Honor the Elderly!

In the aseres hadibros, honoring parents features significantly, thus, we will discuss:

Question #1: Respect your elders?!

“Am I required to stand up anytime I see a senior citizen walking down the street?”

Question #2: Age before wisdom?!

“I give a daf yomi shiur. Many of those who attend are old enough to be my grandfather. Am I required to stand up for them when they arrive at the shiur?”

Question #3: Elder older?

“Does one older person need to stand up for another older person?”

Introduction

In parshas Kedoshim, the Torah teaches that there is a mitzvah to stand up before an older person and to treat a “zakein” with respect. The words of the posuk are: Mipnei seivah takum vehadarta penei zakein, “you should stand up for an older person and treat an ‘elder’ with respect” (Vayikra 19:32).

To begin with, we will raise several additional questions: How old does the person need to be to qualify as being “older”? Does it make a difference if it is an older man or an older woman? For how long must I remain standing? Is there any difference between someone who is “older,” in lashon kodesh, seivah, and someone who is an “elder,” which is the way I translated the word zakein? Is a demonstration of respect required, regardless of how religiously observant the older person is?

Elder or older?

I was very deliberate to translate the word zakein as “elder.” Indeed, the lashon kodesh word zakein, and the English word elder, carry the same two different meanings. The word zakein can mean an older person, but it can also mean a scholar, or someone who is respected for his sage advice and leadership qualities. Both meanings are similarly included in the English word “elder,” but not necessarily in the word “older.” Thus, the expression, “respect your elders,” does not have to refer to someone older than you are, since there can be a young elder, but it is difficult to have a young older.

The Gemara (Kiddushin 32b) presents a three-way dispute as to what type of older person, or “zakein,” is included in the mitzvah. According to the tanna kamma, the mitzvah applies only to someone who is both a Torah scholar and elderly. In his opinion, there is no requirement to stand up for a profound Torah scholar who is young. Rabbi Yosi Hagelili disagrees, contending that there is a mitzvah to rise and show respect both to an older person who is not a profound scholar, as long as he knows some Torah, and to a Torah scholar, even if he is young. A third tanna, Isi ben Yehudah, rules that there is a requirement to stand up for any Torah scholar and for an older person, provided the older person is basically Torah observant. (This reflects the opinion of Rabbeinu Tam, which is the approach accepted by the halachic authorities. According to Rashi, Isi ben Yehudah requires standing up for an older person, even if he is willingly non-observant, and even if he is a rosho.)

The Gemara (Kiddushin 32b-33a) concludes that the halacha follows the third tanna, Isi ben Yehudah, which is accepted by the halachic authorities. Thus, there is a requirement to stand up for an older person, if he is halachically observant, even if he is not a scholar.

The Rambam’s conclusion is that a young talmid chochom should demonstrate honor to someone elderly, even if the older person is not a talmid chochom. This means that he is required to rise slightly to demonstrate honor, but he is not required to stand up fully (Hilchos Talmud Torah 6:9, as explained by Tur Yoreh Deah 244 and later authorities). The poskim refer to this demonstration of honor as hiddur.

There is a minority opinion that no one is required to stand up fully before an older person who is not a Torah scholar, and that it is sufficient to rise slightly (hiddur), as a show of honor (Shu”t Binyamin Ze’ev #243; see Aruch Hashulchan, Yoreh Deah 244:10). However, the Tur (Yoreh Deah 244) and most later authorities do not accept this approach. They conclude that it is a mitzvas aseih min haTorah for anyone but a talmid chochom to stand up for an older person.

Why is a talmid chochom exempt?

This sounds strange! Where else do we have a mitzvah that applies to everyone but a talmid chochom? The answer is that the Torah’s mitzvah is to show respect to Torah scholars and to elderly people who are Torah observant. Of the two categories, a Torah scholar deserves greater respect. If a talmid chochom were obligated to stand up for a non-educated elderly person, this would mean that the Torah is respecting age before wisdom. In fact, the Torah respects Torah wisdom before age.

Nevertheless, the “young” talmid chochom should rise slightly to demonstrate his respect for the older person. Since rising slightly, without standing up completely, is not a tircha, this is not considered showing disrespect to the Torah that the young talmid chochom represents.

Age before wisdom?!

At this point, let us address the second of our opening questions: “I give a daf yomi shiur. Many of those who attend are old enough to be my grandfather. Am I required to stand up for them when they arrive at the shiur?”

In other words, is there a requirement for the rebbi to stand up for his talmid who qualifies as a seivah? This question is discussed by several acharonim. The work She’eiris Yaakov,by Rav Yisroel Yaakov Algazi, is quoted as ruling that the rebbi is required to stand up for his talmid, the seivah. However, the commentary Leiv Meivin, by Rav Bechor Yitzchak Navardo, a nineteenth-century, Turkish posek, proves that the rebbi is required to stand up for his talmid only when the seivah himself is a talmid chochom and only when the rebbi is not obviously a much greater scholar than the seivah (Hilchos Talmud Torah 6:9). In other words, the only time a rebbi is required to demonstrate honor to an older person who is his talmid is when they are both talmidei chochomim of approximately similar stature, such that the younger talmid chochom is not obviously a much greater scholar than the older one. Thus, whether our daf yomi maggid shiur is required to stand up for the golden-aged attendees of his shiur is a dispute between the She’eiris Yaakov and the Leiv Meivin.

An older woman

Is there a mitzvah to stand up for an older woman?

The Sefer Chassidim (#578) rules that there is. Presumably, he is referring to a woman who is halachically observant, even if she is not very knowledgeable about halacha. There are halachic authorities who may disagree with the ruling of the Sefer Chassidim (see Halachos Ketanos 1:154; Shu”t Beis Yehudah, Yoreh Deah #28; Birkei Yosef, Choshen Mishpat 17:5; Bris Olam #578).

Two elderlies

Is an elderly person required to rise for another elderly person?

The Tur suggests that two talmidei chachomim or two elderly people should show respect (hiddur) for one another, although they are not required to stand up fully. This approach is codified by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 244:8). Some authorities explain that this is only when the two are of approximately equal stature as talmidei chachomim. However, if one of the talmidei chachomim is a greater talmid chochom than the other, the “lesser” talmid chochom is required to stand up for his more learned colleague (Leiv Meivin).

How old?

For how old a person are you required to stand up?

In the context of this mitzvah, the halachic authorities mention what appear to be three different ages.

1. The Rambam (Hilchos Talmud Torah 6:9) says that the mitzvah applies to someone “pronouncedly old,” which does not appear to have an obvious, objective criterion.

2. Based on the words of the Mishnah in Pirkei Avos (end of Chapter 5), ben shiv’im le’seivah, the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch rule that these laws apply to a person of the age of 70.

3. The Arizal is quoted as being strict to observe this mitzvah for people who have reached the age of 60 (Birkei Yosef, Yoreh Deah 244:4).

However, the Tur explains that the Rambam’s term “pronouncedly old” means 70, and that he is not disputing the Rambam in this matter.

In addition, there are various interpretations why the Arizal applied this mitzvah to someone who achieved the age of 60. Most conclude that the Arizal agrees with the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch, but that he had a personal chumrah, which was not halachically required, to stand up for a person once the honoree turned 60. Therefore, most rule that even those who follow kabbalistic practices are required to rise only for someone who is 70 years old (Birkei Yosef, Yoreh Deah 244:1; Leiv Meivin).

The halachic conclusion follows the opinion of the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch, ruling that the requirement to stand up for an older person applies only when the older person is at least 70 years old. This halacha holds true today, notwithstanding that 70 is no longer considered advanced in age.

An older person may be mocheil on his honor, and someone who knows that a particular person really does not want people to stand up for him should follow the older person’s wishes. Disregarding his personal desire is not demonstrating respect.

No respect

There is no requirement to rise and show respect when you are in a place where demonstrating respect is inappropriate, such as a bathhouse or bathroom.

When do you stand?

The requirement to stand up for a talmid chochom or an older person applies only when he is within four amos, approximately seven feet, of where you are. There are exceptions to this rule. There is a requirement to stand up for the person who taught you most of the Torah that you know, called your rebbi muvhak. In this case, you are required to stand up once your see the rebbi walking by, even at a distance (Aruch Hashulchan, Yoreh Deah 244:13).

Why four amos?

If you stand up when the talmid chochom or the older person is within your four amos, it is apparent that the reason you stood up is to honor him.

Don’t lose work time

There is an interesting halachic ruling, that there is no requirement to rise and show respect when a person will lose work time as a result. Therefore, a self-employed person is not required to stand up, should he be working when an elderly person comes by, and a worker in the employ of someone else is not permitted to rise while he is working, since he is taking away from the time he owes his employer. In other words, an employee is not permitted to be machmir and stand up when it costs money to a third party. Although one can argue that, in today’s business environment which accepts reasonable coffee breaks and other occasional, brief interruptions, it is permitted for an employee to stand up to show respect for a talmid chochom, we learn a very important lesson how halacha views the responsibility of an employee to his employer. This discussion will be left for a different, future article.

Standing up while learning Torah

The halacha is that someone in the middle of studying Torah is required to stand up for a talmid chochom or for an elderly person (when the halacha requires, as explained above). This is because of a general rule that performing mitzvos of the Torah pushes aside studying Torah.

Transported

What is the halacha, if the elderly person is being carried or wheeled in a wheelchair? Is there still a responsibility to rise when he passes within four amos? The answer is that there is a responsibility to rise when the elderly person passes by, regardless as to whether he is walking or being transported (see Kiddushin 33b). Therefore, it is required to stand up when an older person passes you while he is being pushed in a wheelchair.

As I mentioned above, you are required to stand up for an elderly person, once he is within four amos of where you are. There is a dispute among authorities whether you may sit down as soon as the scholar, or elderly person, passes by, or whether you should wait to sit down until he has passed beyond your four amos (Birkei Yosef, Yoreh Deah 244:12; Aruch Hashulchan, Yoreh Deah 244:13).

At this point, we can address our opening question:

“Am I required to stand up anytime I see a senior citizen walking down the street?”

The answer is that if he is over seventy years old (or appears to be), observes halacha, and you are not busy earning a living, you are required to stand up for him, once he is within your four amos.

In shul or while davening?

Is there a mitzvah to stand up for a talmid chochom or an elderly person when you are in the middle of davening? There is an authority who contends that since you are in the middle of showing respect to Hashem, you should not, then, show respect for a human, who is, himself, required to show respect to Hashem (quoted by Birkei Yosef, Yoreh Deah 244:1). However, the other halachic authorities disagree, contending that fulfilling Hashem’s mitzvah is showing respect to Hashem, and, therefore, should be observed while you are davening (see Birkei Yosef ad locum and Shu”t Radbaz that he quotes).

Your whole house

The Birkei Yosef raises the following question: In general, halacha considers your entire house to be one area of four amos. This has many halachic ramifications. For example, upon awaking in the morning most people wash their hands somewhere in the house, without being careful that they walk less than four amos before doing so.

The question he raises is whether we consider the entire house to be four amos germane to standing up for an older person. If we do, that would mean that whenever you are indoors and you see an older person walking around or being transported in the same house, you are required to remain standing up for him until he reaches his destination, even if he never comes within your four amos!

The halachic authorities conclude that there is no difference between being inside or being outside – in either instance, you are not required to stand until the older person is within your four amos. This is because the point of four amos germane to this mitzvah is that a greater distance away is not apparent that you are standing to demonstrate honor. This is true whether you are indoors or outdoors, and, therefore, there is no requirement to stand up indoors for an older person until he is within your four amos (Birkei Yosef, Yoreh Deah 244:5).

Discordant scholar

The Aruch Hashulchan (Yoreh Deah 244:13) rules that there is no requirement to stand up to show respect for a Torah scholar who creates disputes that are not for the sake of Heaven. This ruling would also apply to an elderly person who creates disputes that are not lesheim shamayim. Even if he meets the age requirement and is observant, if he is a baal machlokess, there is no mitzvah to rise for him.

Can’t see

Does the mitzvah to stand up for a talmid chochom or an elderly person apply when the honoree will be unaware that you did so, such as, if he cannot see? The She’eilos Uteshuvos Halachos Ketanos (1:154) rules that you are not required to stand up for an older person who cannot see that you did so (quoted by Shearim Hametzuyanim Behalacha 144:5). However, many other authorities dispute this conclusion (Birkei Yosef, Yoreh Deah 244:2).

Conclusion

When the posuk (Bereishis 24:1) mentions that Avraham Avinu got older, it uses the expression, ba bayamim, “he came with his days,” the first time this expression occurs in Chumash, even though many people had lived much longer than Avraham. The Gemara explains that this was the first instance of a person looking like an old man. Most people are sensitive about looking older, but the Midrash writes that Avraham Avinu asked to look elderly, so that people would know to treat him with respect! As the Gemara expresses it, “Until the time of Avraham, there was no concept in the world of people looking old. Someone who wanted to talk to Avraham, would (by mistake) go to Yitzchok, since they looked so similar, and vice versa. Avraham then prayed to Hashem, and the concept of appearing elderly began for the first time in history” (Bava Metzia 87a). The Bereishis Rabbah adds, “Avraham requested to look old. He said to Hashem, ‘Creator of all worlds, a man and his son can arrive in a place, and no one knows which of them to honor. If you crown him with the appearance of being elderly, people know whom to honor!’ Hashem answered him. ‘You requested it; it will begin with you.’ From the beginning of the Torah, until Avraham, there is no mention of anyone getting old” (Bereishis Rabbah 65:9).

Avraham Avinu’s outlook should serve as a wise counterbalance to modern society’s adulation and adoration of youth. This approach makes aging something to dread, rather than something deserving of respect. Instead, Avraham Avinu referred to signs of advanced age as a well-earned “crown.”

My Vows I Shall Fulfill #2

Question #1: Can performing a mitzvah be a liability?

Question #2: What is hataras nedarim?

Question #3: How does Kol Nidrei work?

Question #4:

Yankel asked me the following question: “When I attended a Gemara shiur on Nedarim, I got the impression that performing hataras nedarim requires having a talmid chacham deliberate over the specific neder, until he concludes that there are grounds to release the neder. This seems to have no relationship to what we do on Erev Rosh Hashanah.”

Answer:

This week we will continue last week’s article on the topic of vows, oaths, and pledges. As we mentioned there, someone who recites a vow, an oath or a pledge is required to fulfill it (see Bamidbar 30:3). By virtue of the vow, oath or pledge, he now has a Torah obligation to observe something that he is otherwise not required to do. We also discovered that, for reasons discussed in last week’s article, one should be careful not to make vows or pledges. Here is a review of the six main ways to create an obligation upon oneself, either to fulfill something or to abstain from doing something:

(1) Nedarimvows

(2) Shevuosoaths

(3) Kabbalas mitzvah, declaring that one will perform a good deed

(4) Pledges to tzedakah, intending to donate charity

(5) Stringencies – performing a halachic chumra

(6) Doing something three times

The details of how these various activities become halachic responsibilities vary from category to category, and the outline of these rules was discussed in last week’s article. There we were taught that to avoid creating these commitments, someone expressing intent to perform a good deed should be careful to say that he/she is acting bli neder, without accepting it as an obligation. Similarly, someone who begins practicing a halachic hiddur should say, or at least think, that he is not accepting it as an obligation.

In addition, we presented last week how to release ourselves from vows and pledges via aprocess called hataras nedarim, which removes the continuing obligation to fulfill the vow. We noted that someone who violated his vow prior to performing hataras nedarim has sinned and is required to perform teshuvah for his or her infraction. In the case of a pledge to tzedakah¸ there is an additional requirement to pay it as soon as possible; otherwise, someone might violate the prohibition of bal te’acheir leshalmo – “Do not delay paying it” (Devarim 23:22).

If one contemplates making a vow or an oath, at what point has an oath been created? In most instances, thinking about making an oath or vow, or even deciding to do so without expressing it, does not create an oath. The vow or oath is created only by enunciating it.

If someone states the words of an oath or vow, but has no intention to accept an obligation upon himself, no oath or vow has been created. This is referred to by the Gemara as piv velibo shavim – his mouth and his heart are equal. In other words, his intent and his statement are both required in order to create an oath or vow. If he did not intend to create an oath or vow, the words alone do not create one because libo, his heart, meaning, his intention, was not to make an oath or vow.

What is the halacha if he wanted to make an oath or vow and began expressing it, but said something that is not a correct formula for either an oath or a vow? The halacha is that there are times when this is not a valid oath or vow, because what he said is insufficient to qualify, and there are other times when it is valid. Although the details are more complex than we will deal with in this article, we will discuss two instances in which the oath or vow is valid and must be kept.

  1. Yad nedarim – when the statement is incomplete. The word yad means a hand, but also can mean a handle. In this instance, it means that, although the vow was not fully expressed, enough of it was said to understand the person’s intent. He provided a “handle” with which the verbalization of the vow can be “held.” For example, if someone declared muderani mimcha, “I vow from you,” the person who states this is prohibited to talk to the other person until he has hataras nedarim performed (see Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 206:1).
  2. Nickname nedarim – when the neder is expressed in a colloquial fashion. The words themselves are not meaningful, but colloquially this is understood to be a neder. The halachic term used in the Mishnah for these nedarim is kinuyim, which means a nickname (Nedarim 2a). An example of this is someone declaring, “This loaf of bread is konam to me,” who is now prohibited to eat the loaf of bread.

The Gemara quotes a dispute between early amora’im why kinuyim are valid. According to one amora, this was an attempt by non-Jews to imitate Hebrew, but because of their native accents, the words ended up sounding very strange. Nevertheless, once these words became accepted to mean what was intended, they will now create an oath or vow. In other words, language in general is what people mean and is conventionally accepted. Every spoken language is constantly in flux, and, as people use the language, dialects and colloquialisms develop. These are all acceptable uses of the language. For our halachic purposes, these peculiar usages for expressions, such as “oath,” “vow” and the like, are considered part of the language – and, therefore, the oath or vow was stated. According to this approach, the word konam was originally a slang word of non-Jews meaning korban.

The other approach of the Gemara explains that the terms called kiyunim by the Mishnah were deliberate creations of Chazal. Chazal realized that since the posuk refers to a korban laShem, the most common way someone will refer to a vow not to use an item will be to say, “this item is a korban for G-d,” meaning that the item may not be used just as a korban may not be used. When doing so, the person may use Hashem’s name as we express it in Hebrew. Although halachically doing this it is not considered taking Hashem’s name in vain, it can easily lead to someone using Hashem’s name inappropriately and violating the Torah prohibition of lo sisa es sheim Hashem Elokecha lashav (Shemos 20:7). In order to avoid and discourage this, Chazal instituted a different nomenclature, specifically for the purpose of oaths and vows, whose purpose is to discourage people from using Hashem’s name without purpose.

According to both approaches that I have presented, the statement, “This loaf of bread is konam to me”means that he has made a vow that the loaf of bread is prohibited for him to eat, just as he is prohibited from eating a korban.

May I appoint an agent to perform hataras nedarim for me?

No, one must ask the beis din directly to release himself from vows (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 228:16). If the members of the beis din do not understand the language that the nodeir speaks, they may use an interpreter to facilitate communication (Rema ad loc.).

There is one instance in which someone may make another person an agent to release nedarim. Sometimes, a husband may act as an agent for his wife to annul her nedarim. If a husband finds three people already gathered together – for example, they were performing hataras nedarim for him or for someone else – he may act as his wife’s agent to ask them to release her neder at the same time, if she appointed him to do so (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 234:56). However, he may not gather three people together to become a beis din for the purpose of hataras nedarim.

How does a woman perform hataras nedarim?

A woman who has a specific oath, vow, or practice from which she wishes release should arrange to perform hataras nedarim with a talmid chacham or beis din. As mentioned above, if she is married, she may ask her husband to be her agent to perform hataras nedarim, according to the instructions I wrote above (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 234:56).

Hataras nedarim on erev Rosh Hashanah

At this point, we can address Yankel’s question:

“When I attended a Gemara shiur on Nedarim, I got the impression that performing hataras nedarim requires having a talmid chacham deliberate over the specific neder, until he concludes that there are grounds to release the neder. This seems to have no relationship to what we do on Erev Rosh Hashanah.”

Indeed, Yankel’s question is valid: hataras nedarim requires mentioning specifically the vow that one desires to release, and the beis din must deliberate whether this particular neder can be revoked. Thus, it is unclear whether the generic hataras nedarim recited on Erev Rosh Hashanah, indeed, releases one from any commitments. The proper thing to do is to mention to an appropriate beis din every specific neder or practice for which one seeks annulment. What, then, is the purpose of hataras nedarim on Erev Rosh Hashanah.

Mesiras moda’ah

The Gemara mentions that a declaration at the beginning of the year that all vows one will make in the course of the year are invalid has some value. This declaration is called a mesiras moda’ah.The Gemara concludes that this statement has only limited value, and one should not intentionally rely upon it. In point of fact, the standard hataras nedarim procedure performed on Erev Rosh Hashanah includes a mesiras moda’ah.

Kol Nidrei

The rishonim dispute whether the purpose of Kol Nidrei that we recite at the beginning of our Yom Kippur service is also meant to be a form of hataras nedarim, performed at a time when virtually everyone is in shul to include the maximum number of people, or whether it is a mesiras modaah. It is for this reason that there are three different versions of the text: one that has Kol Nidrei refer to the past year’s declarations, which means that it is hataras nedarim; one that refers to the coming year’s declarations, which means that it is a mesiras modaah; and one that mentions both the past and the future years, which means that it is meant to accomplish both. From my experience, most congregations today follow the third approach.

There is another interesting difference in halachic practice that results from this last dispute: Should the congregation recite Kol Nidrei together with the chazzan? If it is a mesiras modaah, then one must declare it oneself, and each individual should read the Kol Nidrei together with the chazzan. On the other hand, if it is a form of hataras nedarim, then it should be declared by the chazzan, alone, accompanied by the two honored men alongside him who hold the sifrei Torah, so that they form a beis din that is annulling everyone’s nedarim. The Mishnah Berurah (619: 2) rules that we should consider it a mesiras modaah, and therefore concludes that each individual should recite Kol Nidrei softly along with the chazzan.

Conclusion

Now that we realize how serious our speech can be, we should reflect not only on the ideas of nedarim, but also on all the ramifications of our speech. As the pasuk (Mishlei 18:21) states, Ma’vess ve’chayim be’yad lashon – Life and death are controlled by our tongues!

My Vows I Shall Fulfill

Question #1: Quiz question

Can performing a mitzvah become a liability?

Question #2: Is this a “klutz question?”

What does it mean that I am doing something “bli neder”?

Question #3: A frum question

“My friend Billy Nader says bli neder on almost everything. Is this being too frum?

Answer:

What is a neder?

It is rather obvious why we are studying this topic this week – since Parshas Matos begins with the laws pertaining to vows.

Someone who recites a vow, an oath or a pledge is required to fulfill it (see Bamidbar 30:3). By virtue of the vow, oath or pledge, one creates a Torah obligation that he is otherwise not required to observe. For example, someone who declares that he will begin studying daf yomi every day is now obligated to do so, even on a day when it is inconvenient. Similarly, one who pledges tzedakah at yizkor or pledges a contribution to a shul upon receiving an aliyah becomes fully obligated, min haTorah, to pay the donation. In the case of a pledge to tzedakah¸ one must redeem it as soon as practical; otherwise, he risks violating an additional prohibition, bal te’acheir leshalmo, “Do not delay paying it” (see Devarim 23:22).

In general, one should be careful not to make vows or pledges. For one thing, one who does so has now created a stumbling block for himself, since he runs the risk that he will not observe his commitment (see Nedarim 20a, 22a). Furthermore, he has created an accusation against himself, for by committing to observe something that the Torah did not require, he implies that he is so skilled at observing mitzvos that he can add a few of his own. The satan can now level accusations against his occasional laxities in a much stronger fashion (see Nedarim 22a, based on Mishlei 20:25). (There are a few circumstances in which one is encouraged to make vows, but we will leave that topic for a different time.) For this reason, it is better not to pledge to contribute to tzedakah: if you have the money available, donate it; if it is not currently available, don’t pledge it! (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 203:4). It is very important that gaba’im be in the habit of declaring that people’s pledges are bli neder, and a similar wording should appear on pledge cards.

Different types of obligations

There are six main ways to create an obligation upon oneself, either to fulfill something or to abstain from doing something.

(1) Nedarim – vows

A neder – a vow, in which one declares that something otherwise permitted is now prohibited – such as declaring that certain foods are prohibited.

Example:

In her desire to keep to her diet, Yaffah states: “I am going to prohibit all chocolate on myself.” Yaffah has now created a neder, which prohibits her, min haTorah, from eating chocolate.

(2) Shevuos – oaths

A shevuah – an oath, in which one swears to fulfill or refrain from some activity – such as swearing that one will fast on a certain day, or that one will say Tehillim every day.

Example:

To repair his somewhat sloppy record at making it to minyan every morning, Shachar makes a shevuah that he will be in shul for shacharis for the next three days. Should he fail to make it to shacharis any of those days, he would be breaking his shevuah, which contravenes a Torah prohibition.

Whether a specific declaration constitutes a neder or a shevuah depends on halachic technicalities, usually contingent on how one makes the declaration. Several halachic differences result from whether someone made a neder or a shevuah, including that violating a shevuah is a more serious infraction (Ran, Nedarim 20a). Later in this article I will mention another important difference between them.

(3) Kabbalas mitzvah, declaring that one will perform a good deed

Someone who declares: I will arise early and study this chapter or that mesechta has declared a great vow to the G-d of Israel (Nedarim 8a). Someone who expresses these plans, intending to perform an exemplary act, has now obligated himself, even though he did not use the terms “vow,” “oath,” or “pledge” (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 213:2).

Example:

Asking others to say certain chapters of Tehillim can create a stumbling block. Specify that it is being done bli neder.

(4) Kabbalas tzedakah, intending to donate charity

In the specific instance of contributing tzedakah funds, even deciding to give tzedakah without verbalizing one’s intention creates an obligation to donate tzedakah (Rema, Yoreh Deah 259:13; see also Choshen Mishpat 212:8; based on Shevuos 26b).

(5) Performing a stringency

Someone who is aware that performing a certain hiddur in halacha is not obligatory, and begins to keep it with the intention of observing it regularly, becomes required to continue the practice as a form of vow. It becomes a binding obligation, requiring hataras nedarim, annulling vows – even if the individual fulfilled the practice only one time, and even if he did not declare that he intends to continue the practice (Nedarim 15a; Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 214:1).

Examples:

Someone who begins standing during kerias haTorah, intending to continue the practice, becomes obligated to do so, unless he specified that he is doing so bli neder. He should perform hataras nedarim at the first opportunity, so as to avoid violating the prohibition of abrogating observance of a vow. After performing hataras nedarim, he may continue the practice of standing during kerias haTorah, but should have in mind that he is doing it bli neder.

A woman began lighting a third Shabbos candle in her own home after her first child was born. This practice might now become an obligation. She then did so the first time she visited her parents’ house; most women who kindle more than two lights before Shabbos do so only in their own home, but kindle only two when they are guests in someone else’s home. She asked a shaylah whether she should have hataras nedarim on the practice of kindling a third light, and she was told to do so.

(6) Three times

Someone who performs a stringent practice three times without saying bli neder must continue to fulfill the hiddur, even if he had not planned to observe it always (Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 67:7).

Saying “bli neder

Should I not observe hiddurim? I want to do these mitzvos, but I certainly do not want to be punished if I fail to continue performing them! How do I avoid becoming obligated?

To avoid creating this commitment, someone expressing intent to perform a good deed should be careful to say that he/she is acting bli neder, without accepting it as an obligation (Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 67:4). Similarly, someone who begins practicing a halachic hiddur should say that he is not accepting it as an obligation.

Example:

Hadassah decides that she will eat only glatt kosher meat or will use only chalav Yisroel products, both meritorious activities. She should state that she is doing it “bli neder.”

Similarly, when pledging money during yizkor, while making a mishebeirach or making any other oral commitment to donate charity, one should be careful to say bli neder. When others are pledging to tzedakah and one feels pressured to participate, specify that the pledge is bli neder (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 257:4). It is still proper to donate the money, but stating that it is prevents bli neder a mishap should one forget or later be unable to do so.

Saying “bli neder” even for a non-mitzvah

Some authorities recommend saying bli neder on all one’s activities, even those that do not fulfill a mitzvah, so that the habit helps prevent one from inadvertently creating nedarim (Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 67:4).

Example:

Chavah tells her husband, “I am going to exercise class this morning, bli neder.” Although the statement that she plans to exercise does not create any obligation on her part, habituating herself to say bli neder is a good practice to develop.

We can now answer one of the questions asked above. “I have a friend who says bli neder on almost everything. Is this being too frum?” The answer is that your friend is being astutely cautious and following the advice of halachic authorities.

Don’t delay paying

In addition to the abovementioned concerns involved in pledging tzedakah, the Gemara rules that the mitzvah of bal te’achar, not to delay the donation of a korban, applies also to tzedakah (Rosh Hashanah 6a). This means that someone who pledges money to a charitable cause is required to pay the pledge as soon as he can.

To quote the Rambam: Tzedakah is included in the laws of vows. Therefore, someone saying, “I am obligated to provide a sela coin to tzedakah,” or, “This sela shall go to tzedakah,” must give it to poor people immediately. If he subsequently delays redeeming the pledge, he violates bal te’acher, since he could have given it immediately, as there are poor people around. If there are no poor people, he should set aside the money until he finds a poor person. However, if, at the time of his pledge, he specified that he is not intending to redeem the pledge until he locates a poor person, he is not required to set aside the money (Hilchos Matanos Aniyim 8:1).

Someone who declares that he will give tzedakah to a certain poor person is not required to give the money until he sees that person (Rema, Yoreh Deah 257:3). However, someone who pledged to contribute to destitute people, without qualifying which poor people he meant, is required to fulfill his pledge immediately (Mordechai, Bava Basra 491).

What is hataras nedarim?

Now that we realize that creating obligations is rather extensive, we want to find out, quickly, how to release ourselves from these vows.

Chazal derive from the Torah that one can be absolved from a vow, pledge or other such commitment, by a process called hataras nedarim. Hataras nedarim does not, in the slightest way, diminish the reward that one receives for the good deeds performed. It simply removes the continuing obligation to fulfill the vow from the individual who created that vow. Therefore, in the vast majority of circumstances, someone who made a neder should undergo hataras nedarim, so that he releases the obligation from himself and therefore does not violate the neder (see Nedarim 22a).

How does one undergo hataras nedarim?

The person who made the vow or other commitment goes to three Jewish men who understand the logic of halacha and know the basics of how hataras nedarim operates (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 228:1 and commentaries). These three form a type of ad hoc beis din for the purpose of releasing vows. One of the three should be a talmid chacham, proficient in the laws of hataras nedarim – and he should be knowledgeable concerning which vows one may not annul (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 228:14; Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 67:8).

The nodeir, the person who made the vow, shares with the three (or, at least, with the talmid chacham who is proficient in the laws of nedarim) the content of the vow, oath, or good practice from which he desires release and why he seeks relief. The talmid chacham asks the nodeir several questions that must be answered truthfully. The talmid chacham thereby determines whether there are valid grounds to release the nodeir from the commitment (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 228:14). Only a talmid chacham who understands the very complicated laws of vows should undertake hataras nedarim, because many details must be met for the hataras nedarim to be valid. (The details of what constitutes an adequate basis for hataras nedarim are beyond the scope of this article.)

Once the talmid chacham feels that there are adequate grounds for hataras nedarim, the beis din declares the neder or other commitment annulled by declaring, “mutar lach, mutar lach, mutar lach” – the activities prohibited by the vow are now permitted. Of course, in the case of a vow to do something, the words mutar lach mean the reverse – the person is no longer obligated to carry out the vow.

Someone who violated his vow prior to performing hataras nedarim has sinned, and is required to perform teshuvah for his or her infraction.

The difference between a neder and a shevuah

There is a halachic difference between performing hataras nedarim to release someone from the obligation he created with a neder, and performing hatarah after someone recited a shevuah. Whereas, in most instances, one should arrange to release someone from a neder, one annuls a shevuah only under extenuating circumstances (Rema, Yoreh Deah 203:3; Rambam end of Hilchos Shavuos). Explaining why this is so will need to wait for a future article.

When has a vow or an oath been created? We’ll discuss that in part 2 of this article.

How Not to Desecrate Shabbos

Question:

“I was once told that the mekosheish was a frum Jew who did not really desecrate Shabbos. What does this mean?”

Foreword:

The story of the mekosheish, the man caught gathering wood on Shabbos, in Parshas Shelach, contains a host of conflicting and unusual midrashim. The story also serves as a springboard for many halachic and hashkafic issues. In order to appreciate fully these issues and midrashim, we must first analyze what the Torah tells us about this story, what Chazal derive from the pesukim, and some more halachic detail that is germane to the story. Then we will be in a position to discuss the question raised above.

The words of the Chumash

“When the Bnei Yisroel were in the Desert, they discovered a man gathering wood on Shabbos. Those who found the woodgatherer brought him to Moshe, Aharon and the rest of the community, and he was placed in custody, because it had not been explained what to do with him” (Bamidbar 15:32-34). The posuk then describes the punishment meted out to the woodgatherer. This was the first instance in history of beis din, a Jewish court, carrying out a ruling because someone defiled Shabbos.

Desecration of Shabbos is punishable by beis din only when many requirements are met, including that the perpetrator acknowledges that he is violating one of the 39 melachos of Shabbos, and that he accepts the punishment that the Torah metes out. The Gemara (Sanhedrin 41a) notes that the words of the Torah they found him gathering implies that the woodgatherer was caught in the middle of his act of violating Shabbos, and he continued desecrating Shabbos even after being warned that his action was liable to punishment by beis din.

Which melacha?

When the Mishnah lists the 39 melachos (Shabbos 73a), it does not include “gathering wood.” Indeed, which of the 39 melachos of Shabbos did the woodgatherer violate? Since the halacha requires that the desecrator be warned which melacha he is violating (see Shabbos 138a), this is important information to ascertain.

The Gemara (Shabbos 96b) cites three opinions concerning which melacha the mekosheish performed. According to Rav Yehudah, he carried through a public area on Shabbos. According to a second opinion, he was chopping down trees, thus violating the melacha of kotzeir, reaping, or, more accurately, disconnecting growing items from the ground. According to a third opinion, he violated the melacha of me’ameir, gathering things from where they grow or fall. This third opinion is also cited in the ancient commentary on Chumash, usually, but inaccurately, called the Targum Yonasan. Each of these three approaches requires some explanation.

Hotza’ah

One violates carrying on Shabbos min haTorah by transporting an item from a reshus harabim, an area meant for public use, into a reshus hayachid, an enclosed area, or vice versa. Alternatively, one can violate carrying by transporting an item more than four amos (about seven feet) through a reshus harabim. There are other details that need to be met that we will not discuss in this article.

However, this presents us with a conundrum. Since a desert is not a public thoroughfare or marketplace, carrying there should not violate Shabbos min haTorah. Rather, it should have the halachic status called a karmelis, an open area not meant for public use, in which carrying on Shabbos is prohibited only because of rabbinic injunction, which would leave the mekosheish exempt from violating the Torah prohibition of carrying on Shabbos.

The explanation is found in the following passage of Gemara (Shabbos 6a-b):

What qualifies as a reshus harabim? A street, a large marketplace, or a side road that is open on both sides…. But why does the Tanna not include a desert, since a different beraisa states, “What qualifies as a reshus harabim? A street, a large marketplace, a side road or the desert.” Abaya explains that there is no contradiction between these two statements, the latter beraisa is discussing the era when the Jews were living in the desert, and the first statement is discussing today. In other words, although a desert is usually considered a karmelis, when a large population, such as the entire Jewish people, is living in a desert, it qualifies as a “public area” for Shabbos purposes. Once the desert path on which the Bnei Yisroel were traveling is considered a reshus harabim, every part of that desert is now considered a reshus harabim (Biur Halacha, 345:7). Therefore, when the mekosheish carried there, he was carrying in a reshus harabim and violating the laws of Shabbos min haTorah.

Kotzeir

A second opinion that we quoted above held that the mekosheish was chopping down trees and thereby performed the melacha of kotzeir, reaping. The Gemara explains that someone harvesting wood on Shabbos violates the melacha of kotzeir (Shabbos 73b). According to this approach, it is curious that the Torah describes the mekosheish as “gathering wood,” not as chopping down trees.

Me’ameir

The third opinion explained that the mekosheish violated me’ameir, the fourth of the 39 melachos, according to the order in the Mishnah. This melacha prohibits gathering together items from where they grow or fall naturally. The Rambam mentions cases of someone who gathered food, feed or kindling, and also mentions someone who created a figcake or strung together figs, as acts that violate me’ameir min haTorah. According to many early authorities, these last two cases refer only to someone who took figs from where they fell near the tree and pressed or strung them together (Kesef Mishneh, Hilchos Shabbos 8:6, quoting Remach; Semag). However, many authorities disagree (Ma’aseh Rokei’ach; Nishmas Adam 13:1; Graz 340:15; Mishnah Berurah 340:38, and Eglei Tal 2:3 ff.), contending that, in these instances, for reasons beyond the scope of this article, one can violate me’ameir even when the fruit is not in its original location.

By the way, since people are less familiar with the melacha of me’ameir, someone could violate the melacha without realizing. For example, someone who collects fallen fruit in an orchard on Shabbos and throws them into a basket violates the melacha min haTorah (Mishnah Berurah 340:37).

The Gemara quotes a dispute whether me’ameir applies min haTorah to someone who gathers sea salt from its evaporation pits. Rava (or Rabbah, depending on a variant text) contends that this violates Shabbos min haTorah, whereas Abaya disagrees, contending that me’ameir is limited to items that grow from the ground (Shabbos 73b). There is a dispute among rishonim concerning how we rule. The Rambam rules that me’ameir is limited to items that grow from the ground (Hilchos Shabbos 8:5), whereas the Remach rules that me’ameir applies even to items that do not grow from the ground. Most later authorities conclude like the Rambam (Kesef Mishneh; Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 340:9, Elya Rabbah, Graz and Mishnah Berurah; Chayei Adam 13:1; however, see Eglei Tal 2, who treats this matter as an unresolved dispute).

In conclusion, since lumber and kindling wood both grow from the ground, it is easy to understand that the mekosheish may have been violating the melacha of me’ameir by gathering fallen wood (Shabbos 96b).

We now understand the three opinions that the mekosheish may have been carrying in a reshus harabim, may have been cutting down trees, or may have been gathering fallen wood and violating the melacha of me’ameir. Now that we have discussed which melacha he violated, for a fuller understanding of the story we may want to attempt to identify who the mekosheish was!

Was he Tzelafchad?

The Torah (Bamidbar 27 1-7; 361-11) recounts the story of the daughters of Tzelafchad. Tzelafchad participated in the Exodus from Mitzrayim but did not make it to Eretz Yisroel. The posuk tells us that Tzelafchad left five daughters, but no sons. Rabbi Akiva, quoted in a passage of Gemara (Shabbos 99b), is of the opinion that the woodgatherer described above was Tzelafchad. To quote the passage of Gemara:

Our sages taught: The mekosheish was Tzelafchad, as the Torah says, And the Bnei Yisroel were in the Desert, and they found a man gathering wood on Shabbos,’ and later on it says, Our father died in the Desert. Just as the second verse refers to Tzelafchad, so does the first.’ This is the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Yehudah ben Beseira said to him, ‘Akiva, either way you will be punished for saying this. If you are correct, the Torah hid this information and you had the audacity to reveal it! And if you are incorrect, you are spreading lies about a tzadik!’”

Midrashim take sides

Our Gemara does not say explicitly whether Rabbi Yehudah ben Beseira agreed with Rabbi Akiva or not. His criticism of Rabbi Akiva was for recounting the information. However, there are many midrashim that weigh in on this issue, some agreeing with Rabbi Akiva, including the Zohar, whereas others dispute his claim. For example, we find the following statement in Sifrei Zuta (Bamidbar 15, 32): “Rabbi Shimon said, ‘It is impossible to say that the mekosheish was Tzelafchad.’

The Yalkut Shimoni, a collection of reliable early midrashim, many of them no longer extant anywhere else, quotes a different tanna who also disagrees with Rabbi Akiva (#749).

Response of Rabbi Akiva

Although the Gemara does not cite a response of Rabbi Akiva to Rabbi Yehudah ben Beseira’s criticism for revealing information that the Torah kept hidden, there is a Midrash that cites a very interesting approach, explaining more about Tzelafachad and what he wanted to accomplish. I will present this approach, as explained by the Maharsha — but first we need a rather extensive introduction.

Although Shabbos is a very strict mitzvah, the laws of Shabbos contain some very interesting rules. One of these rules is called melacha she’einah tzericha legufah, which translates literally as a work activity that is not necessary for itself, an expression that is almost meaningless in English. There are many different approaches how to explain this concept, variant ways to explain the words, and a dispute what the halachic status is, all of which combine to create a confusing discussion. I will endeavor to explain melacha she’einah tzericha legufah as it applies to our discussion.

To begin with, let us examine one of the approaches to explain the concept.

The 39 melachos of Shabbos are derived from the activities performed in the building of the Mishkan in the Desert. Notwithstanding the importance of constructing the Mishkan as quickly as possible, it was strictly prohibited to perform any aspect of its building on Shabbos. From this we see that whatever was necessary for building the Mishkan could not be done on Shabbos, and so we are being told, indirectly, what the Torah forbade on Shabbos.

Tosafos (Shabbos 94a s.v. Rabbi Shimon) explains melacha she’einah tzericha legufah that, not only do we derive the definitions of the 39 melachos from the construction of the Mishkan, but that the prohibition min haTorah includes only activities whose purpose is similar to the purpose for which this melacha activity was performed in the Mishkan. Here are some examples to clarify what Tosafos means.

One of the 39 melachos of Shabbos is gozeiz, shearing, which includes any act that removes something from a living creature. The construction of the Mishkan required obtaining wool, which requires shearing it off sheep; this is a classic example of gozeiz. In this instance, the purpose of the shearing is to obtain usable material that is removed from the creature.

The question we will now ask is whether the melacha is violated min haTorah when gozeiz is performed not for the purpose of using the material that is removed. For example, when someone receives a haircut or clips his nails, he is removing something from a living creature, but he is not interested in the hair (with the exception of someone harvesting hair to sell for wig manufacture) or the nails. Is having a haircut or trimming nails prohibited min haTorah on Shabbos under the heading of gozeiz, or is it prohibited only miderabbanan, and the Torah prohibition of gozeiz is violated only when someone “shears” something that is usable, such as wool or hair suitable for wig manufacture?

According to Tosafos, this is the question of melacha she’einah tzericha legufah, which, the Gemara teaches, is the subject of a dispute among tanna’im. According to Rabbi Shimon, trimming hair or cutting nails is prohibited only as a rabbinic prohibition, since we do not use the trimmed items (Tosafos, Shabbos 94b s.v. aval). The disputing tanna, Rabbi Yehudah, rules that someone who performs a melacha she’einah tzericha legufah on Shabbos is culpable min haTorah. In his opinion, the fact that we do not use the trimmed nails or hair is irrelevant in defining the act as a melacha, as long as the results of the melacha are positive. In this instance, because of asthetic reasons the trimmed nails or hair is a desired outcome. Therefore, these acts violate Shabbos min haTorah, notwithstanding that one’s purpose was qualitatively different from the goal of this melacha in the construction of the Mishkan.

Here is another example of melacha she’einah tzericha legufah: Digging a hole in the ground only because someone needs the earth, but he has no need for the hole. The plowing performed in the building of the Mishkan was in order to plant, whereas digging a hole to obtain earth is qualitatively different from why this melacha was performed for the purpose of building the Mishkan. Therefore, this act qualifies as a melacha she’einah tzericha legufah, and it is exempt from desecrating Shabbos min haTorah according to Rabbi Shimon.

Among the rishonim, we find many other approaches to explain the concept of melacha she’einah tzericha legufah, but for clarity’s sake, we will limit our discussion to the approach of Tosafos.

Returning to the mekosheish

What does the purpose for which we do a melacha have to do with the mekosheish?

Based on his analysis of a midrash, the Maharsha (Commentary to Bava Basra 119a) explains that the mekosheish’s goal was not to perform the melacha, but to become an educational tool.The punishment he would receive for violating Shabbos would teach the Bnei Yisroel the stringency of observing Shabbos. Since he was not interested in the results of his melacha activities, they had the halachic category of melacha she’einah tzericha legufah. According to the authorities who rule that melacha she’einah tzericha legufah is not a Torah violation, the mekosheish never desecrated Shabbos, but instead was creating greater respect for Shabbos. Thus, the answer to the question posed to Rabbi Akiva — how could you reveal negative information about a tzadik — is that the mekosheish was not doing an aveirah, but a mitzvah!

We should note that, even if Tzelafchad was permitted to perform the specific melacha activity that he did, we would not be permitted to perform this activity because it is now prohibited by a rabbinic injunction. This prohibition had not yet been created in the days of Tzelafchad.

Why was he punished?

If, according to the Maharsha, Tzelafchad had technically not violated Shabbos, why was he punished by the beis din as if he had?

The Maharsha explains that since his thoughts of educating Bnei Yisroel were not known, the witnesses and the beis din dealt only with his actions, which is exactly what Tzelafchad wanted.

Thus, we can answer our opening question: “I was once told that the mekosheish was a frum Jew who did not really desecrate Shabbos. What does this mean?”

The answer is that, according to the approach suggested by the Maharsha, the mekosheish was a good guy, whose goal was to strengthen the commitment of Klal Yisroel to the observance of Shabbos, a mission that he accomplished. According to this suggestion, we can readily understand how he fathered such exemplary daughters.

Conclusion

Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch (Shemos 20:10) notes that people mistakenly think that work is prohibited on Shabbos in order to provide a day of rest. This is incorrect, he points out, because the Torah does not prohibit doing avodah, which connotes hard work, but melacha, which implies purpose and accomplishment. On Shabbos, we refrain from constructing and altering the world for our own purposes. The goal of Shabbos is to emphasize Hashem’s rule as the focus of creation by refraining from our own creative acts (Shemos 20:11). Understanding that the goal of our actions affects whether a melacha activity has been performed demonstrates even more so the concepts of purpose and accomplishment.

Waiting for Twelve Months

The end of parshas Balak includes a reference to the laws of kashrus:

Question #1: Sentimental China

“A family is in the process of kashering their home for the first time, and they own an expensive and sentimental, but treif, set of china. Is there any way that they can avoid throwing it away?”

Question #2: No Bologna

“I own an expensive set of fleishig china that I do not use, and, frankly, I desperately need money for other things now. Someone is interested in paying top price for this set because it matches their milchig china. Is there any way I can kasher it and sell it to them, and they may use it for milchig?”

Question #3: Hungary on Pesach

“Help! I just completed cooking the seudos for the first days of Pesach, and I realize now that I used a pot that was used once, more than two years ago, for chometz. Do I have to throw out all the food I made? I have no idea when I am going to have time to make the seudos again!”

Introduction:

Every one of the she’eilos mentioned above shows up in one of the classic works of responsa that I will be quoting in the course of this article. They all touch on the status of food equipment that has not been used for twelve months. In order to have more information with which to understand this topic, I must first introduce some halachic background.

When food is cooked in a pot or other equipment, halacha assumes that some “taste,” of the food remains in the walls of the pot, even after the pot has been scrubbed completely clean. We are concerned that this will add flavor to the food cooked subsequently in that pot. This is the basis for requiring that we kasher treif pots, because the kashering process removes the residual taste.

Until the pot is kashered

Once twenty-four hours have passed since the food was cooked, the residual taste in the vessel spoils and is now categorized as nosein taam lifgam, a halachic term meaning thatthe taste that remains is unpleasant. Something is considered nosein taam lifgam even if it is only mildly distasteful.

The Gemara (Avodah Zarah 67b) cites a dispute between tana’im whether nosein taam lifgam is permitted or prohibited. The Mishnah (Avodah Zarah 65b) rules that nosein taam lifgam is permitted. This is the conclusion of the Gemara in several places (Avodah Zarah 36a, 38b, 39b, 65b, 67b) and also the conclusion of the halachic authorities (Rambam, Hilchos Ma’achalos Asuros 17:2; Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 103:5; 122:6). This means that, although it is prohibited to eat a food that includes a pleasant taste or residue of non-kosher, when the non-kosher food provides a less than appetizing flavor, the food is permitted.

Here is an example that bears out this rule. Glycerin (sometimes called glycerol), which is frequently manufactured from non-kosher animal fat, is often used as an ingredient in foods because, in addition to its other properties, it also adds a sweet flavor to the product. Therefore, when non-kosher glycerin is used in an otherwise kosher product, as I once found in a donut glaze, the product — in this case the donuts — are non-kosher.

On the other hand, if the ingredient adds an unpleasant taste, the finished product remains kosher.

Treif pots

Because of the halachic conclusion that nosein taam lifgam is permitted, min haTorah one would be allowed to use a treif pot once twenty-four hours have passed since it was last used. As mentioned above, at this point the absorbed flavor is considered spoiled, nosein taam lifgam. The reason that we are required to kasher equipment that contains nosein taam lifgam is because of a rabbinic injunction. This is because of concern that someone might forget and cook with a pot that was used the same day for treif, which might result in the consumption of prohibited food (Avodah Zarah 75b).

Chometz is exceptional

The above discussion regarding the rules of nosein taam lifgam is true regarding use of a pot in which non-kosher food was cooked. However, regarding chometz, the prohibition is stricter. Ashkenazim rule that nosein taam lifgam is prohibited in regard to Pesach products. Why is the halacha stricter regarding Pesach? Nosein taam lifgam still qualifies as a remnant of non-kosher food; it is permitted because it does not render a positive taste. However, regarding Pesach, we rule that even a minuscule percentage of chometz is prohibited. Thus, if a chometzdik pot was used to cook on Pesach, even in error, the food is prohibited.

Fleishig to milchig

The rules governing the use of fleishig equipment that was used for milchig and vice versa are similar to the rules that apply to treif equipment, and not the stricter rules that apply to chometzdik equipment used on Pesach. Someone who cooks or heats meat and dairy in the same vessel, on the same day, creates a prohibited mix of meat and milk. If the fleishig equipment had not been used the same day for meat, the meat flavor imparted to the dairy product is nosein taam lifgam. Although the pot must be kashered, since it now contains both milk and meat residue, the dairy food cooked in it remains kosher (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 93:1). The same is true regarding dairy equipment used to prepare fleishig.

Kashering from fleishig to milchig

Although non-kosher equipment can usually be kashered to make it kosher, and chometzdik equipment can usually be kashered to make it kosher for Passover, there is a longstanding custom not to kasher fleishig equipment to use as milchig, and vice versa (Magen Avraham 509:11). The reason for this custom is because if a person regularly koshers his pots or other equipment from milchig to fleishig and back again, he will eventually make a mistake and use them for the wrong type of food without kashering them first (Shu’t Igros Moshe, Yoreh Deah 1:43). By the way, it is accepted that someone who kashered their fleishig pot for Pesach may now decide to use it for milchig and vice versa.

Earthenware

We need one more piece of information before we begin to discuss the laws of equipment that has not been used for twelve months. That is to note that there is equipment that cannot usually be kashered. The Gemara teaches that we cannot kasher earthenware equipment, since once the non-kosher residue is absorbed into its walls, it will never come out. (Some authorities permit kashering earthenware or china, which is halachically similar, three times, although this heter is not usually relied upon. A discussion on this point will need to be left for a different time.)

Twelve months

Now that we have had an introduction, we can discuss whether anything changes twelve months after food was cooked. Chazal created a prohibition, called stam yeinam, which prohibits consumption, and, at times, even use, of wine and grape juice produced by a non-Jew. Halachically, there is no difference between wine and grape juice. Notwithstanding the prohibition against using equipment that was once used for non-kosher, we find a leniency that equipment used to produce non-kosher wine may be used after twelve months have transpired. The equipment used by a gentile to crush the juice out of the grapes, or to store the wine or grape juice is also prohibited. This means that we must assume that this equipment still contains taste of the prohibited grape juice.

The Gemara (Avodah Zarah 34a) rules that the grape skins, seeds and sediment left over after a gentile crushed out the juice are prohibited both for consumption and for benefit. This is because non-kosher grape juice is absorbed into the skins, seeds and sediment. However, after they have been allowed to dry for twelve months, whatever non-kosher taste was left in the skins, seeds and sediment are gone, and it is permitted to use and even eat them. Similarly, once twelve months have transpired since last use, the equipment used to process or store the non-kosher juice also becomes permitted. Thus, the Gemara rules that the jugs, flasks and earthenware vessels used to store non-kosher wine are prohibited for twelve months, but may be used once twelve months have elapsed since their last use. The conclusions of this Gemara are codified in the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 135:16). The process of allowing twelve months to transpire and then permit the leftovers is called yishun.

Several common products are permitted because of this halacha. One example is a wine derivative called tartaric acid, an organic compound with many practical usages. Among its food uses is in beverages, as a flavor enhancer and as baking powder. It is commonly considered kosher, notwithstanding that it is a by-product of non-kosher wine. (It should have a hechsher since it can be produced in ways that are non-kosher.)

It is important to note that this method of kashering, i.e., of waiting twelve months, is mentioned in the Gemara only with reference to kashering after the use of non-kosher wine. The halachic authorities debate whether this method of kashering may be used regarding other prohibitions, and this is the starting point for us to address our opening questions.

Hungry on Pesach

“Help! I just completed cooking the seudos for the first days of Pesach, and I realize now that I used a pot that was used once, more than two years ago, for chometz. Do I have to throw out all the food I made? I have no idea when I am going to have time to make the seudos again!” It would seem that there is no hope for this hardworking housewife, and indeed all her efforts are for naught. However, let us examine an actual case and discover that not everyone agrees.

A very prominent eighteenth-century halachic authority, the Chacham Tzvi, was asked this question: On Pesach, someone mistakenly cooked food in a pot that had been used once, two years before, for chometz. Since Ashkenazim rule that even nosein taam lifgam is prohibited on Pesach, it would seem that the food cooked on Pesach in this pot is prohibited, and this was indeed what some of those involved assumed. However, the Chacham Tzvi contended that the food cooked in this pot is permitted, because he drew a distinction between nosein taam lifgam after 24 hours, and yishun after 12 months. He notes that grape juice absorbed into the vessels or the remaining seeds and skins is prohibited, even for benefit, for up to 12 months, yet after 12 months it becomes permitted. Thus, we see that even the actual wine becomes permitted, because after twelve months it dries out completely and there is no residual taste. It must certainly be true, reasons the Chacham Tzvi, that chometz flavor absorbed into a pot or other vessel must completely dissipate by twelve months after use and that no residual taste is left (Shu’t Chacham Tzvi #75, 80; cited by Pischei Teshuvah, Yoreh Deah 122:3).

Notwithstanding this reasoning, the Chacham Tzvi did not permit using treif equipment without kashering it, even when twelve months transpired since its last use. He explains that since Chazal prohibited use of treif equipment even when the product now being manufactured will be kosher, no distinction was made whether more than a year transpired since its last use — in all instances, one must kasher the vessel before use and not rely on the yishun that transpires after twelve months. However, after the fact, the Chacham Tzvi permitted the food prepared by Mrs. Hardworking in a pot that had been used for chometz more than twelve months before.

Aged vessels

About a century after the Chacham Tzvi penned his responsum, we find a debate among halachic authorities that will be germane to a different one of our opening questions.

Someone purchased non-kosher earthenware vessels that had not been used for twelve months. He would suffer major financial loss if he could not use them or sell them to someone Jewish. Rav Michel, the rav of Lifna, felt that the Jewish purchaser could follow a lenient approach and use the vessels on the basis of the fact that, after twelve months, no prohibited residue remains in the dishes. However, Rav Michel did not want to assume responsibility for the ruling without discussing it with the renowned sage, Rabbi Akiva Eiger (Shu’t Rabbi Akiva Eiger 1:43).

Rabbi Akiva Eiger rejected this approach. First of all, he noted that the Chacham Tzvi, himself, did not permit cooking in vessels aged twelve months since last use, only permitting the product that was cooked in those pots.

Secondly, Rabbi Akiva Eiger disputed the Chacham Tzvi’s approach that the concept of yishun applies to anything other than wine. Rabbi Akiva Eiger writes that, among the rishonim, he found the following explanation of yishun: The Rashba writes that the concept of yishun applies only to wine vessels, and the reason is because no remnant of the wine is left since it has dried out (Shu’t Harashba 1:575). Rabbi Akiva Eiger writes that the only other rishon he found who explained how yishun works also held the same as the Rashba. This means that the kashering method known as yishun applies only for non-kosher wine, but to no other prohibitions. Since Rabbi Akiva Eiger found no rishon who agreed with the Chacham Tzvi, he was unwilling to accept this heter. In his opinion, the food cooked on Pesach by Mrs. Hardworking is chometzdik and must be discarded.

Sentimental china

At this point, let us examine a different one of our opening questions:

“A family is in the process of kashering their home for the first time, and they own an expensive, but treif, set of china. Is there anyway that they can avoid throwing it away?”

Rav Moshe Feinstein was asked this exact question (Shu’t Igros Moshe, Yoreh Deah 2:46). Rabbi Shmuel Weller, a rav in Fort Wayne, Indiana, asked Rav Moshe about a family that, under his influence, had recently decided to keep kosher. The question is that they have an expensive set of porcelain dishes that they have not used for over a year and they do not want to throw it away. Is there any method whereby they may still use it? Rav Moshe writes that, because of the principle of takanas hashavim — which means that to encourage people who want to do teshuvah we are lenient in halachic rules — one could be lenient. The idea is that although Chazal prohibited use of an eino ben yomo, they prohibited it only because there is still residual flavor in the vessel, although the flavor is permitted. Once twelve months have passed, the Chacham Tzvi held that there is no residual flavor left at all. Although the Chacham Tzvi, himself, prohibited the vessels for a different reason, Rav Moshe contends that there is a basis for a heter. (See also Shu’t Noda Biyehudah, Yoreh Deah 2:51.)

Rav Moshe notes that there are other reasons that one could apply to permit kashering this china, and he therefore rules that one may permit the use of the china by kashering it three times. Because of space considerations, the other reasons, as well as the explanation why kashering three times helps, will have to be left for a different time.

No bologna

At this point, let us refer again to a different one of our opening questions: “I own an expensive set of fleishig china that I do not use, and, frankly, I desperately need money for other things now. Someone is interested in paying top price for this set because it matches their milchig china. Is there anyway I can kasher it and sell it to them, and they may use it for milchig?”

This question presents two problems:

(1) Is there any way to remove the residual fleishig flavor and kasher the china?

(2) Is it permitted to kasher anything from fleishig to milchig?

In a responsum to Rav Zelig Portman, Rav Moshe Feinstein (Shu’t Igros Moshe, Yoreh Deah 1:43) discusses this question.

We will take these two questions in reverse order. As I mentioned earlier, the Magen Avraham (509:11) reports that there is an accepted minhag not to kasher fleishig equipment in order to use it for milchig, and vice versa. Wouldn’t changing the use of this china violate the minhag?

Rav Moshe explains that the reason for this minhag is to avoid someone using the same pot, or other equipment, all the time by simply kashering it every time he needs to switch from milchig to fleishig. The obvious problem is that, eventually, he will make a mistake and forget to kasher the piece of equipment before using it.

Rav Moshe therefore suggests that the custom of the Magen Avraham applies only to a person who actually used the equipment for fleishig; this person may not kasher it to use for milchig. However, someone who never used it for fleishig would not be included in the minhag.

Regarding the first question, Rav Moshe concludes that, since twelve months have passed since the china was last used for fleishig, one may kasher it.

Conclusion

The Gemara teaches that the rabbinic laws are dearer to Hashem than are the laws of the Written Torah. In this context, we understand that Chazal established many rules to protect the Jewish people from violating the Torah’s laws of kashrus. This article has served as an introduction to one aspect of the laws of kashrus that relates to utensils. Not only is the food that a Jew eats required to be given special care, but also the equipment with which he prepares that food. We should always hope and pray that the food we eat fulfills all the halachos that the Torah commands us.

The Tumah of Utensils

Since the beginning of this week’s parsha is all about the laws of tumah and taharah, we will be studying these laws in preparation for the arrival of the Moshiach!

Question #1: Slingshots like Tefillin?!?

How are slingshots like Tefillin?

Question #2: Sack or sock?

What is the difference between a sack and a sock?

Question #3: Very earthy

How is an earthenware oven different from other earthenware utensils?

Introduction:

Since, unfortunately, our Beis Hamikdash still lies in ruins, the laws of tumah and taharah do not affect our daily lives significantly. As a result, many people do not approach the study of these laws enthusiastically, and do not pay adequate attention to the Torah readings when they concern this topic. Yet, our prayers for Moshiach to come at any moment require us to be fully knowledgeable of the laws of tumah and taharah, so that we are prepared to observe them.

Some tumah basics

Someone who becomes tamei may not enter the Beis Hamikdash or consume terumah, ma’aser sheini, bikkurim, kodoshim or any other foods that have sanctity.

The following passage of the Torah in parshas Shemini mentions eleven different categories of the laws of tumah, which are numbered in the selection below to facilitate explaining them afterward. The Torah writes:

Among animals that walk on all fours (1), anything that walks upon its forepaws is impure (tamei). Whoever touches the carcass of such an animal will be tamei until evening. And whoever carries their carcass must wash his clothes, and he is tamei until evening, because these animals are tamei for you.

And the following creatures that creep on the ground (2) are tamei for you: The weasel, the mouse, and the various species of toad; also, the hedgehog, the ko’ach, the lizard, the snail and the mole. These are tamei to you, among all the creeping animals – whoever touches them after they are dead will be tamei, until evening. And anything that falls upon them after they are dead will become tamei, whether it is a wooden vessel (3) or a garment (4) or leather (5) or sackcloth (6) – any vessel with which work is performed (7). It must be immersed in water, and then it remains tamei until evening, at which point it becomes tahor.

Furthermore, any part of them (that is, the eight tamei “creeping creatures”) that will fall inside any earthenware vessel (8), whatever is inside it will become tamei and you shall break it (that is,the earthenware vessel). And any edible food (9) that had water touch it can become tamei. Similarly, any liquid (10) that can be drunk will become tamei, if inside such a vessel. Furthermore, anything on which part of a carcass falls will become tamei. An oven or stove (11) should be destroyed, because they are tamei, and when you use them, they will be tamei (Vayikra 11:27-35).

The Torah described many different types of tumah (spiritual contamination). In a previous article on this topic, I explained the laws of neveilah and sheretz (numbers 1 and 2 above).

Utensils that become tamei

Returning to our passage, after mentioning the tumah of neveilah and sheretz, the Torah lists nine categories of items that become tamei from contact with neveilah or sheretz. The specific items mentioned are: (3) wooden vessels, (4) garments, (5) leather items, (6) sackcloth, (7) vessels described by a not-easily-understood clause, “any vessel with which work is performed,” (8) earthenware, (9) food, (10) beverages and (11) ovens and stoves. Each of these categories has its own specific laws, which are hinted at in the pasuk. For reasons that will soon become obvious, I will divide this list into three groups. The first group consists of the first five items, which I will call, collectively, “immersible utensils.”

(3) Wooden utensils

Wooden vessels have the potential to become tamei if they can hold liquid (called a beis kibul) or when people use them and place items on them, such as a table (Rambam, Hilchos Keilim 4:1). These ideas are suggested by the Torah when it describes wooden items that can become tamei as “vessels” (keilim).

(4-5) Garments and leather

All types of garments are susceptible to tumah, although there is a dispute among late authorities concerning whether synthetic fabrics can become tamei.

(6) Sack

Yes, I wrote sack, not sock. Sackcloth means something manufactured from woven goat’s hair or animal hair, such as from the tail hair of cows (Sifra). In general, goat hair is too coarse to use as clothing, but it was used in earlier generations as a bag or sack for storage or transportation, similar to the way we use burlap today. (Some varieties of goat produce extremely fine wool used for garments, such as cashmere and mohair, but most goats do not.)

(7) From slingshots to tefillin

The Torah mentions that any vessel with which work is performed can become tamei from a sheretz. What is included in this category? The Sifra, the halachic midrash on the book of Vayikra that dates back to the era of the tanna’im, explains that this verse teaches that the following three items become tamei: The sling of a slingshot, tefillin, and a pouch in which one places an amulet.

What do slingshots have in common with tefillin?

These three items contain a beis kibul, a receptacle to hold something, yet some might mistakenly think that they do not qualify as “vessels.” The Torah is teaching that these are considered receptacles, or “vessels,” able to become tamei. In the case of the sling, it is meant to hold a marble, stone or other projectile, albeit for a very brief period of time. In the case of tefillin, this is because the batim of the tefillin contain the parshi’os, and, similarly, in the case of an amulet.

(8) Earthenware

Note that I have separated earthenware and not included it under the same category as the other utensils. This is because earthenware has many halachic differences, some lenient and some stringent, from all other utensils.

All other utensils fall under one of two categories:

(A) Utensils that do not become tamei, which is a topic we are not discussing in this article. An example of this is vessels manufactured from stone. By the way, this explains why excavations in the old city and other areas around Israel have found many vessels and utensils made of stone. Since these items are not susceptible to tumah, kohanim who needed to be concerned not to make their terumah and challah tamei often used stone vessels that could not become tamei.

(B) Utensils that do become tamei but can become tahor again by immersion in a mikveh or spring. This latter categoryis called klei shetef, literally, immersible utensils.

How is earthenware different?

(C) Earthenware vessels fall under a third category, because once they become tamei, the only way they can become tahor again is by being broken. Immersing them in a mikveh or spring does not make them tahor.

There are also several other ways whereby halacha treats earthenware vessels differently than it treats immersible utensils. The section of the Torah quoted above alludes to four of the ways that earthenware vessels are different.

Contaminate from outside

(I) Immersible utensils become contaminated when they come in contact with neveilah, sheretz or other tamei sources, regardless whether they are touched on their internal surface or on their outside. However, if something tamei touched the outside of an earthenware vessel, it remains tahor. An earthenware vessel contracts tumah only from its inside, and only when it has a beis kibul – an area that can serve as a “container” to hold liquid. As a result, a flat earthenware board or an earthenware fork cannot become tamei, since it has no “inside” that holds liquid.

Immersion does not help

(II) As mentioned above, another way that earthenware vessels are different from other utensils is that, once they become tamei, there is no means of making them tahor again, other than breaking them.

Airspace

(III) A third way that earthenware vessels are different from other utensils is that they become tamei if a tamei source, such as a sheretz or neveilah, is suspended within the airspace of the earthenware vessel, even if the sheretz or neveilah does not touch the vessel. Halachically, there is no difference between touching the airspace of an earthenware vessel and touching it on the inside – either way makes the earthenware vessel tamei.

Contaminating from within

(IV) A fourth way that earthenware vessels are different from other utensils is that a tamei earthenware vessel spreads tumah to any food or beverage that is inside the vessel, even if the food or beverage never actually touched the vessel.

These four laws regarding earthenware vessels are all taught in a few words in the pasuk mentioned above: Furthermore, any part of them [the eight tamei creatures] that will fall inside any earthenware vessel, whatever is inside it will become tamei and you shall break it [the earthenware vessel].

The Torah mentions that an earthenware vessel contracts tumah only when something falls inside it, and does not say that the tamei substance must actually touch the earthenware vessel. Also, note that any food or beverage inside the earthenware vessel becomes tamei, even if it did not touch the earthenware vessel, but is suspended inside it. And, lastly, upon becoming tamei, the Torah mentions only one solution for the earthenware vessel: breaking it. There is no other way to make it tahor.

(11) Ovens and stoves

Let us return to the final pasuk quoted above, which discusses a special type of earthenware vessel: Anything on which part of a carcass falls will become tamei. An oven or stove should be destroyed, because they are tamei, and when you use them, they will be tamei.

The ovens of the era of the Torah and Chazal were made of earthenware. Their shape was tubular, meaning that they were completely open on top and bottom. The open bottom was placed over a hollow in the ground, and then the outside of the oven was lined with mud or clay to insulate it well. Fuel was placed in the hollow inside the oven and kindled by means of an opening in the side. The food being cooked or baked was placed inside, either through this opening or through an opening at the top. When these ovens were used as stoves, pots of food were placed on the open top. When they were used as ovens, the open top was covered, usually with a piece of earthenware.

I explain these facts not for anthropological documentation, but so that we can better understand both the pasuk of the Torah and the halacha. Although ovens and stoves were made of earthenware, the Torah mentions them as a different category. This is because other earthenware vessels become tamei only when they have a beis kibul, a receptacle. Under this definition, earthenware ovens and stoves should not become tamei, since they have no bottom. The Torah teaches that ovens and stoves are susceptible to tumah, and have the rules of other earthenware vessels, despite the fact that they have no beis kibul.

There are halachic ramifications to this distinction, but we will not discuss that in this article. The intrepid reader is referred to a halachic discussion in Ohalos 12:1, and the commentaries thereon.

Conclusion

This article and one I sent out for parshas Shemini have served to introduce some of the basic rules of tumah and taharah; this one, as these laws relate to utensils. We hope and pray to be able to observe all of these laws soon.

Can There Be Smoke without a Fire?

In parshas Korach, 250 men burnt ketores and paid with their lives.

Question #1: Frankfurters on the Blech

May I place cold frankfurters on top of a hot pot to warm them on Shabbos?”

Question #2: Cheese Dogs

“May one derive benefit from a cheese dog, which is a grilled hot dog with added cheese and chili sauce?”

Question #3: Lox for Eruv Tavshillin?

“I will be traveling overseas for Yom Tov and Shabbos, and it will be difficult for me to have cooked food ready for an eruv tavshillin. May I use lox as my eruv tavshillin?”

Foreword

Our  opening questions are germane to whether “smoking” qualifies as “cooking,” for halachic purposes. As we will see shortly, the Gemara and halachic authorities discuss several situations affected by this question, with ramifications for the laws of Shabbos, kashrus and eruv tavshillin. Let us begin by understanding some background information.

In general, we are familiar with two very common methods of preparing food using heat. In one instance, the food is cooked directly by the heat, without any medium. This is what we do when we barbecue, broil, or bake. The food is cooked or baked directly by the heat. On the other hand, when we boil or fry food, we cook it in a hot liquid — when boiling, usually in water, and when frying, in oil.

There are also many methods of making raw food edible without heat, such as salting, pickling or marinating. Preparing food this way causes the flavors of the different ingredients to blend together, which halacha calls beli’ah. Therefore, should one ingredient be non-kosher, the entire food will become non-kosher. However, there are halachic ramifications to the fact that these methods of food preparation are not considered “cooking.” Even though salting and pickling food make it edible, the food is not considered cooked.Therefore, germane to the laws of Shabbos, one will not be able to heat up smoked food, using methods permitted to warm food on Shabbos. For example, although it is permitted to heat food that is already cooked by placing it atop a pot which is, itself, on top of a fire or blech, one may not heat up deli this way on Shabbos, when it has been pickled, but not cooked, which is usually the case.

Several types of smoking

In contemporary use, the term “smoked” may refer to several different ways of preparing food, with variant halachic ramifications. Here are three methods:

Hot smoke

Frankfurters and many other sausages are “cooked” in hot smoke, in an appliance sometimes called a smoker. Rather than being cooked directly by the fire, or by water that is heated by a fire, these foods are cooked by hot smoke. This is also the usual way in which raw salmon is made into lox. The question we will be discussing in our article is whether this is halachically equivalent to cooking in water, oil or other liquid. There are many halachic ramifications to the question. Unless specified otherwise, our article is discussing this type of smoking, in which smoke is doing the actual cooking (see Perisha, Yoreh Deah 87:9).

Cured food

In this type of “smoking,” wood is burned inside a sealed room, usually called a “smokehouse.” The food to be preserved and processed is placed inside the smokehouse for several days, or perhaps even weeks, while the smoke, now cool, cures and provides the food with a smoky flavor. Since the food production in this instance takes place in room temperature smoke, this process should not be considered either “cooking” or beli’ah. However, there is one late authority who considers this method of producing food to be similar to cooking (Chadrei Deah, quoted by Badei Hashulchan, Biurim 87:6 s.v. Ha’me’ushan). For the rest of this article, I will not take this opinion under consideration, since it is not within mainstream accepted halacha.

Regarding the laws of Shabbos, food smoked this way is certainly considered to be uncooked.

Smoke flavored

A third method of smoking is when food is prepared by steaming, cooking or broiling, and a natural or artificial ingredient called smoke flavor is added to provide smoke taste. If the food was prepared by being cooked or broiled, it is considered cooked for halachic purposes. If the food was prepared by being “steamed,” a process similar to the first method of smoking mentioned above, the halachic issue is more complicated. The halachic question is whether cooking in steam and cooking in smoke are identical, or, perhaps, cooking in steam is like cooking in water. I will leave that aspect of this topic for a future article.

Smoking on Shabbos!

At this point, I will explain some of the halachic issues affected by the question as to whether smoking food is the same as cooking. One of the 39 melachos prohibited on Shabbos is mevasheil, cooking, or, in the words of the Mishnah (Shabbos 73a), ofeh, baking. This melacha involves preparing food with heat (Rambam, Hilchos Shabbos 9:1-5). One of the questions that the Gemara discusses is whether smoking food on Shabbos is considered a violation of the melacha of cooking on Shabbos min haTorah, and another issue is whether smoked food is considered cooked.

Here is one application of this issue: Once dry food has been completely cooked, such as baked or barbecued chicken or a kugel, there is no Torah violation in heating it on Shabbos. (There often may be rabbinic violations involved, but there are ways of warming cooked food on Shabbos that are permitted. We have discussed that topic in the past.) However, heating uncooked food on Shabbos usually involves a melacha min haTorah. The question we are raising is whether food that has been smoked, such as lox or hot dogs, is considered as cooked regarding the laws of warming food on Shabbos. If it is, then there are more options available to warm them on Shabbos.

Smoking meat and milk

A second area of halacha where this question – whether smoking constitutes cooking – is germane, is the prohibition of eating dairy and meat foods cooked together, basar becholov. Although we are prohibited from eating meat and milk together even when both are cold, or even from eating dairy after consuming meat, these prohibitions are only miderabbanan. The prohibition is violated min haTorah by cooking meat and dairy together or by eating meat and dairy that were previously cooked together. The question that we will tackle is whether smoking meat and dairy together is prohibited min haTorah or only miderabbanan.

There is a halachic difference that depends on whether preparing a meat and dairy mixture is prohibited miderabbanan or min haTorah. The prohibition against benefitting from meat and milk applies only when one violated the law min haTorah, but not when one violated it miderabbanan (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 87:3 and commentaries). Therefore, if meat and dairy were mixed together when cold, there is no prohibition in getting benefit from the resultant product, even though it may not be eaten. For this reason, selling pet food does not violate the law of benefiting from basar becholov, even when it contains both meat and dairy products, since the two are not cooked together, but blended together at room temperature.

The question germane to our discussion is whether a Jew may benefit from a meat and dairy product that was smoked together. For example, if someone smoked a raw frankfurter together with cheese, is it prohibited min haTorah, and for this reason one may not have benefit from it min haTorah, or not?

Bishul akum

Here is another kashrus application in which it will make a difference whether smoking is considered cooking or not. Chazal prohibited eating food cooked by a non-Jew, even when all the ingredients are kosher, unless the food is edible raw or would not be served on a royal table. Is smoking considered “cooking” germane to this prohibition, or not? This means that, if a non-Jew smoked food that is inedible raw, is it prohibited because of bishul akum? A practical difference is whether a hechsher on hot dogs must make sure that a Jew smoked the frankfurters; another is whether the smoking of lox must be done by a Jew.  In both of these situations, the question is whether this food is considered cooked by a non-Jew, which might prohibit it as bishul akum, or whether it was prepared in a way that does not qualify as “cooking,” and therefore bishul akum is not a concern.

Eruv tavshillin

Here is yet another halachic application in which it will make a difference whether smoked food is considered “cooked” or not. Chazal prohibited cooking on Yom Tov for Shabbos, unless one prepares an eruv tavshillin, a cooked item designated before Yom Tov that will remain until the Shabbos preparations are completed, and that thereby permits cooking for Shabbos on Yom Tov that falls on Friday. If smoked food is considered cooked, then it is acceptable to use a food that was prepared by smoking, such as a frankfurter or lox, as an eruv tavshillin. If smoked food is not considered cooked, then it is not.

The Yerushalmi

Now that we understand the background, we can examine the Talmudic discussion that concerns smoked food. We will begin by quoting a passage of Talmud Yerushalmi (Nedorim 6:1): “The rabbis of Kisrin asked: What is the law of smoked food in regard to the prohibition of bishul akum? In regard to cooking on Shabbos? What is its law regarding mixing meat and milk together?” The passage of Yerushalmi then changes the subject, without ruling on the three questions raised.

The issue the Yerushalmi seems to be asking is whether cooking food in smoke is halachically equivalent to cooking in liquid. In each of these instances, a hot medium is used to prepare the food. The first question of the Yerushalmi is whether food smoked by a non-Jew is prohibited, or whether the proscription of bishul akum is limited to food cooked via fire or liquid. If cooking in smoke is halachically considered the same as cooking in water or oil, then lox or frankfurters that were smoked by a non-Jew are prohibited because of bishul akum. On the other hand, if smoking is not treated as cooking, then there is no halachic problem with eating lox or hot dogs in which the actual smoking was performed by a non-Jew, provided that the ingredients are all kosher.

The second question of the Yerushalmi can be explained as follows: If a Jewish person placed raw frankfurters or salmon into a smoker on Shabbos, and the frankfurters or lox thereby became edible on Shabbos, did the person desecrate a melacha on Shabbos? If he did, then there are halachic ramifications germane to a product that was smoked on Shabbos in violation of the law.

The third question of the Yerushalmi concerns the laws of cooking meat and milk together. If smoking is considered cooking, min haTorah, then smoking a cheese dog violates basar becholov min haTorah, and it is prohibited to have any benefit from it.

As I noted above, the Yerushalmi that we quoted does not mention a conclusion regarding these three questions. Based on these unresolved questions, the Rambam (Hilchos Ma’achalos Asuros 9:6) appears to conclude the following: when our issue is a halacha that is min haTorah, we rule stringently. However, when the issue is a rabbinic question, we will rule leniently and not consider this to be cooking.

As a result, it is certainly prohibited as a safek de’oraysa to smoke a cheese dog or to smoke food on Shabbos. It would be prohibited to have any benefit from a smoked cheese dog. However, someone who violated these prohibitions would not be punishable for his offense, even when such punishment was practiced and even had he fulfilled all the requirements to receive this punishment, because the Yerushalmi did not conclude definitively that it constitutes a violation. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 87:6) follows the same approach as the Rambam.

We will continue this topic at some point in the future.

Conclusion

In non-observant circles, a well-known non-Jewish criticism of Judaism is frequently leveled: “Does G-d care more about what goes into our mouths than he does about what comes out?” The criticism is, of course, in error, and its answer is that Hashem cares both about what goes in and what comes out, and it is the height of conceit for us to decide which is “more” important in His eyes. Being careful about what we eat and about what we say are both important steps in growing in our development as human beings.

The Holey Donut

Question #1: Holey Blessings

“What brocha should I recite before eating a donut? Does it make a difference whether it is an American-style, hole-in-the-middle donut or an Israeli-style jelly donut?”

Question #1: Chanukah Donuts

“Must I separate challah from the donuts I am frying for Chanukah?”

Question #3: Non-Jewish Consumers

“I just purchased a donut shop that is quite distant from any Jewish community. Must I make sure that challah is taken?”

Introduction:

Although neither Israeli donuts nor Israeli latkes are usually made with holes in the middle, Americans envision donuts as a big zero, no doubt to remind them of the number of calories contained in the hole.

Donuts are made from dough that is deep fried, or cooked in oil (these are two ways of saying the same thing). Because they are cooked, most authorities rule that the correct brocha before consuming them is mezonos. However, our opening questions require that we study the topic in greater depth. Doing so, we will discover that although reciting mezonos before consuming donuts is the accepted approach, it is not a universally held position, and that there are many halachic ramifications to this dispute.

Analyzing this topic requires that we explain several major issues in the laws of separating challah, so that is where our discussion begins. We should note that throughout this entire article, the word challah will be used to refer to the portion removed from dough to fulfill the mitzvah of the Torah, and not to the special Shabbos bread.

The Torah and challah

The Torah describes the mitzvah of challah in the following passage:

When you enter the land to which I am bringing you, it will be that, when you eat from the bread of the land, you shall separate a terumah offering for G-d. The first dough of your kneading troughs shall be separated as challah, like the terumah of your grain shall you separate it (Bamidbar 15:18-20).

Let us make several observations about this posuk, and then proceed to discuss them.

Bread or dough?

1. There appears to be an inconsistency in the words of the Torah. First, it refers to when you eat from the bread of the land, which implies that the requirement to separate challah begins only once it becomes bread. Yet, in the very next posuk, the Torah requires challah to be taken from your kneading troughs, implying that you separate challah when it is still dough. Which is true?

Terumah or challah?

2. The Torah refers to the part separated as a “terumah offering,” and then compares it to the terumah of your grain. In what way is challah like terumah?

Consumer or manufacturer?

3. The words of the Torah, when you eat from the bread of the land, you shall separate a terumah offering, imply that the obligation to take challah falls upon the consumer who will be eating the bread. However, the next verse states, the first dough ofyour kneading troughs shall be separated as challah, implying that the obligation falls upon the manufacturer. Why do two verses imply different laws?

Bread or dough

The answer is that the words of the Torah, the first dough of your kneading troughs, teaches that there is no requirement to separate challah unless there is as much dough as the amount of manna eaten daily by each member of the Jewish people in the desert, which, in their generation, was called “your kneading trough.” Chazal explain that this amount, called ke’shiur i’sas midbar, was equal to the volume of 43.2 eggs. In contemporary measure, we usually assume that this is approximately three to five pounds of flour. (For our purposes, it will suffice to use these round figures. I encourage each reader to ask his own rav or posek for exact quantities.) When there is a definite requirement to separate challah, one recites a brocha prior to fulfilling the mitzvah.

There is another reason why the Torah refers to the mitzvah both in regard to dough and to the finished bread. Usually, one should separate challah when the dough is mixed. However, there are situations in which one cannot separate challah as dough. In these instances, the Torah is teaching that we can also separate challah when it is already bread.

Terumah or challah

I noted above thattheTorah refers to the separated dough as a “terumah offering,” and then compares it to the terumah of your grain. In what way is challah like terumah?

Terumah may be eaten only by a kohen, his wife, sons and unmarried daughters, and only when they are tahor. Since we are without the parah adumah today, we cannot achieve being fully tahor, and, therefore, we cannot eat terumah. The Torah here teaches that challah has the same laws as terumah, and therefore can be eaten only by members of the kohen’s family who are tahor.

Dough versus batter

We find much discussion in the Mishnah regarding what type of product is included in the obligation to separate challah and a fundamental dispute among the early baalei Tosafos concerning these laws. Note that in the following discussion we differentiate between “dough,” a thick mixture which Chazal call belilah avah, and “batter,” a thin mixture which Chazal call belilah rakah. According to Rabbeinu Tam, any dough owned by a Jew is obligated in challah, even if one subsequently cooks or fries it (cited by many rishonim, including Tosafos, Brochos 37b s.v. Lechem and Pesachim 37b s.v. Dekulei alma).

(Please note that some authorities who accept Rabbeinu Tam’s basic approach that any dough is obligated in challah still exempt dough manufactured for pasta, because of considerations beyond the scope of our topic (see Tosafos, Brochos 37b, s.v. Lechem,quoting Rabbeinu Yechiel), but others hold that, according to Rabbeinu Tam, any product made from dough is obligated in challah, provided the batch was large enough (as described above).

Intent

A different baal Tosafos, the Rash, disagrees with Rabbeinu Tam, contending that one is not always obligated to separate challah from dough. There is such a requirement only when the owner intended to make the dough into bread. However, if the owner intended at the time that he kneaded the dough to cook or fry it, as one does when making donuts or kreplach, there is no obligation to separate challah.

Batter up

Both Rabbeinu Tam and the Rash agree that there is no obligation to take challah from a batter (belilah rakah) unless it was subsequently baked into a bread-like food. In this instance, therefore, the obligation to separate challah does not take place until the bread is produced. Thus, according to both Rabbeinu Tam and the Rash, we can resolve why the Torah describes the mitzvah of challah sometimes in terms of bread and sometimes in terms of dough. In most instances, the obligation to separate challah is when the flour mixture becomes dough. However, there are instances, such as when preparing a batter, in which there is no obligation to separate challah until it becomes bread.

Mezonos or hamotzi?

Many authorities explain that the dispute between Rabbeinu Tam and the Rash also affects which brocha one recites on a cooked or fried dough. They contend that, according to Rabbeinu Tam, since dough is obligated in challah, the brocha recited before eating dough that was then cooked or fried is hamotzi, the brocha recited afterwards is the full bensching,and that, prior to eating a cooked or fried dough product, there is a requirement to wash netilas yadayim.

Others rule that one does not recite hamotzi unless another requirement is met – that the finished product, after the frying or cooking, has a bread-like appearance, called in Aramaic turisa denahama (Tosafos, Pesachim and Brochos 37b s.v. Lechem). The halachic basis for drawing a distinction between the mitzvah of challah and the brocha requirements is that the requirement to separate challah is established at the time the dough is mixed, whereas the halachic determination of which brocha to recite is determined by the finished product (Rabbeinu Yonah, Brochos; Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 168:13).

Baking part

At this point, we will return to the laws of challah, in order to understand some of the rulings germane to the laws of brochos. A passage in the Talmud Yerushalmi teaches that someone who prepared a dough or batter with the intention of cooking or frying most of it, and leaving a small amount of the dough for baking, is obligated to separate challah from the entire dough, because of a rabbinic injunction.

The passage reads as follows:

A woman asked Rabbi Mana: ‘I want to make my dough into noodles. Is there a way for me to do so and be exempt from separating challah?’ He told her that it was possible. He then asked his father, Rabbi Yonah, who told him that she should not be exempt from separating challah, out of concern that she will use the rest as one usually processes dough (that is, into bread) (Yerushalmi, Challah 1:4). The rishonim explain that she intended to bake a small part of the dough, and therefore assumed that she is not obligated to separate challah. However, should she subsequently decide that she wanted to bake the entire dough, it would be obligated in challah min haTorah, and she might not realize that she is obligated to separate challah. In order to avoid creating this problem, Chazal required her to separate challah even when she intends to bake only a small amount (Rosh, Pesachim 2:16; Hilchos Challah #2).

Rabbeinu Tam and Rash

At this point, we must note that Rabbeinu Tam and the Rash will dispute exactly what happened in this case. According to Rabbeinu Tam, any time one mixes dough, he is obligated to separate challah. Therefore, the case described by this passage of Yerushalmi must have been where the woman was mixing a batter from which one is usually not obligated to separate challah, intending to bake a small amount, and to cook or fry the rest. Rabbi Yonah ruled that since she might decide to bake the entire batter, she is already obligated, miderabbanan, to separate challah.

According to the Rash, the passage of Yerushalmi can be discussing dough, since the intention at the time of mixing to cook or fry dough exempts it from the mitzvah of separating challah.

The Maharam Rottenberg

Approximately a century after the time of the Rash, the greatest halachic authority in Germany was the Maharam Rottenberg. The Maharam did not want to take sides in this dispute between his two great predecessors, and so he devised the following approach, which he implemented in his own household:

When preparing dough that one intends to cook or fry, the Maharam instructed that one bake a small amount of the dough. According to the Rash, although cooked or fried dough is exempt from challah, when baking some of the dough, one becomes obligated in separating challah because of the takanah established by the Yerushalmi. Therefore, this dough is obligated in challah, whether one holds like Rabbeinu Tam (because it is dough) or like the Rash (because one is baking part of it).

According to Rabbeinu Tam, one should recite a brocha prior to separating challah on dough that one intends to cook or fry, whereas according to the Rash, there is no obligation to separate challah, and this would be a brocha levatalah. To avoid taking sides in this dispute, the Maharam advised baking some of the dough, thus creating a responsibility to separate challah because of the takanas chachamim.

Which brocha when you eat?

The Tur notes that the Maharam’s suggestion of baking some dough resolves only the question of separating challah. However, there is a separate, unresolved question – which brocha does one recite prior to eating a cooked or fried dough product? Rabbeinu Tam contends that the brocha on this product is hamotzi, which also means that one must wash netilas yadayim before eating it and recite bensching afterwards. The Rash maintains that the brocha before eating this food is mezonos, and the brocha afterwards is al hamichyah, and there is no requirement to wash netilas yadayim. How does one avoid taking sides in this dispute? The Maharam’s solution is to eat these products only after one first recited hamotzi on regular bread.

Thus, one of our opening questions “What brocha should I recite before eating a donut?” was considered an unresolved conundrum by the posek of his generation, the Maharam. Since he considered it to be an unresolved halachic issue whether one should recite hamotzi or mezonos prior to eating donuts, he ate them only after first reciting hamotzi on bread. I suspect that low carbohydrate diets were not much in vogue in his day.

How do we rule?

Most authorities conclude that the correct brocha prior to eating a dough product that is cooked or fried is mezonos. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 168:13) and the Rema (ibid.) both follow the majority opinion that the correct brocha prior to eating a dough product that is cooked or fried is mezonos. However, the Shulchan Aruch also cites the minority opinion that one should recite hamotzi prior to eating a cooked dough product. He concludes that, to avoid any question, someone who is a yarei shamayim should eat a cooked dough product only after making hamotzi  on a different item that is definitely bread — what we presented above as the Maharam’s solution. The Shulchan Aruch refers to this as the way a G-d-fearing person should approach the matter. The Rema rules that accepted practice is to simply recite mezonos. Perhaps we could say that the Rema felt that a yarei shamayim can still be concerned about how many carbohydrates he eats!

How do we rule concerning challah?

According to the text accepted by most authorities, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 329:3) concludes that dough that one intends to cook or fry is exempt from the requirement to separate challah, ruling against Rabbeinu Tam. However, the Shach contends that one should separate challah without a brocha. Thus, in his opinion, someone preparing a large quantity of donuts or kreplach is obligated to separate challah, albeit without a brocha. A caterer, restaurant or hotel cooking a large quantity of kreplach for a communal Purim seudah should have challah separated from the dough.

Many later authorities rule that one should take into consideration Rabbeinu Tam’s approach and separate challah from any dough more than three pounds, even when it will be cooked or fried. However, the Shulchan Aruch Harav (Kuntrus Acharon, Orach Chayim 168:7) and the Aruch Hashulchan (Yoreh Deah 329:15) rule that one does not need to be concerned about Rabbeinu Tam’s position if one is making the dough in chutz la’aretz, since the requirement of separating challah there is certainly only miderabbanan.

Non-Jewish consumers

At this point, we can address the third of our opening questions: “I just purchased a donut shop that is quite distant from any Jewish community. Must I make sure that challah is taken?”

Let me explain the background to this shaylah. A frum businessman purchased a franchised donut shop located nowhere near any Jewishcommunity. His managers and employees are all non-Jewish. To avoid issues of being open on Shabbos and Pesach, the businessman used a type of mechir Shabbos, thereby sharing ownership of his business with a gentile, a highly controversial practice that is beyond the scope of this article. He had assumed that he had no responsibility to separate challah, either because he did not know that some authorities require this, or because he assumed that, since no customers are assuming that his products are kosher, he is not obligated to separate challah. This last assumption is incorrect.

Consumer or owner

The obligation to separate challah is a positive requirement incumbent upon the owner, not simply a means of preventing a Jew from eating the finished product without challah having been separated. The requirement to separate challah depends on the ownership of the dough at the time it is mixed, not on who mixes it. In other words, if a Jew owns a bakery, he is required to separate challah, even if his workers are not Jewish. Should the owner not have separated challah, the consumer is obligated to do so before he may eat the finished product.

If a gentile does the kneading in a Jewish-owned household, nursing home or school, there is an obligation to separate challah.  On the other hand, there is no requirement to separate challah in a bakery owned by non-Jews, even if the employees are Jewish.

Conclusion

Having discussed the halachic details of this mitzvah, it is worthwhile taking a glimpse at the following Medrash that underscores its vast spiritual significance: “In the merit of the following three mitzvos the world was created – in the merit of challah, in the merit of maasros, and in the merit of bikkurim” (Bereishis Rabbah 1:4). Thus, besides gaining us eternal reward, this easily kept mitzvah helps keep our planet turning.

Reciting Korbanos Daily

This week’s parsha discusses korbanos, the consecration of the Levi’im, and many other matters germane to the Mishkan.

Introduction

Between the recital of morning berachos and Boruch She’amar, which begins pesukei dezimra, is a section of the davening colloquially referred to as “korbanos,” since it includes many references to the various offerings brought in the Beis Hamikdash. The goal of this article is to provide an overview and some details about this part of the davening.

This section of the davening can be loosely divided into three sub-sections:

(1) Introductory recitations

In addition to a few prayers, this includes the recital of various passages of the Torah that have strong educational and moral benefit.

(2) Parshiyos hakorbanos

Recital of Torah passages regarding the offerings and other daily procedures in the Beis Hamikdash.

(3) Chazal regarding the korbanos

The recital of various statements of Chazal that pertain, either directly or indirectly, to the daily offerings.

Introductory recitations

After the recital of birkas haTorah and the other daily morning berochos, the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch both recommend the recital of different parts of the Torah as an introduction to the morning davening, including parshas haman, the passage about the manna falling, the story of akeidas Yitzchak and the aseres hadibros (Orach Chayim 1:5-9). These parts of the davening foster a stronger sense of faith in Hashem and a basic understanding of the purpose of our creation.

The early authorities recommend reciting parshas haman every morning to remember throughout the day that Hashem provides all of our parnasah (Beis Yosef, Orach Chayim Chapter 1; based on Yoma 76a).

Akeidas Yitzchak is recorded in most siddurim at this part of davening, although the majority of people do not recite it daily. Perhaps the justification of this practice lies in the fact that the Magen Avraham (1:7) records in the name of Rabbeinu Bachya (Commentary on Chumash, parshas Tzav, Vayikra 7:37) that it is insufficient to simply read the parshas akeidah; it must be studied well, something that most individuals cannot realistically do on a daily basis.

For some reason that I do not know nor have seen discussed, whereas most siddurim include parshas akeidah at this point of the davening, most do not include parshas haman here. Yet, the same sources — the Tur, the Shulchan Aruch and others — that record the importance of reciting parshas akeidah at this point of the davening mention also parshas haman. It appears that one early printed siddur began including parshas akeidah but, for whatever reason, did not include parshas haman, and the other, later printings imitated the earlier edition, something fairly common in publishing of seforim in general and of siddurim in particular.

Aseres hadibros

There is a major halachic difference between parshas haman and the akeidah, on the one hand, and the aseres hadibros on the other. In many congregations, parshas haman and the akeidah were recited together by the entire tzibur, whereas it was prohibited to recite the aseres hadibros as part of daily davening by the tzibur (Shu’t Harashba; Rema, Orach Chayim 1:5). The Gemara (Berochos 12a) prohibits this out of concern that those who do not accept authentic Judaism will claim that observing the aseres hadibros is sufficient, and it is not necessary to observe the rest of the Torah. As noted by later poskim, this concern has become much greater in today’s world than it was in earlier generations (Divrei Chamudos, Brochos 1:9; Magen Avraham 1:9). For this reason, the aseres hadibros are not printed in the siddur – since this would be equivalent to making them part of the daily prayer, which Chazal prohibited (ibid.).

Korbanospesukim

The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch both recommend reciting daily the pesukim that describe several of the morning offerings and procedures in the Beis Hamikdash. These are the Torah’s discussions about the various types of korbanos, including the processing of the terumas hadeshen (the ashes on the mizbei’ach), the tamid, olah, chatos, and ketores. It also includes discussion about the kiyor, the laver that was used many times a day by the kohanim to wash their hands and feet.

Why do we recite these passages? The Tur explains: “The recital of parshas hatamid was established on the basis of the midrash’s statement that, when there is no Beis Hamikdash, involvement in the recital of the korbanos is treated as if they were offered” (Tur Orach Chayim, Chapter 48). This important concept is based on the posuk in Hoshea (14:3) that states u’ne’shalmah parim sefaseinu, literally, our lips take the place of the bulls, which is understood by Chazal to mean that our lips, by reciting and studying the korbanos, function as a spiritual replacement for the korbanos (Yoma 86b).

Colloquially, this concept is often expressed by referring to the words of Hoshea: u’ne’shalmah parim sefaseinu. The Mishnah Berurah mentions that u’ne’shalmah parim sefaseinu means understanding the procedure – merely reciting the passages of the Torah by rote, without understanding what is being done, does not fulfill the concept.

In order to fulfill u’ne’shalmah parim sefaseinu, the early authorities cite a custom to recite a prayer after reading each of these sections of the Torah requesting, that the recital of the procedure just mentioned be accepted as if we had actually offered the korban. In many contemporary siddurim, these prayers have been moved from between the pesukim describing the offerings to between the mishnayos of the chapter of Eizehu Mekoman that explain the various korbanos. In some siddurim, you find these prayers in both places.

Standing and in public?

The acharonim disagree whether it is required to stand while reciting the parshas hatamid, the Sefer Olas Tamid and the Magen Avraham ruling that it is required, since all the stages in offering the korban tamid had to be performed while standing. (By the way, no one is ever permitted to sit in the azarah sections of the Beis Hamikdash, with the exception of a Jewish king who is descended from Dovid Hamelech [Yoma 25a et al].) However, most authorities conclude that the parshios hakorbanos may be recited while sitting – in other words, u’ne’shalmah parim sefaseinu does not require standing, notwithstanding that the korbanos, themselves, were required to be offered while standing (e.g., Elya Rabbah; Bechor Shor; Mor U’ketziyah; Shaarei Teshuvah). We see here a dispute to what extent we should treat the concept of u’ne’shalmah parim sefaseinu.

Reciting them together with the tzibur

Here is another issue in which the question is how far do we take the idea of u’ne’shalmah parim sefaseinu. Although there are some acharonim who contend that parshas hatamid should be said only together with the tzibur, since it is a public korban (Be’er Heiteiv, quoting Derech Chochmah), the consensus of poskim is that this is unnecessary.

Korbanos correspond to prayers

Another reason for the recital of korbanos results from the following Talmudic discussion. The Gemara (Berachos 26b) quotes what appears to be a dispute between early amora’im, Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi and Rabbi Yosi berabbi Chanina, whether the three daily tefillos were each established by one of our forefathers, Avraham, Yitzchak and Yaakov, or whether they were established to correspond to the daily offerings. The Gemara’s conclusion is that both statements are true: the forefathers established the daily prayers, but, subsequently, Chazal instituted that these prayers should correspond to the korbanos. Because of this last consideration, the times of the daily prayers are linked to the times that the korbanos were offered. Therefore, we read the story of the akeidah, which emphasizes the role of Avraham and Yitzchak in our prayers, and we also study the pesukim about the different korbanos, to strengthen and highlight the relationship between the korbanos and our prayers.

Chazal regarding the korbanos

At this point, we will explore the third subsection of these introductory prayers, which I called above, “Chazal regarding the korbanos.” Many early authorities(Tur, Rema) recommend beginning the next subsection of the morning davening by reciting the following passage of Gemara (Yoma 33a), which presents the choreographed order of the morning service in the Beis Hamikdash: “Abayei presented the order in which the service was performed in the Beis Hamikdash according to the accepted tradition, following the opinion of Abba Shaul:

Tidying the large pyre on the (main) mizbei’ach (altar) precedes tidying the secondary pyre that was used to burn the ketores (incense).

Tidying the secondary pyre precedes placing the two planks of wood on the mizbei’ach. Placing the two planks of wood precedes removing the ashes from the inner mizbei’ach.

Removing these ashes precedes cleaning five lamps of the menorah.

Cleaning these five lamps precedes processing and offering the blood of the morning korban tamid.

This precedes cleaning the remaining two lamps of the menorah.

Cleaning these two lamps precedes offering the ketores.

This, in turn, precedes offering the limbs of the morning korban tamid.

Offering of the limbs precedes the meal offering (that accompanies the morning korban tamid). The meal offering precedes the chavitin (a grain korban offered daily by the kohein gadol).

The chavitin precede the wine offering (that accompanied the morning korban tamid).

The wine offering precedes the musaf offerings (of Shabbos, Rosh Chodesh, or Yom Tov). The musaf offerings precede the spoons of levonah (frankincense offered on Shabbos, to permit the consumption of the lechem hapanim, the showbread).

The offering of the spoons of levonah precedes the afternoon korban tamid (Yoma 33a).

The Tur (Orach Chayim 48) then cites a prayer to be said after this passage of Gemara is recited, similar to that mentioned after the pesukim of each korban.

Subsequently, the Tur asks, “What should someone do if he wants to recite this prayer [i.e., the request that the recital of the procedure should be accepted in place of the actual korban], but he davens in a shul where the tzibur does not say it?” It appears that the Tur is bothered by the following problem: U’ne’shalmah parim sefaseinu is considered equivalent to actually offering the korbanos. If this is true, it is forbidden to recite parshas hatamid twice in the same morning [i.e., once privately, to be able to recite the special prayer, and once with the tzibur], because it is considered as if you offered the morning korban tamid twice, which is a violation of halacha (see Beis Yosef). Furthermore, reciting this prayer after the communal recitation of  the parshas hatamid omitted this prayer is inappropriate – he should not do something obviously different from what the community does.

The Tur answers that, in this situation, the person should say parshas hatamid by himself before the tzibur begins davening, and, at that time, recite the prayer requesting the acceptance of these korbanos. He should then recite parshas hatamid again together with the tzibur, since a person should not refrain from joining the tzibur. However, when he recites it together with the tzibur, he should consider it as if he is reading the Torah and not fulfilling the concept of u’ne’shalmah parim sefaseinu. This way he will avoid the concern that the second recitation of the parshas hatamid could be the equivalent of offering the korban tamid twice in the same morning.

No Abayei according to Abba Shaul

Notwithstanding that both the Tur and the Rema record reciting the statement of Abayei, this is not printed in all siddurim. Why not?

Abayei began his statement by noting that he was following the opinion of Abba Shaul. Earlier in mesechta Yoma (14b), the Gemara recorded a dispute between the Sages and Abba Shaul. According to the Sages, the beginning of the order should be as follows: organizing the main pyre of ashes, then the secondary pyre, adding the two planks to the fire, removing the ashes, offering the blood of the morning tamid, cleaning five lamps of the menorah, offering the ketores, and then cleaning the remaining two lamps. In other words, both the Sages and Abba Shaul agree that the cleaning of the menorah is interrupted by another avodah, after completing the first five lights and before cleaning the last two. The dispute between them is whether the processing of the tamid is begun before the cleaning of the menorah, or in the middle, as the interruption, and whether the offering of the ketores is inserted or is performed after the cleaning of the menorah is complete. Abayei’s statement follows Abba Shaul. Those who do recite this statement assume that, since Abayei quoted this statement, he rules like the minority opinion of Abba Shaul, in this instance, and that is the halachic conclusion (Beis Yosef).

However, the Rambam (Hilchos Temidim Umusafim 6:1, 3) and the Semag (Positive Mitzvah #192) both rule according to the Sages, the majority opinion, which means that they do not accept Abayei’s testimonial as halachic conclusion. Since Abayei’s statement is not according to the halachic conclusion, it is inappropriate to recite this statement as part of davening (see Beis Yosef). Thus, according to the Rambam and the Semag, one should not recite this passage as part of daily korbanos, whereas, according to the Tur and the Rema, one should. Whether we rule according to Abba Shaul or according to the Sages is an issue that will require the Sanhedrin to resolve, when we are ready to begin offering korbanos again, bim’heirah veyameinu.

Eizehu Mekoman

The next part of the morning prayers is Eizehu Mekoman, which is the fifth chapter of Mishnayos Zevachim. The primary reason why this is recited is in order to make sure that every man studies Mishnah every day, in fulfillment of the dictum of Chazal that a person should make sure to study every day some Mikra, some Mishnah and some Gemara (see Kiddushin 30a; Avodah Zarah 19b, as explained by Tur, Orach Chayim Chapter 50). There is no necessity to add more pesukim to make sure that someone studies some Mikra every day since, in the course of our davening, we recite many passages of Tanach, so Mikra is recited daily. But to make sure that everyone studies Mishnah every day, we recite Eizehu Mekoman.

This chapter was chosen as the representative of Mishnah for several reasons: First, there is no overt dispute in the entire chapter. In other words, although there are statements in this Mishnah about which various tanna’im disagree, no disputing opinions are mentioned. Thus, this chapter is purely Mishnah in the sense that it is completely halacha pesukah, accepted as halachic conclusion (Baruch She’amar; see Rambam, Hilchos Talmud Torah 1:11).

A second reason why this chapter was chosen as the representative of Mishnah is because it discusses the laws of the korbanos, making it very appropriate to be recited before davening.

Yet a third reason why this chapter of Mishnah was chosen is because it appears to be very old, dating back to the era of the first Beis Hamikdash. This is based on the fact that it refers to Bein Habadim¸which did not exist in the second Beis Hamikdash nor in the last years of the first Beis Hamikdash. The badim (the poles of the aron) were required to always be attached to the aron hakodesh, and Yoshiyahu Hamelech hid the aron so that they would not be captured by the Babylonians when the first Beis Hamikdash was destroyed.

Rabbi Yishmael says

I mentioned above the statement of the Gemara that a man is required to study some Gemara every day. According to the Rambam (Hilchos Talmud Torah 1:11), Gemara means understanding and analyzing the meaning and reason behind the laws. To fulfill the daily study of Gemara, the recital of the passage beginning with the words, “Rabbi Yishmael says” was introduced into the daily davening. This passage is the introduction to the midrash halacha called the Sifra or the Toras Kohanim (these are two names for the same work), which is the halachic midrash on the book of Vayikra.

The Sifra is an unusual work among the midrashim of Chazal in that it is completely halacha. (Although Mechilta and Sifrei are both halachic midrashim, they contain substantive parts of agadah, non-halachic material.) The Malbim wrote two different magnum opus works on the Sifra. He intended to write an extensive commentary to explain how Chazal’s method of deriving the halachos in Vayikra is based on a very meticulous understanding of the pesukim. However, after he wrote the commentary on only two pesukim, he writes that he realized that a commentary of this nature would become completely unwieldly – it would be an encyclopedia, rather than a commentary; too long and tedious for anyone to read. Instead, he wrote a different lengthy essay, which he called Ayeles Hashachar, explaining all the principles involved in explaining the pesukim correctly. Then, throughout the rest of his commentary to the Sifra, he refers the reader to the place in Ayeles Hashachar in which he explained the principle or principles involved in explaining the particular passage of Sifra. In Ayeles Hashachar, the Malbim concludes that there are 613 principles involved to derive the correct halachic interpretation of the pesukim.

Although a regular student of the Gemara will be very familiar with many of the rules that Rabbi Yishmael shares with us, a few of these rules are rarely encountered. An in-depth explanation of the beraysa of Rabbi Yishmael is beyond the scope of  this article. Perhaps I will devote an entire future article to explaining Rabbi Yishmael’s thirteen principles. Those interested in more detailed explanations of these principles and examples are referred to the commentary of Rav Hirsch on the siddur.

Conclusion

The purpose of many of our korbanos is to assist us in our teshuvah process.The Gemara states: “Come and see, how different are the qualities of The Holy One, Blessed be He, from mortal man. Someone who offends his friend is uncertain whether his friend will forgive him. And, even if he is fortunate that his friend forgives him, he does not know how much it will cost to appease his friend. However, in reference to The Holy One, Blessed is He – should a man sin against Him in private, all the sinner needs to do is to beg Him for forgiveness, as the posuk says, Take with you words and return to Hashem (Hoshea 14:3).

Furthermore, the Gemara states, “Teshuvah is so great that because of one individual who does teshuvah, the entire world is forgiven, as the Torah says, with their teshuvah I will heal them… because My anger against them is retracted. Note that the posuk does not state, “My anger is retracted “against him,” but against them” (Yoma 86b) – all of them.

Birkas Kohanim

Question #1: Why is this bracha different?

“Why is the bracha for duchening so different from all the other brochos we recite before we perform mitzvos?”

Question #2: Hoarse kohein

“If a kohein is suffering from laryngitis, how does he fulfill the mitzvah of Birkas Kohanim?”

Question #3: The chazzan duchening

“If the chazzan is a kohein, may he duchen?”

Answer:

I have written other articles about the mitzvah of duchening; this article will deal with a few specific issues not mentioned in the other articles.

First of all, I should explain the various names of this beautiful mitzvah. Ashkenazim usually colloquially refer to the mitzvah as duchening. The word “duchen” means a platform, and refers to the raised area in front of the aron kodesh on which the kohanim traditionally stand when they recite these blessings. However, in many shullen today, there is no platform in front of the aron kodesh, and, even when there is, in many shullen there are more kohanim than there is room for them on the duchen. In all these instances, the mitzvah is performed with the kohanim standing on the floor alongside the wall of the shul that has the aron kodesh, facing the people.

There are at least two other ways of referring to this mitzvah. One way of referring to the mitzvah is “Birkas Kohanim,”which is very descriptive of the mitzvah. I will use this term throughout this article, because it avoids confusion.

Nesi’as kapayim

The Mishnah and the Shulchan Aruch call this mitzvah by yet a third term, nesi’as kapayim, which means literally “raising the palms,” a description of the position in which the kohanim hold their hands while reciting these blessings. According to accepted halacha, the kohanim raise their hands to shoulder level, and each kohein holds his hands together. (There are some mekubalim who raise their hands directly overhead while reciting the Birkas Kohanim [Divrei Shalom 128:2]. However, this is a very uncommon practice.) Based on a midrash, the Tur rules that, while he recites the Birkas Kohanim, the kohein should hold his hands in a way that there are five spaces between his fingers. This is done by pressing, on each hand, the index finger to the middle finger and the small finger to the ring finger. This creates two openings — one between the middle finger and the ring finger on each hand. Another two are created between the index finger and thumb on each hand. The fifth opening is between the thumbs. There are various ways for a kohein to position his fingers such that he has a space between his thumbs. I know of several different methods, and I have never found an authoritative source that states that one way is preferable over any other. Most kohanim, myself included, follow the way that they were taught by their father.

An unusual bracha:

Immediately prior to beginning Birkas Kohanimbracha, the kohanim recite a birkas hamitzvah, as we do prior to performing most mitzvos. The text of the bracha is: Boruch Attah Hashem Elokeinu Melech ha’olam asher kideshanu bikedushaso shel Aharon, ve’tzivanu levareich es amo Yisroel be’ahavah. “Blessed are You, Hashem, our G-d, King of the universe, Who sanctified us with the sanctity of Aharon, and commanded us to bless His people, Yisroel, with love.”

Two aspects of this bracha are different from the standard structure of brochos that we recite prior to fulfilling mitzvos. The first change is that, instead of the usual text that we say, asher kideshanu bemitzvosav ve’tzivanu, “Who sanctified us with His mitzvos and commanded us,” the kohanim leave out the reference to “His mitzvos” and instead say “Who sanctified us with the sanctity of Aharon.” The second change is that the kohanim not only describe the mitzvah that they are performing — that Hashem “commanded us to bless his people Yisroel” –but they add a qualitative description, “with love.”

The fact that the kohanim make reference to Aharon’s sanctity is, itself, not unusual. It is simply atypical for us to recite or hear this bracha since, unfortunately in our contemporary world, we have no other mitzvos for which we use this text. However, when we are again all tehorim and when we have a Beis Hamikdash, every time a kohein performs a mitzvah that only a kohein can perform, such as eating terumah, korbanos or challah, donning the bigdei kehunah in the Beis Hamikdash (Artzos Hachayim, Eretz Yehudah 18:1, page 81b), or performing the mitzvos of offering korbanos, he recites a bracha that includes this reference. Unfortunately, since we are all tamei and we have no Beis Hamikdash, a kohein cannot perform these mitzvos today, and therefore we do not recite this bracha text at any other time.

“With love”

The other detail in this bracha that is highly unusual is the statement that the mitzvah is performed be’ahavah,“with love.” No other mitzvah includes this detail in its bracha, and, in general, the brochos recited performing mitzvos do not include details about how the mitzvos are performed. For example, the bracha prior to kindling the Shabbos or Chanukah lights says simply lehadlik neir shel Shabbos or lehadlik neir shel Chanukah,and does not add that we do so “with wicks and oil.” Similarly, note that the bracha recited before we pick up and shake the lulav and esrog does not even mention the esrog, aravos and hadasim, and says, simply, al netilas lulav. Again, the bracha for washing our hands is simply al netilas yadayim without mentioning any of the important details of the mitzvah. Yet, the bracha recited prior to Birkas Kohanim includes the word be’ahavah, with love. Why is this so?

Let us examine the original passage of the Gemara (Sotah 39a) that teaches us about the text of this bracha: “The disciples of Rabbi Elazar ben Shamua (who was a kohein) asked him, ‘Because of what practices of yours did you merit longevity?’ He answered them, ‘I never used a shul as a shortcut, I never stepped over the heads of the holy nation (Rashi explains that this means that when people were sitting on the floor in the Beis Hamedrash, as was common in his day, he never walked over them, but either arrived before everyone else did, or else he sat outside) and I never recited the nesi’as kapayim without first reciting a bracha.’”

The Gemara then asks, “What bracha is recited prior to Birkas Kohanim? Answered Rabbi Zeira, quoting Rav Chisda, asher kideshanu bikedushaso shel Aharon, ve’tzivanu levareich es amo Yisroel be’ahavah.

Thus, we see that the text that we recite prior to Birkas Kohanim is exactly the way the Gemara records it, and that the word “be’ahavah” is part of the original text. Why is this required?

The Be’er Sheva, a European gadol of the late 16th-early 17th century, asks this question. To quote him (in his commentary, Sotah 39a): “Where is it mentioned or even hinted in the Torah that the kohein must fulfill this mitzvah ‘with love’? The answer is that when the Torah commanded the kohanim concerning this mitzvah, it says Emor lahem, ‘Recite this blessing to the Jewish people,’ spelling the word emor with a vov, the full spelling of the word, when it is usually spelled without a vov. Both the Midrash Tanchuma and the Midrash Rabbah explain that there is an important reason why this word is spelled ‘full.’ ‘The Holy One, blessed is He, said to the kohanim that they should bless the Jewish people not because they are ordered to do so, and they want to complete the minimum requirement of that “order,” as if it were “forced labor” and therefore they say it swiftly. On the contrary, they should bless the Jews with much focus and the desire that the brochos all be effective – with full love and full heart.’”

We see from this Gemara that this aspect of the mitzvah, that the kohanim bless the people because they want to and not because they are required to, was so important to Chazal that they included an allusion to this in the text of the bracha, something that is never done elsewhere!

Brochos cause longevity

There are several puzzling questions germane to this small passage of Gemara that we quoted above. What was unique about Rabbi Elazar’s three practices that he singled them out as being the spiritual causes of his longevity? The commentaries explain that each of these three acts were personal chumros that Rabbi Elazar, himself one of the last talmidim of Rabbi Akiva and a rebbe of Rabbi Yehudah Hanasi, practiced (Keren Orah, Meromei Sadeh et al). Since our topic is Birkas Kohanim, we will address only that practice: What was unique about Rabbi Elazar’s practice of reciting a bracha before performing the mitzvah of Birkas Kohanim? Didn’t every kohein do the same? And, if so, why did the other kohanim not achieve the longevity that he did?

The Keren Orah commentary notes that the Gemara quotes the amora, Rav Zeira, as the source for the bracha on Birkas Kohanim, implying that the bracha on Birkas Kohanim was not standardized until his time, and he lived well over a hundred years after Rabbi Elazar’s passing. This implies that a bracha on this mitzvah was not necessarily recited during the era of the tanna’im and early amora’im. The Keren Orah suggests the reason for this was because Birkas Kohanim itself is a blessing, and we do not recite a bracha prior to reciting birkas hamazon or birkas haTorah, even though they themselves are mitzvos. Notwithstanding this consideration, Rabbi Elazar was so enthusiastic about blessing the people that he insisted on reciting a bracha before performing Birkas Kohanim. This strong desire to bless people was rewarded by his having many extra years to continue blessing them (Maharal).

Notwithstanding that the mitzvah is such a beautiful one, technically, the kohein is required to recite the Birkas Kohanim only when he is asked to do so, during the repetition of the shemoneh esrei. We will see shortly what this means practically.

Hoarse kohein

At this point, let us examine the second of our opening questions: “If a kohein is suffering from laryngitis, how does he fulfill the mitzvah of Birkas Kohanim?”

Let us examine this question thoroughly, starting from its sources in the Gemara: “One beraisa teaches: Koh sevarchu (‘this is how you should bless’): face to face… therefore the posuk says Emor lahem (say to them), as a person talks to his friend. Another beraisa teaches: Koh sevarchu, in a loud voice. Perhaps it means that the bracha should be said quietly, therefore the posuk says Emor lahem, as a person talks to his friend” (Sotah 38a).

This derives from the words of the posuk Koh sevarchu and Emor lahem two different laws. The first is that the audience receiving the kohanim’s bracha should be facing them during the Birkas Kohanim. (In error, some people turn around while the kohanim recite Birkas Kohanim, in order to make sure that they do not look at the kohanim’s hands. It is correct that they should not look at the hands of the kohanim who are duchening, but they can look down to avoid this problem, and, anyway, most kohanim cover their hands with their talis while duchening.)

The second law derived from these pesukim is that the kohein should recite the Birkas Kohanim loudly enough so that the people can hear him. Although there are kohanim who shout the words of the Birkas Kohanim, the continuation of the Gemara clearly explains that be’kol ram, in a loud voice, means simply loud enough for the people to hear the kohein. However, someone whose voice is so hoarse that people cannot hear him is not permitted to recite Birkas Kohanim and should leave the sanctuary part of the shul before the chazzan recites the word retzei in his repetition of shemoneh esrei (Mishnah Berurah 128:53).

Why retzei?

Why should the kohein leave the shul before retzei?

Some mitzvos aseh, such as donning tefillin daily, making kiddush, or hearing shofar, are inherent requirements. There isn’t any way to avoid being obligated to fulfill these mitzvos. On the other hand, there are mitzvos whose requirement is dependent on circumstances. For example, someone who does not live in a house is not obligated to fulfill the mitzvah of mezuzah. Living in a house, which most of us do, creates the obligation to install a mezuzah on its door posts. Someone who lives in a house and fails to place a mezuzah on the required doorposts violates a mitzvas aseh.

Similarly, the mitzvah of Birkas Kohanim is not an inherent requirement for the kohein. However, when someone asks the kohein or implies to him that he should perform the Birkas Kohanim, the kohein is now required to do so, and, should he fail to, he will violate a mitzvas aseh.

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 128:2) rules that a kohein who remains in shul is required to recite Birkas Kohanim if (1) he hears the chazzan say the word kohanim, (2) someone tells him to ascend the duchen or (3) someone tells him to wash his hands (in preparation for the Birkas Kohanim). Any of these three actions summon the kohanim to perform the mitzvah, and that is why they create a requirement on the kohein. A kohein for whom it is difficult to raise his arms to recite the Birkas Kohanim should exit the shul before the chazzan says the word kohanim (see Shulchan Aruch Orach Chayim 128:4 and Mishnah Berurah). The Magen Avraham and the Elyah Rabbah conclude that it is preferred if he exits before the chazzan begins the word retzei. The Shulchan Aruch mentions that the custom is for any kohein who is not reciting Birkas Kohanim to remain outside until the Birkas Kohanim is completed.

Washing hands

The Shulchan Aruch we just quoted rules that telling a kohein to wash his hands creates the same obligation to recite Birkas Kohanim as directly summoning him to recite the Birkas Kohanim. Why is that so?

This is because the Gemara rules that “any kohein who did not wash his hands should not perform nesi’as kapayim.” The Rambam (Hilchos Tefillah Uvirkas Kohanim 15:5) rules that the washing before Birkas Kohanim is similar to what the kohanim do prior to performing the service in the Beis Hamikdash. For this reason, he rules that their hands should be washed until their wrists. We rule that this is done even on Yom Kippur, notwithstanding that, otherwise, we are not permitted to wash the entire hand on Yom Kippur (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 128:6). Several acharonim rule that, since Birkas Kohanim is a form of avodah, washing before performing this mitzvah includes other requirements, such as washing with a cup, with clear water, and with at least a revi’is (about three ounces) of water (see Magen Avraham, Yeshuos Yaakov, Shulchan Shelomoh and Mishnah Berurah).

In many shullen, a sink is installed near the duchen, so that the kohanim can wash immediately before Birkas Kohanim. Others have a practice that water and a basin are brought to the front of the shul for this purpose. These customs have a source in rishonim and poskim and should definitely be encouraged. Tosafos (Sotah 39a s.v. Kol) concludes that the kohein should wash his hands immediately before ascending the duchen. He rules that the kohein should wash his hands within twenty-two amos, a distance of less than forty feet, of the duchen. The Magen Avrohom (128:9) rules according to this Tosafos, and adds that, according to Tosafos, since the kohanim wash their hands before retzei, the chazzan should recite the bracha of retzei rapidly. In his opinion, the time that transpires after the kohein washes his hands should be less time than it takes to walk twenty-two amos, and, therefore, retzei should be recited as quickly as possible. The Biur Halacha (128:6 s.v. Chozrim) adds that the kohanim should not converse between washing their hands and reciting Birkas Kohanim, because this also constitutes a hefsek.

The chazzan duchening

At this point, let us examine the third of our opening questions: “If the chazzan is a kohein, may he duchen?”

This question is the subject of a dispute between the Shulchan Aruch and the Pri Chodosh. According to the Shulchan Aruch, if the chazzan is a kohein, he should not recite Birkas Kohanim, unless he is the only kohein. The reason he should not recite Birkas Kohanim is out of concern that he might get confused and not remember the continuation of the davening. The Pri Chodosh disagrees, concluding that this was a concern only when the chazzan led the services from memory, which, although very common in earlier era, is today quite uncommon. If the koheinchazzan is using a siddur, such that Birkas Kohanim will not confuse him from continuing the davening correctly, he can recite Birkas Kohanim

In chutz la’aretz, the accepted practice in this halacha follows the Shulchan Aruch, whereas in Eretz Yisroel, customs vary in different locales. In Yerushalayim and most other places, the accepted practice follows the Pri Chodosh, and the chazzan performs Birkas Kohanim.

When the chazzan does recite Birkas Kohanim, he turns around to face the people, recites Birkas Kohanim, and then turns back to complete the repetition of the shemoneh esrei. He is even permitted to walk to the front of the shul from his place in order to recite Birkas Kohanim should he be leading the services from the middle of the shul rather than the front.

Conclusion

As a kohein myself, I find duchening to be one of the most beautiful mitzvos. We are indeed so fortunate to have a commandment to bless our fellow Jews, the children of Our Creator. All the more so, the nusach of the bracha is to bless His nation Israel with love. The blessings of a kohein must flow from a heart full of love for the Jews that he is privileged to bless.

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