Category: Halacha Articles

Four of Rabbi Yishmael’s Principles

Davar shehayah bichlal veyatza

Question #1: Lelameid al haklal kulo yatza — to teach about the entire category

Aside from being a major mouthful, what does the following statement mean? Davar shehayah bichlal veyatza min haklal lelameid, lo lelameid al atzmo yatza ela lelameid al haklal kulo yatza, “That which was part of a category and was specified to teach, not to teach for itself was it specified but to teach about the entire category.”

Question #2: Melachos of Shabbos

Are the 39 melachos treated like 39 different mitzvos?

Question #3: Davar shehayah bichlal veyatza

In Rabbi Yishmael’s passage, he mentions four middos (numbers 8-11) that begin with: Davar shehaya bichlal veyatza, followed by distinctions that are difficult to understand for most readers. What do these middos mean?

Introduction

Prior to the kaddish derabbanan closing the korbanos section, we enumerate the thirteen middos of Rabbi Yishmael, a listing of methods whereby the laws of the Torah shebe’al peh are derived from the Written Torah (see also Sanhedrin 86a). Without these rules of interpretation, there would be a greater chance that the laws of the Torah shebe’al peh might be forgotten, and it would also be more difficult to apply halacha to new situations and questions that develop. These are some of the advantages of the system of these thirteen rules that we were taught via mesorah from Moshe Rabbeinu at Har Sinai.

Davar shehayah bichlal veyatza

At this point, I will address my opening question: “What does the following statement mean? Davar shehayah bichlal veyatza min haklal lelameid, lo lelameid al atzmo yatza ela lelameid al haklal kulo yatza, ‘That which was part of a category and was specified to teach, not to teach for itself was it specified but to teach about the entire category?’” In other words, a case that was included in a category and is then singled out for a new teaching, it is not singled out to teach the new law only regarding itself. Rather, the new law applies to everything in its original category.

Notwithstanding the rather cumbersome title, this eighth rule of Rabbi Yishmael is actually fairly straightforward. In one place in the Torah, a group of similar mitzvos or items used for a mitzvah are listed. In a different place in the Torah, a new law is taught and only one example from the first list is mentioned. The rule teaches that the halacha applies to all cases in the first list.

The Toras Kohanim itself provides the following example to explain this rule. After teaching us concerning the various offerings brought in the Beis Hamikdash, the Torah concludes by saying: “This is the law for olah (offerings burnt on the altar in their entirety except for the hide), for mincha (grain offerings), for chatas and asham (both offerings brought as atonement for different types of sins), for miluim (offered when the Mishkan was dedicated) and for shelamim offerings (offerings from which the owner and the kohanim eat most of the meat) [Vayikra 7:37].” In a different place (Vayikra 7:20), the Torah teaches that someone who is tamei when he eats meat from the korban shelamim will receive the punishment of kareis. Thus, the Torah mentions only shelamim when it introduces this new law. Because of rule #8, we understand that the punishment of kareis applies to a person who is tamei and eats from any of the other korbanos included in the listing of Vayikra 7:37, but not if he eats something else (see also Yevamos 7a; Kerisus 2b). An example of something excluded from the new law is kodashei bedek habayis, something declared to be property of the Beis Hamikdash, which is sold and its received value is used to pay for repairs and upkeep of the Beis Hamikdash grounds. Although it is prohibited min haTorah to eat from an item that was declared property of the Beis Hamikdash, someone who eats it when he is tamei is not culpable of kareis.

There are numerous applications of this rule in all sorts of types of laws. For example, the halacha that we are not required to eat matzah after the first night of Pesach is derived via this rule (Pesachim 120a). Also, the requirement to bring nesachim (wine offerings) alongside korbanos olah and shelamim, but not alongside asham and chatas, is derived by an application of this rule (Sifrei, Bamidbar 15:3). The fact that the lo saaseh prohibiting making parts of grain korbanos into chometz applies to all stages of the korban’s production is similarly derived from an application of this rule (Menachos 55b).

Here is another example: The Torah states in several places that we are not to perform any melacha on Shabbos. As we derive from several sources, the definition of a melacha is one of the 39 categories of work that were performed in the construction of the Mishkan. Yet, the Torah specifically states independently, lo seva’aru eish bechol moshevoseichem beyom haShabbos, “Do not kindle fire anywhere that you reside on the Shabbos day” (Shemos 35:3). Kindling fire is one of the 39 melachos; therefore, it is included under the general prohibition not to do melacha on Shabbos. If so, why does the Torah need to mention it separately as its own prohibition? This is to teach us that this melacha, on its own, is treated with all the stringencies of melacha. But this answer only begs the question; what is being added to the prohibition of violating Shabbos by having hav’arah, kindling, mentioned specifically?

The halachic conclusion is that this pasuk teaches that hav’arah should be treated as if it was one of the 613 mitzvos and not simply as a category of melachos Shabbos. But since hav’arah is one of the many other melachos that are all included under the heading of melacha, applying rule #8 teaches that each of the 39 melachos is treated as if it is an independent mitzvah of the 613.

What difference does this make? A vast difference. Someone who performs melacha on Shabbos negligently is obligated to offer a korban chatas as atonement for his sin.

Unfortunately, we do not have a Beis Hamikdash today, but when the Beis Hamikdash is iy”H rebuilt, very soon, he will be required to bring a korban chatas. This law is true regarding negligent violation of almost any prohibition for which violating it intentionally brings the punishment of kareis. Whoever violates negligently a potential kareis prohibition must offer a korban chatas.

However, someone who violates the same prohibition many times because he was unaware that what he was doing was against the Torah does not require repeated korbanos chatas, but only one korban chatas.

Now, what is the law concerning someone who violated negligently several different melachos on Shabbos? Since the Torah states, lo seva’aru eish bechol moshevoseichem beyom haShabbos, we derive that all 39 melachos are treated as if they are separate Torah prohibitions. The ramification of this ruling is that someone who violated negligently several different melachos will be obligated to bring a korban chatas for each melacha that he has violated (Shabbos 70a)! We have now explained the second of our opening questions:Are the 39 melachos treated as 39 different mitzvos?

Principles 9-11

At this point, I will explain the next three principles together, since doing so will make it easier. In each of these cases, the interpretation of how the principle is applied depends on how the law that was part of a category and was specified outside that category is different from the laws with which we are already familiar from the category.

Principle #9: Davar shehaya bichlal veyatza lit’on to’an echad shehu che’inyano, yatza lehakeil velo lechachmir. The new case is not noticeably different from an already known case, yet rules that would make this case completely similar to the already known case are omitted.

When nothing new is mentioned, but some halachos are simply omitted, we derive only lenient rulings.

Principle #10: Davar shehaya bichlal veyatza lit’on to’an acheir shelo che’inyano, yatza lehakeil ulehachmir.

The halachic difference in the new case appears to be the opposite of what we would have expected based on the already known case. When the new case includes a ruling that contradicts what we knew previously, we derive both strict and lenient rulings.

Principle #11: Davar shehaya bichlal veyatza bedavar heh’chodosh, iy atah yochol lehachziro lichlalo ad she’yachazeerena hakosuv lichlalo befeirush.

The new case introduces a completely new innovation that was unheard of in any previous application. We do not apply rulings from the original category unless and until the Torah tells us that the new case is still part of that category.

I will now demonstrate applications of each of these three rules:

Principle #9 applied:

All types of tzara’as are divided into two general categories: musgar, a tumah that is temporary, and muchlat, a tumah that remains until the symptoms of tzara’as disappear or the tamei item is destroyed. Usually, musgar can be tamei for up to two weeks (actually thirteen days, because the seventh day of the first week is also the first day of the second week), after which, if no new symptoms develop, the person or garment undergoes immersion in a mikveh or spring and becomes completely tahor at the next nightfall. (In the case of a house, it undergoes a different procedure.) A muchlat could remain tamei forever, and the procedure for becoming tahor after being muchlat is far more expensive, more complicated and is considerably longer to perform than becoming tahor after being musgar. In the case of nega’im on clothing and houses, the status of muchlat will eventually require burning the clothing or razing the house.

For most types of nega’im on a person, there are three symptoms that can make a metzora muchlat:

(1) The tzara’as spreads.

(2) Two dark or other non-white hairs within the nega turn white.

(3) There is a healthy-looking area of skin with a certain minimal size inside of the white nega.

The Torah presents the case of nega’im on healthy skin and its rules and then teaches of nega’im on injured skin, which seem to be the same as the laws of regular nega’im, except:

(A) Whereas regarding other nega’im, the Torah refers to two consecutive weeks of when someone can potentially be a musgar, regarding a nega on injured skin it mentions only being musgar for one week.

(B) There is no mention of healthy skin inside the nega being a sign of muchlat.

Now we can understand how the 9th Principle applies: “Something that became an exception with a detail that fits its general topic teaches lenience but not strictness.” No striking new rules were taught regarding the nega’im on injured skin; simply some details that apply to other nega’im are missing. Therefore, no strict rules that apply to other nega’im apply here unless the Torah specifically mentions them, but lenient rules do apply. As a result of the 9th Principle, a nega on injured skin will never require a second week of musgar;if the signs of the nega are unchanged after seven days, the nega is ruled tahor and requires only immersion. Similarly, healthy-looking skin within a white nega on injured skin is not a sign that it is tamei.

Principle #10 applied:

This is where a case seems to be part of a general rule, but a halachic detail is dissimilar from the laws that apply to the cases of the general rule. In this situation, the new case may have some laws that are stricter and others that are more lenient than the previous known general rule.

As an example, the Toras Kohanim picks another case from the laws of tzara’as. A blond hair has no halachic significance to a regular nega or to any other rules of tzara’as on the body. Yet the Torah gave it much significance regarding a nega on the scalp or face. As mentioned above, a nega that develops two white hairs renders the afflicted person muchlat. Later, when discussing tzara’as found on the scalp or face, the Torah teaches that a blond hair is a sign of tumah (Vayikra 13:30). This example is virtually the opposite from the general rule of negaim on the body, in which white hair, not blond hair, renders it tamei. The Toras Kohanim explains that the 10th principle of Rabbi Yishmael teaches that this case has both lenient and stringent ramifications: a white hair on the scalp or face does not make him muchlat, but a blond hair does.

Principle #11 applied

Something that is part of a general rule but that has a novel detail is no longer considered part of the original category until the Torah explicitly returns it to that category. What does this mean and how is it different from the previous principle (Ra’avad; Halichos Olam; Shlah)? Principle #11 discusses a case which has laws completely dissimilar from the typical experience with these laws.

Here is an example: Every korban, including the asham, must have its blood received into a vessel. However, the law of the korban asham of a metzora includes a ruling that is very different from any other korban. Some of theblood of the korban asham of the metzora is caught by a kohein in his right hand! This striking difference implies that we should not derive any halachos concerning this asham from the laws of other korbanos asham unless the Torah teaches us to do so (see also Zevachim 49a; Sifrei, Bamidbar 6:20, end of piska 37; Malbim #134).

Another example: When teaching what parts of a korban shelamim sheep are burnt on the mizbei’ach, the Torah (Vayikra 3:9) adds the alyah, a fat tail unique to Mid-Eastern sheep. (You won’t find it on American sheep – they have scrawny tails.) Once this detail has been taught regarding this variety of korban shelamim, the Torah needs to teach that the other laws of shelamim are identical, whether it is a sheep, cattle or a goat.

A third example of this rule is that the shelamim offering of the nazir has a special law that its right forearm is cooked before the rest of the korban is offered (Bamidbar 6:19). Once this distinction has been made, we would not apply the other laws of shelamim to this korban until we have a halachic source to do so (Pesikta Zutrasa, Vayikra 3:10).

Conclusion

When the Gemara tells us that the teachings of the rabbonim are dearer to Hashem than the laws of the Torah, it certainly includes the vast halachic literature devoted to understanding the thirteen middos. The Gemara expresses this notion by saying that what is derived from a drasha is more cherished even than the Written Torah (Yevamos 2b; 3a; see also Ritva and Aruch Laneir, Makkos 13a; Maharam Lublin, Bava Kamma 17b). To quote Rav Chaggai in the name of Rav Shmuel bar Nachman: “Torah refers to that which is taught in the Oral Torah and that which is taught in the Written Torah, yet we do not know which is more cherished. When the pasuk states, ‘according to these words I sealed the treaty with you and with Yisrael’ (Yirmiyahu 33:25), this teaches us that the Oral Torah is more dear” (Yerushalmi, Peah 2:4).

International Dateline, Part II

Question #1: International

Does the International Dateline have any halachic ramifications?

Question #2: Date

Can you change your date?

Question #3: Line

Did the Torah create a line where, if you crossed it, you could mysteriously leave Shabbos and then cross it back and return to Shabbos?

The International Dateline follows a path near the 180° longitude but deviates to accommodate national borders.

In part 1 of this article, I presented the first half of this article on the concept of whether there is a halachic international dateline, and if there is, where is it located. As I explained, two people starting from the same point anywhere on earth, one traveling eastward and the other westward, wherever they meet again on the globe, they will be observing different days of the week. The reason is that one has been observing sunset later each day as he moves west, whereas the other has been observing it earlier each day as he moves east. Eventually, the combined differences of their travels add up to a full day.

In the nineteenth century, nations decided to establish an accepted demarcation line, east of which would be considered the day earlier, and west of which would be the day later. This line is the International Date Line (IDL) and it runs from the North Pole to the South Pole, approximately halfway around the world from the prime meridian (0°  longitude), which runs through Greenwich, UK. However, the IDL is not straight, but curves around landmasses and national borders.

Our question is whether and where is the halachic dateline? Although halachic authorities have wrestled with this question for almost a thousand years, its relevance to practical halacha began in the nineteenth century, when Jews began populating Alaska, Australia, China, Hawaii, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, the Philippines, Siberia and similar areas. Literally, dozens of books and essays have analyzed the topic, and many different conclusions have been reached.

By the 1870’s, so many articles had been written on the subject of the dateline that seforim were published to anthologize the opinions. At least a dozen different shitos were presented concerning the halachic dateline, but they can be grouped into six major approaches:

Ninety degrees east of Yerushalayim

1. For the purpose of the laws of Shabbos and Yomim Tovim, the dateline follows what is written in the Kuzari, discussed in last week’s article, and follows a north-south line 90 degrees east of Yerushalayim.

Ninety degrees, with a twist

2. The Chazon Ish (Orach Chayim, Chapter 64) interprets the halacha similar to this approach, although he adds a very original and individualistic twist. In his opinion, when the imaginery line 90 degrees east of Yerushalayim goes through a landmass, the section of the landmass east of the 90-degree marker is treated as if it is west of it. In other words, in Eurasia and Australia, where the 90-degree marker runs through northeastern China, the extreme eastern part of Siberia, and western Australia, the halachic dateline border is the point at which the eastern border of these landmasses (Eurasia and Australia) touch the sea. Islands in the seas and oceans east of these landmasses date themselves as if they are the western part of the Americas.

Thus, in the Chazon Ish’s opinion, Sydney and Melbourne follow Asia, although the islands near them, including much of Indonesia, New Guinea, New Zealand and Tasmania observe Shabbos on Sunday, not Saturday. Take a boatride off most of the Australian eastern coast on a Sunday and you may be traveling into Shabbos.

A bit more than ninety

3. Aside from the Yesod Olam, numerous other authorities place the halachic dateline at different points “slightly” farther east than did Rav A. M. Lapidus (mentioned in last week’s article). Among those who wrote their opinions in the twentieth century, we can include Shu’t Benei Tziyon by Rav Dovid Shapiro, and Rav Shelomoh Goren.

Bering Strait

4. Some authorities place the halachic dateline at the easternmost point on the Eurasian landmass, which is the Bering Strait (Rav Yonah Merzbach in Noam volume 14; Atzei Sadeh). One practical advantage of this opinion is that this halachic dateline does not cross any landmass in which there is any notable Jewish population. Another practical advantage is that it does not vary significantly from the international dateline.

One hundred and eighty degrees

5. Rav Yechiel Michal Tukachinsky (Hayomam Bekadur Ha’aretz) holds that the halachic dateline is 180 degrees east of Yerushalayim and travels in an unbroken imaginary line from north to south. A disadvantage of this approach is that Hawaii, most of the Aleutian Islands and probably most of Alaska must keep Shabbos on their Friday.

First come, first served

6. Although in practical halacha this opinion is not too dissimilar from opinion #4, conceptually, it disputes completely the idea that there is any halachic dateline. This approach, which probably has the most rabbinic scholars following it, contends that the Torah never established a line, but that each individual, when traveling, counts six days from his last Shabbos and observes Shabbos on the seventh day. In theory, two individuals who started at the same place and arrived at the same destination could observe Shabbos on two different days, because one traveled eastward and the other westward. When a community is established in any new place, Shabbos is determined by the community’s count of seven days. Once a community established its Shabbos, anyone visiting observes Shabbos on the day that the community does, regardless of his individual seven-day count. Among the many luminaries who followed this approach, we can count the Radbaz (Shu’t Haradbaz 1:76), Rav Yaakov Emden (Mor Uketziyah, 344), the Sefas Emes and his son the Imrei Emes (the second and third Gerer Rebbes), Rav Yosef Shaul Natanson (Shu’t Sho’eil Umeishiv, Volume IV, Mahdura IV #2:154), Rav Shmuel Mohliver and Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank (Shu’t Har Tzvi, Orach Chayim #138).

International

At this point, let us address our opening question: Does the International Dateline have any halachic ramifications?

As we just noted, this will depend on which opinion we follow. Let us assume, for a moment, that someone concludes that there isn’t any way he can decide among these great authorities – therefore, he will follow all of the opinions in their strictest conclusions. He would need to consider fully 25% of the earth’s surface to be a safek as to which day it is and would need to observe two consecutive days of Shabbos when in 25% of the world. Fortunately for him, there are Jewish communities in only a few cities that are in that 25% section, but he still would be forced to observe two days of Shabbos in Melbourne, Sydney and in all of Alaska, Hawaii, New Zealand and virtually anywhere else in the Pacific.

The shaylah becomes practical

By the beginning of the 20th century, there already were Jews and communities in the areas under question. Harbin, a city in China, had a frum community that grew until it numbered about 15,000 Jews and had a well-respected rav and posek, Rav Aharon Moshe Kisilav. He was also viewed as the posek for all the Jews who lived in the Far East, and, by this time, small Jewish communities were scattered throughout the area. The accepted ruling was to follow the local dating for Shabbos and Yomim Tovim. This situation continued with the increase of the Jewish community in Japan and China that developed during the First World War and then, in the 1930’s, as Jews fled Nazi Germany.

When the Mir Yeshiva escaped Europe during its miraculous flight from Poland through Lithuania, via the Trans-Siberian railroad to Vladivostok and then to Kobe, Japan, they were concerned when they should observe Yom Kippur. Among them were significant talmidei chachamim aware of the writings of the Kuzari and the Ba’al Hama’or that imply that they were now east of the halachic dateline. They were also presumably aware of the controversy among the more recent poskim whether one should observe Shabbos in Japan on the same day that was considered Friday night and Saturday on the local calendar (the opinion of the Radbaz, Rav Yaakov Emden [Mor Uketzi’ah, 344], Rav Shmuel Mohliver and many others) or a day later, which would follow the more obvious understanding of the Kuzari and the Ba’al Hama’or, and was the conclusion of Rav Alexander Moshe Lapidus. That year, Yom Kippur was on a Wednesday everywhere, and the question was whether they should observe Yom Kippur on the day that was considered Wednesday in Japan, or on the following day, which would synchronize the date with that observed in the United States. Among those in Kobe was Rav Dovid Kronglas, eventually to be the mashgiach and a reish mesivta in Yeshivas Ner Yisrael, who ruled that Jews in Japan should observe their date as if they were part of the United States, which was east of them, rather than according to mainland Asia, which was west of them. This position was different from that accepted by most authorities, but agreed with the psak of the Chazon Ish and the Brisker Rav, who contended that the halachic dateline is 90 degrees east of Yerushalayim.

Some of those in Japan sent a telegram to Eretz Yisrael asking what to do. Bear in mind that, by this time, the vast majority of halachic authorities had concluded that all parts of Asia and Oceania (Australia and other island nations of the western Pacific) should observe all dates as done in mainland Asia.

The Chazon Ish answered their telegram with his own, instructing them to eat on Wednesday – that it was Erev Yom Kippur, and that Wednesday night local time was when Yom Kippur commences. This was against the accepted psak halacha. Rav Herzog, then the Chief Rabbi of Eretz Yisrael, called a meeting to which he invited the Chazon Ish, all the major poskim and gedolim of Eretz Yisrael and those rabbanim who had published written opinions on the subject. The meeting was attended by over twenty rabbanim, including: Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank, the rav of Yerushalayim and the recognized posek hador; Rav Isser Zalman Meltzer, the recognizedgadol roshei yeshivos; Rav Yechiel Michel Tukachinsky, then considered the supreme authority on halachos involving calendars and astronomy; the Gerrer Rebbe, Rav Yonah Merzbach, Rav Menachem Kasher, Rav Dovid Shapiro, author of Benei Tziyon, and Rav Shelomoh Goren; the latter two had already published halachic articles on the topic. The Chazon Ish did not attend the meeting, but instead sent Rav Chayim Ze’ev Finkel, son of Rav Lazer Yudel Finkel, the rosh yeshiva of Mir in Yerushalayim, as his representative to present his position.

All the rabbonim at the meeting were intimately familiar with the entire halachic topic and all of them (I presume with the exception of Rav Finkel) agreed that Japan should observe Yom Kippur on Wednesday. Rav Herzog, who sent their collective response telegram to Japan, added, in a hint, that on Thursday they should eat less than the minimal shiur throughout the day. After all, this might be the opinion of the Kuzari, and one who is able should try to be machmir. Apparently, a total of over thirty rabbonim signed off on the psak that Japan should follow Asia.

Subsequent to this event, several of those who met at this conference wrote up the basis for their halachic conclusions.

A monumental work on the topic, entitled Agan Hasahar (the title is based on a pasuk in Shir Hashirim 7:3), was authored by Rav Chaim Zimmerman, at one point therosh yeshiva of Beis Medrash LaTorah in Skokie, Illinois. Rav Zimmerman noted a major discrepancy between the opinion of the Yesod Olam and how the Chazon Ish understood it. The Chazon Ish’s analysis is based on quotations of the Yesod Olam that he found in Hayomam Bekadur Ha’aretz (authored by Rav Yechiel Michal Tukachinsky), but he never saw the actual lengthy full text of the Yesod Olam. Rav Zimmerman himself, aside from acknowledging the approaches of the Kuzari and the Yesod Olam, suggests that the halachic dateline might be at the eastern edge of Siberia, where it touches the Bering Strait. Based on their understanding of the opinions of the Kuzari and the Yesod Olam, and in light of what we know today about the borders of the Eurasian landmass, others have also agreed with this border (Rav Yonah Mertzbach in Noam #14; Atzei Sadeh). Aside from the advantages that this approach has from a cohesive, logical approach to the sugya and the rishonim, it also is fairly close to the IDL, allowing that all major landmasses and virtually all islands observe Shabbos according to the accepted calendar days of Friday and Saturday.

A talmid chacham that I know well was offered to work for a few months in Japan doing kashrus work. He went to ask Rav Elyashiv, zt”l, whether he should take the job – is this an opportunity or a nisayon? – and if he did, what he should do for Shabbos. Rav Elyashiv told him that he could take the job. As far as Shabbos goes, Rav Elyashiv told him to keep Friday night and Saturday local time as Shabbos in regard to davening and seudos, and to be machmir not to perform melachos min haTorah on Saturday night and Sunday. This way, he would be stringent like the position of the Kuzari and those who follow his approach regarding Shabbos. When I showed this talmid chacham this article and asked him whether I had quoted Rav Elyashiv correctly, he responded, “Exactly.”

Halacha instructs us what to do when confronted by a situation in which there is no universally accepted ruling. Explaining the details that govern this arena is its own complicated topic that we will need to deal with at a different time.

Conclusion

The issue of the halachic dateline is perhaps the most original of any shaylos that have occurred in the modern era. According to most authorities, this is a question with no sources in Chazal. Therefore, we build our analysis on passages of Gemara based on people who became lost and did not know which day is Shabbos. Yet, there are others who contend that the rishonim had a mesorah that governs the halacha here. Certainly, an area in which we must accept the decisions of our rabbonim.

Avraham, Father of the Nations

Question #1: Names

When praying or making a mishebeirach for a geir, how should we refer to him?

Question #2: Vows

If someone vowed not to benefit from the descendants of Avraham, is he permitted to benefit from a geir, who is not descended from Avraham?

Question #3: Shemoneh Esrei

Can a geir refer to Hashem as the G-d of our forefathers?

Foreword

In parshas Lech Lecha, Hashem told Avraham Avinu that his name was being changed to Avraham because He has appointed him the spiritual father of all nations (Bereishis 17:5). As the Gemara (Yerushalmi Bikkurim 1:4) expresses it, when he was called Avram, he was the “father” of the Arameans, interpreting Avram as a contraction of av Aram. When he was promoted to Avraham, he became the av hamon goyim, the “father” of all the many nations.

This name change is not merely an added title or an intangible tribute, but it incorporates a status that contains halachic ramifications, which is the subject of today’s article. Among the shaylos we will discuss is whether a geir is able to refer to Hashem as the G-d of our forefathers, when Avraham was not his biological father, nor was Yitzchak or Ya’akov.

Names

At this point, let us examine our opening question: “When praying or making a mishebeirach for a geir, how should we refer to him?” May we use his given, non-Jewish name? Should we use his biological mother’s name? Should we pray for a geir as the son/daughter of Avraham Avinu or as the son/daughter of Sarah Imeinu?

When providing the names of geirim in documents, such as kesubos and gittin, we refer to them as the son (or daughter) of Avraham. To quote the Beis Yosef (Even Ha’ezer 66): “In kesubos, the custom is to identify geirim as ploni ben Avraham.” In a get, the halacha is to write “ploni ben Avraham Avinu” (Even Ha’ezer 129:20). The Beis Shemuel explains that we should not write simply ben Avraham because this might create confusion that his biological father’s name is Avraham; a get must be written with precise identification. The Beis Shemuel suggests an alternative approach, to state in the get that he is a geir.

The universal practice when praying for a geir or a geyores for a refuah sheleimah or similar request, or upon reciting a mishebeirach is to refer to them as ben (or bas) Avraham. Similarly, a geir is called up to the Torah as ben Avraham. I am aware of people who pray for geirim or recite a mishebeirach for them as ben/bas Sarah. I am unaware of any halachic source for this practice, and I believe that it is based on an error. People make  the assumption that since we usually pray for people by their mother’s name, we should use Sarah’s name instead of Avraham’s. However, I am unaware of anywhere in Tanach or Chazal that says that Sarah should be treated as the mother of the nations. The special status of being considered the “father” of all the nations was granted to Avraham Avinu only.

I will point out that Rav Moshe Feinstein had the following practice regarding the name used in a get for a geir. If the geir tzedek was halachically observant, then Rav Moshe referred to him or her in the get as ben Avraham Avinu or bas Avraham Avinu. If the person who “converted” to Judaism was never observant or is no longer observant, Rav Moshe referred to them in the get as giyura or giyurta, a term that is not disparaging and is used frequently in the Gemara as a highly respectful term to refer to geirim (Kiddushin 76b; Bava Basra 149a; Avodah Zarah 70a). Rav Moshe considered it a special honor to refer to a geir as ben or bas Avraham Avinu and he did not feel it proper to associate Avraham Avinu with someone who is not halachically observant, even if they once were. My experience is that this approach was followed by Rav Moshe’s talmidim and is followed today by their talmidim.

Vows

If someone vowed not to benefit from the descendants of Avraham, is he permitted to benefit from a geir, who is not descended from Avraham? The answer is that he may not (Rosh, Nedarim 31a; Tur and Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 217:40). The Rosh explains that geirim are included in this term because of the pasuk of av hamon goyim and also because Avraham Avinu is considered the first convert, and therefore anyone who observes the mitzvos is considered his (spiritual) progeny.

Shemoneh Esrei

At this point, we can discuss another of our opening questions: “Can a geir refer to Hashem as the G-d of our forefathers?”

We find a dispute among tana’im and rishonim regarding this question. Explaining these disputes will require an extensive introduction. We must first discuss a seemingly unrelated mitzvah, that of bringing the bikkurim. Each year, a property owner in Eretz Yisrael brings the first produce of the seven species grown in his land to the Beis Hamikdash.There, he presents his produce to the kohein and makes what we will refer to as a pilgrim’s declaration, thanking Hashem for His many salvations and gifts (Devarim 26:1-11). The Mishnah (Bikkurim 1:1) teaches that there are three levels of requirement to observe this mitzvah, depending on the extent of possession that the owner has of his parcel of land:

1. Meivi vekorei – Bring and read

The highest level is when the owner has two mitzvos, one of bringing the bikkurim and a second of reciting the pilgrim’s declaration, called mikra bikkurim by the Mishnah (Sotah 32a). This is performed when the fruit grew completely on land owned by one of the Benei Yisrael.

2. Meivi ve’eino korei – Bring but cannot read

The secondary level is when the owner brings the bikkurim to the Beis Hamikdash but may not recite the pilgrim’s declaration. One example of this is when the fruit grew in a way that it was not completely nourished by land owned by the pilgrim, but by land owned by someone else – even when the pilgrim has permission to use it (Mishnah Bikkurim 1:1 and Yerushalmi ad loc.). Another example is when the pilgrim sold his land before he brought the bikkurim to the Beis Hamikdash (Bikkurim 1:7). The author of the Mishnah places a geir into this category because, in that tanna’s opinion, a geir cannot declare that Hashem promised this land to his forefathers (Bikkurim 1:4).

3. Eino Meivi – May not bring

There is a lower level in which there is no mitzvah of bikkurim and therefore there is no sanctity on the fruits. An example of this is someone who owned the trees on which the new fruit grew, but does not own the land on which the trees grow (Bikkurim 1:6). Since his fruit are not the produce of land that Hashem gave him, he is excluded from the Torah’s definition of someone obligated to bring bikkurim.

From bikkurim to bensching

As I mentioned above, the Mishnah contends that a geir cannot declare that he received Eretz Yisrael as the land that Hashem gave to “us,” meaning the Jewish people, when neither the geir nor his ancestors received land when the Jewish people entered Eretz Yisrael. This tanna also holds that a geir must recite a modified form of the shemoneh esrei:since he is not a biological descendant of Avraham Avinu, he cannot recite the words Elokei avoseinu, “the G-d of our fathers,” at the beginning of the shemoneh esrei. The Mishnah implies that a son of  parents who are both geirim also cannot recite Elokei avoseinu in the shemoneh esrei.

Some rishonim therefore rule that a geir may not be a chazzan or ba’al tefillah, which requires him to state Elokei avoseinu in order to be motzi someone who doesn’t know how to recite shemoneh esrei. The Mordechai (Mordechai, Megillah 786) mentions that, in his day (13th century), the city of Würzburg (in Bavaria) did not permit a geir to be the chazzan.

On the other hand, the Talmud Yerushalmi quotes Rabbi Yehudah, who disputes the conclusion of the Mishnah and these other rulings, contending that since Avraham Avinu is called the father of all the nations, a geir may and should recite the bikkurim declaration. The Yerushalmi then quotes both Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi and Rabbi Avahu, who rule according to Rabbi Yehudah, against the Mishnah. This ruling is quoted by the Rambam, the Rash and Rav Ovadyah of Bartenura in their commentaries and by many other rishonim (Sefer Yere’im; Ramban; Semag; Sefer Hachinuch; Mordechai, Megillah 786). From this it would appear that a geir may recite the declaration on the bikkurim and should recite the shemoneh esrei as any other Jew would. This approach disagrees with the Würzburg custom that I cited above.

Nevertheless, the Tosefta (Bikkurim 1:3) appears to have understood Rabbi Yehudah’s opinion differently, stating that although Rabbi Yehudah rules that most geirim bring bikkurim, they do not recite mikra bikkurim, since they cannot state “the land that You, Hashem, gave me” (Devarim 26:10). However, geirim who are descended from Yisro do recite mikra bikkurim.

Why is Yisro different from all other gentiles?

Since Yisro and his descendants received land in Eretz Yisrael, as implied by the pasuk in Bamidbar (10:32) and stated there in the Sifrei and by Rashi (see also Rashi, Shoftim 16:1), they can declare “the land that You, Hashem, gave me.”

Rabbeinu Tam’s opinion

In general, the opinion of Rabbeinu Tam carries much weight among the rishonim and the poskim, as is manifest in a long list of halachic practices where his approach is accepted over the rishonim who preceded him. (I am deliberately not listing any of these rulings so as not to take us off our topic.) Rabbeinu Tam (quoted by Tosafos, Bava Basra 81a s.v. Li’me’utei) questions how any geir could recite mikra bikkurim. This bikkurim passage states Arami oveid avi, vayeired Mitzrayma “my father was a lost Aramean, who then descended to Egypt;” according to Chazal, this refers to Ya’akov Avinu. Furthermore, the pilgrim refers to the travails of the Jewish people as the experiences of his own family. Rabbeinu Tam concludes that the Tosefta which permits a descendant of Yisro to recite mikra bikkurim refers to someone whose father’s side of his family is descended from Yisro and his mother’s side descended from Ya’akov Avinu. Rabbeinu Tam’s reasoning is that this person descended from geirim can recite mikra bikkurim on the basis of his mother’s side of the family. However, mikra bikkurim also states “the land that you gave me,” which is inaccurate for someone whose father is a geir even if his mother is from a Jewish family. Therefore, someone of this status cannot declare mikra bikkurim. Nevertheless, since Yisro’s descendants received land in Eretz Yisrael, a geir whose father’s side is descended from Yisro and his mother’s side includes descendants from Ya’akov Avinu may bring bikkurim and recite the parsha.

Based on this Tosefta, and on a passage in the Talmud Bavli (Makkos 19a) that quotes the Mishnah in Bikkurim without the disputing opinion of Rabbi Yehudah, Rabbeinu Tam concludes that a geir cannot recite any prayers or declarations that refers to our ancestors receiving the land or being descended from the avos. Rabbeinu Tam even bans someone descended from geirim from reciting these passages unless he also has antecedents born from the avos. Thus, Rabbeinu Tam rejects the opinion of the Yerushalmi, even suggesting that our text of this passage of Yerushalmi is erroneous and should be expunged. Following this approach, a geir may also not lead services; his approach was implemented by the community of Würzburg, as I cited above.

Bensching

Tosafos (Bava Basra 81a s.v. Li’me’utei) and the Tur (Orach Chayim 199) record a dispute among the rishonim how a geir recites bensching. Rabbeinu Tam and the Behag contend that a geir cannot recite the words she’hinchalta la’avoseinu, “that You bequeathed [Eretz Yisrael] to our fathers.” In their opinion, he cannot recite the exact same text of the bensching that Jews descended from Avraham Avinu do.

Leading a zimun

The next factor requires a bit of an introduction. In earlier generations, the person leading the zimun recited the entire bensching for the others, who fulfilled their mitzvah by listening to his bensching. This is the practice we follow for fulfilling the mitzvos of kiddush and havdalah, which we perform by listening to what is recited by the head of the household. Thus, Rabbeinu Tam rules that a geir cannot lead a zimun for bensching. The reason for this is that Rabbeinu Tam holds that a geir cannot be motzi someone else in bensching since it requires stating that we received from Hashem the wonderful land of Eretz Yisrael (see Devarim 8:7-10; and also Berachos 20b, Rashi s.v. Oh Derabbanan and Tosafos s.v. Nashim).

This opinion of Rabbeinu Tam is recorded by the Tur (Orach Chayim 199), along with the disputing position of Rabbeinu Tam’s disciple (and nephew), Rabbeinu Yitzchak, usually called simply the R’Y.

How do we paskin?

The consensus of the rishonim rejects Rabbeinu Tam’s approach, ruling like the R’Y that Avraham Avinu’s status as the av hamon goyim allowsa geir to recite the same version of birkas hamazon and shemoneh esrei that everyone else does, to be motzi others in birkas hamazon and shemoneh esrei, and to lead the services (Rambam, Hilchos Bikkurim 4:3; Tosafos, Bava Basra 81a s.v. Li’meutei; Ramban, Rashba and Ran in their respective commentaries to Bava Basra; Hagahos Maimoniyos, Hilchos Tefillah 8:20; Bartenura, Bikkurim 1:4; Beis Yosef, Orach Chayim 53). Uncharacteristically, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 53:19) makes a very strong statement rejecting Rabbeinu Tam’s approach: “There are those who refuse to allow a geir to be the chazzan, but their opinion is rejected.”

There is an important conclusion to be brought from the fact that the Shulchan Aruch writes this in such a strong way. The Gemara states that a guest who refuses to lead the bensching when requested to by the host causes himself great harm (Berachos 55a). This is because Avraham Avinu was given a beracha that those who bless him would always be blessed. But, the opposite is also true – those that deny blessing Avraham Avinu or his descendants are cursed. This does not bode well for someone who has the opportunity to bless the benefactor of the se’udah and turns down the opportunity. Thus, since we conclude unlike Rabbeinu Tam, a geir should not turn down the opportunity to lead the bensching, an opportunity he would be unable to take advantage of  according to Rabbeinu Tam.

Technically, the ill effect of declining to lead the bensching may apply only when the others do not recite birkas hamazon on their own. If they do recite birkas hamazon,including the blessing that the guest gives to the host, turning down the honor of leading the birkas hamazon may not have such dire consequences.

The Rambam’s rulings

Not all our questions are fully resolved, because we have an apparent contradiction in the rulings of the Rambam. Whereas he concludes that a geir brings bikkurim and recites the mikra bikkurim (Hilchos Bikkurim 4:3), he rules that a geir does not recite what is called viduy ma’asros (Hilchos Ma’aser Sheini 11:17). This is the declaration that a farm owner in Eretz Yisrael recites after the three year ma’aser cycle (two consecutive years of ma’aser sheini, which have sanctity and must be eaten in Yerushalayim, followed by a year in which ma’aser ani to be distributed to the poor is separated instead) that he has properly separated all that he is required to and has dealt with them all appropriately (Devarim 26:12-15). In the viduy ma’asros, we request from Hashem to “bless Your people, Yisrael, and the land that you swore that you would give us.” Because of this statement, the Rambam rules that a geir does not recite viduy ma’asros, even though he rules that a geir does recite the mikrah bikkurim, which also refers to the land given to our forefathers.

This question is asked by several early acharonim, who propose a variety of answers (Kapos Temarim, Sukkah 38; Bach, Yoreh Deah; Shu’t Sha’ar Efrayim #14; Magen Giborim; Birkei Yosef). I will share the answer provided by the Mahari Kurkus: The last Mishnah in Mesechta Ma’aser Sheini rules that a geir cannot recite the viduy of ma’aser sheini and there is no mention there of a dispute. Ma’aser Sheini should be treated differently from all the other laws mentioned because there the declaration states, “the land that you swore that you would give us.” Although a geir is considered the progeny of Avraham Avinu, he cannot say that Hashem swore to him that He would give him the holy land.

Conclusion

Once his name has been changed, the Gemara forbids calling Avraham by his earlier name, Avram. The question is asked that we do not find such a prohibition of calling Ya’akov by this name, even after his name was change to Yisrael. Quite the contrary, the pasuk itself refers to him as Ya’akov.

The Seforno (Bereishis 17:5) explains that the name Yisrael represents the goal of the world situation. Ultimately, the world will recognize his mission as Yisrael, but at the moment it does not. This is different from Avraham, who, from the moment his name is changed has a new role in the world – and, as we have seen, this role includes many halachic ramifications.

What May I Not Write?

Question #1: Invitations

“I was told that I should not include quotations from pesukim on my daughter’s wedding invitation. Yet I see that ‘everyone’ does! Could you please explain the halacha?”

Question #2: Sukkah Decorations

“Someone told me that sukkah decorations should not include any pesukim. Is this true? My children bring home decorations like this from school.”

To answer these questions, we need to explain several halachic issues, including:

1. The original prohibition against writing Torah she’be’al peh, and the later “heter” to write and publish it.

2. The concern about producing divrei Torah that will not be treated appropriately.

The original prohibition against writing Torah she’be’al peh

Originally, it was prohibited to write down any Torah she’be’al peh (Gittin 60b), except for an individual’s personal notes recorded for one’s own review (Rambam, Introduction to Mishneh Torah; see also Rashi, Shabbos 6b s.v. Megilas). The Oral Torah was not permitted to be taught from a written format. Torah she’be’al peh was meant to be just that — Torah taught completely without any written text. Thus, Moshe Rabbeinu taught us the halachos of the Torah orally, and Klal Yisrael memorized them. Although each student wrote private notes for the sake of review, the Oral Torah was never taught from these notes.

The prohibition against writing Torah she’be’al peh included writing midrashim, prayers and the texts of berachos, as well as translations and commentaries of the Written Torah, since all these are considered Torah she’be’al peh. In those times, all these devarim she’be’kedusha were memorized, and the only parts of the Torah that were written were the pesukim themselves.

The Gemara (Gittin 60b) records this halacha as follows: Devarim she’be’al peh, iy atah resha’ie le’omram bichsav, “You are not permitted to transmit the Oral Torah in writing.” The Ritva (ad loc.) explains that this is because divrei Torah taught verbally are understood more precisely, whereas text learning is often misunderstood.

Another prohibition forbade writing the books of Tanach except when writing a complete sefer (Gittin 60a). Thus, one could not write out a parsha or a few pesukim for learning, although it was permitted to write an entire Chumash, such as Sefer Shemos. Similarly, one could not write out part of a sefer of Navi to study or to read the haftarah. In order to recite the haftarahs regularly, every shul needed to own a scroll of each of the eight Nevi’im (Yehoshua, Shoftim, Shemuel, Melachim, Yeshayahu, Yirmiyahu, Yechezkel, and Terei Asar) in order to read the haftarah from the appropriate sefer. Similarly, a person who wished to study Shiras Devorah or the prayer of Channah had to write the entire Sefer Shoftim or Sefer Shemuel.

Why do we no longer abide by this prohibition?

Chazal realized that it was becoming increasingly difficult for people to learn Torah and to observe certain other mitzvos, such as reading the haftarah. Therefore, they ruled that the prohibition against writing Torah must be superseded by the more vital need of keeping Torah alive in klal Yisrael. This takanah was based on the pasuk, Eis la’asos laShem heifeiru torasecha, which is understood to mean “It is the time to act for Hashem, since Your Torah is being uprooted” (Tehillim 119:126). In order to facilitate Torah study, they permitted writing individual verses and teaching Oral Torah from written texts. We will refer to this takanah, or heter, as “eis la’asos.”

The first part of the Oral Torah to be formally written for structured teaching was the Mishnah, edited by Rebbe (Rabbi Yehudah Hanasi) at the end of the period of the tanna’im (circa 3960/200 c.e.). To quote the Rambam, “Rebbe gathered all the laws and explanations that had been studied and interpreted by every beis din since the days of Moshe Rabbeinu and organized the Mishnah from them. He (Rebbe) proceeded to teach publicly the scholars of his generation from this text, so that the Oral Torah would not be forgotten from the Jewish people. Why did Rebbe change the method that had been used previously? Because he saw that the numbers of Torah students were decreasing, the difficulties facing the Jewish people were on the rise, the Roman Empire was becoming stronger, and the Jews were becoming increasingly scattered. He therefore authored one work that would be in the hands of all the students, to make it easier to study and remember the Oral Torah” (Introduction to Mishneh Torah).

We see that Rebbe instituted the first formalized use of a text to teach the Oral Torah, because of the new circumstances confronting klal Yisrael. After Rebbe’s days, Chazal gradually permitted writing down other texts, first Aggadah (ethical teachings of the Gemara), later the entire Gemara, and still later, the explanations and commentaries on the Gemara.

As a very important aside, we see from the end of the quoted Rambam, “to make it easier to study and remember the Oral Torah,” that even though it is now permitted to write down the Mishnah and Gemara, it is still important to know the entire Oral Torah by heart. The Rambam seems to explain that the Oral Torah that each individual is required to know includes all the accepted conclusions of the Torah she’be’al peh.

In the context of the rule of eis la’asos, the Gemara tells us the following story:

Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakeish (amora’im in Eretz Yisrael shortly after the time of Rebbe) were studying from a Talmudic anthology of ethical teachings, a “sefer Aggadah.”

The Gemara asks, “How could they study from such a book, since it is prohibited to learn Torah from a written text?” The Gemara replies, “Since it is now impossible (to retain all the knowledge of the Torah without a written text), ‘it is the time to act for Hashem, since Your Torah is being uprooted’” (Gittin 60a). We see that the Gemara initially assumed that it was still prohibited to study Torah from a written text, except for the study of Mishnah. The Gemara responded that the prohibition had been further relaxed because it had become even more difficult to learn Torah than it had been in the days of Rebbe.

The Gemara relates a similar episode concerning the recital of the haftarah. As mentioned above, it was originally forbidden to write part of a book of Tanach, and, therefore, every shul needed to own scrolls of all the Nevi’im in order to read the haftarahs. However, as communities became more scattered, making this increasingly difficult, the Gemara permitted the writing of special haftarah books that contained only the haftarah texts, but not the text of the entire Nevi’im. This, too, was permitted because of eis la’asos (Gittin 60a).

What else is permitted because of eis la’asos?

We see that in order to facilitate Torah learning, Chazal permitted the writing of the Oral Torah and parts of the books of the Written Torah. To what extent did they override the original prohibition?

This is a dispute among early poskim, some contending that it is permitted to write only as much as is necessary to prevent Torah from being forgotten. According to this opinion, it is prohibited to write or print even tefillos that include pesukim, when they are not intended for learning Torah (Rif and Milchemes Hashem, Shabbos Chapter 16). This opinion also prohibits writing or printing a translation of Tanach into any language other than the original Aramaic Targum, because a proper translation constitutes Torah she’be’al peh. In addition, this opinion prohibits the printing of a parsha of Chumash in order to teach Torah, since one could write or print the entire sefer (Rambam, Hilchos Sefer Torah 7:14; Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 283:2).

Other poskim permit the writing of any Torah that one uses to learn. Thus, they permit writing a single parsha in order to teach Torah (Taz, Yoreh Deah 283:1; Shach, Yoreh Deah 283:3) and the translating of Tanach into any language. These poskim rally support to their opinion from the fact that Rav Saadya Gaon wrote sefarim in Arabic, including commentaries on Tanach (Ran, Shabbos,Chapter 16).

Both opinions agree that it is prohibited to publish translations of Tanach that will not be used to spread Torah knowledge (Ran, Shabbos, Chapter 16).

How does this prohibition affect us?

All of the opinions quoted above prohibit writing disparate parts of the Written Torah and any of the Oral Torah in situations where there is no Torah benefit. For this reason, early poskim note that one may not embroider a pasuk or a beracha on a talis, since writing thisdoes not serve to teach Torah (Rabbeinu Yerucham, quoted by Beis Yosef, and Taz, Yoreh Deah 283:3. It should be noted that the Levush is more lenient, see Shach, Yoreh Deah 283:6.).

Another concern

There is an additional reason why one should not embroider pesukim on a talis. Since the talis could be brought into an unclean place, it is not proper to have a pasuk written on it.

A third concern – causing the words of Torah to be destroyed

To explain this concept, we must first introduce a surprising statement of the Gemara: Ko’sevei berachos kesorfei Torah, “Those who write berachos (to enable people to recite them) are considered as if they burnt the Torah” (Shabbos 115b). What does this Gemara mean? We would think that these individuals have performed a tremendous mitzvah, since they have enabled people to recite berachos correctly!

This statement was authored at the time when it was still prohibited to write down the Oral Torah. At that time, it was forbidden to teach any halachos in written form, even the correct text of a beracha. Everything had to be taught orally. Therefore, the Gemara states that by writing a beracha, even without the name of Hashem (Shu’t Tashbeitz #2), one is violating the halacha by teaching Torah she’be’al peh in writing.

But why is it considered like “burning the Torah”?

This Gemara introduces a new prohibition. Someone who writes prohibited Torah works is considered culpable afterwards, if those divrei Torah become consumed by a fire! Writing unnecessarily, which results in subsequent destruction, is akin to burning Torah.

We know that it is prohibited to erase or destroy the Name of Hashem (Shabbos 120b), and that this prohibition includes erasing or destroying words of Torah and all other holy writings, including notes of Torah classes, stories of Chazal, sefarim for learning, “benschers,” etc., even if they do not include Hashem’s Name (Shu’t Tashbeitz #2). Therefore, even small benschers, tefillos haderech and similar items published with abbreviated names of Hashem are still considered divrei Torah imbued with kedusha. For the above reason, one must treat these items with proper care and dignity and place them in sheimos when they become unusable.

It is also prohibited to cause destruction of words of the Torah indirectly by writing or publishing divrei Torah that might subsequently be destroyed. This prohibition exists whenever there is insufficient reason to write or publish the divrei Torah.This explains the Gemara’s statement, quoted above, that someone who wrote berachos when it was prohibited to do so is held responsible, if the words of Torah are subsequently destroyed.

Although, nowadays, we are permitted to write and print berachos and siddurim to enable people to recite them properly, it is forbidden to produce these items unnecessarily. It is certainly prohibited to put pesukim, parts of pesukim, or divrei Torah in places where it is likely that they will be treated improperly. Both of these reasons preclude writing pesukim on Sukkah decorations, unless one can assume that they will be properly cared for.

How much of a pasuk is considered to be divrei Torah?

Even three words in a row are considered a pasuk that may not be written without sufficient reason (see Gittin 6b). However, if the letters are improperly or incompletely formed or spelled, it is permitted (Shu’t Tashbeitz #2).

For this reason, some people print on invitations the following, Naaleh es Yerushalayim al rosh simchaseinu, “We will place our memories of Yerushalayim above our celebrations.” This is permitted, because it is not a quotation of a pasuk, although it is similar to the posuk in Tehillim 137:6.

There is another solution that may be used: rearranging the words of the pasuk so that they are not in the correct order. When doing this, one must be certain that one does not have three words in the proper order.

I once received an invitation which stated on the cover, Yom zeh asah Hashem nismecha venagila bo, “This day was made by Hashem. We shall rejoice and celebrate on it.” The person who prepared this quotation had done his halachic research. Although very similar to the pasuk, “Zeh hayom asah Hashem nagilah v’nismecha bo” (Tehillim 118:24), the words of the original pasuk were transposed in such a way that there were no longer three consecutive words together!

Some authorities permit printing pesukim if marks are placed between the words, or if the words are not in a straight line. They feel that these arrangements of words do not constitute pesukim (cf. Shu’t Tashbeitz #2 who disagrees).

Some producers of “lulav bags” are meticulous not to quote three words of the pasuk in order. Thus, they write, “Ul’kachtem lachem… kapos temarim…us’machtem” avoiding writing three consecutive words of a pasuk (Vayikra 23:40). This is permitted.

Invitations

Perhaps people who print pesukim on invitations rely on the fact that this is considered mere poetic writing style, or that the printer has no intent to produce divrei kedusha. However, recent authorities prohibit this practice. In Sivan 5750/June ’90, an open letter signed by the poskei hador warned that advertisements, invitations, receipts, signs, and raffle tickets should not include pesukim or parts of pesukim, except when the pasuk is written as part of literary style, with no connection to its context.

We live in an age of proliferation of written material. Many pamphlets have the positive value of spreading Torah. We must be careful to show our honor to Hashem by treating pesukim and divrei Torah with proper respect. May we always merit to demonstrate Hashem’s honor in the appropriate way!

Klal Hatzarich Lifrat

Question #1: Klal hatzarich lifrat

What is the difference between a klal ufrat and a klal shehu tzarich lifrat?

Question #2: Prat shehu tzarich lichlal

What is the difference between a prat uchlal and a prat shehu tzarich lichlal?

Question #3: Frequency

Which klal shehu tzarich lifrat is the most commonly occurring in Chumash?

Introduction

At the end of the korbanos section of our daily morning prayers, we quote a beraisa that cites the thirteen midos, hermeneutic (check your dictionary) rules of Rabbi Yishmael. These are a listing of methods whereby the laws of the Torah shebe’al peh are derived from the Written Torah. These midos were taught to Moshe Rabbeinu at Har Sinai as part of the Oral Torah. The midos are a backup system to recover the Oral Laws should, G-d forbid, any of them be forgotten.

The first six of Rabbi Yishmael’s list — kal vachomer, gezeirah shavah, binyan av, klal ufrat, prat uchlal, klal ufrat uchlal — are far more commonly used than are most of the others, and are familiar to someone who has studied a significant amount of Gemara. This article will focus on the difference between the fairly common rule of klal ufrat and the uncommon klal hatzarich lifrat, which appears only a few times in the entire Talmud. Explaining the difference between these two created much literature during the generations of the rishonim and the early acharonim. This article will attempt to be non-controversial, but to explain the differences in a clear way.

Klal ufrat refers to a klal, a generality, and a prat, a specification. The rule of klal ufrat applies when the Torah states a generality followed by a specification. The rule applied is ein bichlal ela mah shebe’prat, we derive only what the detail includes. For example, the Torah says: “A person who offers a korban from animals may bring cattle or flock” (Vayikra 1:2). “From animals” is a klal, since it implies that someone could offer any species of animal as a korban, whereas “from cattle or flock” is a prat, limiting the species that one can offer as korbanos to cattle, sheep and goats. Because the rule applied to a klal ufrat is ein bichlal ela mah shebe’prat, these three species are the only mammals that may be offered as sacrifices, even though there are many other kosher mammals, including antelope, bison, buffalo, deer, giraffe, musk ox and yak. Although these latter may be eaten, they cannot be offered as korbanos, even as voluntary donations.

Prat uchlal

Prat uchlal is the exact opposite of a klal ufrat; it involves a specific example followed by a general category. In this instance, the general category is all-inclusive and not limited to the specific example. To illustrate: The Torah teaches, “You may not see your brother’s ox or sheep wandering and hide yourself from them. You must return them to your brother…. You shall do so for his donkey, you shall do so for his garment and you shall do so for any item that your brother has lost” (Devarim 22:1 and 3). The general category “any item” follows several, specific examples – ox, sheep, donkey and garment. Because of the rule of prat uchlal, the obligation to return lost property applies to any lost item, not only to those specified in the verse.

Klal hatzarich lifrat

At this point, I need to explain my opening question, “What is the difference between a klal ufrat and a klal shehu tzarich lifrat?”

The next rule taught in the beraisa of Rabbi Yishmael is Klal shehu tzarich lifrat, prat shehu tzarich lichlal. Although the name of this rule may sound similar to klal ufrat above, this is a completely different rule and applies only in special circumstances. The word tzarich means that the klal cannot be understood without the subsequent prat. In other words, the original klal has more than one interpretation and bears widely ranging meanings and halachic applications. The correct interpretation of the klal can be achieved only by use of the prat (Rashi and Tosafos, Chullin 88b; Ra’avad, Introduction to the Sifra; Halichos Olam 4:32; Yavin Shemuah ad loc.).

It will be easiest to explain this concept with a few examples: The Torah (Vayikra 17:13) commands us that, after shechting fowl or chayos (such as deer or antelope), we are required וכסהו בעפר, vechisahu be’afar, “to cover the blood with earth.” The word “cover,” both in English and its Hebrew original root word כסה, can mean several different things. For example, let us examine the word as it is used in Parshas Vayeishev where the pasuk describes how Yehudah convinced his brothers not to murder Yosef: mah betza ki naharog es achinu vechisinu (shoresh כסה) es damo, “What do we profit if we kill our brother and ‘cover’ his blood” (Bereishis 37:26). The successful way of “covering” foul play is to obliterate the murdered man’s blood in a way that no one will ever see it again. This would mean that they would hide his blood, presumably by burying it deeply underground.

Similarly, in Parshas Vayeira (Bereishis 18:17), Hashem says, “Will I hide המכסה)) from Avraham what I am about to do” (Ra’avad to Toras Kohanim)? Yet another example is the following passage from Mishlei (11:13), Holeich rachil megaleh sod vene’eman ruach mechaseh (again with the shoresh כסה) davar, “A gossip reveals secrets, whereas someone reliable hides matters” (quoted in this context by Halichos Olam 4:32). In each of these instances, the word כסה means to “hide” in the sense of reducing visibility or making unknown. Understanding the word vechisahu this way in the context of kisui hadam would result in a mistake: that the mitzvah is to hide or obliterate the blood by pouring it down a drain or burying it upon bedrock in the bowels of the earth. One might think that the mitzvah is to make sure that Scotland Yard cannot detect that an animal was slaughtered here. Others explain that it might mean to place a board, plate or bowl on top of the blood, which also covers it.

When the word be’afar is added to the expression vechisahu, it now means to mix the blood with earth and to have the liquid of the blood absorbed by a powder or something similar (Rashi and Tosafos, Chullin 88b; Ra’avad, Sifra; Halichos Olam 4:32; Yavin Shemuah; cf. Rabbeinu Tam, Chullin op. cit.). The halacha is that any similar powder fulfills the mitzvah lechatchilah, including sawdust, sand, ashes or even gold dust (Chullin 88b), for those with expensive tastes. It is perfectly permitted to have the color of the blood, and thus its existence, completely noticeable, which would not “hide” the blood from Sherlock Holmes. Thus, the word be’afar changes the entire meaning of the word vechisahu, and the halacha that results is completely different. This is why it is called a klal shehu tzarich lifrat, meaning that the prat is necessary for the klal to be understood correctly.

Another example

The Toras Kohanim that quotes and explains the beraisa of Rabbi Yishmael provides the following example to help us understand this principle. Parshas Bo contains the following pasuk: “Sanctify for Me every firstborn, the first to descend from any womb among the Benei Yisrael, whether human or animal (Shemos 13:2). Another pasuk, states: “Every firstborn male that will be born among your cattle or your flock you shall sanctify to Hashem”(Devarim 15:19). The first pasuk attributes sanctity to “every firstborn,” which should also include every female firstborn. A literal reading of this pasuk implies that we are required to redeem a firstborn daughter just as there is such a mitzvah for the firstborn son. Additionally, the firstborn female lamb, kid, calf or donkey foal would have sanctity. Only the detail in the second pasuk teaches that this kedusha is restricted to male offspring, teaching that there is a mitzvah of pidyon haben only, but not of pidyon habas.

But what about a firstborn male born via Caeserian section? Is he not firstborn? Or, for that matter, the firstborn son who is born after an older sister? Doesn’t the pasuk in Devarim say that “Every firstborn male… you shall sanctify”? Is he not technically a “firstborn male” and he should require a pidyon haben?

The answer to this question is that the klal shehu tzarich lifrat teaches that we are not to explain either the words, “Sanctify for Me every firstborn,” or the words, “Every firstborn male,” literally, but that both klalim are to be explained according to the combined pratim of both pesukim. The result is that only a male, naturally born as his mother’s first offspring has the sanctity and laws of a bechor (Bechoros 19a).

Here is a third example of a klal shehu tzarich lifrat: In describing the punishment of the daughter of a kohein who commits adultery, the Torah teaches ba’eish tisareif, “She shall be burned in fire” (Vayikra 21:9). This is a slightly variant type of klal shehu tzarich lifrat, because the word ba’eish, “in fire,” the prat, comes before “she shall be burned,” the klal. It is still a klal shehu tzarich lifrat — the klal, tisareif, requires the prat to explain what it means.

By the way, the Torah says either ba’eish tisareif or ba’eish yisareif in five other places. Each of these instances is understood the same way halachically.

Prat shehu tzarich lichlal

Prat shehu tzarich lichlal is not a new, different rule, but another application of the rule of klal shehu tzarich lifrat. In this instance, the prat requires the klal to explain what it means. Without the klal, the prat would be misinterpreted.

In preparation of this article, I tried to find examples of prat shehu tzarich lichlal. Neither the beraisa of Rabbi Yishmael nor the Toras Kohanim that explains this beraisa provide any example; nor does the Ra’avad in his commentary. The only explicit example I found is an explanation of a case that we mentioned above, the case of bechor. Rashi (Bechoros 19a) notes that the words zachar, “male,” and peter rechem, the “first to descend from the womb,” are both pratim that, on their own, would include more cases than the halacha requires. Zachar would have included the oldest male born, even when he has an older sister or sisters. The prat, zachar, requires a klal, bechor, to explain that only when the oldest male is also the firstborn does he have kedusha.

Similarly, the prat, peter rechem, would mean the first to be born naturally, notwithstanding that he has older brothers who were born via Caeserian section. Only because we have the klal, bechor, do we know that the prat is limited to a firstborn who is born naturally. Therefore, the halachic conclusion is dependent not only on klal shehu tzarich lifrat but also on prat shehu tzarich lichlal.

Prat shehu tzarich lichlal

We now have enough information to answer the second of our opening questions: “What is the difference between prat uchlal and prat shehu tzarich lichlal?”

They are totally different methods of learning halachos. A prat uchlal widens the rule just taught to include anything that would be included in the klal, whereas a prat shehu tzarich lichlal is soemthing that would be misunderstood would it not be for both terms used by the pasuk. It allows us to zero in on what the Torah is teaching.

We can also now answer the third of our opening questions: “Which klal shehu tzarich lifrat is the most commonly occurring in Chumash?”

The answer is that the verses ba’eish tisareif or ba’eish yisareif show up six times in the Torah and are examples of klal shehu tzarich lifrat.

Be’ezras Hashem, we will continue this topic of analyzing the thirteen midos taught by Rabbi Yishmael in future weeks.

The Thirteen Midos of Rabbi Yishmael

Question #1: Reasoning

Can we restore a lost mesorah on the basis of logic?

Question #2: Kal vachomer

If an opening is large enough for a football tackle to rush through unimpeded, shouldn’t a healthy ten-year-old be able to walk through it?

Question #3: Gezeirah shavah

What is meant that something is an “equal decree”?

Foreword:

Immediately prior to the kaddish derabbanan recited at the end of the korbanos section of our davening, we recite a beraisa in which we enumerate the thirteen “midos” of Rabbi Yishmael, a listing of methods whereby the laws of the Torah shebe’al peh are derived from the written Torah. This beraisa is the beginning of the introduction to the Sifra (also called the Toras Kohanim), the halachic midrash of the book of Vayikra.

The goal of this article is to explain the beraisa of Rabbi Yishmael, but I must first explain what halachic midrash is. Halachic midrash is the method whereby the laws of the Torah shebe’al peh can be derived from the Written Torah. When Moshe Rabbeinu spent forty days on Har Sinai, Hashem taught him all the laws of the Oral Torah. Moshe then taught these laws to the Bnei Yisrael in a method that is described in the Gemara (Eruvin 54b) such that each adult male Jew would hear the laws four different times. Each person kept his own private notes to help him remember the laws of the Torah shebe’al peh.

The system was not perfect. When Moshe Rabbeinu passed on, the Jewish people realized collectively that they could not recall clearly thousands of laws that Moshe had taught them. The Gemara teaches that Asniel ben Kenaz was able to restore these laws to the collective memory by figuring them out bepilpulo, by use of dialectic reasoning.

To quote the passage of Gemara (Temurah 16a):

Immediately prior to his passing on to Gan Eden, Moshe Rabbeinu said to Yehoshua,

“Ask of me every doubt that you have!” Yehoshua answered, “Rebbe, have I left you for a moment and gone somewhere else? Did you not write about me that ‘his assistant, Yehoshua bin Nun, never left the ohel mo’eid’” (Shemos 33:11)? At that moment, Yehoshua weakened (as a punishment for the lack of humility implicit in his answer [Maharsha; cf. Rashi]): he forgot three hundred halachos and also now had seven hundred uncertainties (which were discovered after Moshe passed away). The entire people of Israel rose up against Yehoshua, planning to kill him… The beraisa taught: seventeen hundred cases of kal vachomer, gezeirah shavah, and derived halachic details were forgotten during the mourning period for Moshe. Rabbi Avahu responded that they were “retrieved by Asniel ben Kenaz with his dialectic reasoning.”

Thus, the opening question to our article: “How can we restore a lost mesorah on the basis of logic?”

The answer is that, alongside the Torah shebe’al peh and the written Torah, there is a mesorah of rules whereby the laws of the Torah shebe’al peh are derived from the written Torah. These laws were all part of the original Oral Torah, as were the rules, which provide a backup whereby the laws may be retrieved should they be forgotten.

The rules for deriving the laws fall into two categories:

Extra words — yalfusa

1. Some halachos are derived on the basis of extra words or parts of words in the Torah. An example of this is that, when the Torah provides lengthy instructions for offering the various korbanos each day of Sukkos, a discerning reader will notice that the template reading of the different days is not identical. While the wine libations on these days are identical, the word used to describe those libations varies, twice with a מ added and once with a י added. These extra letters spell the word מים, water, whence we derive that, on Sukkos, there is a unique service called nisuch hamayaim, pouring of water on the mizbei’ach. This law is not mentioned anywhere else in the Written Torah, but is expounded upon in the Oral Torah, the Torah shebe’al peh.

Clearly understanding the pesukim of the Torah provides the sources for these halachos, and this is a common way that these laws are derived by the Gemara and by the halachic midrashim. Understanding the grammar as Chazal understood the pesukim of the Torah is an essential way towards deriving these laws. The absolute master in explaining these rules is the Malbim, in his work entitled Ayeles Hashachar, usually printed as an introduction to his commentary to Vayikra. The Malbim writes that he had originally planned to provide a thorough explanation of the halachic exegesis process as a running commentary to the Sifra. However, after writing the commentary to just two pesukim, he discovered that the results of this work would be the length of a multi-volume encyclopedia. As a result, he wrote instead an introductory work, Ayeles Hashachar, elucidating the grammatical principles whereby Chazal derived the words of the Torah as a source for the laws of Torah shebe’al peh. Throughout his commentary to Vayikra, the Malbim refers to the Ayeles Hashachar to explain how Chazal understood each pasuk and arrived at their conclusion.

Midos

2. Other halachos are derived on the basis of hermeneutic rules, called midos,that are methods whereby halachos not obviously mentioned in the written Torah are taught. In other words, these halachos were included in the Torah shebe’al peh, but, again, as a backup, they could also be derived on the basis of the rules of Torah shebe’al peh. The thirteen rules that we recite in our davening is Rabbi Yishmael’s version of these rules. There are slight discrepancies or differences of opinion among tanna’im concerning some of the rules used to derive these laws, meaning that the details of how these rules work were occasionally disputed. That is why the midos are referred to as the thirteen rules of Rabbi Yishmael. This article will not address the disputes.

These are the thirteen rules that are mentioned in the beraisa of Rabbi Yishmael, as understood by the Ra’avad and most late commentators:

1. Kal vachomer

2. Gezeirah shavah

3. Binyan av

4. Klal ufrat

5. Prat uchlal

6. Klal ufrat uchlal

7. Klal shehu tzarich lefrat

8. Davar shehayah bichlal viyatza lelameid

9. Davar shehayah bichlal viyatza ke’inyano

10. Davar shehayah bichlal viyatza shelo ke’inyano

11. Davar shehayah bichlal viyatza bedavar chodosh

12. Davar halameid mei’inyano

13. Shnei kesuvim hamach’chishin.

Those familiar with the beraisa of Rabbi Yishmael will immediately note that I have omitted significant sections of the beraisa.

A. In some instances, the beraisa provides two variations of a rule, such as, it presents two types of binyan av. I will explain why there are two types, but they are both manifestations of the same hermeneutic principle.

B. Some of these rules are mentioned by the beraisa without any explanation as to how they work or what they mean. For example, four of the first five rules, kal vachomer, gezeira shavah, klal uprat and prat uchlal are not at all explained. On the other hand, the method of derivation of most of the other rules is mentioned in the beraisa, although they are never fully explained. Iy”H, I will be explaining these rules.

Frequency

We should also be aware that some of these rules have thousands of applications, whereas others of them appear very few times in all of Talmudic literature.

Kal vachomer

At this point, I will explain the first of Rabbi Yishmael’s midos,which is perhaps the most obvious rule in terms of logic: the kal vachomer. Among the thirteen rules, this one is unique, because it actually appears several times in the Chumash itself as part of someone’s logical argument. For example, to prove that they are innocent of stealing Yosef’s goblet, the brothers rally a kal vachomer. “If we returned the money that we found in our sacks, how could we possibly have considered taking something that is not ours?” (Bereishis 44:8).

Very simply put, a kal vachomer means that if something is true in a more obvious situation, it should certainly hold true in a less obvious situation. A simple application is as follows: If a burly, 6’ 10” football tackle weighing 350 pounds can race through a passageway unhindered, a 100-pound, 5’ person with no ambulatory difficulties should certainly be able to enter via the same opening.

Ein onshin min hadin

There are a few instances in which a kal vachomer cannot teach a halacha. Although a kal vachomer can prove that something is prohibited, it cannot be used to establish punishment, a principle called ein onshin min hadin. When the Torah imposes a penalty or punishment for violating a law, we cannot derive by means of a kal vachomer that this penalty or punishment applies to a newly derived law.

Why not?

We find two different reasons why ein onshin min hadin. One is that, although the punishment described by the Torah may be appropriate for a lesser crime, someone violating a more serious infraction should perhaps be punished in a harsher way. In other words, kal vachomer can teach that if the Torah prohibited a lesser sin, it certainly prohibited a more serious infraction. However, the more serious crime might require a more severe punishment than what the Torah meted out for the lesser offense.

Another reason explains that ein onshin min hadin is based on possible human logical fallibility. In general, we are obligated to apply our G-d-given intelligence when studying mitzvos, and kal vachomer is an example of this. However, prior to meting out judgment on the basis of a kal vachomer, we must recognize that there might be a reason why what appears as a kal vachomer is actually not. According to this approach, the Torah’s precept not to punish someone until and unless we are absolutely certain of his guilt requires that he not be punished on the basis of a kal vachomer.

These two approaches are not mutually exclusive; both factors might be true. We cannot punish someone on the basis of a kal vachomer because the kal vachomer itself may not be fully accurate; or the kal vachomer may be correct, and precisely because this act is a more serious crime its perpetrator should not be punished this way.

Dayo

There is another instance whereby someone might think he can apply a kal vachomer, but he cannot. This is referred to as a case of dayo laba min hadin li’heyos kanidon, which means that you cannot derive with a kal vachomer more than the original source teaches, regardless as to how compelling the kal vachomer might appear. The Sifra picks an example of this from a pasuk in Chumash. When Miriam complained to Aharon about Moshe’s behavior regarding his wife Tziporah, Miriam was guilty of saying loshon hora at that moment and turned white as a metzora. The pasuk then states, “Had her father spat in her face, would she not not have been ashamed for seven days” (Bamidbar 12:14). The Sifra completes the thought of the pasuk:for violating what Hashem has taught, she should be punished for fourteen days. Yet the Torah continues that her punishment is for seven days! Since the Torah concludes that she should be punished for no longer than she would have had her father censured her, any longer cannot be attributed to the kal vachomer.

Gezeirah shavah

The second principle of Rabbi Yishmael’s list is gezeirah shavah, which is a legal analogy based on the use of the same term in two separate cases. To explain this, we first need to translate and explain the words. Most people familiar with the concept of gezeirah shavah are not aware of the origin of the term. The word gezeirah in this context means “word structure;” the word shavah means “similarity.” Therefore, the term means “a similarity of words.”

Here is an example of a gezeirah shavah: through the use of the same term regarding the mitzvos of eating matzoh on Seder night and on sitting in the sukkah on Sukkos we derive that, although on the rest of the seven days of Sukkos a person may avoid eating bread and other foods that require him to eat in the sukkah, on the first night of Sukkos he is, indeed, required to eat a meal in the sukkah.

Please note that the halacha requiring that we eat in the sukkah on the first night was taught as a mesorah from Sinai. The gezeirah shavah is a means for making certain that this law would not be forgotten.

At this point, we can answer another of our opening questions: What is meant that something is an “equal decree”?

The answer is that this is a complete mistranslation and misunderstanding of the words gezeirah shavah, just as a “helicopter mom” does not require a pilot’s license. The word gezeirah shavah means “a similarity of words.”

Same meaning

Those who are familiar with studying the concept of gezeirah shavah as it surfaces in the Gemara know that sometimes a gezeirah shavah is the exact same word, other times it is the same root, but not the exact same word, and at other times it can even be two words or terms that mean the same thing but are completely different words. One example of this last case is a gezeirah shavah that the Gemara derives from the words shav and ba in the laws of metzora (which is cited by Rashi on Chumash, Vayikra 14:39). Another example is where the words shachat and zavach are used as a gezeirah shavah (Chullin 85a). The two words both mean to slaughter.

There are many rules governing how a gezeirah shavah may be used to derive laws, depending on such issues as whether the word is repeated in both instances of its application, the exact word is used in both places, and are there other places in which a more obvious comparison may exist. We will not study these differences in our article.

Most people do not realize how many gezeiros shavos actually exist. I am in possession of a lengthy manuscript that explains many of the usages and rules applying to gezeirah shavah, and includes an extensive list of every case of gezeirah shavah that its author identified — over four hundred instances of gezeirah shavah and thousands of applications.

Gezeirah shavah is unlike any of the other thirteen midos in one very important way: regarding every other midah, a general mesorah exists to use the midah to derive halachos. Gezeirah shavah, on the other hand, requires that there is also a mesorah via Moshe at Har Sinai that the specific words are a gezeirah shavah. Otherwise, ein adam dan gezeirah shavah mei’atzmo, someone cannot declare that certain terms or words are a gezeirah shavah on the basis of his own personal authority.

Exception

Based on a passage of Talmud Yerushalmi (Pesachim 6:1), we know that there is one exception to this rule. The Yerushalmi notes that, in an instance when we have a mesorah from an earlier source that a specific law is true, but we no longer know the hermeneutic origin for this law, someone may suggest a comparable word association, a gezeirah shavah that might be the hermeneutic source for this law.

However, in this instance, we cannot derive any new rulings with the gezeirah shavah. All we can do is suggest that perhaps the hermeneutic source of this law is the gezeirah shavah. (According to many rishonim, including Rashi, a similar concept exists relative to Halacha leMoshe miSinai. When we know that a halacha is true, but we are unaware that it has a hermeneutic source, we can suggest that its origin is a Halacha leMoshe miSinai [see Rashi, Bava Kama 3b].)

Be’ezras Hashem, we will continue this topic of analyzing the thirteen midos taught by Rabbi Yishmael in a future week.

Conclusion

When the Gemara teaches that the teachings of the rabbonim are dearer to Hashem than the laws of the Torah, it certainly includes the vast halachic literature devoted to understanding the thirteen midos. The Gemara expresses this notion by saying that what is derived from a drasha is more cherished even than the Written Torah (Yevamos 2b; 3a; see also Ritva and Aruch Laneir, Makkos 13a; Maharam Lublin, Bava Kamma 17b). To quote Rav Chaggai in the name of Rav Shmuel bar Nachman: “The Torah refers to that which is taught in the Oral Torah and that which is taught in the Written Torah, yet we do not know which is more cherished. When the pasuk states, ‘according to these words I sealed the treaty with you and with Yisrael’ (Yirmiyahu 33:25), this teaches us that the Oral Torah is more dear” (Yerushalmi, Peah 2:4).

Am I Jewish?

Situation #1: Richard

Richard was born into a non-observant family and married a woman who keeps a kosher home, but she is not interested in becoming more observant. Richard is under the impression that, going back a few generations, his mother’s family was not originally Jewish, and, as far as he is aware, never was observant; yet his mother’s kesubah, which was written up and witnessed by a talmid chacham, identifies her as Jewish from birth. Does this mean that he is halachically Jewish and can wear tefillin and be counted as part of a minyan?

Situation #2: Gail

Gail does not think that her maternal grandmother was born Jewish, but she has little information about that part of her family.

Situation #3: Julia

Julia’s mother always told her that she was Jewish, although she grew up in an area with few Jews and no Jewish community. Recently, she has discovered that her mother is fond of inventing stories about her life, and Julia’s father tells her that he never believed that Mom is Jewish.

Situation #4: Norman

Norman, who was not raised Orthodox, has since become fully frum, is married and has children. Years ago, his bar mitzvah was at a local Orthodox synagogue, but his mother was not Jewish at the time. The rabbi had him undergo a conversion, but he has no recollection whether this was before or after his bar mitzvah, and he was certainly not interested in being observant at the time, so any statement that he was planning to observe mitzvos would not have been serious.

Introduction:

Although I have made some modifications to the above stories, each represents a shaylah that I have been asked. In all four situations, and for literally thousands of similar individuals, their status as Jews is unclear. This article is not intended to provide halachic ruling for any individual, who should address their specific question to a posek.

Korban Pesach

The Gemara in Pesachim (3b) records the following event. A non-Jew came to Rabbi Yehudah ben Beseira, taunting him that, although the Torah states in parshas Bo, kol ben neichar lo yochal bo (Shemos 12:43), kol areil lo yochal bo (ibid. Verse 48) — any son of a stranger (i.e., who is not Jewish) may not eat from it (the korban Pesach), no one uncircumcised may eat from it — he had successfully posed as Jewish and eaten the best cuts of the korban Pesach on a number of occasions. Without batting an eyelash, Rabbi Yehudah ben Beseira turned to the gentile and asked him if they ever offered him to eat the alyah, the fatty tail of sheep that was a prized delicacy. Thereby, Rabbi Yehudah ben Beseira implied to the non-Jew that they had given him only the scrawny parts of the korban, not the juicy, tasty parts that they reserved for the gentry (see Rashi).

Upon his return to the Beis Hamikdash the following Erev Pesach, the gentile requested the alyah portion, not realizing that he had thereby fallen into Rabbi Yehudah ben Beseira’s trap: the alyah is offered on the mizbei’ach. When they asked the non-Jew who told him to ask for the alyah, and he told them that it was Rabbi Yehudah ben Beseira, the people in Yerushalayim now realized that something serious was amiss. They researched the matter, discovered that the fellow was a charlatan, and made certain he would never give them trouble again. The Torah leadership then sent a message to Rabbi Yehudah ben Beseira that although he was very distant from the Beis Hamikdash and unable to attend the offering of the korban Pesach (see Tosafos ad loc. s.v. Ve’ana), his trap set from quite a distance had snared its prey.

This story provides opportunity to discuss the following problem, raised by Tosafos and other rishonim: How was this gentile able to attend the Beis Hamikdash on Erev Pesach and pretend that he was Jewish? Did he not have to bring proof that he was Jewish before being allowed to consume korban Pesach? May anyone claiming to be Jewish be believed, without having to produce a driver’s license, passport or other photo identification?

Tosafos notes that our story does not prove that this conclusion is true. Indeed, someone claiming he is Jewish might require proof, but, since most of those who attended the korban Pesach procedures were Jewish, there was no need for someone to bring additional proof. Halachically, we accept the principle of rov, that we follow the majority, which includes that someone in a place where most people are Jewish may not be required to prove that he is, too. This is similar to the halachic rule that, although the milk of an animal containing unknown internal injuries, tereifos, is not kosher, we may drink milk, assuming that the cow is kosher, since most living animals are kosher. This is a very useful ruling, because if we needed to prove that every cow whose milk we drink is kosher, it would increase the price of kosher milk considerably.

Shidduch crisis

Tosafos notes that other passages of Gemara imply that someone is accepted as Jewish on their say so, without any other proof. For example, the Gemara (Yevamos 45a) quotes several amora’im who contend that someone whose mother is Jewish, but not his father, is halachically Jewish, a principle called matrilineal descent. (Compare, however, Shu”t Chemdas Shelomoh, Even Ha’ezer #2, who quotes an extensive responsum from Rav Yaakov Loeberbaum of Lissa, the author of the Nesivos Hamishpat and many other major halachic works, who understands this passage of Gemara differently.) Subsequently, the Gemara quotes several anecdotes in which sons of such relationships wanted to marry, but were having difficulty finding a shidduch; Rava advised one to move to a place where his genealogy was unknown, in order to find a shidduch.

Tosafos questions: If this person whose father is not Jewish has to prove his lineage wherever he goes, how does this self-imposed exile help? Tosafos concludes (in both Pesachim and Yevamos) that someone presenting himself as Jewish does not need to prove it. Therefore, someone whose father is not Jewish will be able to keep his personal family circumstances a secret.

When the Rambam quotes this law, he records the following: “Someone who came and said, I was a non-Jew and now I have properly converted in beis din, he is believed (without any other proof, because without his saying so we would have no basis to assume that he was once non-Jewish). This is true in Eretz Yisroel, in an era when we could assume that everyone is Jewish. However, outside Eretz Yisroel, he needs to bring proof before he may marry a Jewish woman. In my opinion, this requirement is a stringency created by Chazal to protect proper yichus” (Hilchos Issurei Bi’ah 13:10). The Ra’avad disagrees, contending that, whether he is in Eretz Yisroel or in chutz la’aretz, and regardless of what era he is in, he is required to bring proof that he is Jewish before he marries.

Three opinions

Thus, it appears that we have three differing opinions among the rishonim:

1. Tosafos, who rules that he is never required to prove that he is Jewish, even to marry. It should be noted that this is probably true only when the individual is living a frum lifestyle.

2. The Rambam, who rules that, in Eretz Yisroel, at a time that we would assume that everyone is Jewish, he may marry without any evidence proving his Jewish identity, but, in all other times and places, he must prove he is Jewish to marry, but not for any other benefits.

3. The Ra’avad, who rules that, in all times and places, he must prove he is Jewish to marry. (Also see Yam shel Shelomoh, Kesubos 2:40, who cites, without sources or clarification, the opinions of Rashi and the Remah, who dispute some of what we have written above. However, the Maharshal, the author of the Yam shel Shelomoh, does not provide the sources whence he derived these conclusions from the writings of Rashi and the Remah; it appears that their position may have been similar to that of the Ra’avad.)

How do we rule?

As the primary opinion, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 268:10) quotes Tosafos, although he also then mentions the Rambam’s position. However, several major authorities understand that the Rambam agreed with Tosafos that someone arriving in our community, presenting himself as born Jewish, does not need to prove this. They explain that the Rambam contends only that someone who admits to having once been non-Jewish must provide evidence that he had a proper conversion to allow him to marry (Yam shel Shelomoh, Kesubos 2:40; Bach, Yoreh Deah 268; Shach, Yoreh Deah 268:21). This approach to understanding the Rambam explains how the Rambam can easily explain the Gemara (Yevamos 45a), quoted above, that advised someone to hide his family’s past and get married, without any other proof. This individual,  who had a non-Jewish father but a Jewish mother, was Jewish from birth and, therefore, exempt from providing any other proof to verify his being Jewish.

It should be noted that the Migdal Oz (Hilchos Issurei Bi’ah 13:10)and the Gra (Yoreh Deah 268:25) provide a different approach to explain the Rambam, based on a passage in Mesechta Geirim (4:4), which they both accredit to the Talmud Yerushalmi, that seems to conflict with the Gemara in Yevamos. The Gra’s halachic conclusion agrees with that of the Shulchan Aruch.

Halachic conclusion

In summary, the following are the halachic conclusions:

  • Someone that we know was not Jewish and claims to have been properly converted must prove that he underwent a proper conversion (Tosafos, Yevamos 47a s.v. Bemuchzak quoting Rabbeinu Tam; Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 268:10).
  • Someone claiming to be Jewish from birth is believed, without any proof, even to marry (Shach, Yoreh Deah 268:21).
  • Someone claiming that he was properly converted, about whom we have no previous information whether he is Jewish or not, is a subject of dispute, whether he needs to prove that he was properly converted in order to marry. However, if he is observant, we accept him as fully Jewish for all other halachos (see Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 268:10; Shach, Yoreh Deah 268:21; Aruch Hashulchan, Yoreh Deah 268:14).

Why is he believed?

At this point, I would like to discuss a question that underlies what the rishonim have concluded. Why is someone believed on his own that he is Jewish? What is the halachic reasoning behind this assumption?

I have found three answers to this question:

1. Tosafos (Yevamos 47a s.v. Bemuchzak) states that there is a concept of rov, majority – meaning that most people who act like frum Jews and claim to be Jewish are indeed Jewish.

2. The Tiferes Yisroel (Kesubos 2, Boaz 1) questions Tosafos’s approach by noting that most people in the world are not Jewish. Therefore, he suggests a different approach: when an individual claims he is Jewish, he requires himself to observe all the laws of Shabbos, kashrus, etc., which he is not required to do if he is not Jewish. It is difficult to imagine that someone would do this, if he were not, indeed, already observing these mitzvos.

3. The Tiferes Yisroel then shares another option, which is very similar, and perhaps logically identical, to that of Tosafos,although he explains it in a slightly different way than Tosafos does. Someone who observes halacha as a frum person has a chazakah that he is Jewish, and there is no further reason to require him to prove that he is Jewish (see Yevamos 47a; Kiddushin 80a).

It would seem that all three approaches we have presented accept that only someone who is clearly religiously observant when he presents himself as Jewish is believed.

Situation #1: Richard

Richard was born into a non-observant family and married a woman who keeps a kosher home, but neither he nor his wife are interested in becoming more observant. He is under the impression that, going back a few generations, his mother’s family was not originally Jewish, and, as far as he is aware, never was observant; yet his mother’s kesubah, which was written up and witnessed by a talmid chacham, identifies her as Jewish from birth. Does this mean that he is halachically Jewish and can wear tefillin and be counted as part of a minyan?

At the time that this shaylah came up, I asked Rav Yisroel Belsky, zt”l , who answered me that once we saw that a talmid chacham wrote a kesubah assuming that Richard’s mother was born Jewish, this becomes the accepted halacha. Therefore, Richard is assumed to be Jewish for any halachos.

Situation #2: Gail

Gail does not think that her maternal grandmother was born Jewish, but she has little information about that part of her family.

Answer:

Gail is now living a fully frum lifestyle. As such, for all halachos, those around her should assume that she is Jewish. The only question is whether she can marry someone Jewish. Since she has no proof of her Jewish identity, according to some authorities she may not marry someone Jewish. As opposed to Richard, Gail has no evidence that her grandmother and mother are Jewish. Therefore, Gail was advised to have a giyur lechumra, meaning to undergo a geirus process, but without reciting any brachos when immersing in the mikveh, because of safek brachos lechumra — when we are uncertain about whether to recite a brocha, we do not do so. She subsequently married a fine, frum-from-birth young man.

Situation #3: Julia

Julia’s mother always told her that she was Jewish, although she grew up in an area with few Jews and no Jewish community. Recently, she has discovered that her mother is fond of inventing stories about her life, and Julia’s father tells her that he never believed that Mom is Jewish.

Since Julia is now living a fully frum lifestyle, other people should assume that she is Jewish. However, there is major uncertainty whether or not to believe her mother, and, therefore, I advised her to undergo a geirus procedure.

Situation #4: Norman

Norman, who was not raised Orthodox, has since become fully frum, is married and has children. Years ago, his bar mitzvah was at a local Orthodox synagogue, but his mother was not Jewish at the time. The rabbi had him undergo a conversion, but he has no recollection whether this was before or after his bar mitzvah, and he was certainly not interested in being observant at the time, so any statement that he was planning to observe mitzvos would not have been serious.

Does Norman need to have another conversion procedure?

The answer to this question takes us a bit afield from our topic at hand, but I will supply some of the information in a cursory way. If the conversion process was performed before Norman was bar mitzvah, there are halachic authorities who would rule that he is certainly Jewish, but there are others who might question this, depending on the circumstances. Therefore, it was advised that he perform geirus leshufra demilsa, which means a geirus that may not be necessary, but resolves all issues. This was expedited very discreetly and very swiftly.

Conclusion – geirim are special

A geir tzedek should be treated with tremendous love and respect. Indeed, the Torah gives us a special mitzvah to “Love the geir,” and we daven for them daily in our Shmoneh Esrei! Throughout the years, I have met many sincere geirim and have been truly impressed by their dedication to Torah and mitzvos. Hearing about the journey to find truth that brought them to Judaism is usually fascinating. What would cause a gentile to join the Jewish people, risk confronting the brunt of anti-Semitism, while at the same time being uncertain that Jews will accept him? Sincere converts are drawn by the truth of Torah and a desire to be part of the Chosen People. They know that they can follow the Will of Hashem by doing seven mitzvos, but they insist on choosing an all-encompassing Torah lifestyle.

One sincere young woman, of Oriental background, stood firmly before the beis din. “Why would you want this?” questioned the rav.

“Because it is truth and gives my life meaning.”

“There are many rules to follow,” he cautioned.

“I know. I have been following them meticulously for two years,” was the immediate reply. “I identify with the Jews.”

After further questioning, the beis din authorized her geirus, offering her two dates convenient for them. She chose the earlier one, so that she would be able to keep an extra Shabbos.

We should learn from the geir to observe our mitzvos every day with tremendous excitement – just as if we had received them for the first time!

The Numbers Game

Question #1: Pie r Squared

Yanki is supposed to be watching his weight and therefore needs to figure out how many calories are in the pie he beholds. To figure out how big the pie is, he measures the diameter of the pie, and divides in it half to get the length of its radius. He then multiplies the length of the radius by itself to get “r squared,” and multiplies the result by three so that he knows the area of the pie’s surface. Is there anything wrong with his calculation?

Question #2: Puzzled by the Pasuk

“How can the pesukim tell us that the relationship between the circumference of a circle and its diameter is three to one, when simply taking a string and measuring around a circle demonstrates that the circumference is noticeably longer than three times the diameter?”

Question #3: Performing Mitzvos Accurately

“How accurate a calculation must I make when determining the size of an item to be used for a mitzvah?”

Introduction

In numerous places, both Tanach and Chazal approximate certain mathematical values, such as evaluating the ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter as three to one. The problem is that we can demonstrate mathematically that the ratio is greater than three and is almost 3 1/7. This leads to the following questions:

(1) Why would Chazal calculate using inaccurate approximations?

(2) When making halachic calculations, may we rely on these estimates, or do we need to be mathematically more accurate?

(3) A corollary question is: When providing an estimate, one must allow for a margin of error. Does halachah require a margin of error, and, if so, how much?

The Slide Rule versus the Calculator

Let me begin our discussion with a modern analogy, if something I remember can still be considered “modern.” When I first studied sophisticated mathematical estimates, I learned to use a slide rule, which today is as valuable to an engineer as his abacus. Relative to the calculator, a slide rule does not provide accurate measurements, and someone using a slide rule must allow for a fairly significant margin of error.

Today, complex computations are made with calculators, which provide far more accurate results that can be rounded off, as necessary, to the nearest tenth, millionth, quadrillionth or smaller. Of course, using a calculator still requires one to round upward or downward, but because it is much more precise, the margin of error is greatly reduced.

How Irrational Are You?

Numerous halachic questions require mathematical calculations that involve what we call “irrational numbers.” An irrational number means one that cannot be expressed in fractional notation. Another way of explaining an irrational number is that its value can never be calculated totally accurately, but can only be estimated. The two most common examples of irrational numbers that show up in Chazal are:

Pi

(1) The ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter, which we are used to calling by the Greek letter ∏ (pronounced like the word “pie,” and spelled in English “pi”). Since the 19th century, the letter pi has been used to represent this number, because the Greek word for periphery is peripherion, which begins with the letter ∏. Hundreds of years earlier, the Rambam (Commentary to the Mishnah, Eruvin 1:5) noted that the ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter is an irrational number that can only be approximated, and that the scientists of his era used an estimate of 3 and 1/7, which is actually slightly greater than the value of ∏. The Rambam explains that since there is no accurate ratio, Chazal used a round number, three, for this calculation.

The Diagonal of a Square

(2) The length of a diagonal of a square, which is equal to the side of the square multiplied by the square root of two (√2). Chazal calculated the length of a diagonal of a square to be 1 and 2/5 times its side, which is slightly smaller than the value of the √2. (Another way of expressing this idea is that the ratio between the diagonal and the side is 7:5.) The fact that Chazal’s figuring is somewhat smaller than the mathematical reality is already proved by Tosafos (to Sukkah 8a s.v. kol).

Since both pi and the square root of two are irrational numbers, they can only be estimated but can never be calculated with absolute accuracy.

Based on the above-quoted statement of the Rambam, we can already address one of our earlier questions: “Why would Chazal have used inaccurate evaluations for calculation?” The answer is that any computation of the correlation of the circumference of a circle to its diameter will be an estimate. The only question is how accurate must this estimate be for the purpose at hand.

Chazal or Tanach?

Although the Rambam attributes the rounding of pi to Chazal, in actuality, there are sources in Tanach that calculate the ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter as three-to-one. Both in Melachim (I 7:23) and again in Divrei Hayamim (II 4:2), Tanach teaches that the Yam shel Shelomoh, the large, round pool or mikveh that was built in the first Beis Hamikdash, was thirty amos in circumference and ten amos in diameter, which provides a ratio of circumference to diameter of three-to-one. Thus, we can ask a question of the Rambam: Why does he attribute this ratio to Chazal, rather than the source for Chazal’s calculation, the pesukim?

The commentaries there, however, already ask how the verse can make a calculation that we know is not accurate. The Ralbag suggests two options: either that the numbers used are intended to be a very broad estimate, or, alternatively, that the diameter is measured from the external dimensions of the mikveh, whereas the circumference is measured from its inside, which makes the estimate closer to mathematical reality. According to the second approach, we have no Biblical source that uses an estimate of three-to-one as a substitute for pi.

This will explain why the Rambam attributed the estimation of pi as three to Chazal, rather than to the Tanach. The Rambam was fully aware that one could interpret the verses according to the second approach of the Ralbag, in which case, there is no proof from the verse. He, therefore, attributed this estimate to Chazal.

Gemara Eruvin

However, the Ralbag’s approach seems to conflict with a passage of Gemara. The Mishnah in Eruvin states that if the circumference of a pole is three tefachim, its diameter is one tefach, which means that the Mishnah assumes a ratio of three-to-one.

The Gemara questions how the Mishnah knows that the ratio is three-to-one, and then draws proof from the above-quoted verse that the Yam shel Shelomoh was thirty amos around and ten amos across. The Gemara then debates whether the calculations of the Yam shel Shelomoh indeed result in a ratio of three-to-one, because one must also include the thickness of the poolitself, which offsets the computation. The Gemara eventually concludes that the verse was calculating from the inside of the pool, not its outside, and therefore the thickness of the pool’s containing wall is not included in the calculation (Eruvin 14a).

However, this Gemara’s discussion leaves the mathematician dissatisfied, a question already noted by Tosafos. If the internal diameter of the Yam shel Shelomoh was ten amos, its circumference must have been greater than thirty amos, and if its circumference was thirty amos, then its internal diameter must have been less than ten amos.

A Different Question

The Rosh, in his responsa, is bothered by a different question, based on Talmudic logic rather than on mathematical calculation. He finds the Gemara’s question — requesting proof for the ratio between a circle’s circumference and its diameter — to be odd. The ratio between a circle’s circumference and its diameter is a value that one should calculate. By its nature, this is not a question that requires a Biblical proof or source.

In the literature that we have received from the Rosh, he asks this question in two different places. In his responsa (Shu”t Harosh 2:19), we find a letter that he wrote to the Rashba, in which he asked a series of questions that the Rosh notes bother him tremendously and to whom he has no one else to turn for an answer. One of the questions the Rosh asks is: “Why does the Gemara ask for a Biblical source for a mathematical calculation?”

It is curious to note that a later commentary mentions that, in all the considerable literature that we have received from the Rashba, we have no recorded answer of the Rashba to this question of the Rosh (Cheishek Shelomoh to Eruvin 14a).

Another Rosh

As I mentioned above, there is another place where the Rosh asks why the Gemara wanted a Biblical source for a mathematical calculation, but in this second place the Rosh provides an answer to the question. In his Tosafos Harosh commentary on Eruvin, which was published for the first time fairly recently, the Rosh provides the following answer: Since the calculation of three-to-one is not accurate, the Gemara wanted a biblical source as proof that we are permitted to rely on this estimate.

(It is curious to note that the Cheishek Shelomoh whom I quoted above provided the same answer to this question as did the Rosh in his Tosafos. The Cheishek Shelomoh never saw the Tosafos Harosh, which had not yet been printed in his day.)

Curiousity about the Tosafos Harosh

There is an interesting historical point that can presumably be derived from this statement of the Rosh. As I mentioned, in the Tosafos Harosh, the Rosh does answer the question that he raised, and accredits this answer to himself. This should be able to prove which work the Rosh had written earlier, and also whether he ever received an answer to his question from the Rashba. This analysis is based on the following question: Why did the Rosh cite an answer in his Tosafos¸but not in his responsum, which was addressed as a question to the Rashba. There are three obvious possibilities:

(1) Although the Rosh wrote this answer in his Tosafos, he was dissatisfied with it, and therefore wrote a question to the Rashba. I would reject this possibility because, if it is true, then, in his correspondence to the Rashba, the Rosh would have mentioned this answer and his reason for rejecting it.

(2) The Rosh indeed received an answer, either this one or a different answer, from the Rashba. I reject this approach also, because, were it true, the Rosh would have quoted the Rashba’s answer in his Tosafos and, if need be, discussed it.

(3) Therefore, I conclude that the Rosh, indeed, never received an answer to the question he asked of the Rashba and subsequently reached his own conclusion as to how to answer the question, which he then recorded in the Tosafos Harosh. This would lead us to conclude that the Tosafos Harosh were written later in his life than his responsa, or, at least, than this responsum.

Mathematical Accuracy

At this point, we can address one of earlier questions. “When making halachic calculations, may we rely on these estimates, or do we need to be mathematically more accurate?” We might be able to prove this point by noting something in the Mishnah in Eruvin. The Mishnah there ruled that, under certain circumstances, an area that is fully enclosed on three of its sides and has a beam, a tefach wide, above the fourth side, is considered halachically fully enclosed, and one may carry inside it. The Mishnah then proceeds to explain that if the beam is round and has a circumference of three tefachim, one may carry inside the area because, based on the calculation that the relationship of its circumference to its diameter is three-to-one, the beam is considered to be a tefach wide. However, as the Rambam notes, the beam is actually less than a tefach in diameter, and therefore, one should not be permitted to carry in this area!

The Aruch Hashulchan (Orach Chayim 363:22; Yoreh Deah 30:13) notes this problem and concludes that one may carry in this area. He contends that this is exactly what the Gemara was asking when it requested Scriptural proof for a mathematical calculation. “Upon what halachic basis may we be lenient in using this estimate of three-to-one, when this will permit carrying in an area in which the beam is less than a tefach wide? The answer is that this is a halachah that we derive from the verse.”

To clarify this concept, the Chazon Ish notes that the purpose of mitzvos is to draw us nearer to Hashem, to accept His reign, and to be meticulously careful in observing His laws. However, none of this is conflicted when the Torah teaches that we may use certain calculations, even if they are not completely mathematically accurate. In this instance, relying on these estimates is exactly what the Torah requires (Chazon Ish, Orach Chayim 138:4). As expressed by a different author, the Gemara (Eruvin 4a; Sukkah 5b) teaches that the measurements, the shiurim, required to fulfill mitzvos are all halachah leMoshe miSinai, laws that Moshe Rabbeinu received as a mesorah in Har Sinai. Similarly, these estimates of irrational numbers mentioned above are all halachah leMoshe miSinai that one may rely upon to fulfill mitzvos, whether or not they are mathematically accurate. The same Torah takes these calculations into consideration when instructing us which dimensions are required in order to fulfill these specific mitzvos (Shu”t Tashbeitz 1:165).

In the context of a different halachah in the laws of Eruvin, the Mishnah Berurah makes a similar statement, contending that we can rely on Chazal’s estimates, even when the result is lenient. However, the Mishnah Berurah there vacillates a bit in his conclusion, ruling that one can certainly rely on this when the issue is a rabbinic concern (Shaar Hatziyun 372:18). In a responsum, Rav Moshe Feinstein questions why the Mishnah Berurah limits relying on this approach, and Rav Moshe rules unequivocally that the rule permitting one to rely on these estimates holds true even germane to de’oraysa laws and even leniently (Shu”t Igros Moshe, Yoreh Deah Volume3 #120:5).

How Straight Are My Tefillin?

Personally, I find the context of Rav Moshe’s teshuvah very interesting. There is a halachah leMoshe miSinai that requires that the boxes of the tefillin, the batim, must be perfectly square. In a responsum dated 21 Adar II, 5736, Rav Moshe was asked whether there is a halachic preference to use scientific measuring equipment to determine that one’s tefillin are perfectly square. Rav Moshe rules that there is neither a reason nor a hiddur to measure the tefillin squareness this accurately. Since Chazal have used the calculation of 1.4 or a ratio of 7:5, which we know is an estimate, to determine the correct diagonal of a square, there is no requirement to make one’s tefillin squarer than this, and it is perfectly fine simply to measure the length of each of the sides of one’s tefillin and its two diagonals to ascertain that the ratio between the diagonal and the side is 7:5.

In the above-cited responsum, Rav Moshe notes that he had heard that the Brisker Rav, Rav Yitzchak Ze’ev Soloveitchik, had ruled that it was preferable to check one’s tefillin in the most scientific method available. Rav Moshe writes that he finds this suggestion very strange and disputes its being halachically correct (Shu”t Igros Moshe, Yoreh Deah Volume3 #120:5).

Thus, according to these authorities, we have answered our previous question regarding the halachic significance of estimated values: Indeed, the purpose of Chazal‘s making these estimates was that observing halachah does not require that these calculations be mathematically precise, provided they meet the criteria that the halachah established.

An Alternate Approach

Although the majority of late authorities conclude that the calculations of Chazal are indeed part of the halachos of shiurim, this is not a universally held position. The Tashbeitz, a rishon, wrote a lengthy responsum on the topic, in which he presents two ways to explain why Chazal used estimates that are not precisely accurate. His first approach reaches the same conclusion as we have already found in the later poskim, that these measurements are included within the halachos of shiurim that are part of the halachah leMoshe miSinai.

The second approach of the Tashbeitz, however, differs with the above-mentioned halachic conclusion. In his second approach, he contends that all the above estimates were meant for pedagogic, but not halachic reasons. The rounding of pi to three and the diagonal of a square to 1.4 were provided to make the material easily comprehensible to all students, since every individual is required to know the entire Torah. Thus, when Chazal used these estimates in calculating the laws, their intent was to enable the average student to comprehend the halachic material, not to provide the most accurate interpretation. When an actual halachic calculation is made, it must be totally accurate, and any halachic authority involved would realize that he must use a highly accurate mathematical computation and then round either upward or downward as necessary for the specific application. (A similar position is held by Chiddushim Uviurim, Ohalos 5:6.)

Conclusion

Certainly, the majority of late halachic opinions conclude that the estimates of Chazal are meant to be halachically definitive, and not simply pedagogic in nature. However, I leave it to the individual reader to ask his or her posek what to do when a practical question presents itself.

The Mourning Period of Sefirah

What Are the Guidelines for Aveilus Observed During the Sefirah Weeks?

Reason for Mourning

The midrash teaches that one reason for the counting of the omer is so that we again experience the excitement of anticipating the receiving of the Torah (quoted by Ran, end of Pesachim). At the same time, it is unfortunate that this very same part of the year has witnessed much tragedy for the Jewish people. Indeed, the Mishnah (Eduyos 2:10) points out that the season between Pesach and Shavuos is a time of travail. One major calamity that befell us during this season is the plague that took the lives of the 24,000 disciples of Rabbi Akiva. They died within several weeks in one year between Pesach and Shavuos because they did not treat one another with proper respect (Yevamos 62b). The world was desolated by the loss of Torah until Rabbi Akiva went to the southern part of Eretz Yisroel to teach five great scholars, Rabbi Meir, Rabbi Yehudah, Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai, Rabbi Yosi, and Rabbi Elozor ben Shamua, who became the upholders of the future of Torah.

Again, in the time of the Crusades, terrible tragedies happened to the Jewish communities of the Rhine River Valley during the period between Pesach and Shavuos (Taz and Aruch Hashulchan, Orach Chayim 493). Some of these catastrophes are recorded in the Kinos that we recite on Tisha B’Av. The reciting of “Av Harachamim” after Kerias HaTorah on Shabbos was introduced as a testimonial to remember these holy communities who perished in sanctification of Hashem’s Name rather than accept baptism.

What Practices Are Prohibited?

Because of the tragic passing of Rabbi Akiva’s disciples, the minhag was establishedto treat the sefirah period as a time of mourning and to prohibit the conducting of weddings during this season. It is interesting to note that, although it is forbidden to hold a wedding during this season, if someone schedules a wedding during this season in violation of the accepted practice of the community, we do not penalize him for having done so (Teshuvos Hage’onim #278). Thus, although this person violated the community rules by scheduling the wedding, others may attend the wedding (see Shu”t Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 2:95). There are poskim who permit weddings under extenuating circumstances, such as concern that a delay may cause the engagement to be broken (Aruch Hashulchan, Orach Chayim 493:2).

In addition to abstaining from weddings, certain other mourning practices are observed during the period of sefirah. One does not take a haircut during this season (Tur Orach Chayim Chapter 493). However, if there is a bris during sefirah, the mohel, the sandek, and the father of the baby are permitted to have their hair cut in honor of the occasion (Rema), but not the kvatter or those who are honored with “cheika,” who are those who bring the baby closer to the bris (Mishnah Berurah 493:12). Those who are permitted to have their hair cut in honor of the occasion may even have their hair cut the evening before (Mishnah Berurah 493:13).

Dancing is not permitted during the sefirah season (Magen Avraham). Listening to music is likewise prohibited (Shu”t Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 1:166; Shu”t Minchas Yitzchok 1:111; Shu”t Yechaveh Daas 3:30). One is permitted to teach, learn, or play music if it is for his livelihood (Shu”t Igros Moshe 3:87). This is permitted since he is not playing for enjoyment. However, one should not take music lessons for pleasure.

Rav Moshe Feinstein ruled that if a wedding took place on Lag B’omer or before or on Rosh Chodesh Iyar (in places where this is the accepted practice, see below), it is permitted to celebrate the week of sheva berachos with live music and dancing (Shu”t Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 2:95). There are others who disagree (Shu”t Minchas Yitzchok 1:111. See Piskei Teshuvos Chapter 493 footnotes 39 and 81, who quotes many authorities on both sides of the question.).

Although certain mourning practices are observed during sefirah, many practices that are prohibited during the three weeks or the nine days preceding Tisha B’Av are permitted. For example, house remodeling, which is prohibited during “the Nine Days”is permitted during the sefirah period (Shu”t Yechaveh Daas 3:30). Similarly, although during the Nine Days one is discouraged from doing things that are dangerous, no such concern is mentioned in regard to the period of sefirah. Thus, although the Minchas Elozor reports that he knew of people who would not travel during sefirah, he rules that it is permitted and that this practice is without halachic basis (Shu”t Minchas Elozor 4:44).

In a similar vein, according to most poskim, one may recite a brocha of shehechiyanu on a new garment or a new fruitduring the period of sefirah (Maamar Mordechai 493:2; Kaf Hachayim, Orach Chayim 493:4). The Maamar Mordechai explains that the custom not to recite shehechiyanu is a mistake that developed because of confusion with the three weeks before Tisha B’Av, when one should not recite a shehechiyanu (Maamar Mordechai 493:2). However, there are early poskim who record a custom not to recite shehechiyanu during the mourning period of sefirah (Piskei Teshuvos, quoting Leket Yosher).

It is permitted during sefirah to sing or to have a festive meal without music (Graz; Aruch Hashulchan). It is also permitted to make an engagement party (a vort) or a tnoyim during the sefirah period, provided that there is no music or dancing (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim Chapter 493 and Magen Avraham).

When Do We Observe Mourning?

There are numerous customs regarding which days of sefirah are to be kept as a period of mourning. The Shulchan Aruch rules that the mourning period runs from the beginning of the sefirah counting and ends on the thirty-fourth day of the omer count (Beis Yosef and Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim Chapter 493; Kaf Hachayim 493:25). In his opinion, there is no celebration on Lag B’Omer, and it is forbidden to schedule a wedding on that day! The source for this opinion is a medrash that states that the plague that caused the deaths of the disciples of Rabbi Akiva ended fifteen days before Shavuos. According to the Shulchan Aruch’s understanding, the last day of the plague was the thirty-fourth day of the omer. Thus, the mourning ends fifteen days before Shavuos, on the day after Lag B’Omer.

However, the generally accepted practice is to treat the thirty-third day of the Omer count as a day of celebration (Rema and Darchei Moshe, Orach Chayim Chapter 493, quoting Maharil) because, according to this tradition, the last day of the tragedy was the thirty-third day of the Omer (Gra). There are several other reasons mentioned why Lag B’Omer should be treated as a day of celebration. Some record that it is celebrated because it is the yahrzeit of Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai, the author of the Zohar (Birkei Yosef; Chayei Adam, Klal 131:11; Aruch Hashulchan). Others say that it is celebrated because it is the day that Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai was able to leave the cave in which he had been hiding (Aruch Hashulchan). Another reason recorded for celebrating this day is because it was the day that Rabbi Akiva granted semichah to his surviving disciples (Kaf Hachayim, Orach Chayim 493:26). Others record that it was the first day that the mann began falling for the Jews in the desert (Shu”t Chasam Sofer, Yoreh Deah #233, s.v. Amnam yodati).

According to Maharil and Rema, the evening of Lag B’Omer should be included in the mourning period and the celebration should not begin until daytime. In their opinion, Lag B’Omer is still counted as one of the thirty-three days of mourning. The aveilos period ends on the morning of Lag B’Omer because of a concept called miktzas hayom ki’chulloh, which means that the last day of mourning does not need to be a complete day (Moed Katan 19b). If one observes the beginning of the day in mourning, the entire day is included in the count of the mourning days. For this reason, someone getting up from sitting shiva does so on the morning of the seventh day. Observing mourning requirements at the beginning of the seventh day satisfies the requirement to observe the seventh day of shiva. Similarly, one satisfies the requirement to observe the thirty-third day of sefirah mourning by observing mourning only at the beginning of that day. According to this approach, one should not conduct a wedding on the evening of Lag B’Omer, but only in the daytime. This is because we paskin according to the opinions that the principle of miktzas hayom ki’chulloh applies only if the mourning was observed in the daytime, and it is insufficient to observe aveilos only in the evening of the seventh day.

However, there are other opinions that permit scheduling a wedding already on the evening of the thirty-third, at least under extenuating circumstances (see Graz 493:5; Kaf Hachayim, Orach Chayim 493:28; Shu”t Igros Moshe 1:159). Some explain that, since we consider Lag B’Omer to be a day of celebration, it is not counted as one of the days of mourning (see Chok Yaakov 493:6 and Kaf Hachayim, Orach Chayim 493:28). Thus, there are some poskim who contend that there are only thirty-two days in the sefirah mourning period (Graz 493:5). Another reason to permit scheduling a wedding the evening of Lag B’Omer is based on the opinion that miktzas hayom ki’chulloh applies even when one observes the mourning only at night (Ramban, Toras Ho’adam, Chavel edition page 215). Thus, according to this approach, it is sufficient to have the beginning of the night of Lag B’Omer as a mourning period. (It should be noted that, according to this opinion, shiva ends in the evening of the seventh day, not in the morning.)

When Lag B’Omer falls on Shabbos or Sunday, there is a dispute among early poskim whether it is permitted to get a haircut on Friday in honor of Shabbos. The accepted practice is to permit it (Rema, Orach Chayim 493:2 and Be’er Heiteiv ad loc.). Apparently, the combined honor of Shabbos and the approaching Lag B’Omer together supersede the mourning of sefirah. Some poskim even permit a wedding to take place on the Friday afternoon before Lag B’Omer that falls out on Sunday (Shu”t Ha’elef Lecho Shelomoh, Orach Chayim #330). (Bear in mind that the custom in Eastern Europe, going back hundreds of years, was to schedule weddings on Friday afternoon.)

Are those who follow the practice of observing mourning during the beginning of sefirah permitted to play music during Chol Ha’moed? This subject is disputed by poskim, but the accepted practice is to permit music during Chol Ha’moed (see Piskei Teshuvos 493:6).

There are several other customs that observe the mourning dates of sefirah in different ways. Some observe the mourning period the entire time of sefirah until Shavuos except for Yom Tov, Chol Ha’moed, and Rosh Chodesh (and also, presumably, Lag B’Omer). Therefore, they permit the playing of music on Chol Ha’moed and holding weddings and playing music on Rosh Chodesh. (One cannot have a wedding on Chol Ha’moed for an unrelated reason. The sanctity of Yom Tov precludes celebrating a wedding on this day; see Moed Katan 8b.)This approach is based on an early source that states that Rabbi Akiva’s disciples died only on the thirty-three days of sefirah when tachanun is recited, thus excluding the days of Shabbos, Yom Tov, Chol Ha’moed, and Rosh Chodesh (Bach, Orach Chayim quoting Tosafos). If one subtracts from the forty-nine days of sefirah the days of Pesach, Chol Ha’moed, Rosh Chodesh, and the Shabbosos, one is left with thirty-three days. It is on these days that the mourning is observed. (This approach assumes that in earlier times tachanun was recited during the month of Nisan and during the several days before Shavuos.)

Another, similar, custom is to observe the mourning period only from the second day of Iyar until Rosh Chodesh, with the exception of Lag B’Omer. This approach assumes that the mourning period is only on the days when tachanun is said, but does not assume that there are thirty-three days of mourning.

Yet another custom recorded is to refrain from taking haircuts or making weddings from the beginning of sefirah until the morning of Lag B’Omer, but after Lag B’Omer to observe partial mourning by refraining from weddings, although haircuts are permitted. This approach follows the assumption that the original custom of aveilus during sefirah was based on the fact that the plague that killed the disciples of Rabbi Akiva ended on Lag B’Omer. Later, because of the tragedies of the Crusades period, the custom developed not to schedule weddings between Lag B’Omer and Shavuos. However, the mourning period instituted because of the tragedies of the Crusades was not accepted as strictly, and it was permitted to take haircuts(Taz, Orach Chayim 493:2). This is the prevalent custom followed today by Ashkenazim in Eretz Yisroel.

Still others have the custom that the mourning period does not begin until after Rosh Chodesh Iyar, but then continues until Shavuos (Maharil, quoted by Darchei Moshe, Orach Chayim 493:3). This approach assumes that the thirty-three days of mourning are contiguous, but that the mourning period does not begin until after the month of Nisan is over. In Salonica, they observed a Sefardic version of this custom: They practiced the mourning period of sefirah from after Rosh Chodesh Iyar until Shavuos. However, they took haircuts on the thirty-fourth day of the sefirah count (cited by Shu”t Dvar Moshe, Orach Chayim #32).

A similar custom existed in many communities in Lithuania and northern Poland, where they kept the mourning period of sefirah from the first day of Rosh Chodesh Iyar until the morning of the third day of Sivan. According to this practice, weddings were permitted during the three days before Shavuos. This practice was based on the assumption that the disciples of Rabbi Akiva died after Lag B’Omer until Shavuos (Aruch Hashulchan, based on Gemara Yevamos). Magen Avraham reports that this was the custom in his area (Danzig/Gdansk); Chayei Adam reports that this was the practice in his city (Vilna); and Aruch Hashulchan report that this was the custom in his community (Novardok). These customs are followed to this day in communities where weddings are allowed after Pesach until the end of the month of Nisan.

Rav Moshe Feinstein points out that although these customs differ as to which days are considered days of mourning, the premise of most of the customs is the same: Thirty-three days of sefirah should be observed as days of mourning in memory of the disciples of Rabbi Akiva. In Rav Moshe’s opinion, these different customs should be considered as one minhag, and the differences between them are variations in observing the same minhag (Shu”t Igros Moshe 1:159). This has major halachic ramifications, as we shall see.

Can One Change From One Custom to Another?

We would usually assume that someone must follow the same practice as his parents – or the practice of his community –­­ because of the principle of al titosh toras imecha, “do not forsake the Torah of your mother” (Mishlei 1:8). This posuk is understood by Chazal to mean that we are obligated to observe a practice that our parents observed. However, Rav Moshe Feinstein contends that many of the different customs currently observed are considered to be one minhag, and that, when this is the case, changing from one custom to another that is based on the same halachic considerations does not constitute changing one’s minhag and therefore permitted. There is evidence that other, earlier poskim  agreed that a community may change its custom how it observes the mourning days of sefirah (see Shu”t Chasam Sofer, Orach Chayim #142). According to this opinion, the specific dates that one observes are not considered part of the minhag and are not necessarily binding on each individual, as long as he observes thirty-three days of sefirah mourning.

How Should a Community Conduct Itself?

The Rema rules that, although each of the various customs mentioned has halachic validity (Darkei Moshe, Orach Chayim 493:3), each community should be careful to follow only one practice, and certainly not follow the leniencies of two different customs. If a community follows two different practices, it appears that Hashem’s chosen people are following two different versions of the Torah, G-d forbid.

Rav Moshe Feinstein points out that the Rema is discussing a community that has only one beis din or only one Rav. Under these circumstances, the entire community must follow the exact same practice for sefirah. However, in a city where there are many rabbonim and kehilos, each of which has its own custom regarding the observance of sefirah, there is no requirement for the entire community to follow one practice (Shu”t Igros Moshe Orach Chayim 1:159). Thus, there is no requirement that everyone in a large city follow the same custom for sefirah, unless it has been accepted that the community has one standard custom.

Of course, as in all matters of halacha, each community should follow its practices and rabbonim, and each individual should follow the ruling of his Rav.

Attending a Wedding During One’s Mourning Period

If a friend schedules a wedding for a time that one is keeping sefirah, one is permitted to attend and celebrate the wedding, even listening to music and dancing (Shu”t Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 1:159).

Thus, although I am required to have a mourning period during sefirah of at least thirty-three days, I may attend the wedding of a friend or acquaintance that is scheduled at a time that I keep the mourning period of sefirah. However, Rav Moshe rules that if one is going to a wedding on a day that he is keeping sefirah, he should not shave, unless his unshaved appearance will disturb the simcha (Shu”t Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 2:95).

We should all hope and pray that the season between Pesach and Shavuos should cease from being a time of travail, but instead revert to being a time of total excitement in anticipation of the receiving of the Torah.

Who Drinks the Kiddush Wine in Shul?

In honor of Parshas Bereishis and the first Shabbos…

Drinking in shul

Why is the Kiddush wine in shul given to a child?  If an adult is not permitted to drink before he has personally fulfilled Kiddush, can we cause a child to drink?

Background

The underlying question here is the following: The Torah commands us not only to observe the mitzvos of the Torah, but also not to cause someone else to violate the Torah. This law prohibits even causing a child to violate the Torah, notwithstanding that a child himself is not required to observe the mitzvos. Furthermore, it applies even when the child is, unfortunately, not being raised in an observant way. It is therefore forbidden for someone who has a babysitting job to feed a Jewish child non-kosher food, or to serve non-kosher food to a Jewish adult in a nursing facility or to a Jewish child in a school cafeteria.

The source

There are three different places from which we derive that it is prohibited to cause a child to violate commandments of the Torah (Yevamos 114a). These hermeneutic allusions are in the context of the following three mitzvos:

(1) The prohibition against eating sheratzim, tiny creatures.

(2) The prohibition against eating blood.

(3) The prohibition for a kohen to come in contact with a corpse.

We will soon see the significance of the three sources.

What age child?

This law applies even to a child too young to understand what a mitzvah is (Magen Avraham 343:2). Therefore, one may not use a baby blanket or baby clothes made of shatnez (Shu”t HaRashba HaChadoshos #368; Shu”t Beis Yehudah, Yoreh Deah #45; Eishel Avraham [Butchatch], Orach Chayim 343:1). Similarly, one is prohibited to feed a newborn infant non-kosher food, unless it is a life-threatening emergency (Magen Avraham 343:2).

Based on the above sources, we can now appreciate our opening question. “Why is the Kiddush wine in shul given to a child?  If an adult is not permitted to drink before he has personally fulfilled Kiddush, can we cause a child to drink?” To explain this topic better, let us examine its halachic background.

Friday night Kiddush in shul

At the time of the Gemara, Kiddush was recited in shul Friday night because of visitors who would eat their meals in guest rooms that were located adjacent to the shul (see Pesachim 101a and Tosafos s.v. DeAchlu). The fact that the guests ate their meals nearby is significant because of the principle, ein Kiddush ela bimkom seudah — one fulfills the obligation for Kiddush only when it is recited or heard in the same place where one intends to eat one’s Shabbos repast. Someone who hears Kiddush but does not eat a “meal” where he heard it does not fulfill the mitzvah of hearing Kiddush. Discussing the details of ein Kiddush ela bimkom seudah requires a separate, lengthy article; but, for our purposes, we will say that most authorities conclude that eating a significant amount of food on which we recite a mezonos satisfies the requirement of a seudah.

A bit later in history

In the era of the Rishonim, several hundred years after the Gemara, no one ate Friday night meals in the shul building, yet the custom to recite Kiddush at the end of davening was still commonly observed. Although we find many authorities who ruled that one should not recite Kiddush under these circumstances, most communities continued the practice of reciting Kiddush in shul (Tur and Beis Yosef, Orach Chayim 269).

Why do we continue to recite Kiddush?

If no one fulfills the mitzvah with the Kiddush recited in shul, why did the practice continue? This question is discussed by several of the Geonim and the Rishonim, and I will present here some of their approaches.

Rav Naturanai Gaon states that one should recite the Kiddush in shul because of the benefit that hearing Kiddush has for one’s vision. This idea is based on the Gemara’s statement that taking overly-long strides damages one’s vision, and that the Friday evening Kiddush restores the vision that has been lost (see Brachos 43b). Since not every household had wine on which to recite Kiddush, the custom developed to recite Kiddush in shul for this therapeutic purpose. It appears that, according to Rav Naturanai Gaon‘s reason, no one needs to drink the Kiddush wine in shul, since its purpose is not to fulfill the mitzvah.

The Tur objects

However, the Tur, who quotes Rav Naturanai Gaon, sharply disputes the reason. This is because the Gemara explains that the basis for Kiddush in shul is for guests and not the therapeutic reason of Rav Naturanai Gaon.

Another early authority, Rabbeinu Yonah, presents a different explanation for reciting Kiddush in shul, even though the reason mentioned by the Gemara no longer applies. Rabbeinu Yonah contends that the Kiddush was for the benefit of people who did not know how to recite Kiddush and who would simply not fulfill the mitzvah at all. When these people heard Kiddush in shul, they fulfilled the mitzvah min haTorah, notwithstanding the fact that they did not observe the mitzvah as Chazal instructed, since it was not Kiddush bimkom seudah (Rabbeinu Yonah, quoted by Rosh). Thus, Rabbeinu Yonah assumes that the requirement of Kiddush bimkom seudah is a rabbinic ordinance, and that we would recite the Kiddush in shul for the sake of those who would thereby fulfill the Torah mitzvah.

Not all authorities agree with this approach. The Rosh contends that the requirement of Kiddush bimkom seudah is min haTorah. Thus, simply hearing Kiddush without eating then and there does not fulfill any mitzvah and would, therefore, not provide a satisfactory reason to recite Kiddush in shul.

Other authorities explain that reciting Kiddush in shul has a status of a takkanah, a rabbinically-ordained practice that we continue to observe, even though the reason it was established no longer applies (Rashba and Ran, quoted by Beis Yosef). (We should note that although the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch discuss the practice and logistics of reciting Kiddush in shul, they both state that it is preferred not to recite Kiddush in shul. For this reason, many shuls do not recite Kiddush Friday night. However, where the custom is to recite Kiddush in shul, one should continue the practice.)

Kiddush catch-22

Regardless which rationale we use to explain why we recite Kiddush in shul, the Tur raises the following question: The halachah requires that someone drink from the Kiddush wine (Pesachim 105b; Eiruvin 40b), and also prohibits drinking before fulfilling the mitzvah of Kiddush. Since no one is eating in the shul building, no one fulfills the mitzvah with that Kiddush, because of ein Kiddush ela bimkom seudah. Thus, whoever drinks from the Kiddush wine in shul is drinking before he has fulfilled the mitzvah of Kiddush, which is prohibited; yet, someone must drink from the Kiddush wine.

To resolve this predicament, the Tur recommends that the Kiddush wine in shul be given to a child to drink, which, he notes, fulfills the requirement that someone drink from the Kiddush wine (Tur, Orach Chayim 269).

Kiddush conundrum

However, it is not clear how this innovation of the Tur resolves the predicament in a satisfactory way. How can we give a child the Kiddush wine? As we learned above, we are not permitted to cause a child to violate halachah – and he is drinking without fulfilling the mitzvah of Kiddush!

This difficulty is raised by the Beis Yosef, who suggests three solutions to the problem:

  • All three sources of the halacha not to cause a child to violate the Torah — not to eat tiny creatures, not to eat blood, and that a kohein not become tamei from a meis — are lo saaseh prohibitions of the Torah. There are halachic authorities who rule therefore that the proscription to cause a child to violate the Torah applies only to mitzvos of at least the level of a lo saaseh, but not to any prohibition that is considered halachically a lesser offense, such as an issur aseh or a mitzvas aseh, and that it certainly does not apply to a mitzvah miderabbanan (Hagahos Maimoniyos, Shabbos 29:40). Since Kiddush is a mitzvas aseh and not a lo saaseh, it is permitted to cause a child to violate its laws. As a result. some authorities permit causing a child to eat or drink before he has fulfilled the mitzvah of Kiddush.

Although this approach can be used to justify the Tur’s proposal, the Beis Yosef notes that many authorities reject this limitation and contend that one may not cause a child to violate any prohibited action. To justify the practice of giving the wine to a child according to their opinion, we need to find an alternative reason to explain why the shul Kiddush is given to a child. Therefore, the Beis Yosef presents two other approaches to explain the practice.

Not yotzei, but may drink

  • Although, in general, one may not drink before fulfilling the mitzvah of Kiddush, there is an opinion among Rishonim that one who recites Kiddush to benefit others may drink the wine of Kiddush, even when he is not now fulfilling the mitzvah (Rabbeinu Shemuel in the name of the Sar of Coucy [one of the Baalei Tosafos], quoted by Mordechai, Pesachim, Tosefes MeiArvei Pesachim, page 35a). The Beis Yosef explains that, although we do not usually follow this position, we may have the children rely on it, as a means of resolving what to do with the Kiddush

A third approach

  • The Beis Yosef presents a third approach, perhaps the most unusual, to explain why we permit a child to drink the wine of Kiddush. Because we must recite the Kiddush and we do not want the brocha of Kiddush to be recited in vain, we permit a child to drink the wine, even though this is an act that we would otherwise prohibit.

Halachic differences

There are obvious differences in practical halachah between these approaches. The first opinion holds that one may cause a child to do something that an adult may not do, provided that the prohibition is less severe than a lo saaseh (see also Rashba, Shabbos 121a; Ran, Yoma, 1a). (Even according to this approach, because of the laws of chinuch, the child’s father, and possibly the mother, may not have him drink, if the child is old enough to be educated. Thus, this heter may not apply if the father gives his own son the wine of Kiddush in shul.) Based on this opinion, some authorities permit directing a child to carry something on Shabbos in an area where carrying is prohibited only miderabbanan, if the child needs the item (see also, Shu”t Rabbi Akiva Eiger 1:15; Biur Halachah 343). However, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 343:1) and the Magen Avraham (343:3) prohibit this.

According to the third approach, only one child should drink the Kiddush wine in order to minimize the amount of violation performed, whereas the other two answers permit serving the Kiddush wine to any child who desires. (I note that I have never seen any place that allows only one child to drink the Kiddush. Customarily, many of the children in shul line up to sip the Kiddush wine. This practice implies that this third approach was not accepted as the reason for the custom.)

Matzoh on Erev Pesach

Here is another case where the above-mentioned approaches may disagree: May I feed a child matzoh on Erev Pesach? The Terumas HaDeshen contends that, according to the answer that the prohibition is only to feed a child something that is prohibited with the stringency of a lo saaseh, one may feed a child matzoh on Erev Pesach, which is not as severe a prohibition (Terumas HaDeshen #125). However, he concludes that if the child is old enough to appreciate the Seder, one may not feed him matzoh on Erev Pesach for a different reason — because this runs counter to the experience of matzoh being special on Seder night. (Further discussion on this topic can be found in Rama, Orach Chayim 471:2 and the commentaries thereon.)

Yet a fourth approach

Some later authorities did not feel that the approaches suggested by the Beis Yosef explain the Tur’s ruling in a satisfactory way. They therefore presented other reasons to explain why it is permitted to give a child the Kiddush wine before he has fulfilled the mitzvah. One approach is that it is forbidden to cause a child to violate a Torah law only when the prohibition applies at all times. However, it is permitted to cause a child to perform an activity that is usually permitted, but that is prohibited at this particular time. Following this reason, one may feed a child on Yom Kippur, since eating and drinking are activities that are usually permitted, even though this is a very severe prohibition for an adult (Sefer HaYashar #52). (There are authorities who rule that, according to the previous answers, one is permitted to feed a child on Yom Kippur only when it is a life-threatening emergency, but a child old enough to feed himself should not be fed by an adult, but instead be told where food can be located [Minchas Chinuch, Mitzvah 313; see also Mikra’ei Kodesh of Rav Pesach Frank, Yamim Nora’im, page 149].) Therefore, there is no problem giving a child wine before he has fulfilled the mitzvah of Kiddush, since drinking wine, in general, is a permitted activity (Magen Avraham 269:1).

Another difference in halacha

This last answer also results in a different halachic practice than that of the previous approaches. According to this last answer, one may feed a child on Yom Kippur, even when the child could feed himself. It is also permitted to feed any child before he has heard Kiddush, as long as the child is below the age of bar or bas mitzvah.

A minor kohen

At this point, I would like to discuss a related question. Rivkah Katz* asks me: “My husband and sons are kohanim. Am I required to be careful where I take my infant son?”

In the first pasuk of parshas Emor, the Torah (Vayikra 21:1) states, Emor el hakohanim benei Aharon, ve’amarta aleihem lanefesh lo yitama be’amav — Say to the kohanim, the sons of Aharon, and you shall say to them, that they shall not contaminate themselves to a dead person among their people. Since the Torah repeats the word say, we derive that there are two levels of responsibility here, and since usually it says the sons of Aharon, the kohanim, and here it reverses the order, the Torah is commanding that an adult must not cause a child kohen to become tamei (Yevamos 114a, as explained by Bach, Yoreh Deah 373). From the wording of the Rambam (Hilchos Aveil 3:12), we see that every adult Jew, even a non-kohen, is commanded not to make a child kohen tamei. This requires everyone to know the halachos of what makes a kohen tamei. One cannot have the attitude that, since I am not a kohen, these laws are not relevant to me.

We can therefore answer Rivkah’s question: She is, indeed, required to find out all the halachos germane to kohanim becoming tamei, so that she knows where she may bring her son, and where she may not.

An adult kohen

Another related question I was once asked:

“My father-in-law, who is not observant, is a kohen, whereas I am a Yisroel. Are we required to be as stringent about where we go on family outings as we would if I myself were a kohen?”

Answer:

The Rambam rules that it is forbidden for a non-kohen to make an adult kohen tamei (Rambam, Hilchos Aveil 3:5). To quote the Rambam: “If the kohen is unaware that what he did is forbidden, and the adult who made him tamei knows that it is forbidden, then the adult violates the lo saaseh. If the adult kohen knows that it is forbidden, then the other person violates only lifnei iveir lo sitein michshol, do not place a stumbling block before a blind person (Vayikra 19:14).” Chazal interpret this pasuk to mean that one may not give someone bad advice, nor cause him to violate a prohibition (Pesachim 22b).

Thus, we see that, indeed, one must be concerned about where one takes grandpa, even if he himself is not concerned. For a reason that is beyond the scope of this article, this is true even if grandpa is already tamei meis.

Conclusion

Chazal say in Pirkei Avos: “Kol she’ruach habrios nocha heimenu ruach hamakom nocha heimenu,” One who is pleasing to his fellowman is pleasing to his Creator. Being concerned that we not harm others halachically is certainly part of both our social responsibility and our halachic responsibility. When we do our mitzvos properly, others will see us and say, “He is a frum Jew — he lives his life on a higher plane of caring for others.”

*Name has been changed to protect privacy.

 

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