Therefore, one does not need to make sure that every house has a lit menorah.

Similarly, someone in Eretz Yisroel who is using two houses should light a menorah in each of them, although he should recite only one bracha; in chutz la’aretz he does not need to kindle a menorah in each house.

I can now answer the first question I asked above: If someone will be eating in one house and sleeping in another, where should he kindle the menorah? The answer is that, in chutz la’aretz, he should kindle where he will be eating. In Eretz Yisroel, other factors may be involved, and one should ask a shaylah.

Many poskim contend that a guest who is spending Shabbos at someone else’s home and is leaving after Shabbos may kindle the menorah at his host’s house on Motza’ei Shabbos (Teshuvos Vehanhagos 1:391). Some poskim suggest that someone who follows this approach should spend some time, preferably a half-hour, appreciating his lights at the host’s house before leaving (see Teshuvos Vehanhagos 1:394).

At this point, let us discuss the second of our opening questions: My husband has a meeting at work tonight and will not be home until very late. What should we do about kindling Chanukah lights?

To answer this question, we need to discuss two issues. The first is:

When Should I Kindle the Menorah?

Early poskim dispute concerning when is the optimal time to kindle the Chanukah lights. According to the Gra, the best time is immediately after sunset, whereas most Rishonim rule that it is preferable to kindle at nightfall or shortly before nightfall.

The usually accepted approaches are to kindle sometime after sunset but before it is fully dark. Thus, Rav Moshe Feinstein kindled the menorah ten minutes after sunset, the Chazon Ish lit his menorah twenty minutes after sunset, while others contend that the optimal time to light the menorah is twenty-five minutes after sunset.

Until When May I Kindle the Menorah?

At the time of the Gemara, one fulfilled the mitzvah of lighting menorah only if one lit within a half-hour of the earliest time for lighting (Shabbos 21b; Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 672:2). This was because the focus of lighting the menorah was to publicize the miracle to people in the street. Since, in the days of Chazal, the streets were empty shortly after dark, there was no longer any mitzvah of kindling Chanukah lights half an hour later.

Today, the pirsumei nisa (publicizing the miracle) is primarily for the members of the household, and therefore many poskim hold that it is not essential to kindle the menorah immediately when it begins to get dark (see Tosafos, Shabbos 21b s.v. de’ei). Nevertheless, because this halacha is disputed, one should strive to kindle at the optimal time, which is close to twilight, as we mentioned above. In addition, there is also a halachic problem with working before one performs the mitzvah, similar to other mitzvos, such as bedikas chometz or hearing megillah, where it is prohibited to work or eat before fulfilling the mitzvah (Shu’t Maharshal #85; Mishnah Berurah 672:10; Teshuvos Vehanhagos 1:395:4). Someone who missed lighting menorah at the proper time because of extenuating circumstances should kindle his menorah as soon as his family is assembled at home (Rema Orach Chayim 672:2and Mishnah Berurah ad loc.).

An alternative method can be followed when a husband is delayed. The husband can arrange to have a member of the household, such as his wife, act as his agent and light at the optimal time (Mishnah Berurah 675:9; Teshuvos Vehanhagos 4:170). If he follows this approach, he does not need to light when he arrives home later, and if he does light, he should not recite the brachos. Alternatively, the wife can light at the proper time for herself, and the husband can light when he gets home. If one follows the latter approach, the husband and wife are no longer functioning as agents for one another, as they usually do germane to mitzvos such as ner Chanukah and ner Shabbos. Rather, each is fulfilling the mitzvah of ner Chanukah separately.

Whether to follow this approach depends on the sensitivities of the people involved. My Rosh Yeshivah, Rav Y. Ruderman zt”l, frequently lectured us on the importance of being concerned about others’ feelings. He often repeated the story of the Chofetz Chayim’s rebbe, Rav Nachumke, who waited several hours until his rebbetzin returned home before lighting the Chanukah lights. Therefore, if kindling the menorah early via an agent will create friction between family members, one should wait and kindle at a time that creates more shalom bayis (see Shabbos 23b). It is important to discuss the matter in advance and decide on an approach that keeps everyone happy.

At this point, let us examine the third of our opening questions: I will be attending a wedding during Chanukah that requires me to leave my house well before lighting time, and I will not return until very late. Can I kindle at the wedding, just like the lighting that takes place in shul?

Answer: Let us ask this question about the baalei simcha themselves! If a wedding takes place during Chanukah, where should the baalei simcha light the menorah?

I have attended weddings during Chanukah where the baalei simcha brought their menorahs to the hall and kindled them there. However, this seems incorrect, because the baalei simcha are required to kindle Chanukah lights at their own homes (Teshuvos Vehanhagos 1:398). Therefore, they should light the menorah at their homes sometime during the evening. If this is not convenient, they should arrange for someone to act as their agent and kindle their menorah for them at their house (see Mishnah Berurah 677:12). Guests attending the wedding who cannot kindle their menorah at home should also arrange for someone to light their menorah at their house. If they are concerned about leaving unattended lights burning, they should have someone remain with the lights for half an hour, and then the “menorah sitter” may extinguish the lights. If someone wishes to light an additional menorah at the hall without a bracha, in order to make pirsumei nisa, he may do so. However, this lighting does not fulfill the mitzvah (Teshuvos Vehanhagos 1:398).

Why Is This Different from Lighting in Shul?

Since one fulfills the mitzvah only by kindling the menorah in or near one’s residence, why do we kindle a menorah in shul?

Lighting the Chanukah menorah in shul does not fulfill the mitzvah of kindling Chanukah lights, but is a centuries-old minhag that we perform to make pirsumei nisa.

This practice prompts an interesting question. If lighting a menorah in shul is only a minhag, why do we recite a bracha on it? Do we ever recite brachos on minhagim?

The poskim explain that we recite a bracha because it is an accepted minhag, just as we recite a bracha on Hallel on Rosh Chodesh, even though Chazal did not obligate this recital of Hallel and it, too, is technically a minhag (Shu’t Rivash #111; for other reasons see Beis Yosef, Orach Chayim 671, s.v. uma shekasav shemeinichin).

There Is a Concert in School on Chanukah. Should We Light the Menorah with a Bracha to Perform Pirsumei Nisa?

Although lighting a menorah at the assembly will also be an act of pirsumei nisa, one fulfills no mitzvah or minhag by doing so. Therefore, one should not recite a bracha on this lighting (Teshuvos Vehanhagos 1:398).

Why Is the Concert Different from Lighting in Shul?

Lighting in shul is a specific, established minhag. We cannot randomly extend this minhag to another situation and permit reciting a bracha (Teshuvos Vehanhagos 1:398).

Lighting in a Hotel

And now, let us analyze the last of our opening questions: I will be spending part of Chanukah in a hotel. Where should I kindle my menorah?

Answer: One should light the menorah in one’s room (Chovas Hador, Ner Chanukah 2:9;see Shu’t Maharsham 4:146,who requires one to kindle Chanukah lights even while riding the train). If there is concern about a fire hazard, one should remain with the menorah until a half-hour after nightfall, or at least for a half-hour after kindling, and then extinguish the lights. On Shabbos, place only enough oil to burn the required amount of time, which is until a half-hour after nightfall.

Menorah in the Window?

May one place the menorah near the window of his hotel room? This depends. If someone will be able to see the lit menorah from outside, then it is preferable to light in a window. If no one will be able to see the menorah from outside, he should simply kindle the menorah on a table in his room.

If a hotel forbids lighting flames in its bedrooms, and one is eating regularly in the hotel’s dining room, one may light in the hotel dining room. Although frum hotels often set up menorahs in the hotel lobby, many poskim contend that one does not fulfill the mitzvah by placing a menorah there, since one is required to kindle Chanukah lights at one’s “home,” which is where one regularly eats or sleeps, and not in a lobby. Other poskim are lenient, and contend that the entire hotel lobby is considered one’s living area — just as one’s entire house is considered one’s living area. Therefore, according to these authorities, one may fulfill the mitzvah by lighting in the hotel lobby.

Visiting during Chanukah

Where do I light menorah if I visit a friend for Chanukah dinner, but I am not staying overnight?

Many people err and think that one may fulfill the mitzvah by kindling the menorah at someone else’s house while visiting. I know of people who invite guests to their house for menorah kindling and dinner. The problem with this is that one is required to kindle Chanukah lights at one’s own house. Therefore, the guest must kindle the Chanukah lights at his own house and then go to his friend’s house for the festive meal (Taz 677:2; Mishnah Berurah 677:12).

Yeshivah Bachur

Where should a bachur in yeshivah kindle his menorah? This is a dispute among contemporary poskim. Some contend that he should light in the yeshivah dining room, since it is preferable to kindle where one eats, as we mentioned above. Others contend that his dormitory room is considered more his “dwelling” than the dining room, and that he should light there (Shu’t Igros Moshe Yoreh Deah III 14:5; Shu’t Minchas Yitzchok 7:48; Chovas Hador pg. 106). To resolve this issue, some bachurim have the practice of eating one meal each day of Chanukah in their dormitory room and kindling the menorah there.

What about a yeshivah bachur who spends his entire day in the yeshivah, but sleeps at home?

It is unclear whether his main obligation to light is at home or in yeshivah. Some poskim suggest that he fulfill the mitzvah by relying on the people kindling at each place — his family lighting at his home and his fellow students lighting in the yeshivah.

Reward for Lighting Ner Chanukah

The Gemara teaches that someone who kindles Ner Chanukah will merit having sons who are talmidei chachomim (Shabbos 23b, see Rashi). This is puzzling; since all observant Jews kindle Ner Chanukah, why aren’t all our sons talmidei chachomim? The Rishonim explain that this bracha applies only to someone who observes the mitzvah carefully, in all its details (Sod Hadlakas Ner Chanukah, authored by Rabbi Yitzchok, the son of the Raavad). It is, therefore, in our best interest to be thoroughly familiar with all the halachos of kindling the Chanukah lights. May we all be blessed with a happy and healthy Chanukah!!

image_print