Shabbos – RabbiKaganoff.com

Fragrant Havdalah

Question #1: Perfume

Reuven asks: May I use perfume for havdalah?

Question #2: Hadasim

Freidel queries: If I use hadasim for havdalah, what beracha should I recite prior to smelling them?

Question #3: Fragrantly Distant

Yael ponders: If someone is distant from the besamim at the time that havdalah is recited, what should they do?

Question #4: No Smell

Yehudah questions: I have no sense of smell. Does that mean that someone else in the family must recite havdalah?

Question #5: No Fragrance

Zevulun asks: I am on the high seas and have no besamim with me. Does that mean that I cannot recite havdalah until I locate some fragrance?

Introduction

In a different article, I discussed the order of the four berachos that we recite weekly when we make havdalah. In that article, I mentioned that we smell fragrances on motza’ei Shabbos to console our souls over the loss of the neshamah yeseirah — the extra aspect of the neshamah that we receive when Shabbos arrives that helps us appreciate the cholent, the kugel and the other Shabbos delicacies — that departs when Shabbos ends. This article will emphasize the halachos regarding the fragrances that we smell as part of the havdalah procedure.

I. Which fragrances warrant a beracha?

In general, when we smell pleasant fragrances, we are required to recite a beracha before smelling them. However, we do not recite a beracha on just anything that has a pleasant smell. Pleasant fragrances upon which one may not recite a beracha fall under four general categories:

A. Forbidden fragrances, such as that used in idol worship or sorcery, or the perfume of an ervah (Rambam, Hilchos Berachos 9:7, based on Berachos 53a). Even if a small amount of a forbidden fragrance is mixed into a potpourri of other fragrances, one does not recite a beracha before smelling the blend (Biur Halacha 217:8).

B. Fragrances whose purpose is not for pleasurable smelling (Berachos 53a; Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 217:2 and 297:2). These include: Deodorizers and other fragrances meant to neutralize bad odors; fragrances not meant for their aroma, but for other purpose, such as to add taste to food; items with only subtle fragrance that most people do not appreciate; items that most people do not consider fragrances, such as shampoos, essential oils, lotions or even fresh bread.

C. Fragrances whose source no longer exists, such as when you can still smell the residual aroma in the air or when you enjoy the smell of an empty besamim or esrog box.

D. Some recent authorities suggest that we should not recite a beracha on a synthetically created fragrance (Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, quoted in Shemiras Shabbos Kehilchasah, Vol. 2, Pg. 263 note 32). Synthetic fragrances are very common in perfumes, colognes, aftershave lotions etc., since synthetic aromas are frequently less expensive and their scent is more predictable than natural perfumes.

However, other authorities dispute this ruling, contending that fragrance should not be different from “synthetic food” made from a non-food substance, such as alcohol, vinegar, candies or flavoring whose source is petrochemical — which is very common today.

Perfume

Our opening question, from Reuven, was: May I use perfume for havdalah? I presume that Reuven was asking whether it could be used for the besamim of havdalah. (If he meant to ask if perfume can be used instead of wine, then the answer will have to wait for a future article that I am planning to write.) As we have seen, there may be several reasons why perfume should not be used:

It might be included under perfumes of ervah.
According to Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, it does not warrant a beracha since the flavor component might be synthetic.

II. Hadasim

Several early sources, both halachic and kabbalistic, mention a preference to use hadasim as the fragrance for havdalah (Zohar; Tur, Orach Chayim 297). The various reasons cited also relate to the hashkafic reasons and lessons attached to the role of hadasim on Sukkos. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 297:4) rules that it is customary to use hadasim as besamim for havdalah. However, this sometimes created two difficulties, one, halachic, and the other, practical.

First, the halachic issue: The Gemara and halachic authorities note that there is not just one beracha to recite on pleasant smelling fragrances, but five different berachos, just as there are six different berachos recited on different types of food: hamotzi, mezonos, hagafen, ha’eitz, ha’adamah and shehakol. The five “fragrant berachos” are:

1. Borei shemen areiv, “Who creates pleasant oil,” is recited only before smelling the oil of the balsam tree (see Mishnah Berurah 216:22).

2. Hanosein (or, according to many opinions, Asher nasan) rei’ach tov ba’peiros, “Who bestows (or bestowed) pleasant fragrances in fruits,” is recited before smelling edible fruits and other foods (Shulchan Aruch 216:2; Rema 216:14). In the context of this beracha, peiros means not only what we usually call “fruit,” but anything usually considered edible. We will explain this a bit more shortly.

3. Borei atzei besamim, “Who creates fragrant wood (or fragrant trees).” One recites this beracha before smelling fragrant woody plants and trees or their leaves, seeds, flowers, wood, or oils. Hadasim are certainly in this category, since they grow on a woody branch and bush.

4. Borei isvei besamim, “Who creates fragrant grasses.” We recite this beracha before smelling non-woody plants, their parts and extracts. We will shortly note a point regarding whether a particular plant is called “woody” or “non-woody.” (The technical term for “non-woody” is “herbaceous.”)

5. Borei minei besamim, “Who creates different types of fragrances.” This is the “catch-all” beracha for all fragrances, the equivalent of reciting a shehakol on food. Sometimes, it is the preferred beracha, such as when the fragrance is not of any of the above sources, such as musk, which is of an animal source. It is also used when smelling a blend of several pleasant-smelling substances that have different berachos, such as, if someone mixed hadasim with esrogim. Other times, it is the beracha used to resolve uncertain cases, as we will see shortly. However, since it can be used successfully on any fragrance, if someone, in error or without knowing, recited it before smelling balsam oil, esrogim, hadasim or mint, they will have fulfilled the beracha requirement and should not go back and recite the correct beracha.

Hadasim

At this point, let us address Freidel’s question, the second of those beginning our article: “If I use hadasim for havdalah, what beracha should I recite prior to smelling them?”

As mentioned above, the beracha before reciting hadasim is borei atzei besamim. However, the Shelah rules that, when reciting havdalah, one should always recite borei minei besamim because not everyone knows the halachos of what berachos to recite on fragrances, and yet everyone is required to recite havdalah. On the other hand, there are other early authorities who clearly do not hold like the Shelah, and contend that lechatchilah one is always required to recite the correct beracha when smelling a fragrance, even for havdalah, just as one is always required to recite the correct beracha when eating. In their opinion, when smelling hadasim for havdalah, one should recite borei atzei besamim (Rabbeinu Yerucham, quoted by Magen Avraham, introduction to 297). The Mishnah Berurah (297:1) quotes the Shelah’s opinion as the primary one, but recommends avoiding the shaylah by using for havdalah something upon which the beracha is borei minei besamim. Among the possible choices is using a blend of fragrances that each alone requires a different bracha, or an item upon which there is a safek as to what its beracha is. The result of this discussion is that, according to the Mishnah Berurah, it is not ideal to use exclusively hadasim for besamim in havdalah, but it is preferred to mix hadasim with something that requires a beracha other than borei atzei besamim.

Above, I mentioned that some halachic and kabbalistic sources express a preference to use hadasim as the fragrance for havdalah (Zohar, Tur, Orach Chayim 297). Aside from the halachic issue just explained, there was also a practical problem in that the hadas, called myrtle in English, does not grow in cold climates. Jews in central and eastern Europe were able to get hadasim for Sukkos only with tremendous difficulty, and they were often dried out and without fragrance by the time they arrived. Although crushing the dried hadasim releases some of the fragrance, they were certainly not as fragrant as fresh hadasim or as other varieties of fragrance that were available. For this reason, there is discussion, already in the rishonim, whether to use hadasim for besamim. The conclusion of the Rema (Orach Chayim 297:4) is to take fragrant items available in the area and add some dried hadasim to them. The common practice in Ashkenaz was to use cloves as the fragrance for havdalah, presumably because they have a pleasant odor when dried and were readily available. A clove is the dried flower bud that grows on a tree. The clove is consumed only as a spice, but is not eaten on its own. Among the halachic authorities, we find four opinions which beracha to recite before smelling cloves:

A. Hanosein rei’ach tov ba’peiros

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 216:2) rules that Hanosein rei’ach tov ba’peiros is the correct beracha to say before smelling cloves, contending that this beracha is recited on anything that is consumed, even if only as a seasoning.

B. Borei atzei besamim

Many authorities rule that we recite Hanosein rei’ach tov ba’peiros only on items that are eaten on their own, but not if they are solely a flavoring. Cloves are, therefore, discounted as a food item and treated exclusively as a fragrance. Since the clove grows on a woody stem, these authorities rule that we should recite Borei atzei besamim before smelling cloves (Yalkut Yosef 216:4).

C. Borei isvei besamim

Some contend that Borei atzei besamim is recited only on a fragrance that grows on what is considered a tree for all other halachos. The stem of a clove tree is hollow, which, according to some opinions, precludes it from being considered a tree. Therefore, some consider it an herbaceous plant, upon which the correct beracha is Borei isvei besamim. Apparently, this is the common custom among Yemenite Jews(Ohr Zion Vol. 2 pg. 136; Vezos Haberacha, pg. 174).

D. Borei minei besamim

Because of the disputes quoted above, many rule that one should recite Borei minei besamim on cloves, to avoid any halachic issues (Elyah Rabbah 216:9; Mishnah Berurah 216:16). This is the accepted practice among Ashkenazim and by many Sefardic poskim (Birkei Yosef 216:5; Kaf Hachayim 216:34; Ohr Zion Vol. 2 pg. 136).

In accordance with the custom cited by the Rema and to avoid any shaylos, this author makes a mixture of cloves, cinnamon and dried hadasim for havdalah and crushes the hadasim prior to reciting havdalah, to release their fragrance of the hadasim.

III. Take time to smell the cloves!

Yael asked: What should someone do if he is distant from the besamim at the time that the havdalah is recited?

It happens that not every individual has an opportunity to smell the besamim at the time the beracha on them is recited. In such situations, they should not smell the besamim while the other berachos are recited, but should wait until after the havdalah wine is drunk and then they may recite a beracha and smell the besamim.

IV. No sense of smell

At this point, let us analyze the fourth of our opening questions: “I cannot smell. Does that mean that someone else in the family must recite havdalah?”

In general, someone cannot recite a beracha of benefit, such as a beracha on food or beverage, for another person, unless the person reciting the beracha is also benefiting from the food or beverage and is required to recite a beracha before he may partake in the food or beverage. The exception to this rule is when the beracha is required in order to fulfill a mitzvah. For example, someone who has already fulfilled the mitzvah of kiddush may recite kiddush for someone who has, as yet, not fulfilled the mitzvah. Similarly, someone who has already fulfilled the mitzvah of havdalah may recite havdalah for someone who has, as yet, not heard havdalah.

Why is wine different?

In both of these instances, the person reciting kiddush or havdalah may recite the beracha of hagafen, even though he will not be drinking the wine and someone else will. Why can he recite a beracha on the wine, when he is not partaking from it? The answer is that, in these instances, the beracha on the wine is also considered a birkas hamitzvah, a beracha recited upon performing a mitzvah, and not merely a beracha of benefit. When assisting someone else to perform a mitzvah, I can recite a beracha on the other person’s behalf, and that includes even the beracha recited on the wine as part of performing the mitzvah.

There is one other exception to this rule: I may recite a beracha of benefit to teach my child how to recite it (for the purpose of chinuch), notwithstanding that I am not benefiting at the moment and would otherwise be unable to recite the beracha.

As we will see shortly, reciting a beracha on fragrances is not a requirement on motza’ei Shabbos, but simply a consolation to the neshamah yeseirah. As such, if I cannot smell the fragrances, I cannot recite the beracha on them. If I have children who are old enough to be responsible to recite berachos but are not yet halachically adults, I can recite the beracha on besamim for them and have them smell the fragrances. Otherwise, someone who cannot smell fragrances may not recite the beracha of besamim.

V. No fragrance

At this point, let us analyze the last of our opening questions: Zevulun asks, “I am on the high seas and have no besamim with me. Does that mean that I cannot recite havdalah until I locate some fragrance?”

Regarding the beracha recited on a flame as part of havdalah, the Gemara states, “We do not search to find a flame as we search to observe a mitzvah (Berachos 53b), meaning that there is no requirement to hunt for a flame in order to recite the beracha of borei me’orei ha’eish. Regarding someone who has no fragrance available, the Rosh reasons that the same law applies, since the rationale for the beracha on a flame on motza’ei Shabbos is stronger than that for reciting a beracha on fragrances. Therefore, once the Gemara rules that there is no requirement to search for a flame, there is certainly no requirement to look for fragrances; thus, it is better to recite havdalah when all are assembled than to delay. This ruling is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 297:1) and all later authorities.

Conclusion

In a monumental essay, Rav Hirsch (Bereishis 8:21) explains that the expression rei’ach nicho’ach, usually translated as “a pleasant fragrance,” should more accurately be rendered, “an expression of compliance.” He demonstrates that the word nicho’ach means “giving satisfaction” and the concept of rei’ach is used because fragrance implies receiving a very slight impression of something that is distant. Thus, when a korban is offered as a rei’ach nicho’ach, it means that it shows a small expression of our fulfilling Hashem’s will. Similarly, our observing all the details of the laws of Shabbos, down to the minutia of the halachos on fragrances, demonstrates our praising Hashem for even His small kindnesses.

Eating before Kiddush

Question #1: Reuven calls me: I have not been well, and I need to eat something shortly after awaking. On weekdays, I go to shul to daven when I wake up and can wait until after davening to eat, but I do not have this option on Shabbos. What should I do?

Question #2: Ahuva asks: It is difficult for me to wait for Kiddush until my husband returns from shul. May I eat something before he arrives home?

Question #3: Someone told me that a woman may not eat in the morning before she davens, but I remember being taught in Beis Yaakov that we may eat once we say the morning berachos. Is my memory faulty?

Answer:

This week’s parsha mentions the korban musaf of Shabbos. Observing Shabbos includes the mitzvah of reciting Kiddush Friday evening: borei peri hagafen and the special beracha of Kiddush, preceded by the passage of the Torah beginning with the word Vayechulu (Rambam, Hilchos Shabbos 29:7). This Kiddush fulfills the Torah’s mitzvah of Zachor es yom haShabbos lekadsho, Remember the day of Shabbos to sanctify it.

There is another Kiddush, introduced by our Sages, which is simply reciting borei peri hagafen and drinking wine prior to the Shabbos day meal. This article will discuss under what circumstances one may eat before reciting the daytime Kiddush.

First, we need to clarify that there are two related subjects here:

May one eat before reciting Kiddush?

May one eat before davening in the morning?

May one eat before reciting Kiddush, either at night or day?

May one eat or drink prior to reciting the Torah-required evening Kiddush? Although the Tanna, Rabbi Yosi, holds that someone eating a meal when Shabbos begins is not required to interrupt, but may complete his meal and then recite Kiddush afterwards, the Gemara concludes that we do not follow this approach. Once Shabbos arrives, it is forbidden to eat or drink anything until one recites or hears Kiddush (Pesachim 100a). The poskim conclude that one may not even drink water before Kiddush (Shulchan Aruch Orach Chayim 271:4).

What is the halacha regarding eating or drinking before daytime Kiddush? This matter is disputed by the two great pillars of halacha, the Rambam and the Raavad. The Rambam (Hilchos Shabbos, 29:10) declares that one may not taste anything before reciting the daytime Kiddush, whereas the Raavad contends that this prohibition applies only to the evening Kiddush, but not to the morning Kiddush.

What is the underlying issue of this difference of opinion? At first glance, it would seem that the Rambam and the Raavad are disputing the following question: When our Sages required Kiddush in the daytime, did they provide it with all the rules of evening Kiddush? After all, there is a general halachic principle Kol detikun rabbanan ke’ein de’oraysa tikun, whatever the Sages instituted they followed the pattern of the Torah’s mitzvos. (For brevity’s sake, I will henceforth refer to this concept simply as Kol detikun rabbanan.) Kol detikun rabbanan would indicate that just as one may not eat or drink before evening Kiddush, similarly one may not eat or drink anything before morning Kiddush. It would seem that the Rambam is contending that Kol detikun rabbanan applies to daytime Kiddush, whereas the Raavad disputes this for some reason that we will soon explain.

However, a careful reading of the Rambam demonstrates that this analysis is somewhat oversimplified, since the Rambam himself does not fully apply the concept Kol detikun rabbanan to daytime Kiddush. Whereas he introduces Chapter 29 of Hilchos Shabbos by stating: It is a positive mitzvah of the Torah to sanctify Shabbos with words, when he begins discussing the daytime Kiddush, he says: It is a mitzvah to recite a beracha over wine on Shabbos morning before one eats the second meal of Shabbos, and this is called Kiddusha Rabbah. Evidently, the daytime Kiddush is not a second mitzvah of Kiddush, but simply introduces that the daytime meal is in honor of Shabbos. (The early commentaries note that the term Kiddusha Rabbah [literally, the great Kiddush] for the daytime Kiddush, whose origin is in the Gemara itself [Pesachim 106a], is intentionally overstated.) We could say that the evening Kiddush is a sanctification of Shabbos, whereas the daytime Kiddush is a proclamation about the coming meal.

Reciting Kiddush over Bread

Now that we understand that evening Kiddush and daytime Kiddush serve different functions, we can explain why there are other halachic differences between them. For example, one may recite evening Kiddush over the challah-bread that one is using for the meal, but one may not use the bread of the day meal as a substitute for the daytime Kiddush. After all, if daytime Kiddush is to proclaim that the coming meal is in Shabbos’s honor, this proclamation must precede the meal and be somewhatdifferent from the meal itself.

So now we need to ask: If daytime Kiddush serves a different function than does evening Kiddush, why does the Rambam prohibit eating before daytime Kiddush? The answer is that he understands that some laws of Kiddush still apply in the daytime. The dispute between the Rambam and the Raavad is the degree to which daytime Kiddush is compared to evening Kiddush.

The Halacha

The accepted halacha follows the Rambam that one may not eat before daytime Kiddush (Shulchan Aruch Orach Chayim 289:1), although, as we will soon see, the Raavad’s opinion is not completely ignored by later authorities. They often factor the Raavad’s opinion when other mitigating circumstances exist, a halachic concept called tziruf. For example, the Elyah Rabbah (286:9) rules that a weak person who has no beverage available on which to recite Kiddush may rely on the Raavad together with another opinion who contends that there is no obligation to make Kiddush until one has completed davening Musaf. According to this opinion, someone who eats or drinks after completing Shacharis has no requirement to recite Kiddush before eating.

May one drink water before Kiddush?

In regard to the evening Kiddush, the halacha is that one may not drink anything, even water, once Shabbos begins before reciting Kiddush. Does the same law apply to morning Kiddush? The Tur cites a dispute whether one may drink water before davening on Shabbos morning, since one has as yet not recited or heard Kiddush. He quotes the Avi HaEzri as prohibiting this, whereas the Tur’s own father, the Rosh, permitted drinking water before Kiddush, and he himself drank before Shabbos morning davening. The Rosh reasoned that drinking before Kiddush is prohibited only once the time for reciting Kiddush has arrived, which is not until one has davened. Prior to davening, one is prohibited from eating and it is therefore too early for the Shabbos meal and too early for Kiddush. As we will soon see, one may drink even tea or coffee before davening on weekdays, and the Rosh permits this also on Shabbos morning.

May one eat before morning davening?

At this point, we can discuss the first question raised above: I have not been feeling well lately, and find that I need to eat something shortly after awaking. On weekdays, I go to shul to daven shortly after I wake up and can wait to eat until after davening, but there is no available minyan for me to attend early Shabbos morning. What should I do?

Reuven’s question involves an issue that we have as yet not discussed: May one eat before davening in the morning?

The Gemara (Berachos 10b) states: “What do we derive from the verse, You may not eat over blood? That you may not eat (in the morning) before you have prayed for your ‘blood’… The verse states, in reference to someone who eats and drinks prior to praying: You have thrown me behind your body (Melachim 1 14:9). Do not read your body (in Hebrew gavecha), but your arrogance (gai’echa). The Holy One said: After this person has indulged in his own pride (by eating or drinking), only then does he accept upon himself the dominion of heaven!?”

The halacha that results from this Gemara is codified by all authorities. To quote the Rambam: “It is prohibited to taste anything or to perform work from halachic daybreak until one has prayed shacharis” (Hilchos Tefillah 6:4).

Would you like tea or coffee?

Although all poskim prohibit eating and drinking before morning davening, we find early authorities who permit drinking water before davening since this is not considered an act of conceit (Rosh quoting the Avi HaEzri; the Beis Yosef cites authorities who disagree, but rules like the Avi HaEzri). Most later authorities permit drinking tea or coffee, contending that this is also considered like drinking water, but the poskim dispute whether one may add sugar to the beverage. The Mishnah Berurah and others prohibit this, whereas the Aruch Hashulchan and other later authorities permit it. They are disputing whether adding sugar to the beverage promotes it to a forbidden beverage or whether it is still considered water that one may imbibe before davening.

Hunger

The Rambam rules that someone who is hungry or thirsty should eat or drink before he davens so that he can daven properly (Hilchos Tefillah 5:2).

Similarly, some authorities contend that anything eaten or drunk for medical reasons may be done before davening. They explain that the Gemara prohibited only eating or drinking that demonstrate arrogance, whereas that done for medical reasons is, by definition, not done for arrogance (Beis Yosef, quoting Mahari Abohav). This approach is accepted as normative halacha by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 89:3).

I will be hungry!

What is the halacha if someone is as yet not hungry, but he knows that he will be so hungry by the end of davening that it will distract him from davening properly. Is he permitted to eat before davening so that the hunger does not distract him? This question impacts directly on Reuven’s question.

The answer to this question appears to lie in the following Talmudic discussion (Berachos 28b):

“Rav Avya was weak and, as a result, did not attend Rav Yosef’s lecture that took place before Musaf. The next day, when Rav Avya arrived in the Yeshiva, Abayei saw Rav Avya and was concerned that Rav Yosef may have taken offense at Rav Avya’s absence. Therefore, Abayei asked Rav Avya why he had failed to attend the previous day’s lecture. After which the following conversation transpired:

Abayei: Why did the master (addressing Rav Avya) not attend the lecture?

Rav Avya: I was not feeling well and was unable to attend.

Abayei: Why did you not eat something first and then come?

Rav Avya: Does the master (now referring to Abayei) not hold like Rav Huna who prohibits eating before davening Musaf?

Abayei: You should have davened Musaf privately, eaten something and then come to shul (Berachos 28b).

We see from Abayei’s response that someone who is weak should daven first and then eat, even if this means that he davens without a minyan. Based on this passage, several noted authorities rule that someone who will not be able to wait until after davening, and cannot find an early minyan with which to daven, should daven privately (beyechidus), eat and then attend shul in order to hear the Torah and fulfill the mitzvos of answering Kaddish and Kedusha (Be’er Heiteiv 89:11; Biur Halacha 289; Da’as Torah 289 quoting Zechor Le’Avraham; Shu”t Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 2:28 at end of teshuvah). Thus, it seems that we can positively answer Reuven’s question: If he cannot wait to eat until davening is over, he should daven Shacharis be’yechidus, make Kiddush and eat something, and then come to shul to answer Borchu, Kedusha, Kaddish and hear keri’as haTorah.

May a woman eat before Kiddush?

At this point, we have enough information to discuss Ahuva’s question: It is difficult for me to wait for Kiddush until my husband returns from shul. May I eat before he arrives home?

Of course, Ahuva may recite Kiddush herself and eat something before her husband returns home. To fulfill the mitzvah, she needs to eat something that satisfies the halacha of Kiddush bimkom seudah¸ a topic we will have to leave for a different time. However, Ahuva either does not want to recite Kiddush, or does not want to eat something to accompany the Kiddush. Is there a halachic solution to permit her to eat or drink before Kiddush?

Some authorities suggest approaches to permit Ahuva to eat or drink before Kiddush. Here is one approach:

Although most authorities obligate a woman to recite the daytime Kiddush and prohibit her from eating before she recites Kiddush (Tosafos Shabbos 286:4, 289:3; Pri Megadim, Mishbetzos Zahav 289:1; Mishnah Berurah 289:6), this is not a universally held position. One early authority (Maharam Halavah, Pesachim 106, quoting Rashba) contends that women are absolved of the requirement to recite daytime Kiddush, for the following reason:

Since the daytime Kiddush is not an extension of the mitzvah of evening Kiddush but is to demonstrate that the meal is in honor of Shabbos, this requirement does not devolve upon women. Although this approach is not halachically accepted, some authorities allow a woman to rely on this opinion, under extenuating circumstances, to eat before reciting morning Kiddush (Shu”t Minchas Yitzchak 4:28:3).

When does a married woman become obligated to make Kiddush?

Rav Moshe Feinstein presents a different reason to permit a married woman to eat before Kiddush. He reasons that since a married woman is required to eat the Shabbos meal with her husband, she does not become responsible to make Kiddush until it is time for the two of them to eat the Shabbos meal together, meaning after davening (Shu”t Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 4:101\2). However, the Shemiras Shabbos Kehilchasah (Chapter 52, note 46) quotes Rav Shelomoh Zalman Auerbach as disputing Rav Moshe’s conclusion that a married woman has no obligation yet to make Kiddush. Firstly, he is unconvinced that she is halachically required to eat her meal with her husband. Furthermore, even if she is, this duty may not permit her to eat before Kiddush.

If we do not follow the lenient approaches mentioned, when does a woman become obligated to recite Kiddush and, therefore, at what point may she no longer drink tea, coffee, and water? The Acharonim debate this issue, but understanding their positions requires an understanding of a different topic:

What must a woman pray?

All authorities require a woman to daven daily, but there is a dispute whether she is required to recite the full shemoneh esrei (I will call this the “Ramban’s opinion”), or whether she fulfills her requirement by reciting a simple prayer, such as the morning beracha that closes with the words Gomel chasadim tovim le’amo Yisrael. (I will refer to this as the “Magen Avraham’s opinion.”) Allow me to explain.

When may she eat?

According to the Ramban’s opinion that a woman is required to recite the full shemoneh esrei, she may not eat in the morning without first davening (see the previous discussion), whereas according to the Magen Avraham’s opinion that she fulfills her requirement once she has recited a simple prayer or morning berachos, she may eat once she recited these tefilos.

Some authorities rule that a woman becomes obligated to hear Kiddush as soon as she recites berachos, since she has now fulfilled her requirement to daven and she may therefore begin eating her meals. According to this opinion, once she has recited morning berachos she may not eat or drink without first making Kiddush (Tosafos Shabbos 286:4, 289:3). This approach contends that before she recites morning berachos, she may drink water, tea or coffee, but after she recites morning berachos she may not even drink these items without first reciting Kiddush.

There is another view that contends that a woman can follow the same approach that men follow, and may drink water, tea or coffee even after she recited berachos before she has davened (Pri Megadim, Eishel Avraham 289:4 as understood by Halichos Beisah page 204).

At this point we can address the third question I raised above:

“Someone told me that a woman may not eat in the morning before she davens, but I remember being taught in Beis Yaakov that we may eat once we say the morning berachos. Is my memory faulty?”

Many authorities contend that although a woman should daven shemoneh esrei every morning, she may rely on the opinion of the Magen Avraham in regard to eating, and may eat after reciting morning berachos. In many institutions, this approach was preferred, since it accomplishes that the tefillah that the girls recite is a much better prayer and they learn how to daven properly.

Conclusion

According to Rav Hirsch, observing Shabbos, and declaring its holiness, means recognizing that the arrival of Shabbos signifies that man’s activity has attained its goal. Now it is time to recognize Hashem’s creation and devote ourselves to developing our spirituality. When we recite Kiddush, we should internalize this message.

Do I say Retzei, Ya’aleh Veyavo or both?

Since Rosh Chodesh falls on motza’ei Shabbos, I thought it appropriate to again share our discussion about:

Is it Shabbos versus Rosh Chodesh?

“When Rosh Chodesh begins on motza’ei Shabbos, do I say Ya’aleh Veyavo in bensching at seudah shelishis when I finish it after it is dark?”

Introduction

When we recite Birkas Hamazon on Shabbos, Yom Tov, Chol Hamoed, Rosh Chodesh, Chanukah and Purim, we include special prayers to commemorate the holiday. On Shabbos, we recite a passage beginning with the word Retzei; on Yom Tov, Chol Hamoed and Rosh Chodesh, the opening words are Ya’aleh Veyavo; and on Chanukah and Purim, Al Hanissim.

In a different article, I discussed whether one recites these additions when one’s meal started on Shabbos or a holiday and finished on a weekday, or vice versa – i.e., one began the meal on a weekday and completed it on the holiday. Does one recite the special addition to commemorate the holiday when this happens, or does one omit it? We discovered that there are several opinions as to what to do. These are the earliest opinions that I found:

1. When one bensches

The Rosh rules that one recites the version of Birkas Hamazon appropriate to when one bensches, regardless as to when one ate the meal. In his opinion, one who finished seudah shelishis after nightfall does not recite Retzei. Similarly, one whose Purim seudah ends after Purim does not recite Al Hanissim. The Rosh also holds that someone who completed a meal before Rosh Chodesh and bensches after it is dark should recite Ya’aleh Veyavo.

2. The beginning of the meal

The Maharam, as understood by the Bach and the Aruch Hashulchan, maintains that the text of the bensching is established according to what was correct when the meal began. Therefore, one who finished seudah shelishis after nightfall recites Retzei, since his meal began on Shabbos. Similarly, if he finished his Purim seudah after Purim he recites Al Hanissim.

There is an exception – if he did something to declare that Shabbos is over, such as he recited havdalah, davened maariv, or even simply answered borchu to maariv, he does not recite Retzei any more, as it is therefore inconsistent to mention Shabbos in bensching.

3. All of the above

The Maharam, as understood by the Taz, contends that one adds the special prayer if either the meal began on the holiday or one is bensching on the holiday. Thus, one who finished seudah shelishis after nightfall recites Retzei, and someone who completed a meal before Rosh Chodesh and bensches after it is dark should recite Ya’aleh Veyavo.

The halachic conclusion

The halachic consensus regarding someone who began his meal on Shabbos or Purim and continued it into the night is that one recites Retzei or Al Hanissim, following the position of the Maharam and not the Rosh.

Conflicting prayers

The topic of our current article adds a new aspect to this question – what to do when Rosh Chodesh or Chanukah begins on motza’ei Shabbos, and seudah shelishis started on Shabbos and was completed on Rosh Chodesh or on Chanukah. According to the Rosh, one should recite Ya’aleh Veyavo or Al Hanissim. However, the consensus of halachic later authorities follows the opinion of the Maharam. Those who understand that the Maharam ruled that one should always recite the text of Birkas Hamazon appropriate to the beginning of the meal, one should recite Retzei. Yet, many authorities follow the second interpretation of the Maharam mentioned above, that one adds the special prayer if either the meal began on the holiday or one is bensching on the holiday. What complicates our question is that there may be a requirement to recite both Retzei and either Ya’aleh Veyavo or Al Hanissim, yet mentioning both in the same bensching might be contradictory in this instance, since, technically speaking, the holiday begins after Shabbos ends. As we will soon see, whether or not this is a problem is debated by the authorities.

The earliest authority that I found who discusses this predicament is the Bach (end of Orach Chayim, 188). Regarding what to recite when seudah shelishis continues into Rosh Chodesh, he concludes that one should say Retzei and not Ya’aleh Veyavo, because the beginning of a meal determines the exact text of its Birkas Hamazon. As I mentioned above, this is the way the Bach understands the Maharam’s position – that the proper bensching is always determined by the beginning of the meal. Since the halacha follows the Maharam’s position, the Bach rules according to his understanding of the Maharam, that one recites Retzei and not Ya’aleh Veyavo.

The Magen Avraham (188:18; 419:1) analyzes the issue differently from the way the Bach does. First, he considers the possibility that one can recite both Retzei and Ya’aleh Veyavo. This is based on his understanding of the Maharam’s position that ending a meal on Rosh Chodesh or a different festival is reason to recite the holiday additions, even if the meal started on a weekday. However, the Magen Avraham concludes that one cannot recite both Retzei and Ya’aleh Veyavo in this instance, because this is an inherent contradiction: If it is already Rosh Chodesh, it is no longer Shabbos, and if it is still Shabbos, it is not yet Rosh Chodesh. Because of this conundrum, the Magen Avraham concludes that one should follow the Rosh’s opinion, that one recites whatever is appropriate to be said at this moment, which means to recite only Ya’aleh Veyavo.

The Magen Avraham contends that this is done only when one continued his meal into Rosh Chodesh and ate bread on Rosh Chodesh. If he did not eat bread on Rosh Chodesh, he should recite only Retzei, following the Maharam’s opinion that the special prayers are determined by the beginning of the meal.

Chanukah on motza’ei Shabbos

The Magen Avraham also rules that there is a difference in halacha between Rosh Chodesh and Chanukah. When Chanukah begins on motza’ei Shabbos and seudah shelishis extended into the beginning of Chanukah, he rules that one should recite only Retzei and not Al Hanissim, even if he ate bread on Chanukah.

Why is Chanukah different from all other nights?

The Magen Avraham explains that, whereas when bensching on Rosh Chodesh one is required to say Ya’aleh Veyavo (notwithstanding that forgetting Ya’aleh Veyavo does not require you to repeat the bensching, the Gemara (Shabbos 24a) states that Al Hanissim in bensching of Chanukah is optional and not required. Therefore, continuing the Shabbos meal into Chanukah does not annul the responsibility to recite Retzei.

More opinions

At this point, we have seen two opinions concerning what to do for the bensching of a seudah shelishis that extended into Rosh Chodesh:

(1) The Bach: Recite Retzei; ignore Ya’aleh Veyavo.

(2) The Magen Avraham: If he ate bread on motza’ei Shabbos, he should recite Ya’aleh Veyavo; otherwise he should recite Retzei.

A third position, that we have as yet not discussed, is that once it is Rosh Chodesh he should recite Ya’aleh Veyavo and not Retzei (Maharash of Lublin, quoted by Shelah and Taz 188:7). The Maharash maintains that since it is Rosh Chodesh at the time that he bensches, the requirement to recite Ya’aleh Veyavo is primary and preempts the requirement to recite Retzei, which he considers to be secondary, since it is no longer Shabbos.

Both!

A fourth position is that of the Taz (188:7), who challenges the assumption that one cannot recite both Retzei and Ya’aleh Veyavo in the same bensching. Although Rosh Chodesh falls only after Shabbos ends, the Taz concludes that since Retzei is recited first and Ya’aleh Veyavo afterward, it is not contradictory to first recite Retzei and then Ya’aleh Veyavo. Saying Ya’aleh Veyavo first would be a problem, because that would imply that Shabbos is over. Therefore, one who ate on Shabbos and is bensching on Rosh Chodesh should recite both additions. In this approach, the Taz disagrees with all the other early acharonim in his contention that there is nothing wrong with mentioning both additions.

To sum up, someone whose meal began on Shabbos and is bensching on Rosh Chodesh, should:

Recite Ya’aleh Veyavo, according to both the opinion of the Rosh and that of the Maharash.

Recite Retzei, according to the opinion shared by the Bach and the Aruch Hashulchan.

Recite both Retzei and Ya’aleh Veyavo, according to the conclusion of the Taz.

According to the ruling of the Magen Avraham, if he ate bread after Rosh Chodesh arrived, he should recite Ya’aleh Veyavo. If he did not, he should recite Retzei.

Rabbi, what should I do?

The Mishnah Berurah (188:33), when recording what to do, implies that one should follow the position of the Magen Avraham. He then mentions the Taz as an alternative approach – that one should say both Retzei and Ya’aleh Veyavo. This is consistent with the Mishnah Berurah’s general approach of following the Magen Avraham, except when the latter’s position is opposed by most later authorities.

The Aruch Hashulchan, on the other hand, concludes neither as the Magen Avraham nor the Taz, but that what one recites is always determined by the beginning of the meal. Therefore, in this situation, he rules to recite Retzei and omit Ya’aleh Veyavo, regardless of whether one ate on Rosh Chodesh.

Since there are many conflicting positions as to which additions to recite when Rosh Chodesh begins on motza’ei Shabbos, many people avoid eating bread after nightfall. They eat all the bread that they intend to eat towards the beginning of the meal, and upon completing the seudah, recite bensching including Retzei and omitting Ya’aleh Veyavo. This approach follows the majority of halachic authorities (Bach, Magen Avraham, Aruch Hashulchan, Mishnah Berurah [according to his primary approach]), although it runs counter to the opinions of the Maharash and the Taz. Those who want to avoid any question recite Birkas Hamazon before the arrival of Rosh Chodesh.

Conclusion

In our daily lives, our hearts should be full with thanks to Hashem for all He does for us. Birkas Hamazon provides a regular opportunity to elicit deep feelings of gratitude for what Hashem has done in the past and does in the present. All the more so should we should acknowledge Hashem’s help on special holidays.

Open, Sayeth Me!!

Dateline: Friday Evening Seudah, Dessert: A Bitter Tasting Shabbos

Photo by uluer servet yüce on Freeimages.com

Question #1: Daniel asks you on Monday morning, “We spent last Shabbos at a hotel bearing a proper hechsher, and the coffee was served with small packets of sugar, sweetener, and pareve ‘creamer.’ I always thought that one may not open these packages on Shabbos, so I drank my coffee unsweetened — a bitter experience. What was the hotel relying on?”

Dateline: Shabbos Morning, Bright and Early: A True Family Crisis

Question #2: The Klein family is in crisis this Shabbos morning! Someone finished the box of Sweetios before everyone else ate breakfast! May they open a new box this morning, or are they condemned to a Sweetios-less Shabbos?

Dateline: Shabbos Late Afternoon: Forgot the Flats

Question #3: Judith knocks on the rav’s door Shabbos afternoon. “I purchased disposable flatware for a sheva berachos seudah shlishis, but forgot to open the package before Shabbos. May I open the package on Shabbos? Would it help to recite the magic formula, nicht am Shabbos garet, before doing so?”

Answer:

Daniel, the Kleins, and Judith are all raising common questions regarding the opening of packaging on Shabbos. None of the scenarios above are unusual, and occasionally the entire Shabbos day is filled with such interesting predicaments.

In a different article, I discussed the questions involved in opening cans on Shabbos. I will begin here by reviewing some points mentioned previously.

In that article, we discovered that the laws of Shabbos prevent making a neat opening in a vessel, such as boring a hole in a storage drum (Shabbos 146a). I noted that Rav Moshe Feinstein prohibits opening a milk or juice carton on Shabbos, since creating the spout constitutes making a neat opening (Shu’t Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 4:78). Does opening a single serve package, a cereal box, or a package of disposable tableware constitute making a neat opening? Does it involve any other Shabbos prohibitions?

Ruining

The previous article also analyzed the law of mekalkeil, literally, ruining, and noted that an act whose direct result is destructive is prohibited only miderabbanan. For example, digging a hole in the ground when one needs the earth but is not interested in the hole is halachically defined as a destructive activity and is therefore prohibited only miderabbanan.

Razing

Razing or demolishing a building in order to renovate it violates a Torah melachah called Soseir. As we learned in the previous article, many authorities understand that demolishing a container is included under this melachah; however, since this activity is usually mekalkeil, it will be prohibited only miderabbanan. For example, although smashing a barrel to obtain its contents constitutes Soseir, since the smashed barrel is mekulkal (ruined), it is prohibited only miderabbanan. Some authorities permit smashing a barrel to obtain the food inside, but most prohibit this (Biur Halacha 314:1). Some conclude that one should not admonish those who do, provided they do not make a neat opening in the process (Aruch Hashulchan 314:8).

All authorities agree that to obtain the food inside, one may break open a mustaki, which is a barrel that was previously broken and then reconstructed in a feeble way using resin as glue. Since a mustaki is not considered a proper vessel, smashing it open to obtain the food inside is permitted, provided one does not make a neat opening in the process (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 314:1).

Are any of the packages that Daniel, the Kleins, and Judith asked about comparable to a mustaki, which would permit tearing the packaging open for its contents?

“Lulav Baskets”

The previous article also cited the Gemara that permits ripping open a chosal, a type of basket made of lulav branches, in order to access the unripe dates or dried figs stored inside. Although one may not break open containers on Shabbos, one may tear apart a chosal because it is considered an artificial peel or shell around the fruit, and not a vessel (Kolbo, quoted by Beis Yosef and Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 314:8). Just as one may remove the natural peel or shell of a fruit on Shabbos, and it is not considered destroying a vessel, one may remove an artificial “peel” or “shell” on Shabbos. Do any of the above-mentioned packages constitute chosalos? Do non-edible items, such as paper goods, have a halachically-recognized artificial peel?

Tearing through Letters or Designs

In addition to the above questions, several other halachic concerns may arisewhileopening packages on Shabbos. Erasing, Mocheik, is one of the thirty-nine melachos of Shabbos performed in the building of the Mishkan. Each board used in constructing the walls of the Mishkan was marked in order to identify its correct place when the Mishkan was reassembled (Shabbos 103b; Rashi, Shabbos 73a). Sometimes a board was mislabeled, requiring one to erase its numbering and re-mark it.

Drawing a design also constitutes writing and is prohibited min haTorah on Shabbos (Rambam, Hilchos Shabbos 11:17), since the concept of Koseiv is to create a written form of communication. Mocheik means the removal of a communication. When the purpose of the erasing is to allow correct communication to be inscribed in its place, erasing creates a positive result and therefore incurs a Torah violation. Thus, erasing a whiteboard is prohibited min haTorah since the primary purpose in doing so is so that one can write anew on the board. (Some contend that this is prohibited only miderabbanan because the writing on the board is not permanent. This is a topic for a different time.)

Erasing that does not create any direct positive benefit is prohibited only miderabbanan since it is mekalkeil. It is questionable whether erasing because one wants the board to be clean is prohibited min haTorah or only miderabbanan.

Tearing through a letter or through a design is also prohibited as Mocheik (see Magen Avraham 519:4), since one obliterates the lettering or design. However, since tearing through the lettering or design does not make the communication any clearer, this latter type of Mocheik is usually mekalkeil and involves only a rabbinic prohibition. Still, tearing lettering or a design on a package entails a rabbinic prohibition of Mocheik and must be avoided.

However, to avoid any prohibition of Mocheik, it is adequate to tear in a way that one is not deliberately attempting to tear lettering.

Cutting Him Down to Size

Another melachah called Mechateich involves cutting items to a very precise size or shape. Mechateich was performed in the Mishkan when a hide was trimmed to a requisite size, and is also involved when cutting leather to make shoes or when cutting material for a pattern (see Rashi, Shabbos 73a).

If a sugar packet includes markings to advise someone how to open it, does tearing it there violate Mechateich?

Tearing, Korei’ah

One of the 39 melachos of Shabbos is Korei’ah, tearing, which was incurred while weaving the Mishkan’s elaborate tapestry. Artisans sometimes repair a curtain by tearing the woven material and then resewing or reweaving it (Shabbos 75a). Thus, tearing material on Shabbos as a step in manufacturing or repairing involves a Torah prohibition. Is opening packages prohibited because of tearing?

Wine or Brine

Understanding the melachah of Korei’ah presents us with many challenges and certainly requires an article of its own. In this article, I will simply note two cases mentioned in Talmudic sources that appear to involve tearing and yet do not violate the melachah of Korei’ah. In one instance, the Tosefta permits ripping a leather cover attached to a barrel of wine or brine (Tosefta Shabbos 17:9 and Beitzah 3:9). Also, there is a Gemara that implies that tearing a piece of papyrus on Yom Tov in order to grill food on it does not violate Korei’ah (Beitzah 32b). (The Gemara’s word niyar means papyrus and not paper. Paper was unknown in the Mediterranean Basin and Western Asia at the time of the Gemara.)

Why does neither of these cases involve the melachah of Korei’ah? Without going into all the discussion about this melachah, I will share two answers offered to this question:

Some contend that the prohibition of Korei’ah applies only to woven material and therefore does not apply to paper or leather (Gra”z 340:17; Ketzos HaShulchan 145:4). This compares favorably with the source for the melachah of Korei’ah in the Mishkan, which was tearing cloth that required repair or resewing. Others maintain that Korei’ah applies only when both sides of the ripped item will subsequently be used (Biyur Halacha 340:13 s.v. ein shovrin). According to either of these approaches, no prohibition of Korei’ah is involved when tearing the leather cover off a barrel, either because one does not intend to use the cover or because leather is not woven, nor does it apply when tearing papyrus or paper to grill on it when one has no use for the part torn off. Similarly, one would not violate Korei’ah when opening the sugar and cream packets Daniel asked about, or the Sweetios’ cereal box, or the package of disposable tableware. Nevertheless, there are other authorities who prohibit tearing any of these items on Shabbos (Pri Chodosh, Yoreh Deah 118:18).

Did Shabbos’s Coffee Need To Be Bitter?

Now that we have mentioned many of the basic principles involved, let us discuss Daniel’s question: Can one open small packets of sugar, sweetener and pareve “creamer” on Shabbos?

We now know that several halachic issues must be analyzed carefully in order to resolve Daniel’s question.

1. Is opening these packets equivalent either to creating or to destroying a vessel?

2. Is tearing the top of the packet comparable to creating a spout or opening?

3. Does this violate Mechateich, cutting to size, particularly since one usually opens these packages along a premarked dotted line?

4, Can there be any concern of erasing or tearing?

Sugar Bags

The authorities debate whether one may open a bag of sugar on Shabbos. Shemiras Shabbos Kehilchasah prohibits opening such a bag because it is creating a new serviceable vessel and/or a neat opening. He permits access to the sugar only if one rips the bag in a way that destroys it and then empties the contents into a different container. On the other hand, Rav Moshe Feinstein contends that opening a bag of sugar is not deemed creating a new vessel (Shu”t Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 1:122). In his opinion, a sugar bag is considered a chosal (“peel”), which he defines as any packaging that is not reused for another product; once its product is used, everyone disposes of the chosal. As mentioned above, a chosal is considered to be a “peel” for its contents. Just as one may peel a fruit or vegetable without it being considered making or destroying a vessel, so, too, opening a chosal is not considered making or destroying a vessel.

Single Serve Packets

Regarding single-serve packets, many authorities feel that these are considered chosalos, since they are certainly not meant for reuse after the contents are emptied, and the small packets themselves are flimsy and do not lend themselves to any type of reuse. Those who are lenient feel that there is also no problem with Mechateich, even if one opens the packets along their perforations, since one is not interested in having a packet that has a specific shape or size. The line is there simply to facilitate opening the packet without spilling sugar all over the place.

Erasing

When opening these or any other types of packets, one must be careful to try to not tear any lettering or design, which would involve a rabbinic prohibition of Mocheik. Should one attempt not to tear the lettering or design, and it is possible to tear the package without destroying the lettering or design, one may tear open the package without violating the prohibition of Mocheik. If the lettering tore notwithstanding your efforts, you need not be concerned; Shabbos was not violated.

Korei’ah

In our above discussion, we noted that according to many authorities there is no concern of Korei’ah.

However…

Despite his conclusion that no Shabbos violations are involved in opening any packaging that is disposed of when its contents are finished, Rav Moshe concludes that one should always open these packages before Shabbos since people might misunderstand the laws and mistakenly open packaging that is prohibited (Shu”t Igros Moshe 1:122:10). Many other authorities quote similar positions (Kaf HaChayim 314:38; Minchas Shabbos 80:164:9; Minchas Yitzchak 4:82:38). However, if someone is making a sheva berachos or invited guests and finds, to his embarrassment, that he does not have enough food to serve, Rav Moshe permits having a gentile open the packages on Shabbos (Shu”t Igros Moshe 1:122; for a similar approach, see Shu”t Chelkas Yaakov 3:8). Presumably, having a gentile open them under these circumstances will significantly reduce the risk of future error.

Other authorities are less concerned about the human error problem and permit opening such types of packets on Shabbos (Shulchan Shelomoh). Thus, the hotel that served Daniel these condiments in unopened, single-serve packages held that they could allow its guests to rely on these opinions.

The Kleins’ Cereal Box

At this point, we can try to resolve the crisis at the Klein’s breakfast table. May they open the new cereal box or may they not?

Opening the box is presumably not creating a new vessel – the box existed before it was glued shut. Here the question is whether tearing the glue that seals the box violates Shabbos.

One may not glue items together on Shabbos; therefore, ripping apart a glued item also violates Shabbos (Rambam, Hilchos Shabbos 10:11). Thus, some authorities contend that opening the cereal box is forbidden since one tears apart two sides that are glued together. The same problem is encountered when opening the bag inside the box. A differing position maintains that the prohibition of tearing apart a glued item applies only if one uses a strong permanent paste such as that used in binding, not the type used to close the top of the box (Nimla Tal, Meleches Korei’ah #17).

On the other hand, if we look at this box and the bag inside as chosalos whose entire purpose is to be a “peel” for the cereal, one may open them. It may be prohibited to make a neat opening, but this is not a major concern for five-year-old Yanki Klein, who is only interested in accessing his Sweetios and not about the condition of the bag. Again, one should try not to tear any lettering in the process. Also, many authorities still rule that one should avoid doing this on Shabbos since the laws are very complicated and people may err. I refer the Kleins to get halachic guidance on this issue from their posek.

By the way, many packages are stuck together with very light glue. My wife mentioned that this is common practice for packages of ladies’ socks and disposable tableware. Many authorities feel that opening this type of glue is not considered Korei’ah, and I refer the reader to his/her rav for halachic guidance.

Sheva Berachos Flatware

At this point, I would like to look at our last question: May one open packages of disposable flatware on Shabbos?

Opening this kind of packaging does not involve creating or destroying any vessel since the package never was and never becomes a vessel. There is also no problem of Mechateich for the same reasons mentioned above. Some authorities prohibit opening this package because of Korei’ah, and others contend that there is no heter to consider this a chosal, since the product is not edible. However, many authorities permit opening packages of napkins or disposables (see Shulchan Shelomoh 314:4:4; Orchos Shabbos 12:23 and footnote 37).

Nicht am Shabbos Garet

I presume that we are all aware that there is no magic formula, such as nicht am Shabbos garet, which permits doing anything on Shabbos that is otherwise prohibited.

We can now understand well why, after writing a lengthy responsum on the subject, Rav Moshe Feinstein still concluded that one should not open these packages out of concern that people will violate the laws involved. Creating a beautiful Shabbos entails much planning and organization. It is worthwhile that one’s preparation for Shabbos should include opening packages, perhaps even immediately when bringing the items home from the store before placing them on the shelf. Studying all the melachos of Shabbos helps us appreciate Shabbos more and get the maximum joy out of this special day.

More on Seudah Shelishis

There are two reasons why we are studying the topic of seudah shelishis this week. First of all, the 39 melachos of Shabbos are derived from the laws of the building of the Mishkan, making the laws of Shabbos appropriate for this week. Secondly, in a few short weeks we will be celebrating the rare observance of Erev Pesach that falls on Shabbos. Observing that phenomenon requires knowledge of the laws of eating three meals on Shabbos. So, we are getting prepared in advance

Question #1: Double on Friday!

Does someone who eats two meals on Friday night and only one on Shabbos day fulfill the mitzvah of eating three meals on Shabbos?

Question #2: Split Feature

May I divide my Shabbos morning meal in half, thereby fulfilling seudah shelishis?

Question #3: Early Seudah Shelishis

How early may I eat seudah shelishis?

Answer

In an article I published recently, we discussed the mitzvah to eat three meals on Shabbos, which might be required min haTorah. We learned of the dispute between tanna’im whether the requirement is to eat three meals during the course of the entire Shabbos, or whether it is to eat three meals during the daytime of Shabbos, plus a Friday evening meal, for a total of four meals. We also learned that the rishonim disagree on whether the last of the Shabbos meals must include bread. The conclusion of the Shulchan Aruch and most late authorities requires eating bread for the third Shabbos meal, and that this should be done by reciting hamotzi upon two whole loaves of bread or rolls (lechem mishneh). Both men and women are obligated to fulfill the mitzvah of eating three meals on Shabbos, despite the fact that it is a time-bound positive mitzvah (mitzvas aseih sheha’zeman grama).

We have not yet discussed or resolved several halachic issues germane to the mitzvah of eating three seudos on Shabbos. Is there a time frame within which these three meals must be eaten? For example, may I eat all three meals Friday night? Let’s say that after the Friday night seudah, Reuven decides to make hamotzi when attending a neighbor’s shalom zachor. Or, perhaps, he joined a Friday night sheva berachos for dessert and made hamotzi to satisfy the requirements of a minyan. Upon returning home after the bread, beer, peanuts and chickpeas of the shalom zachor, or the bread, cake, pareve ice cream and wine of the sheva berachos, Reuven makes hamotzi again and has a third seudah. Has he now fulfilled eating the three meals of Shabbos and can sleep (or diet) the entire Shabbos day?

Alternatively, Shimon is invited to a sit-down hamotzi kiddush after an early minyan Shabbos morning. His wife, who prefers to catch up on some much-needed shuteye on Shabbos morning, sleeps until eleven, and then, when Shimon returns from the morning kiddush, joins him for a splendid repast that ends with plenty of time for him to learn with each of his seven sons before he leaves to catch the earliest mincha gedolah minyan in the neighborhood. His wife still needs to eat seudah shelishis, but has Shimon now fulfilled his obligation to eat three meals on Shabbos, one on Friday night and two on Shabbos morning?

Or, an actual shaylah that I was once asked. A mohel had a Shabbos bris to perform that was a considerable distance from his home, and he could not join them for the bris seudah. In order to daven in shul and attend the bris, his only option was to leave his home early Shabbos morning, daven in a shul near the bris, perform the bris and then walk back, arriving home on Shabbos afternoon. Does he fulfill the three meals of Shabbos by eating two of them either on Friday night or on Shabbos afternoon?

A similar shaylah often presents itself among nurses, doctors, other emergency personnel or family members who must be in the hospital on Shabbos or in another setting in which they have little control over their schedule. Does one fulfill the three meals of Shabbos by eating two of them either Friday night or Shabbos afternoon?

Rabbi Chidka

To answer these questions, we will discuss a beraysa that records a dispute between the tanna kamma and Rabbi Chidka, whether we are required to eat three meals on Shabbos or four (Shabbos 117b-118a).

The pasuk in the Torah says, “And Moshe said, eat it today, for today is Shabbos for Hashem. Today you will not find it [the mann] in the field” (Shemos 16:25). The requirement to eat three meals on Shabbos is derived from this pasuk, because the word hayom is written three times. The tanna kamma understands that the requirement is to eat three meals over the course of Shabbos, whereas Rabbi Chikda learns that three meals required during Shabbos day, with an additional requirement to eat a meal on Friday night – for a total of four meals.

Proof from a Mishnah

The Gemara endeavors to prove whether a Mishnah holds like the tanna kamma, like Rabbi Chidka, or perhaps like neither. Before quoting this Mishnah, I need to provide an introduction. The Mishnah (ibid. 117b) discusses a situation in which a house is burning on Shabbos, but there is no risk to life from the fire (see Rema, Orach Chayim 334:26) – for example, all the people in the house can exit safely, and there is no risk of the fire spreading to another building; perhaps it is a farmhouse or exurban house very distant from any neighbors. It is also discussing a situation in which taking items out of the burning house does not involve any prohibition against carrying on Shabbos – in other words, there is an eruv or other halachically acceptable way to carry the items out of the house.

Under the above conditions, Chazal allowed removing from the burning house only as much food as is needed to provide for the meals of Shabbos.

In these circumstances, why do Chazal limit how much one may carry out of the house?

The Gemara explains that the concern is that since a person becomes confused when he may lose money, he might violate Shabbos in ways that are not permitted, such as by extinguishing the fire (Shabbos 117b). The concern is that once someone gets involved in saving things from a fire, he may forget that it is Shabbos (see Tosafos Yom Tov). By providing very specific rules as to what he may save from the fire and what he may not, Chazal ensure that he will not forget that it is Shabbos, and he will be attentive to what he is permitted to do even under stressful circumstances. This demonstrates the absolute brilliance and depth of understanding of the human psyche that Chazal displayed in the way they created their takkanos.

The Mishnah mentions a dispute concerning how much food may be removed from the fire. Theunnamed first opinion (stam Mishnah) rules that it is permitted to save enough for the meals that he intends to eat on Shabbos, but no food for after Shabbos – not even for melaveh malkah, the meal of motza’ei Shabbos. Therefore, the stam Mishnah states that if a fire began on Friday night, it is permitted to remove from the burning house three Shabbos meals. If the fire started Shabbos morning, it is permitted to remove food for two meals. And if it is in the afternoon, which the Mishnah calls “mincha,” it is permitted to save only one meal.

Rabbi Yosi disagrees, ruling that it is always permitted to remove three meals. He contends that once it is sometimes permitted to save three meals, the gezeirah of how much to remove is not contingent on when during the Shabbos day the fire is discovered – it is always permitted to save three meals (Rashi to the Mishnah, Shabbos 117b).

How much can you drink?

By the way, according to all opinions it is permitted to remove as much beverage as you can possibly drink, even late in the afternoon, since a person is never certain how much he might want to drink (Tosefes Shabbos, cited in Biur Halacha 334:1 s.v. Uveshacharis). I am unaware of any distinction made between soft drinks and harder beverages. Thus, although chas veshalom that anyone should ever have a household fire, bear in mind that, within the eruv, you can haul out your entire supply of Chivas Regal on Shabbos.

Tanna kamma or Rabbi Chidka?

In order to understand the proofs regarding whether the three meals of Shabbos must be eaten at certain times of the day, we need to analyze a passage of Gemara. The Gemara seeks clarity as to whether the Mishnah holds like the tanna kamma that there is a requirement to eat three meals on Shabbos, or like Rabbi Chidka, who requires four meals. Ultimately, this depends on how we understand the Mishnah. When the Mishnah permits saving three meals from a burning house on Friday evening, was it discussing someone who had already consumed his Friday night repast when he discovered the fire, or someone who had not yet eaten his meal? This technical question will reveal to us whether the Mishnah holds like the tanna kamma or like Rabbi Chidka. If he has already eaten his Friday night meal, yet the Mishnah still permits saving three meals, clearly the Mishnah holds according to Rabbi Chidka that three additional meals are to be consumed on Shabbos.

If the Mishnah’s case was when he has not yet eaten the Friday night meal, the Mishnah holds like the tanna kamma, since it allows saving three meals and not four, thus not allowing for the fourth meal required by Rabbi Chidka. Since there is no way to know whether the Mishnah’s fire was discovered before or after he ate his Shabbos meal, we cannot prove from this part of the Mishnah on its own whether its author held like the tanna kamma or Rabbi Chidka.

A similar discussion takes place regarding the case in the Mishnah when the homeowner discovers a fire on Shabbos morning – and there, the Mishnah rules that he can save two meals. If the Mishnah refers to someone who has not yet eaten his Shabbos morning repast, and yet it holds that he saves two meals, the Mishnah holds like the tanna kamma. On the other hand, if he has already eaten his Shabbos morning repast, and the Mishnah permits saving two meals, the Mishnah must hold like Rabbi Chidka, who contends that he has two more meals to eat. As with our case above, it is unclear whether this Mishnah is describing someone who discovered the fire before he ate his morning meal or after. Although it is clear that the Mishnah’s author had an opinion regarding the dispute between the tanna kamma and Rabbi Chidka, we cannot determine which way he held on the basis of this part of the Mishnah alone.

The same analysis is germane to the Mishnah’s ruling regarding saving only one meal on Shabbos afternoon, a time period which the Mishnah calls “mincha.” If the Mishnah refers to someone who has not yet eaten his Shabbos afternoon meal, yet it holds that he can save only one meal, then we know that the Mishnah holds like the tanna kamma. On the other hand, if he has already eaten his seudah shelishis and the Mishnah holds that he can save another meal, the Mishnah must hold like Rabbi Chidka, who contends that he has yet to eat a fourth meal. Here, too, we cannot determine which way the Mishnah holds.

Before we discuss the Gemara’s conclusion about whether the Mishnah requires three or four seudos, let us note several important observations. Although the beraysa mentions the position of Rabbi Chidka, there is no allusion as to when Rabbi Chidka holds that the three meals should be eaten, other than that they must all be eaten during the daytime part of Shabbos.

Now, if the Mishnah is according to Rabbi Chidka, it could be possible that on Shabbos afternoon a person could still have two meals to eat. Yet the Mishnah allows only one meal to be saved at “mincha” time. This implies that, according to Rabbi Chidka, he is required to eat one meal Shabbos morning, a second before the time called mincha, and a third sometime thereafter.

Based on the assumption of the Mishnah that mincha time is before someone has eaten their last meal of Shabbos, Tosafos rules that seudah shelishis must be eaten after mincha time (Shabbos 118a s.v. Bamincha). This is also the opinion of several other rishonim (Rambam, Hilchos Shabbos 30:9; Hagahos Maimaniyos ad loc. quoting Rabbeinu Tam; see Mordechai, #397). Thus, according to these rishonim, Shimon, who ate two seudos on Shabbos morning, did not fulfill the mitzvah of eating three meals on Shabbos, since he ate his third meal in the morning and did not wait until the afternoon to eat it. Certainly, Reuven, who ate all three meals at night, did not fulfill this mitzvah correctly.

Ba’al Halachos Gedolos

The Ba’al Halachos Gedolos (usually abbreviated Behag) has a different approach. He rules that it is permitted to split the Shabbos morning meal in half, bensch in the middle of the meal and wash again – and thereby it qualifies as two meals, (Shabbos 6:19:2). The rishonim cite other evidence to this practice from other passages of Gemara: one passage that discusses how much chometz you can leave over when erev Pesach falls on Shabbos, and another regarding washing dishes on Shabbos that will be used in the course of Shabbos. Tosafos notes this to have been a common custom, but raises two objections to the practice. First, seudah shelishis must be eaten in the afternoon, as is implied by the Gemara in Shabbos quoted above, and these people ate in the morning. This objection is deflected by other rishonim. The Mordechai (Shabbos #397), quoting Rabbi Eliezer of Metz, the author of Sefer Yerei’im, and others, explains that the Mishnah is simply estimating how much food a person would usually consume during that part of the day, but not delineating when the meal must be eaten (see also Rosh, Shabbos 16:5).

Beracha she’einah tzericha

The second objection of Tosafos is that the method suggested by the Behag involves reciting berachos she’einan tzerichos – berachos that are unnecessary, since a person is bensching and reciting new berachos of netilas yadayim and hamotzi only in order to count one meal as two.

Obviously, the Behag was not concerned that this practice generates berachos she’einan tzerichos. Some authorities explain that since the purpose of splitting the meal this way is to fulfill the mitzvah of eating three meals on Shabbos, that itself makes all the berachos purposeful. A beracha she’einah tzericha is, by definition, a beracha recited without any purpose at all.

Despite Tosafos’ objections, the Behag’s approach is quoted approvingly by the Ran, who explains that it is not necessary to fully interrupt the meal; it is sufficient, he says, to bensch, throw a cloth on top of the food, recite hamotzi again, uncover the food, eat another kebeitzah-size piece of bread and bensch a second time.

Gemara’s conclusion

Ultimately, the Gemara demonstrates that the Mishnah does not hold like Rabbi Chidka because of a different reason. A principle of the Mishnah and the Gemara is that when a dispute is recorded, this is the only matter in which the two disputants disagree. Based on this, we can prove that Rabbi Yosi – who permits saving three meals any time of the day — holds like the tanna kamma in the dispute of the beraysa between the tanna kamma and Rabbi Chidka. If Rabbi Yosi held like Rabbi Chidka, he would permit removing four meals from the burning house, since there are times that one might need to evacuate the house before eating any Shabbos meals. Yet, Rabbi Yosi permits removal of only three meals – meaning that the maximum number of meals that you are ever required to eat on Shabbos is three!

So the dispute between the stam Mishnah and Rabbi Yosi is not how many meals you are required to eat on Shabbos, but whether Chazal permitted the same number of meal retrievals regardless of the time of day. Therefore, we can demonstrate that the stam Mishnah also held according to the tanna kamma and not Rabbi Chidka (Shabbos 118a with Rashi).

On an ordinary Shabbos, fulfilling the mitzvah of eating three meals should not present any major difficulty or require extensive planning. One should simply follow the conclusion of the Shulchan Aruch, who requires that all three Shabbos meals be bread-based, one on Friday night, a second in the morning, and the third on Shabbos afternoon.

This sequence is halachically preferable. However, we have endeavored to determine what the halacha is in unusual situations. As we have seen, according to most authorities, eating the three Shabbos meals by combining two or more of them into one part of the day does not fulfill the mitzvah. Nevertheless, since there are authorities who rule that this practice fulfills the mitzvah, someone who cannot follow the optimal way to fulfill the mitzvah should still try to have three meals on Shabbos and fulfill the mitzvah according to the Behag’s opinion, namely, that one must eat three meals over the course of Shabbos, but the time when one eats them is not a halachic concern.

Next week’s exciting article will outline how we observe, in practice, these laws on Erev Pesach.

Conclusion

The entire takkanah of saving food from a fire is highly unusual. While observing Shabbos, we need to focus constantly on what we do and how we do it. The laws of moving muktzah fulfill a similar goal. Implementing the laws of muktzah requires the details of Shabbos observance to be on our minds constantly.

Creating a beautiful Shabbos entails much planning and organization. Studying all the halachos of Shabbos helps us appreciate Shabbos more, and enables us to achieve maximum joy and growth on this special day.

Renting Animals for Shabbos

Question #1: Avi’s Donkey Rental

For halachic reasons, Avi always specifies that rental animals must be returned before Shabbos. What does he do if the renter does not bring it back in time?

Question #2: Hertzl’s Horse Sales

Hertzl sells all types of horses: Racehorses, carriage horses (those that lost the Kentucky Derby) for the Amish, and show equines. If he is scrupulous about closing his business on Shabbos and Yom Tov, does he face any other halachic issues? He knows that he has no problems with charging interest, because his clientele is all non-Jewish.

Foreword:

Neither Avi’s nor Hertzl’s shaylos are new – both situations show up in the Gemara. As a matter of fact, the Gemara (Avodah Zarah 15a) teaches that, because of various Shabbos concerns, the Mishnah prohibits selling large animals to non-Jews on any day of the week. The Gemara (ibid.) already mentions heterim that Chazal implemented allowing Jews to be in this line of business, and the rishonim discuss why the custom seems to be more lenient than the Gemara allows. Rabbeinu Peretz, author of probably the earliest edition of the Hagahos Semaq, presents advice what Avi should do if the renter does not return the animal before Shabbos. We will discuss Rabbeinu Peretz’s solution, but first I must explain the halachic background involved.

(Rav Yitzchak of Corbeil, one of the baalei tosafos, wrote a work he called “Amudei Olam” but this work was called the “Semaq” by virtually everyone and became a very common and often copied work. Numerous “hagahos” were added to it. Each of these was simply called Hagahos Semaq, but they are really completely different works sharing in common that they are notes that someone wrote on the manuscript edition of the Semaq that he found. The first of these was presumably the one written by Rabbeinu Peretz, a contemporary of the original author.)

Introduction:

The words of the Aseres Hadibros are: “The seventh day is Shabbos for Hashem, your G-d. You may not do any work; not you, your son, your daughter, your slave, your maidservant or your animal.” Thus, we are introduced to the concept that Shabbos is not only for us to observe, but also for us to ensure that animals are not involved in Shabbos desecration. We understand that we are required to observe Shabbos, but why are our animals required to do so? Does the Torah assume that every animal has the ability to understand which day is Shabbos?

The answer is that animals have no obligation to observe mitzvos. The mitzvah applies to Jews: we are prohibited from having our animals perform melacha on Shabbos. There is absolutely no requirement to restrain an animal from performing melacha that it is performing for its own benefit. Therefore, flock and cattle may be allowed to graze on Shabbos, notwithstanding that they are reaping hay, alfalfa or other grasses in the process. Similarly, chickens and turkeys may hunt and eat worms, cats may hunt mice, and falcons may harvest their prey, provided the falconer is not involved in any capacity.

Shevisas beheimah

Actually, there are two different mitzvos, one called shevisas beheimah and the other called mechameir. Shevisas beheimah prohibits a Jew from having his animal worked by a person on Shabbos. The owner is in violation of this prohibition even if it is a non-Jew who works his animal (Sanhedrin 58b). The Rambam (Hilchos Shabbos 20:1) explains that this is a lav haba michlal aseih (also sometimes called issur aseih)derived from the pasuk, On the seventh day you shall cease from work, in order that your ox and your donkey can rest (Shemos 23:12; see also Devarim 5:14). An issur aseih is a prohibition that the Torah teaches by phrasing it as a positive mitzvah.

Mechameir is when a Jew uses an animal to perform a melacha, even if he does not own the animal.

Shevisas beheimah and mechameir are not mutually exclusive: Shevisas beheimah is violated when a Jew’s animal is worked on Shabbos, regardless as to who caused the animal to work. Mechameir is violated when a Jew is actively involved in having the animal work on Shabbos, regardless of who owns the animal. If a Jew uses his own animal to work on Shabbos, he violates both prohibitions, mechameir and shevisas beheimah.

Both of these activities, shevisas beheimah and mechameir, are prohibited min haTorah. Does this mean that they are considered on the same level as performing one of the 39 melachos on Shabbos? Chazal explain that there are two categories of activities that are prohibited min haTorah on Shabbos — those included under the heading of melacha and those that are not. The first are those that the Torah says could require capital punishment, as we see from the story of the mekosheish (Bamidbar 15:32-35). The second are those that, while prohibited min haTorah, are not as severe and do not involve capital punishment.

Some amora’im contend that mechameir has the full status of a melacha, and that it is included in the statement of the Torah, You may not perform any work – not you, not your son, your daughter, your slave, your maid or your animal (Shemos 20:10; see also Devarim 5:14). Following this position, the amora, Rami bar Chama, rules that causing an animal to perform melacha by goading it with your voice desecrates Shabbos on the same level as performing the melacha yourself. This means that if the goader intentionally violated Shabbos this could be a capital crime; if performed negligently, the goader is obligated to offer a korban chatas (Shabbos 153b; see also Avodah Zarah 15a, cf. Maharsha ad loc.). This renders mechameir far more severe than shevisas beheimah, which violates only an aseih.

Other opinions in the Gemara, including Rabbi Yochanan and Rava, contend that, although mechameir is potentially on this level of culpability, this is only if the goader performed some type of physical action, but speech alone does not qualify. Instructing your animal to plow, harvest, turn on lights or any other melacha indeed violates mechameir, but is not culpable, whether performed intentionally or negligently (Shabbos 154a). However, should someone plow together with his ox (Magid Mishnah, Hilchos Shabbos 20:1) or hunt together with his dogs (Rambam, Hilchos Shabbos 10:22) he would be as guilty as was the mekosheish.

There is a third, compromise position in the Gemara, that of Rav Zevid. In his opinion, mechameir performed intentionally by vocal instruction is a capital offense, whereas doing it negligently is exempt from offering a korban chatas. The Rambam rules according to Rabbi Yochanan and Rava, that mechameir does not render an offender culpable for either capital punishment or korban chatas.

Training your dog

The violation that we are describing applies regardless of which animal has been utilized to violate Shabbos. Many years ago, Mr. Cohen, an observant but not Jewishly well-educated man, trained his dog, Fido, to turn on and off lights by command. He still had the old style draw cords to turn his lights on and off (anyone remember those?) and had attached extended strings to them so that they would be within Fido’s reach. After training his dog to turn the lights on and off upon command, Mr. Cohen felt that he had improved upon the Shabbos clock. Now, through the course of Shabbos, he could change the light settings of his home at will. However, he did not realize that having Canis familiaris turn lights on and off upon command of Homo sapiens is prohibited min haTorah as a violation of mechameir, and, in this instance, also shevisas beheimah. He violated mechameir, because he was himself instructing the dog to desecrate Shabbos, and shevisas beheimah, because a dog owned by a Jew was performing melacha for a human. Needless to say, Mr. Cohen, was surprised and chagrined to discover that all his training efforts were for naught.

Only melacha

Both shevisas beheimah and mechameir violate Shabbos min haTorah only when the animal is used to perform an activity that, for a person, is considered melacha. Thus, having an animal plow or plant a field violates Shabbos. We will soon see that having the animal carry a rider does not.

Selling animals

The Mishnah prohibits selling a large animal, such as a cow or donkey, to a non-Jew. These sales are prohibited on any day of the week. I will cite the Gemara’s reason for this shortly. The main opinion prohibits selling even calves and foals, and even if the animals are injured and unable to work. The Mishnah then cites two opinions that are slightly more lenient: Rabbi Yehudah, who permits selling a “broken” (i.e., an injured) animal to a non-Jew, and Ben Beseira, who permits selling horses (Avodah Zarah 14b).

The Gemara (Avodah Zarah 15a) explains that the prohibition of selling a large animal to a non-Jew could cause the seller to desecrate Shabbos in one of two ways.

Renting or lending

The Gemara explains that for a Jew to rent or lend an animal to a non-Jew over Shabbos could easily cause the Jewish owner of the animal to desecrate Shabbos. Should the non-Jewish renter or borrower have the animal perform melacha on Shabbos, the Jewish owner violates the Torah prohibition of shevisas beheimah. Prohibiting the sale of large animals to non-Jews avoids a Jew having any financial dealings involving these animals, thus avoiding any potential pitfalls.

Mechameir

The other concern is that the Jew might sell the animal to a non-Jew before Shabbos, but the non-Jew discovers on Shabbos that he cannot get the animal to follow his instructions, so he asks the Jew for help with the animal. If the Jew speaks and the animal obeys his voice and thereby performs melacha, the Jew has directed the animal to work on Shabbos, which is a desecration of mechameir, even should the non-Jew already own the animal.

For those in the cattle business, there are heterim discussed in the Gemara and the halachic authorities; we will leave that topic for another time.

The minority opinions

Having explained why the Mishnah prohibited selling, renting or lending animals to non-Jews, we need to explain why Rabbi Yehudah ruled that it is permitted to sell them a broken animal and Ben Beseira permitted selling them a horse.

We learned that the mitzvos of mechameir and shevisas beheimah prohibit having animals perform melacha for a human. A broken animal is defined as one that cannot work. Presumably, the non-Jew purchasing it does so either for its meat, its leather or its milk, none of which involve a prohibition of either mechameir or shevisas beheimah.

To explain why Ben Beseira permitted selling a horse to a non-Jew, I need to explain a different concept.

Chai nosei es atzmo

In several places, the Gemara discusses a halachic principle called chai nosei es atzmo, literally, “a living thing carries itself” (Shabbos 94a, 141b; Eiruvin 103a; Yoma 66b). This principle teaches that, min haTorah, there is no prohibition on Shabbos to carry a person who is able to walk on his own; carrying someone who can walk on his own is prohibited only miderabbanan. A result of this principle is that riding a horse on Shabbos even in a public area is not prohibited min haTorah since the work being performed by the horse would not be considered a melacha.

Ben Beseira permits selling a riding horse to a non-Jew for the following reason. The prohibition of selling an animal is out of concern that the seller might help the new purchaser ride his horse on Shabbos. However, since riding a horse on Shabbos is only a rabbinic prohibition, banning the sale of a riding horse would be a gezeirah le’gezeirah, a decree of the Sages whose purpose is to make sure that someone not violate another decree, and we generally do not impose gezeirah le’gezeirah. The first opinion disagrees with Ben Beseira because of a concern that an old riding horse might be sold to a non-Jew for its horsepower and be used to grind grain or some similar activity that is prohibited on Shabbos min haTorah.

What is the reason that chai nosei es atzmo removes this act of carrying from the category of being a melacha min haTorah? The rishonim discuss this matter, and Tosafos (Shabbos 94a s.v. Shehachai), after suggesting other possibilities, concludes that the reason is because building the Mishkan never necessitated carrying something that was alive. Although both hides of animals and dyes manufactured from animal sources were used in the construction of the Mishkan, Tosafos concludes that the animals whose hides were used were led, rather than carried, to where they were slaughtered, and the animals that provided sources for the dyes were transported after they were dead. Thus, chai nosei es atzmo exempts from desecrating Shabbos because carrying is violated min haTorah only when performed fairly comparably to the way carrying was done when the Mishkan was constructed (Tosafos, Eruvin 97b s.v. Es and Shabbos 2a s.v. Pashat; see also Penei Yehoshua on Tosafos 94a s.v. Shehachai).

Is this still applicable?

Tosafos (Avodah Zarah 15a s.v. Eimur) notes that, in his day, the rabbinic prohibition against selling large animals was not commonly observed. He explains that, whereas, at the time of the Gemara, a Jew who wished to sell an animal could easily find another Jew interested in purchasing it, this was true only when one lived in an area with a sizable Jewish population. However, in Tosafos’ era, there were usually only a few Jews living within a much larger non-Jewish population, and the market for selling or renting excess animals was the local non-Jewish farm population. Tosafos therefore rules that, under these circumstances, Chazal did not create the prohibition. This approach is codified by later rishonim, and leads to a discussion about the following question:

The Gemara (Shabbos 18b) mentions that, just as a Jew is prohibited from having his animal work for him on Shabbos, Beis Shammai also forbids him from having his other property work for him on Shabbos. According to Beis Shammai, it is forbidden to have Shabbos clocks turn appliances on and off on Shabbos; and it should be also forbidden to cook your cholent in your pot on Shabbos and to have your refrigerator operate. But even the households that followed Bais Shammai cooked cholent. The Gemara questions how does Beis Shammai permit having your pot cook or warm your cholent on Shabbos? The Gemara answers that Beis Shammai contends that the owner of these appliances makes them ownerless, hefker, and ownerless items, like a non-Jew’s property, are not included in the laws of Shabbos.

Rabbeinu Peretz (Hagahos Semaq, quoted by Tur, Orach Chayim 246) utilizes this heter to avoid Avi violating Shabbos when the non-Jew works the animal. He rules that the Jew should declare his animal ownerless (cf: Tosafos, Shabbos 18b, end of s.v. Vehashta and s.v. Dimafkera). Of course, this would seem to cause a financial complication for Avi’s business. If the owner declares the animal ownerless, why can’t the non-Jew just walk off with the animal after Shabbos, claiming that the animal is now his?

Based on his understanding of a passage of Gemara in Nedarim (45a), Rabbeinu Peretz explains that Avi can declare that the animal is hefker only for Shabbos, and this precludes anyone taking possession of it. How and why this works is not entirely clear (see Ran and Rosh ibid.; and Shu”t Rabbi Akiva Eiger 1:145 s.v. Amnam). The Graz (Orach Chayim 246:9) explains that the owner’s hefker takes place only when the animal is being used to perform melacha on Shabbos. As soon as the animal stops doing melacha, the Jew repossesses the animal automatically. If and when the non-Jew begins to do more melacha with the animal, the animal becomes hefker again and returns to the Jew’s possession when it is not doing melacha. The Graz contends that this arrangement makes it impossible for anyone to take possession of the animal, although why this is so is also not obvious.

Evidently, this type of hefker, which precludes the non-Jew from taking possesson of the animal, operates similarly to the rules of selling something temporarily, which is different from renting out a property. Whereas a tenant may not make changes in the property because he does not own it, someone who purchases an item temporarily may make any changes in the property that would be considered normative by an owner. The temporary purchaser may not trash the property, but he may make major renovations to it. And, just as someone may sell an item temporarily, and when the terms of the sale are over the item automatically reverts back to its original owner, so, too, an owner may declare a properly temporarily hefker and then it reverts back to its original owner. This unique method will help Avi avoid violating the law of shevisas beheimah, should a non-Jew not return the animal before Shabbos.

Conclusion

As I mentioned above, animals have no requirement to observe mitzvos. The requirement forbidding melacha is a commandment to us; observing Shabbos requires that we refrain from having animals perform melacha for us. And the reason is simple: For six days of every week, Hashem grants permission, indeed responsibility, to oversee and rule over the world that He created. However, we must always remember that it is He who gave us this authority, and, by observing Shabbos, we demonstrate this. Our power extends over all of creation, including the animal kingdom. Thus, Shabbos limiting our control of animals demonstrates that our authority the rest of the week is only by virtue of the authority granted us by Hashem.

Carrying in Public and the Use of an Eruv

In this week’s parsha, the Torah recounts the story of the manna, also including the unbecoming episode where some people attempted to gather it on Shabbos. In the words of the Torah:

And Moshe said, “Eat it (the manna that remained from Friday) today, for today is Shabbos to Hashem. Today you will not find it (the manna) in the field. Six days you shall gather it, and the Seventh Day is Shabbos – there will be none.”

And it was on the Seventh Day. Some of the people went out to gather, and they did not find.

And Hashem said to Moshe: “For how long will you refuse to observe My commandments and My teachings. See, Hashem gave you the Shabbos. For this reason He provides you with two-day’s supply of bread on the sixth day. On the Seventh Day each person should remain where he is and not leave his place” (Shemos 16:25-29).

Although the Torah’s words each person should remain where he is and not leave his place imply that even leaving one’s home is forbidden, the context implies that one may not leave one’s home while carrying the tools needed to gather manna (Tosafos, Eruvin 17b). The main prohibition taught here is to refrain from carrying from one’s house or any other enclosed area (halachically called reshus hayachid) to an area available for the entire Benei Yisroel in the Desert to traverse, a reshus harabim. Chazal further explain that moving an item in any way from a reshus hayachid to a reshus harabim is a Torah violation, whether one throws it, places it, hands it to someone else, or transports it in any other way (Shabbos 2a, 96). Furthermore, we derive from other sources that one may also not transport an item from a reshus harabim to a reshus hayachid, nor may one transport it four amos (about seven feet) or more within a reshus harabim (Gemara Shabbos 96b; Tosafos, Shabbos 2a s.v. pashat). Thus, carrying into, out of, or within a reshus harabim incurs a severe Torah prohibition. For convenience’s sake, I will refer to portage of an item from one reshus to another or within a reshus harabim as carrying, regardless of the method of conveyance.

One should note that with reference to the melacha of carrying on Shabbos, the terms reshus hayachid and reshus harabim do not relate to the ownership of the respective areas, but are determined by the extent that the areas are enclosed and how they are used. A reshus hayachid could certainly be public property and there are ways whereby an individual could own a reshus harabim.

Notwithstanding the Torah’s clear prohibition against carrying into, from, or within a reshus harabim, we are all familiar with the concept of an eruv that permits carrying in areas that are otherwise prohibited. You might ask, how can poles and wires permit that which is otherwise prohibited min haTorah? As we will soon see, it indeed cannot, and the basis for permitting use of an eruv is far more complicated.

We are also aware of controversies in which one respected authority certifies a particular eruv, while others contend that it is invalid. This is by no means a recent phenomenon. We find extensive disputes among early authorities whether one may construct an eruv in certain areas; some considering it a mitzvah to construct the eruv, whereas others contend that the very same “eruv” is causing people to sin.

AN OLD MACHLOKES

Here is an instance. In the thirteenth century, Rav Yaakov ben Rav Moshe of Alinsiya wrote a letter to the Rosh explaining why he forbade constructing an eruv in his town. In his response, the Rosh contended that Rav Yaakov’s concerns were groundless and that he should immediately construct an eruv. Subsequent correspondence reveals that Rav Yaakov did not change his mind and still refused to erect an eruv in his town. The Rosh severely rebuked Rav Yaakov for this recalcitrance, insisting that if Rav Yaakov persisted, he, the Rosh, would place Rav Yaakov in cherem! The Rosh further contended that Rav Yaakov had the status of a zakein mamrei, a Torah scholar who rules against a decision of the Sanhedrin, which, in the time of the Beis HaMikdash, constitutes a capital offense (Shu”t HaRosh 21:8). This episode demonstrates that heated disputes over eruvin are by no means recent phenomena.

The goal of this article is to explain what allows the construction of an eruv, and present some circumstances in which one authority permits carrying within a specific eruv while another forbids it.

IS IT A MITZVAH?

Before I present the arguments for and against eruv construction in the modern world, we should note that all accept that it is a mitzvah to erect a kosher eruv when this is halachically and practically possible, as the following anecdote indicates.

Rabbah the son of Rav Chanan asked Abayei: “How can it be that an area in which reside two such great scholars (Abayei and Abayei’s Rebbe) is without an eruv?” Abayei answered: “What should we do? It is not respectful for my master to be involved, I am too busy with my studies, and the rest of the people are not concerned” (Eruvin 68a).

The commentaries note that Abayei accepted the position presented by Rabbah that one should assemble an eruv. Abayei merely deflected the inquiry by pointing out that no one was readily available to attend to the eruv, and that its construction did not preempt other factors, specifically Abayei’s commitment to Torah study and the inappropriateness for Abayei’s Rebbe to be involved in the project. Indeed, halachic authorities derive from this Talmudic passage that it is a mitzvah to erect an eruv whenever halachically permitted (Tashbeitz 2:37, quoted verbatim by the Birkei Yosef, Orach Chayim 363:2). These rulings are echoed by such luminaries as the Chasam Sofer (Shu”t Orach Chayim #99), the Avnei Nezer (Orach Chayim #266:4), the Levush Mordechai (Orach Chayim #4) and Rav Moshe Feinstein (Shu”t Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 1:139:5 s.v. vilichora).

I mentioned before that the construction of an eruv with poles and wires cannot permit carrying that is prohibited min haTorah. If this is true, upon what basis do we permit the construction of an eruv? To answer this question, we need to understand that not every open area is a reshus harabim – quite the contrary, a reshus harabim must meet very specific and complex requirements, including:

(A) It must be unroofed (Shabbos 5a).

(B) It must be meant for public use or thoroughfare (Shabbos 6a).

(D) According to most authorities, it cannot be inside an enclosed area (cf., however, Be’er Heiteiv 345:7, quoting Rashba, and Baal HaMaor, Eruvin 22a,quoting Rabbeinu Efrayim). Exactly what is the definition of an “enclosed area” is the subject of a major dispute that I will discuss.

(E) According to many authorities, it must be used by at least 600,000 people daily (Rashi, Eruvin 59a, but see Rashi ad loc. 6a where he only requires that the city has this many residents.). This is derived from the Torah’s description of carrying into the encampment in the Desert, which we know was populated by 600,000 people.

(F) Many authorities require that it be a through street, or a gathering area that connects to a through street (Rashi, Eruvin 6a).

(G) Some authorities add still other requirements.

Any area that does not meet the Torah’s definition of a reshus harabim, and yet is not enclosed, is called a karmelis. One may not carry into, from, or within a karmelis following the same basic rules that prohibit carrying into a reshus harabim. However, since the prohibition not to carry in a karmelis is only rabbinic in origin, Chazal allowed a more lenient method of “enclosing” it.

CAN ONE “ENCLOSE” A RESHUS HARABIM?

As I mentioned earlier, carrying within a true reshus harabim is prohibited min haTorah – for this reason, the use of a standard eruv does not permit carrying in such an area (Eruvin 6b). Nevertheless, the construction of large doors that restrict public traffic transforms the reshus harabim into an area that one can now enclose with an eruv. According to some authorities, the existence of these doors and occasionally closing them is sufficient for the area to lose its reshus harabim status. (Rashi, Eruvin 6b; However, cf. Rabbeinu Efrayim, quoted by Baal HaMaor, Eruvin 22a).

PLEASE CLOSE THE DOOR!

There are some frum neighborhoods in Eretz Yisroel where a thoroughfare to a neighborhood or town is closed on Shabbos with a door, in order to allow an eruv to be constructed around the area. However, this approach is not practical in most places where people desire to construct an eruv.

So what does one do if one cannot close the area with doors?

This depends on the following issue: Does the area that one wants to enclose meet the requirements of a reshus harabim min haTorah or is it only a karmelis? If the area is a reshus harabim min haTorah and one cannot occasionally close the area with doors, then there is no way to permit carrying in this area. One should abandon the idea of constructing an eruv around the entire city or neighborhood (see Gemara Eruvin 6a; Shulchan Aruch Orach Chayim 364:2). Depending on the circumstances, one may still be able to enclose smaller areas within the city.

TZURAS HAPESACH

However, if the area one wants to enclose does not qualify as a reshus harabim, then most authorities rule that one may enclose the area by using a tzuras hapesach (plural, tzuros hapesach), literally, the form of a doorway. (However, note that Shu”t Mishkenos Yaakov #120 s.v. amnom and Shu”t Mishnas Rav Aharon #6 s.v. Kuntrus Be’Inyanei Eruvin paragraph #2 forbid this.) A tzuras hapesach consists of two vertical side posts and a horizontal “lintel” that passes directly over them, thus resembling a doorway. According to halacha, a tzuras hapesach successfully encloses a karmelis area, but it cannot permit carrying in a true reshus harabim (Eruvin 6a). Using tzuros hapesach is the least expensive and most discreet way to construct an eruv. In a future article, I hope to explain some common problems that can happen while constructing tzuros hapesach and how to avoid them, and some important disputes relative to their construction.

Let us review. One can permit carrying in a karmelis, but not a reshus harabim, by enclosing the area with tzuros hapesach. Therefore, a decisive factor in planning whether one can construct an eruv is whether the area is halachically a karmelis or a reshus harabim. If the area qualifies as a karmelis, then an eruv consisting of tzuros hapesach permits one to carry; if it is a reshus harabim, then tzuros hapesach do not permit carrying. The issues concerning the definition of a reshus harabim form the basis of most controversies as to whether a specific eruv is kosher or not.

600,000 PEOPLE

An early dispute among Rishonim was whether one of the requirements of a reshus harabim is that it be accessible to 600,000 people, the number of male Jews over twenty that the Torah tells us exited Egypt (see Tosafos, Eruvin 6a s.v. Keitzad). According to Rashi and the others who follow this approach, one may enclose any metropolis with a population smaller than 600,000 with tzuros hapesach to permit carrying. (Rashi in some places describes that the city has 600,000 residents, and in others describes that 600,000 people use the area constantly. The exact definition to be used is the subject of much literature, see Shu”t Mishkenos Yaakov #120 s.v. hinei harishon; and Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 1:139:5.)

However, other early authorities contend that an area with less than 600,000 people still qualifies as a reshus harabim, providing that it fulfills the other requirements that I listed above. In their opinion, such an area cannot be enclosed with tzuros hapesach. Although many authorities hold this way, the accepted practice in Ashkenazic communities was to follow the lenient interpretation and construct eruvin around an area with less than 600,000 people.

Nevertheless, the Mishnah Berurah discourages carrying in such an eruv since many Rishonim do not accept it (364:8; Bi’ur Halacha to 345:7 and to 364:2). There are different opinions whether Sephardim are at liberty to follow this lenience, although the prevalent practice today is for them to be lenient.

MODERN CITY

Most large metropolitan areas today are populated by more than 600,000 people. Some authorities still define many of our metropolitan areas as a karmelis based on the following definition: Any area less concentrated than was the Jews’ encampment in the Desert is considered a karmelis. Since this encampment approximated 50 square miles, these authorities permit an eruv anywhere that the population density is less than 600,000 people per 50 square miles (Shu”t Igros Moshe 4:87). However, other authorities consider any metropolitan area or megalopolis containing 600,000 people to be a reshus harabim, regardless of its population density. Does this mean that there is no heter with which to construct an eruv in a large city? Indeed, many authorities contend this way (Shu”t Mishnas Rav Aharon 1:2).

A LARGE BREACH

The Chazon Ish, however,presented a different approach to permit construction of an eruv in a contemporary large city. His approach requires an introduction.

In general, an area enclosed by three or four full walls cannot be a reshus harabim (Eruvin 22a). What is the halacha if each of the three sides of an area is enclosed for most of its length – however, there are large gaps in the middle of the enclosure. For example, walls or buildings enclose most of an area, but there are gaps in the middle of the area between the buildings where streets cross the city blocks. Does the area in the middle, surrounded on both sides by buildings and other structures, still qualify as a reshus harabim, or has it lost this status because it is mostly “enclosed”?

The basis for the question is the following: There is a general halachic principle that an area that is mostly enclosed is considered enclosed even in its breached areas (Eruvin 5b et al.). For example, a yard enclosed by hedges tall enough to qualify as halachic walls may be considered enclosed notwithstanding that there are open areas between the hedges, since each side is predominantly enclosed either by the hedges or by the house.

On the other hand, a breach wider than ten amos (about 17 feet) invalidates the area from being considered enclosed. Therefore, one may not carry within a fenced-in area that has a 20-foot opening without enclosing the opening in some way.

The issue that affects the modern city is the following: Granted that a large breach needs to be enclosed to permit carrying within the area, but is this required min haTorah or only rabbinically? Let us assume that one encloses a reshus harabim area with walls that run for miles, but the walls have large gaps in the middle. Is this area considered enclosed min haTorah because it is mostly surrounded by walls, or is it considered open because of the gaps?

This question was debated by two great nineteenth-century authorities, Rav Efrayim Zalman Margoliyos, the Beis Efrayim and the Rav of Brody, and Rav Yaakov of Karlin, the Mishkenos Yaakov. The Beis Efrayim contended that a breach is only a rabbinic concern, and that the area is considered enclosed min haTorah, whereas the Mishkenos Yaakov held that a breach qualifies the area as a reshus harabim min haTorah. The lengthy correspondence between the two of them covers also a host of other eruv related issues (Shu”t Beis Efrayim, Orach Chayim # 25, 26; Shu”t Mishkenos Yaakov, Orach Chayim, #120-122).

What difference does it make whether this area is considered open min haTorah or miderabbanan, since either way one cannot carry without enclosing the area?

The difference is highly significant. If we follow the lenient approach of the Beis Efrayim, then even if the area in the middle meets all the other requirements of a reshus harabim, the area loses its status as a reshus harabim because of the walls surrounding it, notwithstanding the large gaps in the walls. In this case, it may be possible to construct an eruv in such a place.

On the other hand, the Mishkenos Yaakov would contend that this area is considered a reshus harabim because of the gaps, and we ignore the walls. According to him it will be impossible to construct an eruv.

How one rules in the dispute between these two gedolim affects the issue of constructing an eruv in a contemporary city. Most modern cities contain city blocks that consist predominantly of large buildings with small areas between the buildings, and streets that are much narrower than the blocks. If we view these buildings as enclosures, then one can easily envision that both sides of the street are considered enclosed min haTorah according to the Beis Efrayim’s analysis. This itself does not sufficiently enclose our area because of the streets that run parallel to the buildings. However, at certain points of the city, the parallel streets dead end into a street that is predominantly enclosed with either buildings, fences, walls, or some other way. The result is that this section of the city can now be considered min haTorah as enclosed on three sides by virtue of the buildings paralleling both sides of the street and those on its dead end. Since this area now qualifies as an enclosed area min haTorah, the entire area is considered a reshus hayachid min haTorah.

The Chazon Ish now notes the following: Once you have established that this part of the city qualifies as a reshus hayachid min haTorah, this area is now considered completely enclosed halachically. For this reason, other city blocks that are predominantly enclosed on both sides of the street that intersect with this first area are also now considered to be enclosed areas min haTorah. According to his calculation, a large section of most cities is considered min haTorah enclosed on at least three sides, according to his calculation. Although one cannot carry in these areas miderabbanan because of the “breaches” in their “enclosures,” they are no longer reshus harabim min haTorah and one can therefore enclose the entire area with tzuros hapesach (Chazon Ish, Orach Chayim 107:5). The Chazon Ish concludes that many large cities today qualify as a karmelis and therefore one may construct tzuros hapesach to permit carrying there.

However, other authorities reject this calculation for a variety of reasons, some contending that the gaps between the buildings invalidate the enclosure, thus leaving the area to be considered a reshus harabim, which cannot be enclosed (Shu”t Mishkenos Yaakov; Shu”t Mishnas Rav Aharon).

In conclusion, we see that disputes among poskim over eruvin are not recent phenomena. In practice, what should an individual do? The solution proposed by Chazal for all such issues is “Aseh lecha rav, vehistaleik min hasafek,” “Choose someone to be your rav, and remove doubt from yourself.” He can guide you whether it is appropriate to carry within a certain eruv, after considering the halachic basis for the specific eruv’s construction, the level of eruv maintenance, and family factors. Never underestimate the psak and advice of your rav!

Eating Before Feeding Your Animals

Question #1: Coffee and the concierge

“Was Noach permitted to have his morning coffee before he brought all the animals breakfast?”

Question #2: Dog’s best friend

“I would like to eat an apple. Must I first feed Fido?”

Question #3: Fish on Shabbos

“On Shabbos, may I make kiddush before I feed the fish?”

Introduction

Considering Moshe Rabbeinu’s responsibilities to his “flock” provides an opportunity to discuss the ruling of the Gemara (Berachos 40a; Gittin 62a) that one may not eat without first feeding his animals. This is based on the Torah’s statement in the second paragraph of Shema, And I will provide grass in your field for your animals,and only subsequently does the Torah say, and you will eat and be satisfied (Devarim 11:15).

Analyzing the mitzvah

There are numerous questions about this mitzvah:

Is this required min hatorah or miderabbanan?

Are we forbidden to eat only a full meal, or even just a snack?

May I quench my thirst before I provide water or feed my animal? In other words, does the prohibition apply only to eating or also to drinking?

Does this mitzvah apply on Shabbos and Yom Tov?

These and other questions will be addressed in the course of this article.

Torah or rabbinic?

Let us start with a basic question: Is the obligation to feed my animals before I eat min hatorah or miderabbanan?

A prominent early acharon, Rav Yaakov Reischer (Shu”t Shevus Yaakov 3:13), rules that, although the Gemara cites a pasuk as the source for this halachah, it is required only as a rabbinic mitzvah, and the pasuk is an allusion, what Chazal call an asmachta. Although I have seen authorities quoted as holding that the requirement is min hatorah (see, for example, Sedei Chemed Volume I, page 40), I have not yet found anyone who rules this way clearly. Quite the contrary, the Rambam (Hilchos Avodim 9:8) states that feeding your animals before you eat is an exemplary way to act, but is not required.

Of course, this leads to another question: How can the Rambam rule that feeding your animals before you eat is merely an exemplary act, when the Gemara prohibits eating before you feed your animals? The Nishmas Adam (5:11) raises this question, answering that the Rambam, presumably, had a variant text of the Gemara, and suggests what he thinks that text was.

A full meal or a snack?

Are we forbidden to eat only a full meal before feeding our animals, or are we prohibited to eat even a snack?

This question is subject to a dispute among early authorities, which appears to be based on how one reads and understands the pertinent passage of Gemara. The two times the Gemara cites this mitzvah in our published editions, it quotes varying and conflicting passages. In Berachos, the Gemara reads, It is prohibited to eat before you provide food for your animals, whereas in Gittin the passage reads, It is prohibited to taste [food] before you provide food for your animals. In Chazal’s lexicon, eatingusually implies a full meal, whereas te’imah, tasting, implies a snack. Thus, the text in Berachos (eat) implies that the prohibition is limited to eating a full meal, but that one may eat a snack even though he has not yet fed his animals. On the other hand, the version in Gittin (taste) implies that even a snack is prohibited. However, I found variations on the Gemara texts, including versions in both places that prohibit tasting, and versions in both places that only prohibit eating. Most significantly, both the Rif and the Rosh, two of the most preeminent authorities, state in their comments to the passage in Berachos that tasting is prohibited. It seems that they prohibit even snacking prior to feeding one’s animals, which is also implied by the Beis Yosef (Orach Chayim 167).

The two major commentaries on the Shulchan Aruch seem to dispute whether one may snack prior to feeding one’s animals — the Taz (167:7) expressly permits snacking before feeding your animal, whereas the Magen Avraham (167:18) implies that it is prohibited.

An in-between meals snack

Some authorities endeavor to resolve the inconsistency between the two Talmudic versions of the text. The Nishmas Adam suggests that the two versions are not contradictory. It is prohibited to eat a meal without feeding your animal first, and that one who is planning to sit down to a meal may not taste anything of the meal without first feeding his animals. However, it is permitted to eat only a small snack prior to feeding your animals, when that is all one intends to eat. This approach is how the Nishmas Adam concludes in his magnum opus, the Chayei Adam (5:11), where he implies that one may eat a snack before feeding one’s animals.

The Nahar Shalom (167:4) answers the contradiction in the two texts in a similar fashion, ruling that when it is meal time, one may not eat even a snack, out of concern that he’ll forget to feed his animals. If he starts eating between meals, one may eat a snack without feeding his animals first. This approach is also quoted by the Kaf Hachayim (167:52) as definitive halachah. However, the Shevus Yaakov, the Kesav Sofer (Shu”t Orach Chayim #32) and the Mishnah Berurah (167:40) all prohibit eating even a snack before feeding one’s animals.

At this point, we can address one of our opening questions: “I would like to eat an apple. Must I first feed Fido?”

According to the Taz, the Chayei Adam, the Nahar Shalom and the Kaf Hachayim, one may eat an apple or some other snack before feeding his dog, although the Nahar Shalom and the Kaf Hachayim permit this only when it is not meal time. On the other hand, many other authorities prohibit eating even a snack without first feeding one’s animals.

Is instructing enough?

The Nahar Shalom and the Kaf Hachayim also contend that if the owner commanded his servants to feed the animals, he may begin his meal. Since his instructions will be obeyed, he does not need to worry that his animals will go hungry. However, other authorities do not record this lenient ruling (see Mishnah Berurah).

Drinking before feeding

Is it permitted to drink before one feeds the animals, or is the prohibition limited to eating?

Based on the Torah’s description of how Rivkah greeted Eliezer, the Sefer Chassidim (#531) makes a distinction between eating and drinking. The Torah teaches that Eliezer asked her for a little bit of water, and she answered him, I will serve you water and also your camels. The Sefer Chassidim asks how Eliezer could drink without first providing the camels with water. He concludes that although one may not eatwithout first feeding one’s animals, it is permitted to drink. This conclusion is quoted by many later authorities (Magen Avraham 167:18; Birkei Yosef 167:6; Mishnah Berurah 167:40; Shu”t Har Tzvi 1:90), although several others (Pri Megadim, Mishbetzos Zahav 167:7; Shu”t Kesav Sofer, Orach Chayim #32) dispute it. The Pri Megadim rules that when the animals are thirsty, one is required to water them before one may drink. He contends that Rivkah offered the men to drink first, because the camels were not as thirsty. This was because the camels had been drinking roadside water that people would consider too dirty to drink. I will share with you that I also do not know how the Pri Megadim knows to make these assumptions.

Another approach is that of the Chasam Sofer, who contends that when someone is offered food by a host, he may eat without first feeding his animals, since the host has no obligation to feed the guest’s animals. This explains why Eliezer drank before watering his camels.

Yet another approach to explain Rivkah’s actions is that she assessed that it was dangerous for Eliezer and his men not to hydrate themselves immediately, and that pikuach nefesh certainly supersedes the requirement to feed or water the animals first (Or Hachayim, quoted by Yad Efrayim on Magen Avraham 167:18).

A drinking problem

Why should drinking be permitted before one feeds one’s animals when it is forbidden to eat, and, according to many authorities, even have a small snack? Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank (Shu”t Har Tzvi, Orach Chayim 1:90) provides two reasons for this distinction. First, suffering from thirst is far more uncomfortable than suffering from hunger, so the Torah did not require one to remain thirsty in order to make sure that the animals are fed. Second, the Torah forbade eating before feeding one’s animals out of concern that once one gets involved in eating, he may forget to feed his animals. Drinking does not create this concern, since it takes less time and is not as involved as eating.

Is Shabbos different?

May one eat on Shabbos and Yom Tov before feeding one’s animals? The Kesav Sofer rules that the prohibition of eating before one feeds one’s animals applies only to eating a meal that does not fulfill a mitzvah, but that one may eat on Shabbos and Yom Tov before one has fed one’s animals, since this eatingfulfills a mitzvah. Not all authorities appear to accept this ruling.

Dog’s best friend

Let us return to one of the questions we discussed above: “I would like to eat an apple. Must I first feed Fido?”

An anonymous questioner asked the great eighteenth-century halachic authority, Rav Yaakov Emden, whether one may eat before feeding his dog or cat. He responded that he does not know why his questioner thought that dogs and cats should be treated differently from any other of G-d’s creatures. He suggests two reasons that might explain why the questioner thought that one may eat before feeding one’s dog or cat. Each of these reasons requires an introduction.

Beheimah versus chayah

For certain laws, the Torah divides animals into two categories, beheimos and chayos. These two categories defy a clear translation in English, although often beheimos are called domesticated animal species and chayos are called wild species. Rav Yaakov Emden suggested that perhaps the questioner thought that the requirement to feed your animals before you eat applies only to species of animal that qualify as beheimah and not to those that are chayah, and that the questioner thought that both dogs and cats are categorized as chayos, thereby exempting the owner from the obligation of feeding his animals before eating. The Yaavetz does agree that both dogs and cats are categorized as chayos — the Mishnah (Kelayim 8:6) quotes a dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Sages regarding whether a dog is considered a chayah or a beheimah. According to the Sages, the halachic conclusion, dogs are chayos, and the Yaavetz endeavors to demonstrate that cats also qualify as chayos.

However, the Yaavetz notes that the prohibition to eat before feeding your animals applies equally to beheimos and chayos. Although there are several areas of halachah in which there is a difference between kosher beheimos and kosher chayos, there is only one Talmudic source that discusses what halachic difference it makes whether a non-kosher animal is categorized as a chayah or as a beheimah. This source is a Tosefta (Kelayim 5:5) that discusses the above-mentioned dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Sages whether a dog qualifies as a chayah or as a beheimah. The Tosefta’sasks, what difference does it make whether a dog is a chayah or a beheimah? The Tosefta explains that the difference applies to someone who gives all his chayos to his son, and we now need to know whether his dogs are included. According to the Sages, the dogs have now been given to the son, whereas, according to Rabbi Meir, they remain property of the father.

The Rash, one of the early Baalei Tosafos, adds another similar halachic difference that will result from the question as to whether a creature is a beheimah or a chayah.The case is where someone declared all his chayos to be kodesh, which means that they have all become property of the Beis Hamikdash. According to Rabbi Meir, since dogs are beheimos, in this situation his dogs will remain his property, whereas, according to the Sages, Fido and his buddies are now property of the Beis Hamikdash and require redemption.

Both the Tosefta and the Rash imply that the mitzvah of feeding your animals before you eat applies equally to beheimos and to chayos.

This Tosefta answers another question, which arises from a Mishnah(Kelayim 8:6) that states that a pig qualifies as a beheimah, whereas the elephant, the monkey and the arod, a type of wildass (very possibly the onager) are chayos. Since these are all non-kosher species, what difference does it make in halachah whether these species qualify as beheimah or as chayah? The answer is, what happens if Mr. Goldberg gave all the chayos in his personal zoo and petting farm to his son as a gift. Who owns the pigs, the elephants, the monkeys and the onagers? The halachah is that Mr. Goldberg still owns the pigs but he has given the elephants, the monkeys and the onagers to his son. (I will not delve into the question as to why Mr. Goldberg owned a pig, when this is forbidden. Perhaps a non-Jewish business contact gave him a present and he had not yet had the opportunity to sell it.)

Feed your workers!

Having established that the prohibition of eating before feeding one’s animals applies equally to beheimos and chayos, the Yaavetz suggests another possibility why the questioner thought that dogs and cats might be excluded from the requirements of this mitzvah. Perhaps the requirement to feed your animal before you eat is because it is working for you, and the questioner thought that dogs and cats are not considered workers. According to this approach, one would be permitted to eat before feeding fish or canaries, since they are basically pension receivers, whereas one would be required to feed his carrier pigeons, cattle, sheep, goats, horses, donkeys and gaming falcons before eating.

However, the Yaavetz rejects both suppositions of this approach.

First, he contends that both dogs and cats qualify as workers, dogs because they serve as loyal watchmen and cats because they clear the house of mice.

Second, the requirement to feed your animal has nothing to do with whether the animal works for you; once you are responsible for the animal, the rules of tzaar baalei chayim, not to cause an animal to suffer, require you to provide it with food. Thus, even pension-receiving animals are entitled to be fed, and the owner must attend to them before he is permitted to eat.

Man’s best friend

So, is there any reason to treat dogs and cats differently from other animals?

Notwithstanding the Yaavetz‘s rejection of both of his suggestions why dogs and cats might be treated differently from other animals, he concludes that, although one is required to make sure that one’s dogs and cats are fed, one is not required to feed them prior to his own eating. He presents the following novel suggestion: Since both of these species do not have difficulty finding food on their own, the responsibility to feed them does not lie so heavily on the owner to feed them before eating. The prohibition to eat before feeding your animals is restricted to animals that, once domesticated, would not be able to find food without the owner feeding them. The Yaavetz contends that only animals that have difficulty finding their own meals create an onus to the extent that their owner must go hungry until he provides them with victuals.

By the way, I found very few later poskim who quote this position of the Yaavetz as the accepted halacha.

Conclusion

Why are we required to feed one’s animals before we eat? The Yad Efrayim (on Orach Chayim, Magen Avraham 167:18) suggests the following: One should always look at himself as unworthy to receive Hashem’s bounty. Perhaps one’s only merit to be fed is that we feed the animals that are dependent upon us. Thus, this mitzvah has a secondary goal – not only to teach us to be concerned about Hashem’s creatures, but also to teach us humility.

What If I Goofed and Said Tikanta Shabbos by Mistake?

Question: In the middle of davening Musaf on Shabbos Rosh Chodesh, I realized that I was reciting the Musaf for a regular Shabbos rather than the special Musaf for Shabbos Rosh Chodesh. What should I have done?

Answer:

This Shabbos is also Rosh Chodesh, requiring the recital of a special text for the middle beracha of Musaf. This special Musaf includes elements of the usual Shabbos Musaf, the usual Rosh Chodesh Musaf, and a special introductory passage. This passage, beginning with the words Atah Yatzarta, actually bears close resemblance to the introductory part of the Yom Tov Musaf rather than to Musaf of either Shabbos or Rosh Chodesh. The rest of the middle beracha of Musaf combines elements of both Shabbos Musaf and Rosh Chodesh Musaf.

I once edited an article in which the author quoted several anthologies, each of which ruled that someone still in the middle beracha of shemoneh esrei should immediately stop where he is, and go to the beginning of Atah Yatzarta, and recite the entire beracha. However, I believe that this ruling is in error, which I will explain shortly. But first…

I attempted to trace the sources quoted in the article to see if perhaps I was missing some logic or information that I would clarify in the course of my research.

What I did discover was that each source was simply quoting a previous one, and that they all traced to one obscure 19^th century work, which did not explain at all the reason for the ruling. Classic group-think.

I will now explain why I believe this ruling is in error, and what one should do. My major concern is that the approach that these works advocate results in repeating many parts of the shemoneh esrei, and that this repetition constitutes a forbidden interruption in the tefillah. Furthermore, to the best of my knowledge, there is no essential requirement to recite this middle beracha of the shemoneh esrei precisely in order. Obviously, one should maintain the order as is, but there is ample evidence from major halacha authorites that, in general, mistakenly rearranging the order of a beracha is not calamitous (see, for example, Rosh, Taanis 1:1; Shu”t Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 4:18 and 4:70:14). Thus, when left with the choice of rearranging the order of a beracha to avoid repetition, or repeating parts of the beracha and ignoring what was already said, one should follow the first approach (cf., however, Biur Halacha 127:2 s.v. Aval).

Based on the above, it appears that someone who discovers that they began reciting Tikanta Shabbos rather than Atah Yatzarta should mention only those parts of the beracha that they had as yet not recited, but not repeat any theme or part of the beracha that one has already said. Although fulfilling this may be confusing to someone unfamiliar with the beracha, this should provide us with a valid reason to pay more attention to the details of this beracha and understand its different parts.

In order to explain how one does this correctly, I will divide the beracha of Atah Yatzarta into its constituent parts, so that we can identify which parts we should not repeat. We can divide it into the following seven sections:

1. The introduction – from the words Atah Yatzarta until (and including) the words shenishtalcha (some recite the text hashelucha) bemikdashecha.

2. The prayer for our return – beginning with the words Yehi Ratzon – until (and including) the word kehilchasam.

3. The sentence that introduces the mention of the pesukim of the Musaf –Ve’es Musafei Yom HaShabbos hazeh… until (and including) the word ka’amur.

4. Mention of the pesukim of the korban Musaf of Shabbos.

5. Mention of the pasuk of the korban Musaf of Rosh Chodesh and the passage Uminchasam… until (and including) the word kehilchasam.

6. The paragraph Yismechu Vemalchusecha that concludes with the words zeicher lemaasei vereishis.

7. The closing of the beracha — Elokeinu Veilokei avoseinu.

On a regular Shabbos we recite the following sections: I have numbered them in a way that parallels the previous list:

1. Tikanta Shabbos – the introduction.

2. Yehi Ratzon – the prayer for our return. This passage then introduces the mention of the pesukim of the Musaf, which includes only the pesukim of Shabbos.

3. Ve’es Musaf Yom HaShabbos hazeh… until the word ka’amur.

4. Mention of the pesukim of the korban Musaf of Shabbos.

6. The paragraph Yismechu Vemalchusecha that concludes with the words zeicher lemaasei vereishis.

7. The closing of the beracha — Elokeinu Veilokei avoseinu. We should note that the closings of the Shabbos and the Shabbos Rosh Chodesh shemoneh esrei prayers are very different. On Shabbos Rosh Chodesh we recite a version that is almost identical to what we recite on a weekday Rosh Chodesh, but we insert three passages to include Shabbos.

See chart next page.

Parts 2, 4 and 6 of the two brachos are identical, whether it is Shabbos or Shabbos Rosh Chodesh. Therefore, one should not repeat these sections if one has said them already.

Part 1 on Shabbos Rosh Chodesh, Atah Yatzarta, is very different from what we usually recite on a regular Shabbos. Therefore, someone who mistakenly said the regular Shabbos beracha should go back and recite this passage (part 1).

If someone missed part 5, which mentions the pesukim of Rosh Chodesh, and is still in the middle of this section, they should recite – the pasuk that describes the korbon of rosh chodesh and introduce it with part 3 above, which introduces the Musaf korbanos. However, if they already recited the pesukim of Shabbos korban Musaf (part 4) above, omit the reference to Shabbos in this piece and only mention Rosh Chodesh. In the latter case, one should change the plural Musafei to a singular Musaf since now he is now referring only to the Rosh Chodesh Musaf.

Having explained the rules governing these halachos, I will now present the conclusions in a hopefully clearer way, depending on when you discover your mistake:

A. If you were still reciting the beginning of Tikanta Shabbos, and had not yet reached Yehi Ratzon:

Return to Atah Yatzarta and recite the beracha in order, without any changes.

B. If you had already begun Yehi Ratzon, but are before Ve’es Musaf Yom HaShabbos hazeh:

Complete the Yehi Ratzon until Ve’es Musaf; then recite Atah Yatzarta until the words Yehi Ratzon, then resume from the words Ve’es Musafei Yom HaShabbos hazeh veyom Rosh Hachodesh hazeh from the Shabbos Rosh Chodesh Musaf and continue through the rest of the tefillah.

C. If you had just begun Ve’es Musaf Yom HaShabbos hazeh:

Add the words Ve’es Musaf Yom Rosh Hachodesh Hazeh, then continue in the Shabbos Rosh Chodesh Musaf until Yismechu Vemalchusecha. Immediately prior to saying Yismechu Vemalchusecha insert the words from Atah Yatzarta until the words shenishtalcha bemikdashecha (part 1). Then return to Yismechu Vemalchusecha and recite the rest of the tefillah in order.

D. If you are already in the middle of Ve’es Musaf Yom HaShabbos hazeh:

Recite Uveyom Hashabbas… until veniskah. Then insert the words from Atah Yatzarta until the words shenishtalcha bemikdashecha. Then return to the words Ve’es Musaf but say the following: Ve’es Musaf Yom Rosh Hachodesh hazeh until the word ka’amur. Then say Uverashei Chadsheichem in the Shabbos Rosh Chodesh section and continue in order.

E. If you are in the middle of Yismechu Vemalchusecha, complete it until Zecher lemaasei vereishis, and then insert the words from Atah Yatzarta until the words shenishtalcha bemikdashecha. Then return to the words Ve’es Musaf but say the following: Ve’es Musaf Yom Rosh Hachodesh hazeh until the word ka’amur. Then say Uverashei Chadsheichem in the Shabbos Rosh Chodesh section. Then go to Elokeinu Veilokei avoseinu (after Yismechu Vemalchusecha) and finish the end of the beracha.

F. If you are already in the middle of the closing part of the beracha (Elokeinu Veilokei Avoseinu) complete the clause that you are saying, and then insert the words from Atah Yatzarta until the words shenishtalcha bemikdashecha. Return to the words Ve’es Musaf but say Ve’es Musaf Yom Rosh Hachodesh hazeh until the word ka’amur. Say Uverashei Chadsheichem from the Shabbos Rosh Chodesh section. Then return to chadeish aleinu beyom haShabbos hazeh es hachodesh hazeh and finish the end of the beracha in the Shabbos Rosh Chodesh section.

If he completed the entire beracha of Tikanta Shabbos, but mentioned in the middle of the brocha some reference to the korban Musaf of Rosh Chodesh, he has fulfilled the requirements of his prayer and he should continue Retzei (see Mishnah Berurah 423:6). If he completed the beracha of Tikanta Shabbos but did not yet begin Retzeih, he should say “venaaseh lefanecha korban Rosh Chodesh hazeh” – “and we shall do before You this Rosh Chodesh offering” – and then continue with Retzeih (ibid.).

Conclusion

Although all this may sound confusing, if you spend a few minutes familiarizing oneself with the divisions of this beracha that I have made, you will easily realize how the parts of the Shabbos and Shabbos Rosh Chodesh davening are aligned. Then you will be ready to make the necessary adjustments should you find that you have erred. This readiness has, of course, a tremendous value on its own: It familiarizes one with the shemoneh esrei, something we always should do, but, unfortunately, is something to which we often do not pay adequate attention.

Understanding how much concern Chazal placed in the relatively minor aspects of davening should make us even more aware of the fact that davening is our attempt at building a relationship with Hashem. As the Kuzari notes, every day should have three very high points — the three times that we daven (or four times on days that we recite Musaf). Certainly, one should do whatever one can to make sure to pay attention to the meaning of the words of one’s Tefillah. We should gain our strength and inspiration for the rest of the day from these prayers. Let us hope that Hashem will accept our tefillos together with those of Klal Yisrael!

Wanted Dead or Alive

Question #1: Getting Rid of those Bugs!

“May I trap or kill mosquitoes, bees, or wasps on Shabbos?”

Question #2: Hanging from the Lowest Tree

“I forgot to hang the flypaper before Shabbos. May I do it on Shabbos?”

Question #3: A Charming Shabbos

“May a snake charmer work on Shabbos?”

Answer: Catching or dispatching

We have all been in the following uncomfortable situation: Sometime during Shabbos, a mosquito appears in our vicinity seeking to earn its living. Although we realize that this creature requires its sustenance, we are not eager that we, our children or our guests should become mosquito fodder, even just as a minor donor. Are we permitted to trap or kill the mosquito?

Trapping living things, tzad, was an action necessary for acquiring some of the materials used to build the Mishkan, and is one of the 39 melachos, categories of prohibited activity on Shabbos (Mishnah Shabbos 73a and Rashi ad loc.). Killing living things also violates the melachos of Shabbos, a topic that we discussed last week. Here, we discuss many pertinent principles of Shabbos and some details of the melachah of tzad.

Shabbos nomenclature

When discussing what one may or may not do on Shabbos, the Mishnah and Gemara use three terms: (1) chayov, punishable, when a particular act constitutes melachah, meaning that it desecrates Shabbos by violating a Torah law; (2) patur, exempt, meaning it does not violate a Torah law, and (3) mutar, permitted, when an act may be performed on Shabbos. We will discuss the middle term, patur, which states that a particular forbidden act does not violate Torah law. This term usually indicates that the act is prohibited due to rabbinic sanction, but sometimes the Sages permitted such acts. But first we will explain what makes performing a forbidden activity patur?

Meleches machsheves

The Gemara (Chagigah 10b; Bava Kama 26b; Kerisus 19b) teaches that the Torah prohibited only something that can be categorized as meleches machsheves, which can perhaps be translated as premeditated melachah. An obvious example of meleches machsheves would be trapping an animal to obtain its hide or meat. Similarly, someone who digs a hole to plant the base of a tree violates the meleches machsheves of choreish, plowing, and one who picks a fruit performs a meleches machsheves of kotzeir, harvesting.

Meleches machsheves is often explained by what it is not. Following that approach, I will provide three categories of labor that are exempt from being defined as desecrating Shabbos min haTorah, because they do not qualify as meleches machsheves, at least according to some opinions.

Mekalkeil

In general, an act constitutes meleches machsheves only when its direct result is beneficial. This means that an action that is inherently destructive does not violate Shabbos min haTorah, even when one needs the result. For example, digging a hole in the ground when one needs the earth but not the hole is defined as a destructive activity and prohibited only miderabbanan. The dug hole itself is a negative development, rendering the burrowing to be mekalkeil, not prohibited min haTorah, but only because of rabbinic injunction. However, digging a hole to plant or to create a posthole results in a positive benefit and is indeed prohibited min haTorah, since one wants the hole in the ground.

Bemino nitzad

Here is a second example of meleches machsheves that is particular to the melachah that we are discussing, tzad. The tanna’im (Shabbos 107b) dispute whether it is prohibited min haTorah to ensnare a creature that mankind does not typically use, such as a scorpion or a flea, which is called ein bemino nitzad, literally, a species that is not trapped. The halachic conclusion follows the lenient opinion, ruling that tzad applies only to a species that is bemino nitzad, commonly trapped, so that mankind can benefit from it. For example, a species that is eaten, from whose body a medicine is extracted, or whose hide is used as leather qualifies as bemino nitzad. The halachic authorities discuss whether trapping an animal for scientific research or so that one can have it as a pet makes the animal bemino nitzad (Rambam, Hilchos Shabbos 10:21; Chazon Ish, Orach Chayim 50:4 at end).

However, a species that is caught only because it is an annoyance has the status of ein bemino nitzad.

Why is this true? The purpose of trapping is to harness a living creature so that mankind can use it. Thus, tzad is a type of acquisition (see Shu”t Avnei Neizer, Orach Chayim 189:7; Biur Halachah, 316:2 s.v. Oh Choleh). However, trapping a creature that mankind does not generally use is not acquiring these creatures, but distancing them from potential victims. Therefore, most opinions conclude that trapping a species that is ein bemino nitzad does not violate the melachah of tzad, and is prohibited only because of rabbinic injunction. Thus, since flies are ein bemino nitzad, catching them would not violate a Torah prohibition. Hanging flypaper on Shabbos would still involve a rabbinic prohibition and it is similarly prohibited to set up a mousetrap on Shabbos (Magen Avraham 316:9; see Piskei Tosafos, Shabbos 17b #62).

By the way, many authorities consider mice to be bemino nitzad, since there are places in the world where their hide is used (Chayei Odom 30:7). There is also a dispute whether a non-kosher species harvested only as food is considered bemino nitzad (Ritva, Shabbos 106b; Nimla Tal, Meleches Tzad #37).

Melachah she’einah tzerichah legufah

Many authorities rule that another category of activity — Melachah she’einah tzerichah legufah, literally, an act not needed for its purpose — is not prohibited min haTorah because it is not considered meleches machsheves. In fact, there is a dispute among tanna’im whether a Melachah she’einah tzerichah legufah is prohibited min haTorah or only miderabbanan. Whereas Rabbi Yehudah contends that Melachah she’einah tzerichah legufah is prohibited min haTorah, according to Rabbi Shimon, these acts are prohibited only by virtue of rabbinic injunction.

What is a Melachah she’einah tzerichah legufah? Among the rishonim, we find differing opinions as to exactly how to define this term, and there are many instances where a dispute in halachah results. Since this complicated question is a bit tangential to our topic, I am going to present only one approach. According to Tosafos (Shabbos 94a s.v. Rabbi Shimon) and the Rivash (Shu”t Harivash #394), Rabbi Shimon contends that the 39 melachos are prohibited min haTorah only when performed for a goal or purpose similar to the reason why this melachah was done when constructing the Mishkan. However, performing a melachah to accomplish a purpose other than that for which this melachah was performed in the Mishkan qualifies as a Melachah she’einah tzerichah legufah. This means that it is prohibited only miderabbanan, according to Rabbi Shimon and those who rule like him.

Here is an example: Removing an item that has a bad odor from a reshus hayachid, an enclosed area, into a reshus harabim, an open area meant for public use, is a classic case of Melachah she’einah tzerichah legufah. Although moving something from a reshus hayachid into a reshus harabim constitutes the melachah of carrying, moving the foul-smelling item from a house to a reshus harabim does not constitute a melachah min haTorah, according to Rabbi Shimon, because the purpose of the carrying when building the Mishkan was to relocate the item to a new place. However, when removing a foul-smelling item, there is no significance attached to the place to which the item is moved; one’s goal is only to distance it from its current location. The public area does not constitute the goal of one’s act; rather, it is merely a convenient place to deposit unwanted material. For this reason, Rabbi Shimon contends that this act was not prohibited by the Torah, but only by the Sages. On the other hand, Rabbi Yehudah considers Melachah she’einah tzerichah legufah as conforming to the definition of meleches machsheves and prohibited min haTorah.

Although most rishonim conclude that the halachah follows Rabbi Shimon that Melachah she’einah tzerichah legufah is prohibited only because of rabbinic injunction, the Rambam and others rule, according to Rabbi Yehudah, that Melachah she’einah tzerichah legufah is prohibited min haTorah.

When exempt is permitted

There is a passage of Gemara that reflects both on our opening question and on a different aspect of the melachah of tzad. “Shemuel said: Whenever the Mishnah states that something is patur when performed on Shabbos, the activity is prohibited [because of a rabbinic injunction], with the exception of the following three instances, when patur means that the activity is permitted. The first case discusses catching a deer, the second is catching a snake and the third is lancing a boil” (Shabbos 3a; 107a, as explained by Tosafos, Shabbos 3a s.v. Bar). Shemuel proves from Mishnayos that, in these three instances, the acts are permitted (Shabbos 107a). The first two of these cases educate us to understand what constitutes the melachah of trapping. (The case of lancing a boil involves a different topic that we will leave for a different article.)

What are the first two cases presented by Shemuel? The first situation is when a deer entered a building, and someone sat in the doorway of the building, thereby preventing the deer’s escape. When that person sat down, he trapped the deer and therefore performed the melachah of tzad. This is true, even if he was not involved in coaxing the deer into the building. The Mishnah (Shabbos 106b) then states that if a second person sits alongside the first in a way that the deer’s escape is still blocked, even when the first person gets up, the second person has not desecrated Shabbos. This is because the second person did not trap the deer but merely guaranteed that a captured animal remains in captivity. Although the Mishnah says that the second person is patur, Shemuel explains that one may lechatchilah sit down alongside the first person, even if one’s intention is to keep the deer trapped when the first person gets up. This explains a different aspect of tzad — the melachah is making the animal available for human use, but once it is already trapped, there is no further violation in keeping it under human control.

The second case is based on two different mishnayos. One Mishnah (Shabbos 107a) permits catching a scorpion, so that it doesn’t bite, and another states that catching a snake to prevent it from biting does not violate Shabbos min haTorah, whereas catching it for medicinal uses does (Eduyos 2:5). Tosafos proves that both Mishnayos that permit tzad to protect someone are discussing creatures whose bite is painful, but not life-threatening, pikuach nefesh (Tosafos, Shabbos 3a s.v. Bar). Were the Mishnah discussing a creature whose bite is life-threatening, it would be obvious that one may kill it, because of the general rule that actions necessary to protect life supersede Shabbos and almost all other mitzvos.

Shemuel ruled that although catching non-dangerous creatures is ordinarily prohibited on Shabbos, since this involves only a rabbinic injunction the Sages permitted it under extenuating circumstances.

Why is the act of trapping non-dangerous creatures considered only a rabbinic injunction? We have already presented two possible reasons. The first is because of the principle of Melachah she’einah tzerichah legufah, since one has no interest in capturing a snake or a scorpion (Tosafos op. cit.). The second reason is that one is not catching these species to make them available for human use, which is an essential component of the melachah of tzad (Avnei Neizer, Orach Chayim 189:7; Biur Halachah, 316:2 s.v. Oh Choleh).

Mosquitoes versus snakes

Although we have discovered that one may catch snakes and scorpions that are not life-threatening, this does not tell us whether one may trap mosquitoes, bees or wasps. Although the sting or bite of these species is indeed painful, it is not usually as painful as a snake or scorpion bite. Thus, it might be that Chazal did not permit catching mosquitoes, bees or wasps.

We can presumably derive the answer from the following passage of Gemara:

“Someone who trapped a flea on Shabbos, Rabbi Eliezer rules him liable for desecrating Shabbos min haTorah, whereas Rabbi Yehoshua rules that his desecration of Shabbos was only of a rabbinic ordinance” (Shabbos 107b). The Gemara explains that this dispute is dependent on an issue that we discussed earlier. Does one desecrate Shabbos min haTorah if he traps a species that is not usually trapped? Rabbi Eliezer rules that he does, whereas Rabbi Yehoshua rules that he does not. Thus, it appears from this Gemara that although Shemuel proved that it is permitted to trap a scorpion, even of the non-deadly variety, one cannot trap a flea, which is considered only as causing discomfort.

Three types of varmints

We can, therefore, divide the different types of unpleasant biters and stingers into three categories:

1. Those that are potentially life-threatening to people. In this instance, if there is even the slightest possibility of danger, one may kill or catch them on Shabbos.

2. Those whose bite will be very painful, but there is no life-threatening danger. These may be trapped on Shabbos, provided that one’s intent is only to save people from harm (Rambam, Hilchos Shabbos 10:25). However, it is forbidden to trap if one intends to use the insect, reptile or arachnid. (Modern biology categorizes spiders and scorpions as arachnids, because they have eight legs, are carnivorous and are wingless. If we want to categorize insects and arachnids together, we should use the word arthropods, but that still excludes snakes and other reptiles. So, for most of this article, I have simply used the word creatures. My apologies to the scientists who are reading this.)

3. Those whose bite will be unpleasant, but not highly painful. In this instance, there is a dispute among the rishonim. Tosafos and the Rosh quote from an earlier baal Tosafos named Rav Poras that, if one sees that an insect may bite him, he is permitted to remove the insect. When the insect is not so close to him, he may brush the insect off, but he may not trap it.

Not all authorities accepted Rav Poras’ approach. The Mordechai (#402) quotes Rav Yehudah Gaon that he noticed that the “elder rabbis” did not trap fleas, even when they were on their skin. The Beis Yosef, however, contends that even Rav Yehudah Gaon accepts the ruling of Rav Poras, but that he himself practiced this as a personal chumrah, not as the required halachah that he would rule for others. There are other rishonim, however, who certainly disagree with Rav Poras and prohibit trapping mosquitoes, even when they are on your skin, since they are only a discomfort (Meiri, Shabbos 107b).

Consensus

The consensus of halachic authorities follows Rav Poras, although there is a dispute among them whether it is permitted to catch the insect only when it is actually biting (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 316:9; Bach) or whether one may remove the insects even when they are in close proximity (Taz 316:8; Magen Avraham 316:18; Elyah Rabbah). The Mishnah Berurah (316:37) concludes that when one can brush off the insect, he should not rely on the heter of trapping it, but he implies that one may trap the insect if brushing it off will not suffice.

Answers

At this point, let us take a fresh look at our original questions:

“May I trap mosquitoes, bees, or wasps on Shabbos?”

The answer is that if the insect is about to attack someone, one may trap it. One may also trap it if its sting or bite is very painful, and certainly if it is potentially dangerous.

May one hang flypaper on Shabbos? The answer is that one may not.

“May a snake charmer work on Shabbos?” If one is not intending to use the snake, it is permitted. This is all the more so if the snake is dangerous.

In conclusion

Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch (Shemos 20:10) notes that people mistakenly think that work is prohibited on Shabbos, to ensure that Shabbos is a day of rest. He points out that the Torah does not prohibit doing avodah, which connotes hard work, but melachah, which implies purpose and accomplishment. We certainly see this idea borne out by the ideas of meleches machsheves, which denote the purpose of the action, and have no correlation at all to the amount of energy expended. The goal of Shabbos is to allow Hashem’s rule to be the focus of creation by our refraining from our own creative acts (Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch Commentary to Shemos 20:11).