Category: Featured Articles

International Dateline, Part II

Question #1: International

Does the International Dateline have any halachic ramifications?

Question #2: Date

Can you change your date?

Question #3: Line

Did the Torah create a line where, if you crossed it, you could mysteriously leave Shabbos and then cross it back and return to Shabbos?

The International Dateline follows a path near the 180° longitude but deviates to accommodate national borders.

In part 1 of this article, I presented the first half of this article on the concept of whether there is a halachic international dateline, and if there is, where is it located. As I explained, two people starting from the same point anywhere on earth, one traveling eastward and the other westward, wherever they meet again on the globe, they will be observing different days of the week. The reason is that one has been observing sunset later each day as he moves west, whereas the other has been observing it earlier each day as he moves east. Eventually, the combined differences of their travels add up to a full day.

In the nineteenth century, nations decided to establish an accepted demarcation line, east of which would be considered the day earlier, and west of which would be the day later. This line is the International Date Line (IDL) and it runs from the North Pole to the South Pole, approximately halfway around the world from the prime meridian (0°  longitude), which runs through Greenwich, UK. However, the IDL is not straight, but curves around landmasses and national borders.

Our question is whether and where is the halachic dateline? Although halachic authorities have wrestled with this question for almost a thousand years, its relevance to practical halacha began in the nineteenth century, when Jews began populating Alaska, Australia, China, Hawaii, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, the Philippines, Siberia and similar areas. Literally, dozens of books and essays have analyzed the topic, and many different conclusions have been reached.

By the 1870’s, so many articles had been written on the subject of the dateline that seforim were published to anthologize the opinions. At least a dozen different shitos were presented concerning the halachic dateline, but they can be grouped into six major approaches:

Ninety degrees east of Yerushalayim

1. For the purpose of the laws of Shabbos and Yomim Tovim, the dateline follows what is written in the Kuzari, discussed in last week’s article, and follows a north-south line 90 degrees east of Yerushalayim.

Ninety degrees, with a twist

2. The Chazon Ish (Orach Chayim, Chapter 64) interprets the halacha similar to this approach, although he adds a very original and individualistic twist. In his opinion, when the imaginery line 90 degrees east of Yerushalayim goes through a landmass, the section of the landmass east of the 90-degree marker is treated as if it is west of it. In other words, in Eurasia and Australia, where the 90-degree marker runs through northeastern China, the extreme eastern part of Siberia, and western Australia, the halachic dateline border is the point at which the eastern border of these landmasses (Eurasia and Australia) touch the sea. Islands in the seas and oceans east of these landmasses date themselves as if they are the western part of the Americas.

Thus, in the Chazon Ish’s opinion, Sydney and Melbourne follow Asia, although the islands near them, including much of Indonesia, New Guinea, New Zealand and Tasmania observe Shabbos on Sunday, not Saturday. Take a boatride off most of the Australian eastern coast on a Sunday and you may be traveling into Shabbos.

A bit more than ninety

3. Aside from the Yesod Olam, numerous other authorities place the halachic dateline at different points “slightly” farther east than did Rav A. M. Lapidus (mentioned in last week’s article). Among those who wrote their opinions in the twentieth century, we can include Shu’t Benei Tziyon by Rav Dovid Shapiro, and Rav Shelomoh Goren.

Bering Strait

4. Some authorities place the halachic dateline at the easternmost point on the Eurasian landmass, which is the Bering Strait (Rav Yonah Merzbach in Noam volume 14; Atzei Sadeh). One practical advantage of this opinion is that this halachic dateline does not cross any landmass in which there is any notable Jewish population. Another practical advantage is that it does not vary significantly from the international dateline.

One hundred and eighty degrees

5. Rav Yechiel Michal Tukachinsky (Hayomam Bekadur Ha’aretz) holds that the halachic dateline is 180 degrees east of Yerushalayim and travels in an unbroken imaginary line from north to south. A disadvantage of this approach is that Hawaii, most of the Aleutian Islands and probably most of Alaska must keep Shabbos on their Friday.

First come, first served

6. Although in practical halacha this opinion is not too dissimilar from opinion #4, conceptually, it disputes completely the idea that there is any halachic dateline. This approach, which probably has the most rabbinic scholars following it, contends that the Torah never established a line, but that each individual, when traveling, counts six days from his last Shabbos and observes Shabbos on the seventh day. In theory, two individuals who started at the same place and arrived at the same destination could observe Shabbos on two different days, because one traveled eastward and the other westward. When a community is established in any new place, Shabbos is determined by the community’s count of seven days. Once a community established its Shabbos, anyone visiting observes Shabbos on the day that the community does, regardless of his individual seven-day count. Among the many luminaries who followed this approach, we can count the Radbaz (Shu’t Haradbaz 1:76), Rav Yaakov Emden (Mor Uketziyah, 344), the Sefas Emes and his son the Imrei Emes (the second and third Gerer Rebbes), Rav Yosef Shaul Natanson (Shu’t Sho’eil Umeishiv, Volume IV, Mahdura IV #2:154), Rav Shmuel Mohliver and Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank (Shu’t Har Tzvi, Orach Chayim #138).

International

At this point, let us address our opening question: Does the International Dateline have any halachic ramifications?

As we just noted, this will depend on which opinion we follow. Let us assume, for a moment, that someone concludes that there isn’t any way he can decide among these great authorities – therefore, he will follow all of the opinions in their strictest conclusions. He would need to consider fully 25% of the earth’s surface to be a safek as to which day it is and would need to observe two consecutive days of Shabbos when in 25% of the world. Fortunately for him, there are Jewish communities in only a few cities that are in that 25% section, but he still would be forced to observe two days of Shabbos in Melbourne, Sydney and in all of Alaska, Hawaii, New Zealand and virtually anywhere else in the Pacific.

The shaylah becomes practical

By the beginning of the 20th century, there already were Jews and communities in the areas under question. Harbin, a city in China, had a frum community that grew until it numbered about 15,000 Jews and had a well-respected rav and posek, Rav Aharon Moshe Kisilav. He was also viewed as the posek for all the Jews who lived in the Far East, and, by this time, small Jewish communities were scattered throughout the area. The accepted ruling was to follow the local dating for Shabbos and Yomim Tovim. This situation continued with the increase of the Jewish community in Japan and China that developed during the First World War and then, in the 1930’s, as Jews fled Nazi Germany.

When the Mir Yeshiva escaped Europe during its miraculous flight from Poland through Lithuania, via the Trans-Siberian railroad to Vladivostok and then to Kobe, Japan, they were concerned when they should observe Yom Kippur. Among them were significant talmidei chachamim aware of the writings of the Kuzari and the Ba’al Hama’or that imply that they were now east of the halachic dateline. They were also presumably aware of the controversy among the more recent poskim whether one should observe Shabbos in Japan on the same day that was considered Friday night and Saturday on the local calendar (the opinion of the Radbaz, Rav Yaakov Emden [Mor Uketzi’ah, 344], Rav Shmuel Mohliver and many others) or a day later, which would follow the more obvious understanding of the Kuzari and the Ba’al Hama’or, and was the conclusion of Rav Alexander Moshe Lapidus. That year, Yom Kippur was on a Wednesday everywhere, and the question was whether they should observe Yom Kippur on the day that was considered Wednesday in Japan, or on the following day, which would synchronize the date with that observed in the United States. Among those in Kobe was Rav Dovid Kronglas, eventually to be the mashgiach and a reish mesivta in Yeshivas Ner Yisrael, who ruled that Jews in Japan should observe their date as if they were part of the United States, which was east of them, rather than according to mainland Asia, which was west of them. This position was different from that accepted by most authorities, but agreed with the psak of the Chazon Ish and the Brisker Rav, who contended that the halachic dateline is 90 degrees east of Yerushalayim.

Some of those in Japan sent a telegram to Eretz Yisrael asking what to do. Bear in mind that, by this time, the vast majority of halachic authorities had concluded that all parts of Asia and Oceania (Australia and other island nations of the western Pacific) should observe all dates as done in mainland Asia.

The Chazon Ish answered their telegram with his own, instructing them to eat on Wednesday – that it was Erev Yom Kippur, and that Wednesday night local time was when Yom Kippur commences. This was against the accepted psak halacha. Rav Herzog, then the Chief Rabbi of Eretz Yisrael, called a meeting to which he invited the Chazon Ish, all the major poskim and gedolim of Eretz Yisrael and those rabbanim who had published written opinions on the subject. The meeting was attended by over twenty rabbanim, including: Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank, the rav of Yerushalayim and the recognized posek hador; Rav Isser Zalman Meltzer, the recognizedgadol roshei yeshivos; Rav Yechiel Michel Tukachinsky, then considered the supreme authority on halachos involving calendars and astronomy; the Gerrer Rebbe, Rav Yonah Merzbach, Rav Menachem Kasher, Rav Dovid Shapiro, author of Benei Tziyon, and Rav Shelomoh Goren; the latter two had already published halachic articles on the topic. The Chazon Ish did not attend the meeting, but instead sent Rav Chayim Ze’ev Finkel, son of Rav Lazer Yudel Finkel, the rosh yeshiva of Mir in Yerushalayim, as his representative to present his position.

All the rabbonim at the meeting were intimately familiar with the entire halachic topic and all of them (I presume with the exception of Rav Finkel) agreed that Japan should observe Yom Kippur on Wednesday. Rav Herzog, who sent their collective response telegram to Japan, added, in a hint, that on Thursday they should eat less than the minimal shiur throughout the day. After all, this might be the opinion of the Kuzari, and one who is able should try to be machmir. Apparently, a total of over thirty rabbonim signed off on the psak that Japan should follow Asia.

Subsequent to this event, several of those who met at this conference wrote up the basis for their halachic conclusions.

A monumental work on the topic, entitled Agan Hasahar (the title is based on a pasuk in Shir Hashirim 7:3), was authored by Rav Chaim Zimmerman, at one point therosh yeshiva of Beis Medrash LaTorah in Skokie, Illinois. Rav Zimmerman noted a major discrepancy between the opinion of the Yesod Olam and how the Chazon Ish understood it. The Chazon Ish’s analysis is based on quotations of the Yesod Olam that he found in Hayomam Bekadur Ha’aretz (authored by Rav Yechiel Michal Tukachinsky), but he never saw the actual lengthy full text of the Yesod Olam. Rav Zimmerman himself, aside from acknowledging the approaches of the Kuzari and the Yesod Olam, suggests that the halachic dateline might be at the eastern edge of Siberia, where it touches the Bering Strait. Based on their understanding of the opinions of the Kuzari and the Yesod Olam, and in light of what we know today about the borders of the Eurasian landmass, others have also agreed with this border (Rav Yonah Mertzbach in Noam #14; Atzei Sadeh). Aside from the advantages that this approach has from a cohesive, logical approach to the sugya and the rishonim, it also is fairly close to the IDL, allowing that all major landmasses and virtually all islands observe Shabbos according to the accepted calendar days of Friday and Saturday.

A talmid chacham that I know well was offered to work for a few months in Japan doing kashrus work. He went to ask Rav Elyashiv, zt”l, whether he should take the job – is this an opportunity or a nisayon? – and if he did, what he should do for Shabbos. Rav Elyashiv told him that he could take the job. As far as Shabbos goes, Rav Elyashiv told him to keep Friday night and Saturday local time as Shabbos in regard to davening and seudos, and to be machmir not to perform melachos min haTorah on Saturday night and Sunday. This way, he would be stringent like the position of the Kuzari and those who follow his approach regarding Shabbos. When I showed this talmid chacham this article and asked him whether I had quoted Rav Elyashiv correctly, he responded, “Exactly.”

Halacha instructs us what to do when confronted by a situation in which there is no universally accepted ruling. Explaining the details that govern this arena is its own complicated topic that we will need to deal with at a different time.

Conclusion

The issue of the halachic dateline is perhaps the most original of any shaylos that have occurred in the modern era. According to most authorities, this is a question with no sources in Chazal. Therefore, we build our analysis on passages of Gemara based on people who became lost and did not know which day is Shabbos. Yet, there are others who contend that the rishonim had a mesorah that governs the halacha here. Certainly, an area in which we must accept the decisions of our rabbonim.

International Dateline, Part I

Question #1: International

Does the International Dateline have any halachic ramifications?

Question #2: Date

Can you change your date?

Question #3: Line

Did the Torah create a line where, if you crossed it, you could mysteriously leave Shabbos and then cross it back and return to Shabbos?

The International Dateline follows a path near the 180° longitude but deviates to accommodate national borders.

Foreword

Where, what and why is the International Dateline (IDL)?

From virtually every place on earth you can move east or west. If two people start from the same point, one traveling eastward and the other westward, wherever they meet again on the globe, they will be observing different days of the week. The reason is that one has been observing sunset later each day as he moves west, whereas the other has been observing it earlier each day as he moves east. Eventually, the combined differences of their travels add up to a full day.

There is no such thing as the easternmost “beginning” of world time or the “last” place to observe Shabbos, unless one establishes a point, line or boundary to be the beginning. When mankind began traversing the globe in the sixteenth century, the European colonizers usually established the day of the week according to which way they had traversed the globe and not with any regard to the location of the colony. Thus, Indonesia, which the Dutch colonized by circumnagiating Africa, followed the day of the week as it was observed in Europe, whereas the Spanish who colonized the Phillipines on their travels westward from the Americas used the next day. If you look at a map, you will see that the Phillipines lie due north of Indonesia.

In the nineteenth century, nations decided that it was a good idea to establish an accepted demarcation line, east of which would be considered as far as you can go west on the day later, and west of which is as far as you can go east and is on the day earlier. Once you cross that line eastward, you have “gained” a calendar day, and you repeat the calendar day you just lived through. Crossing it westward, you skip 24 hours ahead, i.e., you lose a calendar day. This line is the International Date Line (IDL). The IDL runs from the North Pole to the South Pole and is at the 180th meridian, i.e., halfway around the world from the prime meridian (0° longitude), which runs through Greenwich, UK. The IDL is not straight, but curves around landmasses and national borders. It tilts east around Siberia at the Bering Strait, westward around the Aleutian Islands, and eastward in the central Pacific to allow countries that are composed of islands to keep the entire nation on the same date. The 180th  meridian was selected as the basis for the International Dateline because it runs mostly through a very sparsely populatedarea in the vast middle of the Pacific Ocean.

Introduction

Since the time of the rishonim, there has been halachic discussion that revolves around the following: Except for the flat earthers (which no rishonim accept), all halachic authorities recognized the observable proofs that the earth is basically round and that, therefore, from virtually every place on earth you can move east or west.

As described above, an international dateline was established in the nineteenth century,  which follows 180 degrees from Greenwich Mean Time, with certain exceptions. The IDL passes almost exclusively through water – predominantly the Arctic, Pacific and Antarctic Oceans, going over land only in Antarctica, which affects only a few penguins and researchers.

Our question is whether and where is the halachic dateline? Although halachic authorities have wrestled with this question for almost a thousand years, its relevance to practical halacha began in the nineteenth century, when Jews began populating Australia, Siberia, China, Japan, the Philippines, Alaska, Hawaii, Korea, New Zealand and similar areas, as we will soon see. Literally, dozens of books and essays have analyzed the topic, and many different conclusions have been reached. As always, this article is to provide background, and any individual who intends to travel in the areas that will be discussed here should ask their rav or posek what to do.

Stopover in the Far East

I am going to pose a very curious shaylah that I was recently asked which most people would not even realize involves this issue. Someone who lives in Eretz Yisrael had a family emergency on the Pacific coast of the United States and quickly booked a ticket to leave Israel on Thursday and arrive at their destination on Friday morning. They were so appreciative of finding a connection that had them arriving before Shabbos that they did not realize that they had any shaylah until they settled in on their flight. Their flight connection was through Seoul, South Korea, but they could just as easily have made a booking that connected through Tokyo. As we will see in the course of our discussion, either of these stopovers might create a serious halachic shaylah.

Opinions of halachic authorities

Perhaps the earliest authority who discusses the ramification of where halacha might place a dateline was the Kuzari (Book 2, Section 20). This work is devoted to hashkafah and the beauty and importance of Torah, Jewish thought and values and it is not usually considered a halachic work. Yet, based on his explanation of a passage of Gemara (Rosh Hashanah 20b), the Kuzari concludes that halacha recognizes a dateline that is 90 degrees east and 270 degrees west of Yerushalayim. Any point east of this line follows the date of the Americas, and any point west of this line starts its day earlier than Yerushalayim.

The Kuzari’s approach to understanding both the topic and the passage of Gemara is followed by the Ba’al Hama’or in his commentary to the Rif’s Halachos on Rosh Hashanah. However, this is only one approach to explaining the passage of that Gemara. For example, according to Rashi’s approach, which is explained brilliantly by the Ben Aryeh (to Rosh Hashanah 20b) and Rav Henkin (Lev Ivra, pages 51-60), this passage of Gemara has nothing to do with the concept of a halachic dateline.

A disciple of the Rosh named Rav Yitzchak Yisraeli authored a work on astronomy entitled Yesod Olam, in which he discusses the contributions of the Kuzari and the Ba’al Hama’or on the subject and objects very strongly to their conclusions. Among the concerns that he raises is that their calculations assume that Yerushalayim is on the east-west midpoint of the Eurasian landmass and that the distance eastward from the easternmost point of the Eurasian landmass to its westernmost point is approximately the same as the east-west distance of Eurasia. He notes that neither of these calculations is at all accurate. He further notes that, according to the opinion of the Kuzari, two people could stand together and be observing two different days of Shabbos, because the imaginary line 90 degrees east of Yerushalayim stands between them. He objects to this possibility. He understands that the proper place of the halachic dateline should not be 90 degrees of Yerushalayim, but should be at the east-west midpoint of the Eurasian landmass, which is considerably to the east of Yerushalayim.

The Yesod Olam, himself, locates the halachic dateline 23.5 degrees further east than do the Kuzari and the Ba’al Hama’or. This places it east of most of Japan, although it still runs through Australia, placing both Sydney and Melbourne on the “wrong” side of the dateline, although the Yesod Olam would have had no way to know that. It is possible that, if the Yesod Olam had the geographic information that we currently have, he would have determined the line to be farther east, off the eastern coast of Siberia, and this is the conclusion of the Atzei Hasadeh (page 66) and several other authorities.

In the early 16th century, the Radbaz (Shu’t Haradbaz 1:76), probably the greatest halachic authority of his era, also weighed in on the subject, concluding that there is no halachic date line. In his opinion, each individual should continue his count of the days of the week from where he left. When a community is established, it will determine when its Shabbos is, based on the starting point of most of its membership. The community will then have an established day for Shabbos that will be binding on all its members and visitors. Should two nearby communities be established, one of people who traveled from the east and the other of people who traveled from the west, we could indeed have the phenomenon of two nearby communities that observe Shabbos on different days. However, each community, and all members of that community, will always observe Shabbos on the same day each week, seven days after they did the previous week, which is seven days after the week before, going back to when their community first established itself.

Date

The second of our opening questions was: “Can you change your date?” What this question means is — can the date in a certain place be changed to a day earlier or a day later?

Indeed, I am aware of at least two times that this happened:

The first “westerners” to visit Alaska were fur trappers from Russia. Thus, Russia was the first state to place a claim on possessing Alaska.  When this claim was made by the czar of Russia, the date in Alaska was observed according to eastern Asia, as the earliest point – the easternmost point — of the world. When Alaska was sold to the United States in 1867, its date was changed so that it became the last time zone of the United States, that is, the westernmost point of the Americas, rather than the easternmost point of Asia. Suddenly, what had been considered Friday night and Saturday now became Thursday night and Friday.

A second place where this happened was the Philippines. Although these are islands off the eastern coast of mainland Asia, they were colonized by Spain who governed them as a sub-colony of Mexico, very far to the east. When the Spaniards did this, they counted the days in the Philippines as the westernmost point of the Americas, rather than part of the Far East. This is indeed strange, since Taiwan, Indonesia, Australia and New Zealand, all island nations lying far to the east of the Philippines, kept their days the same as mainland Asia. Thus, someone traveling from any nearby country to the Philippines found themselves a day in the week earlier.

During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Holland and Spain were frequently at war in the Far East. At the time, Holland controlled many east Asian islands that eventually became Taiwan and Indonesia. The Dutch repeatedly attempted to wrest the Philippines from Spain by attacking either Manila Harbor or the Spanish navy. Although the Dutch did not succeed in colonizing the Philippines, they did at times capture Spanish prisoners of war, who discovered that, not only were they now slaves, but they also had to change their days of the week to accomodate their new masters!

This situation existed in the Philippines from the sixteenth century until the 1820’s when Spain lost Mexico and almost all of its new world colonies. Once Spain no longer governed the Philippines from Mexico, they eventually changed its date to the same as the rest of the east Asian world.

There apparently was no Jewish community in the Philippines when this change occurred. Had there been one, they would have had to ask a shaylah whether they are now to observe Shabbos on Friday!

The Mid-19th Century

Slightly past the middle of the 19th century, such great luminaries as Rav Shemuel Mohliver and Rav Alexander Moshe Lapidus wrote works on the topic of the halachic dateline. They were well aware of the contributions on the subject by the Kuzari and the other rishonim that we have quoted. Most of these scholars contended that, notwithstanding that the Kuzari appears to be the only rishon who provided an opinion on the subject of the dateline, his approach was not accepted by the majority of rishonim and early halachic opinion. In addition, Rav Shemuel Mohliver noted that neither the Kuzari nor the Ba’al Hama’or ever expressly stated that they were ruling that there is a halachic dateline to determine when Shabbos begins. However, Rav Lapidus concluded that the dateline is 90 degrees east of Yerushalayim. Thus, he ruled that Japan, Korea, Kamchatka, Harbin, Melbourne, Sydney, New Zealand and eastern Indonesia should observe Shabbos, Yom Kippur and other Jewish laws as if they are part of the Americas, a day later than mainland Asia.

See part 2 of this article for the continuation of this discussion.

It’s for the Birds, Part I

Question #1: Bird Determination

Photo by NaturePhotosAndMore on Freeimages.com

I know that birds are very determined to get to their destinations, but how do we determine whether they are kosher?

Question #2: Noach’s Kosher Aviary

How did Noach know which species of bird and animal are kosher? The Torah was not given until Moshe Rabbeinu, fifteen generations later!

Question #3: The Chicken or the Egg?

Which comes first, the chicken or the egg? In other words, may I eat a bird relying that the egg it lays has a kosher shell shape?

Question #4: Mom and Pop Shop

Can a non-kosher species of bird and a kosher species of bird produce viable offspring together?

Foreword:

Noach was commanded to bring more kosher than non-kosher animals into the teivah, as the Torah states: “From each of the kosher animals you shall take seven, male and female, and from the non-kosher animals two, male and female. Also, from the birds of the heavens you shall take seven, male and female” (Bereishis 7:2-3). But how did Noach know which species are kosher? Rashi (Bereishis 7:2) explains that this demonstrates that Noach studied the Torah. Presumably, he became an expert on the list of kosher birds in Parshas Shemini and Parshas Re’eih.

However, this presents us with a curious problem. Noach could have easily observed which mammals have split hooves, and he could also figure out which species chew their cud. (Although it is not perfectly accurate, I am going to substitute the word mammal, rather than animal, for the Torah’s beheimah and chayah in order to avoid confusion that occurs in English – since birds, fish, reptiles and insects are all types of animal, although none of them qualify as either beheimah or chayah, which are subcategories of what we call “mammals.”)

Although the Torah describes the exact indicating signs, simanim, that render fish and animals kosher (“indicia” in proper English), regarding birds the Torah simply inventories the non-kosher varieties (Vayikra 11:13-19; Devarim 14:11-19). Most of these appear to be non-kosher species, but in four instances, the Torah states lemino or lemineihu, meaning that these include categories of non-kosher birds. In addition, Chazal’s analysis of the case of nesher concludes that this is also a category of birds. So how did Noach know to identify the non-kosher species? The rishonim (Radak, Bereishis 7:2; Ramban, Bereishis 6:20) explain that when Noach was commanded concerning how many of each species to bring into the teivah, he was also told how to identify which are kosher.

Noach’s Kosher Aviary

We now have the answer to one of our opening questions: “How did Noach know which species of bird and animal are kosher? The Torah was not given until Moshe Rabbeinu, fifteen generations later!”

According to the Ramban and others, Hashem taught Noach the Torah, including a comprehensive listing of all kosher birds and animals, so that he could accomplish what he was commanded.

Simanim of kosher birds

At this point, we need to understand several aspects of the indicia of kosher birds. As opposed to kosher mammals, fish and grasshoppers, where the Torah provides rules indicating which are kosher, regarding birds the Torah lists the non-kosher ones, implying that all other birds are kosher. The Gemara analyzes the Torah’s two lists, concluding that 24 varieties and categories of bird are non-kosher (Chullin 61b). Someone who verifies all 24 non-kosher varieties may shecht and eat any other bird species he discovers. The Gemara states that a hunter who recognizes all the varieties of non-kosher bird may shecht and eat any other species of bird he discovers and may teach other people which species are kosher (Chullin 63b). By process of elimination, our hunter knows that all other birds are kosher. The same passage of Gemara notes that there are countless kosher species of birds (Chullin 63b).

Size of teivah

Of course, we now have a question: If there are thousands of varieties of kosher bird, each of which had fourteen representatives in the teivah, how could the teivah have been big enough for all of them!

I note that, even without this birdie calculation, the Ramban already points out that the teivah was not possibly big enough to accommodate all its passengers and their food requirements. He observes that even ten teivos of the size that Noach constructed would be vastly insufficient to hold the necessary cargo. It could only exist and survive by a miracle. The Ramban then explains why Noach was required to build the teivah to its insufficient dimensions.

Bird determination

At this point, let us address our opening question: “I know that birds are very determined to get to their destinations, but how do we determine whether they are kosher?”

Chazal observed that there are four simanim of kosher birds (Mishnah Chullin 59a). However, there is a qualitative difference between the identifying characteristics of birds and those that the Torah uses to identify kosher fish and mammals. Any mammal that has fully split hooves and chews its cud is kosher, and any that does not have both of these indicia is not. There are no exceptions; the simanim of the Torah are absolute. Similarly, any fish that has fins and the proper scales (see Ramban, Vayikra 11:9; Rema, Yoreh Deah 83:1) is kosher, and any that does not have these simanim is not kosher. Again, there are no exceptions.

However, when discussing indicia that a bird is kosher, the Mishnah teaches that there are four simanim. Any bird that has all four kosher simanim is kosher. Any bird that has none of the four kosher simanim is not kosher. However, many birds have some of the simanim, but not others, and are still kosher. Yet there are other birds that have some simanim and are not kosher. In other words, a bird that has some of the simanim, but not all, might be kosher and might not be. This means that the simanim can be used sometimes to ascertain whether a bird is kosher, but are not a litmus test. Although the halachically expert hunter mentioned in the Gemara could figure out by process of elimination whether a species is kosher, the only practical way for us to know whether a bird with some simanim and not others is kosher is through mesorah.

For example, the peres and the ozniah, two of the 24 non-kosher varieties, each possesses only one of the kosher simanim and lacks the other three. The oreiv, usually identified as the raven (see Tosafos, Chullin 62a s.v. Mipnei who discusses whether this is accurate) and the zarzur each has two kosher simanim and lack the remaining two, and the remaining 19 types of non-kosher birds each has three of the simanim and lacks only one. (This follows the approach of most interpretations of this passage of Gemara.) But there are other birds that have one, two or three of the simanim and are kosher.

What are the indicia that a bird is kosher? In other words, what are the simanim that if we can identify that a bird has all of them it is definitely kosher? For practical reasons, I am not listing and explaining them in the order of the Mishnah, but according to function. The Mishnah (Chullin 59a) lists four simanim, which include three anatomical features, one external and two internal, and one behavioral.

The external feature, called etzba yeseirah, means that it possesses an “extra claw,” or, according to other opinions, “a larger claw.” The rishonim disagree what exactly this means, some understanding that this claw points in the opposite direction from the other claws of the bird; others explain that this claw protrudes at a higher point on the leg than do the other claws. A third approach understands that the claw protrudes outward farther than the others.

Crop and gizzard

The two internal features of a kosher bird are that it has a crop, and a gizzard that can be peeled manually. To the uninitiated, this sounds fairly strange, particularly, since most of us have never dissected the digestive system of a bird and certainly have never had the opportunity to compare the digestive systems of various types of bird. Let me explain, very briefly:

The crop is an expandable storage pouch for undigested food. It is commonly found among birds that eat seeds and grains for sustenance.

The gizzard is more commonly known to us by its Yiddish name, pupek, whose hard muscle grinds the seeds that a bird eats so that they can then be properly digested.

Don’t chew your food before you swallow it!

Hashem gave these features to small birds who stick to a vegan diet. These allow them to enter fields and meadows and quickly gobble up a large quantity of seed without chewing or digesting them. Then they can disappear to their hiding places before they become somebody’s lunch. Those of us who do not have crops and gizzards would get severe indigestion if we gobbled up our food this way, which is why your mother told you to chew your food slowly and carefully before you swallow it.

Doreis

The behavioral feature is that kosher birds are never doreis. The rishonim debate exactly what this is, but it is a feature that exhibits cruelty in the way the bird seizes and devours prey. The Gemara (Chullin 62b) implies that a bird is non-kosher even if it is doreis very rarely, making it difficult to identify a bird as a non-doreis. It is also important to note that although all birds that are doreis are non-kosher, the inverse is not true — there are varieties of fowl that are not doreis, yet are not kosher.

This leads us to a conundrum raised by Tosafos (Chullin 61a, s.v. Kol Of). Whereas the simanim for kosher mammals and fish are taught by the Torah, the simanim for kosher birds are observations of the Mishnah. But that assumes that Chazal checked carefully every kosher species of bird in the world and determined that not one of them is doreis. How did that happen?

Tosafos rules out the explanation that this was an oral tradition communicated to Moshe Rabbeinu at Har Sinai (halacha leMoshe miSinai) because, if that were true, the Torah need not have mentioned all 24 varieties of non-kosher bird in order to identify all non-kosher varieties. Instead, it could have succinctly taught that all birds that are doreis are non-kosher and then provide the very small list of birds that, despite the fact that they are not doreis, are still not kosher.

Tosafos focuses on who was the only person in world history to have seen and interacted with every species, and that is Noach, who spent months in very close quarters providing the needs of all the terrestrial species of the world. Noach, who knew which birds are kosher and which are not (as explained above), observed that none of the kosher varieties were doreis. Thus, the siman that a doreis is not kosher is an oral tradition dating back to Noach (Chullin 61a, s.v. Kol Of).

The Mishnah records an alternative method of verifying whether a bird is doreis: Rabbi Elazar ben Rabbi Tzadok rules that any bird that splits its talons, two before and two behind, when it grips a rope, is doreis and therefore not kosher (Chullin 59a, as explained there by the Gemara 65a). The halachic authorities quote this statement as definitive.

For the continuation of this article, click here.

The Rosh Hayeshiva, Rav Ruderman

In commemoration of my Rosh Yeshiva’s yahrzeit, which is this Thursday, the 14th of Tamuz:

For clarity, I included the Rosh Yeshiva’s family name in the title, but, because of the way I always call him and because of my relationship with him, I will refer to him throughout this article simply as “the Rosh Yeshiva.” I cannot bring myself to refer to him any other way.

As a very American high school graduate, raised in a frum, New York family, I arrived in Ner Yisrael planning to stay one year in full-time yeshiva. My life was all planned out. I already had a scholarship to a good college in New York City and was the winner of a New York State Regents Scholarship, which would provide me with extra money while attending college. I planned to combine my daily college attendance with some yeshiva education while I achieved my B.A. degree, probably with a major in psychology, and then I intended to pursue my professional career, either to attend graduate school to become a psychologist or, more likely, to attend a top law school and become an attorney.

I had accepted my high school menahel’s suggestion to spend a year in yeshiva full-time before starting college. He suggested that I attend Ner Yisrael for a year, which did not pose any conflict with my long-term plans, either for myself or for my father, because of the yeshiva’s reputation for not being opposed to “college.”

Having arranged that my slot in college and the scholarship wait for a year, I arrived in Ner Yisrael. After one year in yeshiva, I decided to stay for another year and extended my slot in college and my scholarship for another year. After two years, I was told that my New York State’s Regents Scholarship would not be renewed anymore. I decided to spend another year in yeshiva, and then another. Now, decades later, I presume that there is still a place for me in the college I was supposed to attend but never did. Instead, extensive reading supplied my secular education, whereas learning, teaching and spreading Torah to Klal Yisrael became my life’s aspiration and commitment. Clearly, my vision for what I wanted to do with my life changed very significantly, albeit highly gradually.

How did this happen? Certainly not overnight. As a high school senior, I remember questioning the study of Bava Basra, a mesechta whose halachic issues discuss whether it is my financial responsibility to provide a neighbor privacy in his yard and whether using a field for three years enforces claiming ownership of the property. Obviously, these reasons would not establish a legal claim in today’s world, so why devote time to arcane, non-practical matters? Shouldn’t we be studying only practical topics like Shabbos or Berachos? This was the perspective of a senior from a frum background in a quality yeshiva high school. Yet, somehow the yeshiva changed my entire life’s priorities without my ever feeling that I was threatened. To understand how the yeshiva accomplished this, we need to understand the greatness of who the Rosh Yeshiva was.

That the Rosh Yeshiva was one of the greatest talmidei chachamim of his era is an undisputed fact, but provides little understanding of his brilliance as an educator. That he had absorbed the wellsprings of the Slabodka approach to mussar and personal development from its original proponent and builder, Rav Nosson Tzvi Finkel, the Alter of Slabodka, is also true, but does not convey to us anything of meaning. Nor does the fact that his head stored the collected knowledge of tens of thousands of seforim explain the success of the yeshiva he founded. And noting his regal comportment does not clarify our perception of his pedagogic genius. Instead, I will attempt to show how I, as one young talmid, was influenced on a daily basis, without my noticing that it was happening. Others will have different stories but, the results were usually parallel. Parallel, but not identical, because the Rosh Yeshiva developed our latent, individual abilities far greater than I have seen by any master of the literature of contemporary educational theory.

Furthermore, the cultural difference between the Rosh Yeshiva and us American boys should have been overwhelming. The Rosh Yeshiva was the age of our grandfathers (the few of us who had grandfathers), he spoke only Yiddish (which none of us did), had grown up in the poverty of eastern Europe and had been raised from the cradle in a culture in which Torah study was the highest, and perhaps only, goal. We were all baseball playing, typically spoiled, middle-class American kids, interested in eventually developing a comfortable, professional lifestyle. Of course, the most important part of the daily newspaper was the sports section. How did the Rosh Yeshiva bridge this gap to be such a successful educator and role model!

Let me mention some specific observations and anecdotes about the Rosh Yeshiva’s method of teaching and the yeshiva he built. The Rosh Yeshiva, who had a serious case of phlebitis, was medically required to go for walks to the extent that he could. As talmidim, we would often take the Rosh Yeshiva for walks. (I note that this was done, officially, during the time that, according to the usual yeshiva schedule, we should be in the Beis Medrash studying with our chavrusos.) If you did not prepare questions to ask the Rosh Yeshiva, he would ask you where you were up to in the Gemara, and ask you questions that demonstrated your level of absorption of the material. These were usually inquiries that did not have obvious answers. He would ask you what you thought the correct approach was.

It was not until many years later that I realized the humor of the scenario. The Rosh Yeshiva knew thousands of seforim by heart. There was nowhere in Torah that we would have any information that he did not know. Yet, rather than bamboozle us with his chiddushim, his novel approaches, or his massive Torah knowledge, as many roshei yeshiva would do, he asked us, as if he did not know the answer to the question. Was it possible that we might think of an answer that he had not seen or thought of? Highly unlikely. His goal was to build confidence in us to think independently and seek answers to Torah questions from within ourselves.

Over the years, I have been able to write many articles and full-length works on Torah topics. Many have asked me, where did I learn to think so independently? Initially my answer was incredulous. Is there any other way to learn Torah? This is the way I was taught how to analyze Torah sources. And then I realized that in Ner Yisrael we received an education that included how to use our own best resources – that blessed brain that G-d gave us – and lots of sweat – to plumb the original Torah material until we were satisfied with the approach at which we arrived. And that approach would remain with us as the truth of Torah until such time as we realized that we may not have understood the sources correctly. At that moment, our need for absolute intellectual honesty would teach us to review and potentially revise our understanding.

I will include a few anecdotes that I witnessed during the Yom Kippur and Sukkos season of holidays. I note that these stories indicate very different aspects of the Rosh Yeshiva’s greatness: His skill at molding people to serve Hashem and how to be a mentsch, not by force of personality, but by example.

The machzor

There is a famous story, which I personally witnessed, about the Rebbitzen’s machzor. One Rosh Hashanah musaf, we saw that the Rosh Yeshiva had davened his quiet shemoneh esrei near the doorway of the Beis Medrash, instead of at his usual place in the center of the front of the Beis Medrash. Why had he davened there?

The Rebbitzen was homebound in those days (her health had been failing; she predeceased the Rosh Yeshiva by several years). When the Rosh Yeshiva was about to begin the musaf shemoneh esrei, he realized that when he had left home (after making Kiddush before the shofar blowing), he had mistakenly taken the Rebbitzen’s machzor with him. Realizing that the Rebbitzen would want to use her familiar machzor, the Rosh Yeshiva immediately walked home (not an easy walk for him at his age) to make sure that the Rebbitzen had her machzor, and then returned to yeshiva to join the davening of the quiet shemoneh esrei in progress. This became his uppermost concern prior to the musaf shemoneh esrei of Rosh Hashanah, a prayer that he told us annually was of utmost importance. A lesson in respect for one’s wife that you never forget.

Prior to a Yom Tov, the wife of one of the prominent chavrei hakollel had given birth to twins, and they had one other child, about three years old, at the time. Because of the timing, no extended family was available to help out at the house. This yungerman understood that his responsibility for Yom Tov was to help his wife at home and not to attend davening in shul. Apparently, at the time that kerias haTorah would occur, things at home were quiet, and he came to the Beis Medrash, three-year-old in tow, because, after all, he could daven at home, but he could not hear kerias haTorah at home. Immediately, the Rosh Yeshiva called him over and sent him home. Your mitzvah for this Yom Tov is to take care of your wife and children, not to hear kerias haTorah or come to the Beis Medrash. A lesson in family responsibility that you never forget.

On the longer winter Friday nights, I would often visit the Rosh Yeshiva and his rebbitzen at their house on the yeshiva campus. The conversations were always about what life was like in Eastern Europe, in the town of Slabodka and similar matters. The rebbitzen participated in the conversations very freely, and the Rosh Yeshiva was very forthcoming with information, stories, insights and observations. It was completely natural and informal. I had no sense in the slightest that I was wasting his time or preoccupying him with matters when he would rather be studying Torah. He was too great for that. This is a lesson that I have thought about, although I admit to falling far short of his abilities in this area also.

One insight of mine is that the Rosh Yeshiva would answer any question that I asked him about any matter – with one major exception. When I asked him about the greatness of the Alter of Slabodka and his abilities to create so many gedolei Yisrael from his disciples, the Rosh Yeshiva would not answer. All he would do was allude to the incredible greatness of who the Alter was. Anything more than that was sacred territory on which the Rosh Yeshiva would not tread.

Perhaps I should follow his lead and refrain from discussing the greatness of the Rosh Yeshiva. But I feel this would deprive future generations of an appreciation of who he was, and, perhaps by some extension, a sense of the greatness of his rebbe, the Alter.

Kusim or Shomronim?

There is a bit of a sad association between the Shomronim and Parshas Shelach; both relate to our losing rights to Eretz Yisrael.

Question #1: Kusim or Shomronim?

What is the difference between the Kusim and the Shomronim?

Question #2: Kussite? Shomronite?

What language do they speak? Do they have their own language as do the seventy original nations?

Question #3: Kusi religion?

Are they Moslem? What religion do they practice?

Question #4: Kusi Chaveir???

Can there be a Kusi chaveir? This sounds like an oxymoronic term.

Question #5: When is a Kusi not a Kusi?

Is the word Kusi authentic?

Foreword:

The Gemara is filled with references to a people called the Kusim, yet most people are either confused or unaware of their existence, their history and that they still exist as a minority population in Eretz Yisrael. And then I find many people who confuse them with the Kara’im (in English, called the Karaites), to whom the Kusim have no relationship, history or common culture. Since this is a halachic column, I will be emphasizing the halachic aspects of the Kusim and discuss their history and sociology only to the extent necessary to make the halacha clear, and I will leave discussion about the Kara’im for a different time.

Introduction:

When the northern tribes, Malchus Yisrael, were led away in exile by Ashur, the Assyrian empire, several nations from other places were moved into their lands to replace them. Sancheirev, the king of Ashur, did not want to leave Eretz Yisrael vacant; firstly, this could eventually make a valuable country uninhabitable, and it was certainly not good for the Assyrians who needed the area as a buffer zone against their traditional enemy, Egypt. The Midrash Tanchuma (Vayeishev II) adds another reason: Sancheirev did not want to lose the valuable taxes he would receive from the produce of the land if it was properly and profitably farmed.

These transplanted people are called the Kusim or the Shomronim, the Samaritans. Among the different places that they came from was the town of Kusah (see Melachim II 17:24-41). In addition to the several locations, stated in Melachim, from which Sancheirev resettled them, the Midrash cites many other places whence they came. In all likelihood, each of these places had its own language or dialect, and attempts to communicate among themselves must have been similar to the Tower of Bavel. They may have created a polyglot language of their own, but, eventually, as we see from the book of Ezra (Chapter 4), they used Aramaic, the lingua franca of the era, to communicate with others. With time, Aramaic became their only language until, hundreds of years later, it was replaced by Arabic, which was the spoken language of the Middle East. (For a brief time, Greek was used more commonly than Aramaic, but local populations continued to speak Aramaic among themselves, as evidenced by the Assyrian, Kurdish, Georgian, Circassian and other longstanding Middle Eastern populations that still speak Aramaic dialects as their native tongue. [Both Georgian and Circassian are derived from Aramaic. Most linguists also consider Arabic to originally have been a dialect of Aramaic.])

From early times, the Kusim were joined by other peoples and religions, and even by some less committed Jews. At one time even some kohanim joined them (Kiddushin 75b; Tosefta, Demai 3:3), and they initially were meticulous about not contaminating themselves by coming in contact with tumas meis (Niddah 57a).

Thus, with time, the Kusim became a people descended from a mix of various nations, languages and cultures, all of whom assimilated to become a small population.

Shomronim

Whereas the name Kusim derived from their town of origin, the term Shomronim is derived from the place to where they moved. Shomron was the capital city and regional area of the former northern Jewish kingdom, just as today the area between the Judean Mountains and Migdal Ha’eimek in modern Israel is called the Shomron. As the Midrash notes, Chazal use both terms, Kusim and Shomronim, although they use the term Kusim more commonly (Pirkei Derabbi Eliezer, Chapter 37). This community is today usually called the Shomronim (“Samaritans” in English).

As the sefer Melachim describes, after these nations had been settled into their new homeland in Eretz Yisrael, Hashem sent lions to attack them. The Kusim appealed to the Assyrian monarch to send someone to instruct them how to serve the local deity so that the animal attacks would end. Sancheirev accommodated them, and the pasuk describes how they began to observe some of the mitzvos of the Torah, but still continued to worship their idols, thus creating their own religion.

The Kusim never accepted most of the Torah she’be’al peh, nor did they accept the sanctity or educational value of Nevi’im and Kesuvim. Although they claimed to accept the laws as stated in the written Torah, in practice, they followed a potpourri, observing some mitzvos, ignoring others and including practices from their previous idolatrous ways.

Assyria was eventually conquered by the Babylonian Empire, and, as taught at the end of the Book of Daniel, the Persian Empire overran the Babylonian Empire. Ezra describes how Koresh, the Persian Emperor, gave permission and encouragement to the Jews to return to Eretz Yisrael, to build the second Beis Hamikdash and to create a Jewish community in Eretz Yisrael. Zerubavel, a descendant of malchus beis David, was appointed the governor of Eretz Yisrael. Upon their arrival in Eretz Yisrael, the small returning Jewish community were assisted by the prophets Chaggai, Zechariah and Malachi in locating the venue of the mizbei’ach;  they began offering korbanos even before they had built the Beis Hamikdash. The kohein gadol was Yehoshua ben Yehotzadok, whose father was a brother of Ezra.

When the Jews arrived in Yerushalayim, the Kusim approached the Jews, attempting to infiltrate the renascent Jewish community. The Kusim were rebuffed because the Jews distrusted them (Arachin 5b). We see how well placed this distrust was: the Kusim sent a missive to Koresh charging the Jews with insurrection, a complete canard. Unfortunately though, the charge resounded within the royal household, and the emperor ordered an immediate halt to the construction of the Beis Hamikdash. Throughout the rest of Koresh’s reign and that of Achashveirosh, construction of the Beis Hamikdash was stopped. Eventually, the Persian emperor Daryavesh (Darius) allowed the construction of the Beis Hamikdash to continue (Ezra 4:24) and ignored the further attempts of the Kusim to block it.

Nevertheless, the Kusim and their allies continued to harass the Jewish community. As Nechemiah writes, “We were performing the construction, while half our number was holding their spears (on constant defense against attack) from daybreak until the stars appeared” (Nechemiah 4, 15). Shortly afterward, the Kusim staged a major attack on the Jewish community and also attempted to assassinate Nechemiah (Nechemiah 6:2; Pirkei derabbi Eliezer, Chapter 38).

During the period of the second Beis Hamikdash, relationships with the Kusim deteriorated further. The Kusim saw the Jews as an enemy and devoted much effort to undermining the Jewish community and its practices (Mishnah Rosh Hashanah 22b; Beitzah 4b). When Alexander the Great marched through the holy land, the Kusim tried to convince him to destroy the Beis Hamikdash (Yoma 69a; Megillas Ta’anis). As we know from the Gemara, when he saw Shimon Hatzadik leading the procession of Jews to greet him, Alexander dismounted and bowed to Shimon Hatzadik (Yoma 69a). Thus, another of the Kusim’s nefarious plots was foiled.

Eventually, the Kusim gave up on trying to control Yerushalayim. At this point, they decided to replace Har Hamoriah (also known as Har Habayis) as the focal point of their religion, with Har Gerizim. As they apparently frequently did, when they changed their minds about a particular practice, they modified their version of the Torah to reflect their changed perception (Sanhedrin 90b; Shu”t Melamed Leho’il 3:79). Thus, all references and allusions in the Torah to Har Habayis were changed to Har Gerizim.

Apparently, at a later time, the Kusim abandoned their idols, but even then, they did not fully observe mitzvos (Rambam, Peirush Hamishnah, Berachos 8:8). At the time of the Mishnah and Gemara, they were keeping some mitzvos, such as shechitah (Chullin 3a), baking matzoh and separating ma’asros (Berachos 47b; Gittin 25), more or less correctly, but not other mitzvos. They had no concern about lifnei iveir, the prohibition of causing someone else to violate what Hashem has commanded him. Chazal derive from the pasuk lifnei iveir lo sitein michshol, the prohibition of misleading someone or causing them to sin. The Kusim limited the meaning of the pasuk to literally placing a stumbling block in front of a blind person.

The Kusim had little concern about observing Shabbos properly (Eruvin 31b), purity laws (Niddah 69a; Tosefta, Demai 3:3), properly observing the laws of gittin and kiddushin (Kiddushin 75; Yerushalmi, Gittin 1:4) or of being honest about financial matters. They were also notorious for not being knowledgeable or careful about the laws of yichus (Kiddushin 75a-76a) and rejected basic tenets of the Torah (Sanhedrin 90b). Because of their callousness in the important area of yichus, there are opinions in the Gemara that, according to halacha, a male Kusi and a female Kusis are forbidden to marry one another, because of the possibility that one is a mamzeir and the other is halachically a kosher Jew (Kiddushin 75a-76a; Tosafos s.v. Verabbi).

On the other hand, the Gemara notes that at times they observed practices that halacha does not require, such as separating challah on products made from rice flour (Pesachim 51a).

The early tanna’im dispute whether (1) there was a point in history at which the Kusim accepted mitzvos properly and became authentic Jewish converts, an opinion called Kusim geirei emes; or (2) Kusim geirei arayos, the Kusim converted only because of the lions and never accepted the mitzvos, as the halacha requires (Yerushalmi, Gittin 1:4).

According to the first opinion, since the Kusim observe certain mitzvos, such as shechitah and matzoh, properly, there was a time in history when it was permitted to eat Kusi shechitah and to fulfill the mitzvah of matzoh at the seder with what the Kusim baked. To quote a beraisa, “It is permitted to eat the matzoh of a Kusi and one can fulfill with it the responsibility of eating matzoh seder night, whereas Rabbi Eliezer prohibits it because they are not expert at the details required to observe mitzvos correctly. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says that the mitzvos that Kusim do observe, they are much more careful in observing than Jews are” (Kiddushin 76a; see also Berachos 47b).

Kusi chaveir

In several places, Chazal also note a phenomenon of a Kusi chaveir, which meant a Kusi who was very meticulous to observe the details of their practices (Berachos 47b; Gittin 10b; Niddah 33b). As opposed to other Kusim, a Kusi chaveir could be relied upon to faithfully keep what Kusim contended that they kept.

The opinion that Kusim geirei arayos maintains that meat or matzoh of Kusim is produced by non-Jews. Since meat shechted by non-Jews is not kosher, the meat of Kusim is non-kosher, and, since the matzoh produced by non-Jews may not be used at the seder, the matzoh they baked is not acceptable for seder use, although it could, in theory, be eaten during the rest of Pesach, if one is certain that proper standards were maintained throughout the production.

One of the surprising aspects of Kusi mitzvah observance is that, apparently, in this era, Kusim performed shechitah correctly, notwithstanding that the details of its laws are mesorah from Moshe Rabbeinu at Har Sinai, and that, otherwise, the Kusim rejected any aspect of the Oral Torah. In other words, the Kusim were completely inconsistent. Yet, the Gemara (Chullin 3a; 5b; 6a) reports of amora’im who ate from the shechitah of Kusim. Nevertheless, with time, the opposition to treating the Kusim as kosher Jews strengthened and it became accepted to treat the Kusim as non-Jews.

In the time of the later Tannaim, Kusim were discovered to maintain an idol of a dove atop Har Gerizim (Chullin 6a), to which they dedicated their performance of bris milah (Avodah Zarah 27a). For this reason, the Mishnah (Berachos 51b, see especially Rambam Commentary) rules that one does not recite amen when hearing the conclusion of a Kusi’s brocha unless you heard him recite the entire brocha. This is out of concern that he might have been blessing his deity on Har Gerizim.

Eventually, the Kusim created their own religion, which bears some minor resemblance to a literal observance of the Written Torah. They follow their own version of the eastern calendar and they have their own “kohein gadol” with their own version of his garments. It is a popular tourist experience to visit the Kusim — or as they are commonly called today, the Shomronim — on their day of erev Pesach to watch them “offering” their version of korban Pesach. One does not need to look hard to realize that they no longer practice shechitah according to the method that they did at the time of the Gemara. Their “shechitah” appears much closer to the Moslem method of halal slaughter than it does to what halacha requires.

As an experienced student will readily note, the attempts by the Tzedukim, Samaritans, Kara’im, Conservatives and others at ignoring Chazal and the mesorah from Moshe Rabbeinu of the Oral Torah have resulted in completely different observances, non-identifiable with one another. Some of this was actually the subject of the doctoral dissertation of Rabbi Dr. Bernard Revel.

At one point, the organized Jewish community, both in Eretz Yisrael and in Bavel, realized that there was no choice but to excommunicate the Kusim and declare them as personae non gratae to the Jewish people. They were to be treated as non-Jews. Their bread was to be considered completely non-kosher “like pork.” Even conversions of Kusim to the Jewish people were banned, out of concern that they were already mamzeirim because of their approach to yichus and related laws. This ban was accepted even by the Persian royal household (Yalkut Shimoni, Melachim II 234; see also Chullin 6a).

The Samaritan community today has two withering branches, one on Har Gerizim, right next to the yishuv Har Beracha, and the other in Holon. They speak Arabic, but identify with the Jewish presence in Israel. Most are law-abiding Israeli citizens, and they even operate food companies bearing mehadrin hechsherim. In recent decades, they have suffered from a high rate of assimilation of their descendants (becoming secular Israeli Arabs) and a shortage of potential wives for their young men. Prior to the Ukrainian War, they were actively recruiting rural Ukrainian women to join their ranks as converts to their religion and wives for their men. Many of the more established Kusim complained about the lack of sincerity and consistency of the neophyte converts. The young men responded that they had no other choices for mates. Of course, the result was an even greater ethnic and polyglot mix, with Ukrainian and Arabic intermingled.

When is a Kusi not a Kusi?

At this point, we should discuss the last of our opening questions: When is a Kusi not a Kusi? First, some background.

As we are painfully aware, the invention of the printing press in Europe was instrumental in creating several new professions. One of them was the censor, a government official authorized to use his discretion to decide what was in the interests of the ruler to publish and what was not. The censor deleted and changed text at whim, depending on whether he felt the intended text might be perceived as showing the rulers, their religion or anything similar in a poor light. Of course, there was little interest in preserving the accuracy of the text, nor were the censors necessarily well versed in the language or the material that they were censoring. For this reason, many censors used a very broad wand to eliminate words that they considered offensive. Many words that were not intended in any negative way were often deleted, and at times replaced by others that the censors considered to be “pareve.”

The term “Kusim” had no negative connotations for the censors or their employers. They considered the Kusim to be another wayward group, similar to the Roma, the Jews and the Moslems. Thus, to change a word to “Kusi” was a convenient way for the censors to wave their wand. For this reason, there are many instances in which censors changed the words akum (idol worshipper), goy (non-Jew), or min (non-believer), a word often reserved in the Gemara for the early Christians, to Kusi. In all of these instances, one must realize that the text has nothing to do with Kusim (see, for example, Gittin 10b; Avodah Zarah 15b, Niddah 50b), but probably means either “non-Jews” or “heretics,” depending on context.

Conclusion

The story of the Kusim is very different from the various challenges and alternative mistaken expressions of Judaism that we have encountered over the millennia, such as the Tzedukim, the Mis’yavnim, the Kara’im, Reform and Conservative Judaism, the haskalah and secular Zionism. All of these were attempts by Jews to redefine Judaism to their liking. They were attempts to exchange the covenant that Hashem provided with something that could be accommodated to someone’s personal modus vivendi.

In the case of the Kusim, we are dealing with a group who were not originally Jewish and may never have become Jewish. Although many Jews apparently intermarried with them, the culture was completely non-Jewish. Yet, even at the time when there was a possibility that the Kusim were wayward Jews, our Torah leadership realized that this was a group from which to distance ourselves, not only from their philosophy, but even from themselves personally, a highly unusual step, perhaps without any precedent.

Eating before Kiddush

Question #1: Reuven calls me: I have not been well, and I need to eat something shortly after awaking. On weekdays, I go to shul to daven when I wake up and can wait until after davening to eat, but I do not have this option on Shabbos. What should I do?

Question #2: Ahuva asks: It is difficult for me to wait for Kiddush until my husband returns from shul. May I eat something before he arrives home?

Question #3: Someone told me that a woman may not eat in the morning before she davens, but I remember being taught in Beis Yaakov that we may eat once we say the morning berachos. Is my memory faulty?

Answer:

This week’s parsha mentions the korban musaf of Shabbos. Observing Shabbos includes the mitzvah of reciting Kiddush Friday evening: borei peri hagafen and the special beracha of Kiddush, preceded by the passage of the Torah beginning with the word Vayechulu (Rambam, Hilchos Shabbos 29:7). This Kiddush fulfills the Torah’s mitzvah of Zachor es yom haShabbos lekadsho, Remember the day of Shabbos to sanctify it.

There is another Kiddush, introduced by our Sages, which is simply reciting borei peri hagafen and drinking wine prior to the Shabbos day meal. This article will discuss under what circumstances one may eat before reciting the daytime Kiddush.

First, we need to clarify that there are two related subjects here:

May one eat before reciting Kiddush?

May one eat before davening in the morning?

May one eat before reciting Kiddush, either at night or day?

May one eat or drink prior to reciting the Torah-required evening Kiddush? Although the Tanna, Rabbi Yosi, holds that someone eating a meal when Shabbos begins is not required to interrupt, but may complete his meal and then recite Kiddush afterwards, the Gemara concludes that we do not follow this approach. Once Shabbos arrives, it is forbidden to eat or drink anything until one recites or hears Kiddush (Pesachim 100a). The poskim conclude that one may not even drink water before Kiddush (Shulchan Aruch Orach Chayim 271:4).

What is the halacha regarding eating or drinking before daytime Kiddush? This matter is disputed by the two great pillars of halacha, the Rambam and the Raavad. The Rambam  (Hilchos Shabbos, 29:10) declares that one may not taste anything before reciting the daytime Kiddush, whereas the Raavad contends that this prohibition applies only to the evening Kiddush, but not to the morning Kiddush.

What is the underlying issue of this difference of opinion? At first glance, it would seem that the Rambam and the Raavad are disputing the following question: When our Sages required Kiddush in the daytime, did they provide it with all the rules of evening Kiddush? After all, there is a general halachic principle Kol detikun rabbanan ke’ein de’oraysa tikun, whatever the Sages instituted they followed the pattern of the Torah’s mitzvos. (For brevity’s sake, I will henceforth refer to this concept simply as Kol detikun rabbanan.) Kol detikun rabbanan would indicate that just as one may not eat or drink before evening Kiddush, similarly one may not eat or drink anything before morning Kiddush. It would seem that the Rambam is contending that Kol detikun rabbanan applies to daytime Kiddush, whereas the Raavad disputes this for some reason that we will soon explain.

However, a careful reading of the Rambam demonstrates that this analysis is somewhat oversimplified, since the Rambam himself does not fully apply the concept Kol detikun rabbanan to daytime Kiddush. Whereas he introduces Chapter 29 of Hilchos Shabbos by stating: It is a positive mitzvah of the Torah to sanctify Shabbos with words, when he begins discussing the daytime Kiddush, he says: It is a mitzvah to recite a beracha over wine on Shabbos morning before one eats the second meal of Shabbos, and this is called Kiddusha Rabbah. Evidently, the daytime Kiddush is not a second mitzvah of Kiddush, but simply introduces that the daytime meal is in honor of Shabbos. (The early commentaries note that the term Kiddusha Rabbah [literally, the great Kiddush] for the daytime Kiddush, whose origin is in the Gemara itself [Pesachim 106a], is intentionally overstated.) We could say that the evening Kiddush is a sanctification of Shabbos, whereas the daytime Kiddush is a proclamation about the coming meal.

Reciting Kiddush over Bread

Now that we understand that evening Kiddush and daytime Kiddush serve different functions, we can explain why there are other halachic differences between them. For example, one may recite evening Kiddush over the challah-bread that one is using for the meal, but one may not use the bread of the day meal as a substitute for the daytime Kiddush. After all, if daytime Kiddush is to proclaim that the coming meal is in Shabbos’s honor, this proclamation must precede the meal and be somewhatdifferent from the meal itself.

So now we need to ask: If daytime Kiddush serves a different function than does evening Kiddush, why does the Rambam prohibit eating before daytime Kiddush? The answer is that he understands that some laws of Kiddush still apply in the daytime. The dispute between the Rambam and the Raavad is the degree to which daytime Kiddush is compared to evening Kiddush.

The Halacha

The accepted halacha follows the Rambam that one may not eat before daytime Kiddush (Shulchan Aruch Orach Chayim 289:1), although, as we will soon see, the Raavad’s opinion is not completely ignored by later authorities. They often factor the Raavad’s opinion when other mitigating circumstances exist, a halachic concept called tziruf. For example, the Elyah Rabbah (286:9) rules that a weak person who has no beverage available on which to recite Kiddush may rely on the Raavad together with another opinion who contends that there is no obligation to make Kiddush until one has completed davening Musaf. According to this opinion, someone who eats or drinks after completing Shacharis has no requirement to recite Kiddush before eating.

May one drink water before Kiddush?

In regard to the evening Kiddush, the halacha is that one may not drink anything, even water, once Shabbos begins before reciting Kiddush. Does the same law apply to morning Kiddush? The Tur cites a dispute whether one may drink water before davening on Shabbos morning, since one has as yet not recited or heard Kiddush. He quotes the Avi HaEzri as prohibiting this, whereas the Tur’s own father, the Rosh, permitted drinking water before Kiddush, and he himself drank before Shabbos morning davening. The Rosh reasoned that drinking before Kiddush is prohibited only once the time for reciting Kiddush has arrived, which is not until one has davened. Prior to davening, one is prohibited from eating and it is therefore too early for the Shabbos meal and too early for Kiddush. As we will soon see, one may drink even tea or coffee before davening on weekdays, and the Rosh permits this also on Shabbos morning.

May one eat before morning davening?

At this point, we can discuss the first question raised above: I have not been feeling well lately, and find that I need to eat something shortly after awaking. On weekdays, I go to shul to daven shortly after I wake up and can wait to eat until after davening, but there is no available minyan for me to attend early Shabbos morning. What should I do?

Reuven’s question involves an issue that we have as yet not discussed: May one eat before davening in the morning?

The Gemara (Berachos 10b) states: “What do we derive from the verse, You may not eat over blood? That you may not eat (in the morning) before you have prayed for your ‘blood’… The verse states, in reference to someone who eats and drinks prior to praying: You have thrown me behind your body (Melachim 1 14:9). Do not read your body (in Hebrew gavecha), but your arrogance (gai’echa). The Holy One said: After this person has indulged in his own pride (by eating or drinking), only then does he accept upon himself the dominion of heaven!?”

The halacha that results from this Gemara is codified by all authorities. To quote the Rambam: “It is prohibited to taste anything or to perform work from halachic daybreak until one has prayed shacharis” (Hilchos Tefillah 6:4).

Would you like tea or coffee?

Although all poskim prohibit eating and drinking before morning davening, we find early authorities who permit drinking water before davening since this is not considered an act of conceit (Rosh quoting the Avi HaEzri; the Beis Yosef cites authorities who disagree, but rules like the Avi HaEzri). Most later authorities permit drinking tea or coffee, contending that this is also considered like drinking water, but the poskim dispute whether one may add sugar to the beverage. The Mishnah Berurah and others prohibit this, whereas the Aruch Hashulchan and other later authorities permit it. They are disputing whether adding sugar to the beverage promotes it to a forbidden beverage or whether it is still considered water that one may imbibe before davening.

Hunger

The Rambam rules that someone who is hungry or thirsty should eat or drink before he davens so that he can daven properly (Hilchos Tefillah 5:2).

Similarly, some authorities contend that anything eaten or drunk for medical reasons may be done before davening. They explain that the Gemara prohibited only eating or drinking that demonstrate arrogance, whereas that done for medical reasons is, by definition, not done for arrogance (Beis Yosef, quoting Mahari Abohav). This approach is accepted as normative halacha by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 89:3).

I will be hungry!

What is the halacha if someone is as yet not hungry, but he knows that he will be so hungry by the end of davening that it will distract him from davening properly. Is he permitted to eat before davening so that the hunger does not distract him? This question impacts directly on Reuven’s question.

The answer to this question appears to lie in the following Talmudic discussion (Berachos 28b):

“Rav Avya was weak and, as a result, did not attend Rav Yosef’s lecture that took place before Musaf. The next day, when Rav Avya arrived in the Yeshiva, Abayei saw Rav Avya and was concerned that Rav Yosef may have taken offense at Rav Avya’s absence. Therefore, Abayei asked Rav Avya why he had failed to attend the previous day’s lecture. After which the following conversation transpired:

Abayei: Why did the master (addressing Rav Avya) not attend the lecture?

Rav Avya: I was not feeling well and was unable to attend.

Abayei: Why did you not eat something first and then come?

Rav Avya: Does the master (now referring to Abayei) not hold like Rav Huna who prohibits eating before davening Musaf?

Abayei: You should have davened Musaf privately, eaten something and then come to shul (Berachos 28b).

We see from Abayei’s response that someone who is weak should daven first and then eat, even if this means that he davens without a minyan. Based on this passage, several noted authorities rule that someone who will not be able to wait until after davening, and cannot find an early minyan with which to daven, should daven privately (beyechidus), eat and then attend shul in order to hear the Torah and fulfill the mitzvos of answering Kaddish and Kedusha (Be’er Heiteiv 89:11; Biur Halacha 289; Da’as Torah 289 quoting Zechor Le’Avraham; Shu”t Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 2:28 at end of teshuvah). Thus, it seems that we can positively answer Reuven’s question: If he cannot wait to eat until davening is over, he should daven Shacharis be’yechidus, make Kiddush and eat something, and then come to shul to answer Borchu, Kedusha, Kaddish and hear keri’as haTorah.

May a woman eat before Kiddush?

At this point, we have enough information to discuss Ahuva’s question: It is difficult for me to wait for Kiddush until my husband returns from shul. May I eat before he arrives home?

Of course, Ahuva may recite Kiddush herself and eat something before her husband returns home. To fulfill the mitzvah, she needs to eat something that satisfies the halacha of Kiddush bimkom seudah¸ a topic we will have to leave for a different time. However, Ahuva either does not want to recite Kiddush, or does not want to eat something to accompany the Kiddush. Is there a halachic solution to permit her to eat or drink before Kiddush?

Some authorities suggest approaches to permit Ahuva to eat or drink before Kiddush. Here is one approach:

Although most authorities obligate a woman to recite the daytime Kiddush and prohibit her from eating before she recites Kiddush (Tosafos Shabbos 286:4, 289:3; Pri Megadim, Mishbetzos Zahav 289:1; Mishnah Berurah 289:6), this is not a universally held position. One early authority (Maharam Halavah, Pesachim 106, quoting Rashba) contends that women are absolved of the requirement to recite daytime Kiddush, for the following reason:

Since the daytime Kiddush is not an extension of the mitzvah of evening Kiddush but is to demonstrate that the meal is in honor of Shabbos, this requirement does not devolve upon women. Although this approach is not halachically accepted, some authorities allow a woman to rely on this opinion, under extenuating circumstances, to eat before reciting morning Kiddush (Shu”t Minchas Yitzchak 4:28:3).

When does a married woman become obligated to make Kiddush?

Rav Moshe Feinstein presents a different reason to permit a married woman to eat before Kiddush. He reasons that since a married woman is required to eat the Shabbos meal with her husband, she does not become responsible to make Kiddush until it is time for the two of them to eat the Shabbos meal together, meaning after davening (Shu”t Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 4:101\2). However, the Shemiras Shabbos Kehilchasah (Chapter 52, note 46) quotes Rav Shelomoh Zalman Auerbach as disputing Rav Moshe’s conclusion that a married woman has no obligation yet to make Kiddush. Firstly, he is unconvinced that she is halachically required to eat her meal with her husband. Furthermore, even if she is, this duty may not permit her to eat before Kiddush.

If we do not follow the lenient approaches mentioned, when does a woman become obligated to recite Kiddush and, therefore, at what point may she no longer drink tea, coffee, and water? The Acharonim debate this issue, but understanding their positions requires an understanding of a different topic:

What must a woman pray?

All authorities require a woman to daven daily, but there is a dispute whether she is required to recite the full shemoneh esrei (I will call this the “Ramban’s opinion”), or whether she fulfills her requirement by reciting a simple prayer, such as the morning beracha that closes with the words Gomel chasadim tovim le’amo Yisrael. (I will refer to this as the “Magen Avraham’s opinion.”) Allow me to explain.

When may she eat?

According to the Ramban’s opinion that a woman is required to recite the full shemoneh esrei, she may not eat in the morning without first davening (see the previous discussion), whereas according to the Magen Avraham’s opinion that she fulfills her requirement once she has recited a simple prayer or morning berachos, she may eat once she recited these tefilos.

Some authorities rule that a woman becomes obligated to hear Kiddush as soon as she recites berachos, since she has now fulfilled her requirement to daven and she may therefore begin eating her meals. According to this opinion, once she has recited morning berachos she may not eat or drink without first making Kiddush (Tosafos Shabbos 286:4, 289:3). This approach contends that before she recites morning berachos, she may drink water, tea or coffee, but after she recites morning berachos she may not even drink these items without first reciting Kiddush.

There is another view that contends that a woman can follow the same approach that men follow, and may drink water, tea or coffee even after she recited berachos before she has davened (Pri Megadim, Eishel Avraham 289:4 as understood by Halichos Beisah page 204).

At this point we can address the third question I raised above:

“Someone told me that a woman may not eat in the morning before she davens, but I remember being taught in Beis Yaakov that we may eat once we say the morning berachos. Is my memory faulty?”

Many authorities contend that although a woman should daven shemoneh esrei every morning, she may rely on the opinion of the Magen Avraham in regard to eating, and may eat after reciting morning berachos. In many institutions, this approach was preferred, since it accomplishes that the tefillah that the girls recite is a much better prayer and they learn how to daven properly.

Conclusion

According to Rav Hirsch, observing Shabbos, and declaring its holiness, means recognizing that the arrival of Shabbos signifies that man’s activity has attained its goal. Now it is time to recognize Hashem’s creation and devote ourselves to developing our spirituality. When we recite Kiddush, we should internalize this message.

Carrying in Public and the Use of an Eruv

clip_image002

In this week’s parsha, the Torah recounts the story of the manna, also including the unbecoming episode where some people attempted to gather it on Shabbos. In the words of the Torah:

And Moshe said, “Eat it (the manna that remained from Friday) today, for today is Shabbos to Hashem. Today you will not find it (the manna) in the field. Six days you shall gather it, and the Seventh Day is Shabbos – there will be none.”

And it was on the Seventh Day. Some of the people went out to gather, and they did not find.

And Hashem said to Moshe: “For how long will you refuse to observe My commandments and My teachings. See, Hashem gave you the Shabbos. For this reason He provides you with two-day’s supply of bread on the sixth day. On the Seventh Day each person should remain where he is and not leave his place” (Shemos 16:25-29).

Although the Torah’s words each person should remain where he is and not leave his place imply that even leaving one’s home is forbidden, the context implies that one may not leave one’s home while carrying the tools needed to gather manna (Tosafos, Eruvin 17b). The main prohibition taught here is to refrain from carrying from one’s house or any other enclosed area (halachically called reshus hayachid) to an area available for the entire Benei Yisroel in the Desert to traverse, a reshus harabim. Chazal further explain that moving an item in any way from a reshus hayachid to a reshus harabim is a Torah violation, whether one throws it, places it, hands it to someone else, or transports it in any other way (Shabbos 2a, 96). Furthermore, we derive from other sources that one may also not transport an item from a reshus harabim to a reshus hayachid, nor may one transport it four amos (about seven feet) or more within a reshus harabim (Gemara Shabbos 96b; Tosafos, Shabbos 2a s.v. pashat). Thus, carrying into, out of, or within a reshus harabim incurs a severe Torah prohibition. For convenience’s sake, I will refer to portage of an item from one reshus to another or within a reshus harabim as carrying, regardless of the method of conveyance.

One should note that with reference to the melacha of carrying on Shabbos, the terms reshus hayachid and reshus harabim do not relate to the ownership of the respective areas, but are determined by the extent that the areas are enclosed and how they are used. A reshus hayachid could certainly be public property and there are ways whereby an individual could own a reshus harabim.

Notwithstanding the Torah’s clear prohibition against carrying into, from, or within a reshus harabim, we are all familiar with the concept of an eruv that permits carrying in areas that are otherwise prohibited. You might ask, how can poles and wires permit that which is otherwise prohibited min haTorah? As we will soon see, it indeed cannot, and the basis for permitting use of an eruv is far more complicated.

We are also aware of controversies in which one respected authority certifies a particular eruv, while others contend that it is invalid. This is by no means a recent phenomenon. We find extensive disputes among early authorities whether one may construct an eruv in certain areas; some considering it a mitzvah to construct the eruv, whereas others contend that the very same “eruv” is causing people to sin.

AN OLD MACHLOKES

Here is an instance. In the thirteenth century, Rav Yaakov ben Rav Moshe of Alinsiya wrote a letter to the Rosh explaining why he forbade constructing an eruv in his town. In his response, the Rosh contended that Rav Yaakov’s concerns were groundless and that he should immediately construct an eruv. Subsequent correspondence reveals that Rav Yaakov did not change his mind and still refused to erect an eruv in his town. The Rosh severely rebuked Rav Yaakov for this recalcitrance, insisting that if Rav Yaakov persisted, he, the Rosh, would place Rav Yaakov in cherem! The Rosh further contended that Rav Yaakov had the status of a zakein mamrei, a Torah scholar who rules against a decision of the Sanhedrin, which, in the time of the Beis HaMikdash, constitutes a capital offense (Shu”t HaRosh 21:8). This episode demonstrates that heated disputes over eruvin are by no means recent phenomena.

The goal of this article is to explain what allows the construction of an eruv, and present some circumstances in which one authority permits carrying within a specific eruv while another forbids it.

IS IT A MITZVAH?

Before I present the arguments for and against eruv construction in the modern world, we should note that all accept that it is a mitzvah to erect a kosher eruv when this is halachically and practically possible, as the following anecdote indicates.

Rabbah the son of Rav Chanan asked Abayei: “How can it be that an area in which reside two such great scholars (Abayei and Abayei’s Rebbe) is without an eruv?” Abayei answered: “What should we do? It is not respectful for my master to be involved, I am too busy with my studies, and the rest of the people are not concerned” (Eruvin 68a).

The commentaries note that Abayei accepted the position presented by Rabbah that one should assemble an eruv. Abayei merely deflected the inquiry by pointing out that no one was readily available to attend to the eruv, and that its construction did not preempt other factors, specifically Abayei’s commitment to Torah study and the inappropriateness for Abayei’s Rebbe to be involved in the project. Indeed, halachic authorities derive from this Talmudic passage that it is a mitzvah to erect an eruv whenever halachically permitted (Tashbeitz 2:37, quoted verbatim by the Birkei Yosef, Orach Chayim 363:2). These rulings are echoed by such luminaries as the Chasam Sofer (Shu”t Orach Chayim #99), the Avnei Nezer (Orach Chayim #266:4), the Levush Mordechai (Orach Chayim #4) and Rav Moshe Feinstein (Shu”t Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 1:139:5 s.v. vilichora).

I mentioned before that the construction of an eruv with poles and wires cannot permit carrying that is prohibited min haTorah. If this is true, upon what basis do we permit the construction of an eruv? To answer this question, we need to understand that not every open area is a reshus harabim – quite the contrary, a reshus harabim must meet very specific and complex requirements, including:

(A) It must be unroofed (Shabbos 5a).

(B) It must be meant for public use or thoroughfare (Shabbos 6a).

(C) It must be at least sixteen amos (about twenty-eight feet) wide (Shabbos 99a).

(D) According to most authorities, it cannot be inside an enclosed area (cf., however, Be’er Heiteiv 345:7, quoting Rashba, and Baal HaMaor, Eruvin 22a,quoting Rabbeinu Efrayim). Exactly what is the definition of an “enclosed area” is the subject of a major dispute that I will discuss.

(E) According to many authorities, it must be used by at least 600,000 people daily (Rashi, Eruvin 59a, but see Rashi ad loc. 6a where he only requires that the city has this many residents.). This is derived from the Torah’s description of carrying into the encampment in the Desert, which we know was populated by 600,000 people.

(F) Many authorities require that it be a through street, or a gathering area that connects to a through street (Rashi, Eruvin 6a).

(G) Some authorities add still other requirements.

Any area that does not meet the Torah’s definition of a reshus harabim, and yet is not enclosed, is called a karmelis. One may not carry into, from, or within a karmelis following the same basic rules that prohibit carrying into a reshus harabim. However, since the prohibition not to carry in a karmelis is only rabbinic in origin, Chazal allowed a more lenient method of “enclosing” it.

CAN ONE “ENCLOSE” A RESHUS HARABIM?

As I mentioned earlier, carrying within a true reshus harabim is prohibited min haTorah – for this reason, the use of a standard eruv does not permit carrying in such an area (Eruvin 6b). Nevertheless, the construction of large doors that restrict public traffic transforms the reshus harabim into an area that one can now enclose with an eruv. According to some authorities, the existence of these doors and occasionally closing them is sufficient for the area to lose its reshus harabim status. (Rashi, Eruvin 6b; However, cf. Rabbeinu Efrayim, quoted by Baal HaMaor, Eruvin 22a).

PLEASE CLOSE THE DOOR!

There are some frum neighborhoods in Eretz Yisroel where a thoroughfare to a neighborhood or town is closed on Shabbos with a door, in order to allow an eruv to be constructed around the area. However, this approach is not practical in most places where people desire to construct an eruv.

So what does one do if one cannot close the area with doors?

This depends on the following issue: Does the area that one wants to enclose meet the requirements of a reshus harabim min haTorah or is it only a karmelis? If the area is a reshus harabim min haTorah and one cannot occasionally close the area with doors, then there is no way to permit carrying in this area. One should abandon the idea of constructing an eruv around the entire city or neighborhood (see Gemara Eruvin 6a; Shulchan Aruch Orach Chayim 364:2). Depending on the circumstances, one may still be able to enclose smaller areas within the city.

TZURAS HAPESACH

However, if the area one wants to enclose does not qualify as a reshus harabim, then most authorities rule that one may enclose the area by using a tzuras hapesach (plural, tzuros hapesach), literally, the form of a doorway. (However, note that Shu”t Mishkenos Yaakov #120 s.v. amnom and Shu”t Mishnas Rav Aharon #6 s.v. Kuntrus Be’Inyanei Eruvin paragraph #2 forbid this.) A tzuras hapesach consists of two vertical side posts and a horizontal “lintel” that passes directly over them, thus resembling a doorway. According to halacha, a tzuras hapesach successfully encloses a karmelis area, but it cannot permit carrying in a true reshus harabim (Eruvin 6a). Using tzuros hapesach is the least expensive and most discreet way to construct an eruv. In a future article, I hope to explain some common problems that can happen while constructing tzuros hapesach and how to avoid them, and some important disputes relative to their construction.

Let us review. One can permit carrying in a karmelis, but not a reshus harabim, by enclosing the area with tzuros hapesach. Therefore, a decisive factor in planning whether one can construct an eruv is whether the area is halachically a karmelis or a reshus harabim. If the area qualifies as a karmelis, then an eruv consisting of tzuros hapesach permits one to carry; if it is a reshus harabim, then tzuros hapesach do not permit carrying. The issues concerning the definition of a reshus harabim form the basis of most controversies as to whether a specific eruv is kosher or not.

600,000 PEOPLE

An early dispute among Rishonim was whether one of the requirements of a reshus harabim is that it be accessible to 600,000 people, the number of male Jews over twenty that the Torah tells us exited Egypt (see Tosafos, Eruvin 6a s.v. Keitzad). According to Rashi and the others who follow this approach, one may enclose any metropolis with a population smaller than 600,000 with tzuros hapesach to permit carrying. (Rashi in some places describes that the city has 600,000 residents, and in others describes that 600,000 people use the area constantly. The exact definition to be used is the subject of much literature, see Shu”t Mishkenos Yaakov #120 s.v. hinei harishon; and Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 1:139:5.)

However, other early authorities contend that an area with less than 600,000 people still qualifies as a reshus harabim, providing that it fulfills the other requirements that I listed above. In their opinion, such an area cannot be enclosed with tzuros hapesach. Although many authorities hold this way, the accepted practice in Ashkenazic communities was to follow the lenient interpretation and construct eruvin around an area with less than 600,000 people.

 Nevertheless, the Mishnah Berurah discourages carrying in such an eruv since many Rishonim do not accept it (364:8; Bi’ur Halacha to 345:7 and to 364:2). There are different opinions whether Sephardim are at liberty to follow this lenience, although the prevalent practice today is for them to be lenient.

MODERN CITY

Most large metropolitan areas today are populated by more than 600,000 people. Some authorities still define many of our metropolitan areas as a karmelis based on the following definition: Any area less concentrated than was the Jews’ encampment in the Desert is considered a karmelis. Since this encampment approximated 50 square miles, these authorities permit an eruv anywhere that the population density is less than 600,000 people per 50 square miles (Shu”t Igros Moshe 4:87). However, other authorities consider any metropolitan area or megalopolis containing 600,000 people to be a reshus harabim, regardless of its population density. Does this mean that there is no heter with which to construct an eruv in a large city? Indeed, many authorities contend this way (Shu”t Mishnas Rav Aharon 1:2).

A LARGE BREACH

The Chazon Ish, however,presented a different approach to permit construction of an eruv in a contemporary large city. His approach requires an introduction.

In general, an area enclosed by three or four full walls cannot be a reshus harabim (Eruvin 22a). What is the halacha if each of the three sides of an area is enclosed for most of its length – however, there are large gaps in the middle of the enclosure. For example, walls or buildings enclose most of an area, but there are gaps in the middle of the area between the buildings where streets cross the city blocks. Does the area in the middle, surrounded on both sides by buildings and other structures, still qualify as a reshus harabim, or has it lost this status because it is mostly “enclosed”?

The basis for the question is the following: There is a general halachic principle that an area that is mostly enclosed is considered enclosed even in its breached areas (Eruvin 5b et al.). For example, a yard enclosed by hedges tall enough to qualify as halachic walls may be considered enclosed notwithstanding that there are open areas between the hedges, since each side is predominantly enclosed either by the hedges or by the house.

On the other hand, a breach wider than ten amos (about 17 feet) invalidates the area from being considered enclosed. Therefore, one may not carry within a fenced-in area that has a 20-foot opening without enclosing the opening in some way.

The issue that affects the modern city is the following: Granted that a large breach needs to be enclosed to permit carrying within the area, but is this required min haTorah or only rabbinically? Let us assume that one encloses a reshus harabim area with walls that run for miles, but the walls have large gaps in the middle. Is this area considered enclosed min haTorah because it is mostly surrounded by walls, or is it considered open because of the gaps?

This question was debated by two great nineteenth-century authorities, Rav Efrayim Zalman Margoliyos, the Beis Efrayim  and the Rav of Brody, and Rav Yaakov of Karlin, the Mishkenos Yaakov. The Beis Efrayim contended that a breach is only a rabbinic concern, and that the area is considered enclosed min haTorah, whereas the Mishkenos Yaakov held that a breach qualifies the area as a reshus harabim min haTorah. The lengthy correspondence between the two of them covers also a host of other eruv related issues (Shu”t Beis Efrayim, Orach Chayim # 25, 26; Shu”t Mishkenos Yaakov, Orach Chayim, #120-122).

What difference does it make whether this area is considered open min haTorah or miderabbanan, since either way one cannot carry without enclosing the area?

The difference is highly significant. If we follow the lenient approach of the Beis Efrayim, then even if the area in the middle meets all the other requirements of a reshus harabim, the area loses its status as a reshus harabim because of the walls surrounding it, notwithstanding the large gaps in the walls. In this case, it may be possible to construct an eruv in such a place.

On the other hand, the Mishkenos Yaakov would contend that this area is considered a reshus harabim because of the gaps, and we ignore the walls. According to him it will be impossible to construct an eruv.

How one rules in the dispute between these two gedolim affects the issue of constructing an eruv in a contemporary city. Most modern cities contain city blocks that consist predominantly of large buildings with small areas between the buildings, and streets that are much narrower than the blocks. If we view these buildings as enclosures, then one can easily envision that both sides of the street are considered enclosed min haTorah according to the Beis Efrayim’s analysis. This itself does not sufficiently enclose our area because of the streets that run parallel to the buildings. However, at certain points of the city, the parallel streets dead end into a street that is predominantly enclosed with either buildings, fences, walls, or some other way. The result is that this section of the city can now be considered min haTorah as enclosed on three sides by virtue of the buildings paralleling both sides of the street and those on its dead end. Since this area now qualifies as an enclosed area min haTorah, the entire area is considered a reshus hayachid min haTorah.

The Chazon Ish now notes the following: Once you have established that this part of the city qualifies as a reshus hayachid min haTorah, this area is now considered completely enclosed halachically. For this reason, other city blocks that are predominantly enclosed on both sides of the street that intersect with this first area are also now considered to be enclosed areas min haTorah. According to his calculation,  a large section of most cities is considered min haTorah enclosed on at least three sides, according to his calculation. Although one cannot carry in these areas miderabbanan because of the “breaches” in their “enclosures,” they are no longer reshus harabim min haTorah and one can therefore enclose the entire area with tzuros hapesach (Chazon Ish, Orach Chayim 107:5). The Chazon Ish concludes that many large cities today qualify as a karmelis and therefore one may construct tzuros hapesach to permit carrying there.

However, other authorities reject this calculation for a variety of reasons, some contending that the gaps between the buildings invalidate the enclosure, thus leaving the area to be considered a reshus harabim, which cannot be enclosed (Shu”t Mishkenos Yaakov; Shu”t Mishnas Rav Aharon).

In conclusion, we see that disputes among poskim over eruvin are not recent phenomena. In practice, what should an individual do? The solution proposed by Chazal for all such issues is “Aseh lecha rav, vehistaleik min hasafek,” “Choose someone to be your rav, and remove doubt from yourself.” He can guide you whether it is appropriate to carry within a certain eruv, after considering the halachic basis for the specific eruv’s construction, the level of eruv maintenance, and family factors. Never underestimate the psak and advice of your rav!

Motherhood, Rivkah and Amalek

Question #1:

Who was Amalek’s mother?

Question #2:

Why was she not accepted into the Jewish people?

Answers

This article will be discussing several observations germane to motherhood based on ideas that surface in the parshiyos of Tolados, Vayeitzei and Vayishlach. This will be combined with the concept of Amalek, even though it sounds strange to mix such seemingly dissimilar themes.

We will begin at the end of parshas Tolados: Yaakov has received the berachos, Yitzchak recognizes that he had mistakenly intended to give the berachos to the wrong person, Eisav begged for berachos and receives a generous beracha. As Yaakov is about to leave, Yitzchak gives him another beracha — the birkas Avraham.

Eisav is planning to murder his brother, Yaakov. We can legitimately ask why Eisav is so enraged about Yaakov receiving the berachos. He had already sold Yaakov the rights of the firstborn, and, anyway, does not appear very interested in fulfilling anything to do with the family business.  Although it is true that Yaakov got the berachos instead of him, but what would Eisav have done with those berachos? However, as we all know, anger and hate are irrational.

Rivkah knows about Eisav’s plans, but does not tell them to Yitzchak – whether because she is afraid of the damage it will do to his health or some other reason, we are never told. She considers knowledge of Eisav’s plans to be information placed on a need-to-know basis, and Yitzchak does not need to know Eisav’s murderous intent. Instead, she tells Yitzchak that Yaakov should not marry a local girl, but one of her nieces – notwithstanding that this means making a shidduch with Lavan, far from an exemplary mechutan. Yitzchak, having seen what Eisav’s two wives are like, heartily approves of the idea.

Yitzchak sends Yaakov on his way, and that is where parshas Tolados ends. “Yitzchak sends Yaakov to Padan Aram.” Padan Aram, also known as Aram Naharayim, is in Mesopotamia. The word Mesopotamia means “between the rivers,” just as the word naharayim means “the pair of rivers.” (There is another Aram, Aram Tzova, in Syria, identified with the northern and northwestern parts of Syria, Aleppo and its environs. These two areas, Aram Naharayim and Aram Tzova, together are the origins of the Aramite area and of the “Aramaic” language. Aramaic later becomes the lingua franca of the Middle East for several hundred years, when it replaces Greek, and before Arabic replaces it. By the way, it is still a spoken language among some populations in this region.)

Let us return to the pasuk. “Yitzchak sent Yaakov to Padan Aram — to Lavan the son of Besuel the Aramean, the brother of Rivkah, the mother of Yaakov and Eisav.”

In reference to these words, “The mother of Yaakov and Eisav,” Rashi leaves a four-word Hebrew comment: Eini yodei’a mah melamdeinu, “I do not know what this is teaching us.”

This itself is not a strange comment by Rashi. Dozens of times, throughout the Chumash and the Gemara, Rashi informs us that he is unaware of the answer to a question. Rashi has no ego to protect. He is the ultimate, exceptional pedagogue; without question, he is the greatest pedagogue of all history.

However, here it seems that there are very satisfying answer to his question. Several of the commentaries — Ohr Hachayim, Seforno, Ramban and others — provide very nice answers to explain these three extra words in the pasuk, “the mother of Yaakov and Eisav,” and so could have Rashi. Why does Rashi not suggest one of their approaches?

I believe that Rashi is bothered by a different issue: When we have an expression like this — a few words that seem to be extra — it makes it appear as if Tanach is literature in which words are added only to smooth out the writing style. However, Rashi tells us each time (see, for example, his comments to Bereishis 3:8), that his goal is to explain the pshat of the pasuk, and/or he will examine the various midrashei Chazal and pick from them one or two statements that he feels the pasuk is emphasizing.

What is bothering Rashi here? The words, “the mother of Yaakov and Eisav” are not needed for the pshat, since we know who Rivkah is. A simple explanation of what these words are adding is also not difficult. We know that she is the mother of both Yaakov and Eisav and that she loves Yaakov, her younger son, more than Eisav, the elder. The reason she loves Yaakov more than Eisav is also not difficult; Yaakov will be her spiritual heir, and Eisav, be a source of grief. Throughout the story of the berachos, she goes out of her way to care for Yaakov. However, she still loves Eisav as her son. As a wayward son, perhaps, but she still loves him. No matter how far he distances himself from everything she cherishes, she still loves him. As, in fact, she told Yaakov: “Go to Aram; why should I lose both of you?” That is her big concern. She doesn’t want to lose both, or either, of them.

Thus, making the words, “the mother of Yaakov and Eisav,” read nicely in the pasuk is not difficult; that is not what is bothering Rashi. What Rashi is saying is that there should be a midrashic interpretation that would satisfy his audience on a deeper level. As Rashi himself describes the process of his commentary, he explains a pasuk according to its simplest pshat, or according to a midrash aggadah that fits the pasuk smoothly. However, here there are few midrashim, and none which Rashi feels fits the pshat of the pasuk.

 Yaakov leaves empty-handed

Below, we will discuss Timna, the mother of Amalek. Eisav has a son named Elifaz, and Elifaz has a son named Amalek. We learn a lot about Elifaz from a comment of Rashi in parshas Vayeitzei.

As an introduction to understand Elifaz, we will begin with a puzzling fact at the beginning of parshas Vayeitzei. Why is Yaakov empty-handed when he heads toward Charan? To make Yitzchak’s shidduch, Eliezer took ten camels laden with the most valuable items of the time. Sure, Yaakov was in a rush because Eisav wanted to kill him, but Yitzchak is very wealthy and Yaakov could have taken some precious stones, which are light. Take a bag of them, or sew them into your clothes. It is very doable. It seems deliberate that he has no valuables with him. Why?

Midrashei Chazal provide two approaches to answer this question.

One: Indeed, Yitzchak sent him away empty handed. This approach sounds pretty strange to me, but this is the opinion of a midrash. Rav Hirsch provides an approach that is similar to this midrash, which I can understand a bit better. Yaakov chose not to take anything with him, hoping that this would mitigate Eisav’s anger. He wanted to show Eisav that the latter had lost nothing when the berachos went to Yaakov instead. What has Yaakov earned by winning the berachos or by purchasing the right of the firstborn from Eisav? Absolutely nothing of value to Eisav. Yaakov has left Eisav all the property from the household — far more than Eisav could ever have imagined he would receive in inheritance if he divided it with Yaakov. So, why should Eisav be upset at him?

Two: The better known approach, quoted by Rashi (to 29:10). Yaakov indeed left with much wealth. Eisav sent his eldest son Elifaz to kill Yaakov. (Incidentally, why didn’t Eisav go himself? Maybe because if he disappeared for a bit and then Yaakov was found murdered, it would be clear that Eisav had killed Yaakov; this would anger Yitzchak. So he sent Elifaz. Perhaps…) Now, the midrash tells us that Elifaz approached Yaakov and told him of his predicament. His father had commanded him to kill Yaakov, but he did not want to. Yaakov told Elifaz: “Take all of my possessions.” As we know from the Gemara, a poor person is considered as dead. And now Yaakov is empty handed.

 Elifaz

I would like to point out that the name Elifaz appears in Tanach in only two contexts. Elifaz is the name of Eisav’s son, who takes a woman named Timna as a pilegesh, and there is an Elifaz who shows up as one of Iyov’s friends.

Is that a coincidence? Are there two men named Elifaz? Or is it the same Elifaz?

This is a discussion in midrashei Chazal. There are many midrashei Chazal that assume that they are the same Elifaz, that Iyov’s buddy Elifaz is Eisav’s son. This will tell us much about the proper placement of Iyov in history. There is a large discussion in the Gemara regarding when Iyov lived, whether he was Jewish or not, whether he even lived or was simply a mashal, a fable, if you pardon the expression. Iyov is one of the most difficult books in Tanach for many reasons, but regardless, Iyov’s friend Elifaz is a respected individual.

Timna

Now, let us discuss Elifaz’s pilegesh, Timna. Pilegesh is usually translated as concubine; it can also be translated as mistress. In parshas Vayishlach, we have a discussion about the chieftains of Eisav, of Edom. There, we see the name Timna appearing twice. She became a pilegesh to Elifaz and bore him Amalek. Amalek appears to be the only issue from their relationship.

Later on, it discusses the royalty of Edom, using the word “aluf,” which in Modern Hebrew has come to mean “general” or “champion.” Chazal tell us that aluf is someone who is right below a king, a member of the royal family who does not wear the crown and does not have primary power. We usually call such a person a prince. One of those princes or princesses, is Timna; the verses refer to “Aluf Timna” and to “Aluf Elifaz.” Timna was from a royal family. She had a brother, Lotan, who is described as an aluf, and that she too was called aluf, a princess.

We need to examine a very baffling passage of Gemara: Timna wanted to convert and join the Jewish people. While this was before the giving of the Torah, we know that Avraham had a significant following of people who were attracted by his ethics, morals, sense of purpose, sense of G-d and his monotheism.

Timna wanted to join. The midrash says that she came to Avraham, Yitzchak, and Yaakov, requesting to join the Jewish people, but they refused to accept her. Why not? That’s a good question, to which we do not know the definitive answer.

Since Timna was refused entry to the people of Avraham, Yitzchak, and Yaakov, she said: “OK. Eisav is a grandson of Avraham, and Elifaz is a great-grandson of Avraham. I know that Elifaz is a good guy; he was Iyov’s friend and he did not obey Eisav’s bad commandments. If I cannot join Avraham’s group, I will join Elifaz. She goes to Elifaz, who tells her that he already has a wife. So, she says, “OK, I’ll be a pilegesh, a concubine.” Concubine has a connotation of a second-class citizen. The origin of the Hebrew word pilegesh means “half a wife.” Timna said: “I would rather be a pilegesh to this nation than a princess among my own.”

The pasuk teaches that the union of Elifaz and Timna produced Amalek, and the Gemara notes that he was the founder of the nation that gives the Jews non-stop difficulty. Why, asks the Gemara, was that the result? The Gemara answers that they should not have pushed Timna away from joining the Jewish people. At this point, the Gemara closes its discussion on this topic, leaving us without any explanation as to what it means.

This sounds like we are blaming the victim – that is, we are blaming the Jewish people for anti-Semitic atrocities!

I was troubled by this question: why are we blaming Avraham, Yitzchak, and Yaakov for not accepting Timna? I went looking, and I found several approaches that did not speak to me. I finally found an approach in the Maharal of Prague.

The Maharal explains that accepting Timna to join the Jewish people would not have worked. She was from a royal family. She wanted to marry into the family of Avraham, Yitzchak, and Yaakov, but her nature was still royalty. Even if she became a concubine to Elifaz, she still viewed herself as royalty, whereas Avraham, Yitzchak, and Yaakov were not royalty. She would not have gained what she needed to grow from them, because she still viewed herself as superior. Avraham, Yitzchak, and Yaakov all saw this and said that they could not take her, because she would not have become a proper student or disciple of theirs.

If so, what did Avraham, Yitzchak, and Yaakov do wrong?

The Maharal explains that although they had a reason not to accept her, it still wasn’t the correct thing to do. She sincerely wanted to join. We do not find the fact of someone’s royalty among the reasons mentioned to refuse people from joining the Jewish people. We reject conversion to the Jewish people if the candidate is insincere in his reason to join the Jews – such as, he is joining for the sake of marriage, or to obtain citizenship or benefits in the State of Israel. In an era like those of King David and Shelomoh, or after Mordechai and Esther’s victory over Haman, we decline conversions out of concern that its motivation is that it is beneficial to be a Jew. Those are reasons to reject someone, but not because someone comes from royalty and may not be able to fully accept our teachings. For this reason, notwithstanding that Timna and Elifaz were both sincere, the result of their union was Amalek!

But what about Hagar? According to the midrash, she was a daughter of the Egyptian pharaoh, the greatest power on the face of the earth at the time. And she was accepted to join Avraham’s people. Why did they not reject Hagar for the same reason that they rejected Timna?

The answer is that Hagar was accepted as a slave. She and her father knew that she was only going to be a slave in Avraham’s household. She was to be Sarah’s personal maidservant. Once they accepted this, she could absorb as much of Avraham’s and Sarah’s teaching as she was capable. And, when Sarah chose her from all the other female slaves of the household to become Avraham’s concubine, it was a tremendous vote of confidence that Hagar had largely succeeded in accepting their leadership and instruction. So much so, that when Hagar was apprised of the suggestion, she demurred, not feeling herself appropriate to the task.

These discussions leave us with a lot of food for thought…

The ABC’s of Yummy Bishul Akum Foods

Since there is an allusion to the prohibition of bishul akum in this week’s parsha:

Question #1: Artichokes

In most places, artichokes are eaten cooked, but Egyptians eat them raw. Do artichokes cooked in Egypt present a bishul akum concern in America?

Question #2: Bishul akum equipment

If a non-Jew cooked kosher products in my pots, do the pots now require kashering?

Question #3: Cooking for the ill

If a non-Jew cooked on Shabbos for someone who is ill, must I treat the food as non-kosher when Shabbos is over?

Historical Background

Based on a pasuk, the Gemara (Avodah Zarah 37b) suggests that the prohibition of bishul akum, banning food cooked by non-Jews, might be min haTorah. Subsequently, the Gemara rejects this assumption, concluding that bishul akum is a rabbinic injunction that was not yet prohibited when the Jews traversed the Desert. Nevertheless, Rabbeinu Tam infers that bishul akum was enacted very early in Jewish history; otherwise, how could the Gemara even consider that it might have a Biblical origin (Tosafos, Avodah Zarah 37b s.v. Vehashelakos)?

Chazal instituted the law of bishul akum to discourage social interaction, which might lead to intermarriage, and also to guarantee that kashrus is not compromised (Rashi, Avodah Zarah 35b s.v. Vehashelakos and38a s.v. Miderabbanan, and Tosafos ad loc.).

Introduction

Before we can address our opening questions, we need to understand some of the basic laws of bishul akum. Although Chazal enacted a prohibition on food cooked by non-Jews, they permitted three categories of food; in all three of these instances, the social interaction considerations are mitigated. Here is an easy acronym by which to remember these three rules:

YUM – Yisrael, Uncooked, Monarch

Yisrael:

An important rule is that even if a non-Jew performed most of the cooking, as long as a Jew participated in a significant way, the food is permitted as “bishul Yisrael.” The reason that Chazal were lenient is because the social interaction that they wanted to discourage is decreased when the cooking is dependent on a Jew’s involvement.

The level of Jewish participation required is a dispute among rishonim that manifests itself in practical differences between Ashkenazic and Sephardic practice.

In Ashkenazic practice, if a Jew ignites or adds to the fire used for cooking, the food qualifies as bishul Yisrael, even if a non-Jew added the ingredients and did all the actual cooking. On the other hand, Sephardic Jews require direct involvement of a Jew in the actual cooking. This means that a Jew must place the food on the fire or participate in some other significant way. Simply igniting the fire upon which a non-Jew places food is insufficient to make the food kosher (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 113:7).

These differences in interpretation are particularly relevant in situations involving restaurants, caterers and other food service, where the kitchen help is frequently non-Jewish. In some instances, Sephardic authorities permit the food, after the fact, based on a combination of leniencies (Shu”t Yechaveh Daas 5:54).

Uncooked:

Foods that are consumed raw are exempt from the prohibition of bishul akum. The reason for this exception is because the respect and social interaction is decreased when the food served is edible without cooking.

This exemption of “uncooked food,” which is called ne’echal chai, applies to items like applesauce or canned pineapple, as both apples and pineapples are eaten uncooked. However, in some cases there are disputes among halachic authorities as to whether a specific food is considered edible raw or not.

What is the halacha if a particular vegetable is commonly consumed uncooked in one country, but not in another? For example, artichokes are commonly eaten raw in Egypt, but not in Spain, although both countries grow them for export. Are artichokes cooked in Spain prohibited as bishul akum, but those grown in Egypt are not? Assuming that artichokes cooked in Egypt are not prohibited as bishul akum, do cooked Egyptian artichokes become prohibited upon being shipped to Spain or somewhere else where they are always eaten cooked? Indeed, this is the ruling of the Kaf Hachayim (Yoreh Deah 113:20). However, there are authorities who disagree with this ruling, contending that the prohibition of bishul akum must take effect at the time that the food is cooked. Since, in Egypt, artichokes are eaten raw, cooking them in Egypt does not prohibit them as bishul akum, the subsequent shipping cannot make them prohibited. Of course, this approach creates the rather anomalous ruling that cooked artichokes in Spain are prohibited as bishul akum if locally cooked, but permitted if imported from Egypt!?

Certainly, styles of food preparation also change. For example, until relatively recently, broccoli or cauliflower were always served cooked and would have involved bishul akum. Contemporarily, both are commonly served as a raw vegetable, with the result that even when cooked they are no longer prohibited as bishul akum.

Similarly, the popularity of sushi, sashimi and similar Japanese dishes outside Japan influences whether various types of fish that are now eaten raw will be prohibited if cooked by a non-Jew.

Another food that has changed are carrots. Our European grandparents and great-grandparents never ate raw carrots, which would have made them (the carrots, not the grandparents) subject to bishul akum considerations.

Monarch:

Bishul akum applies only to foods that one would serve on a king’s table. Less prominent dishes are exempt, since they are unlikely to lead to improper social interactions. The Gemara refers to this as oleh al shulchan melachim lelafeis bo es hapas, literally, served on a king’s table to be eaten together with bread. However, this definition, also, may depend on what form the particular food has and on what is considered appropriate to eat at a gourmet meal. At one point, potatoes were considered poor people’s food and would never be served at a respectable event. For this reason, some prominent authorities exempted them from the prohibition of bishul akum. Since, in today’s world, potatoes are served at weddings and other fancy events, they certainly can be forbidden as bishul akum.

There are other interesting issues regarding potatoes. Although nothing harmful will happen to those imbibing raw white potatoes or sweet potatoes, few people eat them that way. Thus, we may arrive at an interesting conclusion: expensive cuts of fish may be exempt from bishul akum regulations because they are now considered edible raw, whereas the far more humble potato is included in bishul akum regulations because it is not eaten raw.

Of course, this brings us to the question of whether potato chips are included in the prohibition of bishul akum. I find more acceptable the opinion of those who rule that, since potato chips are not served at state dinners and other upper-class events, they are exempt from bishul akum concerns, although I am aware that there are halachic authorities who insist that potato chips be bishul Yisrael.

Bishul akum equipment

At this point, let us examine the second of our opening questions: If a non-Jew cooks kosher ingredients in my pots, do the pots absorb non-kosher bishul akum? Must the pots be kashered before they are used again, or does bishul akum only ban food but not pots?

We find a dispute among rishonim, some contending that since bishul akum was limited to circumstances that encourage social interaction, the taste of bishul akum that is absorbed into pots was not included in the prohibition. Thus, equipment that cooked bishul akum does not require kashering (Bedek Habayis, Bayis 3, Shaar 7; Rosh, quoted by the Tur, Yoreh Deah, end of Chapter 113, and by Rabbeinu Yeruchem).

The detractors

Others contend that any time food becomes prohibited because of a rabbinic edict, the equipment used to cook it also becomes prohibited and requires kashering (Mishmeres Habayis, Bayis 3, Shaar 7). This is based on a general ruling, kol detikun rabbanan ke’ein de’oraysa tikun (Pesachim 30b, 39b et al), “whatever the Sages established, they followed a system similar to those governing Torah laws.” Many prohibit using equipment until they are kashered, even if non-Jewish servants or employees cooked for themselves in a Jew’s house. According to this approach, to avoid prohibiting the pots when non-Jewish workers cook for themselves in a Jewish house, you must make sure that someone Jewish participates in the cooking in a way that avoids the prohibition of bishul akum (Tur end of Yoreh Deah 113, quoting theRashba).

Earthenware pots

When the Ran discusses this dispute, he conceptually agrees with the lenient approach, but concludes that the equipment should be kashered (Shu”t Haran 5:11-12). This leads to a new question. Metal pots can be kashered by hag’alah, boiling them, but most pots in earlier generations were made from earthenware, a more available and less expensive material, which the Torah implies cannot be kashered. If bishul akum food was cooked in an earthenware pot, the Ran concludes that it should be broken, since it cannot be kashered (see Pesachim 30b; Avodah Zarah 33b-34a).

This last ruling of the Ran is curious, because the Rashba, who ruled that bishul akum does require kashering the equipment used to cook it, permitted kashering earthenware pots used for bishul akum by boiling them three times, called hag’alah shalosh pe’amim (quoted by Tur Yoreh Deah 123 and accepted by the Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 113:16). The basis for this heter is a passage of Talmud Yerushalmi (Terumos 11:4), which states that earthenware used to cook food prohibited only rabbinically may be kashered by boiling the vessel three times.

Halachic conclusion

The Beis Yosef and the Shulchan Aruch mention both opinions, whether bishul akum requires that the equipment be kashered. The Shulchan Aruch concludes it must be kashered.

Cooking for someone who is ill

Now, let us examine the third of our opening questions: “If a non-Jew cooked on Shabbos for someone who is ill, must I treat the food as non-kosher when Shabbos is over?”

Allow me to explain the issue. If someone is ill, we are permitted to have a non-Jew cook for the sick person. This may be done, even if no life-threatening emergency exists, as long as the person is ill enough to be choleh kol gufo, usually defined as someone ill enough to go to bed (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 328:17), or whose discomfort is intense enough that he feels that his entire body is affected (Rema ad locum).

With this halacha in mind, we need to address the following question: If a non-Jew cooks on Shabbos for someone who is ill, is the food he cooks prohibited because of bishul akum? As I will discuss shortly, the ill person may eat the food cooked on Shabbos by the non-Jew, but may someone who is healthy eat the food? For that matter, may the ill person, himself, continue to eat it after Shabbos, when now someone Jewish can cook for him? According to those who rule that bishul akum prohibits the pots and other equipment used, do we need to kasher the equipment used by the non-Jew to cook on Shabbos?

These shaylos have major ramifications for hospital and nursing home kitchens. In theory, they are permitted to have non-Jews cook on Shabbos for the benefit of their patients who qualify either as choleh she’yeish bo sakanah or as choleh kol gufo. (Visitors or those attending the cholim would not be permitted to eat the food cooked on Shabbos.) If the heter to cook on Shabbos for the ill is not included in the prohibition of bishul akum, the cooked food may be eaten after Shabbos, both by the ill and by visitors and staff. On the other hand, if the food is considered bishul akum, the food may not be consumed after Shabbos. Furthermore, the equipment in the kitchen has become non-kosher and now requires kashering, notwithstanding that it was permitted to have the non-Jew cook in it on Shabbos!

Exclusion or medical exemption?

To answer these questions, we should realize that there are different ways of looking at the heter that permits a sick person to consume food that would otherwise be prohibited as bishul akum.

Exclusion:

One approach understands that any food cooked on Shabbos for a person who is ill was excluded from the prohibition of bishul akum. If we understand the halacha this way, anyone may eat it after Shabbos, and the equipment does not need kashering.

Medical exemption:

A differing approach understands that Chazal permitted someone ill to consume food that would otherwise be prohibited as bishul akum. This is a temporary exemption created to allow those who are ill to have hot, freshly cooked food on Shabbos. When Shabbos is over and fresh food can now be cooked by someone Jewish, the prohibition of bishul akum starts again, even for those for whom it was originally cooked. According to this opinion, after Shabbos, the food already cooked becomes prohibited for anyone to eat, even those for whom it was originally cooked. In addition, the equipment used to cook the food on Shabbos needs to be kashered.

The rishonim debate this matter, some contending that since it was permitted to cook and eat this food on Shabbos, it remains permitted. Furthermore, the fact that a healthy person is not permitted to eat it is because of the laws of Shabbos – we are concerned that someone may ask the non-Jew to do something on Shabbos that is not permitted, but not because of the laws of kashrus. Since the cooking was not performed for social reasons, but to have fresh food for the ill, no prohibition of bishul akum was involved at the time that the food was cooked. Therefore, it does not become prohibited as bishul akum after Shabbos is over, even for a perfectly healthy person (Bedek Habayis, Bayis 3 Shaar 7).

Others disagree with every point that was just made. They compare the food cooked for an ill person on Shabbos to the situation of a person who is deathly ill and requires fresh meat which is unavailable. The halacha in this situation is that, if no shocheit is available, you are required to kill an animal, rendering its meat neveilah, and cook it for the sick person. As soon as a shocheit becomes available, you are no longer permitted to feed the sick person non-kosher food. Of course, the pot in which the neveilah was cooked must be kashered.

Similarly, although it is permitted to have a non-Jew cook for someone who is ill, the food may be eaten only by the ill and only until fresh food is cooked after Shabbos. Once that time arrives, the food cooked by the non-Jew becomes prohibited as bishul akum, even for a sick person, and it certainly was never permitted for someone well to eat it. In addition, the pot used by the non-Jew to cook for the ill on Shabbos is prohibited because of the bishul akum, and must be kashered.

Returning to our question about hospital and nursing home kitchens: If they were to permit non-Jews to cook on Shabbos, this last opinion requires that all food cooked on Shabbos must be disposed of on motza’ei Shabbos, and the entire kitchen might require kashering every week!

How do we pasken?

The Rema and the Shach conclude that the food is permitted after Shabbos, even for a healthy person to eat, whereas the Taz, Mishnah Berurah (328:63) and others rule that it is prohibited, even for the ill person to eat, once food cooked by a Jew becomes available.

Conclusion

The Gemara teaches that the rabbinic laws are dearer to Hashem than the Torah laws. In this context, we can explain the vast halachic literature devoted to understanding this particular prohibition, created by Chazal to protect the Jewish people from major sins.

Photo credit: Vectonauta on Freepik

Tearing Keriah for the Beis Hamikdash

Introduction

This is obviously an appropriate week to discuss the halachos regarding the agony we are to feel when seeing the destruction of the Beis Hamikdash. I want to note that, for various well-meaning but incorrect reasons, people are very lenient about these laws. However, it is clear from the Gemara and the halachic authorities that we are to feel tremendous anguish when seeing the destruction of our Beis Hamikdash area and to express this agony by tearing keriah on a garment that we are wearing at the time. Thus, various approaches, such as visiting the Kosel on erev Shabbos or “selling your clothes” to someone else, are probably all invalid (Shu”t Teshuvos Vehanhagos 1:334; Orchos Rabbeinu #2 page 149; Makom Hamikdash page 7) and certainly do not reflect the proper hashkafah.

The Gemara (Mo’eid Katan 26a) states: Someone who rends his clothes because of the passing of his father, mother, his rebbe who taught him Torah, the king of Klal Yisrael, the head of the beis din or upon hearing other bad tidings — including hearing someone curse Hashem or he observed a sefer Torah being burned or he saw the destroyed cities of Yehudah, the Beis Hamikdash, or Yerushalayim — may not reweave the garment afterward to mend it (see Hagahos Maimaniyos, Hilchos Aveil 9:3). Improperly stitching or pinning the garment closed afterward is permitted(Rambam, Hilchos Aveil 9:3). A woman should pin her torn garment closed (Mo’eid Katan 22b; Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 340:15).

From this Gemara, the Rishonim and poskim derive the obligation to tear one’s garments upon seeing the destroyed cities of Yehudah, Yerushalayim or the Beis Hamikdash (Rambam, Hilchos Ta’anis 5:16; Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 561). As is evident from the Gemara and the Rambam, the point of tearing one’s garments over the calamity of the destruction is to express one’s sorrow over these tragic events.

The laws of keriah apply equally to men and women, the only distinction being that a woman should tear in a tzeniyus way (Mo’eid Katan 22b; Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 340:11; Shach 340:22). Most authorities rule that a child under bar or bas mitzvah does not tear keriah upon observing the site of the Beis Hamikdash.

Keriah must be performed while standing (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 340:1). The rending should be on the front of the garment and from the top, near the collar, downward. The torn area should be a tefach (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah, 340:3), about three inches long.

How many garments does one tear?

Germane to one who tears keriah for the loss of a close relative, the Gemara lists several halachic stringencies that apply when tearing keriah for the loss of a parent that do not apply when tearing keriah for other relatives. When tearing keriah for the loss of a parent, the tearing must be done by hand and includes a requirement to tear any garment worn at the time that is included in the laws of keriah, regardless as to how many one is wearing (Mo’eid Katan 22b). As we will see shortly, this excludes both undergarments and coats and similar outer garments. After the loss of any other relative, one tears only one garment, and it may be torn by using a scissors or knife. We will soon explain which garments are excluded and what is the halacha germane to someone tearing his garment because he sees the Beis Hamikdash grounds.

There is no requirement to be wearing many garments when tearing keriah for a parent, but any garment that qualifies for the rules of keriah (see below) that is worn at the time must be torn.

Which garment does one tear?

Which garment is one required to tear upon seeing the destroyed remnants of the Beis Hamikdash? Prior to answering this question, I need to provide some background, regarding the laws of rending keriah for the loss of a close relative. Based on the descriptions provided by Chazal, the rishonim explain that there is no requirement to tear garments worn next to the body that are meant to “absorb perspiration.” Nor is there a requirement to tear garments that are worn only outside the house, such as a coat, but something worn both indoors and outdoors must be rent (Aruch Hashulchan, Yoreh Deah 340:9).

In practical halacha, there is a dispute among the early poskim which garment to tear for the loss of a close relative (Yoreh Deah 340:10 with Taz and Nekudos Hakesef). The common practice among Ashkenazim in America is to tear keriah on a jacket, whereas the common practice in Eretz Yisrael is to tear keriah on a shirt.

Common custom is that, upon losing a parent, one tears keriah on the left side of a garment, and the halacha requires that it be from the top of the garment downward. The left side is torn, in the case of a parent, because of the reference of Chazal that, in this instance, one should tear until he “reveals his heart,” and the heart is on the left side.

Custom is that someone who lost a different relative tears keriah on the right side of the garment. Someone who tore on the right side for a parent or on the left side for someone other than a parent has fulfilled the mitzvah and should not make another tear, provided he tore the front part of the garment (Rema, Yoreh Deah, 340:2).

How to tear for the Beis Hamikdash

Someone should feel as emotional about the loss of our Beis Hamikdash as he feels about the loss of a parent, and, therefore, should tear “until he reveals his heart,” meaning, on his left side. How many garments must he tear?

This is the subject of a dispute among the rishonim. The Rambam (Hilchos Ta’anis, 5:17) understands that, since the Gemara rules that the tearing performed for a parent and for the Beis Hamikdash may never be repaired, we see that tearing for the Beis Hamikdash is considered the more severe type of tearing and should therefore be on all his garments. In the Rambam’s opinion, just as someone tearing keriah upon the loss of a parent is required to tear his jacket, his shirt and any other garments that he might be wearing; someone tearing because of loss of the Beis Hamikdash should tear all the garments he is wearing at the time – perhaps even his jacket, sweater and shirt.

On the other hand, the Ra’avad (ad loc.) and other rishonim (Magid Mishnah ad loc.) rule that, although the tear rended because of the Beis Hamikdash can never be repaired, there is no requirement to tear all his garments, only one. Although the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 561:4) concludes like the stringent opinion of the Rambam to tear all the garments being worn, and specifically only by hand, the accepted practice is to tear only one garment, usually a shirt, and to allow use of an instrument to make the tear (Ir Hakodesh Vehamikdash, Volume 3, 17:1.1; Shu”t Minchas Shlomo 1:73).

The custom is to tear a shirt and, as mentioned above, to tear it on his left side, from the collar area of the shirt downward one tefach.

Yerushalayim today

Above, we quoted the Gemara that requires tearing keriah when seeing cities in Yehudah that are destroyed and when seeing Yerushalayim. The poskim rule that this does not refer to the newer areas of Yerushalayim, which were not destroyed at the time of the churban (see also Sha’arei Teshuvah 561:1).

The more recent authorities dispute whether seeing Yerushalayim nowadays, when the city is, thank G-d, rebuilt with a large Jewish population, still requires tearing keriah. Some contend that since today there is a sizable Jewish population in Yerushalayim, one does not need to tear keriah when seeing the city (Shu”t Igros Moshe, Orach Chaim 5:37), whereas others contend that, since the city is still not in the ideal way the Torah would like it to be, we should still tear keriah upon seeing it (Shu”t Minchas Shlomo, 1:73; Shu”t Shevet Halevi, 7:78).

The common custom is not to tear upon seeing Yerushalayim (Shu”t Igros Moshe, Orach Chaim 5:37).

Upon seeing the place where the Beis Hamikdash once stood, everyone agrees that there is an obligation to tear one’s clothes (Shu”t Igros Moshe, Orach Chaim 4:70:11; 5:37). When we speak about the obligation to tear one’s clothes upon seeing the place of the Beis Hamikdash, what does one have to see? Does one have to see the actual ground where the Beis Hamikdash stood on Har Habayis, also called Har Hamoriah, the top of the mountain where the Beis Hamikdash stood? Perhaps it is sufficient to see the mosque or the Dome of the Rock that stands where the Beis Hamikdash once stood? Or is it sufficient just to see the Kosel, which is the wall surrounding the Har Habayis (Makom Hamikdash page 6)?

There are poskim who hold that tearing keriah opposite the Kosel fulfills the mitzvah (Shu”t Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 4:70:11; Halichos Shlomo, Tefillah, chap. 16, footnote #15; see Makom Hamikdash page 6). However, this matter is disputed, since the Kosel is the wall surrounding the Har Habayis, the top of Mount Moriah, and is not where the Beis Hamikdash stood. Although Har Habayis has kedusha, and the gedolim of previous generations across the hashkafic spectrum banned entering the Har Habayis until we again have ashes of the parah adumah, many poskim rule that tearing keriah is for seeing the area of the Beis Hamikdash itself or signs of its destruction.

Some authorities contend that it is preferable to see the actual floor of the Har Habayis before tearing. This involves finding a high enough point from which he can see over the walls surrounding Har Habayis, such as from parts of Har Hazeisim, Har Hatzofim, or perhaps a rooftop within the Old City (Shu”t Teshuvos Vehanhagos, 1:331 in the name of the Brisker Rav). However, most authorities rule that seeing the mosque or the Dome of the Rock is sufficient. After all, the Gemara states that something attached to the ground is considered like the ground itself (see Shabbos 81a; Gittin 39a). Therefore, since both the mosque and the Dome of the Rock standing on Har HaBayis are connected to the ground, seeing either of them is the equivalent to seeing the ground itself (Zichron Betzalel 38:2). More importantly, there is perhaps no greater indication of the churban than seeing a mosque on the site where the Beis Hamikdash should be (Sefer Eretz Yisrael; Halichos Shlomo, Tefillah, chap. 16, footnote #15).

Standing

As mentioned above, keriah must be made while standing (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 561:4), unless the person is physically unable to stand. Someone who tore his garment while sitting or while leaning on something with enough weight that he would fall if it was removed suddenly, has not fulfilled the mitzvah of keriah and must tear again. Therefore, someone who sees the area where the Beis Hamikdash once stood or something constructed on its site while riding in a car or a bus should not tear while seated. If he can, he should get out of the vehicle and tear.

The proper procedure

The Bach (Orach Chayim 561) cites the following: Someone who enters Yerushalayim and sees where the Beis Hamikdash stood is required to bow facing its direction, tear his clothes, cry, moan, mourn and feel sorrow over the the destruction of the Beis Hamikdash — crying in a bitter way and reciting first the 79th chapter of Tehillim describing how the gentiles entered, contaminated and destroyed Hashem’s holy sanctuary. When tearing keriah, he should recite the words, baruch Dayan ha’emes, without the Name of Hashem. He then recites several pesukim: Devarim 32:4; Nechemiah 9:33; Eicha 2:9. Other sefarim present other, similar procedures.

The Bach then explains that the recital of this passage and these pesukim is so that it is obvious why he is rending his clothes. Although the ruling that someone cry and moan about the churban is not mentioned in the Gemara specifically in reference to seeing the destroyed location of the Beis Hamikdash, the Bach notes that common sense dictates that one act as if his loved one lies dead in front of him. This idea is implied by the pasuk in Yirmiyahu (41:5).

Thirty days

Someone who saw the place where the Beis Hamikdash once stood and tore keriah is not required to tear keriah again, until thirty days have passed since the last time that he saw it (see Yerushalmi, Brachos 9:2; Rambam, Hilchos Ta’anis 5:18). The Magen Avraham (561:6) notes that someone born in Yerushalayim may never be required to tear keri’ah for the destruction of the Beis Hamikdash, if he saw the area of the churban within 30 days before turning bar mitzvah, and then returns to it within every thirty days.

Second visit

Someone who did not tear his garment upon seeing the churban hamikdash area, either because he was unaware of the halacha or because he was unable to (such as, it was Shabbos) and revisits the area within thirty days, must he tear now, since he did not tear the first time? This question is disputed by the poskim. Rav Moshe Feinstein maintains that he must tear his garment at his next visit (Shu”t Igros Moshe, Yoreh Deah 3:52:4), whereas Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach contends that he is exempt (Shu”t Minchas Shlomo, 1:73) and notes that this is the accepted practice.

Someone who arrives at the Kosel dressed for Shabbos, and will not have anything else appropriate to wear on Shabbos, is exempt from tearing (Shu”t Igros Moshe, Yoreh Deah 3:52:4 and Orach Chaim 5:37; Shu”t Minchas Shlomo,1:73).

Chol Hamo’eid

Does someone who sees the Beis Hamikdash area on chol hamo’eid tear keriah? Although the halacha implies that there is an obligation to tear even on chol hamo’eid, the minhag is to follow the opinions of the rishonim that one does not tear on those days (Shu”t Minchas Shlomo, 1:73).

Yerushalayim residents

Some authorities contend that Yerushalayim residents do not need to tear again, even if they did not see the place of the churban for thirty days (Birkei Yosef, Orach Chayim 561:2; Sha’arei Teshuvah 561). This is the prevailing practice, although there is much discussion among late authorities whether it is halachically correct (Sha’arei Teshuvah 561; Shu”t Shevet Halevi 7:78; Shu”t Divrei Yetziv 1:89; Zichron Betzalel #38).

I have been told that Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach explained the reason why the minhag is not to tear is because a person living in Yerushalayim who does not come to the Kosel at least once a month indicates that he does not feel the pain of the churban, and there is no point for him to tear his clothes.

Meat and wine

The Mishnah Berurah (561:4) rules that the first time someone tears keriah for seeing the destroyed Beis Hamikdash, it is proper that he not eat meat or drink wine that day.

Conclusion

The prophet Yeshaya declared: “Exult with Yerushalayim and rejoice over her, all those who love her. Rejoice with her rejoicing all those who mourned over her” (Yeshaya 66:10). “From here we see,” says the Gemara, “that whoever mourns over Yerushalayim will merit to see her happiness, and whoever does not mourn over Yerushalayim will not merit to see her happiness” (Ta’anis 30b).

The Midrash (Midrash Rabbah, Shemos 15:21) teaches that Hashem will bring forth ten new creations in the era of Moshiach:

1.      He will endow the world with a new light.

2.      Hashem will create a spring in Yerushalayim whose waters will heal all illness.

3.      He will create trees that will produce new fruits every month that cure disease.

4.      All the cities of Eretz Yisrael will be rebuilt, including even Sodom and Amora.

5.      Hashem will rebuild Yerushalayim with glowing sapphire stone. It will attract all the nations of the world to come and marvel at the beauty of the city.

6.      The cow and the bear will graze together, and their young will play together (see Yeshaya 11:7). The commentaries dispute whether this pasuk is meant to be understood literally or as a parable for the nations of the earth.

7.      Hashem will make a covenant with all the creatures of the world and banish all weapons and warfare (see Hoshea 2:20).

8.      There will be no more crying in the city of Yerushalayim.

9.      Death will perish forever.

10.  Everyone will be joyful, and there will be an end to all sighing and worry.

May we all merit seeing these miracles speedily and in our days.

image_print