Author: CBL

Eruv Tavshilin

Since Yom Tov begins on Friday, a rare occurrence, we must prepare an eruv tavshilin, whether we live in Eretz Yisrael or in Chutz La’Aretz.

Question #1: Where?

“Is it true that eruv tavshilin is more common in chutz la’aretz than in Eretz Yisroel?”

Question #2: What?

“In what way is the halacha of eruv tavshilin different on Shavuos and Shevi’i shel Pesach from other Yomim Tovim?”

Question #3: Why?

“What is the reason that many people use a hard-boiled egg for eruv tavshilin?”

Foreword

With Shavuos beginning on Thursday evening, the laws of eruv tavshilin are germane both to those living in Eretz Yisroel and to those living in chutz la’aretz. In order to reply accurately to the above inquiries, we must first examine several aspects of this mitzvah that Chazal implemented – particularly, the whys, hows, and whats of eruv tavshilin. Because of space considerations, this article will not be able to address all the issues of eruv tavshilin, but will answer the opening questions that were posed. However, there are other articles on the topic, as well as on the laws of Yom Tov, that may be read on RabbiKaganoff.com.

First, the basics: When Yom Tov falls on Friday, an eruv tavshilin must be made on erev Yom Tov to permit cooking and other preparations on Yom Tov for Shabbos. As it turns out, making an eruv tavshilin is much more common in chutz la’aretz than it is in Eretz Yisroel. Since, in our calendar devised by Hillel Hanasi, the beginning of Sukkos, Pesach and Shmini Atzeres never falls on Friday, the only time there is a need for an eruv tavshilin in Eretz Yisroel is when Shavuos or the seventh day of Pesach falls on Friday, or when Rosh Hashanah falls on Thursday. On the other hand, in chutz la’aretz, in additional to these instances, often the two days of Yom Tov fall on Thursday and Friday.

Introduction

When discussing the laws of Yom Tov, the Torah teaches kol melacha lo yei’aseh bahem, ach asher yei’acheil lechol nefesh hu levado yei’aseh lachem,“No work should be performed on these days; however, that which is eaten by everyone (kol nefesh), only that may be prepared for yourselves” (Shemos 12:16). We see from the posuk that, although most melachos are forbidden on Yom Tov, cooking and most other food preparations are permitted. However, cooking is permitted on Yom Tov only when it is for consumption on that day. It is forbidden to cook on Yom Tov for the day after, and at times this is prohibited min haTorah. There is, however, one exception – when Yom Tov falls on Friday and an eruv tavshilin is made, it is permitted to cook on Yom Tov for Shabbos.

To quote the Mishnah (Beitzah 15b), “When Yom Tov falls on erev Shabbos, it is prohibited to begin cooking on Yom Tov for Shabbos. However, it is permitted to cook for Yom Tov, and, if there are leftovers, plan them to be for Shabbos. Furthermore (there is a way in which it is permitted to cook on Yom Tov for Shabbos), by preparing a cooked food from before Yom Tov which he leaves for Shabbos. According to Beis Shamai, this must be two cooked items, and, according to Beis Hillel, one cooked item suffices.” (As we are aware, we also set aside a baked item for the eruv tavshilin, but this is not essential.)

Prior to quoting the dispute between Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel, the Mishnah has expressed three distinct concepts:

No cooking on Yom Tov for Shabbos

1. It is prohibited to cook on Yom Tov for Shabbos (without making the eruv tavshilin).

Plan-overs

2. It is permitted to cook for Yom Tov, planning to have leftovers for Shabbos.

Eruv tavshilin

3. Making an eruv tavshilin permits cooking on Yom Tov for Shabbos.

Each of these concepts requires clarification:

1. No cooking on Yom Tov for Shabbos

It is prohibited to cook on Yom Tov for Shabbos.

Let me explain a question that is implicit here. If it is prohibited to cook on Yom Tov for Shabbos, why does an eruv tavshilin permit it? Or, in other terms, there are three types of eruv that Chazal instituted, eruv techumim, eruv chatzeiros and eruv tavshilin. All three of these mitzvos have the status of a takanas chachamim, which means that they were instituted by Chazal to permit something that is otherwise prohibited because of a rabbinic injunction. An eruv techumim permits walking on Shabbos and Yom Tov beyond the techum Shabbos, the distance outside the city or other “Shabbos residence;” an eruv chatzeiros permits carrying on Shabbos from one individual’s jurisdiction to that of another. Both of these prohibitions permitted by their respective eruvin are rabbinic injunctions. An eruv, which is a rabbinic introduction, cannot permit something that is prohibited min haTorah, as the Gemara asks, “Can an eruv tavshilin permit a Torah prohibition” (Pesachim 45b)?

If cooking on Yom Tov for Shabbos is permitted min haTorah, and it is prohibited only because of a rabbinic injunction, we can understand how Chazal could create a rabbinic innovation called eruv tavshilin and thereby permit this cooking. To paraphrase this expression of the Gemara, since Chazal created the prohibition, they can also reverse it (ibid.). However, if cooking on Yom Tov for Shabbos is prohibited min haTorah, how do Chazal have the authority to permit that which the Torah forbade?

Two differing approaches

How we answer this conundrum is dependent on a debate between two amora’im, Rabbah and Rav Chisda (Pesachim 46b), which has major ramifications specifically for this coming Yom Tov, when Shavuos falls on Friday.

Rav Chisda contends that, min haTorah, it is always permitted to cook on a Friday Yom Tov for Shabbos. This is called tzorchei Shabbos na’asin beYom Tov, literally, “Shabbos needs may be performed on Yom Tov.” Since Shabbos and Yom Tov both have kedusha, and are both sometimes called “Shabbos” by the Torah, cooking on Yom Tov for Shabbos is permitted min haTorah, just as cooking on Yom Tov is permitted for the same day (Rashi ad loc.). The prohibition not to cook on Yom Tov for Shabbos is a rabbinic injunction; Chazal prohibited this in order to make sure that people do not cook on Yom Tov for a weekday, or on the first day of Yom Tov for the second, both of which might be prohibited min haTorah. Making an eruv tavshilin permits cooking on Yom Tov for Shabbos, since a person thereby realizes that, without an eruv tavshilin, he cannot cook on Yom Tov even for Shabbos — therefore, he understands that he certainly cannot cook on Yom Tov for any other day.

The other position — ho’il

Rabbah contends that it is often prohibited min haTorah to cook on Yom Tov for Shabbos. In other words, he maintains that tzorchei Shabbos einam na’asin beYom Tov – notwithstanding that Yom Tov is sometimes called Shabbos, it is still prohibited min haTorah to cook on Yom Tov for any other day, including Shabbos!

If that is true, how can an eruv tavshilin, which is a rabbinic solution, permit that which is prohibited min haTorah?

The answer is a halachic concept called ho’il, which permits cooking on Yom Tov min haTorah whenever you might have a need for extra cooked food on Yom Tov itself, even when you are not expecting to need the extra food and it is unlikely that such a situation will arise. For example, after finishing the Yom Tov day seudah, min haTorah it is permitted to cook another meal, provided it will be ready to eat before the Yom Tov day is over. This is because unexpected guests may arrive at your door, and you now have a meal ready to serve them. The idea that perhaps something will happen is expressed as the word ho’il; this word is now used as a brief way of referring to a complicated legal concept.

Therefore, whenever it is possible that guests may yet arrive on Yom Tov, it is permitted to cook for them min haTorah. Although miderabbanan it is not permitted to rely on ho’il to cook on Yom Tov for Shabbos, since this is only a rabbinic injunction, eruv tavshilin can permit the cooking.

However, this heter applies only as long as the meal will be ready to be eaten while it is still Yom Tov. There is no heter to begin cooking a meal on Yom Tov that will not be ready until Yom Tov is over g . In other words, according to Rabbah, when ho’il does not apply, it is prohibited min haTorah to cook. Under these circumstances, an eruv tavshilin will not permit someone to cook on Yom Tov for Shabbos.

Thus, there is a halachic difference between Rabbah and Rav Chisda that affects us! According to Rabbah, it is not permitted to put a cholent on the fire on Friday that will not be ready to eat until sometime on Shabbos. Usually, it is perfectly fine to cook food on Friday that will be left on a properly covered fire when Shabbos starts and not ready to eat until the Friday night seudah. However, this Yom Tov it is not permitted to do this, according to Rabbah. Since this food will not be ready to eat on Yom Tov, the law of ho’il does not apply. Since the rule of ho’il does not apply, there is no heter to cook the cholent on Yom Tov for Shabbos, even if one makes an eruv tavshilin! Thus, the menu for Shabbos may have to depend on what one is planning to cook, or, more accurately, on whether it will be cooked in a way that it can be eaten on Yom Tov.

How do we rule?

The Mishnah Berurah, in Biur Halacha (527:1), notes that it is unclear whether we rule according to Rabbah or according to Rav Chisda. He concludes, therefore, that it is preferred to be machmir and have the food cooked for Shabbos in a way that ho’il applies, particularly when we are dealing with a potential question of a Torah law, such as when the first day of Yom Tov falls on Friday, as it does on Shavuos. This means that all food cooked for Shabbos should be edible before Shabbos arrives. The Biur Halacha rules that, under extenuating circumstances, it is permitted to rely on the rishonim who rule according to Rav Chisda’s opinion, but it is preferable lechatchilah to have the food for Shabbos cooked in a way that it will be already edible on Friday.

When the the first day of Yom Tov falls on Thursday, and, therefore, Friday Yom Tov is miderabbanan, there is more latitude to be lenient.

At this point, we can answer the second of our opening questions: “In what way is the halacha of eruv tavshilin different on Shavuos and Shevi’i shel Pesach from other Yomim Tovim?”

In the calendar we currently use, the first day of Shavuos and Shevi’i shel Pesach never fall on Thursday, although they both often fall on Friday. When this happens, Friday is Yom Tov min haTorah, and it is important to plan the menu such that the meals cooked on Friday for Shabbos will be ready to eat when there is still time to eat them on Yom Tov.

Plan-overs

At this point, we will examine the second point that we derived from the Mishnah, which stated, “It is permitted to cook for Yom Tov, and, if there are leftovers, plan them to be for Shabbos.” In other words, even without having made an eruv tavshilin, there is a way to cook more than you need on Yom Tov in order to have plenty of leftovers, or, shall we call them, “plan-overs.” One may cook amply for the Yom Tov meal, knowing that there will certainly be leftovers that can be served on Shabbos. As a matter of fact, if one follows the halacha correctly here, it is even permitted to cook on the first day of Yom Tov planning to have enough leftover to serve on the second day, or even on a weekday. This is provided that each dish is, or could be, served at a Yom Tov meal on the day that it was prepared.

This plan-over preparation is called marbeh beshiurim, literally, “increasing the quantities,”which means that, while preparing food on Yom Tov, it is permitted to include a greater quantity while cooking, provided no additional melacha act is performed. For example, if you need to heat a small amount of water for a cup of tea, you may place a large pot of water on the fire, since only one act of heating water — placing a pot on the fire — is being performed.

However, it is prohibited if an additional melacha action is performed. For example, if the pot is already on the fire, you may not add extra water to it, since this involves a new melacha action.

Adding more

Here are other examples. You are making a cholent or cooking soup — you may add greater quantities of meat, beans or other ingredients than you will need for your Yom Tov meal into the pot before it is placed on the stove, because you place the entire pot onto the fire at one time, or turn up the fire only once, regardless as to how much is thereby being cooked.You may fill a pot with meat on the first day of Yom Tov, even though you need only one piece for the first day.

However, it is prohibited to prepare individual units of a food item, knowing that you are preparing more than can possibly be eaten on Yom Tov. For this reason, you may not fry more schnitzel or similar items than you will possibly need for a Yom Tov meal, since these involve separate melacha actions. Similarly, it is forbidden to bake more than what you will possibly need for the day (Beitzah 17a). Adding water or meat before putting the pot on the fire simply increases the quantity cooked, but does not increase the number of melacha acts, whereas shaping each loaf or roll is done separately, thus increasing the number of acts performed.

Why is this permitted?

Why is it permitted to cook extra on Yom Tov by use of marbeh beshiurim? We would think that cooking extra on Yom Tov is forbidden, just as in a situation of pikuach nefesh, where it is forbidden to cook more than what is necessary for the needs of the ill person. Why, then, is it permitted to cook extra on Yom Tov, as long as no extra melacha actions are performed?

The Ran (Beitzah 9b in Rif pages, s.v. Umiha) explains that there is a qualitative difference between the performance of melacha actions on Shabbos (or Yom Tov) to save someone’s life, and cooking on Yom Tov. Although saving lives is a huge mitzvah and supersedes Shabbos, the act performed is still an act of melacha. On the other hand, prohibited activities on Yom Tov are defined as melachos that are not food preparatory. Preparing food on Yom Tov involves no melacha activity whatsoever, and is as permitted on Yom Tov as it is to set the table on Shabbos. Since no melacha activity is performed, there is nothing wrong with adding more to cook while the Yom Tov meal is prepared, provided that no additional melacha action is done.

Hard-boiled eruv?

At this point, let us examine the third of our opening questions: “Why do many people use a hard-boiled egg for eruv tavshilin?”

It is permitted to continue cooking on Yom Tov for Shabbos only as long as the eruv tavshilin, or at least a kezayis of the cooked part of the eruv tavshilin, still exists. In the days before refrigeration, someone who prepared meat or a different food on Wednesday or Thursday for eating on Shabbos was faced with a practical problem. Once you cook food, it begins to spoil very quickly, if it is not refrigerated. Therefore, notes the Aruch Hashulchan, it was not uncommon that the eruv tavshilin was no longer edible when people were cooking on Wednesday for Shabbos, and an inedible eruv tavshilin no longer permits you to cook on Yom Tov for Shabbos.

Using a hard-boiled egg for the eruv tavshilin resolved this problem, since an egg cooked before Yom Tov and kept without refrigeration will still be edible on Shabbos.

However, in today’s world, when you can place the cooked part of your eruv tavshilin in the refrigerator and it will last until Shabbos, it is preferred to use as eruv tavshilin a cooked delicacy that you intend to serve at the Shabbos meal. For this reason, I for the eruv tavshilin the gefilte fish that will be served on Shabbos.

Conclusion

The Torah refers to the Yomim Tovim as mo’ed. Just as the word ohel mo’ed refers to the tent in the desert which served as a meeting place between Hashemand the Jewish people, so, too, a mo’ed is a meeting time between Hashemand the Jewish people (Hirsch, Vayikra 23:3 and Horeb). Unlike Shabbos,when we refrain from all melacha activity, on Yom Tov the Torah permits melacha activity that enhances the celebration of the Yom Tov as a mo’ed. Permitting us to cook delicious, fresh meals allows an even greater celebration of this unique meeting time with Hashem.

The Numbers Game

Question #1: Pie r Squared

Yanki is supposed to be watching his weight and therefore needs to figure out how many calories are in the pie he beholds. To figure out how big the pie is, he measures the diameter of the pie, and divides in it half to get the length of its radius. He then multiplies the length of the radius by itself to get “r squared,” and multiplies the result by three so that he knows the area of the pie’s surface. Is there anything wrong with his calculation?

Question #2: Puzzled by the Pasuk

“How can the pesukim tell us that the relationship between the circumference of a circle and its diameter is three to one, when simply taking a string and measuring around a circle demonstrates that the circumference is noticeably longer than three times the diameter?”

Question #3: Performing Mitzvos Accurately

“How accurate a calculation must I make when determining the size of an item to be used for a mitzvah?”

Introduction

In numerous places, both Tanach and Chazal approximate certain mathematical values, such as evaluating the ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter as three to one. The problem is that we can demonstrate mathematically that the ratio is greater than three and is almost 3 1/7. This leads to the following questions:

(1) Why would Chazal calculate using inaccurate approximations?

(2) When making halachic calculations, may we rely on these estimates, or do we need to be mathematically more accurate?

(3) A corollary question is: When providing an estimate, one must allow for a margin of error. Does halachah require a margin of error, and, if so, how much?

The Slide Rule versus the Calculator

Let me begin our discussion with a modern analogy, if something I remember can still be considered “modern.” When I first studied sophisticated mathematical estimates, I learned to use a slide rule, which today is as valuable to an engineer as his abacus. Relative to the calculator, a slide rule does not provide accurate measurements, and someone using a slide rule must allow for a fairly significant margin of error.

Today, complex computations are made with calculators, which provide far more accurate results that can be rounded off, as necessary, to the nearest tenth, millionth, quadrillionth or smaller. Of course, using a calculator still requires one to round upward or downward, but because it is much more precise, the margin of error is greatly reduced.

How Irrational Are You?

Numerous halachic questions require mathematical calculations that involve what we call “irrational numbers.” An irrational number means one that cannot be expressed in fractional notation. Another way of explaining an irrational number is that its value can never be calculated totally accurately, but can only be estimated. The two most common examples of irrational numbers that show up in Chazal are:

Pi

(1) The ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter, which we are used to calling by the Greek letter ∏ (pronounced like the word “pie,” and spelled in English “pi”). Since the 19th century, the letter pi has been used to represent this number, because the Greek word for periphery is peripherion, which begins with the letter ∏. Hundreds of years earlier, the Rambam (Commentary to the Mishnah, Eruvin 1:5) noted that the ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter is an irrational number that can only be approximated, and that the scientists of his era used an estimate of 3 and 1/7, which is actually slightly greater than the value of ∏. The Rambam explains that since there is no accurate ratio, Chazal used a round number, three, for this calculation.

The Diagonal of a Square

(2) The length of a diagonal of a square, which is equal to the side of the square multiplied by the square root of two (√2). Chazal calculated the length of a diagonal of a square to be 1 and 2/5 times its side, which is slightly smaller than the value of the √2. (Another way of expressing this idea is that the ratio between the diagonal and the side is 7:5.) The fact that Chazal’s figuring is somewhat smaller than the mathematical reality is already proved by Tosafos (to Sukkah 8a s.v. kol).

Since both pi and the square root of two are irrational numbers, they can only be estimated but can never be calculated with absolute accuracy.

Based on the above-quoted statement of the Rambam, we can already address one of our earlier questions: “Why would Chazal have used inaccurate evaluations for calculation?” The answer is that any computation of the correlation of the circumference of a circle to its diameter will be an estimate. The only question is how accurate must this estimate be for the purpose at hand.

Chazal or Tanach?

Although the Rambam attributes the rounding of pi to Chazal, in actuality, there are sources in Tanach that calculate the ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter as three-to-one. Both in Melachim (I 7:23) and again in Divrei Hayamim (II 4:2), Tanach teaches that the Yam shel Shelomoh, the large, round pool or mikveh that was built in the first Beis Hamikdash, was thirty amos in circumference and ten amos in diameter, which provides a ratio of circumference to diameter of three-to-one. Thus, we can ask a question of the Rambam: Why does he attribute this ratio to Chazal, rather than the source for Chazal’s calculation, the pesukim?

The commentaries there, however, already ask how the verse can make a calculation that we know is not accurate. The Ralbag suggests two options: either that the numbers used are intended to be a very broad estimate, or, alternatively, that the diameter is measured from the external dimensions of the mikveh, whereas the circumference is measured from its inside, which makes the estimate closer to mathematical reality. According to the second approach, we have no Biblical source that uses an estimate of three-to-one as a substitute for pi.

This will explain why the Rambam attributed the estimation of pi as three to Chazal, rather than to the Tanach. The Rambam was fully aware that one could interpret the verses according to the second approach of the Ralbag, in which case, there is no proof from the verse. He, therefore, attributed this estimate to Chazal.

Gemara Eruvin

However, the Ralbag’s approach seems to conflict with a passage of Gemara. The Mishnah in Eruvin states that if the circumference of a pole is three tefachim, its diameter is one tefach, which means that the Mishnah assumes a ratio of three-to-one.

The Gemara questions how the Mishnah knows that the ratio is three-to-one, and then draws proof from the above-quoted verse that the Yam shel Shelomoh was thirty amos around and ten amos across. The Gemara then debates whether the calculations of the Yam shel Shelomoh indeed result in a ratio of three-to-one, because one must also include the thickness of the poolitself, which offsets the computation. The Gemara eventually concludes that the verse was calculating from the inside of the pool, not its outside, and therefore the thickness of the pool’s containing wall is not included in the calculation (Eruvin 14a).

However, this Gemara’s discussion leaves the mathematician dissatisfied, a question already noted by Tosafos. If the internal diameter of the Yam shel Shelomoh was ten amos, its circumference must have been greater than thirty amos, and if its circumference was thirty amos, then its internal diameter must have been less than ten amos.

A Different Question

The Rosh, in his responsa, is bothered by a different question, based on Talmudic logic rather than on mathematical calculation. He finds the Gemara’s question — requesting proof for the ratio between a circle’s circumference and its diameter — to be odd. The ratio between a circle’s circumference and its diameter is a value that one should calculate. By its nature, this is not a question that requires a Biblical proof or source.

In the literature that we have received from the Rosh, he asks this question in two different places. In his responsa (Shu”t Harosh 2:19), we find a letter that he wrote to the Rashba, in which he asked a series of questions that the Rosh notes bother him tremendously and to whom he has no one else to turn for an answer. One of the questions the Rosh asks is: “Why does the Gemara ask for a Biblical source for a mathematical calculation?”

It is curious to note that a later commentary mentions that, in all the considerable literature that we have received from the Rashba, we have no recorded answer of the Rashba to this question of the Rosh (Cheishek Shelomoh to Eruvin 14a).

Another Rosh

As I mentioned above, there is another place where the Rosh asks why the Gemara wanted a Biblical source for a mathematical calculation, but in this second place the Rosh provides an answer to the question. In his Tosafos Harosh commentary on Eruvin, which was published for the first time fairly recently, the Rosh provides the following answer: Since the calculation of three-to-one is not accurate, the Gemara wanted a biblical source as proof that we are permitted to rely on this estimate.

(It is curious to note that the Cheishek Shelomoh whom I quoted above provided the same answer to this question as did the Rosh in his Tosafos. The Cheishek Shelomoh never saw the Tosafos Harosh, which had not yet been printed in his day.)

Curiousity about the Tosafos Harosh

There is an interesting historical point that can presumably be derived from this statement of the Rosh. As I mentioned, in the Tosafos Harosh, the Rosh does answer the question that he raised, and accredits this answer to himself. This should be able to prove which work the Rosh had written earlier, and also whether he ever received an answer to his question from the Rashba. This analysis is based on the following question: Why did the Rosh cite an answer in his Tosafos¸but not in his responsum, which was addressed as a question to the Rashba. There are three obvious possibilities:

(1) Although the Rosh wrote this answer in his Tosafos, he was dissatisfied with it, and therefore wrote a question to the Rashba. I would reject this possibility because, if it is true, then, in his correspondence to the Rashba, the Rosh would have mentioned this answer and his reason for rejecting it.

(2) The Rosh indeed received an answer, either this one or a different answer, from the Rashba. I reject this approach also, because, were it true, the Rosh would have quoted the Rashba’s answer in his Tosafos and, if need be, discussed it.

(3) Therefore, I conclude that the Rosh, indeed, never received an answer to the question he asked of the Rashba and subsequently reached his own conclusion as to how to answer the question, which he then recorded in the Tosafos Harosh. This would lead us to conclude that the Tosafos Harosh were written later in his life than his responsa, or, at least, than this responsum.

Mathematical Accuracy

At this point, we can address one of earlier questions. “When making halachic calculations, may we rely on these estimates, or do we need to be mathematically more accurate?” We might be able to prove this point by noting something in the Mishnah in Eruvin. The Mishnah there ruled that, under certain circumstances, an area that is fully enclosed on three of its sides and has a beam, a tefach wide, above the fourth side, is considered halachically fully enclosed, and one may carry inside it. The Mishnah then proceeds to explain that if the beam is round and has a circumference of three tefachim, one may carry inside the area because, based on the calculation that the relationship of its circumference to its diameter is three-to-one, the beam is considered to be a tefach wide. However, as the Rambam notes, the beam is actually less than a tefach in diameter, and therefore, one should not be permitted to carry in this area!

The Aruch Hashulchan (Orach Chayim 363:22; Yoreh Deah 30:13) notes this problem and concludes that one may carry in this area. He contends that this is exactly what the Gemara was asking when it requested Scriptural proof for a mathematical calculation. “Upon what halachic basis may we be lenient in using this estimate of three-to-one, when this will permit carrying in an area in which the beam is less than a tefach wide? The answer is that this is a halachah that we derive from the verse.”

To clarify this concept, the Chazon Ish notes that the purpose of mitzvos is to draw us nearer to Hashem, to accept His reign, and to be meticulously careful in observing His laws. However, none of this is conflicted when the Torah teaches that we may use certain calculations, even if they are not completely mathematically accurate. In this instance, relying on these estimates is exactly what the Torah requires (Chazon Ish, Orach Chayim 138:4). As expressed by a different author, the Gemara (Eruvin 4a; Sukkah 5b) teaches that the measurements, the shiurim, required to fulfill mitzvos are all halachah leMoshe miSinai, laws that Moshe Rabbeinu received as a mesorah in Har Sinai. Similarly, these estimates of irrational numbers mentioned above are all halachah leMoshe miSinai that one may rely upon to fulfill mitzvos, whether or not they are mathematically accurate. The same Torah takes these calculations into consideration when instructing us which dimensions are required in order to fulfill these specific mitzvos (Shu”t Tashbeitz 1:165).

In the context of a different halachah in the laws of Eruvin, the Mishnah Berurah makes a similar statement, contending that we can rely on Chazal’s estimates, even when the result is lenient. However, the Mishnah Berurah there vacillates a bit in his conclusion, ruling that one can certainly rely on this when the issue is a rabbinic concern (Shaar Hatziyun 372:18). In a responsum, Rav Moshe Feinstein questions why the Mishnah Berurah limits relying on this approach, and Rav Moshe rules unequivocally that the rule permitting one to rely on these estimates holds true even germane to de’oraysa laws and even leniently (Shu”t Igros Moshe, Yoreh Deah Volume3 #120:5).

How Straight Are My Tefillin?

Personally, I find the context of Rav Moshe’s teshuvah very interesting. There is a halachah leMoshe miSinai that requires that the boxes of the tefillin, the batim, must be perfectly square. In a responsum dated 21 Adar II, 5736, Rav Moshe was asked whether there is a halachic preference to use scientific measuring equipment to determine that one’s tefillin are perfectly square. Rav Moshe rules that there is neither a reason nor a hiddur to measure the tefillin squareness this accurately. Since Chazal have used the calculation of 1.4 or a ratio of 7:5, which we know is an estimate, to determine the correct diagonal of a square, there is no requirement to make one’s tefillin squarer than this, and it is perfectly fine simply to measure the length of each of the sides of one’s tefillin and its two diagonals to ascertain that the ratio between the diagonal and the side is 7:5.

In the above-cited responsum, Rav Moshe notes that he had heard that the Brisker Rav, Rav Yitzchak Ze’ev Soloveitchik, had ruled that it was preferable to check one’s tefillin in the most scientific method available. Rav Moshe writes that he finds this suggestion very strange and disputes its being halachically correct (Shu”t Igros Moshe, Yoreh Deah Volume3 #120:5).

Thus, according to these authorities, we have answered our previous question regarding the halachic significance of estimated values: Indeed, the purpose of Chazal‘s making these estimates was that observing halachah does not require that these calculations be mathematically precise, provided they meet the criteria that the halachah established.

An Alternate Approach

Although the majority of late authorities conclude that the calculations of Chazal are indeed part of the halachos of shiurim, this is not a universally held position. The Tashbeitz, a rishon, wrote a lengthy responsum on the topic, in which he presents two ways to explain why Chazal used estimates that are not precisely accurate. His first approach reaches the same conclusion as we have already found in the later poskim, that these measurements are included within the halachos of shiurim that are part of the halachah leMoshe miSinai.

The second approach of the Tashbeitz, however, differs with the above-mentioned halachic conclusion. In his second approach, he contends that all the above estimates were meant for pedagogic, but not halachic reasons. The rounding of pi to three and the diagonal of a square to 1.4 were provided to make the material easily comprehensible to all students, since every individual is required to know the entire Torah. Thus, when Chazal used these estimates in calculating the laws, their intent was to enable the average student to comprehend the halachic material, not to provide the most accurate interpretation. When an actual halachic calculation is made, it must be totally accurate, and any halachic authority involved would realize that he must use a highly accurate mathematical computation and then round either upward or downward as necessary for the specific application. (A similar position is held by Chiddushim Uviurim, Ohalos 5:6.)

Conclusion

Certainly, the majority of late halachic opinions conclude that the estimates of Chazal are meant to be halachically definitive, and not simply pedagogic in nature. However, I leave it to the individual reader to ask his or her posek what to do when a practical question presents itself.

Miscellaneous Mitzvah Matters

The midrash at the beginning of this week’s parsha mentions that the details of all mitzvos were taught at Sinai, making this topic extremely timely…

Question #1: Choosing your Mitzvos

“I don’t have enough money for all the mitzvah objects that I need. Which should I purchase?”

Question #2: Extra Mezuzos

“I have extra mezuzos. May I use them for tefillin?”

Question #3: When Do We Recite a brocha?

“Why don’t we recite a brocha when we put tzitzis onto a garment, yet we recite a brocha when we affix a mezuzah to a door?”

Introduction

The first two of our opening questions deal with a very interesting issue: Are there hierarchies among our mitzvos? In other words, are some mitzvos more important than others?

We do not usually attempt to judge which mitzvah is more important, since it is our obligation to observe all the mitzvos to the best of our ability. Nevertheless, there are occasional circumstances when we must decide which mitzvah is more “valuable.” One example when this could happen is when we must choose between observing one mitzvah and another. The Gemara (Rosh Hashanah 34b) discusses a situation in which one has to choose whether to spend Rosh Hashanah in a place where there is someone to blow shofar, but no Rosh Hashanah davening, or in another place where there is Rosh Hashanah davening, but no shofar. The Gemara concludes that it is more important to spend Rosh Hashanah in a place where there might be an opportunity to fulfill the mitzvah of shofar, than to go somewhere else where there will definitely be davening but no shofar blowing. This is because safek d’oraysa, a possibility of fulfilling a mitzvah min haTorah,carries more weight than definitively fulfilling that which is required only miderabbanan.

Yerushalmi

A more revealing and detailed discussion is in the Talmud Yerushalmi, at the very end of Mesechta Megillah, which quotes a dispute between Shmuel and Rav Huna concerning someone who has only sufficient money to purchase either tefillin or mezuzah, but not both. The question debated in the passage of the Yerushalmi is: Which mitzvah is it more important to fulfill? The explanations provided in this passage of the Yerushalmi provide insight into other mitzvos, should these rules need to be applied. For example, should someone have to choose between purchasing the four species for Sukkos or materials for a sukkah, which takes precedence? (For simplicity’s sake throughout the rest of this article, I will refer to the purchasing of the four species for Sukkos as simply the mitzvah of “lulav.”) Or, should one have to choose between purchasing a lulav or purchasing tefillin, which takes precedence? This passage of Yerushalmi provides foundation for subsequent halachic discussion on these issues.

Let us quote the passage of the Yerushalmi:

Tefillin and mezuzah, which comes first? Shmuel said, “Mezuzah comes first.” Rav Huna said, “Tefillin comes first.” What is Shmuel’s reason? Because mezuzah applies on Shabbos and Yom Tov. What is Rav Huna’s reason? Because tefillin applies to people traveling on the seas and in deserts. A beraisa (teaching of the era of the Mishnah, but not included in the Mishnah) supports Shmuel, which says that if tefillin have worn out, one may use its parshiyos (written parchments) for mezuzah, but one may not use a mezuzah for tefillin, since we have a general rule that one increases but does not decrease sanctity.

To explain the Yerushalmi’s conclusion: The mitzvah of tefillin requires use of four sections of the Torah, two in parshas Bo, and two others, the first two of the three parshiyos of kerias shma, which are from parshas Va’eschanan and parshas Eikev. A mezuzah includes only these last two sections of the Torah. May one take the pieces of parchment that were used as a mezuzah and use them for tefillin, or vice versa — if they were used for tefillin can they be used for a mezuzah?

Understanding Shmuel

Shmuel contends that since mezuzah applies every day of the year, it is a greater and holier mitzvah than tefillin. The Gemara quotes two ramifications of this ruling:

(1) Should one be able to fulfill only one of these two mitzvos, mezuzah is preferred.

(2) Parshiyos once used for tefillin may be used for a mezuzah, but a mezuzah may not be used for parshiyos in tefillin. Since mezuzah is a holier mitzvah, using a mezuzah for tefillin decreases its sanctity, which is not permitted. This is because of a general halachic rule, maalin bekodesh velo moridim:something may be elevated to a use that is of greater sanctity, but it may not be reduced to a lower level of sanctity. For example, a kohein gadol can never return to being a kohein hedyot, a regular kohein. Since the beraisa quoted by the Yerushalmi states that one may not use mezuzah parshiyos for tefillin, the conclusion is, like Shmuel, that mezuzah is more important.

There is a question on Shmuel’s explanation. In what way does mezuzah apply on Shabbos and Yom Tov, when one is not permitted to put a mezuzah on a door on either of these holidays, because of the melacha involved? The answer is that, if someone is required to affix a mezuzah but did not, he is not permitted to spend Shabbos in that house unless he has nowhere else to live (see Pri Megadim, Orach Chaim, Eishel Avraham 38:15; Aruch Hashulchan, Yoreh Deah 285:5). In other words, although one may not install a mezuzah on Shabbos or Yom Tov, the mitzvah still applies on those days.

Understanding Rav Huna

Rav Huna explains that on days that one is obligated to wear tefillin, there are no exemptions from that responsibility. On the other hand, someone who has no residence is not obligated in mezuzah. In theory, one can exempt oneself from the mitzvah of mezuzah by avoiding living in a residence. Therefore, tefillin is a greater mitzvah than mezuzah.

This has two ramifications:

(1) Should one be able to fulfill only one of these two mitzvos, tefillin is preferred.

(2) A mezuzah may be used for parshiyos in a pair of tefillin, but parshiyos used for tefillin may not be used for mezuzah. Since tefillin is a holier mitzvah, using parshiyos of tefillin for a mezuzah decreases their sanctity, which is not permitted.

How do we rule?

The Rosh (Hilchos Tefillin, Chapter 30) rules that the mitzvah of tefillin is more important, and this approach is followed by the Tur, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 38:12), the Rema (Yoreh Deah 285:1) and the later authorities. The Rosh explains that tefillin is more important because a mitzvah de’gufei adif, literally “a mitzvah of your body is more important.” What does this mean?

One early acharon, the Beis Hillel (Yoreh Deah 285), understood the Rosh to mean that the mitzvah of tefillin is more important because one puts tefillin on his body, as opposed to mezuzah, which is on one’s house, not body. Based on his reason, the Beis Hillel concludes that tefillin is more important than sukkah or lulav, since neither of these mitzvos is performed on one’s body to the extent that tefillin is. Once the Beis Hillel is discussing which mitzvos are “more important,” he discusses whether tefillin is more important than tzitzis or vice versa, concluding that tefillin are more important, since the name of Hashem is in the tefillin.

However, most authorities understand that the Rosh means something else. They explain that the mitzvah of tefillin is inherently obligatory, whereas the mitzvah of mezuzah is circumstantial. Every weekday there is an obligation for every adult Jewish male to don tefillin. The mitzvah of mezuzah is not inherently obligatory, but is dependent on one’s living arrangements, and can be avoided completely (Gra; Rabbi Akiva Eiger, in his notes to Shulchan Aruch and Responsum 1:9; Aruch Hashulchan, Yoreh Deah 285:5). Furthermore, according to most authorities, mezuzah is obligatory min haTorah only if one owns the house in which he lives.

A big difference between these two approaches is germane to the mitzvos of lulav and sukkah. According to the Beis Hillel, these mitzvos carry less weight than tefillin. However, according to those who disagree with him, both of these mitzvos are inherently obligatory, just as tefillin. This would mean that, regarding the Rosh’s criterion, all three of these mitzvos should be treated on an equal footing, and we would need to find other criteria to decide which of them is more important.

Tefillin or Sukkah?

Rabbi Akiva Eiger notes that the above-discussed passage of Yerushalmi provides an answer to this question. There it stated that a mitzvah that occurs more frequently should be prioritized over one that occurs less frequently. Tefillin is far more frequently observed than either sukkah or lulav, and, therefore, should be treated with more priority than they are.

However, notes Rabbi Akiva Eiger, this question is usually moot for the following reason: When one has a mitzvah that he is obligated to observe immediately, he does not wait to fulfill it. Therefore, any time other than erev Sukkos, one who needs to choose between these mitzvos should use the funds to acquire tefillin, since he has that responsibility immediately, and the mitzvos of Sukkos will wait. If the situation occurs during chol hamoed Sukkos, the priority will be: sukkah, tefillin, lulav. This is because the mitzvah of sukkah is, at the moment, definitely min haTorah, whereas even those who wear tefillin on chol hamoed accept that it is disputed whether there is a mitzvah to wear them on chol hamoed. Therefore, sukkah, which is definitely a requirement min haTorah on all seven days of Sukkos, takes precedence over tefillin. Since the mitzvah of taking lulav is min haTorah only on the first day of Sukkos, but afterwards is required only miderabbanan (unless one is in or near the Beis Hamikdash grounds), tefillin will have precedence over lulav for those who wear tefillin on chol hamoed, which is the assumption that Rabbi Akiva Eiger makes.

Tefillin versus tzitzis

Rabbi Akiva Eiger agrees that tefillin is more important than tzitzis, but for a different reason than that provided by the Beis Hillel. Tzitzis is like mezuzah – there is only an obligation if he has a four-cornered garment, but it is not an automatic requirement. Although one is obligated to place tzitzis on any four-cornered garment that one owns and wears, one can avoid wearing four-cornered garments more easily than one can avoid living in a house that one owns. On the other hand, a man is required to wear tefillin every weekday.

Difficulty with the Rosh

Notwithstanding that all later authorities conclude that tefillin is considered a more “important” mitzvah than mezuzah, a difficulty is presented by the Rosh’s conclusion. Why would he rule according to Rav Huna, when the Yerushalmi’s conclusion is, like Shmuel, that mezuzah is a more important mitzvah?

The answer is that the Talmud Bavli (Menachos 32a) states the following: “A sefer Torah that wore out, or tefillin that wore out, cannot be used for a mezuzah, because one is not permitted to reduce something from a greater sanctity to a lower one.” Thus, we see that the Bavli ruled according to Rav Huna, that tefillin is a greater mitzvah than mezuzah, and the halacha follows the Bavli over the Yerushalmi (Beis Yosef, end of Orach Chayim, Chapter 38).

Practically speaking

The Magen Avraham (38:15), one of the major halachic authorities, notes that, although the mitzvah of tefillin is more important than mezuzah, in practice it might be better for someone to purchase mezuzos. Someone might be able to coordinate his schedule such that he can borrow tefillin from other people when he needs them for davening every day, something impractical to do with mezuzos. Thus, if he can thereby observe both mitzvos, he should purchase the mezuzos to allow this. This ruling is followed by the later authorities (Shulchan Aruch Harav; Mishnah Berurah; Aruch Hashulchan).

Nevertheless, the rule has not changed: Someone who will be unable to observe the mitzvah of tefillin should purchase tefillin first and wait until he has more resources before he purchases mezuzos (Shulchan Aruch Harav; Mishnah Berurah; Aruch Hashulchan).

Choosing your mitzvos

At this point, we can now address our opening question: “I don’t have enough money for all the mitzvah objects that I need. Which should I purchase?”

The halachic conclusion is:

He should first see which mitzvos he can fulfill without purchasing them. For example, he might be able to borrow tefillin, and he also might be able to use someone else’s sukkah. If he lives near someone else who is observant, he should be able to fulfill the mitzvah of lulav with someone else’s lulav. In earlier generations, it was common for an entire community to purchase only one set of four minim, and everyone used that set to fulfill the mitzvah. Mezuzah is more difficult to observe with borrowed items, and, therefore, he might need to purchase mezuzos ahead of tefillin, lulav, or sukkah, notwithstanding that they are obligatory mitzvos to a greater extent than mezuzah is.

Furthermore, which mitzvah he will need to observe first might be a factor, as we saw from Rabbi Akiva Eiger’s discussion about someone who needs to purchase tefillin, sukkah and lulav.

When Do We Recite a Brocha?

At this point, we can discuss the third of our opening questions: “Why don’t we recite a brocha when we put tzitzis onto a garment, yet we recite a brocha when we place a mezuzah on a door?”

This question is raised by the Magen Avraham, in his commentary on the following words of the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 19:1): “Until one dons the garment, one is exempt from putting tzitzis on it. For this reason, one does not recite a brocha when one places the tzitzis on the garment, since the mitzvah is only when you wear it.”

The Magen Avraham (19:1) asks why we do not recite a brocha when putting tzitzis onto a garment, yet we recite a brocha when we affix a mezuzah to a door? The Magen Avraham answers that the reason is practical. Usually, one moves into the house first, before he installs the mezuzah, and, since he already lives in the house, he is responsible to have a mezuzah on the door. Thus, placing the mezuzah on the door is the fulfillment of the mitzvah and warrants a brocha. On the other hand, one does not usually place tzitzis on a garment while wearing it, but before he puts it on, when there is no obligation yet to fulfill a mitzvah.

Based on his analysis, the Magen Avraham rules that should any of the tzitzis tear off a garment while someone is wearing it, and he attaches replacement tzitzis while he is still wearing it, he should recite a brocha prior to attaching the replacement. The brocha he would recite in this instance is Asher kideshanu bemitzvosav vetzivanu la’asos tzitzis, which translates as a brocha “to make tzitzis,” a text that we do not have recorded by any earlier authority.

Notwithstanding his conclusion, the Magen Avraham rules that this is not the preferable way to act, but, rather, he should remove the tzitzis once they become invalid and attach replacement tzitzis without a brocha. On the other hand, the Magen Avraham contends that if a mezuzah falls off or becomes invalid, the occupant is not required to relocate until he can replace the mezuzah. The difference between the two cases is how much tircha the person is required to undergo – one is required to remove a pair of tzitzis, which is a simple act, but not required to relocate himself and his family until he has a chance to replace or reaffix the mezuzah.

The Magen Avraham then suggests that if someone affixed a mezuzah before he moved into a house, he should not recite the brocha when he affixes the mezuzah, but when he moves in he should recite the brocha, Asher kideshanu bemitzvosav vetzivanu ladur babayis sheyeish bo mezuzah, “to live in a house that has a mezuzah,” again, a new text of a brocha not recorded by any earlier authority.

The Birkei Yosef (Orach Chayim 19:2) disagrees with the Magen Avraham, contending that we should not create texts of brochos that we do not find in early sources. In regard to the Magen Avraham’s question, why do we recite a brocha upon affixing a mezuzah but not upon placing tzitzis, the Birkei Yosef provides a different answer: Chazal required a brocha on the last act that you do to fulfill a mitzvah. In the case of tzitzis, it is when you put on the garment. In the case of mezuzah, it is when you affix it. However, if there is a mezuzah on the door already, one does not recite a brocha upon moving into a house, since one did not perform any act to fulfill the mitzvah.

Conclusion

A famous quotation from a non-Jewish source is: “Is G-d more concerned about what comes into our mouth or what comes out?” This question assumes that some of Hashem’s mitzvos are more “important” for us to observe than others. The Torah’s answer is that it is not for us to decide which of the mitzvos is more important. One grows in one’s relationship with Hashem through each opportunity to perform a mitzvah.

Hybrid or Kil’ayim?

Parshas Kedoshim contains one of the two places in the Torah where the mitzvos of kil’ayim are taught.

Question #1: Kil’ei beheimah

May one attempt to crossbreed a mule with a stallion?

Question #2: Kil’ei zera’im

May I plant the vegetables in my garden close together?

Question #3: Kil’ei hakerem

Is there any way that I can plant vegetables near my vineyard?

Question #4: Harkavas ilan

Must I be careful before I purchase a fruit tree?

Many people assume that the halachic definition of the mitzvah of kil’ayim is the crossbreeding of different species of plants or animals, but, as we will soon see, not all of the laws of kil’ayim have to do with what a farmer or a scientist would call crossbreeding or hybridization.

My desktop dictionary defines hybrid as “the offspring produced by breeding plants or animals of different varieties, species, or races.” Thousands of years ago, mankind crossbred horses and donkeys to create mules and hinnies. This hybrid, called a pered (female pirdah) is already mentioned many times in Tanach. As a pack animal, the mule — produced from a male donkey, called a “jack” and a mare (female horse) — has many advantages over either of its parents. It is usually as strong as a horse, sturdy, sure-footed, and, notwithstanding its reputation for being “stubborn as a mule,” is more reliable for hauling than draft horses. (A hinney, which has less commercial value, is produced from a stallion (male horse) and a female donkey, called a “jenny.” The word “hinney” comes from its parents – a horse and a jenny.)

Other crossbred animals

Artificial insemination has been used to crossbreed camels and llamas with the goal of producing a larger quantity of quality llama wool. Mankind has created such interesting creatures as ligers, crossbreeds of male lions and tigresses, tiglons (sometimes called tigons) from male tigers and lionesses, leopons (male leopards and lionesses), wholpins (whales and dolphins) and geeps (goats and sheep). Most of these have resulted in limited, if any, commercial value, although it was thought by some that they might.

Crossbreeding animal species is one of the prohibitions of the Torah when it declares behemtecha lo sarbia kil’ayim (Vayikra 19:19). It is one of the unusual mitzvos that even a non-Jew is required to observe (Rambam, Hilchos Melachim 10:6).

The prohibition is only to create the crossbreed; one may use a mule or any other crossbred animal. However, not only is it prohibited to crossbreed a horse with a donkey, it is even forbidden to attempt to breed a mule or hinney with either a donkey or a horse (Mishnah, Kil’ayim 1:6). In fact, it is rare that such an attempt will produce offspring, although it is claimed anecdotally that this can happen upon occasion. Nevertheless, someone who attempts to crossbreed them violates a Torah prohibition.

Crossbreeding of plants

Crossbreeding of plants, or, as it is usually called, cross-fertilization or cross-pollination, is when one pollinates the flower of one species with pollen from a different species, to produce offspring with some characteristics of each. Many fruits have been developed this way, although I want to share that a nectarine is not a crossbreed of a peach and a plum, as often mistakenly thought. A nectarine is an ancient variety of peach (Prunus persica) that has a smooth skin. Botanists consider it to be the same species as peaches.

What is interesting is that, in the discussions about kil’ayim in the Torah, the Mishnah and the writings of Chazal, nowhere does it say that it is prohibited to cross-pollinate from one plant species to another. This does not mean to say that there is no prohibition of kil’ayim germane to trees or plants. Quite the contrary, there are three such prohibitions min haTorah. They are referred to as kil’ei zera’im, kil’ayim in plants; kil’ei hakerem, kil’ayim in vineyards; and kil’ayim in trees, usually referred to as harkavas ilan. But, as we will soon see, none of these three prohibitions has anything to do with crossbreeding.

Kil’ei zera’im

Kil’ei zera’im is planting two or more different species of grains, vegetables or other edible herbaceous plants in close proximity. Exactly what defines “close proximity” is a very complicated halachic topic, and depends on factors such as the shape and size of the vegetable patch, and what variety of produce one is planting. We should note that, from a botanical point of view, planting two species in close proximity will not cause hybridization because it does not affect the genetic makeup.

This mitzvah applies only in Eretz Yisroel. Thus, someone in chutz la’aretz may plant his backyard garden with a wide variety of vegetables without any halachic concern, whereas in Eretz Yisroel someone planting a garden patch must be very careful to keep the different species separate.

Kil’ayim in a vineyard, kil’ei hakerem

Kil’ei hakerem is the prohibition against planting grains or vegetables in, near, above or below a vineyard. Again, this forbidden planting will not affect the genetic makeup of any of the plants involved. It is also clear that this was not the concern in halacha as we see from many of the halachic details. Here is one example: Although it is prohibited to plant grains or vegetables near a vineyard, there is a way to permit it by separating the vegetable patch from the vineyard with a halachic wall between them. For example, if one places two poles and a wire across the top, a tzuras hapesach, between the vegetable patch and the vineyard, it is permitted to plant vegetables right next to the vineyard (Eruvin 11a). This is similar to what we do when we construct an eruv to permit carrying on Shabbos. It is quite clear that, botanically, the tzuras hapesach does not accomplish anything to prevent the mingling of the species. Yet, with the tzuras hapesach, it is permitted to plant the crop; without the tzuras hapesach, it is a Torah prohibition to do so! This certainly cannot be explained on a scientific basis.

Even one grapevine is problematic near a crop plant, so care must be taken even in the home garden. For example, a pot with herbs or a vegetable under a trellised grapevine could forbid the grapes and the produce of the pot!

Unlike other forms of kil’ayim, the produce of kil’ei hakerem is forbidden to use.

The prohibition of planting grains or vegetables in a vineyard applies in chutz la’aretz, but only miderabbanan (Kiddushin 39a).

Harkavas ilan – grafting trees

The laws of kil’ayim also prohibit grafting one species of tree or plant onto the wood stock, or lower trunk, of another species. Although a town dweller may feel that this is a rare occurrence, in fact, contemporary plant nurseries and tree farmers usually graft branches of a species that produces delicious fruit onto the hardier stock of a different species.

For example, most peach and nectarine trees are produced by grafting a peach or nectarine branch onto the stock of a hardier tree, such as an almond. Someone who performs this, either in Eretz Yisroel or in chutz la’aretz, violates a Torah prohibition whether he is Jewish or not (Rambam, Hilchos Melachim 10:6). Most authorities rule that one may not own, water or prune a kil’ayim tree, whether or not it is in Eretz Yisroel or in chutz la’aretz (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 295:7 and Piskei Teshuvah).

However, many observant Jews purchased agricultural properties that contained kil’ayim trees and did not cut down those trees. Was there any justification for their actions? Numerous halachic responsa discuss what was apparently a widespread practice in the eighteenth and nineteenth century. Whereas most poskim rule that these Jews violated the halacha, some authorities justify the practice of owning these trees, at least in chutz la’aretz (Shu’t Chasam Sofer, Yoreh Deah #288; Aruch Hashulchan, Yoreh Deah 295:17-18).

Because so many trees are grafted nowadays, someone who owns a fruit tree should have a horticultural expert check whether its stock is from the same species or not. Often, even a non-expert can detect if a tree was grafted onto a different species by simply scrutinizing the tree. If the bark somewhere near the bottom of the tree looks different from the upper part of the tree, this indicates that the upper part of the tree was grafted. Often one can see a line separating the grafted scion from the rootstock, or a difference in thickness between the top and bottom. Before purchasing a new tree at a nursery, examine the trunk carefully for signs of grafting.

The prohibition of planting vegetables and other edible crops together applies only in Eretz Yisroel, whereas grafting trees applies equally min hatorah in chutz la’aretz and in Eretz Yisroel.

Although planting and caring for a kil’ayim tree is forbidden, the fruit from such a tree is permitted. Thus, one may purchase fruit in a market without worrying about kil’ayim.

Esrogim

Although space does not allow us to discuss this fascinating topic, there is a huge amount of halachic literature discussing the very common instance of using an esrog from a tree that was grafted onto a non-esrog tree. Most authorities rule that this esrog may not be used to fulfill the mitzvah on Sukkos.

Conclusion

Rav Hirsch (Vayikra 19:19) explains that the root word ke’le means to keep or hold something back, and that the plural form kil’ayim is similar to yadayim or raglayim and means a pair. Therefore, the word kil’ayim means to pair together two items that should be kept apart. This is to teach us that although we are given the world to develop, we must follow the rules that Hashem established for us to do so.

Early Maariv

Question #1: Earliest Maariv?

When is the earliest time that I may daven maariv?

Question #2: Earliest Shabbos?

May I daven maariv earlier on Friday evening?

Question #3: Earliest Conflict?

What does “tartei desasri” mean?

Question #4: Early Meal?

If I make “early Shabbos,” when may I begin the Shabbos meal?

Background

We may have heard terms like “mincha gedolah,” “mincha ketanah,” “plag,” “Magen Avraham’s zman,” “Gra’s zman,” “tosefes Shabbos;” and “tartei desasri” and have an approximate idea of what they mean, yet not a perfect understanding.

Let’s explain some of the terms:

Mincha gedolah: This is the earliest time that it is permitted to daven mincha (Brachos 26b, see Rashi and Rambam), and is half an hour after halachic midday (ibid.). For virtually all the calculations that we will be making, “an hour” is what we call a sha’ah zemanis, which means that we divide the daytime into twelve parts, and each part is considered an hour. One of the major questions that we will be discussing is whether the “daytime” we are dividing is calculated from sunrise to sunset (which means that it averages out over the year to about sixty minutes) or whether it is calculated from halachic dawn until nightfall, in which case each hour is considerably longer.

Mincha ketanah: The preferred time to daven mincha is after mincha ketanah (Brachos 26b, see Rashi and Rambam). This is half an hour after the day is three-quarters over (ibid.). Expressing this in a more mathematical way, it is 9.5/12 or 19/24 of the day. Here the range among the various opinions is much wider than it is for mincha gedolah. The time on your home clock for mincha ketanah is much later when you end the day at nightfall than when you end it at sunset because your daytime hours and length of each hour are longer.

Plag, or, as it should properly be called, “plag hamincha,” is midway between mincha ketanah and the “end” of the day. The word plag literally means “splitting” or “half.” The mathematical way of expressing this is 10.75/12, or 43/48 of the way through the day, meaning that if you divide daytime into 48 quarter-hours, calculating backward from the end of the day by five of these quarter-hours is plag haminchah. The same dispute that I mentioned earlier, whether we calculate the end of the day from nightfall or from sunset, also makes a tremendous difference here regarding when is plag haminchah.

The main halachic factors determined by plag hamincha are when is the earliest time of day that one may daven maariv, and when is the earliest time of the day that someone may light the Shabbos lights and accept Shabbos.

“Magen Avraham’s zman” and “Gra’s zman:” These terms are used most frequently in reference to the latest time by which Shema must be recited every morning, which is before a quarter of the day has passed. The difference between these two zmanim is that the Magen Avraham calculates the day from alos hashachar, sometimes called halachic dawn, until tzeis hakochavim (Magen Avraham 58:1), “when the stars come out,” whereas the Gra calculates it from sunrise to sunset (Orach Chayim 459:2; Aruch Hashulchan, Orach Chayim 261:10). Calculating the other three times of the day that I mentioned above — mincha gedolah, mincha ketanah, and plag hamincha — is also dependent on the same question: whether we calculate these zmanim by beginning the day at alos hashachar and ending it at tzeis hakochavim, or by beginning it at sunrise and ending it at sunset. (There are authorities who calculate some of these laws from alos hashachar to tzeis hakochavim and others from sunrise to sunset; see acharonim who explain above Magen Avraham; Achuzas Sadeh, page 62.)

The Gemara mentions that the cutoff-point between one day and the next, is at tzeis hakochavim, “when the stars come out” (Brachos 2a-b; Pesachim 2a; Megillah 20b). There are authorities who reach a different halachic conclusion, but we will discuss this some other time.

Tosefes Shabbos: the halachic requirement to begin observing Shabbos before the day has yet arrived and, also, to continue observing Shabbos for some time after the day is over on Saturday night. Even if we are able to calculate the exact moment that Shabbos begins and ends, we are required to add time, before it begins and after it ends.

Tartei desasri, literally, two that contradict, means two practices that conflict with one another, because they follow two opposing opinions. We will soon see how this applies to our discussion.

Opening questions

At this point, let us discuss our first opening question: When is the earliest time that I may daven maariv?

Although several Mishnayos discuss the beginning and ending time of many mitzvos and prayers, they make no reference to the earliest time to daven maariv. Instead, the Mishnah (Brachos 26a) states that “the maariv prayer has no established time.” The same Mishnah records a dispute among tanna’im when is the latest time to daven mincha (Brachos 26a): An anonymous tanna, whom the Gemara calls the “Sages” (chachamim), permits davening mincha “until evening,” whereas Rabbi Yehudah ends the time for mincha at plag hamincha, notwithstanding that the day is not yet over.

The Gemara (Brachos 26b) then quotes a Tosefta (Brachos Chapter 3) in which these tanna’im explain their opinions. Rabbi Yehudah contends that the latest time for mincha is at plag hamincha because this is the latest time that the afternoon korban tamid may be offered in the Beis Hamikdash. The Sages disagree with Rabbi Yehudah, contending that the korban tamid may be offered until the end of the day and, therefore, the prayer of mincha may also be recited until then. Thus, all agree that the time for davening mincha is dependent on when the afternoon korban tamid may be offered.

In the Tosefta and Gemara, it states that maariv has no “set time” because the remains of the korbanos that were offered during the previous day are burnt on the mizbeiach all night long.

Earliest Maariv?

As mentioned, the Mishnah says nothing about when the time for maariv begins. However, the following Gemara implies that it begins when the time for mincha ends. The Gemara notes that Rav davened the maariv of Shabbos when it was still Friday afternoon; the Gemara derives from this practice that Rav accepted the opinion of Rabbi Yehudah. The Gemara then concludes that, since Rav Huna and other great rabbis did not daven maariv until it was night, they follow the opinion of the Sages. Thereby, the Gemara implies that the time for maariv begins whenever the time for mincha ends; since Rav davened maariv before nightfall, he must hold like Rabbi Yehudah that it is now too late to daven mincha. According to the Sages, that the latest time for mincha is “evening,” one cannot daven maariv earlier.

Rabbi Yehudah or the Sages?

The Gemara discusses whether the halacha accords with Rabbi Yehudah, that the demarcation between mincha and maariv is plag hamincha, or whether we rule like the Sages, that it is the end of the day. After rallying various opinions in either direction, the Gemara concludes that there is no clear-cut accepted practice, and, as a result, each individual can choose which approach he wants to follow. This leads us to the following question, which the rishonim address: Can one daven sometimes according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehudah, and sometimes according to the Sages? Although there are many instances in halacha of tartei desasri, the one involving davening mincha and maariv is the most commonly referred to instance.

Tartei desasri

I explained above that this means following two practices that conflict with one another, because they follow opposing opinions. For example, the Gemara prohibits certain practices that would be following the opinion of Beis Hillel, in one aspect, and that of Beis Shammai, in another. This is prohibited because, taken together, someone is doing something not accepted by either academy (Eiruvin 7a).

At this point, our question is as follows: May someone follow the opinion of the Sages by davening mincha after plag, and also follow the opinion of Rabbi Yehudah and daven maariv before the day ends? Although the halacha does not definitively follow either Rabbi Yehudah or the Sages, davening mincha at a time that Rabbi Yehudah rules is too late, and maariv when the Sages consider it too early, is tartei desasri (Tosafos, Brachos 2a s.v. Mei’eimasai). Although I may follow either of the two opinions, tartei desasri implies that I cannot mix – since this results in following no opinion.

Most rishonim consider this a concern, the majority contending that someone should decide that he follows either Rabbi Yehudah, and never davens mincha after plag hamincha, or that he follows the Sages, and never davens maariv before the day ends.

Some rishonim rule that this is a problem only on the same day, i.e., one should not daven mincha after plag and maariv before the day ends on the same day, but there is no problem doing this on different days (see Mordechai, Brachos #89, cited by Magen Avraham). Although most rishonim do not hold this way, the prevalent custom is to follow this approach.

There is a minority opinion that there is no problem with davening mincha and maariv in a way that causes a tartei desasri, particularly when davening with a tzibur (see Beis Yosef, Orach Chayim 235; Taz, Orach Chayim 235:2; Yad Efrayim, 267:1).

Fourteenth century conundrum

In the fourteenth century, it was apparently common among Ashkenazim that the summertime communal mincha–maariv minyan was scheduled considerably before plag hamincha. This raises a major halachic concern, because no opinion cited by the Gemara allows davening maariv this early.

This issue was raised by perhaps the most prominent poseik of the era, the Terumas Hadeshen (1:1), who notes that the practice seems to defy the rules we would derive from the Gemara. Yet, he concludes that one should daven together with the community minyan. Although the Terumas Hadeshen does not fully explain his conclusion, he may opine that a community’s prayer schedule may be more flexible than that of an individual, as evidenced by a different passage of Gemara (Brachos 27b). We should note that the Gemara mentions this factor only regarding a situation in which an error occurred that caused the tzibur to daven too early.

Earliest Shabbos?

At this point, we will address the second of our opening questions: May I daven maariv earlier [than I usually do] on Friday night?

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 267:2) permits davening maariv on Friday evening while it is still day, even according to the Sages. This appears to contradict the Gemara, cited above, that permitted davening maariv early on Friday night only according to Rabbi Yehudah.

I am aware of at least four approaches that can be used to justify this practice, three of which are mentioned by the Magen Avraham (267:1):

(1) The Baal Halachos Gedolos and other authorities understand that a later passage of Gemara permits early maariv on Friday night even according to the opinion of the Sages. The rationale for this is because tosefes Shabbos permits davening early, since accepting Shabbos prohibits davening the weekday mincha of Friday. Once the time of mincha ended (because he accepted Shabbos), the time for maariv automatically begins, even though night has not yet begun (Mordechai; Olas Shabbos 267:1; Penei Yehoshua, Brachos 27a s.v. Amar rav Chanina).

(2) As I mentioned above, Chazal instituted the nightly prayer of maariv, corresponding to placing leftover parts of the day’s korbanos on the mizbei’ach. On a weekday in the Beis Hamikdash, what was not consumed by the fires during the day was burnt at night. However, this was the procedure only on a weekday. No leftovers were burnt on Friday night, because it is Shabbos; instead, they were burnt Friday afternoon. Since maariv corresponds to the burning of these parts of the korbanos, it is permitted to daven maariv at the time that these were offered – on Friday before nightfall.

(3) The Magen Avraham suggests a different reason why someone may daven earlier on erev Shabbos — based on the opinion of the Mordechai that permits following the opinion of Rabbi Yehudah one day and that of the Sages on a different day. Thus, you may daven mincha before plag and maariv after plag on Friday, notwithstanding that the rest of the week you daven mincha much later in the day.

(4) According to the above-mentioned responsum of the Terumas Hadeshen, a tzibur may daven maariv early, immediately after davening mincha, even though we would otherwise consider it too early to daven maariv. This approach might be based on the idea that tefillas aravis reshus, that maariv is less obligatory than the other tefillos, and therefore one can be more flexible with its time.

There are several halachic differences (nafka mina) that result from these various answers. For example, according to the first two approaches, it is acceptable to daven mincha on Friday evening after plag and maariv immediately after, and it is not considered tartei desasri.

The Magen Avraham concludes that someone davening maariv early on Friday evening should daven mincha before plag. This is because he accepts the third approach, that of the Mordechai, as the main heter, notwithstanding that he quoted three reasons to be lenient.

Nevertheless, the accepted practice, in most places, is to be less concerned than is the Magen Avraham.

Earliest Shema?

When is the earliest time to fulfill the mitzvah of reciting Shema at night?

Most rishonim assume that the earliest time to recite the Shema is at tzeis hakochavim. After all, most mitzvos that we observe at night are dependent on tzeis hakochavim.

However, when the Torah instructs us concerning the mitzvah of reading the Shema, it never says that the mitzvah is at night. The Torah teaches that we are to perform the mitzvah be’shachbecha, when we go to bed, or while we are in bed (see Rashi, Brachos 2a). This distinction produced much halachic literature at the time of the tanna’im, many of whom held that the time for reciting the evening Shema does not necessarily begin at tzeis hakochavim (Brachos 2b). Rabbeinu Tam concludes that one may fulfill the mitzvah of reciting Shema as early as plag hamincha. His reasoning why Shema is different appears to be that the Torah never states that Shema be recited at night, but when you go to bed, and there are those who go to bed early.

Early Meal?

At this point, let us discuss the last of our opening questions: If I make “early Shabbos,” must I be careful what time I begin eating the Shabbos meal?

The halacha prohibits beginning a meal once it is the time for reciting Shema, or even within a half hour of that time, without first reciting Shema. This means that if it is less than half an hour before the time that the day ends, one must wait until it is nightfall and recite Shema before beginning the meal.

However, there is no problem with beginning the meal more than half an hour before nightfall, continuing the meal into the night, and reciting Shema when the meal is over. Since it was permitted to start the meal, Chazal did not require interrupting the meal to say Shema.

Someone who starts Shabbos shortly after plag hamincha and begins the meal within a short time thereafter does not have any concern about this halacha, since he is beginning the meal well before half an hour before the time to recite Shema. The question concerns someone who starts Shabbos at a set time every week, and the meal sometimes starts within half an hour of the time to recite Shema. Is he permitted to begin his meal now, or must he wait until it is late enough for him to recite Shema before he begins his meal?

Indeed, the conclusion of many prominent authorities is that he should wait until he recites Shema (Magen Avraham 235:2).

However, although most rishonim do not accept Rabbeinu Tam’s approach that one can fulfill the mitzvah of reciting Shema after plag hamincha, there are those who do (Mordechai, Hagahos Maimani, Raavyah, all quoted by Terumas Hadeshen 1:1). The Beis Yosef (Orach Chayim 235, quoting Mordechai, Shabbos 224 and Ran) and others conclude that, although everyone who davens maariv before it is fully dark should recite the full Shema later and not rely on Rabbeinu Tam’s opinion, regarding the rabbinic prohibition to delay the meal until he recited Shema, one may rely on Rabbeinu Tam that he already fulfilled the mitzvah and may begin the meal already (Beis Yosef, Orach Chayim 267 and Yad Efrayim).

Conclusion — Why is maariv different?

As the Gemara teaches, Yaakov Avinu introduced maariv. If so, why does the Gemara discuss whether maariv is an obligatory prayer or not? Although we consider maariv to be obligatory, it sounds like someone considered it “second rate” relative to shacharis and mincha,which were established by Avraham and Yitzchak?

The Penei Yehoshua answers that Yaakov was not planning to daven maariv; he had intended to daven mincha, but Hashem caused the sun to set suddenly, giving Yaakov no choice but to daven after nightfall. Since this davening was performed not as Yaakov’s first choice, but because he had no other option, this allows us the option to be more flexible regarding the time of this prayer – a very helpful halachic consideration when Shabbos begins late (Penei Yehoshua, Brachos 26b s.v. Mihu).

It’s Hip to Dip

The Charoses Saga

Question #1: How Deep a Dip?

How deep into the charoses am I supposed to dip the maror?

Question #2: Only Lettuce!

What do you serve for karpas, if you realize that the only vegetable you have in the house is the lettuce you were planning to use for maror?

Introduction

Much Pesach and pre-Pesach discussion focuses on the vast preparation necessary for the holiday and, also, on the mitzvos of the Seder. Because of the importance of the mitzvos of hagadah and matzoh, some of the less vital aspects of the Seder sometimes get shunted to the side. One of these observances is that of the charoses, which actually has considerable discussion in the Gemara. We will be discussing some of the questions germane to charoses, such as:

Is charoses a mitzvah of its own, or just a garnish to the maror?

If it is a mitzvah, how do we fulfill its observance?

Does it require eating a kezayis within a specific timeframe?

Let us begin our discussion from the earliest halachic source that mentions charoses, the Mishnah (Pesachim 114a) that states, “They brought in front of him [the person leading the Seder] matzoh, lettuce, charoses and two cooked items [these correspond to the zeroa and the beitzah that we have at our Seder], even though charoses is not a mitzvah. Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok says that it is a mitzvah. [We will soon explain the two sides in this dispute.] During the era of the Beis Hamikdash, they also brought the roasted korban Pesach at this time.”

We see that this Mishnah is of a relatively later date, after the Beis Hamikdash was destroyed and there was no longer a korban Pesach, and the two “cooked items” at the Seder are to remind us of the korban Pesach and the korban chagigah. This is interesting, because the very next Mishnah (Pesachim 116a) dates back to the era of the Beis Hamikdash, since its discussion of the four questions includes a question that assumes that there is a korban Pesach at the Seder: She’bechol haleilos anu ochlin basar shaluk, tzeli umevushal, halailah hazeh kulo tzeli, “On all other nights we eat meat that is either boiled, roasted or cooked; this night, we eat only roasted [meat].” Obviously, this Mishnah dates to the time of the Beis Hamikdash and refers to the eating of the roasted korbanos Pesach and chagigah. The Gemara (Pesachim 70a) explains that the text of this Mishnah follows the opinion of a tanna, Ben Teima, who contends that the korban chagigah eaten Pesach night at the time of the Beis Hamikdash was also required to be roasted. Thus, in his opinion, all meat eaten at the Seder was roasted.

The structure of this chapter of the Mishnah implies that there was an earlier edition of this Mishnah dating to the time of the Beis Hamikdash, and that when Rabbi Yehudah Hanasi edited it after the churban, he rewrote certain parts to accommodate the new reality, but he left other parts in their original format.

A mitzvah or a garnish?

We asked, above, whether charoses is a mitzvah on its own, or just a garnish to the maror. This appears to be the dispute between the Tanna Kamma and Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok in the Mishnah that I quoted. Let us see the passage of the Gemara (116a) that examines this dispute: First, the Gemara devotes itself to explaining the opinion of the Tanna Kamma, asking: Since this tanna insists that there is no mitzvah in using charoses, why prepare it and serve it at the Seder? The Gemara answers that charoses is brought to the Seder because of kafa, which is some type of toxin. Rashi and Rabbeinu Chananel disagree as to what kafa is. According to Rashi, it is in the sap of the maror, whereas Rabbeinu Chananel explains it to be an insect that is in the maror.

Tosafos (Pesachim 115b s.v. Kafa), in explaining Rabbeinu Chananel’s approach to kafa, asks the following: If kafa is an insect, then eating lettuce any time should be prohibited, because of a kashrus concern. Tosafos answers that most of the time, maror does not contain kafa. Since it is rare for maror to contain kafa, there is no kashrus concern when eating lettuce or other maror vegetables that you may be eating non-kosher kafa. (There may be a concern that you will eat thrips, aphids, leaf miners or other insects, but that is not the topic for today’s article. I recommend that our concerned readers contact their rav, posek or local vaad hakashrus for direction.)

However, there is a general halachic ruling of chamira sakanta mei’isura (see Chullin 10a), we are required to be more careful about safety concerns than about prohibitions. In other words, although there is no kashrus concern about possibly consuming kafa, there is still a safety concern, and for this reason, we eat the maror with charoses, which will prevent the toxin in the kafa from harming anyone.

According to both Rashi and Rabbeinu Chananel, we are faced with a question: When lettuce is eaten as karpas, most poskim (with the exception of Rashi and Tosafos, 114a s.v. Metabeil), do not require that it be dipped in charoses. What happened to the concern about kafa? The same question can be asked regarding eating lettuce or the other species of maror at any other time of the year. The halacha does not require that we eat these species with charoses – why not? Since we rule that chamira sakanta mei’isura, shouldn’t we always be required to eat charoses with our lettuce?

Rabbeinu Yonah asks this question and provides the following observation: “All year long, we eat lettuce without charoses, without being concerned about the ill effects that kafa causes… We are concerned only when we fulfill the mitzvah of maror – then the chachamim were careful that this [mitzvah] should not cause any possibility of danger.” In other words, the danger of kafa is not significant enough for us to show concern. However, in the opinion of the Sages, we should be careful to not let a mitzvah act cause even the remotest possibility of danger, and therefore we should eat the maror of the mitzvah with charoses (quoted by Rosh, Pesachim 10:25).

Tasting the maror

When the lettuce is eaten as maror, and you dip it deep into the charoses, you can hardly taste the lettuce, and you certainly don’t notice any bitterness. Have you fulfilled the mitzvah of maror this way?

The Gemara (Pesachim 115b) quotes the following: “Rav Papa said, ‘Don’t leave the maror sitting in the charoses, out of concern that the acid of the spices will overwhelm the bitterness, and we require the taste of maror, which you will not have.”

How deep a dip?

How deep into the charoses am I to dip the maror?

The answer to this question, which involves a dispute among the poskim, depends on the following discussion in the Gemara.

How does charoses work? The Gemara (Pesachim 115b) quotes a dispute whether it is contact with the charoses that overcomes the kafa, or whether it is the fragrance of the charoses that does the job. The difference in practical halacha is whether it is required to submerge the maror into the charoses, or if it is sufficient to dip the maror into the charoses. This difference of opinion in the Gemara manifests itself in a dispute between the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 475:1) and the Pri Chodosh.

The Shulchan Aruch rules that the maror should be submerged in the charoses, but you should not leave the maror in the charoses for long, and you should shake off the charoses. The Pri Chodosh notes that the prevalent custom is to simply dip the maror into the charoses, and he explains why this is sufficient. Both of these approaches are in order that the taste of the charoses not overwhelm that of the maror. The Mishnah Berurah mentions the opinion of the Pri Chodosh that disagrees with the Shulchan Aruch, and the custom in most places accords with the Pri Chodosh.

Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok

Until this point, we have been explaining the position of the Tanna Kamma. The Mishnah (Pesachim 114a) quotes Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok as saying that charoses is a mitzvah. The Gemara (ad locum 116a) asks, “What is the mitzvah? Rabbi Levi said, ‘In commemoration of the tapuach [usually translated as “apple” or “apple tree”].’ Rabbi Yochanan said, ‘To remember the clay [from which the bricks were baked in Mitzrayim].’”

Rashi explains the opinion of Rabbi Levi by quoting the verse in Shir Hashirim (8:5), tachas hatapuach o’rar’tich, “I roused you under the tapuach,” and the Midrash that the Jewish women encouraged their disheartened husbands to continue with married life, and thereby succeeded in creating the large Jewish nation that left Mitzrayim.

To quote the passage of Gemara that retells this miracle, “Because of the merit of the righteous women of that generation, Yisroel was redeemed from Egypt. When they went to draw water, Hashem prepared small fish in their buckets, such that what they drew was half water and half fish. The women then took two pots, one of hot water and one of cooked fish, and went to their husbands in the field. They washed their husbands, anointed them, fed them and gave them to drink… When the women became pregnant, they returned home. When it came time for them to give birth, they went out to the fields and gave birth under the tapuach, as the posuk says, ‘I roused you under the tapuach.’ Hashem sent from his upper heavens someone to make the children good-looking… When the Egyptians realized what had happened, they came to kill them [the Jewish women and the babies], but they were miraculously absorbed into the earth. At that point, they [the Jewish men] brought oxen who plowed above them” (Sotah 11b).

The Gemara in Pesachim, germane to the discussion about the charoses, continues: “Abaya said, ‘Therefore, you should make the charoses acidic [by adding apples, other fruits or vinegar], to remember the miracle of tapuach, and you should thicken the charoses, similar to the way clay functions.’ We found a beraisa supporting Rabbi Yochanan’s opinion [that charoses should contain spices] as a commemoration of the straw, and that the charoses should be ground up well, to commemorate the clay. Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok said: ‘The merchants of Yerushalayim used to advertise from the windows of their stores, “Come and purchase spices for the mitzvah.”’”

There is also a passage of Talmud Yerushalmi that states that the charoses should be of a thin consistency, so that it reminds us of makas dam.

Charoses recipe

What types of spices should be included in the charoses? The Rif and the Rosh both mention that charoses should contain spices such as cinnamon and ginger. This is in accordance with the description of Rabbi Yochanan, that it should have spices that have a physical appearance somewhat similar to that of straw.

The Rambam (Hilchos Chometz Umatzoh 7:11) adds to the recipe that it should include something like mashed dates, mashed dried figs or mashed raisins.

What is the dispute?

Above, I quoted the dispute between the Tanna Kamma and Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok whether charoses is a mitzvah or not. What practical application results from this dispute?

It seems from the discussion in the Gemara that the two tanna’im disagree regarding the recipe that we should use for charoses. According to the Tanna Kamma, the requirement is that charoses contain some ingredient that will mitigate the toxicity of the kafa. However, Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok rules that it should contain something acidic, like wine, apples or vinegar, and spices that bear a physical resemblance to straw; and that it should have a consistency that reminds us of clay. And, according to the Yerushalmi, the final product should have the viscosity of a thick liquid.

The position of the Rambam on this topic seems to have changed from what he held initially. In his commentary on the Mishnah, the Rambam seems to understand that the dispute between the Tanna Kamma and Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok is that, according to Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok, charoses is a mitzvah on the night of the Seder that requires the recital of a brocha prior to eating it, whereas according to the Tanna Kamma charoses in not a mitzvah and does not require a brocha. The Rambam writes that the halacha is not like Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok. However, in the Mishneh Torah the Rambam seems to have had a change of opinion, as he rules that charoses is a mitzvah (Lechem Mishneh). He also seems to understand that the dispute between the Tanna Kamma and Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok is as explained above, regarding which ingredients are required in the charoses (see Magid Mishnah, Hilchos Chometz Umatzoh 7:11).

Dip the matzoh in charoses?

There is also another interesting dispute among the very early poskim. Most people today have the custom that when they eat the matzoh the first night of Pesach to fulfill the mitzvah, they do not dip the matzoh in salt or anything else. There are some who dip it in salt. However, several very early authorities, including Rav Amram Gaon, Rabbeinu Yosef, Rashi, Rabbeinu Shmayah (quoted by Tosafos, Pesachim 114a s.v. Metabeil) and the Rambam rule that when eating the very first matzoh, you should dip the matzoh into charoses! What is the Talmudic source for this ruling?

Some explain that when the Mishnah states that you should bring out the charoses together with the matzoh, it is implying that just as we dip our hamotzi into salt or something similar the rest of the year, at the Seder the matzoh should also be dipped into something to make it tastier – in this case, charoses.

Others explain that Rav Amram and the Rambam understood that this is part of the machlokes between the Tanna Kamma and Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok.

Only lettuce!

At this point, let us explain the third of our opening questions: “What do you serve for karpas, if you realize that the only vegetable you have in the house is the lettuce you were planning to use for maror?”

This situation is found in the following Mishnah (Pesachim 114a), which describes someone who had only one vegetable available for the Seder: the lettuce that he will be using for the mitzvah of eating maror. Since this is his only vegetable, it will have to serve also as his karpas.  The Mishnah says, “They brought in front of him and he dips the lettuce, prior to the lettuce that he will be eating after the matzoh.” There is a dispute between Rashi and his grandson, the Rashbam, as to how he dipped this lettuce. Rashi explains that he dips it into the charoses, presumably for the same reasons why the maror is dipped into the charoses. According to the Rashbam, when the lettuce is eaten for karpas, it is not dipped into the charoses, but into something else. Most of us are familiar with a custom of dipping the karpas into saltwater. I have also seen references to customs of dipping the karpas into vinegar or wine. The Rashbam’s opinion is that, notwithstanding that lettuce will also be used for maror, when being used as karpas, it is treated like karpas and dipped into something other than charoses.

The Gemara (114b) raises a question here: If for karpas you are eating lettuce, with which you can fulfill the mitzvah of maror, when do you recite the brocha of al achilas maror? How can you recite this brocha later, after you have already eaten maror? The Gemara concludes that you do not fulfill the mitzvah of maror when you eat the lettuce as karpas, a concept called mitzvos tzerichos kavanah, fulfilling a mitzvah requires that you have in mind to perform it (Tosafos ad locum).

Still, although the rule is that mitzvos tzerichos kavanah, there is a dispute as to when you recite the brocha of al achilas maror. Rav Huna rules that you recite it prior to eating the lettuce for maror, whereas Rav Chisda rules that you recite it prior to eating the lettuce for karpas, even though the main mitzvah of eating maror will be fulfilled later. The Gemara then describes how later amora’im ruled, some following Rav Huna and others Rav Chisda. The Gemara concludes that the halacha follows Rav Chisda. Despite this conclusion, an amora, Rav Acha the son of Rava, went out of his way to make sure that he had other vegetables in the house, so that he could avoid the entire question by serving something else for karpas.

Conclusion

The Seder is a very special time for us to transmit our mesorah and some of the most basic of our Jewish beliefs to our children and future generations. Chazal added to the beautiful Torah mitzvos of hagadah, matzoh, and maror many other mitzvos that broaden the entire experience. We should also note the Gemara (Avodah Zarah 35a) that teaches that the rabbinic laws are dearer than the Torah laws, since they demonstrate how much the Jewish people, as a nation, value our special relationship with Hashem.

Mizmor Lesodah, Parshas Tzav and Erev Pesach

Question #1: Korban Todah or Bensching Gomeil?

“Which is the better way to thank Hashem for a personal salvation, by reciting birchas hagomeil, or by offering a korban todah?”

Question #2: The Breadwinner!

“Why is the korban todah accompanied by so many loaves of bread and so much matzoh?”

Question #3: Mizmor Lesodah and Pesach

“I recently assumed a position teaching in a small-town day school. Before Pesach, I mentioned that we do not recite Mizmor Lesodah on Erev and Chol Hamoed Pesach. One of the students afterwards told me that this is not his family minhag, but only Ashkenazi practice. Is he correct?”

Answer:

Although Chapter 100 of Tehillim is known by its opening words as Mizmor Lesodah, there actually are two different chapters of Tehillim, #100 and #107, that devote themselves to the thanksgiving acknowledgement of someone who has survived a major physical challenge. In Psalm 107, Dovid Hamelech describes four different types of treacherous predicaments — traveling through the desert, traveling overseas, illness, and imprisonment — in which a person would pray to Hashem for salvation. When the person survives the travails and thanks Hashem, this thanks is reflected in the passage , Yodu lashem chasdo venifle’osav livnei adam, “they acknowledge thanks to Hashem for His kindness and His wondrous deeds for mankind.”These words are repeated four times, once after each of the four situations is described.

The Gemara cites this Psalm as the source for many of the laws of birchas hagomeil, the brocha we recite when surviving these calamities. To quote the Gemara: Four people need to acknowledge thanks to Hashem.

Actually, someone who survived these predicaments should offer a korban todah, which is described in parshas Tzav. The birchas hagomeil is recited in place of the korban todah that we cannot bring, since, unfortunately, our Beis Hamikdash lies in ruin (Rosh, Brachos 9:3; Tur, Orach Chayim 219).

What are the unusual features of the korban todah?

The korban todah is a specialized variety of shelamim, whose name means, according to the Toras Kohanim, that it creates peace in the world, since the owner, the kohen and the mizbeiach (the altar) all share in consuming it (quoted by Rashi, Vayikra 3:1). A shelamim, which was perhaps the most common korban in the Beis Hamikdash, was offered to express the desire to draw closer to Hashem from a sense that he lacks nothing in his physical life (see Commentary of Rav Hirsch, Vayikra 3:1).

The korban todah is offered following the general procedures and rules of a shelamim; however, it has several unique features. The first is that the korban is accompanied by a huge amount of bread, called korbanos mincha (plural, menachos), a total of forty loaves. Thirty of these comprise ten loaves each of three varieties of matzoh. However, the remaining ten loaves are highly unusual: first of all they are chometz, and this is the only instance of a private korban that includes chometz. (There is only one other korban that is chometz, and that is the two loaves offered by the community on Shavuos.) As a result, the korban todah could not be offered on Erev Pesach or on Pesach itself.

The chometz loaves are unusual in another way, in that each of them is three times the volume of the matzoh loaves (see Menachos 76b). Thus, the ten chometz loaves were, together, of equal size to the thirty matzohs.

Of the four varieties of mincha that accompany the korban todah, one of each type of loaf is given to the kohen to take home and consume together with his family and friends. The other 36 loaves are given to the offerer of the korban.

There is another unusual facet of the korban todah offering. Whereas a korban shelamim may be eaten until nightfall of the next day after it is offered, the korban todah must be eaten before the morning after it was offered, a much shorter period of time. Chazal further shortened the time it may be eaten — permitting it to be eaten only until halachic midnight — to assure that no one eat the korban when it is forbidden to do so.

Thus, there are three ways in which the korban todah is treated differently from an ordinary shelamim: 1) the todah is accompanied by an absolutely huge amount of bread, made from a total of twenty isronim of flour, which is twenty times the amount of flour that requires one to separate challah; 2) half of this bread is chometz and half matzoh; and 3) the korban and its bread must be consumed within a very short period of time.

Why would the Torah “impose” these additional requirements on the offerer of the korban? Well, let us figure out what is he going to do. He has a significant amount of holy meat that must be eaten by midnight, and a huge amount of accompanying bread with the same restrictions. What will he do?

Presumably, he will invite a large crowd to join him in his feast and will thereby explain to them the reason for his repast. Thus, we increase the appreciation of others forthe salvation that Hashem has provided him, which is the cause of this thanksgiving. This now leads us directly into our discussion of the chapter of Tehillim that begins with the words Mizmor Lesodah.

Mizmor Lesodah

Whereas the above-mentioned Chapter 107 of Tehillim describes the background behind korban todah and birchas hagomeil, the 100th chapter of Tehillim, Mizmor Lesodah, is a sample praise that the saved person recites. Although only five verses long, this psalm, one of the eleven written by Moshe Rabbeinu (see Rashi ad locum), captivates the emotion of a person who has just survived a major ordeal. The first verse expresses the need for everyone on Earth to recognize Hashem, certainly something that conveys the emotions of someone very recently saved from a major tribulation. The second verse shares the same passion, since it calls upon everyone to serve Hashem in gladness and to appear before Him in jubilation. The third sentence continues this idea. In it, the thankful person calls on everyone to recognize that Hashem is the personal G-d of every individual, that we are His people and the sheep of his pasture. He then calls on all to enter into Hashem’s gates and His courts, so that we can thank and bless Him. We should note that the gates of the Beis Hamikdash were meant for all of mankind, not only the Jewish people, as mankind is specifically included in Shlomoh Hamelech’s prayer while inaugurating the Beis Hamikdash (Melachim I 8:41-43).

The closing sentence of Mizmor Lesodah is also very significant: “For Hashem is good, His kindness is forever, and our trust should be placed in Him in every future generation.” (We should note that the word olam in Tanach means “forever” and never means “world,” which is a meaning given to this word by Chazal. The most common Tanach word for “world” is teiveil; see, for example, Tehillim 19:5; 33:8; and 90:2 — all of which are recited during the Pesukei Dezimra of Shabbos and 96:10, 13; 97:4; 98:7, which are part of kabbalas Shabbos.) The celebrant calls upon those he has assembled to spread the message that Hashem is the only Source of all good, and that we should recognize this at all times, not only in the extraordinary situations where we see the manifestation of His presence!

We can now understand better why the Mizmor Lesodah chapter of Tehillim is structured as it is. It provides the beneficiary of Hashem’s miracle with a drosha to present at the seudas hodaah that he makes with all the bread and meat that he does not want to go to waste — complete with encouragement to others to internalize our thanks to Hashem.

Clearly, then, this psalm was meant to be recited by the thankful person prior to offering his korban, and this is his invitation to others to join him as he thanks Hashem. The Avudraham notes thatHashem’s name appears four times in the psalm, corresponding to the four people who need to thank Him for their salvation.

Mizmor Lesodah on Shabbos

We find a dispute among early authorities whether one should recite Mizmor Lesodah on Shabbos (Shibbolei Haleket, quoted by Beis Yosef, Orach Chayim 281). Why should this be?

Since the korban todah is a voluntary offering, it cannot be offered on Shabbos. The Tur mentions that established custom is to omit Mizmor Lesodah on Shabbos and Yom Tov, out of concern that when the Beis Hamikdash is rebuilt, someone may mistakenly offer the korban todah on these days. On Shabbos, of course, it is prohibited to offer any korban other than the required daily tamid and the special Shabbos korbanos, whereas on Yom Tov one may offer only voluntary korbanos that are brought because of the Yom Tov (Beitzah 19b).

The Tur does not agree that this is a valid reason to omit reciting Mizmor Lesodah on these days, contending that we need not be concerned that people will mistakenly offer a korban todah on Shabbos or Yom Tov (Orach Chayim, Chapter 51 and Chapter 281). Others explain that we recite Mizmor Lesodah to remind us of the korban todah, and since it was not offered on these days, there is no point in reciting it (see Pri Megadim, Eishel Avraham 51:11). Perhaps this is done as an aspect of u’neshalma parim sefaseinu (Hoshea 14:3), “may our lips replace the bulls (of offerings),” which is interpreted to mean that when we have no Beis Hamikdash, we recite passages that commemorate those offerings. For this reason, the custom developed among Ashkenazim to omit Mizmor Lesodah on days that the offering could not be brought in the Beis Hamikdash.

Mizmor Lesodah on Chol Hamoed Pesach

For the same reason that Mizmor Lesodah is omitted on Shabbos, Ashkenazim omit reciting it on Chol Hamoed Pesach. Since the korban todah contained chometz, it could not be offered on Pesach; therefore Ashkenazim refrain from saying Mizmor Lesodah.

Mizmor Lesodah on Erev Pesach

Ashkenazic custom is to omit Mizmor Lesodah on Erev Yom Kippur and on Erev Pesach. The korban todah and its breads can usually be eaten until the midnight after the day it was offered. However, were one to offer a korban todah early on Erev Yom Kippur or on Erev Pesach, one would be restricted to eating its chometz for only a few hours. Since one may not offer a korban whose time limit is curtailed, one may not offer a korban todah on these days, and, following Ashkenazic practice, Mizmor Lesodah is omitted then, also. The common custom among Sefardim is to recite Mizmor Lesodah on Erev Yom Kippur, Erev Pesach and Chol Hamoed Pesach (Pri Chodosh 429:2; Kaf Hachayim 51:51-52).

With this background, I can now return to the third question raised above.

“I recently assumed a position teaching in a small town day school. Before Pesach, I mentioned that we do not recite Mizmor Lesodah on Erev and Chol Hamoed Pesach. One of the students afterwards told me that this is not his family minhag, but only Ashkenazi practice. Is he correct?”

Indeed, in this instance, the student is correct. Hopefully, the rebbe was not that badly embarrassed.

Mizmor Lesodah and our daily davening

In order to make sure that this thanks to Hashem takes place daily, the chapter of Mizmor Lesodah was introduced into our daily pesukei dezimra. We should remember that miracles happen to us daily, even when we do not realize it (quoted in name of Sefer Nehora; see also Beis Yosef, Orach Chayim 281). Although Mizmor Lesodah was not part of the original structure of the daily prayers established by the Anshei Keneses Hagedolah, long before the time of the Rishonim, it was already common practice to include it as part of the daily recital of pesukei dezimra and to say it almost at the beginning. The importance of reciting this psalm should not be underestimated. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 51:9), states: One should recite Mizmor Lesodah with song, since eventually all songs will cease, except for Mizmor Lesodah. This statement of Chazal is explained by Rav Hirsch (Commentary to Psalm 100) in the following manner: One day in the future, everything on Earth will be so ideal that there will be no reason to supplicate Hashem for changes. Even then, prayers of gratitude and thanksgiving will still be appropriate.

Now I Have It, Now I Don’t

Question #1: Snail Mail

I mailed some hamantashen to a non-frum relative, well before Purim, as a “kiruv” gesture of friendship. The efficient post office has not yet delivered it. I am concerned that (1) as a result, my relative may eat chometz on Pesach; (2) I will be in violation of owning chometz on Pesach.

Question #2: Moonshine in the First Month!

The police confiscated some contraband moonshine in the beginning of April, issuing a criminal citation for the violation. Subsequently, the criminal charges were dropped. On Pesach, the police appeared at the door of the moonshine vendor to return the liquor, who told them that he could not receive the merchandise on his Jewish holiday. They came back to return it after Pesach. May he sell the liquor?

Question #3: Whiskey She’avar Alav haPesach

A non-Jewish business contact was shipped a gift of expensive whiskey, which never arrived. Instead, the shipping company returned it to the Jewish sender, and it arrived shortly after Pesach. Is this prohibited because of chometz she’avar alav haPesach?

Foreword

The above questions are all based on responsa in prominent late poskim, specifically, Rav Moshe Feinstein, Rav Meir Arik, and the Sochatchover, Rav Avraham Bornstein, often referred to by the names of his most famous two seforim, the Avnei Neizer and the Eglei Tal. Each of our openings questions relates to a serious halachic shaylah involving two different issues:

(1) A legal circumstance referred to as shelo ve’eino birshuso,which means property that you own but is not under your control (Bava Kama 68b-70a and many other places).

(2) The specific ramifications that shelo ve’eino birshuso has regarding owning chometz on Pesach.

Shelo ve’eino birshuso

The concept of shelo ve’eino birshuso translates, literally, as “your property, but not in your jurisdiction.” The Gemara explains that when an item is stolen, neither the original owner nor the thief has the halachic ability to declare the stolen property as hekdesh, the property of the Beis Hamikdash, as long as the original owner has not lost hope that he might retrieve it. The thief cannot make it hekdesh, because it is not his property, and only an owner can declare an item hekdesh. But the original owner, also, cannot make it hekdesh, because it is outside his control, and only an item within your control can be declared hekdesh. Thus, the stolen item flounders in a twilight zone, in which no one has full legal control over it – it is in a no man’s land.

More important for our purposes, just as neither the thief nor the owner can declare the item hekdesh, they also cannot sell it. This creates an intriguing conundrum, when we need to make sure that no Jew owns chometz on Pesach. The owner certainly does not want to own chometz on Pesach and would like to include it with the chometz that he sells to a non-Jew, if he can. A self-respecting Jewish thief may, also, not want to violate bal yeira’eh and bal yimatzei. He may be a gonif, and his gelt is earned in a non-kosher way, but he wouldn’t dream of owning chometz on Pesach! So, what does he do with the cases of Chivas Regal that he lifted and for which he has not yet found a fence? (For some interesting reason, in all of the teshuvos I found, the question was asked by the original owner, and not from the perspective of the thief! Maybe thieves are reticent to ask their shaylos from prominent rabbonim?)

Introduction

The Torah prohibits a Jew from owning chometz on Pesach. This is included in the two lo sa’aseh proscriptions of bal yeira’eh and bal yimatzei, one of which prohibits a Jew from owning chometz that may be seen, but does not prohibit owning buried chometz that cannot be seen; and the other prohibits owning chometz, even when it has been buried. In other words, owning buried chometz violates one lo sa’aseh, that of bal yimatzei; owning unburied chometz violates two lo sa’aseh, bal yeira’eh and bal yimatzei. Because of this distinction, the Rambam counts bal yeira’eh and bal yimatzei as two separate lo sa’aseh prohibitions among the 365 lo sa’aseh mitzvos of the Torah. Most authorities contend that these two prohibitions apply both to chometz gamur (pure chometz) and to ta’aroves chometz (chometz mixed into another product). (See, however, the opinion of Rabbeinu Tam, quoted in Tosafos, Pesachim 42a s.v. ve’eilu.)

To enforce these Torah mitzvos, Chazal penalized a Jew who owned chometz during Pesach by barring benefiting from it. Chometz prohibited because of this penalty is called chometz she’avar alav haPesach.

Tashbisu

There is also a positive mitzvah to destroy chometz, tashbisu, which requires a Jew to rid himself of his chometz before Pesach. Since the Torah uses an unusual term, tashbisu, the rishonim explain that there are actually two ways to avoid violating bal yeira’eh and bal yimatzei, and both involve the mitzvah of tashbisu.

Biur chometz: One is by physically destroying the chometz, either by burning it or disposing of in a different, equally effective way (Mishnah, Pesachim 21a and numerous places in the Gemara).

Bitul chometz: Alternatively, I can rid myself of owning my chometz by making a declaration of bitul, which states that I view all chometz in my possession to be like dust of the earth. This declaration, assuming that it is sincere, removes the chometz from my ownership, so that I do not violate bal yeira’eh and bal yimatzei.

The preceding analysis reflects the halacha as explained by Targum Onkelos, Rashi, the Ran and many other rishonim. There is an alternative approach, that of Tosafos, who explains that bitul chometz is declaring the chometz to be ownerless, hefker. According to either approach, someone who performed bitul chometz and does not want to own their chometz will not violate the prohibitions of bal yeira’eh and bal yimatzei. However, for reasons beyond the scope of this article, the halachic conclusion is that the penalty of chometz she’avar alav haPesach applies to chometz on which someone performed bitul, but not to chometz that was properly sold to a non-Jew.

Selling chometz

Although a Jew may not own chometz on Pesach, there is nothing wrong with selling chometz to a non-Jew before it becomes prohibited. In contemporary times, people usually do not undertake to sell their chometz themselves, but, instead, appoint a rav to sell the chometz for them. The reason for this is that the non-Jew does not take the chometz with him; he leaves it in our houses. Since this may have the appearance of a charade, the sale must be performed in a way that halacha recognizes as valid. Since the laws of selling are very complicated, it is better that a lay person not handle the arrangements for mechiras chometz by himself, which is why it is common to use a rav as one’s agent to sell the chometz.

Snail mail

At this point, we are prepared to discuss the halachic background to our opening question. Rav Moshe Feinstein discusses the following case: Someone wants to ship several products, including some chometz items, to a relative in Eretz Yisroel, and wants to include this chometz with his standard mechiras chometz that he does before Pesach. The rav who sent Rav Moshe the shaylah felt that there may be legitimate halachic grounds to do this, but Rav Moshe proves that such a sale cannot be done. This is because once the chometz is delivered to or picked up by the shipping company, the chometz is beyond the owner’s jurisdiction (shelo ve’eino birshuso), and there is no simple way to regain control over it. Even should the package be refused by the receiving party and returned to the sender, until and unless that happens and the item is indeed returned, it is eino birshuso.

Moonshine in Nissan!

The next shaylah is discussed by the Av Beis Din of Sochatchov (1839-1910), known as the first Sochatchover rebbe, whose halachic works are used by all talmidei chachamim. He was the son-in-law of Rav Menahem Mendel of Kotsk (known by all, very simply, as “The Kotzker”). The Sochatchover was a highly respected gaon in learning when he married the daughter of the Kotzker, even though he had just turned bar mitzvah!

To review the case: the police confiscated some contraband moonshine in the beginning of April, issuing a criminal citation for the violation. Subsequently, the criminal charges were dropped. On Pesach, the police appeared at the door of the moonshine vendor to return the liquor, who told them that he could not receive the merchandise on his Jewish holiday. They came back to return it after Pesach. May he sell the liquor?

It is interesting to read the actual shaylah as it appears in the teshuvos of the Sochatchover, from which we can appreciate the mesiras nefesh of the Jew involved. In czarist Russia, where this case occurred, the whiskey business was a government monopoly, and the czar and his agents did not take kindly to those who ignored this, particularly if they were Jews. The czar’s police investigated this Jew’s premises, and located both legal, government distilled liquor and privately made product, moonshine. All the liquor was confiscated, and the accused knew that his future as a client of the czar’s legal and penal system was far from envious. However, with great difficulty, much mazel, and an appropriate transfer of rubles, the police concluded that they had not discovered anything. The vendor assumed that the police had utilized the contraband or sold it, for some additional profit on their part of the venture.

Surprise of surprises: During Pesach, the cops showed up on his doorstep with the schnapps, insisting that if they held onto it any longer, they would be forced to reopen the “protocol” against the vendor. In my opinion, this would qualify as pikuach nefesh, a life-threatening emergency, permitting him to receive the chometz, and then immediately destroy it in honor of Pesach, thus fulfilling the mitzvah of tashbisu in an extremely exemplary fashion. (Note that, according to Tosafos, Pesachim, 29b s.v. Rav, there is no violation of bal yeira’eh and bal yimatzei in this situation.) This worthy Jew did not ask me a shaylah, but simply told the czar’s finest that he could not receive the chometz during the holiday.

To complete our surprise, after Pesach, the police returned with the chometz. The vendor then asked his local rav, Rav Chanoch, whether the chometz was prohibited as chometz she’avar alav haPesach. Although the vendor had indeed sold all his chometz before Pesach, it qualified as eino birshuso, and he could not halachically sell it; and, now, it may be prohibited as chometz she’avar alav haPesach.

The Sochatchover contends that the whiskey is not prohibited as chometz she’avar alav haPesach, because of the following reasons:

The Sochatchover weighs whether, according to halacha, the vendor owns the chometz in a way that he can still sell it. If, indeed, it is still considered to be his chometz, it was sold. However, we previously demonstrated that this is not true, because of the principle of shelo ve’eino birshuso. The Sochatchover quotes the opinion of the Maharam and the Rosh, quoted by the Shitah Mekubetzes, Bava Kama 33a, that when the property is returned to the owner, the hekdesh that he declared will take effect. (Note that many authorities do not agree with this conclusion, including Tosafos s.v ika and Penei Yehoshua ad loc.; Nachal Yitzchak, end of chapter 73.) Similarly, rules the Sochatchover, should the gift not take place and the chometz return to his hands, it is considered to have been under his control the entire time, and is included in the sale retroactively.

On the other hand, if we assume that having the whiskey confiscated is a reason why he cannot sell it, he also did not violate bal yeira’eh and bal yimatzei, since the chometz was not his during the entire Pesach period. Rav Chanoch, the rav who sent the Sochatchover the question, noted that, according to Russian law of the time, when the police seized the contraband, it automatically became property of the czar. Since none of the czars were ever Jewish, this also means that it is not chometz she’avar alav haPesach. When the vendor received the liquor after Pesach, it was a new acquisition of chometz that had been owned by non-Jews over Pesach. As a result, no prohibition of chometz she’avar alav haPesach applies to this whiskey (Shu’t Avnei Neizer, Orach Chayim #339).

Whiskey she’avar alav haPesach

At this point, let us discuss the last of our opening questions: “A non-Jewish business contact was shipped a gift of expensive whiskey, which never reached him. Instead, the shipper returned it to the Jewish sender, and it arrived shortly after Pesach. Is this prohibited because of chometz she’avar alav haPesach?”

This question is based on a case discussed in Shu’t Imrei Yosher (1:32), authored by Rav Meir Arik (1855–1925), who was viewed as the posek hador of his era in Galicia. Among his most famous talmidim were Rav Meir Shapiro, Rav Reuven Margolies (author of Margoliyos Hayam on Sanhedrin and many other seforim), and Rav Zev Wolf Leiter, who later was the av beis din of Pittsburgh. The situation which the Imrei Yosher discusses was when a Jew sent a barrel of local spirits, by train, to a government official. The barrel, indeed, arrived before Pesach, but the official refused to accept it, so it was shipped back, arriving at the Jew’s house after Pesach. At this point, the Jew sees himself a loser on both scores – he did not successfully curry any favor with the official, and he is also out of the expensive barrel of liquor, which he fears is prohibited as chometz she’avar alav haPesach because he did not sell it.

Rav Arik discusses several possible angles whereby the chometz might be permitted. First of all, he notes that, in their day in Russia, the primary ingredient in the mash that was fermented and distilled was potatoes, which are not chometz. However, all whiskey had a small amount of barley malt added, which is chometz. Nevertheless, the liquor manufactured this way was predominantly not chometz, and would have a status of chometz only miderabbanan, since the percentage of chometz in the final product is below the threshold to qualify as ta’aroves chometz min haTorah. Thus, the questioner did not violate bal yeira’eh and bal yimatzei min haTorah.

A second reason to permit this liquor is that the owner had fulfilled bitul chometz before Pesach, in which he declared all of his chometz null, void and ownerless. In this instance, he would not have violated bal yeira’eh and bal yimatzei, even without the bitul, and, therefore, it may be possible to permit the liquor.

This heter is not obvious, for two reasons:

The Shulchan Aruch rules that you cannot rely on bitul to permit chometz she’avar alav haPesach (Orach Chayim 448:5).

Some authorities reject relying on bitul when the owner would certainly have sold the chometz, rather than trash it.

The conclusion of the Imrei Yosher is that a Jew should not drink this liquor after Pesach, but that the owner can sell the liquor to a non-Jew for a price that subtracts the amount of chometz-malt in the finished product. If this is done, the Jew is neither drinking nor benefiting from the chometz. (He discusses concerns that the non-Jew may sell it, afterward, to a Jew who is not permitted to drink it, and suggests a couple of ways to make sure that this does not happen.)

I will share with you one last case, which happened to friends of mine. They had shipped their belongings on a lift while making aliyah, and realized that they had included chometz on their lift. The question was whether they could include the chometz in the sale that they made. This case is different from all those we have discussed because, although they have no access to the chometz at the moment, it is being shipped to themselves. The question is whether this qualifies as birshuso. They received a psak that it was permitted for them to do so, although I do not know who ruled this way and certainly recommend anyone with a similar shaylah ask his own rav or posek.

Conclusion

According to kabbalah, searching for chometz is symbolic of searching, internally, to locate and remove our own arrogant selves. As we go through the mitzvos of cleaning the house, searching, burning, and selling the chometz, we should also try to focus on the spiritual side of this search-and-destroy mission.

Some of the Laws of Seudah Shelishis

Question #1: Min haTorah or not?

Is eating three meals on Shabbos a Torah requirement?

Question #2: Shaloshudis?

Why do most people slur the word and pronounce it as shaloshudis? Should it not be called seudah shelishis?

Question #3: Three and over

What is required to be eaten for the third meal on Shabbos?

Answer:

The mitzvah of celebrating Shabbos is mentioned by the prophet Yeshayahu (58:13), in his famous words, vekarasa laShabbos oneg, “And you shall call Shabbos a delight.” Although this observance is not mentioned in the written Torah, many authorities rule that it has a halachic status of being min haTorah. It may be included in the Torah’s words mikra’ei kodesh (Vayikra 23:2, see Ramban, as explained by Shaar Hatziyun 242:1). Alternatively, it was originally a halacha leMoshe miSinai, meaning part of the Torah Shebe’al Peh without allusion in the written Torah, until Yeshayahu stated this requirement (Chasam Sofer, Shabbos 118a). The Gemara (Yoma 71b) instructs that some halachic rulings had been halacha leMoshe miSinai until the nevi’im taught them. As the Ramban explains (Notes to Sefer Hamitzvos, Shoresh II), since a navi may not add to the Taryag mitzvos, if this requirement was introduced by Yeshayahu, it would have the status of a takkanas chachamim introduced by the great Torah scholar Yeshayahu, who also happened to be a prophet.

The Chasam Sofer (Shabbos 118a) appears to be of the opinion that no early authority held that the mitzvah is only miderabbanan.  After mentioning that some poskim understand the requirement to celebrate the Shabbos not to be min haTorah, the Mishnah Berurah (Shaar Hatziyun 242:1) notes that people should not treat this mitzvah lightly. He suggests that, perhaps, it should be treated even more strictly than a Torah requirement.

Three meals

As part of the observance of oneg Shabbos, Chazal required that we eat three meals every Shabbos. Although the Mishnah never mentions directly a requirement to eat three meals on Shabbos, a beraysa from the era of the Mishnah does report it (Shabbos 117b). This beraysa records a dispute between the tanna kamma, who rules that three meals are required, and Rabbi Chidka, who requires that we eat four meals every Shabbos. The Gemara provides an extensive discussion regarding this dispute.

The famous amora, Rabbi Yochanan, explains that both tanna’im derive their ruling from seemingly extra words in the same pasuk that states, regarding the mann, “And Moshe said, eat it today, for today is Shabbos for Hashem. Today you will not find it (the mann) in the field” (Shemos 16:25). Rabbi Yochanan notes that the word hayom, today, is written three times in the pasuk, and refers each time to Shabbos. This is the midrashic source for eating three meals on “the day” — Shabbos. In other words, eating extra meals on Shabbos is a way to remind us that Hashem provided for us in the Desert.

The tanna kamma understands the pasuk to be requiring that three meals are eaten in the course of Shabbos, whereas Rabbi Chidka derives that the three meals must be consumed during the daytime of Shabbos.

Three meals or four?

Having established that the tanna kamma requires three meals each Shabbos, and Rabbi Chidka requires four, the Gemara discusses whether proof can be rallied from various Mishnayos regarding whether it held like either of these opinions or, perhaps, held a potential third position. In this context, the Gemara cites a Mishnah (Peah 8:7) that reports that there were many levels of tzedakah collection in the days of Chazal, among them was one called tamchuy (literally, plate or platter) and another called kuppah (literally, box). The tamchuy, which was what we call a soup kitchen, supplied meals for anyone who arrived in a Jewish community. Any pauper, whether resident or itinerant, was entitled to eat at the tamchuy (Tosefta, Peah Chapter 4). However, only those who did not have enough money or food for two meals were eligible.

The kuppah was restricted to the local poor (Tosefta, Peah 4:8). Itwas intended for those who were relatively well off –enough to provide at least for their next fourteen meals. The Mishnah assumes that a poor person is satisfied with two meals a day, one in the morning and one in the evening (no free lunch), and that the kuppah is for those who do not anticipate being able to support themselves and their families with minimal food requirements for the coming week.

Someone with sufficient financial resources to expect that he will have fourteen meals was not permitted to join either the tamchuy or the kuppah. Someone who had two meals, but not fourteen, was permitted to collect from the kuppah, but not from the tamchuy.

The question raised by the Gemara was that the Mishnah does not seem to agree with either the tanna kamma or Rabbi Chidka. According to the tanna kamma, since the requirement for participation in the kuppah was the ability to provide for yourself and your family for the next week, why does the Mishnah state that the minimal requirement for the tanna kamma is someone who has fourteen meals. Since there is a requirement to eat three meals on Shabbos according to the tanna kamma, and four according to Rabbi Chidka, the kuppah limit should be higher – fifteen meals according to the tanna kamma, and sixteen meals according to Rabbi Chidka, allowing for the extra meals required on Shabbos. Upon this basis, the Gemara suggests that the Mishnah represents a third opinion, which requires only two meals on Shabbos.

After a bit of discussion, the Gemara concludes that, indeed, the Mishnah’s ruling is not universally held. However, the author of this Mishnah is Rabbi Akiva (Pesachim 112a, 113a), whose dispute is not with the tanna kamma or Rabbi Chidka regarding the requirement to eat extra meals on Shabbos, but in a different subject. Rabbi Akiva rules that, although there is a requirement to eat extra meals on Shabbos, the requirement does not extend to someone who will require tzedakah funds to provide the extra meals (Shabbos 118a). The rishonim dispute whether we rule according to Rabbi Akiva or not (see Rambam, Hilchos Shabbos 30:9, who rules unlike Rabbi Akiva).

The Shulchan Aruch rules according to Rabbi Akiva, although he qualifies the ruling somewhat: “Even a person who is in need of financial assistance should exhibit his desire to honor Shabbos by minimizing what he eats during the weekdays, in order to be able to have a respectable Shabbos meal. The ruling [of Rabbi Akiva] that you should make your Shabbos as a weekday and not utilize tzedakah funds applies only to someone who is truly needy” (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 242:1).

Melaveh malkah

Although our article has been discussing exclusively the three meals of Shabbos, and not the motza’ei Shabbos meal of melaveh malkah, we would be remiss not to note the following discussion. In his commentary on this passage of Gemara, Rashi asks the following question: When the Gemara discusses whether the extra Shabbos meals are included in the qualifications for the kuppah, why does it not take into consideration the melaveh malkah meal that one should eat on motza’ei Shabbos (see Shabbos; Tur and Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 300)? Rashi answers that tzedakah funds are not used to provide for melaveh malkah (Shabbos 118a s.v. achlei). I am aware of two other approaches to answer this question.

1. The Magen Avraham explains that if you ate seudah shelishis late, there is no requirement to eat bread for melaveh malkah, but you can fulfill the mitzvah by eating fruit (Orach Chayim 300). Since the Tosefta (Peah Chapter 4) mentions that a poor person provided from the communal funds is also provided with fruits and vegetables, he can leave over from these for his melaveh malkah.

2. The Ba’eir Heiteiv (Orach Chayim 300:1) quotes from the Ohr Zarua that if you extend seudah shelishis into night, you thereby fulfill the mitzvah of eating melaveh malkah.

According to both of these approaches, someone can fulfill the mitzvah of melaveh malkah without needing extra support from the tzedakah funds.

Bread or not?

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 291:5) cites a four-way dispute among rishonim, whether the third meal of Shabbos must be a bread meal. He quotes the following opinions:

1. The third meal must be a bread meal (Mordechai, Shabbos #397, quoting Yerei’im and Maharam; Tosafos, Brachos 49b s.v. ei nami).

2. The third meal can be either mezonos or a bread meal (Tosafos, Sukkah 27a s.v. beminei; see also Tosafos, Yoma 79b s.v. minei).

3. The third meal can be meat or fish, and need not include bread (Mordechai, Shabbos #397, quoting Ra’avyah). Ra’avayah states that eating something that would be considered a delicacy fulfills the mitzvah of eating the third meal.

4. The third meal can be fruit (Ramban; Rashba; Ran all to Shabbos 118a).

It should be noted that all authorities agree that it is preferable to have a bread meal for seudah shelishis, and the other three approaches are to be followed only under extenuating circumstances (Bach; Mishnah Berurah).

Two other opinions

5. Among rishonim, we find yet a fifth, more lenient opinion, that of the Rashba, who contends that one can fulfill any of the three meals of Shabbos by eating fruit. It is possible that he is assuming, similar to the Ra’avyah quoted above, that it must be something unusual to demonstrate the kavod and oneg of Shabbos, and not just eating an apple. This position is not accepted by most authorities, who rule that only the third meal may have this lenience (Tosafos, Pesachim 101a s.v. te’imu; Tur Orach Chayim 274). Those who have difficulty eating grain products can explore with their rav or posek the possibility of relying upon the Rashba’s approach.

6. There is, possibly, yet a sixth opinion, quoted in the name of the Zohar (Parshas Emor), that Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai fulfilled the mitzvah of seudah shelishis on Erev Pesach by learning Torah. It is unclear if this Zohar is meant to be understood literally as a halachic opinion, and, even if it is, is it meant to reflect something specifically related to Erev Pesach. Nevertheless, since I have seen it quoted in a halachic context, I share this with our readers.

At this point, we can address one of our opening questions: What is required to be eaten for the third meal on Shabbos?

According to the accepted conclusion of Shulchan Aruch, the third meal of Shabbos for both men and women should include bread. By the way, it should also have two whole loaves on the table, lechem mishneh. This latter halacha applies equally to women and men (Ran, Shabbos).

Under extenuating circumstances, to be discussed with an individual’s rav or posek, it may be permitted to eat mezonos, meat, fish or fruit instead of a full seudah and thereby fulfill the mitzvah of seudah shelishis, which, as we noted above, might be a requirement min haTorah. Someone who has medical issues that preclude his consuming bread at the third meal of Shabbos, or on Erev Pesach, when having three bread meals presents a challenge, can discuss with his rav or posek what to do.

Shaloshudis?

We can also address, at this point, another of our opening questions: Why do most people slur the word and pronounce it as shaloshudis? Should it not be called seudah shelishis?

Indeed, the correct pronunciation of this meal is seudah shelishis, or, in Sefardic and Israeli pronunciation, seudah shelishit. The history of its being called shaloshudis appears to be as follows:

Although having three meals on Shabbos, one on Friday night and two on Shabbos day, should not be a difficult mitzvah to fulfill, many viewed eating bread to fulfill the third meal as a burden. They stated quickly, “we need to fulfill shalosh seudos,” a tongue twister, which easily slurs into shaloshudis. (Similar slurrings occur when people wish one another “a guten yontif,” instead of a guten Yom Tov, or when reading the posuk in Hallel as “ki le’olam chazdo,”instead of ki le’olam chasdo, as the posuk states.)

Kiddush bimkom seudah

It should be noted that a dispute similar to the machlokes rishonim I cited above regarding what one is required to eat for seudah shelishis, exists regarding kiddush bimkom seudah. This means that when one recites kiddush on Friday night or Shabbos morning, one fulfills the mitzvah of kiddush only when he intends to eat a meal at the same time and place (Pesachim 101a; Shulchan Aruch¸Orach Chayim 273 and 289:1). (The details of the laws of kiddush bimkom seudah are quite extensive and will be dealt with at a different time.) The question is: What constitutes a meal?

There are four major opinions:

1. A bread meal (Maasei Rav #122;see also Biur Halacha 273:5 s.v. kosvu).

2. Mezonos (Rabbi Akiva Eiger commentary to Shulchan Aruch Orach Chayim 273:

3. Wine or mezonos (Shulchan Aruch Orach Chayim 273:5; Magen Avraham 273:11).

4. Fruit (Shiltei Hagiborim, quoted by Magen Avraham 273:11; and accepted as definitive by Rav Yitzchak Elchanan Spector, Shu’t Ein Yitzchak, Orach Chayim #12).

We should note that the Shulchan Aruch quotes only the third opinion. Following this approach, standard practice on Shabbos morning is to recite kiddush and then eat mezonos to accomplish kiddush bimkom seudah. There are individuals who may wish to be stringent and follow opinion #1, and make sure to eat hamotzi when they recite kiddush Shabbos morning. This is mentioned by his disciples as the Vilna Gaon’s personal practice, but is a personal stringency that may be followed only in a completely unobstrusive way and only after discussion with a gadol baTorah. I refer the reader to the insightful statement of Rav Eliyahu Dessler, Michtav Mei’eliyahu, Volume III, page 294, regarding the status of observing personal chumros that are not halachically mandated.

The fourth, and very lenient, opinion is quoted by some major halachic authorities, but is not usually considered a halachic position on which one can rely. However, someone may receive a special dispensation from their rav or posek to rely upon this approach and eat only fruit and consider it to be kiddush bimkom seudah. This will certainly be understandable for someone suffering from celiac, a food allergy or other medical situation in which consumption of any grain product is counterindicated.

Women and three meals?

Are women obligated to eat three meals on Shabbos, when it is a time-bound mitzvah?

Although the Gemara teaches that women are exempt from time-bound, positive mitzvos, the early halachic authorities require women to eat three meals on Shabbos. Nevertheless, we find a critical dispute as to why this mitzvah is an exception to the rule. Rabbeinu Tam rules that women are obligated because of the principle, af hein hayu be’oso haneis¸ they were also the beneficiaries of the miracle that is the basis of this mitzvah observance, since they also received the mann, upon which the three meals of Shabbos are based. On the other hand, the Ramban and the Ran rule that there is a more basic reason why women should observe this mitzvah: the two different references to the observance of Shabbos in the two versions of the Aseres Hadibros — zachor, remember,and shamor, observe –teach that in all mitzvos of Shabbos, men and women are equally obligated. In other words, we have a general principle that the laws of Shabbos are exceptions to the rule that women are not obligated in time-bound mitzvos. (There are practical halachic differences that result from this dispute. Those who would like to research them can look, for example, at Shu’t Rabbi Akiva Eiger #1.)

Conclusion

In reference to the pasuk from Yeshayahu, vekarasa laShabbos oneg, likdosh Hashem mechubad, “And you shall call Shabbos a delight, that day which is holy to Hashem should be honored”, the Ramban (Shemos 20:8) explains that observing Shabbos is not simply a day of rest, and it is certainly not intended to be a day of recreation. It is meant to be a day of holiness, where we draw our attention away from temporal and temporary involvement, ideas and values and, instead, provide pleasure for our bodies, lives and souls in the service of Hashem. This includes emphasizing Torah study, and spending time with Torah scholars, to hear what Hashem wants from us in our daily lives. As I explained at the onset of this article, celebrating Shabbos according to the Torah’s dictates is part of the Torah’s instruction for the proper observance of this Holy day.

Women and Reading Megillah

Question #1: Ba’alas Korei

May a woman be the ba’alas keri’ah of the megillah?

Question #2: Kiddush and Arba Kosos

The elderly Mr. Klein is fully alert, but, unfortunately, he has difficulty enunciating. May Mrs. Klein recite kiddush and the other brachos of the seder for him?

Foreword

Although there is a general rule exempting women from mitzvos aseih shehazeman grama, (time-bound requirements involving positive action), such as tefillin, sukkah and tzitzis, there are numerous exceptions to this rule. For example, women are required to observe mitzvos related to Shabbos and Pesach and to hear Megillas Esther on Purim, all topics that we will discuss.

Part of the miracle

In three places, the Gemara quotes an early amora, Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, who ruled that women are obligated to fulfill the mitzvos of megillah, ner Chanukah and the four kosos of seder night. Although these are all time-bound mitzvos aseih, women are obligated to observe these specific mitzvos because of a different rule, af hein hayu be’oso haneis, “they were also included in the miracle.” This rule means that, when Chazal created the mitzvos of kindling Chanukah lights, reading megillah on Purim or consuming the four cups on the first night of Pesach, they included women in the obligation, notwithstanding that they are usually exempt from mitzvos aseih shehazeman grama.

The rishonim dispute what the term af hein hayu be’oso haneis means. Is this emphasizing that they were saved by the miracle, or does it mean that they were involved in bringing about the miracle?

Rashi and the Rashbam (Pesachim 108b) explain that af hein hayu be’oso haneis means that women were involved in causing the miracle (think of Esther declaring that the Jews fast and do teshuvah, approaching Achashveirosh and setting Haman up for his execution). On the other hand, Tosafos (Megillah 4a s. v. She’af; Pesachim 108b s. v. Hayu) contends that it means that women, also, were saved by the miracle of survival, either physical or spiritual, that we celebrate in each of these observances.

Mitzvos min haTorah?

Note that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi applied his principle to three mitzvos, each of which is a requirement only miderabbanan. Is this coincidental, or is the principle of af hein hayu be’oso haneis a principle that Chazal created that does not apply min haTorah? This issue is disputed by two Ba’alei Tosafos. The first opinion cited by Tosafos contends that af hein hayu be’oso haneis is a rabbinic principle and will not create a Torah requirement (Tosafos, Megillah 4a s. v. She’af; Mordechai, Megillah #780). The disputant, Rabbeinu Yosef of Eretz Yisrael, rules that af hein hayu be’oso haneis applies even to mitzvos that are min haTorah.

Shomei’a ke’oneh

Prior to answering our opening questions, we need to understand a halachic principle called shomei’a ke’oneh, which translates, literally, as “hearing is like responding.” This principle means that when I hear someone recite a prayer, the megillah, kiddush or havdalah, it is considered as if I, myself, recited it.

I will explain this principle with an example that we utilize regularly: Except for heads of household, most of us fulfill the mitzvos of kiddush and havdalah by hearing someone else recite them. But the mitzvah is to recite kiddush and havdalah, not merely to hear them. So, how do we fulfill these mitzvos when we are only hearing them? The answer is that, because of shomei’a ke’oneh, it is deemed that we recited kiddush and havdalah ourselves.

Three conditions

For shomei’a ke’oneh to work, three conditions must be met:

(1) The individual performing the mitzvah must have in mind to be motzi the other people, meaning that he knows that he is acting on behalf of those listening.

(2) The individual performing the mitzvah must be required to observe this mitzvah. In other words, if a child (under bar or bas mitzvah) recites kiddush or havdalah on behalf of an adult, the adult does not fulfill the mitzvah, since the child is not obligated in this mitzvah min haTorah (see Brachos 20b).

(3) The listeners must have in mind that they are discharging their obligation to perform the mitzvah by hearing this recital.

Parshas Zachor

It is for this last reason that, immediately prior to Parshas Zachor, the gabbai announces that everyone should have in mind with the reading of the ba’al keri’ah to fulfill the mitzvah of remembering Amaleik’s dastardly deeds. Only the ba’al keri’ah actually reads the appropriate Torah portion. The rest of us discharge our obligation to observe this mitzvah by hearing the ba’al keri’ah, which, because of shomei’a ke’oneh, is considered as if we read it ourselves. In addition to Parshas Zachor, brachos, reading the Torah and the megillah, kiddush and havdalah, there are numerous other applications of shomei’a ke’oneh.

Not now!

We should note that, although the person being motzi others must be obligated by the Torah to fulfill the mitzvah, this does not require him to fulfill the mitzvah with this reading, by which he is being motzi others. He may recite kiddush or havdalah for someone else, even if he, himself, has already fulfilled the mitzvah, or if he intends to fulfill the mitzvah later with a different recital of kiddush or havdalah. That is why a ba’al keri’ah can read megillah many different times to be motzi other people, even though he has already fulfilled the mitzvah. This is also the reason why kiddush and havdalah are recited in shul, notwithstanding that the person reciting them plans to recite them again at home.

Ba’alas korei

At this point, I can present the halachic background behind our opening question: May a woman be the ba’alas korei or ba’alas keri’ah of the megillah?

Whether a woman may assume the role of ba’alas keri’ah is the subject of a fascinating dispute among rishonim, as we will soon see.

The Mishnah (Megillah 19b) states: Everyone is qualified to read the megillah except for a minor and someone who is not halachically responsible for his actions. The Gemara (Arachin 2b) asks: what is being added by emphasizing that “everyone” is qualified to read the megillah? The Gemara replies that women, who are usually not obligated in time-bound mitzvos, are obligated to read the megillah, to the extent that they may read the megillah to be motzi others. Rashi explains, explicitly, that this means that a woman may read the megillah to be motzi a man in his obligation. Thus, according to Rashi, a woman may be the ba’alas keri’ah of the megillah.

However, the Ba’al Halachos Gedolos (usually abbreviated as Bahag, the author of a halachic work from the era of the geonim) notes that the Tosefta, a halachic work dating back to the era of the Mishnah, disagrees. The salient part of the Tosefta (Megillah 2:4), as we have its text, reads: “All are obligated in the reading of the megillah… . Women… are exempt and cannot be motzi the public (rabbim) from their responsibility.”

Is there any way to resolve this contradiction between the Mishnah, as understood by the Gemara, and the Tosefta?

The Bahag presents an approach to explain the Mishnah and the Tosefta such that there is no conflict between the two positions. When the Mishnah implies, and the Gemara states explicitly, that a woman can be motziah (the feminine of motzi; plural motzios) someone else, it means that she can be motziah a woman, but not a man.

Why should this be true? The Bahag explains that there are two levels of mitzvah regarding the megillah:

(1) To read the megillah.

(2) To hear the megillah.

Ordinarily, a man fulfills both requirements when he hears the megillah from another man, since the person reading the megillah, who has both obligations, reads it for the purpose that the listeners fulfill all their megillah-related obligations. However, since a woman’s obligation is only to hear the megillah, but not to read it, it is not within her ability to be motzi someone who is obligated to read the megillah (Rosh, Megillah 1:4; note that Shu”t Avnei Neizer [Orach Chayim #511:4-5] and the Brisker Rav [Al Hashas, Inyanim #15] explain the Bahag’s approach slightly differently).

With this approach, the Bahag explains that the Mishnah refers to a woman reading the megillah for other women, which she can do, and the Tosefta refers to a woman reading the megillah for men, which is why it states that a woman cannot be motziah the public, which includes men.

The Tosefta according to Rashi

According to Rashi, either the text of this Tosefta is in error (as is not uncommon in our texts of the Tosefta) or it disagrees with the Mishnah as understood by the Gemara, in which case we rule according to the Mishnah and Gemara (both of these approaches are mentioned, in different places, by the Bach, Orach Chayim 689). We should point out that the texts that we have received of the Tosefta are notoriously unreliable, since copyists often made errors and, as a result, texts that were studied less frequently are often inaccurate. As an example, the rishonim who quote this Tosefta cite it with at least three significantly different texts.

Also, if, indeed, there is a dispute between the tanna who authored the Mishnah and the one who authored the Tosefta, the halacha follows the author of the Mishnah. Thus, either approach used to explain Rashi’s position is highly satisfactory.

Other rishonim?

Several authorities infer from the Rambam that he agreed with Rashi’s halachic conclusion (Magid Mishnah, Hilchos Megillah 1:2; Beis Yosef, Orach Chayim 689). The Beis Yosef and the Darkei Moshe quote other rishonim on both sides of fence: The Or Zarua rules like Rashi, whereas the Ra’avyah and the Mordechai (Megillah #779) rule like the Bahag. The Shulchan Aruch’s conclusion is unclear (Orach Chayim 689:2), whereas the Rema rules like the Bahag.

According to the Bahag’s opinion, some authorities contend that a woman hearing megillah when no male is fulfilling the mitzvah should not recite the brocha al mikra megillah, since she is not required to read the megillah, but to hear it. The Rema records that she should recite lishmo’a megillah, but others prefer that she should recite lishmo’a mikra megillah (Mishnah Berurah 689:8).

Getting a third opinion

Are there any other opinions? We actually find a few other opinions among rishonim, who present alternative ways of resolving the contradiction between the Mishnah and the Tosefta, with halachic results unlike either Rashi or the Bahag. Rabbi Moshe of Coucy (France), a ba’al Tosafos who wrote a halachic work based on the 613 mitzvos, usually called Sefer Hamitzvos Hagadol (abbreviated as Semag), agrees with the Bahag that a woman cannot be motziah a man, but disagrees with the reason why. In his opinion, just as Chazal ruled that a woman cannot fulfill the mitzvah of keri’as haTorah, because it is not kavod hatzibur for her to read for the community (Megillah 23a), she may also not read to be motzi a man in megillah (towards the beginning of Hilchos Megillah in the Semag). Tosafos (Sukkah 38a s. v. Be’emes at end) may agree with this opinion of the Semag.

With this approach, the Semag answers the contradiction between the Mishnah and the Gemara, on one hand, and the Tosefta, on the other, in a way similar to that of the Bahag. The Mishnah and Gemara teach that a woman may read the megillah for someone else; the Tosefta is ruling that she may not be the ba’alas keri’ah for a community.

There is yet a fourth approach to the issue, that of the Ba’al Ha’itur (Hilchos Megillah, page 110, column 1), but the details of his opinion are somewhat unclear (see Ran [Megillah 19b, 6b in the Rif’s pages]; Tur and Bach, Orach Chayim 689).

Three is a crowd

There is yet another opinion, contending that the Tosefta means that a woman should not read the megillah for more than one other woman (Korban Nesanel, Megillah 1:4:60, in explanation of Tosafos, Sukkah 38a s. v. Be’emes). According to this position, the Tosefta meant this when it said that a woman she should not read for the “public” (“rabbim” in the words of the Tosefta). The Mishnah Berurah quotes this approach as authoritative halacha (Shaar Hatziyun, 689:15). This opinion actually ends up with a stricter ruling, since, according to both Rashi and the Bahag, a woman may read megillah to be motziah other women, regardless as to how many there are, whereas this opinion allows her to be motziah only one other woman, not any more.

Kiddush

Does this principle of the Bahag apply to kiddush just as it applies to the reading of the megillah? Let us explore the halachic data on the subject.

The Gemara (Brachos 20b) states, unequivocally, that women are obligated in the mitzvah of reciting kiddush. Does this mean that a woman may recite kiddush to be motzi a man? Or, is this dependent on the dispute between Rashi and the Bahag?

Several early acharonim understand that the same dispute that exists between Rashi and the Bahag regarding women reading the megillah for men applies to women reciting kiddush for men (Maharshal and Bach, in their commentaries to Tur Orach Chayim 271). They conclude that a woman may recite kiddush for other women, but may not recite kiddush to be motzi a man in kiddush.

However, the Taz, who was the son-in-law of the Bach, disputes his father-in-law’s conclusion, contending that the Bahag’s opinion is limited to reading the Megillah, and does not apply to reciting kiddush. Since the Gemara concludes that women are obligated in kiddush min haTorah, it appears that they can be motzi men in kiddush. (This approach appears to be implied by the Gemara, Brachos 20b).

Kiddush according to the Semag

We noted above the opinion of the Semag that women cannot be motzios men in reading the megillah, just as they cannot be called up to read the Torah. This position should apply only to a woman reading the megillah, but not to reciting kiddush, which is usually not performed publicly, but recited at home.

Arba Kosos

At this point, let us explore one of our opening questions: The elderly Mr. Klein is fully alert, but, unfortunately, he has difficulty enunciating. May Mrs. Klein recite kiddush and the other brachos of the seder for him?

Chazal required that men and women have four kosos at the seder. It is difficult to imagine that someone can be motzi someone else in this requirement – drinking the four cups of wine it a mitzvah degufei, a mitzvah that is performed with one’s body, similar to matzoh, lulav and tefillin, which preclude one person performing the mitzvah for another. However, someone can recite the brachos that pertain to these kosos for someone else.

The Gemara states that each of the four kosos is associated with a different mitzvah of the seder, and, in fact, each of these mitzvos includes at least one brocha. We hold the kos while we recite these brachos.

1. The first kos is kiddush.

2. Over the second kos, we recite the brocha of Asher Ge’alanu, which completes the mitzvah of magid.

3. The third kos is used for birkas hamazon.

4. The fourth kos is the brocha upon the completion of Hallel.

Women are obligated in all the laws of the seder, which includes reciting the brachos associated with its four kosos. Does it say whether they can be motzios a man in these brachos? Would the Bahag’s opinion that they should not be motziah a man in megillah apply to these brachos? I did not find anyone who discusses this issue.

How do we pasken?

Having explained the understanding and ramifications of all these issues, let us present the halachic conclusions:

Most late authorities conclude that, regarding the reading of the megillah, we should follow the approach of the Bahag that women should not read megillah for men, and, also, we should follow the approach of the Semag that women should not read in public for a group of women. If no man is available who can read the megillah for her, a woman may read the megillah for herself, and she may also read the megillah for another woman.

Regarding the halachos of women being motzios men in kiddush, the later authorities do not accept the approach of the Maharshal and the Bach that the same ruling applies to kiddush. Instead, they contend that when there is a valid reason for a woman to make kiddush for her family, she should do so and be motziah the male members (Magen Avraham, 271:2 and later acharonim). Regarding the bracha of Asher Ge’alanu at the seder, my halachic conclusion is that Mrs. Klein may recite these brachos and be motziah Mr. Klein with them.

Conclusion

Why are women exempt from mitzvos aseih shehazeman grama? Most people, and certainly several commentaries, assume that this is because a woman’s family responsibilities should not be subject to other mitzvos that may conflict with them. However, not everyone agrees with this idea. Some note that there already is a halachic principle of oseik bemitzvah patur min hamitzvah, someone occupied with fulfilling one mitzvah is exempt from performing a different mitzvah, until the first mitzvah is completed. Thus, it would seem superfluous for the Torah to have established yet another rule, to exempt women from mitzvos aseih shehazeman grama, because of the exact same rationale.

Other authorities contend that Hashem, Who created all of our neshamos, knows which mitzvos our particular soul needs in order to thrive, and each individual’s neshamah needs different mitzvos. Following this idea, it is obvious that kohanim need certain mitzvos, but are excluded from others; men require certain mitzvos and cannot fulfill others, and so, also, with women. Each person’s neshamah has its own Divinely created formula for what it needs.

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