Sewing on Shabbos

Question #1: Stuffing a Pillow

“My pillow is torn, and some of the filling has fallen out. May I restuff it on Shabbos?”

Question #2: Stitches

“Does stitching a wound closed involve a Torah prohibition on Shabbos?

Question #3: Miscellaneous

What do these questions have to do with one another?

Introduction

Among the 39 melachos of Shabbos, we find several sets of pairs, including tying and untying, writing and erasing, building and razing, and kindling and extinguishing. One of the sets is tofeir and korei’a, sewing and tearing. Of this pair, korei’a usually gets more coverage in practical halacha, because it involves many common questions such as opening packaging and tearing toilet paper. So that tofeir does not feel left out, the aim of this article is to show that there are many interesting details relevant to this melacha, and we will also discover some halachic surprises.

Tofeir 101

First, some introductory information about this melacha: One violates the av melacha either by sewing three stitches (meaning that the needle goes through the material three times) or by sewing two stitches and then tying the thread with a knot, so that the stitches remain (Rambam, Hilchos Shabbos 10:9). Without this last step, the stitches will not last, and, therefore, one does not violate the melacha min haTorah.

Non-permanent sewing

The rishonim dispute whether one violates a melacha min haTorah if one sews an item closed, but intends to open the stitches very shortly. Why would one do this? An example is that launderers sometimes stitched small items of clothing to larger ones, so that they will not get lost. This stitching will be removed as soon as the laundry is complete. Does this involve a Torah prohibition or is it prohibited only because of a rabbinic injunction?

I’ll provide a contemporary application, although it presumably does not affect most of our readers. To make sure that they remain firmly in place, boxing gloves are sewn closed around the wrists of the boxer. However, the boxer presumably wants to remove his gloves before his next meal or when he next needs to blow his nose. Thus, although the gloves are sewn very tightly onto his hands, the stitches will be undone very shortly, sometimes within a few minutes, if the boxer is either extremely successful or extremely unsuccessful. Does this sewing involve a Torah prohibition?

Most rishonim follow the more stringent approach, which is also the way the Shulchan Aruch rules (Orach Chayim 340:7). The Rema (Orach Chayim 317:3) quotes both approaches. Most later authorities understand that the Rema also concludes that the primary opinion is that sewing properly is prohibited min haTorah, even when one intends to rip out the stitches shortly (Tehillah Ledavid 340:6; Chazon Ish, hashmatos, Orach Chayim page 257; cf., however, Graz 317:7). So, boxers, beware, don’t sew your gloves on Shabbos! (Now, can you have a non-Jew do it? That is a topic for a different time!)

Tightening stitches

Here is a case that involves sewing min haTorah that most people do not realize is prohibited. On Shabbos, someone sees that some stitching on his garment is loose, so he pulls the stitching together. Halachically, this is considered an act of sewing the two pieces of the garment together, and, therefore, this seemingly innocent act involves a Torah prohibition of sewing (see Rashi, Shabbos 75a). This act will be prohibited min haTorah also on Yom Tov.

Embroidering

Embroidering cloth also violates the av melacha of tofeir (Nimla Tal, Meleches Tofeir note 25). Notwithstanding that, when embroidering, one does not necessarily stitch through the entire thickness of the cloth, there is still a Torah violation of tofeir (Yerushalmi, Shabbos 7:2, as explained by Pnei Moshe).

Pinning

A safety pin is usually inserted twice through cloth and then closed. Could this be considered sewing, since it is similar to making two stitches and then tying a knot, which is prohibited min haTorah?

Indeed, several prominent early acharonim banned the use of safety pins for precisely this reason (Shu”t Ginas Veradim, Orach Chayim 3:17, 19; Rabbi Akiva Eiger, notes to Magen Avraham 340:11; see also Korban Nesanel, Shabbos 7:50). However, many later acharonim permitted the use of pins on Shabbos, citing the following reasons:

(1) The closing performed by pinning is by nature temporary, and therefore not an act of tofeir (Chazon Ish, Orach Chayim #156, page 257, notes to Chapter 340; Az Nidberu 3:72).

(2) Tofeir is the act of making two or more items into one unit, which a pin does not do (Shu”t Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 2:84). Notwithstanding that a pin attaches two items, there are many activities that attach two items, such as buttoning, zippering and snapping, all of which are permitted on Shabbos. So, there is no reason to assume that pinning two items together should be treated any more stringently than buttoning them together.

The position of the Mishnah Berurah on this question is unclear (see 308:46; 340:27). Rav Yaakov Kamenetsky understood that the Mishnah Berurah was also lenient about the use of pins on Shabbos (Emes Leya’akov, Orach Chayim 340).

Stuffing a pillow

Now that we have a basic introduction to the melacha, we are in a position to discuss the halachos relevant to our opening question: “My pillow is torn, and some of the filling has fallen out. May I restuff it on Shabbos?”

The answer to this question lies in understanding a small passage of Gemara (Shabbos 48a), which teaches the following:

Rav Chisda permitted returning stuffing into a pillow on Shabbos. Rav Chanan bar Chisda asked Rav Chisda how he could permit this, since an earlier, authoritative source (a beraisa) prohibited stuffing soft material into a pillow on either Yom Tov or Shabbos. Rav Chisda responded that it is prohibited to create a pillow for the first time by stuffing it, but it is permitted to restuff an old pillow.

Why can’t you stuff?

What is wrong with stuffing a pillow on Shabbos? The rishonim dispute why the beraisa prohibited stuffing a new pillow on Yom Tov or Shabbos. Rashi explains that the prohibition is because of the melacha of makeh bepatish, making a new item, since one is manufacturing a new pillow. The Mishnah Berurah (340:33) understands this act to be a Torah violation of the melacha.

However, the Rambam explains the Gemara quite differently, that the prohibition here is rabbinic, and that this is not a case of makeh bepatish. He understands that Chazal prohibited stuffing the pillow because of concern that someone might forget and sew the pillow closed (Hilchos Shabbos 22:23).

Both opinions agree that the prohibition is only to stuff a pillow for the first time, but that it is permitted to replace stuffing that fell out (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 340:8). Thus, we have an answer to the question: “My pillow is torn, and some of the filling has fallen out. May I restuff it on Shabbos?” The answer is that one may, assuming that one does not tighten the thread that connects the two sides.

Stitches

An interesting and contemporary question with a surprising answer is whether suturing a wound on Shabbos by a physician involves a de’Oraysa prohibition of sewing. In truth, most instances of stitching usually entail an element of pikuach nefesh, life-threatening emergency, because of the risk of infection. It seems to this author that this would permit stitching a wound on Shabbos, even if it involves an act that is a melacha min haTorah. However, there are at least three situations in which it will make a practical difference whether stitching a wound closed involves a Torah prohibition or not.

I. Extra stitches

One of the differences that might result is whether, because of asthetic, non-medical reasons, it is permitted to make more stitches than necessary. For example, when a plastic surgeon closes a wound, he makes the stitches very close together in order to avoid a serious-looking scar. To do so, he uses more stitches than necessary from a strictly medical basis. These additional stitches are not pikuach nefesh, since one can safely close the wound with fewer stitches.

II. Non-Jew

Whether one can have a Jew perform melacha that is pikuach nefesh when a non-Jew is available is a dispute among rishonim and early poskim. In our case, it would have the following application: Is one permitted to have a Jewish physician suture a wound closed on Shabbos when there is a non-Jewish physician available who can?

III. Late on Shabbos

If an injury was sustained on Shabbos afternoon not long before sunset, it is usually not pikuach nefesh to close the wound immediately; one can wait safely until Shabbos is over and then stitch the wound closed. Thus, if stitching the wound involves a Torah prohibition, one should wait until after Shabbos to suture it. However, if no violation is involved, one might be able to suture it immediately.

At this point, we will discuss whether stitching a wound is included under the melacha of tofeir on Shabbos. I have seen two reasons to contend that there is no melacha of tofeir involved in stitching a wound closed:

A. We do not find that sewing as a melacha applies to the bodies of people (Shemiras Shabbos Kehilchasah, 1979 edition, Chapter 35, note 62).

B. Tofeir is the combining of two items. Stitching skin does not make the two sides into one unit, but draws them close together so that they can heal into one unit (Nimla Tal, meleches tofeir #37). Thus, the stitching does not consist of a melacha min haTorah.

Tied in knots

However, either of these approaches may not change what the practical halacha is in these situations, because of a completely different problem. When stitching a wound closed, every stitch is followed by tying a knot, which is left permanently. Even when the stitch is removed, it is removed by cutting the thread and slipping out the stitching, not by untying the knot. Thus, the surgeon’s knot, which is definitely a specialist’s knot and is also knotted permanently, probably involves a melacha de’oraysah of kosheir, tying knots, a different one of the 39 melachos. Since this article is about tofeir and not about kosheir, I will leave further discussion on this point for a different time. Those who have the shaylah should get direction from their rav or posek.

We can now address the second of our opening questions: “Does stitching a wound closed involve a Torah prohibition on Shabbos?”

It would seem that stitching a wound closed on Shabbos involves a Torah prohibition of knotting.

Conclusion

We have learned many details about the melacha of sewing. Sewing three stitches violates the melacha min haTorah, as does sewing two stitches and then securing them so that they hold. Although using a safety pin may appear to be similar to sewing two stitches and securing them, many later authorities permit using pins to hold things together on Shabbos. We learned that stuffing a pillow for the first time is prohibited on Shabbos, and, according to some authorities, the reason for this prohibition is because we are concerned that someone may inadvertently sew the pillow closed. We also learned that there is an interesting halachic discussion whether stitching a wound closed involves a Torah prohibition on Shabbos.

Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch (Shemos 20:10) notes that people mistakenly think that work is prohibited on Shabbos in order to provide a day of rest. This is incorrect, he points out, because the Torah does not prohibit doing avodah, which connotes hard work, but melacha, which implies purpose and accomplishment. The goal of Shabbos is to emphasize Hashem’s rule as the focus of creation by refraining from our own creative acts (Shemos 20:11).

Using a Thermos on Shabbos

Since most of the laws of Shabbos are derived from the construction of the Mishkan, it is an appropriate week to discuss:

Question #1: Using a Thermos

“May I pour hot water from an urn or a kettle that is on the blech into a thermos on Shabbos?”

Question #2: Wrapping a Thermos

“May I wrap a thermos bottle, containing hot water, with towels on Shabbos to keep the water hot?”

Introduction:

Explaining the background behind both of these questions involves an in-depth analysis of the rabbinic injunctions instituted by our Sages to safeguard the Shabbos. The laws of Shabbos include many Torah prohibitions, such as not to cook or stir a fire, and also many rabbinic prohibitions to guarantee that people not violate Torah laws. We will begin our explanation of this topic with an extensive glossary, but bear in mind that this is a brief overview of these concepts and not to be used for practical halacha.

Shehiyah – leaving food on the fire

Chazal prohibited shehiyah, which is leaving food on a fire or in an oven when Shabbos begins, because of concern that someone might mistakenly stir the coals. However, they permitted leaving food this way when one fulfills any one of the following three requirements:

1. Covering the fire

One may leave food cooking or warming as Shabbos begins, if he covers the fire in a way that lessens its heat and also reminds one not to stir the fire on Shabbos (see Shabbos 36b with Rashi and Ran). The most common method used today to accomplish this is to place a blech on top of the stove. It is preferable that the blech also cover the dials, to avoid inadvertently adjusting the flame (Shu”t Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 1:93).

2. Adding raw meat

A second method to permit cooking or warming food when Shabbos begins is to place raw meat into the pot immediately before Shabbos (Shabbos 18b). By doing so, one knows that the food will certainly not be ready to eat for the Friday night meal, and it will be ready for the Shabbos day meal, so there is no need to be concerned about turning up the fire (Rashi ad locum).

Several late poskim are reluctant to rely on this heter today, for reasons beyond the scope of this article (Chazon Ish, Orach Chayim 37:22; Teshuvos Ivra in Kisvei Hagaon Rav Yosef Eliyahu Henkin, Volume 2, page 19).

3. Cooked before Shabbos

A third approach is to have the food cooked before Shabbos begins. According to Ashkenazic practice, one may leave the food even on an open fire, as long as it is considered edible when Shabbos begins. Sefardim follow a more stringent approach, allowing this heter only if the food is fully cooked and only for heating water and similar foods that do not improve by remaining longer on the fire. To prepare chamin shel Shabbat, what Ashkenazim call cholent, a Sefardi must rely on one of the other two heterim mentioned above, whereas an Ashkenazi may leave his food even on an open flame, if it is edible when Shabbos begins.

Chazarah – warming food on Shabbos

A second prohibition that Chazal instituted is called chazarah, which includes placing food, even if fully cooked, on a heat source on Shabbos to warm it up. The details of this prohibition are complicated, but for our purposes we will mention that it is permitted to return a pot or food to the fire on Shabbos, even if the food is fully cooked, only in two general ways:

A. The food is still hot, one removed it from the blech intending to return it to remain hot or warm, provided he kept his hand on the handle of  the pot the entire time that it was off the fire. Many Sefardim are lenient, maintaining that one does not need to observe the last two requirements, provided the pot of food was not placed on the ground; Ashkenazim can be lenient about returning the food to the fire, if someone mistakenly forgot these two requirements. Concerning how hot the food must be, Sefardim are stricter than Ashkenazim, contending that the food must be too hot to hold directly in one’s hand in order to permit returning. Ashkenazim rule that one may return the food as long as it is still warm enough to eat.

B. Under certain circumstances, Chazal permitted warming dry food on Shabbos in a way that is different from the way one normally cooks food. For example: One may place a fully-baked kugel on top of a pot that is on the fire.

Hatmanah – insulating

A third prohibition that Chazal instituted, one very relevant to our topic, is called hatmanah, wrapping or insulating food to keep it hot. This includes two different sets of rules – one for someone who wraps the food before Shabbos and one for someone who wants to wrap his food on Shabbos.

Before Shabbos

Chazal prohibited hatmanah before Shabbos in a way that increases the heat, such as with hot ash, fertilizer, or the remaining crushed-out pulp of olives or sesame seeds. These materials are called davar hamosif hevel, items that increase heat. This is prohibited because of a concern that someone might mistakenly stir coals on Shabbos (Shabbos 34b). However, it is permitted to insulate foods before Shabbos with materials that do not increase heat, called davar she’eino mosif hevel, such as clothing, blankets, towels, or sawdust. (In the case of sawdust, one may also have to deal with the laws of muktzah, but that is not today’s subject.)

Partial hatmanah before Shabbos

The Rishonim dispute what constitutes hatmanah. Does leaving food on a fire to continue warming when Shabbos arrives constitute hatmanah? Although this does not fulfill our usual definition of insulating, it warms the food on Shabbos by maintaining physical contact with a source of heat. According to many Rishonim, placing food so that it touches the fire is included in the prohibition of hatmanah (Ba’al Hamaor and Ran, beginning of Shabbos, Chapter 3). In their opinion, if one heats food on a wood fire and intends to leave the food that way into Shabbos, one must place the food atop a tripod or other device that raises it above the burning wood and coals. Placing the pot of food on the tripod avoids the prohibition of hatmanah (but may still involve the prohibition of shehiyah), since the food is no longer touching any heat source. Failing to distance the food from direct contact to the source of heat violates the prohibition of hatmanah, and the food may not be eaten on Shabbos.

According to other Rishonim, hatmanah is prohibited only when the pot of food is covered completely or mostly (see Tosafos, Shabbos 36b s.v. Lo; Sefer Hayashar, Cheilek Hachiddushim Chapter 235). The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 253:1) follows the first opinion that one may not have food lying directly on a flame or hot coals when Shabbos begins. Thus, Sefardim, who follow the Shulchan Aruch’s decisions, may not leave food for Shabbos touching the heat directly, even if it is otherwise exposed to the air. The Rema permits partial hatmanah on Shabbos, allowing placing a pot into warm coals before Shabbos, as long as the lid is not covered by the coals.

Thus, people on a camping trip over Shabbos who choose to keep their Friday night dinner warm by leaving it on their campfire need to know if they are Ashkenazim or Sefardim. If they are Ashkenazim, they may leave their food on the fire when Shabbos starts, as long as it is already cooked to the extent that it is edible. If they are Sefardim, they must have the food elevated above the fire when Shabbos begins, and, in addition, they can do this only with food that is fully cooked and does not improve when it stews longer.

Lid is not covered

If one is an Ashkenazi, how much of the pot may be covered without violating the laws of hatmanah? The Shulchan Aruch Harav (Kuntrus Acharon 257:3) contends that as long as the pot lid remains uncovered, one may cover all the sides of the pot. He permits placing a bottle into a pot of hot water before Shabbos, provided that the cover of the bottle is above the water level.

The Pri Megadim (Mishbetzos Zahav, Orach Chayim 259:3) discusses whether it is sufficient that the top of the pot be exposed, or whether a larger area of the pot must be exposed. Based on a ruling of the Taz (Orach Chayim 258:1), the Pri Megadim contends that one must leave most of the pot exposed to avoid violating hatmanah. (We should note that the Taz in Orach Chayim 253:14 appears to hold like the Shulchan Aruch Harav.)

This dispute would affect to what extent one may drape towels over an urn either before or on Shabbos. According to the Pri Megadim, one may do this only if the sides of the urn are predominantly exposed. According to the Shulchan Aruch Harav, it is sufficient if the sides are partially exposed.

Shabbos sleeve

I once saw a woman prepare her electric hot water urn by draping a cloth sleeve made especially for the urn and embroidered with the words “Lichvod Shabbos.” I asked her why she did that and she said, “It keeps it hotter.” When I told her she can’t use it because of hatmanah, she was incredulous, and responded, “but it says ‘lichvod Shabbos!’” I have no idea who produced this sleeve, but there was no hechsher embossed on it. Unfortunately, the label on the cloth does not permit its use.

By the way, there is a simple solution for this problem. If some space is left between the side of the urn and the towels or sleeve, this is not considered hatmanah and is permitted (Chayei Odom, Hilchos Shabbos 2:5). One may place a board or other item on top of the urn that is wider that the urn and drape the towel over the item. In this instance, one may leave the towel there all of Shabbos, and one may even place the towel there on Shabbos itself. Since the towel is not resting flush against the urn, this is not included in the prohibition of hatmanah.

On Shabbos

On Shabbos itself, Chazal prohibited covering the food, even with something that does not increase heat (Shabbos 34a). Therefore, one may not take a cholent pot or kettle and wrap it in towels on Shabbos to keep it hot. The reason for this prohibition is concern that someone insulating his food will discover that it is colder than he wants and will mistakenly heat it (Shabbos 34a).

Kli rishon and sheini

The next part of our glossary involves explaining the terms kli rishon, kli sheini and yad soledes bo.

A kli rishon is a pot, pan or other vessel containing food that was heated on top of a stove, inside an oven or any other way directly from a source of heat. A kli sheini is the platter or bowl into which food was poured from a kli rishon.

Here is a halachic example of the distinction between kli rishon and kli sheini. The Mishnah (Shabbos 42a) teaches that if a pan or pot of food was removed from the fire on Shabbos, one may not add spices into that pot, because this constitutes bishul. However, one may add spices to a platter which contains the food after it has been poured out of the original pot or pan. The second case is a kli sheini, meaning that the platter itself was never on the fire.

Why is there a halachic difference between a kli rishon and a kli sheini? Tosafos (Shabbos 40b s.v. Ushma) explains that when the vessel itself is on the fire or inside the oven, the heat of the food is sustained by the hot walls of the vessel, and that is why bishul occurs. However, when the container itself was never directly warmed, the walls of the vessel diminish the heat of the food placed therein. As a result, the food will not cook from the heat of the kli sheini walls. In other words, cooking requires not only sufficient heat, but also that the walls of the pot or vessel maintain that heat. Therefore, cooking occurs in a kli rishon even after it was removed from the fire, but, under most circumstances, not in a kli sheini.

Yad soledes bo

Whenever halacha discusses that something is hot, it means that it is at least yad soledes bo, a term meaning that it is hot enough that a person pulls his hand back instinctively when he touches it. There is much dispute among the halachic authorities as to how we measure this in degrees, which is a subtopic that we will leave for a different time.

Using a thermos

Now that we have completed our very extensive introduction, we can address the questions that began this article:

“May I pour hot water from an urn or a kettle that is on the blech into a thermos on Shabbos?”

“May I wrap a thermos bottle, containing hot water, with towels on Shabbos to keep the water hot?”

The Gemara (Shabbos 51a) quotes a Tosefta (see Shabbos 4:12) that provides the prologue to our question: “Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says that they prohibited (insulating on Shabbos) only if the food is in the pot in which it was originally heated up, but if it was moved to a different pot, one may insulate it on Shabbos.” The Gemara explains that the prohibition to insulate food on Shabbos is out of concern that someone might increase the heat by stirring coals (see Shabbos 34a). Rashi explains that the reason Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel permitted wrapping up the pot of food in this case is because the person is actively trying to cool off the water by pouring it into a cooler vessel. However a thermos bottle that is being used to keep things hot may be different.

On the other hand, the Rambam (Hilchos Shabbos 4:5) cites this law as follows: “If you moved the cooked food or the hot water from one vessel to another, one is permitted to insulate the second vessel on Shabbos, provided one uses material that does not increase heat… because they forbade insulating food on Shabbos only in a kli rishon, in which the food was originally cooked, but once it was moved from that vessel, it is permitted.” Clearly, the Rambam understands that there was no decree prohibiting hatmanah in a kli sheini on Shabbos with devorim she’einam mosifim hevel. Following this logic, it would appear that one may pour hot water into a thermos bottle on Shabbos, even though one’s intent is to keep the water hot,since a thermos is only a kli sheini. Thus, whether one may pour hot water into a thermos on Shabbos may depend on this dispute between Rashi and the Rambam.

In general, halachic authorities rule according to the Rambam when he disputes with Rashi, both lechumrah and lekulah. The Birkei Yosef (Choshen Mishpat 25:31) explains the reason is because Rashi wrote his comments to explain the text of the Gemara, and it is possible that he might have reconsidered had he issued a final ruling.  Indeed, in this instance, several major authorities appear to rule according to the Rambam (Ran; Tur; Taz, Orach Chayim 257:5; see also Magen Avraham 252:13).

Notwithstanding the opinions of these authorities, Rav Moshe Feinstein writes that it is preferable to be machmir like Rashi (Shu”t Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 1:95). Rav Moshe concludes, however, that, even according to Rashi, it is permitted to pour water into a thermos bottle on Shabbos, because of a different reason. The closing of a thermos bottle is not an act of hatmanah, but an act of closing the bottle. However, according to Rashi, it is certainly forbidden to wrap the thermos bottle with towels to keep it hot. According to Rambam, this should be permitted, because there is no hatmanah in a kli sheini.

In conclusion

Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch (Shemos 20:10) notes that people mistakenly think that work is prohibited on Shabbos in order that it be a day of rest. He points out that the Torah does not prohibit doing avodah, which connotes hard work, but melacha, which implies purpose and accomplishment. Shabbos is a day on which we refrain from altering the world for our own purposes, and the goal of Shabbos is to allow Hashem’s rule to be the focus of creation, by refraining from our own creative acts (Shemos 20:11).

The Gemara teaches that the rabbinic laws are dearer to Hashem than the Torah laws. In this context, we can explain the vast halachic literature devoted to understanding these prohibitions, created by Chazal to protect the Jewish people from major sins. Seeing how much attention the poskim apply to understanding the laws of Shabbos thoroughly should encourage us to make sure we know these laws well, in all their details.

Carrying in Public and the Use of an Eruv II

Last week, I began discussing many of the background issues germane to whether one can erect an eruv to permit carrying in a city. We discovered that the Torah prohibits carrying an object from one’s house or any other enclosed area (halachically called a reshus hayachid), to an area available to the general public, a reshus harabim, or vice versa; or to carry an item four amos (about seven feet) or more within a reshus harabim. Even when there is no Torah prohibition involved in carrying the item, there may still be a rabbinic violation.

As we noted there, with reference to the melacha of carrying on Shabbos, the terms reshus hayachid and reshus harabim do not relate to the ownership of the respective areas, but are determined by the extent that the areas are enclosed and how they are used. A reshus hayachid could certainly be public property, and there are ways whereby an individual could own a reshus harabim. I also mentioned that the construction of an eruv consisting of poles and wire cannot permit carrying in an area that is prohibited min haTorah. In addition, we learned that a reshus harabim must meet very specific and complex requirements, including:

(A) It must be unroofed (Shabbos 5a).

(B) It must be meant for public use or thoroughfare (Shabbos 6a).

(C) It must be at least sixteen amos (about twenty-eight feet) wide (Shabbos 99a).

(D) According to most authorities, it cannot be inside an enclosed area (cf., however, Be’er Heiteiv 345:7, quoting Rashba; and Baal HaMaor, Eruvin 22a,quoting Rabbeinu Efrayim). The exact definition of an “enclosed area” is the subject of a major dispute that I will discuss.

(E) According to many authorities, it must be used by at least 600,000 people daily (Rashi, Eruvin 59a, but see Rashi ad loc. 6a where he requires only that the city has this many residents). This is derived from the Torah’s description of carrying into the encampment in the desert, which we know was populated by 600,000 people.

(F) Many authorities require that it be a through street, or a gathering area that connects to a through street (Rashi, Eruvin 6a).

Some authorities add additional requirements.

We explained that an area that does not meet the Torah’s definition of a reshus harabim, yet is not enclosed, is called a karmelis. One may not carry into, from or within a karmelis, following the same basic rules that prohibit carrying into a reshus harabim. However, since the prohibition not to carry in a karmelis is rabbinic in origin, Chazal allowed a more lenient method of “enclosing” it.

At this point, let us continue our discussion.

600,000 People

An early dispute among Rishonim was whether one of the requirements of a reshus harabim is that it be accessible to 600,000 people, the number of male Jews over twenty the Torah tells us left Egypt (see Tosafos, Eruvin 6a s.v. keitzad). According to Rashi and others who follow this approach, one may enclose any metropolis with a population smaller than 600,000 with tzuros hapesach to permit carrying. (In some places Rashi describes the city as having 600,000 residents, and in others describes it as having 600,000 people using the area constantly. The exact definition is the subject of much literature; see, for example, Shu”t Mishkenos Yaakov #120 s.v. hinei harishon; and Shu”t Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 1:139:5.)

However, other early authorities contend that an area with less than 600,000 people still qualifies as a reshus harabim, if it fulfills the other requirements that I listed above. In their opinion, such an area cannot be enclosed with tzuros hapesach. Although many authorities hold this way, the accepted practice in Ashkenazic communities was to follow the lenient interpretation and construct eruvin in places with less than 600,000 people (see, for example, Aruch Hashulchan 345:18). Nevertheless, the Mishnah Berurah discourages carrying in such an eruv, since many Rishonim hold that an eruv in such a place is not acceptable (364:8; Bi’ur Halacha to 345:7 and to 364:2). There are different opinions as to whether Sefardim may follow this leniency, although the prevalent practice today is for them to be lenient.

Modern City

Most large, metropolitan areas today are populated by more than 600,000 people. Some authorities still define many of our metropolitan areas as a karmelis, based on the following definition: Any area less concentrated than the Jews’ encampment in the desert is considered a karmelis. Since this encampment covered approximately 50 square miles (or approximately 130 sq km), these authorities permit an eruv in any place where the population density is less than 600,000 people per 50 square miles (Shu”t Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 4:87). However, other authorities consider any metropolitan area or megalopolis containing 600,000 people to be a reshus harabim, regardless of its population density. Does this mean that there is no heter with which to construct an eruv in a large city? Indeed, many authorities contend this (Shu”t Mishnas Rav Aharon 1:2).

A Large Breach

Nevertheless, the Chazon Ish presented a different approach to permit construction of an eruv in a large contemporary city. His approach requires an introduction.

In general, an area enclosed by three or four full walls cannot be a reshus harabim (Eruvin 22a). What is the halacha if each of the three sides of an area is enclosed for most of its length – however, there are large gaps in the middle of the enclosure? For example, if walls or buildings enclose most of an area – however, there are gaps in the middle of the area between the buildings, where streets cross the city blocks. Does the area in the middle, surrounded by buildings and other structures, still qualify as a reshus harabim, or has it lost this status, because it is mostly “enclosed”?

The basis for the question is the following: There is a general halachic principle that an area that is mostly enclosed is considered enclosed, even in its breached areas (Eruvin 5b, et al.). For example, a yard enclosed by hedges tall enough to qualify as halachicwalls may be considered enclosed, despite open areas between the hedges, since each side is predominantly enclosed by either hedges or a house.

On the other hand, a breach wider than ten amos (about 17 feet, or about 5 meters) invalidates the area from being considered enclosed. Therefore, one may not carry within a fenced-in area that has a 20-foot opening, without enclosing the opening in some way.

The issue that affects the modern city is the following: Granted that a large breach needs to be enclosed to permit carrying within the area, is this required min haTorah or only rabbinically? If one encloses a large area with walls that run for miles but have large gaps, is this area considered enclosed min haTorah on the basis of its walls, or is it considered open because of its gaps?

This question was debated by two great nineteenth-century authorities, Rav Efrayim Zalman Margoliyos of Brody, known as the Beis Efrayim, and Rav Yaakov of Karlin, the Mishkenos Yaakov. The Beis Efrayim contended that a breach invalidates an enclosure only because of a rabbinic prohibition and the area is considered enclosed min haTorah, whereas the Mishkenos Yaakov held that the breach renders the area as a reshus harabim min haTorah. The lengthy correspondence between these two authorities covers a host of other eruv-related issues (Shu”t Beis Efrayim, Orach Chayim # 25, 26; Shu”t Mishkenos Yaakov, Orach Chayim, #120- 122).

What difference does it make whether this area is considered open min haTorah or miderabbanan, since either way one must enclose the area?

The difference is highly significant. If we follow the lenient approach, then even if the area in the middle meets all the other requirements of a reshus harabim, the Beis Efrayim contends that it loses its status as a reshus harabim because of its surrounding walls, notwithstanding their large gaps – in which case it may be possible to construct an eruv.

On the other hand, the Mishkenos Yaakov contends that this area is considered a reshus harabim because of the gaps, and we ignore the walls. According to the Mishkenos Yaakov, it is impossible to construct an eruv around this area.

How one rules in this dispute between these two gedolim affects the issue of constructing an eruv in a contemporary city. Most modern cities contain city blocks that consist predominantly of large buildings with small areas between the buildings, and streets that are much narrower than the blocks. One can easily envision that both sides of the street are considered enclosed min haTorah, according to the Beis Efrayim’s analysis. This, itself, does not sufficiently enclose our area, because the street is open at both ends. However, at certain points of the city, the street dead-ends into a street that is predominantly enclosed with buildings, fences, walls or something else. The result is that this section of the city can now be considered min haTorah as enclosed on three sides by virtue of the parallel buildings along both sides of the street and those at its dead end. Since, according to the Beis Efrayim, this area now qualifies as an enclosed area min haTorah, he also holds that the entire area is considered a reshus hayachid min haTorah.

The Chazon Ish now notes the following: Once you have established that this part of the city qualifies as a reshus hayachid min haTorah, this area is now considered completely enclosed halachically. For this reason, other city blocks that are predominantly enclosed on both sides of the street that intersect with this first area are now also considered to be enclosed areas min haTorah. As a result, a large section of most cities is considered min haTorah enclosed on at least three sides, according to this calculation. Although one cannot carry in these areas miderabbanan because of the “breaches” in their “enclosures,” they are no longer reshus harabim min haTorah, and one can, therefore, enclose the entire area with tzuros hapesach (Chazon Ish, Orach Chayim 107:5). As a result of this calculation, the Chazon Ish concludes that many large cities today qualify as a karmelis, and therefore one may construct tzuros hapesach to permit carrying there.

However, other authorities reject this calculation for a variety of reasons. Some contend, as explained above, that the gaps between the buildings invalidate the enclosure, thus leaving the area a reshus harabim, which cannot be enclosed (Shu”t Mishkenos Yaakov; Shu”t Mishnas Rav Aharon).

In conclusion, we see that a dispute among poskim over eruvin is not a recent phenomena. In practice, what should an individual do? The solution proposed by Chazal for all such issues is “Aseh lecha rav, vehistaleik min hasafek – Choose someone to be your rav, and remove yourself from doubt.” Your rav, or your halachic authority, can guide you as to whether it is appropriate to carry within a certain eruv, after considering the halachic basis for the specific eruv’s construction, the level of eruv maintenance, and family factors. Never underestimate the psak and advice of your rav!

Carrying in Public and the Use of an Eruv

Question #1:

“Is it a mitzvah to build an eruv?”

Question #2: Public or private ownership?

“Can I own a reshus harabim?”

Question #3:

“How does a little bit of wire enclose an area? Isn’t this a legal fiction?”

Answer:

In this week’s parsha, the Torah recounts the story of the mann, including the unbecoming episode where some people attempted to gather it on Shabbos. In the words of the Torah:

And Moshe said, “Eat it [the mann that remained from Friday] today, for today is Shabbos to Hashem. Today you will not find it [the mann] in the field. Six days you shall gather it, and the Seventh Day is Shabbos – There will be none.”

And it was on the Seventh Day. Some of the people went out to gather, and they did not find any.

And Hashem said to Moshe: “For how long will you refuse to observe My commandments and My teachings? See, Hashem gave you the Shabbos. For this reason, He provides you with two-day supply of bread on the sixth day. On the Seventh Day, each person should remain where he is and not leave his place” (Shemos 16:25- 29).

Although the Torah’s words “each person should remain where he is and not leave his place” might be understood to mean that even leaving one’s home is forbidden, the context implies that one may not leave one’s home while carrying the tools needed to gather the mann (Tosafos, Eruvin 17b). The main prohibition taught here is to refrain from carrying an object from one’s house or any other enclosed area (halachically called reshus hayachid) to an area available to the general public, a reshus harabim. Chazal further explain that moving an item in any way from a reshus hayachid to a reshus harabim violates the Torah law, whether one throws it, places it, hands it to someone else, or transports it in any other way (Shabbos 2a, 96). Furthermore, we derive from other sources that one may also not transport an item from a reshus harabim to a reshus hayachid, nor may one transport it four amos (about seven feet) or more within a reshus harabim (Shabbos 96b; Tosafos, Shabbos 2a s.v. pashat). Thus, carrying into, out of, or within a reshus harabim violates a severe Torah prohibition. For the sake of convenience, I will refer to the transport of an item from one reshus to another or within a reshus harabim as “carrying,” regardless of the method of conveyance.

One should note that with reference to the melacha of carrying on Shabbos, the terms reshus hayachid and reshus harabim do not relate to the ownership of the respective areas, but are determined by the extent that the areas are enclosed and how they are used. A reshus hayachid could certainly be public property, and there are ways whereby an individual could own a reshus harabim.

Notwithstanding the Torah’s clear prohibition against carrying into, from or within a reshus harabim, we are all familiar with the concept of an eruv that permits carrying in areas that are otherwise prohibited. You might ask, how can poles and wires permit that which is otherwise prohibited min haTorah? As we will soon see, it cannot – and the basis for permitting the use of an eruv is far more complicated.

We are also aware of controversies in which one respected authority certifies a particular eruv, while others contend that it is invalid. This is by no means a recent development. We find extensive disputes among early authorities regarding whether one may construct an eruv in certain areas. Some consider it a mitzvah to construct an eruv there, whereas others contend that the very same “eruv” is causing people to sin.

An Old Machlokes

Here is one instance. In the thirteenth century, Rav Yaakov ben Rav Moshe of Alinsiya wrote a letter to the Rosh explaining why he forbade constructing an eruv in his town. In his response, the Rosh contended that Rav Yaakov’s concerns were groundless, and that he should immediately construct an eruv. Subsequent correspondence reveals that Rav Yaakov did not change his mind and still refused to erect an eruv in his town.

The Rosh severely rebuked Rav Yaakov for this recalcitrance, insisting that if Rav Yaakov persisted, he, the Rosh, would place Rav Yaakov in cherem! The Rosh further contended that Rav Yaakov had the status of a zakein mamrei, a Torah scholar who rules against the decision of the Sanhedrin, which in the time of the Beis HaMikdash constitutes a capital offense (Shu”t HaRosh 21:8). This episode demonstrates that heated disputes over eruvin are by no means recent phenomena.

Is It a Mitzvah?

Before I present the arguments for and against eruv manufacture in the modern world, we should note that all accept that it is a mitzvah to erect a kosher eruv when this is halachically and practically possible, as the following anecdote indicates.

Rabbah the son of Rav Chanan asked Abayei: “How can it be that an area in which reside two such great scholars [Abayei and Abayei’s Rebbe] is without an eruv?” Abayei answered: “What should we do? It is not respectful for my Master to be involved, I am too busy with my studies, and the rest of the people are not concerned” (Eruvin 68a).

The commentaries note that Abayei accepted the position presented by Rabbah that one should build an eruv. Abayei merely deflected the inquiry by pointing out that no one was readily available to attend to the eruv, and that its construction did not preempt other activities: Abayei’s commitment to Torah study and the kovod haTorah of his Rebbe. Indeed, halachic authorities derive from this Talmudic passage that it is a mitzvah to erect an eruv whenever it is halachically permitted (Tashbeitz 2:37, quoted verbatim by the Birkei Yosef, Orach Chayim 363:2). These rulings are echoed by such luminaries as the Chasam Sofer (Shu”t Orach Chayim #99), the Avnei Neizer (Shu”t Avnei Neizer, Orach Chayim #266:4), the Levush Mordechai (Shu”t Levush Mordechai, Orach Chayim #4) and Rav Moshe Feinstein (Shu”t Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 1:139:5 s.v. Velichora).

I mentioned before that the construction of an eruv of poles and wire cannot permit carrying that is prohibited min haTorah. If this is true, upon what basis do we permit the construction of an eruv? To answer this question, we need to understand that not every open area is a reshus harabim – quite the contrary, a reshus harabim must meet very specific and complex requirements, including:

(A) It must be unroofed (Shabbos 5a).

(B) It must be meant for public use or thoroughfare (Shabbos 6a).

(C) It must be at least sixteen amos (about twenty-eight feet) wide (Shabbos 99a).

(D) According to most authorities, it cannot be inside an enclosed area (cf., however, Be’er Heiteiv 345:7, quoting Rashba; and Baal HaMaor, Eruvin 22a,quoting Rabbeinu Efrayim). The exact definition of an “enclosed area” is the subject of a major dispute that I will discuss.

(E) According to many authorities, it must be used by at least 600,000 people daily (Rashi, Eruvin 59a, but see Rashi ad loc. 6a where he requires only that the city have this many residents). This is derived from the Torah’s description of carrying into the encampment in the Desert, which we know was populated by 600,000 people.

(F) Many authorities require that it be a through street, or a gathering area that connects to a through street (Rashi, Eruvin 6a).

Some authorities add additional requirements.

Any area that does not meet the Torah’s definition of a reshus harabim yet is not enclosed is called a karmelis. One may not carry into, from or within a karmelis, following the same basic rules that prohibit carrying into a reshus harabim. However, since the prohibition not to carry in a karmelis is only rabbinic in origin, Chazal allowed a more lenient method of “enclosing” it.

Can One “Enclose” a Reshus Harabim?

As I mentioned earlier, carrying within a true reshus harabim is prohibited min haTorah – for this reason, a standard eruv does not permit carrying in such an area (Eruvin 6b). Nevertheless, large doors that restrict public traffic transform the reshus harabim into an area that one can enclose with an eruv. According to some authorities, the existence of these doors and occasionally closing them is sufficient for the area to lose its reshus harabim status. (Rashi, Eruvin 6b; however, cf. Rabbeinu Efrayim, quoted by Baal HaMaor, Eruvin 22a).

Please Close the Door!

There are some frum neighborhoods in Eretz Yisroel where a thoroughfare to a neighborhood or town is closed on Shabbos with doors, in order to allow an eruv to be constructed around the area. However, this approach is not practical in most places where people desire to construct an eruv.

So what does one do if one cannot close the area with doors?

This depends on the following issue: Does the area that one wants to enclose meet the requirements of a reshus harabim min haTorah, or is it only a karmelis? If the area is a reshus harabim min haTorah and one cannot occasionally close the area with doors, then there is no way to permit carrying in this area. One should abandon the idea of constructing an eruv around this city or neighborhood (see Eruvin 6a; Shulchan Aruch Orach Chayim 364:2). Depending on the circumstances, one may still be able to enclose smaller areas within the city.

Tzuras Hapesach

However, if the area one wants to enclose does not qualify as a reshus harabim, then most authorities rule that one may enclose the area by using a tzuras hapesach (plural, tzuros hapesach) – literally, “the form of a doorway.”(However, note that Shu”t Mishkenos Yaakov #120 s.v. Amnom and Shu”t Mishnas Rav Aharon #6 s.v. Kuntrus Be’Inyanei Eruvin paragraph #2 both forbid using a tzuras hapesach in many places that other poskim permit.)

A tzuras hapesach consists of two vertical side posts and a horizontal “lintel” that passes directly over them, thus vaguely resembling a doorway. According to halacha, a tzuras hapesach successfully encloses a karmelis area, but it cannot permit carrying in a true reshus harabim (Eruvin 6a). Using tzuros hapesach is the least expensive and most discreet way to construct an eruv. In a future article, I hope to explain some common problems that can occur while constructing tzuros hapesach and how to avoid them, and some important disputes relating to their construction.

Let us review. Carrying can be permitted in a karmelis, but not a reshus harabim, by enclosing the area with tzuros hapesach. Therefore, a decisive factor as to whether one can construct an eruv is whether the area is halachically a karmelis or a reshus harabim. If the area qualifies as a karmelis, then an eruv consisting of tzuros hapesach permits one to carry; if it is a reshus harabim, then tzuros hapesach do not. The issues concerning the definition of a reshus harabim form the basis of most controversies as to whether a specific eruv is kosher or not.

I will continue this article next week, bli neder.

Who Drinks the Kiddush Wine in Shul?

In honor of Parshas Bereishis and the first Shabbos

Drinking in shul

Why is the Kiddush wine in shul given to a child?  If an adult is not permitted to drink before he has personally fulfilled Kiddush, can we cause a child to drink?

Background

The underlying question here is the following: The Torah commands us not only to observe the mitzvos of the Torah, but also not to cause someone else to violate the Torah. This law prohibits even causing a child to violate the Torah, notwithstanding that a child himself is not required to observe the mitzvos. Furthermore, it applies even when the child is, unfortunately, not being raised in an observant way. It is therefore forbidden for someone who has a babysitting job to feed a Jewish child non-kosher food, or to serve non-kosher food to a Jewish adult in a nursing facility or to a Jewish child in a school cafeteria.

The source

There are three different places from which we derive that it is prohibited to cause a child to violate commandments of the Torah (Yevamos 114a). These hermeneutic allusions are in the context of the following three mitzvos:

(1) The prohibition against eating sheratzim, tiny creatures.

(2) The prohibition against eating blood.

(3) The prohibition for a kohen to come in contact with a corpse.

We will soon see the significance of the three sources.

What age child?

This law applies even to a child too young to understand what a mitzvah is (Magen Avraham 343:2). Therefore, one may not use a baby blanket or baby clothes made of shatnez (Shu”t HaRashba HaChadoshos #368; Shu”t Beis Yehudah, Yoreh Deah #45; Eishel Avraham [Butchatch], Orach Chayim 343:1). Similarly, one is prohibited to feed a newborn infant non-kosher food, unless it is a life-threatening emergency (Magen Avraham 343:2).

Based on the above sources, we can now appreciate our opening question. “Why is the Kiddush wine in shul given to a child?  If an adult is not permitted to drink before he has personally fulfilled Kiddush, can we cause a child to drink?” To explain this topic better, let us examine its halachic background.

Friday night Kiddush in shul

At the time of the Gemara, Kiddush was recited in shul Friday night because of visitors who would eat their meals in guest rooms that were located adjacent to the shul (see Pesachim 101a and Tosafos s.v. DeAchlu). The fact that the guests ate their meals nearby is significant because of the principle, ein Kiddush ela bimkom seudah — one fulfills the obligation for Kiddush only when it is recited or heard in the same place where one intends to eat one’s Shabbos repast. Someone who hears Kiddush but does not eat a “meal” where he heard it does not fulfill the mitzvah of hearing Kiddush. Discussing the details of ein Kiddush ela bimkom seudah requires a separate, lengthy article; but, for our purposes, we will say that most authorities conclude that eating a significant amount of food on which we recite a mezonos satisfies the requirement of a seudah.

A bit later in history

In the era of the Rishonim, several hundred years after the Gemara, no one ate Friday night meals in the shul building, yet the custom to recite Kiddush at the end of davening was still commonly observed. Although we find many authorities who ruled that one should not recite Kiddush under these circumstances, most communities continued the practice of reciting Kiddush in shul (Tur and Beis Yosef, Orach Chayim 269).

Why do we continue to recite Kiddush?

If no one fulfills the mitzvah with the Kiddush recited in shul, why did the practice continue? This question is discussed by several of the Geonim and the Rishonim, and I will present here some of their approaches.

Rav Naturanai Gaon states that one should recite the Kiddush in shul because of the benefit that hearing Kiddush has for one’s vision. This idea is based on the Gemara’s statement that taking overly-long strides damages one’s vision, and that the Friday evening Kiddush restores the vision that has been lost (see Brachos 43b). Since not every household had wine on which to recite Kiddush, the custom developed to recite Kiddush in shul for this therapeutic purpose. It appears that, according to Rav Naturanai Gaon‘s reason, no one needs to drink the Kiddush wine in shul, since its purpose is not to fulfill the mitzvah.

The Tur objects

However, the Tur, who quotes Rav Naturanai Gaon, sharply disputes the reason. This is because the Gemara explains that the basis for Kiddush in shul is for guests and not the therapeutic reason of Rav Naturanai Gaon.

Another early authority, Rabbeinu Yonah, presents a different explanation for reciting Kiddush in shul, even though the reason mentioned by the Gemara no longer applies. Rabbeinu Yonah contends that the Kiddush was for the benefit of people who did not know how to recite Kiddush and who would simply not fulfill the mitzvah at all. When these people heard Kiddush in shul, they fulfilled the mitzvah min haTorah, notwithstanding the fact that they did not observe the mitzvah as Chazal instructed, since it was not Kiddush bimkom seudah (Rabbeinu Yonah, quoted by Rosh). Thus, Rabbeinu Yonah assumes that the requirement of Kiddush bimkom seudah is a rabbinic ordinance, and that we would recite the Kiddush in shul for the sake of those who would thereby fulfill the Torah mitzvah.

Not all authorities agree with this approach. The Rosh contends that the requirement of Kiddush bimkom seudah is min haTorah. Thus, simply hearing Kiddush without eating then and there does not fulfill any mitzvah and would, therefore, not provide a satisfactory reason to recite Kiddush in shul.

Other authorities explain that reciting Kiddush in shul has a status of a takkanah, a rabbinically-ordained practice that we continue to observe, even though the reason it was established no longer applies (Rashba and Ran, quoted by Beis Yosef). (We should note that although the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch discuss the practice and logistics of reciting Kiddush in shul, they both state that it is preferred not to recite Kiddush in shul. For this reason, many shuls do not recite Kiddush Friday night. However, where the custom is to recite Kiddush in shul, one should continue the practice.)

Kiddush catch-22

Regardless which rationale we use to explain why we recite Kiddush in shul, the Tur raises the following question: The halachah requires that someone drink from the Kiddush wine (Pesachim 105b; Eiruvin 40b), and also prohibits drinking before fulfilling the mitzvah of Kiddush. Since no one is eating in the shul building, no one fulfills the mitzvah with that Kiddush, because of ein Kiddush ela bimkom seudah. Thus, whoever drinks from the Kiddush wine in shul is drinking before he has fulfilled the mitzvah of Kiddush, which is prohibited; yet, someone must drink from the Kiddush wine.

To resolve this predicament, the Tur recommends that the Kiddush wine in shul be given to a child to drink, which, he notes, fulfills the requirement that someone drink from the Kiddush wine (Tur, Orach Chayim 269).

Kiddush conundrum

However, it is not clear how this innovation of the Tur resolves the predicament in a satisfactory way. How can we give a child the Kiddush wine? As we learned above, we are not permitted to cause a child to violate halachah – and he is drinking without fulfilling the mitzvah of Kiddush!

This difficulty is raised by the Beis Yosef, who suggests three solutions to the problem:

  • All three sources of the halacha not to cause a child to violate the Torah — not to eat tiny creatures, not to eat blood, and that a kohein not become tamei from a meis — are lo saaseh prohibitions of the Torah. There are halachic authorities who rule therefore that the proscription to cause a child to violate the Torah applies only to mitzvos of at least the level of a lo saaseh, but not to any prohibition that is considered halachically a lesser offense, such as an issur aseh or a mitzvas aseh, and that it certainly does not apply to a mitzvah miderabbanan (Hagahos Maimoniyos, Shabbos 29:40). Since Kiddush is a mitzvas aseh and not a lo saaseh, it is permitted to cause a child to violate its laws. As a result. some authorities permit causing a child to eat or drink before he has fulfilled the mitzvah of Kiddush.

Although this approach can be used to justify the Tur’s proposal, the Beis Yosef notes that many authorities reject this limitation and contend that one may not cause a child to violate any prohibited action. To justify the practice of giving the wine to a child according to their opinion, we need to find an alternative reason to explain why the shul Kiddush is given to a child. Therefore, the Beis Yosef presents two other approaches to explain the practice.

Not yotzei, but may drink

  • Although, in general, one may not drink before fulfilling the mitzvah of Kiddush, there is an opinion among Rishonim that one who recites Kiddush to benefit others may drink the wine of Kiddush, even when he is not now fulfilling the mitzvah (Rabbeinu Shemuel in the name of the Sar of Coucy [one of the Baalei Tosafos], quoted by Mordechai, Pesachim, Tosefes MeiArvei Pesachim, page 35a). The Beis Yosef explains that, although we do not usually follow this position, we may have the children rely on it, as a means of resolving what to do with the Kiddush

A third approach

  • The Beis Yosef presents a third approach, perhaps the most unusual, to explain why we permit a child to drink the wine of Kiddush. Because we must recite the Kiddush and we do not want the brocha of Kiddush to be recited in vain, we permit a child to drink the wine, even though this is an act that we would otherwise prohibit.

Halachic differences

There are obvious differences in practical halachah between these approaches. The first opinion holds that one may cause a child to do something that an adult may not do, provided that the prohibition is less severe than a lo saaseh (see also Rashba, Shabbos 121a; Ran, Yoma, 1a). (Even according to this approach, because of the laws of chinuch, the child’s father, and possibly the mother, may not have him drink, if the child is old enough to be educated. Thus, this heter may not apply if the father gives his own son the wine of Kiddush in shul.) Based on this opinion, some authorities permit directing a child to carry something on Shabbos in an area where carrying is prohibited only miderabbanan, if the child needs the item (see also, Shu”t Rabbi Akiva Eiger 1:15; Biur Halachah 343). However, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 343:1) and the Magen Avraham (343:3) prohibit this.

According to the third approach, only one child should drink the Kiddush wine in order to minimize the amount of violation performed, whereas the other two answers permit serving the Kiddush wine to any child who desires. (I note that I have never seen any place that allows only one child to drink the Kiddush. Customarily, many of the children in shul line up to sip the Kiddush wine. This practice implies that this third approach was not accepted as the reason for the custom.)

Matzoh on Erev Pesach

Here is another case where the above-mentioned approaches may disagree: May I feed a child matzoh on Erev Pesach? The Terumas HaDeshen contends that, according to the answer that the prohibition is only to feed a child something that is prohibited with the stringency of a lo saaseh, one may feed a child matzoh on Erev Pesach, which is not as severe a prohibition (Terumas HaDeshen #125). However, he concludes that if the child is old enough to appreciate the Seder, one may not feed him matzoh on Erev Pesach for a different reason — because this runs counter to the experience of matzoh being special on Seder night. (Further discussion on this topic can be found in Rama, Orach Chayim 471:2 and the commentaries thereon.)

Yet a fourth approach

Some later authorities did not feel that the approaches suggested by the Beis Yosef explain the Tur’s ruling in a satisfactory way. They therefore presented other reasons to explain why it is permitted to give a child the Kiddush wine before he has fulfilled the mitzvah. One approach is that it is forbidden to cause a child to violate a Torah law only when the prohibition applies at all times. However, it is permitted to cause a child to perform an activity that is usually permitted, but that is prohibited at this particular time. Following this reason, one may feed a child on Yom Kippur, since eating and drinking are activities that are usually permitted, even though this is a very severe prohibition for an adult (Sefer HaYashar #52). (There are authorities who rule that, according to the previous answers, one is permitted to feed a child on Yom Kippur only when it is a life-threatening emergency, but a child old enough to feed himself should not be fed by an adult, but instead be told where food can be located [Minchas Chinuch, Mitzvah 313; see also Mikra’ei Kodesh of Rav Pesach Frank, Yamim Nora’im, page 149].) Therefore, there is no problem giving a child wine before he has fulfilled the mitzvah of Kiddush, since drinking wine, in general, is a permitted activity (Magen Avraham 269:1).

Another difference in halacha

This last answer also results in a different halachic practice than that of the previous approaches. According to this last answer, one may feed a child on Yom Kippur, even when the child could feed himself. It is also permitted to feed any child before he has heard Kiddush, as long as the child is below the age of bar or bas mitzvah.

A minor kohen

At this point, I would like to discuss a related question. Rivkah Katz* asks me: “My husband and sons are kohanim. Am I required to be careful where I take my infant son?”

In the first pasuk of parshas Emor, the Torah (Vayikra 21:1) states, Emor el hakohanim benei Aharon, ve’amarta aleihem lanefesh lo yitama be’amav — Say to the kohanim, the sons of Aharon, and you shall say to them, that they shall not contaminate themselves to a dead person among their people. Since the Torah repeats the word say, we derive that there are two levels of responsibility here, and since usually it says the sons of Aharon, the kohanim, and here it reverses the order, the Torah is commanding that an adult must not cause a child kohen to become tamei (Yevamos 114a, as explained by Bach, Yoreh Deah 373). From the wording of the Rambam (Hilchos Aveil 3:12), we see that every adult Jew, even a non-kohen, is commanded not to make a child kohen tamei. This requires everyone to know the halachos of what makes a kohen tamei. One cannot have the attitude that, since I am not a kohen, these laws are not relevant to me.

We can therefore answer Rivkah’s question: She is, indeed, required to find out all the halachos germane to kohanim becoming tamei, so that she knows where she may bring her son, and where she may not.

An adult kohen

Another related question I was once asked:

“My father-in-law, who is not observant, is a kohen, whereas I am a Yisroel. Are we required to be as stringent about where we go on family outings as we would if I myself were a kohen?”

Answer:

The Rambam rules that it is forbidden for a non-kohen to make an adult kohen tamei (Rambam, Hilchos Aveil 3:5). To quote the Rambam: “If the kohen is unaware that what he did is forbidden, and the adult who made him tamei knows that it is forbidden, then the adult violates the lo saaseh. If the adult kohen knows that it is forbidden, then the other person violates only lifnei iveir lo sitein michshol, do not place a stumbling block before a blind person (Vayikra 19:14).” Chazal interpret this pasuk to mean that one may not give someone bad advice, nor cause him to violate a prohibition (Pesachim 22b).

Thus, we see that, indeed, one must be concerned about where one takes grandpa, even if he himself is not concerned. For a reason that is beyond the scope of this article, this is true even if grandpa is already tamei meis.

Conclusion

Chazal say in Pirkei Avos: “Kol she’ruach habrios nocha heimenu ruach hamakom nocha heimenu,” One who is pleasing to his fellowman is pleasing to his Creator. Being concerned that we not harm others halachically is certainly part of both our social responsibility and our halachic responsibility. When we do our mitzvos properly, others will see us and say, “He is a frum Jew — he lives his life on a higher plane of caring for others.”

*Name has been changed to protect privacy.

 

To Repeat or not to Repeat?

Question #1: Shul Feud

“There is an ongoing dispute in my shul between the baal keri’ah, who is not particularly careful how he accents words, and the gabbai, who periodically insists that the baal keri’ah reread a word because it was accented wrongly. Who is correct?”

Question #2: Reading, Righting…

“Since the Torah prohibits humiliating someone, and particularly in public, why do we correct a baal keri’ah who errs during the reading? Isn’t this embarrassing someone in public?”

Question #3: Monday Morning Quarterback

“We finished the keri’as haTorah and now realize that the baal keri’ah misread a word. What do we do?”

Answer:

Anyone who is the shaliach tzibur for the public, either to fulfill the mitzvah of reading the Torah (the baal keri’ah) or to lead services as the chazzan or baal tefilah, must be alert to recite everything correctly. This includes reading and accenting each word properly, being careful not to run words together, reading the passages so that their implication is correct, and understanding their connotation. A person unable to prepare the reading properly should decline the honor and defer to someone who can recite it acceptably. The only excuse for a chazzan or baal keri’ah not being appropriately prepared is that there is no one else available to read the Torah and he does not have the ability to prepare it properly (Terumas Hadeshen 2:181). The halachic discussion germane to the last circumstance is a topic for a different time.

Correcting errors

What is the halachah if a baal keri’ah misread part of the reading? Are we required to correct him so that we hear an accurate rendition? On the one hand, the Torah is very adamant about not embarrassing a person, and more particularly so in public. On the other hand, distorting a passage of the Torah is a serious offense. (See Yam shel Shlomoh, Bava Kama 4:9, who explains how strict we must be.) Thus, if someone read inaccurately, the entire tzibur failed to observe the mitzvah of reading the Torah.

Indeed, whether one should correct an errant baal keri’ah is a dispute among the rishonim, some contending that one is required to ignore the error, because correcting the baal keri’ah embarrasses him in public. Tosafos (Avodah Zarah 22b s.v. Rigla) quotes a midrash that someone reading the Torah who skipped a syllable, thereby saying ‘Haron’ instead of ‘Aharon,’ has fulfilled his requirement to read the Torah — we do not correct the misreading, even though the letter aleph was skipped. This midrash is quoted also by several other rishonim (Hagahos Ashri, Shabbos 6:13; Sefer Hamanhig, Laws of Shabbos). (I was unable to locate this midrash as the rishonim quote it. Presumably, the manuscript source of this Chazal has been lost or distorted during the intervening centuries.)

On the other hand, the Talmud Yerushalmi (Megillah 4:5) states that one is required to correct a baal keri’ah who errs in his reading: “Rabbi Chinina, the son of Andrei, quoted Rabbi Zakai of Kabul: ‘If someone erred and read the wrong word during the reading of the Torah, we have him reread the passage correctly.’ Rabbi Yirmiya said to Rabbi Zeira: ‘Do we indeed follow this practice [despite the fact that it involves embarrassing a person in public]?’ Rabbi Zeira replied: ‘We correct even a more minor error, such as if he had omitted the letter vav.’”

We see that it was an early dispute among Chazal whether the community’s hearing a meticulously accurate reading is more essential, or whether embarrassing the baal keri’ah is more of a concern. (However, we will soon see an alternative way to resolve the seemingly incompatible passages of the midrash and the Yerushalmi.)

Among the rishonim, we find that Tosafos and the Baal Hamanhig quote the midrash that one should not correct an error, notwithstanding the fact that the Talmud Yerushalmi disagrees. On the other hand, the Rambam (Hilchos Tefillah 12:6) rules in accordance with the Yerushalmi, that a reader’s error cannot be left uncorrected.

Is there a resolution?

Can we possibly resolve the two statements, the midrash and the Yerushalmi, so that they do not clash?

The Beis Yosef, quoting the Mahari ibn Chabib, provides an answer to resolve the conflict: The midrash is discussing a case where the inaccuracy does not affect the sense of the passage, whereas the Yerushalmi refers to a situation in which the error does change its meaning. According to this approach, all agree that one must correct any inaccurate reading in which the meaning of the passage is distorted.

How do we rule?

When the author of Beis Yosef records his decision in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 142:1), he states very succinctly: “One who read and erred, even in a detail regarding only one letter, must repeat the reading.” The early acharonim dispute to what extent the Shulchan Aruch ruled this way: The Rema contends that the Shulchan Aruch’s conclusion requires rereading only when the error changed the meaning of the passage, whereas the Pri Chodosh rules that one must reread, even when the blunder did not alter the meaning (Chayei Odom 31:31). According to the latter opinion, although the Beis Yosef had quoted the Mahari ibn Chabib’s resolution of the conflict between the midrash and the Yerushalmi, in Shulchan Aruch he agreed with the more obvious way of understanding the Rambam and the Yerushalmi, which concluded that any inaccuracy must be corrected.

Most late authorities rule, in agreement with the Rema, that we reread only when the meaning was changed by the error (Mishnah Berurah 142:4; Bi’ur Halachah 142:1 s.v. Ein). We also correct someone who skipped an entire word, even if the passage’s meaning does not change as a result (Bi’ur Halachah 142:1 s.v. Aval).

Common error

I have heard people assume that certain types of errors, such as where one accents the word and how one chants a passage of the reading (called the taamei hamikra or the trop), never require repeating. This assumption is halachically inaccurate. Many times these errors affect the meaning of the verse. An error in the “trop” or in accenting the wrong syllable may change the meaning of the passage and invalidate the reading, as I will now explain.

Taamei hamikra

The Torah is read with a specific tune, determined by certain note symbols on each word. In Yiddish, these notes are called the trop and in Hebrew they are usually called either taamei hamikra or taam hanikud. Which notes apply to each word in Tanach is a halachah leMoshe miSinai (Chayei Odom  31:31). Although most people think that these notes affect only how the Torah reading is chanted, this is not accurate, since the meaning of the Torah is often affected by the taamei hamikra.

One can divide all the taamei hamikra into two general categories, called in Hebrew mesharsim, servants, and mafsikim, stops. Just as in English, the meaning of a sentence depends on where one puts commas and the period, so, too, in Tanach, the meaning of a passage depends on the punctuation, which, in this case, are the mafsikim. The mesharsim are on words where one should not stop. The Mishnah Berurah (142:4), quoting the Shulchan Atzei Shittim, rules that misreading the taamei hamikra in a way that changes the meaning requires that the passage be reread acceptably.

Here is an example. When Pharaoh instructed Yosef about his family’s accommodations, he told Yosef to settle them in the best area of Egypt — Goshen. However, understanding Pharaoh’s instructions to Yosef depends on how you read the pasuk. Reading the verse according to the taamei hamikra, it states: “In the best of the land settle your father and your brothers. They should live in the land of Goshen (Bereishis 47:6).” This means that the land of Goshen is, indeed, the best part of Mitzrayim, and that all of Yosef’s family should move there. However, reading the verse without concern about the taamei hamikra could result in the following: “In the best of the land settle your father. And your brothers should live in the land of Goshen.” This would mean that Yaakov was directed to choose the best part of Mitzrayim, whereas the brothers were assigned Goshen, which may not have been the best part. This misreading is a falsification of Torah. According to halachah, if the passage was read without proper respect for the taamim, such that it would now be “stopped,” or punctuated this way, the passage must be reread.

Stop sign

It is important to note that not only should one be careful to read according to the taamei hamikra, but that one must also be careful to follow the rules of mafsikim and mesharsim, meaning to pause slightly at all mafsikim and not to pause at mesharsim. In some well-meaning communities, it is rather common that baalei keri’ah read as quickly as they can and not make any noticeable stops, until they need to pause for breath. It is possible that this approach does not fulfill the mitzvah of keri’as haTorah, because the reader may stop for breath at inappropriate places and not pause at the correct ones.

Wrongly accented

As I mentioned above, many people are under the mistaken impression that how one accents the words while reciting the Torah or the prayers is not a serious concern. However, emphasizing the wrong syllable may change the meaning of a word, with the result that one does not fulfill the mitzvah of keri’as haTorah. This requires a brief explanation of some of the rules of correct Hebrew diction.

Accenting the wrong syllable

In correctly pronounced Hebrew, all words are accented either on the last syllable of the word, called mi’lera¸ or on the next to last syllable, called mi’le’eil. The word mi’lera is the Aramaic translation of the Hebrew mitachas, meaning below or later (see, for example, Targum Onkelos, Bereishis 35:8, 49:25 and Shemos 2:3), whereas mi’le’eil means above.

In most instances, accenting the wrong syllable does not create a word that changes the intended meaning. Although the word was mispronounced, since the error does not create a new meaning, one does not need to reread the word. However, there are occasions in which a word has two distinctly different meanings, depending on whether it is pronounced mi’lera or mi’le’eil. In these instances, accenting the wrong syllable changes the meaning, and, as a result, one has not fulfilled the mitzvah in his reading. In such cases, the baal keri’ah has prevented the entire tzibur from fulfilling the mitzvah of reading the Torah.

For example, the word ba’ah changes its meaning depending on which syllable is accented. Accented on the first syllable, the word is past tense, meaning she has come, whereas, inflected on the second syllable it is present tense, meaning she is coming. Thus, the meaning of the two pesukim in parshas Vayeitzei, Perek 29, pesukim 6 and 9, changes, if one accents the words incorrectly, as Rashi notes there.

Here is a far more common error. In the mitzvah that we fulfill twice each day, reading the Shma, we read a sentence, ve’ahavta es Hashem elokecha bechol levavcha uvechol nafshecha uvechol me’odecha. Following the rules of Hebrew grammar, the word ve’ahavta has two different meanings, depending on whether it is accented on the last syllable, ta, or on the previous syllable, hav. When accented on ta, as is required when reciting Shma and reading keri’as haTorah, the passage means “and you shall love Hashem, your G-d, with all your heart, with all your soul and with all your abilities.” However, accenting the word on hav distorts its meaning to “you have loved Hashem your G-d with all your heart, with all your soul and with all your abilities.”

Similarly, the word vedibarta, two pesukim later in Shma, changes meaning when not accented on the last syllable. Accenting the word on the middle syllable, bar, changes its meaning to “and you spoke to them [the words of Torah],” rather than “and you shall speak it to them.” Again, one wrong accent, and one does not fulfill the mitzvah.

Shul feud

At this point, we can address our opening question:

“There is an ongoing dispute in my shul between the baal keri’ah, who is not particularly careful how he accents words, and the gabbai, who periodically insists that the baal keri’ah reread a word because it was accented wrongly. Who is correct?”

The halachah is that the baal keri’ah is required to learn the rules for properly accenting Hebrew, and he must also be careful how he reads the passages. There are certainly places where accenting the word on the wrong syllable changes its meaning. In these instances, one who misread the passage must read it over correctly.

Taking out the Torah again

At this point, let us examine the third question above:

“We finished the keri’as haTorah and now realize that the baal keri’ah misread a word. What do we do?”

If the reader misread a word in a way that one did not fulfill the mitzvah, we noted above that one is required to reread the passage. Does this halachah change if one has already completed the Torah reading and returned the sefer Torah to the aron kodesh?

Let us examine some background to this question.

Mesechta Sofrim (11:6) teaches the following: Someone who skipped a pasuk during keri’as haTorah, but nevertheless read ten pesukim correctly does not return to keri’as haTorah. If the original keri’as haTorah was exactly ten pesukim, then he is required to return. When do we follow this approach? On weekdays and mincha of Shabbos… However, if he forgot a pasuk during the main Shabbos reading, he must return to the keri’as haTorah, even if, in the interim, they recited the haftarah and davened Musaf.”

We see that one who missed part of keri’as haTorah on Shabbos morning must take out the sefer Torah again to read the missing passage. One is not required to do so if one missed part of the reading on Monday, Thursday or at Shabbos mincha, provided that one read enough to fulfill the minimum mitzvah on those days, which is to call up three people, each of whom reads at least three pesukim, and to read in total at least ten pesukim.

How much must I reread?

In a situation where one is required to take out the sefer Torah again, how much of the reading must be repeated? Again, Mesechta Sofrim comes to our rescue, where it says (21:7): If he skipped a pasuk and said kaddish, he must reopen the sefer Torah, recite a brochah, read [a pasuk] and two others.” Based on this quotation of Mesechta Sofrim, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 137:3; 282:7) rules that if, on Shabbos, the baal keri’ah skipped a pasuk of the reading, and now the reading has been completed, the sefer Torah returned to its place, and musaf has been davened, one must take out the sefer Torah again to read the omitted verse. Since Chazal required that one may not read an aliyah of less than three pesukim, this means that the requirement will be to read three pesukim, including the previously omitted pasuk. The Mishnah Berurah (282:35) notes that this same halachah is true if one omitted a word of the reading. Since one has missed an essential part of the reading, one must take out a sefer Torah and read three consecutive pesukim, one of which includes the word that was previously missed. The Mishnah Berurah rules this way, also, if one misread part of a word or the taamei hamikra in a way that changes the meaning. However, in the last instance, he concludes that although one should take the sefer Torah out of the aron kodesh again and reread three pesukim, one should not recite a brochah prior to the reading (Bi’ur Halachah 142:1 s.v. Machzirin). Furthermore, the requirement to repeat what one missed is only at the Shabbos morning reading, but on weekday readings or Shabbos mincha, one does repeat the reading for a missed word or even a missed pasuk (Bi’ur Halachah 142:1 s.v. Machzirin).

Conclusion:

The Gemara (Brachos 15b) teaches that whoever reads Shma and is meticulously careful about enunciating the words merits that Gehenom is cooled for him. What is meant by this very strange passage of Gemara? In what way is cooling the fires of Gehenom a reward for reciting Shma slowly?

This could be explained in the following way. Often, we are in a rush to finish davening – there is so much to do, I need to get to work. We know too well the yeitzer hora’s methods of encouraging us to rush through our davening. In order to daven and read the Torah properly, one needs to do these mitzvos slowly and carefully.

Now, at the end of a person’s days on earth, he is called for his final judgment. We are all aware, ein tzadik ba’aretz asher yaaseh tov velo yecheta; everyone has done some aveiros that will require punishment. The Satan, who operates Gehenom, has measured out his cauldron according to the punishment deserved, particularly if the person performed aveiros for which he did not do teshuvah. At this point, the mitzvos of having read the Shma slowly and carefully rise to the forefront. After all, this individual slowed down for the sake of Hashem’s honor, and the Satan has to admit that attempts to get him to rush were, at times, not fruitful. These mitzvos force the Satan to wait until his boiling cauldron is cooled off and is only a bit uncomfortably warm, barely enough to be considered a punishment for the aveiros committed (see Iyun Yaakov).

Salting on Shabbos

 

Question #1: Is this a Bubba Meisah?

“When I was a child, my bubby, a”h, told me that the rav of the shtetl in which she was raised once permitted them to have a gentile kasher meat on Shabbos. Could that possibly be true?”

Question #2: Salting on Yom Tov?

“May one salt vegetables on Yom Tov?”

Question #3: Saltwater at the Seder

“If we forgot to prepare saltwater for the Seder, may we make it on Yom Tov? Does it make any difference this year, when the first night of Pesach falls on Shabbos?”

Question #4: Salting Snow

“May one spread salt outside on Shabbos so that people do not slip?”

Introduction:

Parshas Terumah mentions the construction of the mishkan, which provides the laws of what work may not be performed on Shabbos. We learn from this the 39 melachos involved in building the mishkan that are also the 39 melachos that we may not do on Shabbos.

One of the 39 melachos is me’abeid, tanning. This melachah was performed as part of the construction of the mishkan, because of the need to preserve the hides of the rams and the techashim, whose skins were used for the covering of the ohel mo’ed. The purpose of tanning is to preserve and strengthen hide, and to manufacture leather from it. One of the steps performed while tanning is salting the rawhide, which draws out its moisture. One of the questions that we will be discussing is whether, and to what extent, one may salt food items on Shabbos and Yom Tov. Is this considered similar enough to the melachah of tanning that it is also prohibited?

As always, the intent of this article is not to provide a definitive psak regarding these issues – every person should ask his own rav or posek. Our goal is to give people a better understanding of the issues involved and an appreciation of their rav’s ruling, whatever it may be.

The Gemara’s discussion

Prior to the invention of the freezer, the most practical method of preserving meat for long term use was to pack it heavily in salt. The Gemara (Shabbos 75b) records a dispute between the amora’im, Rabbah bar Rav Huna and Rava, whether salting meat on Shabbos to preserve it is prohibited min haTorah. The dispute between the amora’im was whether this salting, whose purpose is to make the meat last, is comparable to salting hides and therefore included in the Torah’s prohibition. Rabbah bar Rav Huna held that since one’s goal is to preserve the meat, this salting is indeed prohibited min haTorah, whereas Rava held that the melachah of tanning does not apply to food, presumably because this process is considered dissimilar from salting hides to make leather. The goal of tanning a hide is to create strong and permanent leather that will last, perhaps, even for years. Although salting meat to preserve it is for the purpose of making it last, the goals of the two processes are not similar enough to make them comparable – when tanning, one is trying to make leather very tough, which is not the goal of salting meat (see the continuation of the Gemara there).

How do we rule?

Do we paskin according to Rabbah bar Rav Huna, that it is prohibited min haTorah to salt meat in order to preserve it, or according to Rava, that no Torah violation is involved when salting meat? We find that the rishonim dispute how we rule. Whereas the Rambam (Hilchos Shabbos 11:5) concludes that ein ibud ba’ochalin, the melachah of me’abeid does not apply when salting food, other rishonim rule that one can violate Shabbos min haTorah when salting meat to preserve it (Rashba, Toras Habayis 3:3; Piskei Rid, Shabbos 75b; Me’iri, Beitzah 11a). Among the acharonim, we find this dispute repeated, with the Magen Avraham (321:7) siding with the Rambam and contending that ein ibud ba’ochalin, whereas the Elyah Rabbah (321:9) and the Chasam Sofer (Shabbos 75a) rule that packing meat in salt to preserve it is indeed prohibited min haTorah.

There is an interesting difference in practical halachah that results from this dispute.

Accepted halachah prohibits asking a gentile to perform an act on Shabbos that a Jew is prohibited to do min haTorah. (An exception to this rule is to accomodate the needs of someone who is ill, a topic that is beyond the scope of this article [Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 328:17].) However, under certain extenuating situations, such as major financial loss, one may ask a gentile to perform an activity that, were a Jew to do it, would violate only a rabbinic injunction (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 307:5).

According to the position of the Rambam and the Magen Avraham that packing meat in salt to preserve it does not violate a Torah prohibition, one is permitted to have a gentile preserve the meat, in a situation of major financial loss. However, according to the opinion of the other authorities, one would not be permitted to do so.

Salting korbanos

Prior to placing offerings on the mizbei’ach (the altar), there is a requirement to salt them (Vayikra 2:13). The authorities dispute whether this activity would be considered a melachah on Shabbos. The Rashba* (Menachos 21a) and the Me’iri (Beitzah 11a) rule that this salting qualifies as a melachah, whereas several other commentaries contend that it does not. All agree that since offering the regular daily korbanos and the special Shabbos korbanos supersedes Shabbos, salting these korbanos supersedes Shabbos, similar to the law that a bris milah is sometimes performed on Shabbos. The dispute between the authorities would be applicable to someone who, in error, salted an offering that was not to be offered on Shabbos – did he desecrate Shabbos min haTorah when he salted it?

Kosher salting of meat

Now that we have some background to the laws of salting meat on Shabbos, we can discuss the first question that was raised above:

“When I was a child, my bubby, a”h, told me that the rav of the shtetl in which she was raised once permitted people to have a gentile kasher meat on Shabbos. Could that possibly be true?”

Allow me to provide an introduction: Prior to preparing meat for the table, halachah requires that one salt it to remove the blood. We now need to understand: Would performing this salting on Shabbos be prohibited min haTorah as an extension of the prohibition of salting or tanning leather? In the above-quoted Gemara, Rava rules that it is not. The Gemara subsequently concluded with a comment from a later amora, Rav Ashi, who said that Rabbah bar Rav Huna contended that one violates Shabbos min haTorah only when one is salting meat for the purpose of preserving it, such as when he intends to pack for a lengthy trip. Only this type of salting can possibly be included in the Torah violation of me’abeid. However, salting meat to make it kosher for the Jewish table is certainly not a Torah violation of me’abeid. The Aruch Hashulchan (321:29) explains that salting hides is prohibited min haTorah, because this is one stage in the process of making leather last for a very long time. When kashering meat, one is not trying to have the meat last long; therefore, this is not included in the Torah’s prohibition.

Thus, we see that all opinions in the Gemara conclude that there is no Torah prohibition when salting meat for kashrus purposes. Not being omniscient, I have no idea what were the circumstances at the time that the rav in “bubby’s” shtetl paskined. But the background to the question makes it sound as if that reasonably could actually have happened. Gentiles in the shtetl who assisted in Jewish homes were very familiar with Jewish practices, including how to kasher meat, and they often helped the housewife do so. It is certainly possible that there was an extenuating situation, whereby the local rav permitted instructing a gentile to kasher meat on Shabbos, presumably with someone Jewish overseeing to guarantee that the process was performed correctly. Since kashering meat on Shabbos involves only a rabbinic prohibition, and one may ask a gentile to perform a rabbinic prohibition on Shabbos to avoid a major financial loss, circumstances may have been such that the local rav permitted this.

We should note that there is an opinion that holds that kashering meat on Shabbos might be prohibited min HaTorah for a different reason. This approach contends that kashering meat, which is in order to remove the blood, is similar to squeezing juice out of fruit or milking a cow, both of which are prohibited because they are extracting one substance from a different substance (Rosh Yosef, Shabbos 75b, based on Rambam, Hilchos Shabbos 8:7, 10). It would appear that the rav in “bubby’s” shtetl was not concerned about this opinion, at least not under the circumstances and the fact that a gentile was performing the kashering.

Salting on Yom Tov?

Let us now examine a different question that we mentioned above:

“May one salt vegetables on Yom Tov?” First, let us analyze the Gemara’s discussion about salting vegetables on Shabbos. The Gemara (Shabbos 108b, as explained by Rashi) prohibits salting a few slices of radish at a time on Shabbos, but permits dipping them in salt, one at a time, as one eats them.

Among rishonim, there are different opinions why it is prohibited to salt several radish slices at one time. Rashi explains that this is a rabbinic injunction, because when the slices are placed in salt they begin to undergo a process that is somewhat similar to what salting does to preserve hides. However, dipping a radish in salt as you eat it is not comparable to that injunction.

A second approach to explain why we may not salt radishes on Shabbos is because it looks like you are pickling foods on Shabbos. This is prohibited, because it is considered miderabbanan as a type of cooking on Shabbos (Rambam, Hilchos Shabbos 23:10).

A third approach

We find yet a third approach among the rishonim why it is prohibited to salt foods heavily on Shabbos. The Semag and the Hagahos Semak prohibit salting food on Shabbos because this is considered maaseh chol, an activity that is not in the spirit of Shabbos.

The Rambam, who understands that salting vegetables is prohibited as a type of cooking miderabbanan, needs to explain why pickling is more stringent than cooking directly in the sun, which is permitted on Shabbos (see Shabbos 39a; Shu”t Noda Biyehudah 2: Orach Chayim #23; Shaarei Teshuvah 318:3). It would seem that the difference is that pickling and salting are common food preparation procedures, and were therefore treated more strictly than cooking in the sun, which is not normally done (Nimla Tal, Me’abeid, note 16).

Other veggies

The halachic authorities rule that, although the Gemara mentions specifically that it is prohibited to salt radishes, the law applies to any other vegetable that would commonly be processed or prepared by salting (Taz, Orach Chayim 321:2). Thus, the same prohibition would certainly apply to onions or cucumbers (see Shu”t Shevus Yaakov 2:12).

Ramifications of a dispute

There are several applications in which the dispute among the rishonim as to why one may not salt vegetables on Shabbos results in differences in practical halachah. According to the Rambam, one may not submerge vegetables in vinegar on Shabbos; this would also violate, miderabbanan, the prohibition of cooking on Shabbos (Pri Megadim, Mishbetzos Zahav 321:3). However, according to Rashi, this should be permitted, since placing vegetables into vinegar is not comparable to salting leather (Nimla Tal, Meleches Me’abeid, note 16).

Wine and vinegar blend?

May one mix wine and vinegar on Shabbos? According to Rashi, this is certainly permitted. The Taz (321:3) prohibits it, based on the Rambam, but the Aruch Hashulchan (321:34) disagrees, ruling that pickling is considered comparable to cooking only when pickling a solid item like meat, fish or vegetables, but not when mixing together two liquids.

Not worth its salt

Here is another case that might be dependent on the dispute among rishonim why one may not salt radishes on Shabbos. One has a vegetable that is not usually salted, and one wants to put it in salt on Shabbos and leave it there in order to preserve it. According to the Semag and Rashi, this should be prohibited, either because it is comparable to me’abeid miderabbanan or because it is uvda de’chol. However, according to the Rambam, this might be permitted, because it is not considered a type of cooking, and the rule of ein me’abeid ba’ochalin has no exceptions. In halachic conclusion on this question, the Graz (321:2) prohibits preserving a vegetable in salt on Shabbos, even when it is not usually eaten or preserved this way.

Salting veggies on Yom Tov

One of our opening questions was whether the rabbinic prohibition not to salt radishes and other vegetables applies on Yom Tov, just as it applies on Shabbos. This question is dependent on the dispute between the rishonim that we just raised. According to Rashi, that the prohibition is because it is comparable to tanning, since the melachah of me’abeid is prohibited on Yom Tov, it should similarly be prohibited to salt vegetables on Yom Tov. However, according to the Rambam that the prohibition of salting vegetables on Shabbos is because it is a form of cooking, it should be permitted on Yom Tov, just as cooking is. (The dispute among authorities in this matter is recorded in the Rema, Orach Chayim 510:7).

How do we rule?

Within this dispute among rishonim concerning why one may not salt radishes on Shabbos, what is the halachic conclusion? The Shulchan Aruch, in Orach Chayim 321:2, quotes Rashi’s reason, and yet, in 321:3, he quotes the Rambam’s opinion prohibiting salting radishes, because it is like cooking. It appears that he ruled to be strict and follow the chumros of both opinions. Thus, it would appear that one should follow the stringent approach in the different cases that we have mentioned. This conclusion is consistent with the various rulings of the different acharonim (Pri Megadim, Mishbetzos Zahav 321:3; Mishnah Berurah 321:15; Gra”z 321:2).

Saltwater at the Seder

Let us now examine a different question that we mentioned above:

“If we forgot to prepare saltwater for the Seder, may we make it on Yom Tov? Does it make any difference this year, when the first night of Pesach falls on Shabbos?”

To answer this question, we first need to examine the appropriate passage of Gemara. The Mishnah (Shabbos 108a), as explained by the Gemara (108b), says as follows:

One may not make a large quantity of saltwater on Shabbos, but one may make a small quantity of saltwater, dip your bread into it or add it to your cooked food. Rabbi Yosi disagrees, prohibiting making even a small amount of saltwater on Shabbos.

To answer the question whether one may make saltwater for the Seder on Shabbos, we need to answer two questions:

Do we rule according to Rabbi Yosi or according to the first tanna?

What is considered a “small quantity” of saltwater that the first tanna permits?

How do we rule?

The Gemara in Eiruvin (14b) rules according to the first tanna, and this is the halachic conclusion of virtually all authorities (Rif, Rabbeinu Chananel, Tosafos, Rambam, Semag, Rosh, Tur and Shulchan Aruch. However, the Semak quotes some authorities who ruled according to Rabbi Yosi.)

What is considered a “small quantity” of saltwater that the first tanna permits?

The Ran explains that the amount of saltwater one needs for the dipping of the coming meal. Thus, according to his conclusion, one may make saltwater on Shabbos prior to the start of the Seder, but only as much as one thinks one will need for the one Seder. After Shabbos, one will have to make more saltwater for the second Seder.

Salting snow

And now, time for our last opening question: “May one spread salt outside on Shabbos so that people do not slip?”

Assuming that there is an eruv that permits carrying outside, I see no evidence that there is anything prohibited about spreading salt on the ground to melt the ice. It is therefore permitted. I subsequently discovered that several contemporary authors concur with this conclusion (Shemiras Shabbos Kehilchasah; Orchos Shabbos).

In conclusion

All of the 39 melachos are derived from what was done when building the mishkan. In this case, tanning hides was a necessary step in building the mishkan, and our question is to what extent is salting food comparable to salting and tanning hides.

Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch (Shemos 20:10) notes that people mistakenly think that work is prohibited on Shabbos in order to provide a day of rest. This is incorrect, he points out, because the Torah does not prohibit doing avodah, which connotes hard work, but melachah, which implies purpose and accomplishment. The goal of Shabbos is to emphasize Hashem’s rule as the focus of creation by refraining from our own creative acts (Hirsch Commentary, Shemos 20:11). By refraining from melachah for one day a week, we acknowledge the true Builder of the world and all that it contains.

* It is generally accepted that the author of this commentary to Menachos is not the Rashba, as once thought, but a different rishon.

 

No Leg to Stand On

Question #1: Placing my feet

“If the wheel of a stroller falls off on Shabbos, may I slide it back?”

Question #2: A benched bench

“If one leg fell off a bench, may I place the bench on top of another so that people can sit on it on Shabbos?”

Question #3: Pulling my leg

While in shul the first day of Sukkos, I noticed that one of the legs of the shulchan on which the sefer Torah is read was loose and fell off. I then noticed that the gabbai used his foot to push the leg underneath the shulchan to keep it balanced, apparently something he has been doing fairly frequently. As I will explain, I was concerned that the entire shulchan and the leg might be muktzah because of a special decree of Chazal. But first we need an introduction.

Answer

The manufacture of the mishkan and the vestments of the kohanim, discussed in parshas Tetzaveh, provides the source for the 39 melachos, categories of prohibited activities, of Shabbos. One of the activities prohibited min haTorah on Shabbos is repairing an appliance in a permanent, professional way. The early authorities dispute under which melacha heading this activity is included, some considering it to be a type of boneh, constructing, whereas others incorporate it under makeh bepatish, the melachah involved when completing construction of an item. According to both opinions, repairing an appliance in a permanent, professional way is prohibited min haTorah.

Since repairing an appliance in a permanent way is prohibited d’Oraisa, Chazal prohibited other activities that might lead one to violate the Torah law. Here is an example: In the days of Chazal, a kirah was a type of low, earthenware stovetop that rested on short legs that kept it balanced on the ground. A fire was constructed either inside the kirah or beneath it in a small trough dug into the ground. The Gemara (Shabbos 138b) teaches that if the legs of the kirah became detached, the entire stovetop is muktzah, out of concern that one might forget and insert the legs in a permanent way, an act that is prohibited min haTorah.

At this point, we can already understand the question that was raised above regarding the shulchan with a broken leg. Just as the stovetop is muktzah because of its missing leg, perhaps the same is true regarding the shul’s shulchan. Answering this question will require that we delve into this and other related passages of Gemara, and then study what the early commentators write about this topic – so let us roll up our sleeves. As in all our articles, it is not our purpose to render a final halachic decision – that is the role for an individual’s rav or posek. Our goal is to elucidate the topics in order to enable our readers to be able to ask an intelligent shaylah and understand the answer well.

Rav versus the beraisa

Let us begin by examining the Gemara more carefully (Shabbos 138b):

Rami, the son of Yechezkel, asked Rav Huna to review for him three rulings that Rav Huna had heard directly from the great amora Rav, whose name refers to his role as the teacher of all of Klal Yisroel. One of these rulings was: A beraisa (an ancient teaching dating from the era of the tanna’im that was not included in the Mishnah) ruled that a kirah of which two legs became detached is muktzah and may not be used on Shabbos, whereas if only one leg slipped out of place, the kirah may still be used. According to our text of the Gemara, Rav disagreed with the beraisa, contending that if even one leg slipped out of place, the stovetop cannot be moved because of concern that one might reinsert the leg on Shabbos in a permanent way. This text does not reveal why the beraisa contended that one may move a kirah if it is missing only one leg but not if it is missing two.

Among the early rishonim, we find three ways to explain this passage of Gemara:

According to the Ran, the dispute between the beraisa and Rav relates to whether we need to be concerned that someone might insert the leg in a permanent way when only one leg is missing (Ran’s commentary on Rif ad loc.). Presumably, when two legs are missing, the stovetop is difficult to use, and, therefore, the beraisa was concerned that someone might mistakenly insert the two legs in a permanent way, thus desecrating Shabbos. However, when only one leg is missing, since one can use the stovetop by balancing it on its remaining legs, Chazal did not ban using it. Rav disagreed, concerned that even one missing leg might cause someone to repair it in a way that desecrates Shabbos.

A second approach to understanding the beraisa is that of the Aruch, who holds that the beraisa itself was not concerned that someone might repair the stovetop in a way that desecrates Shabbos. The beraisa held that a stovetop missing two legs is muktzah for a completely different reason: It is considered useless with two missing legs, and a useless item is muktzah on Shabbos. Rav is concerned that someone might forget and repair the stovetop in a permanent way, and this concern exists even if only one leg is missing (quoted in the margin of the Gemara in the glosses added by Rav Yeshaya Pik).

A third approach is that of Rashi, who apparently had in front of him a text of the Gemara that varies from what is printed in our editions. His text omits three words that we have in our Gemara, including the words that Rav disagreed with the beraisa. According to his version, there is no dispute in the Gemara and no one prohibits using a stovetop that is missing only one leg. The beraisa ruled that one may not use a stovetop missing two legs, and Rav explained the reason: We are concerned that someone may insert the legs in a permanent way (see Maharshal and Maharam, Shabbos 138b).

According to Rashi, a stovetop missing one leg is not a cause for concern that someone may repair it on Shabbos and, therefore, Chazal did not rule it to be muktzah. Following this approach, there should similarly be no problem with the shulchan that I found to be missing a leg. However, based on the text that we have in our Gemara, all other halachic authorities conclude that if even one leg is missing, the stovetop is muktzah. This ruling is codified by the Rif, Rambam (Hilchos Shabbos 26:6), Rosh, Tur and Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 308:16). Thus, it would seem that our shulchan may indeed be muktzah. We will return to this dispute among the rishonim shortly.

A benched bench

Based on the above quoted passage of Gemara, we find that an early authority, the Terumas Hadeshen, prohibited using on Shabbos a bench missing one of its legs – even by resting the bench on top of another bench or chair. This is because of concern that one might forget and repair the bench (Terumas Hadeshen 1:71). And, according to late authorities, the rulings that we have seen applied to stovetops and benches apply to other tools and furniture with similar issues. For example, although it is permitted to use a hammer on Shabbos to open a coconut, if the head of the hammer fell off before Shabbos, the entire hammer is now muktzah and thus forbidden even for what would otherwise be a permitted purpose. This is because of a concern that someone may re-attach the head in a permanent way, which would desecrate Shabbos (Ketzos Hashulchan 109, Badei Hashulchan #10, at end).

To sum up: We see that Chazal were concerned about someone using a broken appliance because he might forget and, without thinking, repair it in a way that is prohibited min haTorah. To avoid this problem, they prohibited moving the appliance.

We can now explain the concern that I had about the shul’s shulchan. Since the shulchan had a leg that fell off, is the shulchan now muktzah?

Complicating the question

Circumstances complicated the question that I had raised regarding the loose shulchan leg. I discovered the problem on the first day of Sukkos, which means that the coming days are chol hamoed, Shemini Atzeres and Simchas Torah. Since repairing the shulchan in a professional manner is prohibited on chol hamoed, the repair would have to be postponed until after Yom Tov. However, on Simchas Torah the shulchan will be moved in order to accommodate the dancing. How are we going to do this if the shulchan is muktzah?

Conflicting passage

Although the above-quoted discussion would lead us to conclude that a damaged appliance that might accidentally be repaired is muktzah, other rulings of Chazal indicate that this is not always the case. A different passage of Gemara quotes a beraisa that one may remove the door of a cabinet, footlocker or bookcase on Shabbos, but one may not reaffix the door afterward, because of concern that one might hang it in a permanent way, which would desecrate Shabbos min haTorah (Shabbos 122b). However, there is no mention that these appliances or their doors may not be moved because of concern that someone will reaffix the door in a permanent way. In other words, although the Gemara prohibits reaffixing the door, it permits use of the cabinet, footlocker and bookcase and of their doors. Thus, although a broken kirah is muktzah, these appliances are not, despite the fact that we are concerned that someone might reaffix their doors in a permanent way. What is the difference between the two cases?

Similarly, we find a passage in Gemara Eiruvin (102b) that demonstrates the same point. There the Gemara records that if a hinge of the door of a cabinet, footlocker or bookcase is slipping out of place, one may push it back into place, but if it has completely slipped out of place one may not put it back, because of a concern that someone will mistakenly repair it in a permanent way, which, as we noted above, is prohibited min haTorah. Again here, although the Gemara prohibits reaffixing the hinge, the appliance itself does not become muktzah. Thus, we see again that the appliance may be moved as long as no one attempts to reaffix the door or the hinge. This contrasts with the cases of the stovetop leg where the Gemara ruled that the entire stove becomes muktzah.

Stoves versus footlockers

How is a stove different from a footlocker?

One might explain the difference between the case of the stove and that of the footlocker as being that it is difficult to use the stove at all without its leg, whereas the cabinet, footlocker or bookcase can be used without its door or hinge operating properly. We can explain this phenomenon as meaning that when someone has an appliance that is functional, he is less likely to forget and repair it on Shabbos. Although Chazal prohibited reaffixing the hinge or door in a temporary fashion, they saw no reason to prohibit using the appliance. On the other hand, since the stove could be used only with difficulty, Chazal prohibited its use altogether, concerned that even using the appliance might cause someone to repair it in a permanent way. Based on this analysis, we can understand why the Terumas Hadeshen banned the use of the bench, since, as it is now, it cannot be used without being repaired.

Return to the shulchan

According to this analysis, it would appear that the shulchan missing a leg should not be muktzah, since the shulchan can be used while missing a leg, notwithstanding the fact that it will obviously be somewhat wobbly. Thus, we can assume that Chazal would not have been concerned that someone might mistakenly repair it in a permanent way.

In addition to the reasoning we have just presented, there are several other reasons why this shulchan should probably not be muktzah. The first reason is based on the fact that the shulchan has already been used without having its leg repaired. This approach is based on the following ruling of the Rema. When he quotes the Terumas Hadeshen’s case (of the bench missing a leg) as definitive halachah, the Rema adds, however, that if the bench had been used before Shabbos by placing one end on top of another bench, one may use the bench and move it on Shabbos. Thus we see that when the appliance has already been used in its compromised status before Shabbos, we are not concerned that someone may mistakenly repair it on Shabbos. Since the shulchan was apparently being used with the broken leg propped up, one could argue that the Gemara’s concern does not apply.

Major repair

I believe that there is yet another reason why we do not need to be concerned about the damaged shulchan leg. The Taz (Orach Chayim 308:14) explains that, notwithstanding that a kirah whose leg or legs have fallen out may not be used, this is not true if the entire leg of the stovetop was lost, or the leg broke in the middle, rather than having fallen out. The reasoning here is as follows. Reaffixing a leg into an appliance in a permanent way is something that can be done relatively easily. This is why Chazal were concerned that someone might repair this item without realizing that it is prohibited to do so on Shabbos. However, repairing a leg that has broken is more complicated. We are confident that someone who considers making this repair will remember that it is Shabbos before he attempts it. The same is true if the leg is missing completely, since this requires fashioning a whole new leg that is the right size, appearance, and strength. Since this is a more complicated repair, we are not concerned that someone will forget it is Shabbos and do it. The Mishnah Berurah (308:69) rules in accordance with this Taz¸ that in these two situations one may use the stovetop.

In our case of the shul’s shulchan leg, it appears that reinserting it is a complicated task requiring specialized skills and would require the skills of a repairman. If that is so, it would seem that we could be lenient to assume that Chazal did not make the broken shulchan muktzah unless someone could easily make the repair on his own.

Why are we moving it?

Until now, we have not discussed whether the reason that one wants to move the broken shulchan, bench or stovetop affects whether one may move them. In point of fact, some authorities maintain that the prohibition of moving the broken stovetop is only when one wants to use it. Chazal prohibited not only using the stovetop but also moving it. However, there are late authorities who contend that it is permitted to move a kirah whose leg fell out if one is not interested in using the kirah, but its location is needed for another item or because it is in the way of something one needs to do (Ketzos Hashulchan 109:10 in Badei Hashulchan, at end; see also Tehillah Ledavid 308:22). They rally proofs to show that when Chazal prohibited moving a broken stovetop, the prohibition was only when one wants to use it, but that one may move it if one needs its place. In halachic terminology, it is prohibited to move the broken kirah or bench letzorech gufah (literally, for its own sake), but it may be moved letzorech mekomah (literally, for the purpose of its place). Thus, if the broken stovetop was being moved in order to make room for the Simchas Torah dancing, these authorities would permit moving it.

We should note that this question may be dependent on a dispute we quoted at the very beginning of our article between the Aruch and the Ran, whether a kirah with two detached legs is muktzah because one may come to repair it, or because it is no longer functional. If the reason not to move it is because of concern someone will repair it, it stands to reason that this concern exists only when one wants to use it. However, when one moves it to get it out of the way, why should moving it cause someone to mistakenly repair it? On the other hand, if it is muktzah because it is useless, then it makes no difference why one chooses to move it – it is prohibited to do so because the item is muktzah (Tehillah Ledavid 308:22).

In conclusion

Although I initially thought that the shulchan with a broken leg presented a serious problem, my personal conclusion was that the shulchan could be used and moved as is. I am very glad to have noticed the shaylah, because it provided me with the opportunity to research the question thoroughly and to provide our readers with the extensive background that this question entailed. Again, I note that if our readers are faced with a similar, actual question, they should pose it to their own rav or posek.

Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch (Shemos 20:10) notes that people mistakenly think that work is prohibited on Shabbos in order to provide a day of rest. This is incorrect, he points out, because the Torah does not prohibit doing avodah, which connotes hard work, but melachah, which implies purpose and accomplishment. On Shabbos, we refrain from constructing and altering the world for our own purposes. The goal of Shabbos is to emphasize Hashem’s rule as the focus of creation by refraining from our own creative acts (Shemos 20:11). By refraining from building for one day a week, we acknowledge the true Builder of the world and all that it contains.

 

 

Carrying Him Home

According to some commentaries, the source for some of the laws regarding the prohibition of carrying on Shabbos is in this week’s parsha. This certainly provides an excellent reason to discuss:

Carrying Him Home

Question #1: My son

“We were returning home in an area without an eruv, when my two-year old decided that he was walking no farther. Is there a halachically acceptable way for me to carry him home?”

Question #2: Public safety

“There is something dangerous lying in the street. May we remove it on Shabbos before anyone gets hurt?”

Question #3: Tefillin

“While taking a Shabbos stroll through the woods outside my town, I discovered some pairs of tefillin lying on the ground! Presumably, these were taken by thieves who broke into a shul, but subsequently abandoned them. Is there any way that I can bring these tefillin back to town?”

Answer:

All of the above questions involve carrying something on Shabbos in a place where there is no eruv. Our topic will be whether there is a halachic basis to permit carrying under these circumstances. As always, the purpose of this article is not to render decisions for our readers, but to introduce background and have the reader refer any related questions to his or her rav or posek. But first, some basic background.

What is “carrying”?

As we know, one of the 39 melachos of Shabbos is hotza’ah, which is violated by transporting an item from a reshus harabim, a public thoroughfare or open marketplace, into a reshus hayachid, an enclosed area, or, vice versa, by transporting from a reshus hayachid to a reshus harabim. The melacha also includes carrying or otherwise transporting items four amos (about seven feet) or more within a reshus harabim (Shabbos 96b; Tosafos, Shabbos 2a s.v. pashat). With reference to the laws of Shabbos, the terms reshus hayachid and reshus harabim are not determined by ownership, but by the extent to which the area is enclosed and how it is used. An area could be either publicly-owned or ownerless and still qualify as a reshus hayachid; an area owned by an individual might still qualify as a reshus harabim.

Akirah and hanacha

Violating this melacha min haTorah is defined by three steps.

(1) The first step is called akirah, literally, uprooting, which means removing the item from a place where it is at rest. The item must be at rest before the melacha is performed. “At rest” does not have to mean that it is on the ground – it could be resting on an item or piece of furniture, and, sometimes could even be “resting” in someone’s hand. Removing it from its “place of rest” qualifies as an akirah.

(2) The second step is the actual movement of the item, as described above.

(3) The final step is called hanacha, placing, which means that when the melacha activity is completed, the item is again “at rest.”

Let me use the first Mishnah of Maseches Shabbos for examples that explain these rules: One person, whom we will call “the outsider,” is standing in a reshus harabim, picks up an item that is located in the reshus harabim and passes it to someone in a reshus hayachid, “the insider.” If the outsider places the item into the hand of the insider, then the outsider has violated Shabbos – he (1) performed the akirah, (2) transported the item from a reshus harabim into a reshus hayachid and (3) performed the hanacha. Placing the item into the insider’s hand is considered hanacha, since the item is now “at rest,” and, when it reaches its resting point, it is in the reshus hayachid.

However, if the outsider merely extends his hand containing the item into the reshus hayachid, and the insider takes the item from the outsider’s hand, neither of them has performed a Torah violation of Shabbos. Although the outsider performed akirah and moved the item into the reshus hayachid (thereby performing steps 1 and 2), he did not complete the hanacha (step 3). Since the item was still in the suspended hand of the outsider, who himself was standing in a different area, it is not considered to be at rest in a reshus hayachid.

In this situation, the Mishnah explains that neither the outsider nor the insider has violated a melacha min haTorah. Nevertheless, both have violated rabbinic prohibitions, because Chazal prohibited performing akirah without hanacha and also prohibited performing hanacha without akirah. In addition, Chazal prohibited carrying something in the reshus harabim without either akirah or hanacha, and transporting something from a reshus hayachid to a reshus harabim, or vice versa, without akirah or hanacha.

Akirah and hanacha both within a reshus harabim

Similarly, the Torah’s prohibition to carry something or otherwise transport it four amos or more within a reshus harabim is only when there is both an akirah and a hanacha. If one transports it more than four amos, but did not perform both an akirah and a hanacha, the prohibition is only miderabbanan. Thus, if someone picks up an item in a reshus harabim, carries it four amos, but did not stop, and a different person removes it from his hand, neither of them has desecrated Shabbos min haTorah, although both violated rabbinic prohibitions for performing part of the melacha act.

What is a hanacha?

Here is another example of a case where no hanacha was performed. Someone picks up a bundle in a reshus harabim, places it on his shoulder, and walks with it more than four amos. At this point, he stops to adjust the bundle. The Gemara (Shabbos 5b) teaches that this is not considered a hanacha, and therefore the person has not desecrated Shabbos min haTorah.

However, if the person carrying the bundle stopped to rest, it is considered hanacha. (We will explain shortly what we mean that he “stopped to rest.”) Therefore, if he performed an akirah, carried a bundle more than four amos in a reshus harabim and then stopped to rest, he has performed a melacha, whereas if he stopped simply to rearrange his bundle and then continued on his way, he did not yet perform a melacha.

Less than four amos

In addition to the requirements of akirah and hanacha, one violates the melacha of carrying within a reshus harabim only when one transports the item at least four amos. Carrying an item less than four amos, called pachos mei’arba amos, in a reshus harabim does not violate Torah law. Whether this is prohibited by the Sages is the subject of a dispute among tana’im. According to the Rambam, it is permitted even miderabbanan to move an item less than four amos in a reshus harabim, whereas according to the Raavad, this is prohibited miderabbanan, except in extenuating situations.

A lenient hanacha

Until now, both akirah and hanacha have been sources of stringency, meaning that they have created a Torah prohibition, and without both of them, one does not violate the melacha of carrying min haTorah. However, there is actually a leniency that can be created by performing a hanacha. Here is the case: Someone transported an item less than four amos through a reshus harabim and then performed a hanacha, thereby completing this act of carrying. He then performs a new akirah and carries the item an additional short distance, but again less than four amos. Although, as we will soon see, it is prohibited to do this on Shabbos, there is no violation min haTorah; each time he carried the item, it was for less than four amos, since the two acts were separated by a hanacha.

Pachos pachos

What is the halacha regarding the following scenario: Reuven notices an item in a reshus harabim that he would like to move to a different location, more than four amos from where it currently is. He knows that it is prohibited min haTorah for him to pick it up, move it there, and put it down in its new location, since this constitutes akirah, moving it more than four amos, and hanacha. Instead, Reuven decides to do the following: he will pick up the item, move it less than four amos and put it down. Although he did both an akirah and a hanacha, since he moved the item less than four amos, this does not constitute a Torah violation, and, according to many rishonim, it is permitted lechatchilah. However, moving the item less than four amos does not accomplish what Reuven wants. In order to get the item to where he would like it to be, Reuven performs this process again – that is, he picks it up, moves it less than four amos, and puts it down again. This type of carrying is called pachos pachos mei’arba amos, meaning that although each time he carries the item he transports it less than four amos, he carries it this way more than one time. Reuven would like to repeat this process until he gets the item where he wants it. Is this permitted?

Indeed, Reuven’s plan will avoid desecrating a Torah prohibition of Shabbos, since he has successfully avoided performing melacha. However, Chazal prohibited someone from transporting an item this way out of concern that he may err, even once, and carry the item four amos or more and then perform the hanacha, thereby violating Shabbos min haTorah (Shabbos 153b).

However, the Gemara mentions that, under certain extraordinary circumstances, someone is permitted to transport an item in this manner. For example, someone walking through a reshus harabim discovers a pair of tefillin! He is concerned that, should he leave the tefillin where they are, they will be desecrated. The Gemara rules that, should the finder have no other option, he may transport the tefillin to a secure place via pachos pachos (Eruvin 97b). In other words, in order to avoid the desecration of the tefillin, Chazal relaxed the prohibition of carrying pachos pachos.

Babies and thorns

Similarly, the Gemara discusses this in the context of a baby who is outside of an eruv, and permits use of the heter of pachos pachos to transport him to an appropriate place.

In yet another example, the Gemara permits removing a thorn from a reshus harabim so that no one gets hurt (Shabbos 42a). Again, in an extenuating situation, Chazal permitted one to carry this way, even though it is usually not permitted.

At this point, we can address a different one of our above questions: “There is something dangerous lying in the street. May we remove it before anyone gets hurt?”

The answer is that one may remove it by carrying it less than four amos, stopping, and then repeating, as described above.

Must he sit down?

As I explained above, transporting something pachos pachos can be accomplished only when there is a proper hanacha to divide the two carrying acts into two separate halachic activities. What constitutes a proper hanacha in this instance?

There is a dispute between rishonim whether, in this instance, the person transporting the tefillin must sit down, or whether it is sufficient that he stop to rest while remaining standing.  Rashi (Avodah Zarah 70a) rules that it is sufficient for someone to stop to rest within four amos of his last stop. He does not explain how long he must rest for it to be considered a hanacha.

There are those who disagree with Rashi, contending that stopping to rest qualifies as a hanacha only when one truly wants to rest. However, when one’s goal is not to rest, but simply to avoid desecrating Shabbos, stopping of this nature while still standing does not constitute hanacha. According to this opinion, to avoid the prohibition of carrying on Shabbos, the tefillin transporter must actually sit down to qualify as having performed hanacha (Rabbeinu Yerucham, quoted by Beis Yosef, Orach Chayim 266 and 349, as explained by Magen Avraham 266:9).

How do we rule?

There is a dispute among early acharonim whether we follow Rashi or Rabbeinu Yerucham in this matter, but the majority follow Rashi’s approach that stopping to rest is adequate as a hanacha, even in this situation (Darchei Moshe, Orach Chayim 266:1; Magen Avraham 266:9; cf. Taz, Orach Chayim 266:4 who rules like Rabbeinu Yerucham).

Found tefillin

At this point, we can address one of our opening questions: “While taking a Shabbos stroll through the woods outside my town, I discovered some pairs of tefillin lying on the ground! Presumably, these were taken by thieves who broke into a shul, but subsequently abandoned them. Is there any way that I can bring these tefillin back to town?”

In this context, the Gemara rules that if one cannot safely remain with the tefillin until Shabbos ends, one may bring them back via the method of pachos pachos, meaning that one carries the tefillin for less than four amos, stops to rest, and then continues. According to Rabbeinu Yerucham, one should actually sit down when one stops to rest, whereas according to Rashi, this is unnecessary.

Karmelis

Until this point, we have been discussing the halachic rules that exist min haTorah, and we have dealt with areas that are either reshus harabim or reshus hayachid. However, there are many areas that do not qualify as either reshus harabim or reshus hayachid. A reshus harabim must be meant for public use or thoroughfare (Shabbos 6a) and must also meet other specific requirements, which I discussed in a different article. Any area that does not meet the Torah’s definition of a reshus harabim, and yet is not enclosed, is called a karmelis. Min haTorah, one may carry inside, into and from a karmelis. However, Chazal ruled that a karmelis must be treated with the stringencies of both a reshus hayachid and a reshus harabim. This means that it is forbidden to carry inside, into, or from any area that is not completely enclosed. This is the way we are familiar with observing Shabbos – one does not carry in any unenclosed area.

Nevertheless, the Gemara rules that there are exceptional situations when Chazal permitted one to carry in a karmelis. The Gemara mentions explicitly that should one find a thorn in a karmelis that might hurt someone, one can simply pick it up and remove it, since the prohibition of carrying within and out of a karmelis is only miderabbanan.

Pachos pachos in a karmelis

Is it permitted to carry pachos pachos in a karmelis? In other words, since carrying in a karmelis is, itself, prohibited only miderabbanan, and carrying pachos pachos in a reshus harabim is prohibited only miderabbanan, if we combine both of these aspects in one case, is it permitted to carry?

This question is discussed neither in the Gemara nor by most of the rishonim. Although there are several attempts to demonstrate proof one way or the other from the Gemara and the early authorities, none of the proofs is conclusive. There is a dispute among the later authorities, many contending that pachos pachos is prohibited in a karmelis (Tashbeitz 2:281; Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 349:5; Gra), whereas others feel that there should be no halachic problem at all with carrying pachos pachos in a karmelis (Even Ha’ozer and Maamar Mordechai, Orach Chayim 349; Shu”t Avodas Hagershuni #104). Common practice is to prohibit carrying pachos pachos in a karmelis, following the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch.

Conclusion

Let us now examine our opening question: “We were returning home in an area without an eruv when my two-year old decided that he was walking no farther. Is there a halachically acceptable way for me to carry him home?”

According to what we have now learned, even if the area in question qualifies as a reshus harabim, if one were to pick up the child, carry him less than four amos, and then stop, this would be permitted under the circumstances. Assuming that there are two people to carry the child, there is even a better solution, one that space-constraints does not allow us to explain fully, and that is to have the two people hand the child from one to the other and back without either walking four amos at any given time. There is also another reason to be lenient in the case of a child old enough to walk, in that carrying him in a reshus harabim is not prohibited min haTorah, because of a principle called chai nosei es atzmo, which we will have to leave for a future article.

Difference of carrying

The melacha of hotza’ah, carrying, is qualitatively different from the other 38 melachos. Every other melacha results in some type of change, either physical or chemical, to the item on which the melacha is performed. In the case of carrying, the only thing being changed is the item’s location. Furthermore, the rules governing what is permitted min haTorah and what violates Torah law seem strange and arbitrary. Yet, we understand that these rules are part of our Torah shebe’al peh, and we have to study to learn how to apply them. The Navi Yirmiyohu (17:19-27) was concerned about carrying on Shabbos; it is a melacha like any other, yet people mistakenly think that it is not important. Indeed, we would not usually define transporting something as changing it functionally, which is what most melachos accomplish. Yet, this does not make the melacha of hotza’ah any less important than any other melacha.

Rav Hirsch (Shemos 35:2) explains that whereas other melachos demonstrate man’s mastery over the physical world, carrying demonstrates his mastery over the social sphere. The actions that show the responsibility of the individual to the community and vice versa are often acts of hotza’ah. Thus, the prohibition to carry on Shabbos is to demonstrate man’s subordination to Hashem, in regard to his role and position in his social and national life.

 

Do I say Yaaleh Veyavo, Retzei or both?

Since Rosh Chodesh falls on motza’ei Shabbos, I thought it appropriate to discuss:

Do I say Yaaleh Veyavo, Retzei or both?

Question #1: Is it Shabbos versus Rosh Chodesh?

“When Rosh Chodesh begins on motza’ei Shabbos, do I say Yaaleh Veyavo in bensching at seudah shelishis?”

Question #2: Why is this night of Chanukah different from all other nights?

“Chanukah begins this motza’ei Shabbos. If I finish seudah shelishis after nightfall, do I include Al Hanissim in bensching?”

Introduction

When we recite birchas hamazon on Shabbos, Yom Tov, Chol Hamoed, Rosh Chodesh, Chanukah and Purim, we include special prayers to commemorate the holiday: on Shabbos, a passage beginning with the word Retzei; on Yom Tov, Chol Hamoed and Rosh Chodesh, the opening words are Yaaleh Veyavo; and on Chanukah and Purim, Al Hanissim.

In a different article, I discussed whether one recites these additions when one’s meal was divided between a holiday and a weekday – i.e., one ate part of his meal on the holiday and part before or after; or when the change of date transpired between the eating of the meal and the bensching. Does one recite the special addition to commemorate the holiday when this happens, or does one omit it? We discovered that there are several opinions as to what to do. These are the earliest opinions that I found:

  1. When one bensches

The Rosh rules that one recites the version of birchas hamazon appropriate to when one bensches, regardless as to when one ate the meal. In his opinion, one who finished seudah shelishis after nightfall does not recite Retzei. Similarly, one whose Purim seudah ends after Purim does not recite Al Hanissim. The Rosh also holds that someone who completed a meal before Rosh Chodesh and bensches after it is dark should recite Yaaleh Veyavo.

  1. The beginning of the meal

The Maharam, as understood by the Bach and the Aruch Hashulchan, maintains that the text of the bensching is established according to what was correct when the meal began. Therefore, one who finished seudah shelishis after nightfall recites Retzei, since his meal began on Shabbos. (There is an exception – if he did something to declare that Shabbos is over, such as reciting havdalah, davening maariv, or even simply answering borchu, he does not recite Retzei any more, as it is therefore inconsistent to mention Shabbos in bensching.)

  1. All of the above

The Maharam, as understood by the Taz, contends that one adds the special prayer if either the meal began on the holiday or one is bensching on the holiday. Thus, one who finished seudah shelishis after nightfall recites Retzei, and someone who completed a meal before Rosh Chodesh and bensches after it is dark should recite Yaaleh Veyavo.

The halachic conclusion

The halachic consensus regarding someone who began his meal on Shabbos or Purim and continued it into the night is that one recites Retzei or Al Hanissim, following the position of the Maharam and not the Rosh.

Conflicting prayers

The topic of our current article adds a new aspect to this question – what to do when Rosh Chodesh or Chanukah begins on motza’ei Shabbos, and seudah shelishis started on Shabbos and was completed on Rosh Chodesh or on Chanukah. According to the Rosh, one should recite Yaaleh Veyavo or Al Hanissim, whether or not one ate on Rosh Chodesh or on Chanukah. However, the consensus of halachic opinion is that the Maharam’s opinion is accepted, in this topic, over that of the Rosh. According to those who understand that the Maharam ruled that one should always recite the text of birchas hamazon appropriate to the beginning of the meal, one should recite Retzei. Yet, many authorities follow the second interpretation of the Maharam mentioned above, that one adds the special prayer if either the meal began on the holiday or one is bensching on the holiday. What complicates our question is that there may be a requirement to recite both Retzei and either Yaaleh Veyavo or Al Hanissim, yet mentioning both in the same bensching might be contradictory in this instance, since the holiday begins after Shabbos ends. As we will soon see, whether or not this is a problem is, itself, debated by the authorities.

The earliest authority that I found who discusses this predicament is the Bach (end of Orach Chayim, 188). Regarding what to recite when seudah shelishis continues into Rosh Chodesh, he concludes that one should say Retzei and not Yaaleh Veyavo, because the beginning of a meal determines the exact text of its birchas hamazon. As I mentioned above, this is precisely the way the Bach understands the Maharam’s position – that the proper bensching is always determined by the beginning of the meal. Since the halacha follows the Maharam’s position, the Bach comfortably rules according to his understanding of the Maharam, that one recites Retzei and not Yaaleh Veyavo.

The Magen Avraham (188:18; 419:1) analyzes the issue differently from the way the Bach does. First, he considers the possibility that one can recite both Retzei and Yaaleh Veyavo. This is based on his understanding of the Maharam’s position that ending a meal on Rosh Chodesh or a different festival is reason to recite the holiday additions, even if the meal started on a weekday. However, the Magen Avraham concludes that one cannot recite both Retzei and Yaaleh Veyavo in this instance, because this is an inherent contradiction: If it is already Rosh Chodesh, it is no longer Shabbos, and if it is still Shabbos, it is not yet Rosh Chodesh. Since this is now a conundrum, the Magen Avraham concludes that one should follow the Rosh’s opinion, that one recites whatever is appropriate to be said at this moment, which means to recite only Yaaleh Veyavo. Magen Avraham contends that this practice is followed only when one ate bread on Rosh Chodesh. If he did not eat bread on Rosh Chodesh, then he should say only Retzei, following the Maharam’s opinion that the special prayers are determined by the beginning of the meal.

Chanukah on motza’ei Shabbos

The Magen Avraham also rules that there is a difference in halachah between Rosh Chodesh and Chanukah. When Chanukah begins on motza’ei Shabbos and seudah shelishis extended into the beginning of Chanukah, he rules that one should recite only Retzei and not Al Hanissim, even if he ate bread on Chanukah.

Why is Chanukah different from all other nights?

The Magen Avraham explains that, whereas when reciting Yaaleh Veyavo on a weekday Rosh Chodesh bensching is required, reciting Al Hanissim in bensching of a weekday Chanukah is technically not required, but optional. Therefore, when his meal began on Shabbos (which was as yet not Chanukah) and he is, therefore, required to recite Retzei, even if he continued the meal into Chanukah and ate bread then, the optional addition of Al Hanissim does not cancel the requirement to recite Retzei.

More opinions

Thus far, we have seen two opinions concerning what to do for the bensching of a seudah shelishis that extended into Rosh Chodesh that begins on motza’ei Shabbos:

(1) The Bach, that one should recite Retzei and not Yaaleh Veyavo.

(2) The Magen Avraham, that if he ate bread on motza’ei Shabbos he should recite Yaaleh Veyavo, but otherwise he should recite Retzei.

A third position is that, once it is Rosh Chodesh, one should recite Yaaleh Veyavo and not Retzei (Maharash of Lublin, quoted by Shelah and Taz 188:7). The Maharash maintains that since at the time he bensches it is Rosh Chodesh, the requirement to recite Yaaleh Veyavo is primary and preempts the requirement to recite Retzei, which he considers to be secondary, since it is no longer Shabbos.

Why not both?

The Taz (188:7) disagrees with all the above-mentioned positions, challenging the assumption that one cannot recite both Retzei and Yaaleh Veyavo. He concludes that since Yaaleh Veyavo is recited after Retzei there is no contradiction, since Rosh Chodesh begins after Shabbos ends. Therefore, one who ate on Shabbos and is bensching on Rosh Chodesh should recite both additions.

To sum up, someone whose meal began on Shabbos and is bensching on Rosh Chodesh, should:

  • recite Yaaleh Veyavo, according to both the opinion of the Rosh and that of the Maharash,.
  • recite Retzei, according to the opinion shared by the Bach and the Aruch Hashulchan.
  • recite both Retzei and Yaaleh Veyavo, according to the conclusion of the Taz,.

According to the ruling of the Magen Avraham, if he ate bread after Rosh Chodesh arrived, he should recite Yaaleh Veyavo. If he did not, he should recite Retzei.

Rabbi, what should I do?

The Mishnah Berurah (188:33), when recording what to do, implies that one should follow the position of the Magen Avraham. He then mentions the Taz as an alternative approach – that one should say both Retzei and Yaaleh Veyavo. This is consistent with the Mishnah Berurah’s general approach of following the Magen Avraham, except when the latter’s position is opposed by most later authorities.

The Aruch Hashulchan, on the other hand, concludes neither as the Magen Avraham nor the Taz, but that what one recites is always determined by the beginning of the meal. Therefore, in this situation, he rules to recite Retzei and omit Yaaleh Veyavo, regardless of whether one ate on Rosh Chodesh.

Since there are many conflicting positions as to which additions to recite when Rosh Chodesh begins on motza’ei Shabbos, many people avoid eating bread after nightfall. They eat all the bread that they intend to eat towards the beginning of the meal, and upon completing the seudah, recite bensching including Retzei and omitting Yaaleh Veyavo. This approach follows the majority of halachic authorities (Bach, Magen Avraham, Aruch Hashulchan, Mishnah Berurah [according to his primary approach]), although it runs counter to the opinions of the Maharash and the Taz. Those who want to avoid any question recite birchas hamazon before the arrival of Rosh Chodesh.

Conclusion

In our daily lives, our hearts should be full with thanks to Hashem for all He does for us. Birchas hamazon provides a regular opportunity to elicit deep feelings of gratitude for what Hashem has done in the past and does in the present. All the more so should we should acknowledge Hashem’s help on special holidays.