The Words of the Prophets

Question #1: Just This Once

“Obviously, I never met either the Chofeitz Chayim or Rav Aryeh Levin, but there is a great tzadik in our neighborhood, a big talmid chacham and a mekubal, who is never involved in what is going on. Today, he came to me, quietly, and told me that Hashem appeared to him in a vision and instructed him to tell me that this coming Shabbos, but only this Shabbos, I am supposed to drive him somewhere in my car. Am I supposed to listen to him?”

Question #2: Untruthful Prophets?

The brocha we recite prior to reading the haftarah states ve’rotzeh be’divreihem ha’ne’emarim be’emes, that Hashem “desired the words of the prophets that are said in truth.” This brocha requires explanation: Of course, Hashem desires the words of the prophets – He was the One Who sent them the message in the first place! What does this brocha mean?

Answer:

To answer the above questions thoroughly and correctly, we need to study the entire halachic issue of prophets, beginning from the Chumash, through the Gemara, rishonim and poskim. Even if we do not happen to have a neighbor in shul who meets all the requirements of a navi, we should know these laws:

(1) From a perspective of mitzvas Talmud Torah.

(2) So that we can observe them properly when we again have the opportunity.

(3) So that we can understand the verses that are germane.

(4) A proper understanding of the thirteen ikarei emunah of the Rambam is contingent on comprehending these laws.

How prophetable?

We will start with the Torah’s discussion in parshas Shoftim about the topic:

 “You shall be wholehearted with Hashem, your G-d… A prophet from among you, from your brothers, like me (Moshe), will Hashem, your G-d, establish for you. You shall listen to him…. Then, Hashem said to me… ‘I will establish for you a prophet from among your brothers, like you, and I will put My words in his mouth – everything that I will command him. Whoever will not listen to My words that the prophet will speak in My name – I will exact punishment from him. However, any prophet who will have the audacity to speak in My name that which I did not command him to say, or any prophet who will speak in the name of foreign gods – that prophet shall surely be put to death.’ And should you ask in your heart, ‘How am I to know which statement was not said by Hashem?’ (The answer is): That which the prophet says in the name of Hashem (that it will miraculously happen) and the matter does not transpire, this is, for certain, something that Hashem never said. This prophet has violated the Torah intentionally: Do not be afraid of him.” (Devorim 18: 13, 15, 18-22).

We see in these pesukim the following laws:

A.    If a prophet demonstrates that he is, indeed, a prophet that Hashem sent, we are required to obey whatever he tells us that Hashem commanded. Based on the pesukim and some relevant passages of Gemara and halachic midrash, the Rambam (Sefer Hamitzvos) explains as follows: “Mitzvah #172 is that we were commanded to listen to every prophet and to obey what he commands, even if it contradicts a mitzvah… as long as it is temporary, not a permanent change either to add or subtract… The words of the Sifrei are ‘to him shall you listen’; even if he tells you to violate temporarily one of the mitzvos that are written in the Torah, listen to him.”

B.     Someone who does not follow the commandment of the prophet – Hashem will exact punishment from him. Chazal tell us that the punishment is quite severe.

C.     If the prophet claims to speak in Hashem’s Name and he had received no such commandment – such a “prophet” should be executed.

D.    Someone who meets all the requirements of a true prophet, but relates a prophetic vision in the name of an idol or other foreign god (anything that qualifies as avodah zarah) — this “prophet” should also be executed.

In the Rambam’s opinion, there is also another place in the Torah where this mitzvah is discussed. At the end of parshas Va’eschanan, the Torah writes, “Lo senasu es Hashem Elokeichem, do not test Hashem your G-d” (Devorim 6:16), which the Rambam explains to mean: Do not test the promises or warnings that Hashem sent to us via His prophets, by casting doubt on the veracity of a prophet after he has proven his authenticity. This mitzvah is similarly quoted by the Sefer Hachinuch, who calls this mitzvah (#424 in his count): “Not to test a true prophet more than necessary.”

This leads us to the following question: What are we to do when someone seems to have the right qualifications for a prophet, and he tells us that he received a prophetic vision? The prohibition just described is only after he has demonstrated adequately that he is, indeed, a navi. How does he prove that he is an authentic navi?

Who is prophetable?

First, we need to establish that there are pre-requisite qualifications that must be met by a navi. The Gemara (Nedarim 38a) states: “Hashem places his presence only on someone who is physically powerful, wealthy, wise and humble.” The Gemara proceeds to prove that we know these factors from the fact that Moshe Rabbeinu was physically strong enough to assemble the Mishkan on his own, and that he was extremely wealthy from the trimmings of precious stone that he collected when he chiseled out the second luchos.

The Rambam adds a few other qualities that a prophet must always exhibit: “Among the most basic concepts of religion is to know that Hashem communicates with people. Prophecy happens only to a very wise talmid chacham who is in total control of his personality traits, whose yetzer hora never controls him – rather, he is in control of his yetzer hora, always. He must also be someone with tremendous and correct understanding. Someone filled with all these qualities, who is physically complete and healthy, when he begins studying the deeper aspects of Torah and is drawn into these great topics, develops great understanding, becomes sanctified and continues to grow spiritually, separates himself from the ways of common people who follow the darkness of the time, and instead, he is constantly growing and spurring himself onward. He teaches himself to control his thoughts so as not to think of things that have no value. Rather, his thoughts should always be engaged with the ‘Throne of Hashem’, in his attempts to understand holy and pure ideas.… When the spirit of Hashem rests upon him, his soul becomes mixed with that of the angels… and he becomes a new person who understands that he is no longer the same as he was before, but that he has become elevated beyond the level of other talmidei chachamim” (Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah 7:1).

Net prophets

When the prophet reveals his first prophecy, the posuk that we quoted above teaches: “How am I to know which word was not said by Hashem?” (The answer is): “That which the prophet says in the name of Hashem (that it will miraculously happen) and the matter does not transpire, this is for certain something that Hashem never said.”

This posuk teaches that, in addition to having all the requisite personal qualities, a navi must foretell the future in the Name of Hashem in order to qualify as a navi. There is a dispute between Rav Sa’adiyah Gaon and the Rambam what type of “prophecy” must be demonstrated to prove that he is a prophet. According to Rav Sa’adiyah, the prophet must perform something that is supernatural, such as Moshe did when he turned water into blood, or the stick into a snake. This is because the navi, functioning as a messenger of Hashem, would have been provided by Him with a sign that only Hashem could accomplish, such as preventing water from running downhill, or stopping a heavenly body in its course (Emunos Udei’os 3:4). (This is also the opinion of the Abarbanel in parshas Shoftim.)

On the other hand, the Rambam (Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah 10:2) disagrees, stating:

“Any prophet who arises and says that Hashem sent him does not need to produce a sign on the level of what Moshe Rabbeinu did, or Eliyahu or Elisha, which was completely supernatural. It is sufficient that he prophesy, saying that something will happen in the future, and his words come true.… Therefore, when a man appropriate to being a navi comes… we do not tell him, ‘Let us see you split the sea, or bring the dead back to life, or anything similar, in order that we can believe you’. Rather, we tell him: ‘If you are indeed a prophet, foretell something that will happen.’ When he foretells, we then wait to see if it happens. If it does not happen, even if something small of his prophecy does not happen, we know for certain that he is a false prophet. If his words are entirely fulfilled, you should consider him to be truthful. We then proceed to check him several times; if each time his words are exactly fulfilled, we consider him a true prophet.”

According to some acharonim (Arba’ah Turei Aven), we test him three times, just as Moshe Rabbeinu was given three signs. If he meets all the requirements of a navi and foretells the future, perfectly and accurately, three times, we are required to follow what he tells us to do, and, when we do so, we accomplish the mitzvah of the Torah.

If he predicts that something will happen and it does not, we know that he is a false prophet. In any of these cases where we are not permitted to obey his words, the Sanhedrin would subject him to capital punishment as a false prophet.

Prophets on prophets

There is another way that a navi can be verified as such, without his producing a miracle or foretelling the future. If someone we already know to be a prophet testifies that an individual who meets the personal requirements of a prophet is indeed a navi, the second individual should be accepted immediately as a prophet (Rambam, Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah 10:5). The proof for this is that Yehoshua became accepted as a prophet on Moshe Rabbeinu’s say-so, without producing any miracles or foretelling the future. (The miracles he performed were done later, after he already had been accepted as a navi.)

Gross prophet

What is the halacha if someone who clearly does not meet the personal requirements that we have described tells us that Hashem spoke to him. Let us even assume that he foretells the future successfully, or that he performs miracles. What is the halacha?

The halacha is that he is considered a false prophet. When the batei din had the ability to carry out capital punishment, he would be executed by them. Since our batei din do not have this ability today, we can excommunicate him or banish him, to mitigate the harm he causes. This was done many times in our past, when we were confronted by false prophets. In other words, it is non-prophetable to have him among the Jewish people.

Highly prophetable

The halacha is that once he proved he is a prophet, we are required to obey him, even if he tells us to do something that is counter to a mitzvah or is usually prohibited. The two exceptions are if he tells us that he is changing something of the Torah permanently, or if tells us to violate the prohibition of avodah zarah. In either of these two situations, the Torah tells us that he is a false prophet, even if his tests were true.

Is this a prophetable venture?

At this point, we can analyze our opening question: “Obviously, I never met either the Chofeitz Chayim or Rav Aryeh Levin, but there is a great tzadik in our neighborhood, a big talmid chacham and a mekubal, who is never involved in what is going on. Today, he came to me, quietly, and told me that Hashem appeared to him in a vision and instructed him to tell me that this coming Shabbos, but only this Shabbos, I am supposed to drive him somewhere in my car. Am I supposed to listen to him?”

Let us assume that this talmid chacham/mekubal meets all the requirements that the halacha requires, as quoted above. He now needs to meet the next challenge: According to Rav Sa’adiyah and the Abarbanel, he must perform a miracle that defies nature as we know it. According to the Rambam, he must successfully predict future events several times, without a single detail varying from his description and without any incorrect prediction. If his prophecy is inaccurate even in a slight detail, he is subject to the death penalty, if Sanhedrin can carry out this ruling. Since we have no Sanhedrin today, he would be ruled as a rosho, notwithstanding his other fine qualities.

Personally, I would think that he is probably suffering from some mental illness, and I would recommend that he have a full psychiatric evaluation. I do not think that he is evil; I think that he is ill.

Prophetable brochos

At this point, let us examine our second opening question: The brocha we recite prior to reading the haftarah states that Hashem “desired the words of the prophets that are said in truth.” This brocha requires explanation: Of course, Hashem desires the words of the prophets – He was the One Who sent them the message in the first place! What does this brocha mean?

We can answer this question by realizing the following: With the exception of Moshe Rabbeinu, Hashem communicated to the prophets in a vision, not in words. The prophet, himself, put the ideas he had seen, heard and understood into his own words. It is for this reason that the Midrash teaches that ein shenei nevi’im misnabe’im besignon echad, it will never happen that two prophets recite the exact same words of prophecy (Pesikta and Midrash Seichel Tov, Parshas Va’eira 9:14). Each prophet still maintains some of his own personality and upbringing that will reflect itself in the way he describes what he saw. Yet, the final words, which are the words of the prophet, “their words,” are still “said in truth” – meaning that notwithstanding the personal imprint of the prophet on what he said, the words all convey Hashem’s absolute intent.

Conclusion

In the Sefer Hachinuch, mitzvah #424 is: “Not to test a true prophet too much.” He explains that, if we test the navi after he has adequately proved his veracity, those jealous of him or pained by his success may use excessive testing as an excuse not to listen to his commandments. In other words, they will deny his authenticity unjustifiably, by claiming that he has as yet not been tested sufficiently. Thus, we see that even something so obvious as the ability of a great tzadik to foretell the future can be denied by people, when they don’t want to accept the truth!

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The Talis Exchange and Other Lost Stories

Chazal teach us that in the merit of Avraham saying to the king of Sodom that he would not accept even a thread from him, his descendants received the mitzvah of tzitzis.

Question #1: THE TALIS EXCHANGE

Dovid asked me the following shaylah: “I put down my talis in shul and, upon returning, discovered that it had been replaced with a similar-looking talis. I left the talis undisturbed, and hung up a sign noting the exchange. Unfortunately, no one responded, and, indeed, the owner may not even realize that he has my talis. Should I take his talis home? May I use it, or must I purchase a new one and leave his until he claims it, which may never happen?”

Question #2: THE LAUNDRY EXCHANGE

A laundry returned the correct quantity of items that had been brought originally; however, the customer, Reuvein, later realized that one sheet was not his. A different customer, Shimon, picked up his laundry and was missing some items; however the laundry insisted that it had returned whatever was brought. Shimon subsequently discovered that Reuvein had one of Shimon’s missing sheets and he clearly identified his missing sheet. Reuvein claimed that the sheet was a replacement for his sheet that was lost and that he is therefore not required to return it. Must he return the sheet?

Question #3: THE WEDDING EXCHANGE

Someone went to a wedding wearing one coat and mistakenly returned home with a different one. May he use this coat and assume that the other party is agreeable to the exchange? Does this depend on which coat is more valuable?

Question #4: AN UMBRELLA ON THE SUBWAY

On the subway you see a frum, unfamiliar person rush off the car, forgetting her umbrella. May you keep or use the umbrella, knowing that the owner will soon realize her loss?

SHO’EL SHELO MIDAAS

The concern in all these situations is that one is using someone else’s property without permission. This is called sho’el shelo midaas, borrowing without the owner’s knowledge, which is usually halachically equivalent to stealing(Bava Metzia 41a; 43b)! In general, one may not use an item until one receives permission from the owner.

CAN’T I JUST ACCEPT THE TRADE OF THE TWO ITEMS?

Since the loser is wearing my talis, why can’t I simply assume that we have traded taleisim; I’ll keep his talis and allow him to keep mine? (Although the correct Hebrew plural is taliyos or talisos, I will use the colloquial taleisim.)

Although Dovid may grant permission to the other person to use his talis,can he assume that he has permission to use the other person’s talis? Let us examine a relevant discussion:

EXCHANGED ITEMS AT THE TAILOR

Someone whose clothes were replaced with someone else’s at a tailor may use what he received until his garment is returned. However, if the exchange transpired at a shiva house or a simcha, he may not use the garment he received but must hold it until the owner claims his property. What is the difference between the two cases? Rav answered: “I was sitting with my uncle, and he explained to me, ‘Sometimes people tell the tailor to sell the item for them’” (Bava Basra 46a).

We see from this case that if I exchanged a coat with someone else at a simcha or at a shiva, I may not wear the coat,since I am “borrowing” it without permission. The fact that the other person is using my garment, knowingly or unknowingly, does not permit me to use his. I may have to purchase a replacement, even though a perfectly nice garment is sitting unused in my closet, since the garment is not mine.

However, if the exchange happened in a tailor shop, I may use the replacement.

WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A TAILOR AND A WEDDING?

Why is the tailor shop different? The Gemara presents a rather cryptic answer to this question: “Sometimes people tell the tailor to sell the item for them.” What does this mean?

The early poskim explain that when the exchange transpired in a repair shop, one may assume that the following situation occurred:

Someone brought a garment to the tailor, asking him to sell it for him. The tailor erred and sold your garment instead and then paid the money received (minus his sales commission) to the original owner of that garment. When you came to claim your garment, the tailor realized his error, and also realized that he must compensate you for your item, since he probably has no way to retrieve it. However, he had no cash available,so he gave you a replacement instead – the garment that he was supposed to sell (Tur and Sma, Choshen Mishpat 136:1). Since the tailor already paid the original owner for his garment, he now owns it and he is fully authorized to give it to you as a replacement for your lost garment. This case is referred to as nischalfu keilim beveis ha’uman (items that were exchanged in a craftsman’s shop).

The next passage in the Gemara’s discussion is now almost self-explanatory:

Rav Chiya the son of Rav Nachman explained that the ruling of nischalfu keilim beveis ha’uman applies only if the repairman himself gave you the different garment, but not if his wife or children gave them to you.

Obviously, if the tailor’s wife or child gave you the wrong garment, you cannot assume that this was because of the tailor’s earlier error. It is more likely that they simply mistakenly gave you the wrong garment, which needs to be returned.

Similarly, the following concluding passage of this discussion is clear.

Rav Chiya the son of Rav Nachman continued: The halacha of nischalfu keilim beveis ha’uman applies only if the repairman told you, “Here is a garment.” However if he said “Here is your garment,” we assume that he erred, since he is not giving you your garment.

If the tailor had sold your garment in error and is now sheepishly providing you with a replacement, he would not tell you, here is your garment. Therefore, if he says here is your garment, we assume he must have mistakenly given you the wrong garment, and you must return it.

We see clearly that the ruling of nischalfu keilim beveis ha’uman applies only when I can assume that a tailor or other repairman inadvertently sold or disposed of my item and can legitimately offer me the replacement. Otherwise the situation is comparable to the case of garments exchanged at a simcha, where one may not use the received garment without permission.

At this point we can analyze Question #2.

A laundry returned to Reuvein the same number of items he had brought originally; however, one sheet is not his. Shimon claims to be missing some items, which the laundry denies. Shimon proves that the sheet is his, yet Reuvein claims that the laundry gave it to him as a replacement for what they lost and that he is therefore not required to return it. Must he return the sheet?

Answer: Shimon did not give the sheet to the laundry to sell. Therefore, the laundry gave Shimon’s sheet to Reuven without authorization and he must return it to its rightful owner, even if Reuven has no other way of being compensated for his loss (Terumas Hadeshen #319; one of the interesting and surprising aspects of this shaylah is that this actual case was asked over 600 years ago!!).

The reason for this is obvious: Laundries do not usually act as agents to sell people’s clothing, and in any case, Shimon clearly denies ever making any such arrangement.

SO, WHAT IS THE STATUS OF THE TALIS?

Let us return to our original question. Someone took Dovid’s talis and left behind a similar-looking one. The owner has not responded to any of his notices, and Dovid suspects that he does not even realize that an exchange transpired.

Based on the above discussion, it would seem that Dovid has no choice but to consider purchasing a new talis. However, there is another Gemara discussion that affects our case, so don’t run to the store just yet. Let us examine the following passage:

Shmuel said, “Someone who finds tefillin in the street should estimate their worth and may wear them himself” (Bava Metzia 29b). If the finder has no need for a pair of tefillin, he may sell them and put the money aside for the owner. The Rosh (Bava Metzia 2:16) rules that the finder may even use the money in the interim.

Shmuel’s statement presents some obvious questions:

His ruling seems to contradict the principle that borrowing an item without permission is tantamount to theft. Why can the finder wear (or sell) these tefillin? As we are all aware, one of the Torah’s mitzvos is to return a lost object to its owner (Devorim 22:1-3; Shemos 23:4). How does the Gemara permit the tefillin finder to wear them and not return them to the owner? And even if we correctly assume that “estimating their worth” means that he is responsible to return the value of the tefillin to its owner if and when he locates him, why is this case different from the normal obligation of returning the actual lost item itself to its owner? Obviously, there must be something about tefillin that permits the finder to keep them and simply repay their estimated value.

Some poskim contend that this ruling applies only to a mitzvah object, where the owner wants someone else to use his tefillin rather than have them sit unused (Shach 267:16, in explanation of the Rambam, Hilchos Gezeilah 13:14). However, most authorities imply that this ruling also applies to non-mitzvah items, in cases where the owner is satisfied with simply receiving back their value (see Tur and Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 267:21). The basis for this second opinion is the continuation of the Gemara’s discussion:

TEFILLIN VERSUS SEFORIM

The Gemara asks why someone finding tefillin may wear them, since this ruling appears to contradict a statement that someone who found books may not use them, but must hold them for the owner. Why are tefillin different from seforim? The Gemara answers that a person wants to receive back his own books, whereas he can always purchase new tefillin. This implies that people have no strong attachment to any specific pair of tefillin, whereas they have tremendous interest in seforim that are difficult to replace. From this one could infer that there is a difference between finding an item that the owner does not mind replacing and finding an item that he does not want to replace, and this would seem to have ramifications for someone who finds a talis, an umbrella, or some other easy to replace item.

Although this seems to be the obvious point of this Gemara, elsewhere the Gemara seems to rule otherwise. If someone found coins placed in a deliberate fashion, the finder may not spend this money and replace it with other coins, but must hold these very coins and return them to their owner (Bava Metzia 29b). Obviously, the owner is not concerned about receiving back these specific coins, and would be very satisfied with receiving replacement money. Why is it not sufficient to simply return coins of the same value? We see that returning replacement value is not satisfactory, even when the owner does not care.

The answer is that in the case of lost tefillin, two factors must be met before one may use them. In addition to the point mentioned above, another consideration is that someone who finds tefillin must occasionally air them out and ensure that they are kept dry (Rosh, Bava Metzia 2:18). (When a person wears tefillin daily, he automatically airs them out at the same time, which benefits them.) Thus, the owner of the tefillin actually benefits more if the finder sets aside money, since the tefillin will become ruined if no one takes proper care of them. This is qualitatively different from finding lost coins, which require no care other than storing them in a secure place.

We can therefore derive the following principles:

If taking care of a lost item requires some effort, and the owner does not care whether he receives back the original item, the finder may estimate the value of the lost item and plan to repay the owner this amount. Otherwise, the finder should hold the lost item and await the owner’s return.

Having established the rule, let us see which cases fit the rule and which do not. Clothing does not usually fit this rule, since people are interested in receiving back the same garment. A person is comfortable with his own clothes, and often purchasing something to one’s taste is not a simple matter. Therefore, someone finding a lost garment may not sell it and hold the money for the owner.

ARE UMBRELLAS AND TALEISIM LIKE TEFILLIN?

On the other hand, the average person does not develop a personal attachment to his umbrella and is perfectly satisfied to have a usable replacement umbrella. Similarly, a man is usually not that concerned about his specific talis and is satisfied with a replacement. In addition, both of these items are comparable to tefillin and not to coins, since if they are never used they become musty. (Normal use of an umbrella airs it out.) Therefore, someone who locates a lost umbrella may use it after estimating its value.

We are now prepared to answer Question #1 and also Question #4. I will answer Question #4 first: On the subway you see a frum but unfamiliar person rush off the car, forgetting her umbrella. May you keep or use the umbrella, knowing that the owner will soon realize her loss?

Clearly, she will despair of recovering her umbrella as soon as she realizes her loss (yi’ush), and if pick it up after she realizes that she left it on the subway, you are not responsible to return it or its value. Nevertheless, in this subway scenario, you will be picking up the umbrella before she realizes her loss.  In that case,  the umbrella is still the property of the person who lost it and someone picking it up is responsible to return it.

However, a person is usually not concerned about owning a specific umbrella, but is satisfied with money to purchase a replacement. (Indeed, if the umbrella that was lost appears to be a designer umbrella, the halacha will be different.) Therefore, even though the owner still owned the umbrella when you found it, you may claim the umbrella as your own, and simply make a mental note how much it is worth. Should you ever meet its owner and she proves that the umbrella was hers, you must compensate her.

And now our analysis of our opening question, The Talis Exchange

Dovid had put down his talis in shul, and it was replaced by a similar-looking talis. His attempts to alert the owner were unsuccessful, and, indeed, the owner may not even notice the exchange. May Dovid use the other talis or must he purchase a new one?

I believe that most men do not feel attached to their particular taleisim, and this case is therefore comparable to the tefillin case of the Gemara. Assuming this to be true, someone who finds a lost talis may estimate its value and then either wear it or sell it. Either way, he should record the value of the talis and intend to return it to the owner, should the owner ever return for it. When I first published this article, I received several responses disagreeing with me, contending that most people are more possessive of their taleisim than I felt.

PECULIARITIES

The careful reader may have noted that our discussion is heading to an unusual conclusion.Although the Gemara’s rules that the owner is less concerned about retrieving his tefillin than retrieving his seforim, today the opposite is generally true – an owner is usually not concerned about receiving backthe same sefer since one can usually purchase it again in a bookstore. (However, the Gemara’s halacha would remain true if he had written notes in the sefer, or it is a special edition that the owner would not be able to readily replace.)

On the other hand, many people own hand-picked tefillin and want their specific pair back (Minchas Elazar 4:9; see Pischei Choshen, Aveidah 6:ftn23). They may have purchased tefillin whose parshi’os were written by a specific sofer who no longer writes, or made by a specific batim macher who has a long waiting list. After analyzing the principles of the above-mentioned Gemara, the Minchas Elazar decides that the original owner gets his tefillin back. Thus, although the principles of the Gemara are infinite, the specific cases that match them change with society.

Returning lost items is a beautiful and important mitzvah. As we now see, the details of observing this mitzvah are often very complicated – and can vary from item to item.

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May a Non-Jew Own a Nectarine Tree?

Photo by Philipp Pilz from FreeImages

For that matter, may a Jew?

I once received the following query:

“I am not Jewish, but I observe the laws of Noahides as recorded in the writings of Maimonides, which I have read in the Yale University translation. I am aware that a gentile may not graft one species of tree onto another. Does owning a nectarine tree violate this prohibition? I would be greatly appreciative if you could answer this question, since I have just purchased a house with a nectarine tree in the yard.

Sincerely,

Jacqueline Baker

250 Washington Blvd.

Asheville, NC” (name and address have been changed)

Many of us reading the title of this article may have wondered, “If I am permitted to eat nectarines, why shouldn’t I own a nectarine tree?” Although the answer to this question is fairly straightforward, there are many other issues that need clarification, before we can answer Jacqueline’s shaylah.

First, let us explain the halachos of tree-grafting applicable to Jews. Sadly, because many Jews are unfamiliar with these halachos and unaware of the prevalence of grafted trees, they often, unwittingly, violate these laws.

Also, most people misunderstand the prohibition against kelayim, which is often translated as “mixed species.” People often understand this to mean a prohibition against hybridization or cross-breeding. Although it is true that the Torah prohibits crossbreeding different species of animal, virtually all other types of forbidden mixtures have nothing at all to do with hybridization. We list here the six types of prohibited mixtures, called kelayim.

1. Wearing shatnez, which is a mix of wool and linen.

2. Cross-breeding two animal species.

3. Using two animal species to haul or work together. This mitzvah is usually called lo sacharosh, do not plow with an ox and a donkey together.

4. Grafting different tree species. A sub-category of this prohibition is planting one species on top of or inside another species, a process that is virtually non-existent in contemporary agricultural practice.

5. Planting other crop species in a vineyard. For this purpose, “crop” refers to an annual (grows for only one year and then dies) edible plant. Examples are: seeds that are eaten, like beans, wheat, and sesame; root vegetables, like radish; leaves, such as lettuce; or fruit, such as tomatoes or melons.

6. Planting two crop species together or near one another. This prohibition applies only to species that are eaten.

Although we usually assume that the word kelayim means “mixture,” some commentaries explain that this word originates from the same Hebrew root as the word “prison,” beis ke’le. Thus, Rav Hirsch (Vayikra 19:19) explains that the root word כלא means to keep or hold something back, and that the plural form kelayim is similar to yadayim or raglayim and means a pair. Therefore, the word kelayim means to pair together two items that should be kept apart.

In order to explain the prohibition against grafting trees, the subject of our article, I will first provide some scientific background for city dwellers like myself, who know almost nothing about gardening and horticulture. Having been a city slicker almost my whole life, I freely admit that I knew little about this subject until I did some research in order to understand the halacha.

Hybridization (cross-breeding) of plants occurs when one pollinates the flower of one species with pollen from a different species. However, most of the prohibitions of kelayim have nothing to do with cross-breeding species. In the case of “herbaceous plants,” that is, plants other than perennial (live for many years) trees and shrubs, kelayim is a prohibition against planting two crop species close together. Halacha prohibits planting a crop species inside a vineyard, planting one species too close to another already planted species (distances vary according to how many plants are growing together), planting one species on top of or inside another species, and sowing the seeds of two species together. Incidentally, these prohibitions apply only in Eretz Yisrael, with the exception of planting a crop species in a vineyard (Kiddushin 39a) and, possibly, of planting one species inside another (see Gemara and Tosafos, Chullin 60a; Rambam, Hilchos  Kelayim 1:5 and Radbaz). Thus, someone in chutz la’aretz may plant his backyard garden with a wide variety of vegetables and other edibles without any halachic concern, whereas in Eretz Yisrael, someone planting a garden patch must be very careful to keep the different species separate. The complicated question of how far apart to plant them, and what qualifies as a valid separation if one plants them close together, is beyond the scope of this article (see Chazon Ish, Hilchos Kelayim 6:1).

(By the way, the halachic definition of a species often differs from scientific definition. For example, although some scientists consider wolves and dogs to be the same species, halacha does not; therefore, one may not crossbreed them or use them to haul a load together [Mishnah, Kelayim 1:6]. On the other hand, the Chazon Ish [3:7] discusses whether all citrus fruits are the same species regarding the laws of kelayim, which would permit grafting a grapefruit branch onto a lemon rootstock, whereas scientists consider them to be two distinct species.)

HARKAVAS ILAN – CROSS-GRAFTING

The laws of kelayim also prohibit grafting a branch of one species of tree onto the root stock, or lower trunk, of another species. Although a town dweller may feel that this is a rare occurrence, in fact, contemporary plant nurseries and tree farmers usually graft branches of a species that produces delicious fruit onto the hardier stock of a different species.

For example, most modern peach and nectarine trees are produced by grafting a peach or nectarine branch onto the stock of a hardier, botanically-related tree, such as an almond. As I will explain, someone who performs this, either in Eretz Yisrael or in chutz la’aretz, violates a Torah prohibition. According to many authorities, a non-Jew is also commanded regarding this mitzvah. This latter opinion contends that a Jew who causes a non-Jew to graft such a tree, or even to prune or water it after grafting was done, contravenes lifnei iveir, causing someone else to violate a prohibition.

Because so many trees are grafted nowadays, someone who owns a peach tree should have a horticultural expert check whether its rootstock is also a peach tree, or whether it is of a different species. If the stock is peach, even of a different variety, he may keep the tree; if the stock is of a different species, he should chop off the tree below the point of the graft. (Nobody has suggested that George Washington chopped down his father’s cherry tree because it was grafted onto a different species. Since George always strove for truth, however, this was, nonetheless, an additional good deed, at least according to some opinions.) As we will see shortly, there is no violation of bal tashchis in cutting down a grafted tree.

Often, even a non-expert can detect if a tree was grafted onto a different species by simply scrutinizing the tree. If the bark somewhere near the bottom of the tree looks very different from the upper part of the tree, this indicates that the upper part of the tree was grafted, possibly onto a different species. Before purchasing a new tree at a nursery, examine the trunk carefully for signs of grafting. If, indeed, this tree is the product of a graft onto a different species, then watering or pruning it violates a Torah law, as I will explain. Furthermore, one may not use a sprinkler to irrigate the rest of the lawn on which the tree stands, if this tree will benefit.

NECTARINE TREES

Nectarine trees are susceptible to a host of plant diseases, and, as a result, are usually grafted onto the stock of peach, plum, almond or other trees. It is unclear whether peach and nectarine are halachically considered the same species, but the other species are not the same, according to halacha. Therefore, watering a nectarine tree grafted onto a different species stock probably violates halacha.

By the way, according to halacha, one may plant or maintain different species of trees in close proximity, presumably because grown trees do not look mixed together but stand distinct.

DOES THE PROHIBITION AGAINST GRAFTING APPLY IN CHUTZ LA’ARETZ?

Although most agricultural mitzvos (mitzvos hateluyos ba’aretz), such as terumah, maaser, and shmittah apply only in Eretz Yisrael, some of these mitzvos apply also in chutz la’aretz, such as the mitzvah of orlah, which prohibits using fruit that grows on a tree before it is three years old.

Although the laws of orlah differ when the tree grows in chutz la’aretz, the fruit produced before the tree is three years old is nevertheless prohibited.

Where does kelayim fit into this picture? Of course, some kelayim prohibitions, such as shatnez, cross-breeding animals and lo sacharosh are not agricultural and, therefore, apply equally in Eretz Yisrael and in chutz la’aretz. Among the agricultural prohibitions of kelayim, some apply in chutz la’aretz also, whereas others apply only in Eretz Yisrael.

Planting vegetables and other edible crops together applies only in Eretz Yisrael, grafting trees applies equally in chutz la’aretz and in Eretz Yisrael min hatorah, while planting in a vineyard applies in chutz la’aretz, but only miderabbanan (Kiddushin 39a).

MAY I OWN KELAYIM?

The Gemara (Moed Katan 2b) cites a dispute whether maintaining kelayim in a vineyard (in Eretz Yisrael) is prohibited min hatorah. Rabbi Akiva contends that building a fence to assist the growth of the two different species together violates a Torah law, whereas the Sages contend that it does not (Rashi to Avodah Zarah 64a).

Most poskim conclude that one may not own kelayim in a vineyard, but must remove the plant that is causing kelayim (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 297:2). The Rambam (Hilchos  Kelayim 1:2) paskins that owning kelayim is prohibited only miderabbanan, whereas the Rosh (Hilchos  Kelayim #3) prohibits this min hatorah. (We should note that Shu’t Chasam Sofer [Yoreh Deah #282] contends that Tosafos [to Avodah Zarah 64a s.v. Rabbi Akiva] permits owning kelayim.)

WHAT ABOUT OWNING A GRAFTED TREE?

Most poskim assume that one may not own a kelayim tree, just as one may not own kelayim in a vineyard. Furthermore, they contend that this halacha applies, whether the tree is in Eretz Yisrael or in chutz la’aretz (Rosh, Hilchos  Kelayim Chapters 1& 3; Pischei Teshuvah, Yoreh Deah 295:2, quoting many poskim).

However, in times past, many observant Jews purchased agricultural properties that contained kelayim trees, and they did not cut down those trees. Was there any justification for their actions? Many halachic responsa discuss what was, apparently, a widespread practice in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Whereas most poskim rule that these Jews violated the halacha, some authorities justify the practice of owning grafted trees, at least in chutz la’aretz (Shu’t Chasam Sofer, Yoreh Deah #288; cf. Aruch Hashulchan, Yoreh Deah 295:17-18). Even these opinions agree that it is preferred to follow the stricter approach and cut down the grafted part of the tree.

I THOUGHT THAT ONE MAY NOT CUT DOWN A FRUIT-BEARING TREE?

Although it is usually prohibited to chop down a tree that bears enough fruit to be profitable, this prohibition does not exist when owning the tree involves a prohibition. Furthermore, bal tashchis, generally, does not exist when one is trying to enhance one’s observance of mitzvos.

Nevertheless, it is preferred to have a non-Jew chop down the tree, since he has no mitzvah of bal tashchis.

DOES THE MITZVAH OF KELAYIM APPLY TO NON-JEWS?

In general, a non-Jew is required to observe only seven mitzvos. However, there are many opinions that require non-Jews to observe certain other mitzvos. The Gemara (Sanhedrin 56b) quotes a dispute concerning whether a non-Jew must observe certain of the kelayim mitzvos. According to the Sages, no aspect of the prohibition of kelayim applies to bnei Noach, whereas Rabbi Elazar contends that they are included in some of the kelayim prohibitions, but not others. Specifically, they are prohibited from mating different animal species and from grafting one species of fruit tree onto another, but they may plant different species together or in a vineyard, and they may wear shatnez.

Why are they included in some prohibitions but not others?

Describing the creation of plants, the Torah says: “And G-d said, ‘The earth shall sprout forth vegetation, herbage that produces seed; edible trees that produce fruit of their own species…’ And the earth produced vegetation, herbage that produces seed of its own species and trees that bear seed-bearing fruit of their own species” (Bereishis 1:11-12).

Reading the pasuk carefully, we see that Hashem ordered only the trees, and not the herbaceous plants, to “produce fruit of their own species.”

Even though the herbage did, in the end, produce “seed of its own species,” this was not because it was commanded. The Gemara derives from other sources that, just as the earth was commanded to keep tree species distinct, so, too, Adam harishon and all his descendants were commanded to keep these species distinct. But since the herbaceous world was never commanded to keep its species distinct, Adam was not commanded concerning this halacha. Therefore, although Jews may not plant different species together, bnei Noach may (Yerushalmi Kelayim 1:7, quoted by Gra, Yoreh Deah 295:2).

WHICH OPINION DO WE FOLLOW?

Do we rule like the Sages that a non-Jew is not included in the prohibition of harkavas ilan, or like Rabbi Elazar, that he is? The Rambam (Hilchos Melachim 10:6) rules like Rabbi Elazar, that a non-Jew may not graft one species of tree onto another, whereas the Ritva (Kiddushin 39a s.v. amar Rabbi Yochanan) and the Shach (Yoreh Deah 297:3) are lenient.

Although we usually follow the Rambam’s opinion, some poskim suggest that we might be able to rule leniently, if only a rabbinic prohibition is involved, such as where the grafted tree exists already and one is not watering or pruning it (Chazon Ish, Kelayim 1:1).

MS. BAKER’S SHAYLAH

I mentioned earlier that a Jew who prunes or waters a kelayim tree violates the Torah prohibition, whether in Eretz Yisrael or in chutz la’aretz. According to most authorities, one may not even own this tree, and one is required to cut down the grafted part. However, since this last prohibition is only miderabbanan, according to most poskim, non-Jews may allow a grafted tree to survive and may even build a fence around it, since they are not required to observe rabbinic prohibitions. (Compare, however, Shu’t Mahari Asad, Yoreh Deah #350 and Shu’t Maharsham 1:179.) Ms. Baker may not water or prune a grafted tree, because that is halachically equivalent to planting it, which is prohibited according to most opinions. In my opinion, she may also not operate her sprinkler system to irrigate her lawn, if the kelayim tree will benefit as a result.

May Ms. Baker ask another non-Jew to water her tree? The poskim dispute whether a non-Jew may ask or hire someone else to violate a mitzvah. Most contend that this is permissible, because the mitzvah of lifnei iveir, causing someone else to violate a mitzvah, does not apply to non-Jews (Tosafos, Avodah Zarah 16b s.v. lenachri). Other authorities (Ginas Veradim, Klal 43) prohibit this, basing themselves on earlier sources that prohibit a ben Noach from violating a transgression that logic tells us to avoid (Rabbeinu Nissim, Introduction to Shas).

MAY WE EAT THE FRUITS OF A GRAFTED TREE?

One may eat the fruits of a grafted tree (Rambam, Hilchos  Kelayim 1:7, based on Yerushalmi). One may even take the shoot of a grafted tree and plant it, after it has been severed from the original tree.

SEPARATION OF SPECIES

In all six types of kelayim mentioned above, the general criterion is to avoid the appearance of different species being intermingled.

Concerning this, Rav Hirsch (Vayikra 19:19) writes, “The Great Lawgiver of the world separates the countless numbers of His creations in all their manifold diversity, and assigns to each one of them a separate purpose and a separate form for its purpose.”

In addition, observing the laws of kelayim helps us remember how various species obeyed Hashem’s instructions to remain separate during their creation (the source for some halachos of kelayim, as we saw above). This reminds the contemplative Jew that if the plants heeded Hashem’s word during the Creation, how much more are we obligated to obey all His instructions.

The author thanks Dr. Joshua Klein of the Volcani Institute and Rabbi Shmuel Silinsky for their tremendous assistance in providing horticultural information for this article.

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Food Coloring and Shabbos

Question #1: Mixing drinks

“May I mix red and white wines on Shabbos?”

Question #2: Cake decorating

“May I decorate a cake on Shabbos?”

Answer:

One of the 39 melachos, prohibited activities, of Shabbos is tzovei’a, dyeing. Tzovei’a was performed during the construction of the Mishkan when they dyed the rams’ hides red, as well as when they dyed the woolen threads used in the curtains and the clothing of the kohanim (Yerushalmi, Shabbos 7:2, referring to Shemos 25:5, 26:14, 35:7,23; 36:19, 39:34). Staining furniture, dyeing cloth or painting a rustproof finish on a metal trim (see Minchas Chinuch, Mitzvah 32:15) on Shabbos or Yom Tov all violate this melacha. Someone who paints a house on Shabbos is punishable for two different melachos, tzovei’a and boneh, construction (Tiferes Yisrael, Kalkeles Shabbos #15).

Dyeing food

The opening questions concern the following topic: May one color food on Shabbos or Yom Tov? As we will see shortly, many halachic authorities contend that the melacha of tzovei’a does not apply to edible items. Why should food be treated differently from furniture or clothing?

Egging on your mustard!

To begin, let us note a Talmudic passage that implies that tzovei’a does not apply to food. The Mishnah (Shabbos 139b) rules that one may add egg to mustard seeds on Shabbos, which the Gemara (140a) explains to mean even when the goal is for the yolk to color the mustard more yellow than it is naturally. Why is this not prohibited as dyeing on Shabbos?

An early authority, the Shibbolei Haleket (#86), explains that adding egg to mustard is permitted because of a halachic principle that he calls ein tzovei’a ba’ochlin, the melacha of dyeing does not apply to food. Because of this principle, he permits dipping bread into fruit juice on Shabbos in order to color it. Since the position of the Shibbolei Haleket is the only opinion on the subject quoted by the Beis Yosef (Orach Chayim 320), we are not surprised to find that Rav Yosef Karo, the author of the Beis Yosef, ruled in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 320:19) that ein tzovei’a ba’ochlin, without even mentioning that some authorities reject this ruling. Because of ein tzovei’a ba’ochlin, the Shulchan Aruch permits using saffron to color food on Shabbos.

Although we have now established a halachic precedent for ein tzovei’a ba’ochlin, we still do not know a rationale why this principle should be true. Among the later authorities, we find several approaches to explain why ein tzovei’a ba’ochlin.

Dyeing is forever!

The first approach requires a bit of an introduction, because we will be comparing dyeing to other melacha activities that do not apply to food. The Gemara cites a dispute whether salting meat heavily so that it will not spoil, as was done commonly in earlier generations, violates the melacha of tanning (me’abeid) on Shabbos (Shabbos 75b). Rabbah bar Rav Huna contends that salting meat on Shabbos to preserve it for a long trip is prohibited min hatorah, whereas Rava maintains that salting meat or any other food can never violate this melacha min hatorah, a position he explains as ein ibud ba’ochlin, the melacha of tanning does not apply to food.

Both Rabbah bar Rav Huna and Rava agree that the salting of meat to remove its blood, what we call kashering, does not violate the Torah prohibition of tanning (Shabbos 75b). According to Rava, even the heavy salting done to preserve meat for months is not comparable to the salting that preserves hides, which is prohibited min hatorah. The goal of tanning hides is to make leather that will last as long as wood does, which is not the goal when salting food, even for preservation purposes.

The Chasam Sofer explains that the reason for ein tzovei’a ba’ochlin is closely related to the principle of ein ibud ba’ochlinthe melacha of tanning does not apply to food. He contends that the melacha of dyeing applies only to items that one can dye permanently (Chasam Sofer, Shabbos 75a, s.v. Rav). The coloring on food is never meant to be forever, since one’s goal is that the food is eaten.

Following this approach, we find that some authorities understand ein tzovei’a ba’ochlin in a very broad way. The Chacham Tzvi (Shu”t Chacham Tzvi 2:92) implies that the principle of ein tzovei’a ba’ochlin permits using fruit juice or other edible dye to paint one’s hands on Shabbos. Since the source of the dye is edible, as long as one does not use it to color clothing and other items where the color may set in a permanent way, it is permitted to do so. We should note that later authorities reject this broad heter of the Chacham Tzvi (see, for example, Pri Megadim, Eishel Avraham 320:25).

Rabbinic limitations

Others note that the comparison of dyeing to tanning should have us conclude that dyeing food does not constitute a violation min hatorah, because it is not permanent, but it should still be prohibited on Shabbos and Yom Tov because of a rabbinic injunction. The same is true regarding kashering meat on Shabbos. Although it does not violate any Torah prohibition, it is prohibited because of a rabbinic injunction, as noted by Tosafos (Shabbos 75b). Yet, we see that it is permitted lechatchilah to color mustard seeds with yolk on Shabbos. According to what we have just said, this should be prohibited because of a rabbinic injunction.

The Chayei Adam answers that using an item that is commonly viewed as a colorant is prohibited because of rabbinic injunction, but coloring food with an item not usually considered a colorant, such as egg yolk, is permitted lechatchilah (Chayei Adam 24:5, Nishmas Adam 24:3).

A difference in practical halacha results between the two opinions we have quoted: the approach of the Chasam Sofer, that painting food is never considered tzovei’a, and that of his contemporary, the Chayei Adam. According to the Chasam Sofer’s approach, any food coloring may be added on Shabbos, even something commonly used to add color, such as saffron. According to the Chayei Adam’s approach, ein tzovei’a ba’ochlin is limited to items that are not usually considered colorants, such as fruit juice or egg yolk. The Chayei Adam expressly disputes the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch, quoted above, who permitted using saffron on Shabbos as a food color, contending that saffron may not be used, since it is a commonly used colorant (Nishmas Adam).

Color is like flavor

There is yet a third way to understand why ein tzovei’a ba’ochlin. The Kehillas Yaakov (Shabbos #40) explains that the melacha of dyeing is violated only when one intends to create a beautiful item. One adds color to food not so that the item should be more beautiful, but to make it more appetizing to eat. As any caterer or restaurateur will tell you, serving food in a colorful and eye-catching way is an important factor in making a repast a pleasant experience. According to this approach, coloring food on Shabbos is permitted, just as one may flavor food, even if one uses a colorant, such as saffron. Thus, we can explain why the Shulchan Aruch permitted using saffron on Shabbos, either according to the approach of the Chasam Sofer or according to the approach of the Kehillas Yaakov.

On the other hand, the approach of the Kehillas Yaakov permits tzovei’a ba’ochlin only when one’s goal is to make the food more palatablee. However, dyeing food to demonstrate that the colorant creates a permanent hue desecrates Shabbos. It is prohibited, perhaps min hatorah, to use food color when your goal is to create an exhibition, and not simply to encourage people to eat (Pri Megadim; Eishel Avraham 320:25). Similarly, one may not color water when one does not intend to serve it, since the purpose of the dyeing is not to make it more attractive as a food (Chayei Adam 24:4; Tiferes Yisrael, Kalkeles Shabbos #15).

We should note that one major authority rules that the last instance of tzovei’a, mixing food color and water, is not prohibited min hatorah, but for a totally unrelated reason. The Rogatchover Gaon explains that the definition of tzovei’a requires that pigment is placed on the surface of an item, such as is done when painting or dyeing (Commentary to Hilchos Shabbos, 9:14). However, in his opinion, mixing dye with water is not placing a color atop an item, but an act of diluting pigment, and, therefore, does not qualify as tzovei’a.

Cake decorating

May one decorate a celebratory cake with various food colors on Shabbos? On the one hand, this is food that will soon be consumed, so perhaps this should be included under the rubric of ein tzovei’a ba’ochlin. On the other hand, one can argue that, in this instance, the purpose of the coloring is not to attract people to eat the cake. Rather, the decorating is to use the cake as a means of conveying good wishes to the celebrant, and the color, therefore, does not serve a food purpose. Therefore, according to the Kehillos Yaakov, this is similar to coloring food on Shabbos as part of an exhibition, which is prohibited.

Adding red wine to white

Here is another case which might be affected by the dispute why ein tzovei’a ba’ochlin. Based on a pasuk in Mishlei (23:31) that implies that red wine is preferred, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 472:11) rules that it is preferred to use red wine for the four cups of wine at the Seder (based on Bava Basra 97b). The question is raised by early authorities: If one has reasons to use a white wine for the seder, but wants to provide a reddish tinge to fulfill this halachic preference, may he mix red and white wines together on Shabbos or Yom Tov? Is this permitted because of ein tzovei’a ba’ochlin?

The Darchei Moshe (end of Orach Chayim 320) quotes a dispute between the Agur and Rav Avraham Mintz. The Agur quotes that he heard from Rav Avraham Mintz that mixing the wines is prohibited because of tzovei’a, whereas the Agur himself permits it, because of ein tzovei’a ba’ochlin, just as one may add egg yolk to mustard seeds.

According to the first two approaches to explain ein tzovei’a ba’ochlin, it should be permitted to mix the wines. The blended wine will soon be consumed, and, therefore, this coloring is certainly not permanent. Furthermore, wine is not usually considered a colorant. So why did Rav Avraham Mintz prohibit it?

We can suggest the following: Perhaps he understood the halacha similar to the way the Kehillas Yaakov did – that the reason we permit coloring food on Shabbos is to make it attractive and this is considered equivalent to flavoring it. This halacha is true only when the coloring is to encourage people to eat the food. However, blending red and white wine because he wants the wine to fulfill those opinions that hold that red wine is halachically preferable is an act of coloring and forbidden. This, reasoned Rav Avraham Mintz, is not included under the heter of ein tzovei’a ba’ochlin (see Mishnah Berurah 320:56). (We should note that the Nishmas Adam 24:3 presents a different approach to explain the position of Rav Avraham Mintz.)

A challenge

Notwithstanding the extensive discussion I have presented of the concept ein tzovei’a ba’ochlin, many authorities challenge the conclusion that ein tzovei’a ba’ochlin, based on the following Talmudic passage:

The Gemara (Shabbos 75a) cites a dispute between Rav and Shmuel germane to the question of how many melachos of Shabbos someone violates if he slaughters (shechts) an animal on Shabbos. Shmuel rules that he has violated only one melacha, that of taking a life. Rav contends that he violates two, one for taking a life and a second for dyeing, since one desires that potential purchasers see that the meat is fresh (see Rashi ad locum). Since Rav contends that coloring the meat red with blood is prohibited min hatorah as an act of dyeing, he presumably disputes the ruling of ein tzovei’a ba’ochlin!

In terms of halacha lema’aseh, the question becomes even stronger, since the majority of authorities rule according to Rav (Semag; Yerei’im; Semak; Or Zarua; Meiri; Rashi, Bava Kama 34b s.v. betzarich). [We should note that several authorities, including the Chasam Sofer, the Nishmas Adam (24:1), and the Avnei Neizer, understand that the Rambam ruled according to Shmuel.] Indeed, we should be aware that, on the basis of this Gemara, one major rishon disputes the entire principle of ein tzovei’a ba’ochlin and rules that it is prohibited to color foods on Shabbos (Tosafos Rid, Shabbos 75b; see also Shu”t Avnei Neizer, Orach Chayim 1:173). It is possible that Rav Avraham of Mintz held this way also, and that this is the reason he prohibited mixing red and white wine on Shabbos. However, most authorities conclude that ein tzovei’a ba’ochlin, which means that we must have some way of explaining why Rav prohibited shechting an animal because it violates tzovei’a.

Meat or hide?

It is possible that Rav does not dispute the principle of ein tzovei’a ba’ochlin, and that he ruled that one violates tzovei’a when slaughtering an animal only when the hide is bloodied, but not for the bloodying of the meat. Hide is not food, and coloring it has the halachic status of dyeing leather, which is certainly forbidden min hatorah. Indeed, there are rishonim who explain that Rav contends that one violates tzovei’a only when he wants the hide to look red (Sefer Yerei’im; Or Zarua).

Although this approach has much merit, there must be another way to explain the difference between Rav’s case and the principle of ein tzovei’a ba’ochlin. This is because Rashi explains that Rav ruled that one violates tzovei’a even when he wanted only the meat to look red. According to Rashi, we must look further to find an answer why Rav ruled that providing fresh meat with a bloody surface violates tzovei’a min hatorah, notwithstanding that ein tzovei’a ba’ochlin.

Meat versus mustard!

Indeed, many authorities contend that there is a qualitative difference between coloring mustard seed with yolk and coloring meat with blood. In the meat case, one is not trying to make a ready-to-eat food more attractive, which is halachically equivalent to flavoring food and therefore permitted. Rather, the slaughterer’s interest is to sell the meat, and reddening the meat is to make it more attractive for purchase. This may be no different from painting a house that one is selling, which is done to make it more aesthetically pleasing and attractive to a potential buyer. Both activities are prohibited min hatorah on Shabbos (Nishmas Adam 24:3).

An alternative approach to explain why Rav considered bloodying meat an act of dyeing min hatorah is because ein tzovei’a ba’ochlin applies only to food that can be eaten immediately. However, the freshly slaughtered meat that Rav describes requires soaking and salting to make it kosher for the Jewish table (Shu”t Chacham Tzvi 2:92; Shu”t Avnei Neizer, Orach Chayim 1:173).

Food color to whiskey

Would adding colorant to hard liquor on Shabbos to make it more salable violate a Torah prohibition of dyeing? According to the last reason we have cited, it would, and, indeed, the Pri Megadim (Eishel Avraham 320:25) prohibits adding colorant on Shabbos to whiskey or mead that is for sale, contending that the heter of ein tzovei’a ba’ochlin does not apply in this instance.

In conclusion

Most, but not all, authorities rule that ein tzovei’a ba’ochlin, at least when one is using something that is usually not considered to be a pigment. For example, Rav Shelomoh Zalman Auerbach (Shulchan Shelomoh to 320:19) rules that one may add syrup (petel) to water on Shabbos, even if the syrup contains food coloring that adds no taste, since the purpose is to make the beverage attractive for people to drink. However, someone desiring a specific variety of petel, because of an affinity for its particular color, should not mix it on Shabbos. It seems that this is not adding color to encourage people to drink the beverage, but it is considered producing a particular shade for aesthetic reasons.

Hashkafah

Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch (Shemos 20:10) notes that people mistakenly assume that work is prohibited on Shabbos, in order to provide a day of rest. This is incorrect, he points out, because the Torah does not prohibit doing avodah, which connotes hard work, but melacha, which implies work with purpose and accomplishment. On Shabbos, we refrain from altering the world with our own creative acts and, instead, emphasize Hashem’s all-encompassing role (Rav Hirsch’s Commentary to Shemos 20:11).

Our current discussion provides an excellent example to prove this point. Whether someone violates the Shabbos melacha of dyeing is not at all dependent on how hard he worked, but on abstract principles that determine whether this act is considered a creative act of man or not. Thus, understanding the laws of tzovei’a on Shabbos provides greater insight into how the true Builder and Creator of the world wants us to understand the beauty of Shabbos.

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Chol Hamo’eid – Weekday or Yom Tov?

Question #1: My shoes tore on Yom Tov. May I have them repaired on Chol Hamo’eid?

Question #2: The supermarket has something on sale on Chol Hamo’eid that I need for after Yom Tov. May I purchase it?

Question #3: I am visiting my parents in Chutz La’aretz for Yom Tov. I know that cooking on Chol Hamo’eid is permitted only for Yom Tov and Chol Hamo’eid. Does the fact that I must keep two days of Yom Tov while in Chutz La’aretz permit me to cook on Chol Hamo’eid for their Simchas Torah?

Question #4: Someone told me that Chol Hamo’eid is sometimes stricter than Shabbos. How can that be?

Answering these shaylos provides an opportunity to discuss the important and complicated halachos of Chol Hamo’eid. As the Gemara (Mo’eid Katan 12a) points out, the halachos of Chol Hamo’eid are hard to categorize. Therefore, although a short article cannot possibly explain all the halachos of Chol Hamo’eid, I will present many of the principles and provide a basis for each individual to ask his or her own shaylos.

The Gemara (Chagigah 18a) implies that working on Chol Hamo’eid is forbidden min haTorah. Indeed, observing Chol Hamo’eid is included in the mitzvah of keeping Yom Tov, which is testimony of Hashem’s special relationship with the Jewish people (Pesachim 118a with Rashbam).

The Torah describes four mitzvos as an “Os,” a sign of Hashem’s relationship with us: Bris Milah, Shabbos, Yom Tov (including Chol Hamo’eid) and Tefillin. Because Chol Hamo’eid is included in this very special category, Jews should treat Chol Hamo’eid with great respect. Indeed, the Gemara states that disregarding the kedusha of the Yomim Tovim, including Chol Hamo’eid, is like idolatry (Pesachim 118a with Rashbam). Some commentators explain that this includes even someone who fails to serve special meals in honor of Chol Hamo’eid (Bartenura, Avos 3:11). Observing Chol Hamo’eid appropriately attests to our special relationship with Hashem.

DEFINING WORK ON CHOL HAMO’EID

Chol Hamo’eid is an unusual holiday. On the one hand it is Yom Tov, and we may not engage in many melacha activities. On the other hand, we may do many activities that enhance the celebration of Yom Tov.

The laws determining what is permitted and what is prohibited on Chol Hamo’eid are very detailed and technical. What really governs whether something is permitted on Chol Hamo’eid or not? The Gemara explains that the Torah prohibits doing some melachos on Chol Hamo’eid, yet “passed on to Chazal the rules of what melacha is prohibited and what is permitted” (Chagigah 18a).

What does this mean? Is the foundation of this mitzvah min haTorah, or is it miderabbanan? How could the Torah create a prohibition and “pass on to Chazal” what is prohibited?

Here are three basic interpretations of this Gemara:

1. Some rishonim (Tosafos, Chagigah 18a) explain that melacha on Chol Hamo’eid is an asmachta, meaning something the Torah implies that it does not want us to do, but does not expressly forbid (see Ritva, Rosh Hashanah 16a). According to this approach, the Torah did not want Bnei Yisroel to work on Chol Hamo’eid, but never prohibited it. Thus, when the Gemara implies that melacha on Chol Hamo’eid is prohibited min haTorah, it is presenting the Torah’s sentiment, not a commandment. Working on Chol Hamo’eid violates the spirit of Yom Tov, but does not violate the letter of the law. Chazal then implemented the Torah’s sentiment as law, by forbidding certain melachos on Chol Hamo’eid. Since Chazal created the prohibition, they also created the rules, prohibiting some activities and permitting others.

2. Other rishonim explain that the details of Chol Hamo’eid law are part of Torah Shebe’al Peh that Hashem gave Moshe Rabbeinu at Har Sinai for him to transmit orally (Ritva, Mo’eid Katan 2a). Thus, someone who violates the laws of Chol Hamo’eid is violating a Torah prohibition, just as someone who violated any other interpretation of a Torah law that is transmitted to us through Chazal.

3. A third interpretation is that although the Torah prohibited melacha on Chol Hamo’eid, it delegated to Chazal the power to decide what to prohibit and what to permit. Thus, even though Chazal formulated the rules that govern Chol Hamo’eid, someone who violates them abrogates Torah law (Rashi, Chagigah 18a).

Whether the prohibition of melacha is min haTorah or only miderabbanan, the purpose of Chol Hamo’eid is to devote one’s time to learning Torah (Yerushalmi, Mo’eid Katan 2:3). In addition, ceasing from certain melachos elevates Chol Hamo’eid above ordinary weekdays (Rambam, Hilchos Yom Tov 7:1).

This last reason is a theme that lies behind the complex details of the laws of Chol Hamo’eid: we desist from activity that detracts from the purpose of Yom Tov. For this reason, Chazal prohibited some activities on Chol Hamo’eid that are not necessarily melacha, but nonetheless detract from the Yom Tov experience. These prohibited activities include:

1. Commerce that is not necessary for the festival.

2. Moving to a new residence.

COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY

Chazal prohibited business activity on Chol Hamo’eid, unless it is to enhance the festival or to prevent financial loss (Mo’eid Katan 10b). Even business that is permitted should be conducted in a discreet way that does not disturb kedushas Yom Tov (Mishnah, Mo’eid Katan 13b). Thus, Chazal ruled that a clothing store may sell clothes to be worn on the festival, but that its main door to the street should be closed. If it has two doors to the street, one may be open and the other should be closed, in order to demonstrate that today is Chol Hamo’eid (Gemara ad loc.; Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim, 539:11).

A store selling only perishable food items may remain open in the usual manner, since everything purchased there is for Chol Hamo’eid and Yom Tov (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim, 539:10).

Thus, according to the Gemara and Shulchan Aruch, a Jew may not open his store for business as usual on Chol Hamo’eid (see Shu”t Chasam Sofer #1, at end). In the modern world, this is a hardship for business owners who may lose regular customers to their competitors who do not observe Chol Hamo’eid. The poskim consider loss of regular customers as a davar ha’avud that allows the business to make some accommodations. Details of this halacha are discussed by the poskim, and each store owner should ask his rav what to do (see Biur Halacha 539:5).

MOVING

Although one could, theoretically, change dwellings in a way that involves no melacha, the move itself is very strenuous and distracting. Therefore, Chazal forbade moving on Chol Hamo’eid (Mishnah, Mo’eid Katan 13a). Sometimes, moving results in an enhancement of Yom Tov, under which circumstances Chazal permitted it. Again, if someone feels that his particular circumstances may be included, he should ask his rav.

EASY WORK

On the other hand, one is permitted to do melacha that does not detract from the atmosphere of Chol Hamo’eid. Therefore, Chazal permitted moving muktzah items on Chol Hamo’eid (Tosafos, Shabbos 22a s. v. Sukkah), since this does not disturb the purpose of the day. Similarly, many poskim permit performing an actual melacha if it involves little effort, even if it does not fulfill any festival purpose (Terumas Hadeshen #153). According to these opinions, one may strike a match or take a photograph on Chol Hamo’eid, even if no festival need is involved. There are poskim who dispute this and permit such activities only to fulfill a festival need (see Shu”t Radbaz #727).

FOOD PREPARATION

Chazal permitted activities that enhance Chol Hamo’eid and Yom Tov, such as cooking and shopping for Yom Tov and traveling for festival purposes. One may grind, select, knead and perform other standard kitchen activities for Yom Tov or Chol Hamo’eid meals, but should not prepare for after Yom Tov.

This presents us with a problem that many people overlook. Since one may not cook on Chol Hamo’eid for after Yom Tov, someone living in Eretz Yisroel who observes one day of Yom Tov may not cook on Chol Hamo’eid for one’s Chutz La’aretz guests the food for Acharon shel Pesach or Simchas Torah of Chutz La’aretz, because these days are no longer Yom Tov for a resident of Eretz Yisroel. Thus, one is cooking on Chol Hamo’eid for after Yom Tov. This can result in an interesting problem. The visiting guests need to be served a special Yom Tov meal on the evening of Acharon shel Pesach or their Simchas Torah, yet the host/hostess, who lives in Eretz Yisroel, may not cook this meal on Chol Hamo’eid.

This problem has a simple solution, if one plans in advance. One can either wait until after Yom Tov is over to begin cooking for the Chutz La’aretz guests, or one may cook a lot on Chol Hamo’eid for Shemini Atzeres (called Simchas Torah in Eretz Yisroel) or the Seventh day of Pesach, making sure to serve something from each course on the Eretz Yisroel’s Simchas Torah (Shemini Atzeres) or Shvi’i shel Pesach. Then one serves the “leftovers” on the last day.

MAASEH HEDYOT, UNSKILLED WORK

Chazal permitted making and repairing items that are needed on Chol Hamo’eid, provided one does not use a skilled method (meleches uman) to do so. For example, one may tune an instrument, if it requires no special skills (Shu”t Shevus Yaakov #25). Shulchan Aruch (540:5) rules that one may build an animal’s trough in an unskilled way. Similarly, one may perform household repairs that serve a festival purpose in an unskilled manner (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 540:1). However, they may not be performed in a skilled way, unless a financial loss is involved (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 537:1).

Many years ago, a talmid chacham visited me on Chol Hamo’eid and noticed that one of our front steps was damaged and somewhat dangerous. Ruling that repairing the step is a meleches hedyot, he proceeded to measure the step, purchased a suitable piece of lumber and nailed it in.

However, one may not do skilled work on Chol Hamo’eid. Therefore, one may not develop film (does anybody still do this?), even for a festival purpose, since this is skilled work. However, one may use a digital camera, even though the picture “develops” on Chol Hamo’eid, since no skill is involved. Similarly, one may not repair shoes on Chol Hamo’eid, since this is skilled work. Theoretically, one may repair them in an unskilled way or with a shinui, meaning in an unusual way; however, neither of these methods is a practical way to repair shoes. As we will see later, one may not have a gentile shoemaker repair them either.

MAY I REPAIR A GARMENT FOR YOM TOV WEAR?

One may repair a torn garment in order to wear it on Yom Tov or Chol Hamo’eid, but only if one sews it in an unusual way or it is sewn by an unskilled person (Mishnah Mo’eid Katan 8b). In this instance, Chazal permitted the use of a shinui (doing something in an unusual way) for the sake of Yom Tov or Chol Hamo’eid. However, a skilled person may not sew in a normal way, even to fulfill a festival need.

Why did Chazal draw a distinction between skilled and unskilled work, and with a shinui and without? Does requiring the use of a shinui to repair a garment enhance the spirit of Yom Tov?

It appears that Chazal felt that regulating how one performs this activity reminds a person that today is Chol Hamo’eid, even while engaged in a melacha activity. This enhances the spirit of Yom Tov that should imbue all the days of Chol Hamo’eid.

“A WORKER WHO DOES NOT HAVE FOOD TO EAT”

Chazal permitted a worker who cannot provide his family with meat and wine for Yom Tov to work on Chol Hamo’eid (Biur Halacha 545:3; cf., however, the Magen Avraham 542:1, who says that only a worker who cannot provide bread for Yom Tov may work.) It is self-understood why permitting this melacha enhances Yom Tov.

DAVAR HA’AVUD, FINANCIAL LOSS

One of the situations where Chazal permitted working on Chol Hamo’eid is when financial loss will result, if the job waits until after Yom Tov. This is allowed, because otherwise a person may worry about his loss and spoil his simchas Yom Tov (Ritva, Mo’eid Katan 13a).

Another application of preventing financial loss is that one may repair a broken lock or a broken alarm system on Chol Hamo’eid (Mishnah Mo’eid Katan 11a). Similarly, someone may remove a stain from a garment that might become ruined. An employee may go to work on Chol Hamo’eid, if taking vacation will jeopardize his job. However, if he can take unpaid vacation on Chol Hamo’eid without jeopardizing his job, he may not work.

Someone may purchase an item that he will definitely need after Yom Tov, if the item is on sale during Chol Hamo’eid. Poskim conclude that this is considered a davar ha’avud (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 539:9).

Because of davar ha’avud, the Mishnah (Mo’eid Katan 2a) permits watering an irrigated field on Chol Hamo’eid, if a week without water will harm the growing produce. However, one may not irrigate a field that receives adequate rain, even though it benefits considerably from additional water. The latter situation is one of creating profit, for which I may not do melacha on Chol Hamo’eid; one may do melacha only to avoid loss and not to avoid loss of profit (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 537:1). Thus, although one may not engage in commercial activity in order to generate new business, one may service existing customers.

The rationale for distinguishing between loss and potential profit is that people become upset when they lose something they already own and this then disturbs their Yom Tov, but people are bothered much less when they lose potential profit.

LAUNDRY

Chazal prohibited laundering, shaving and haircutting on Chol Hamo’eid, precisely in order to enhance Yom Tov. In earlier days, people did their laundry and shaved only occasionally and may have postponed doing them before Yom Tov. To enhance Yom Tov observance, Chazal prohibited laundering, shaving and haircutting on Chol Hamo’eid to guarantee that people would make sure to attend to such things before Yom Tov.

Chazal permitted laundering handkerchiefs and children’s clothes, since, even if they are washed before Yom Tov, they get soiled very quickly (Mishnah Mo’eid Katan 14a; Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 534:1).

Many poskim permit removing a spot from a garment on Chol Hamo’eid, contending that this was not included in the gezeirah. However, one may not have this garment dry cleaned, even at a gentile’s shop, since this would, indeed, violate the gezeirah against doing laundry. One may iron, because it is not included in the gezeirah (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 541:3). However, one may not make a new pleat, because it involves skilled work [meleches uman] (Magen Avraham 541:5).

WORK THROUGH A GENTILE

May a gentile do a type of work on my behalf on Chol Hamo’eid that Chazal prohibited me to do myself?

In general, if I may not do something myself on Chol Hamo’eid, I may not have a gentile do it, either (Mo’eid Katan 12a; Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 543:1). However, if the non-Jew is a contractor paid by the job, there are some situations when I may allow him to work on Chol Hamo’eid.

WHY IS THIS CASE DIFFERENT?

When I pay someone by the job, it is halachically viewed as if he is working for himself and not for me. Therefore, when I hire a non-Jewish contractor and he chooses to work on Shabbos or Chol Hamo’eid, it is not considered that someone is working for me on these holy days. I may, therefore, allow him to work on Chol Hamo’eid, provided no one thinks that he is my employee.

Therefore, if I meet the following conditions, I need not prevent the gentile from working on Chol Hamo’eid:

1. I pay him a flat fee to complete the job, not an hourly or daily wage.

2. I hire him before Yom Tov and I do not instruct him to work on Chol Hamo’eid.

3. The gentile performs the work in a way that other Jews do not know that he is working for me. Thus, the gentile must work on his own premises and in a way and place that no one knows that he is working for a Jew.

I will explain this halacha with an actual case: Friedman’s Department Store, which is located outside a Jewish community, retains Tim McCartney as a contract gardener to maintain the lawn and hedges around the store. Must Mr. Friedman insist that his gentile gardener not work on Shabbos, Yom Tov, Chol Hamo’eid, even when it fits his regular routine?

The halacha is that Mr. Friedman may allow Tim to work on Shabbos or Yom Tov, but must insist that he refrain on Chol Hamo’eid.

HOW CAN CHOL HAMO’EID BE STRICTER THAN SHABBOS?

Since Friedman’s Department Store is not within walking distance to any Jewish community, we may assume that no observant Jew will see Tim trimming the hedges on Shabbos and Yom Tov and think that Mr. Friedman hired him to work on Shabbos or Yom Tov. Therefore, since Tim is a contractor he may do the work (Mo’eid Katan 12a; Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 244:1).

However, on Chol Hamo’eid, since it is permitted to travel, a frum Jew might indeed see Tim mowing Friedman’s lawn and think that a Jew hired Tim to work on Chol Hamo’eid. Therefore, Tim may not mow the lawn or trim the hedges on Chol Hamo’eid (Mo’eid Katan 12a; Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 543:2). (The irony is that he may do so on Shabbos or Yom Tov since we can assume that no frum Jew will be in this neighborhood!)

Chol Hamo’eid provides many unique opportunities to experience our special relationship with Hashem. When we observe it properly, we demonstrate the tremendous os between Hashem and us. May we always merit demonstrating Hashem’s presence amongst us and in His world!!

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Second Day of Rosh Hashanah

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Question #1: Second Day?!

“Is it universally accepted that everyone in Eretz Yisroel is required to observe two days of Rosh Hashanah?”

Question #2: Second Day Haftarah

“Why do we read the specific haftarah that we do on the second day of Rosh Hashanah?”

Question #3: Second Day of Judgment!?

“How can our tefillos refer to the second day of Rosh Hashanah as the ‘Day of Judgment,’ when we were already judged on the first day?”

Introduction:

The Torah describes Rosh Hashanah as a one-day holiday that falls on the first day of the seventh month, the date that is Rosh Chodesh Tishrei. Yet, as we all know, we observe two days of Rosh Hashanah.

Each of the opening three questions notes something anomalous concerning this concept of two days of Rosh Hashanah, although, as we will see, the answers to these questions are not closely related to one another. Before discussing the opening questions, I need to provide some introduction. Let us enter a time machine and bring ourselves back to the era when there was a functioning Sanhedrin.

Among the numerous and multifaceted responsibilities of the Sanhedrin, also called by its proper Hebrew name, the Beis Din Hagadol, was overseeing the Jewish calendar. In that era, the determination of whether Rosh Chodesh would be on the thirtieth or on the thirty-first day (counting from the previous Rosh Chodesh) was uncertain, until the head of the Sanhedrin, called the nasi, declared it such. The Beis Din did not declare the thirtieth day as Rosh Chodesh until two witnesses testified that they had seen the new moon. Only after the witnesses were cross-examined by the Beis Din, and their testimony was analyzed carefully, did the Beis Din declare the thirtieth day to be Rosh Chodesh.

(By the way, the Beis Din was quite certain as to when the new moon occurred, where it could be located in the sky and whether the testimony of the witnesses was accurate. Notwithstanding that the Beis Din had all this information, the Torah requires eyewitness testimony of a sighting of the new moon. The witnesses and the Beis Din are fulfilling a mitzvah min haTorah by using this system to “determine” the new moon, notwithstanding that no new technical information is gleaned from the witnesses’ testimony.)

During this era, anyone not within walking distance of the Sanhedrin would be uncertain whether Elul was 29 or 30 days long, and, therefore, would also be uncertain whether Rosh Hashanah is the 30th or the 31st day after Rosh Chodesh Elul. Because of this uncertainty, everyone observed two days of Rosh Hashanah. The only possible exception was the town in which the Beis Din Hagadol met, where they would be certain during Rosh Hashanah which day had been chosen.

Sometimes, even the town in which the Beis Din Hagadol met was required to observe two days Rosh Hashanah, not because of an uncertainty, but because of a takanas chachamim. The Mishnah (Rosh Hashanah 30b) explains that once, when the Beis Hamikdash still stood, the witnesses attesting to the new moon appeared in Beis Din late in the afternoon of Rosh Hashanah. By the time the Beis Din had declared that day to be Rosh Chodesh and Rosh Hashanah, the afternoon korban tamid had already been offered. Since this korban had been offered before any declaration that the day was Rosh Chodesh, the Levi’im accompanied the korban by singing the shirah of the weekday korban. Result: the shirah specific for Rosh Hashanah was not sung that day as accompaniment to the daily korban.

To make sure that this situation did not recur, Chazal instituted that, should witnesses arrive after the afternoon korban was offered, Beis Din would not accept them, thus automatically postponing Rosh Hashanah to the next day, so that the correct shirah would

 be sung on that day. Although once Beis Din knew that they would not accept witnesses, the first day was no longer Rosh Hashanah, Chazal required that it be kept as such (as a takanah) so that, in the future, people would not be lax in observing the assumed day of Rosh Hashanah.

What is significant about this takanah is that now there could be instances when Chazal declared two days of Rosh Hashanah. Until this time, observing two days of Rosh Hashanah had always been only a result of uncertainty, because of lack of local knowledge about the decision of the Beis Din. Henceforth, observing two days of Rosh Hashanah was sometimes a takanas chachamim.

We realize that all of these reasons made it impossible for local schools to send out annual Jewish calendars as fundraisers. But the schools in this era had a different and much more efficient method to raise necessary funds. This is a topic we will discuss at some time in the future.

Changes because of permanent calendar

Thus far, we have explained the historical background to the observance of two days of Rosh Hashanah. However, today we do not wait for the Sanhedrin to determine which day is Rosh Chodesh. Hillel Hanasi (not to be confused with his better-known and much earlier ancestor, Hillel Hazakein), realizing that the Roman persecutions of his time (the third century C. E.), would soon make it impossible for Sanhedrin to function in Eretz Yisroel, created a predetermined calendar. His incredibly accurate and vastly simplified calendar allowed someone equipped with paper, pencil and a reasonable faculty for numbers to calculate the calendar, until the Sanhedrin again exists. In other words, Hillel set the Jewish calendar on autopilot.

(This is not halachically preferable. Ideally, the decisions germane to the calendar should be based upon witnesses and the monthly input of the Sanhedrin. However, Hillel Hanasi’s system is permitted when using the Sanhedrin is not an option.)

With the implementation of the new calendar not dependent on month-by-month decisions of Beis Din, the following observation was raised: At this point in history, people in chutz la’aretz can calculate definitively which day is Yom Tov. If so, there should be no reason to observe two days of any Yom Tov anymore (Beitzah 4b).

The Gemara explains that a special takanah was instituted at this time in history. The Beis Din in Eretz Yisroel sent a message to those in chutz la’aretz to continue observing a second day of Yom Tov, which is usually called yom tov sheini shel galiyos, following their prior custom, notwithstanding that the reason for the observance no longer applies. Rashi explains that the reason for the new takanah is that persecutions might cause Jews to forget the information necessary to figure out the calendar. The likelihood of a Jew eating chometz on Pesach unwittingly, or violating other serious prohibitions, is reduced when keeping two days of Yom Tov. In other words, although keeping an extra day of Yom Tov was originally for a completely different concern, once the custom had been established, Chazal required the continuation of the observance, for a basically unrelated reason.

Two days of Rosh Hashanah

Now that we have plowed through this extensive introduction, we have yet to analyze why the holiday of Rosh Hashanah has two days even in Eretz Yisroel. When the determination of Rosh Chodesh was in the hands of the Sanhedrin, we understand the need to observe two days of Rosh Hashanah – people were uncertain which day had been established as Rosh Hashanah, and therefore they were required to observe both. However, now that our calendar can be calculated in advance, why should those who live in Eretz Yisroel be observing two days of Rosh Hashanah?

Indeed, the rishonim dispute whether there is a requirement to keep two days of Rosh Hashanah in Eretz Yisroel, once the calendar is on autopilot as a result of Hillel Hanasi’s new takanah.

The Rif rules that, in Eretz Yisroel, two days of Rosh Hashanah should be observed. The Baal Hama’or not only questions why this should be true, but contends that, prior to the Rif’s ruling, the practice in Eretz Yisroel had been to observe only one day of Rosh Hashanah. This was changed, he claims, when disciples of the Rif arrived in Eretz Yisroel in the twelfth century and began promulgating his opinions. They changed the minhag of observing only one day of Rosh Hashanah in Eretz Yisroel, which the Baal Hama’or contends is the correct practice.

Upon what is this dispute dependent? It appears that the Baal Hama’or was of the opinion that while the communities in chutz la’aretz requested — and were denied — permission to drop their observance of the second day of Yom Tov, this discussion did not affect those in Eretz Yisroel, even on the one Yom Tov when they observed two days, Rosh Hashanah.

However, there are allusions in the Gemara that Rosh Hashanah is now a two-day observance. The Rif, and those who followed his approach, concluded that, since at one point there had been a takanah to observe two days of Rosh Hashanah, this takanah remained in place.

Why is Yom Kippur different?

If those who live in chutz la’aretz are required to observe two days of Sukkos because of the uncertainty which day is the proper Yom Tov, should not Yom Kippur, also, be kept for two consecutive days?

The reason why Yom Kippur is treated differently is simple: for most people, fasting two consecutive days constitutes pikuach nefesh, a life-threatening situation. Just as we override Shabbos to provide medical care for someone who might be in a life-threatening situation, and we permit a person for whom fasting for even one day is life-threatening to eat on Yom Kippur, so do we consider two days of Yom Kippur observance as life-threatening for most people. Therefore, no community ever observed two consecutive days of Yom Kippur.

There is another reason to be lenient. Elul was virtually always a 29-day month. It could happen in any given year that Elul would have thirty days, and therefore Rosh Hashanah and Sukkos were observed as two days of Yom Tov. However, because of the obvious difficulty of fasting two consecutive days, the practice regarding Yom Kippur was to assume that Elul was 29 days, and that the day we call the tenth of Tishrei is the correct Yom Kippur.

Second Day Haftarah

At this point, let us examine the second of our opening questions: “Why do we read the specific haftarah that we do on the second day of Rosh Hashanah?”

The haftarah read on the second day of Rosh Hashanah is in the book of Yirmiyahu and begins with the words: Koh amar Hashem. There is no obvious allusion to Rosh Hashanah in this haftarah, yet there appears to have been a takanah of Chazal to read this haftarah on this day.

Before proceeding to discuss this question, we need to explain the history of why we read the haftarah, altogether. The early halachic authorities report two reasons for the establishment of the reading of the haftarah. According to one approach, during the period of the second Beis Hamikdash, at the times of the persecutions prior to the Chanukah story, the Seleucid Greek emperor Antiochos Epiphanes was bent on destroying Judaism. Strongly assisted by assimilated Jewish elements, called the misyavnim, literally, “those who made themselves into Greeks,” or Hellenized Jews, Antiochos banned virtually all shemiras hamitzvos, until the remnant of Torah-true Jews rebelled. Eventually, they drove his empire out of the Holy Land, which had not even been their objective.

During the persecutions that were the run-up to their rebellion, Antiochos had banned the reading of the Torah, kerias haTorah. As a response to his persecutions, Chazal implemented several takanos to retain Jewish practices. One of these takanos was the introduction of the reading of the haftarah, which were selections of Nevi’im. On Shabbos, Yom Tov and fast days, the haftarah was read in shul at the point in the prayers when the Torah should have been read (Avudraham; Levush; Tosafos Yom Tov, Megillah 3:4).

A very different reason for reading haftarah on Shabbos and Yom Tov is that an early practice was for Jews to gather daily after they completed the morning davening and study together Torah, prophets, and other Torah subjects for a considerable amount of time, before they went to work. As generations passed, it became increasingly difficult to devote this amount of time to studying Torah, and the custom was abandoned on weekdays, but still maintained on Shabbos and Yom Tov, when people did not go to work (Teshuvos Hage’onim #55; Sefer Hapardes, page 306; Shibolei Haleket #44).

According to either approach, at the time that the takanah of haftarah was initiated, the individual who was called upon to read the haftarah could choose any reading he preferred. It was recommended to read something that was associated with the Torah reading of the day, either the one that had been missed (according to the first approach) or that actually was read (according to the second).

On certain dates of the year, Chazal instituted that specific haftarah portions be read (Mishnah, Megillah 30b; Maseches Sofrim 17; Gemara Megillah 31a). Among these instructions, the Gemara (Megillah 31a) mentions that on the second day of Rosh Hashanah the haftarah should be Habein yakir li Efrayim, from the 31st chapter of the book of Yirmiyahu. Rashi notes that this posuk quotes the expressions zochor ezkerenu, “I will certainly remember,” and racheim arachamenu,“I will certainly have mercy,” both concepts that are very appropriate to Rosh Hashanah.

Peculiarity about this haftarah

To the best of my knowledge, all of Klal Yisroel includes the posuk Habein yakir li Efrayim in the haftarah of the second day of Rosh Hashanah, as mentioned in the Gemara; however, there are different ways to read this haftarah. Ashkenazic and most other practices begin the haftarah with the words, Koh amar Hashem motzo chein bamidbar, and close it with the posuk, Habein yakir li Efrayim. Virtually all customs — Ashkenazi, Sefardi, Edot Hamizrah, Italian, and Yemenite — follow this basic approach, although some communities begin the haftarah one posuk earlier.

However, all of these customs appear to be strange. Whenever the Mishnah or Gemara identifies a reading by its words, these are the first words that we recite as part of that reading. (On occasion, it is the second posuk, and the Mishnah or Gemara uses the word beginning the second posuk because the first posuk may be Vayedabeir Hashem el Moshe Leimor or a similar wording that does not identify clearly what we are to read.) However, in the instance of this haftarah, virtually all customs end with the reading of Habein yakir li Efrayim, as the last posuk.

The only custom I discovered that seems to follow the Gemara literally and, it would seem, more accurately, is the ancient Greek custom, called Minhag Romaniot (so called because it was the practice of the Jewish communities who lived under the rule of the Eastern Roman Empire, which later came to be known as the Byzantine Empire). Unfortunately, the practices of Minhag Romaniot are virtually extinct. To the best of my knowledge, there are only three congregations anywhere in the world that still follow Romaniot practice, one in Crete, a second in Turkey, and a third in New York, and none has significant observant membership that follows Minhag Romaniot.

We are forced to explain that our common custom assumes that the Gemara is requiring simply to include the posuk of Habein yakir li Efrayim as part of the haftarah for the second day of Rosh Hashanah, and the accepted custom includes several other beautiful themes mentioned by the prophet Yirmiyahu that are appropriate to Rosh Hashanah, including the unique relationship of Hashem and the Jewish people, the promise that Hashem will return us, and the moving account of Rachel’s successful beseeching Hashem on behalf of her children. The last of these themes has a special relationship with Rosh Hashanah because of the statement of the Gemara that Rachel was one of the women remembered by Hashem on Rosh Hashanah, the other two being Sarah and Chana, who are the subjects of the first day’s Torah reading and haftarah, respectively.

Second Day of Judgment!?

At this point, let us address the last of our opening questions: “How can the second day of Rosh Hashanah be called the ‘Day of Judgment,’ when we were judged already on the first day?”

As we can well imagine, we are not the first to ask this question. Allow me to provide an introduction from Tanach that will help to explain the approach presented by the Zohar:

After Shlomoh Hamech’s lengthy prayer dedicating the Beis Hamikdash, he blessed the people by reciting the following: May these words of mine with which I beseech Hashem be close to Hashem day and night, to accomplish the justice of His servant and the justice of His people, each and every day (Melachim I 8:59).

The posuk implies that there are two different types of justice, one of Hashem’s servant, the king, and the other applied to the people, as a whole. The proof that there are two types of judgment is that the word justice is repeated in the posuk. The Zohar (Parshas Pinchas) refers to these types of justice as the “upper judgment” and the “lower judgment,” and that these are performed by two different heavenly courts. The upper judgment, which is the harsher one, is performed on the first day of Rosh Hashanah and the “lower judgment,” which is softer, is performed on the second day. The Zohar states that these two judgments are “correlated” or “combined,” and are both “existent,” whatever these terms mean in Kabbalistic terminology.

Rav Dessler intimates that the difference between these two types of judgment is the extent to which a person makes serving Hashem the central focus in his life. Someone who has diverted the focus of his daily life from serving Hashem must rely on his relationship with those greater than he is. This is the “lower judgment” that this person undergoes on the second day, with a greater chance of success.

Conclusion

The Torah refers to the Yomim Tovim as mo’ed. Just as the term ohel mo’ed refers to the tent in the desert which served as a meeting place between Hashem and the Jewish people, so, too, a mo’ed is a meeting time between Hashem and the Jewish people (Hirsch, Vayikra 23:3 and Horeb).

We understand well why our calendar involves use of the solar year – after all, our seasons, and the appropriate times for our holidays, are based on the sun. But why did the Torah insist that our months follow the moon and that our holidays depend, also, on the moon’s phases and rotation? It seems that we could live fine without months that are dependent on the moon’s rotation around the earth!

An answer to this question is that the waxing and waning of the moon is symbolic of our own relationship with Hashem – which also sometimes waxes and sometimes wanes. Yet, we know that just as the moon, after its waning and almost disappearing, always renews itself, so, too, we have the capacity to grow and improve, in accordance with how much we allow Hashem into our world and into our actions.

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A Shmittah Glossary

This Shabbos is parshas Ki Savo, 10 days before Rosh Hashanah of shmittah year.

We are at the end of the sixth year of the shmittah cycle. Most chutz la’aretz residents are not that familiar with the laws of shmittah that will affect those who live in Eretz Yisroel every day next year. Actually, the laws can and do affect people living in chutz la’aretz also. This article will focus on explaining a basic glossary of shmittah-related terms.

Among the terms that we will learn are the following:

Biur

Havla’ah

Heter mechirah

Heter otzar beis din

Issur sechorah

Kedushas shvi’is

Ne’evad

Otzar beis din

Pach shvi’is

Sefichin

Shamur

Tefisas damim

First, let us discuss the basics:

Basic laws of the land

In Parshah Behar, the Torah (Vayikra 25:1-7) teaches that every seventh year is shmittah. We are prohibited from plowing, planting or working the land of Eretz Yisroel in any way and must leave our land fallow. It is even prohibited to have a gentile work a Jew’s land (Avodah Zarah 15b), just as one may not hire a gentile to do work on Shabbos that a Jew may not do. The owner of a field or orchard must treat whatever grows on his land as ownerless, allowing others to enter his field or orchard to pick, without charge, as much as their families can use. The landowner himself also may pick as much as his family will eat (see Rambam, Hilchos Shmittah 4:1).

The landowner should make sure that others know that they may help themselves to the produce. One may not sell, in a business manner, the produce that grows on its own.

Kedushas shvi’is

The Torah declared vehoysah shabbas ha’aretz lochem le’ochlah, “the produce of the shmittah should be used only for food” (Vayikra 25:6), thereby imbuing the fruits and vegetables that grow in shmittah year with special sanctity, called kedushas shvi’is. There are many ramifications of this status, such as, the produce that grows during shmittah year should be used only for consumption and should be eaten (or drunk) only in the usual way. For example, one may not cook foods that are usually eaten raw, nor may one eat raw produce that is usually cooked (Yerushalmi, Shvi’is 8:2; Rambam, Hilchos Shvi’is 5:3). One may not eat raw shmittah potatoes, nor may one cook shmittah cucumbers or oranges. It would certainly be prohibited to use shmittah corn for gasohol or any other form of biofuel.

Contemporary authorities dispute whether one may add shmittah oranges or apricots to a recipe for roast or cake. Even though the fruit adds taste to the roast or cake, many poskim prohibit this cooking or baking, since these types of fruit are usually eaten raw (Shu”t Mishpat Cohen #85). Others permit this if it is a usual way of eating these fruits (Mishpetei Aretz page 172, footnote 10).

Similarly, juicing vegetables and most kinds of fruit is considered “ruining” the shmittah produce and is prohibited, although one may press grapes, olives and lemons, since the juice and oil of these fruits are considered superior to the fruit itself. Many contemporary authorities permit pressing oranges and grapefruits, provided one treats the remaining pulp with kedushas shvi’is. Even these authorities prohibit juicing most other fruit, such as apples and pears (Minchas Shlomoh, Shvi’is pg. 185).

Food and not feed

One may feed shmittah produce to animals only when it is not fit for human consumption, such as peels and seeds that people do not usually eat (Rambam, Hilchos Shmittah 5:5). Last shmittah, a neighbor of mine, or perhaps his turtle, had a problem: The turtle is fond of lettuce, and won’t eat grass. One may feed animals grass that grew in Eretz Yisroel during shmittah, but one may not feed them lettuce that grew during shmittah.

Jewish consumption

Shmittah produce is meant for Jewish consumption; one may not give or sell kedushas shvi’is produce to a gentile, although one may invite a gentile to join your meal that includes shmittah food (Rambam, Hilchos Shmittah 5:13 as explained by Mahari Korkos).

Although some authorities rule that there is a mitzvah to eat shmittah produce, most contend that there is no obligation to eat shmittah food – rather, the Torah permits us to eat it (Chazon Ish, Hilchos Shvi’is 14:10).

Don’t destroy edibles

One may not actively destroy shmittah produce suitable for human consumption. Therefore, one who has excess shvi’is produce may not trash it in the usual way.

Peels that are commonly eaten, such as apple peels, still have kedushas shvi’is and may not simply be disposed. Instead, we place these peels in a plastic bag and then place the bag in a small bin or box called a pach shvi’is, where it remains until the food is inedible. When it decomposes to this extent, one may dispose of the shmittah produce in the regular garbage.

Why is this true?

Once the shmittah produce can no longer be eaten, it loses its kedushas shvi’is. Although the concept that decay eliminates sanctity seems unusual, this is only because we are unfamiliar with the many mitzvos where this principle applies. There are several other mitzvos where, in theory, this rule applies – meaning that the items have kedushah that governs how they may be consumed, but once they are no longer edible, this kedushah disappears. The mitzvos that this rule applies to are terumah, challah, bikkurim, revai’i and maaser sheini. However, although this rule applies to these mitzvos, in practice we cannot observe it since produce that has kedusha cannot be consumed by someone who is tamei (Rambam, Hilchos Terumos Chapter 11; Hilchos Maaser Sheini 3:11). This explains why most people are unfamiliar with the rules of kedushas shvi’is.

When eating shmittah food, one need not be concerned about the remaining bits stuck to a pot or an adult’s plate that one usually just washes off; one may wash these pots and plates without concern that one is destroying shmittah produce. However, the larger amounts left behind by children, or leftovers that people might save should not be disposed in the garbage. Instead, they can be scraped into the pach shvi’is.

Issur sechorah – commercial use

One may not harvest the produce of one’s field or tree in order to sell it in commercial quantities or in a business manner (Tosefta, Shvi’is 5:7; Rambam, Hilchos Shmittah 6:1). For example, shmittah produce may not be sold by weight or measure (Mishnah, Shvi’is 8:3), nor sold in a regular store (Yerushalmi, Shvi’is 7:1).

Tefisas damim

If one trades or sells shmittah produce, the food or money received in exchange becomes imbued with kedushas shvi’is. This means that the money should be used only to purchase food that will itself now have the laws of shmittah produce. The original produce also maintains its kedushas shvi’is (Sukkah 40b).

Havla’ah

At this point, we must discuss a very misunderstood concept called havla’ah, which means that one includes the price of one item with another. The Gemara (Sukkah 39a) describes using havla’ah to “purchase” an esrog that has shmittah sanctity, without the money received becoming sanctified with kedushas shvi’is. For example, Reuven wants to buy an esrog from Shimon; however, Shimon does not want the money he receives to have kedushas shvi’is. Can he avoid this occurring?

Yes, he may. If Shimon sells Reuven two items at the same time, one that has kedushas shvi’is and the other does not, he should sell him the item that does not have kedushas shvi’is at a high price, and the item that has kedushas shvi’is accompanies it as a gift. This method works, even though everyone realizes that this is a means of avoiding imbuing the sales money with kedushas shvi’is.

Shamur and ne’evad

According to many (and perhaps most) rishonim, if a farmer did not allow people to pick from his fields, the shmittah produce that grew there becomes prohibited (see Ra’avad and Ba’al Ha’maor to Sukkah 39a). This produce is called shamur. Similarly, many authorities prohibit consuming produce that was tended in a way that violated the agricultural laws of shmittah (Ramban, Yevamos 122a). This produce is called ne’evad.

Shmittah exports

The Mishnah (Shvi’is 6:5) prohibits exporting shmittah produce outside Eretz Yisroel. Some recognized authorities specifically permit exporting shmittah wine and esrogim, although the rationales permitting this are beyond the scope of this article (Beis Ridbaz 5:18; Tzitz Hakodesh, Volume 1 #15:4). This approach is the basic halachic reason to permit the export of esrogim that grow during shmittah next year for Sukkos, 5783. (The esrogim for this coming year will all be from the pre-shmittah crop and not involve any shmittah concerns.)

Sefichin

As explained in last week’s article, the prohibition of sefichin does not refer to perennials that do not require planting every year. Although trees and other perennials definitely thrive when pruned and cared for, most will produce even if left unattended for a year and the farmer has less incentive to violate shmittah by tending his trees.

Thus, tree fruits, nuts, strawberries and bananas do not involve the prohibition of sefichin. (If they grew in a field whose owner was not observing shmittah, they might involve the prohibition of shamur.)

Biur shevi’is

At this point in our discussion, we need to explain the concept of biur shvi’is. The word biur literally means elimination, as in biur chometz, which refers to the eradication of chometz performed each year before Pesach. One of the laws that applies to shmittah produce is that once a specific species is no longer available in the field, one can no longer keep shmittah produce from that species in one’s possession. At this point, one must perform a procedure called biur shvi’is. Although there is a dispute among the rishonim as to the exact definition and requirements of biur shvi’is, we rule that it means declaring ownerless (hefker) any shmittah produce in one’s possession (Ramban, Vayikra 25:7; cf. Rashi, Pesachim 52b s.v. mishum and Rambam, Hilchos Shmittah 7:3 for alternative approaches.) For example, let us say that I picked shmittah apricots and canned them as jam. When no more apricots are available in the field, I must take the remaining jam and declare it hefker in the presence of three people (Yerushalmi, Shvi’is 9:5). I may do this in front of three close friends who will probably not take the jam after my declaration; it is sufficient that they have the right to take possession. If someone fails to perform biur, the shmittah produce becomes prohibited.

Otzar beis din

What is an otzar beis din? Literally, the words means “a storehouse operated by beis din.” Why would a beis din be operating a storehouse? Did they need to impound so much merchandise while doing litigation? No, let me explain.

As mentioned above, the owner of an orchard may not harvest his produce for sale, and he must allow individuals to help themselves to what their family may use. But what about people who live far from the orchard? How will they utilize their right to pick shmittah fruit?

Enter the otzar beis din to help! The beis din represents the public interest by hiring people to pick and transport the produce to a distribution center near the consumer. Obviously, no one expects the pickers, sorters, truckers, and other laborers to work as unpaid volunteers; they are also entitled to earn a living. Similarly, the managers who coordinate this project are also entitled to an appropriate wage for their efforts. Furthermore, there is no reason why beis din cannot hire the owner of the orchard to supervise this massive project, paying him a wage appropriate to his significant skills and experience in knowing how to manage this operation. This is all legitimate use of an otzar beis din.

Who pays for otzar beis din services? The otzar beis din divides its costs among the consumers. The charges to the user should reflect the actual expenses incurred in bringing the products to the consumers, and may not include any profit for the finished product (Minchas Shlomoh, Shvi’is 9:8 pg. 250). Thus, otzar beis din products should cost less than regular retail prices for the same items, since there should be no profit margin. (See Yerushalmi, Shvi’is 8:3 that shvi’is produce should be less expensive than regular produce.)

Please note that all the halachos of kedushas shevi’is apply to otzar beis din produce. Also note that acquiring from an otzar beis din is not really “purchasing” since you are not buying the fruit, but receiving a distribution – your payment is exclusively to defray operating costs. Therefore, the money paid for otzar beis din produce does not have kedushas shvi’is, because it is compensation for expenses and not in exchange for the shmittah fruit (Minchas Shlomoh, Shvi’is 9:8 pg. 250).

Produce still in the possession of an otzar beis din at the time of biur is exempt from biur. The reason is that this product is still without an owner – the otzar beis din is a distribution center, not an owner. However, produce originally distributed through an otzar beis din and now in private possession must be declared hefker.

Heter otzar beis din

The modern term “Heter otzar beis din” is used pejoratively. The purpose of an otzar beis din is to service the consumer, not the producer, as I explained above. Unfortunately, unscrupulous individuals sometimes manipulate the rubric of otzar beis din to allow a “business as usual” attitude and violate both the spirit and the halacha of shmittah. If the farmer is operating with a true otzar beis din, he will allow people to enter his field and help themselves to the produce. If he bars people, then he is violating the basic laws of shmittah and his produce distribution is not according to otzar beis din principles. Similarly, if the field owner treats the produce as completely his own and charges accordingly, this contradicts the meaning of otzar beis din. These cases are disparagingly referred to as heter otzar beis din; meaning they reflect abuse of the concept of otzar beis din.

Conclusion

Those living in chutz la’aretz should be aware of the halachos of shvi’is and identify with this demonstration that the Ribbono Shel Olam created His world in six days, thereby making the seventh day and the seventh year holy.

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The Heter Mechirah Controversy

In a few short weeks, we will begin shmittah year. In preparation, I present this article.

Photo by Rodolfo Belloli from FreeImagesOLYMPUS DIGITAL CAMERA

Several shmittah cycles ago, I was working as a mashgiach for a properly run American hechsher. One factory that I supervised manufactured breading and muffin mixes. This company was extremely careful about checking its incoming ingredients: George, the receiving clerk who also managed the warehouse, kept a careful list of what products he was to allow into the plant and what kosher symbols were acceptable.

On one visit to the plant, I noticed a problem, due to no fault of the company. For years, the company had been purchasing Israeli-produced, freeze-dried carrots with a reliable hechsher. The carrots always arrived in bulk boxes, with the Israeli hechsher prominently stamped in Hebrew and the word KOSHER prominently displayed, in English. George, who always supervised incoming raw materials, proudly showed me through “his warehouse” and noted how he carefully marked the arrival date of each new shipment. I saw crates of the newest shipment of Israeli carrots, from the same manufacturer, and the same prominently displayed English word KOSHER on the box. However, the Hebrew stamp on the box was from a different supervisory agency, one without the same sterling reputation. The reason for the sudden change in supervisory agency was rather obvious, when I noted that the Hebrew label stated very clearly “Heter Mechirah.”

Let me explain the halachic issues that this product entails.

The Torah (Vayikra 25:1-7) teaches that every seventh year is shmittah and prohibits working the land of Eretz Yisroel. During that year, one may not plough, plant or work the field in any way. Furthermore, the farmer must treat whatever grows on his land as ownerless, allowing others to pick and keep his fruit. Many laws apply to the produce that grows during shmittah, including, for example, that one may not sell the produce in a business manner, nor may one export it outside Eretz Yisroel.

For the modern farmer, observing shmittah is indeed true mesiras nefesh, since, among the many other concerns that he has, he also risks losing customers who have been purchasing his products for years. For example, a farmer may be selling his citrus or avocado crop to a distributor in Europe who sells his produce throughout the European Community. If he informs his customer that he cannot export his produce during shmittah year, he risks losing the customer in the future.

Of course, a Jew realizes that Hashem provides parnasah and that observing a mitzvah will never hurt anyone. Therefore, a sincerely observant farmer obeys the Torah dictates, knowing that Hashem attends to all his needs. Indeed, recent shmittos have each had numerous miracles by which observant farmers were rewarded in this world for their halachic diligence. Who can possibly imagine what reward awaits them in Olam Haba!

Unfortunately, the carrot farmer here was not committed to this level of bitachon and, instead, explored other options, deciding to rely on heter mechirah. He soon discovered that his regular, top-of-the line hechsher would not allow this, so he found an alternative hechsher that allowed him to be lenient, albeit by clearly forewarning customers who may consider this product non-kosher. Although he realized that sales would suffer without his regular hechsher, he figured that selling some product is better than selling none.

WHAT IS HETER MECHIRAH?

The basic concept of heter mechirah is that the farmer sells his land to a gentile, who is not required to observe shmittah. Since a gentile now owns the land, the gentile may farm the land, sell its produce and make a profit. The poskim dispute whether a Jew may work land owned by a gentile during shmittah (Tosafos, Gittin 62a s.v. ein odrin, prohibits; Rashi, Sanhedrin 26a s.v. agiston, permits).

IS THIS ANY DIFFERENT FROM SELLING ONE’S CHOMETZ FOR PESACH?

Although some poskim make this comparison (Shu’t Yeshuos Malko, Yoreh Deah #53), many point out differences between selling chometz to a gentile and selling him land in Eretz Yisroel. Indeed, although the Mishnah (Pesachim 21a) and other early halachic sources (Tosefta, Pesachim 2:6) mention selling chometz to a non-Jew before Pesach, no early source mentions selling land in Eretz Yisroel to avoid shmittah (Sefer Hashmittah pg. 71). The earliest source I found discussing this possibility was an eighteenth-century responsum penned by Rav Mordechai Rubyou, the Rosh Yeshivah in Hebron at the time, who discusses the tribulations of a Jew owning a vineyard in Eretz Yisroel in that era (Shu’t Shemen Hamor, Yoreh Deah #4; this sefer was published posthumously in 1793).

HISTORY OF MODERN HETER MECHIRAH

Before explaining the halachic background to the heter mechirah question, I think it is important to understand the historical context of the shaylah.

Rav Yechiel Michel Tukachinski, one of the great twentieth-century poskim of Eretz Yisroel, describes the history and development of the use of heter mechirah. (My source for most of the forthcoming historical material is his work, Sefer Hashmittah.)

The first modern shmittah was in the year 5642 (1882), when there was a mere handful of Jewish farmers in Israel, located in Petach Tikvah, Motza and Mikveh Yisroel. The highly observant farmers in these communities were uncompromising in their commitment to keep shmittah in full halachic detail. [Apparently, at the same time, there were some Sefardi farmers in Israel whose rabbonim did allow them to sell their fields to a gentile for the duration of shmittah (see Shu’t Yeshuos Malko, Yoreh Deah #53; Shu’t Yabia Omer 3:Yoreh Deah #19:7).]

By the next shmittah, 5649 (1889), there was already a much larger Jewish agricultural presence in Eretz Yisroel. Prior to that shmittah year, representatives of the developing Israeli agricultural communities approached several prominent Eastern European gedolim, claiming that the new yishuv could not survive financially if shmittah was observed fully, and that mass starvation would result. Could they sell their land to a gentile for the duration of shmittah and then plant the land and sell its produce?

THE BEGINNINGS OF A CONTROVERSY

Rav Naftali Hertz, the rav of Yaffo, who also served as the rav of most of the agricultural communities involved, directed the shaylah to the gedolei haposkim of the time, both in Israel and in Europe. The rabbonim in Europe were divided, with many prominent poskim, including Rav Yehoshua Kutno, Rav Yosef Engel and Rav Shmuel Mahliver, approving the sale of the land to non-Jews as a hora’as sha’ah, a ruling necessitated by the emergency circumstances prevailing, but not necessarily permitted in the future. They permitted the heter mechirah, but only with many provisos, including that only non-Jews perform most agricultural work. On the other hand, many great European poskim prohibited this heter mechirah, including such luminaries as the Netziv (Rav Naftali Tzvi Yehudah Berlin, the Rosh Yeshivah of the preeminent yeshiva of the era in Volozhin, Lithuania), the Beis Halevi (3:1; Rav Yosef Dov Halevi Soloveichek), the Aruch HaShulchan (Rav Yechiel Michel Epstein) and Rav Dovid Karliner.

Rav Yitzchak Elchanan Spector, the rav of Kovno, Lithuania, whom many viewed as the posek hador, ruled that Rav Hertz could perform the sale and instructed him to have the great poskim of Yerushalayim actuate the sale.

This complicated matters, since the Ashkenazi rabbonei Yerushalayim universally opposed the heter mechirah and published a letter decrying it stridently. This letter, signed by the two rabbonim of Yerushalayim, Rav Yehoshua Leib Diskin and Rav Shmuel Salant, and over twenty other gedolim and talmidei chachamim, implored the farmers in the new yishuv to keep shmittah steadfastly and expounded on the Divine blessings guaranteed them for observing shmittah. The letter also noted that Klal Yisroel was punished severely in earlier eras for abrogating shmittah (see Avos Chapter 5). As Rashi (Vayikra 26:35) points out, the seventy years of Jewish exile between the two batei hamikdash correspond to the exact number of shmittos that were not observed from when the Jews entered Eretz Yisroel until the exile. The great leaders of Yerushalayim hoped that if Klal Yisroel observed shmittah correctly, this would constitute a collective teshuvah for the sins of Klal Yisroel and would usher in the geulah.

Rav Hertz, who had originally asked the shaylah, was torn as to what to do. Although he had received letters from some of the greatest poskim of Europe permitting the mechirah, the poskei Yerushalayim adamantly opposed it. He decided not to sell the land himself, but arranged mechirah for those who wanted it through the Sefardi rabbonim in Yerushalayim, who had apparently performed this mechirah in previous years.

What happened? Did the Jewish farmers observe the shmittah as instructed by the rabbonei Yerushalayim, or did they rely on heter mechirah? Although the very committed farmers observed shmittah according to the dictates of the gedolei Yerushalayim, many of the more marginally observant farmers acceded to the pressure and relied on heter mechirah. Apparently, many farmers were subjected to considerable financial and social pressure to evade observance of shmittah.

Prior to shmittah year 5656 (1896), Rav Hertz again considered what to do in the coming shmittah and approached the rabbonei Yerushalayim. This time, both Rav Shmuel Salant and Rav Yehoshua Leib Diskin approved the mechirah and even suggested to Rav Hertz how to arrange this mechirah in a halachically approved fashion.

WHAT CHANGED?

Why were the very same rabbonim who vehemently opposed the mechirah seven years earlier not opposed to it this time? Initially, these rabbonim felt that since we had now merited returning to Eretz Yisroel, we should make sure to observe all the mitzvos of Eretz Yisroel without compromise, and evading shmittah with heter mechirah runs totally counter to this spirit. However, upon realizing that few farmers had observed the previous shmittah properly, the feeling of these great gedolim was that without the option of heter mechirah, most farmers would simply conduct business as usual and ignore shmittah completely. Therefore, it was better to permit heter mechirah, while at the same time encourage farmers not to rely on it.

Prior to the next shmittah, in 5663 (1903), Rav Hertz re-asked his shaylah from the rabbonim of Yerushalayim, Rav Shmuel Salant and the Aderes, Rav Eliyahu Dovid Rabinowitz Teumim (Rav Diskin had passed on in the meantime), since the original approval stipulated only that shmittah. These rabbonim felt that there was still a need for heter mechirah in 5663. Rav Hertz, himself, passed away before the heter mechirah was finalized, and his son-in-law, Rav Yosef Halevi, a talmid chacham of note, finalized the mechirah in his stead, following the instructions of the rabbonei Yerushalayim.

Seven years later (5670/1910), Rav Avraham Yitzchak Kook was the rav of Yaffo and continued the practice of the mechirah, while at the same time encouraging those who would observe shmittah correctly to do so. He continued this practice of performing the heter mechirah for the several subsequent shmittos of his life.

In addition, Rav Kook instituted a new aspect to heter mechirah. Prior to his time, the heter mechirah involved that the owner of the farm appointed a rav as his agent to sell the land, similar to what we usually do to arrange selling the chometz. Rav Kook added that a farmer who was not going to observe shmittah but did not appoint a rav to sell his land was included in the mechirah, since it is in his best interest to have some heter when he works his field, rather than totally desecrating the Holy Land in the holy year. Although there is merit in protecting the farmer from his sin, now, a practical question results that affects a consumer purchasing this farmer’s produce. If the farmer did not authorize the sale, perhaps the produce indeed has the sanctity of shmittah. For this latter reason, many individuals who might otherwise accept heter mechirah produce do not rely on this heter.

By the way, although the original heter mechirah specified that gentiles must perform all plowing, planting and harvesting, this provision is no longer observed by some farmers who rely on heter mechirah. Many farmers who rely on heter mechirah follow a “business as usual” attitude once they have dutifully signed the paperwork authorizing the sale. Indeed, who keeps the profits from the shmittah produce, the Jew or the non-Jew to whom he sold his land? One can ask — is this considered a sale?

Another point raised is that, although Chazal also contended with much laxity in observing the laws of shmittah, they did not mention selling the land to evade the mitzvah. This is underscored by the fact that there are indeed precedents where Chazal mention ways to avoid observing mitzvos. For example, the Gemara mentions methods whereby one could avoid separating maaser, for those who want to evade this mitzvah, although Chazal did not approve doing so. Furthermore, when Hillel realized that people were violating the halachos of shmittas kesafim, he instituted the pruzbul. Yet, no hint of avoiding shmittah by selling land to a gentile is ever mentioned, thus implying that there is halachic or hashkafic difficulty with this approach (Sefer Hashmittah pg. 82).

SELLING ERETZ YISROEL

In addition to the question of whether one should evade performing a mitzvah of the Torah, the issue of heter mechirah involves another tremendous halachic difficulty. How can one sell any land of Eretz Yisroel, when the Torah prohibits selling it to a non-Jew (Avodah Zarah 20a), and Chazal prohibit even renting the land (Mishnah, Avodah Zarah 20b)?

Different poskim have suggested various approaches to avoid this prohibition. Some contend that selling land temporarily, with an expressed condition that it return to the owner, preempts the violation (Shu’t Shemen Hamor, Yoreh Deah #4), while others permit the sale since its purpose is to assist the Jewish presence in Eretz Yisroel (Shu’t Yeshuos Malko, Yoreh Deah #55; Yalkut Yosef pg. 666, quoting Rav Reuven Katz, the late rav of Petach Tikvah). Others contend that the prohibition extends only to selling land to an idol-worshipper, but not to a gentile who does not worship idols (Sefer Hashmittah, pg. 74; Yalkut Yosef pg. 665, quoting Mizbei’ach Adamah), whereas still others maintain that one may sell land to a gentile who already owns land in Israel (Shabbas Ha’aretz, Mavo 12). The original contracts approved by the rabbonei Yerushalayim designed that sale to incorporate many aspects to avoid this concern (Sefer Hashemittah, pg. 75). However, each of these approaches is halachically controversial. In fact, the problem of selling the land to a gentile is so controversial that many poskim consider such a sale invalid because of the principle of ein shaliach lidvar aveirah, that transacting property through agency in a halachically unacceptable manner is invalid (Chazon Ish, Shvi’is 24:4).

Among contemporary poskim there is wide disagreement whether one may eat produce on the basis of heter mechirah. Some contend that one may, whereas others rule that both the produce and the pots used to cook this produce become non-kosher. Others follow a compromise position, accepting that the pots should not be considered non-kosher, although one should carefully avoid eating heter mechirah produce. Because of the halachic controversies involved, none of the major hechsherim in North America approve heter mechirah produce. Someone visiting Eretz Yisroel during shmittah who wants to maintain this standard should clarify his circumstances in advance.

FRUITS VERSUS VEGETABLES

Some rabbonim ruled that the fruits produced under heter mechirah may be treated as kosher, but not the vegetables. The reason for this distinction is as follows:

SEFICHIM

The Torah permitted the use of any produce that grew on its own in a field that was not worked during shmittah. Unfortunately, though, even in the days of Chazal, it was common to find Jews who deceitfully ignored shmittah laws. One practice of unscrupulous farmers was to plant grain or vegetables and market them as produce that grew on its own. To make certain that these farmers did not benefit from their misdeeds, Chazal forbade all grains and vegetables, even those that grew on their own, a prohibition called sefichim, or plants that sprouted.

Several exceptions were made, including that produce of a non-Jew’s field is not prohibited as sefichim. Thus, if the heter mechirah is considered a charade and not a valid sale, the grain and vegetables growing in a heter mechirah field are prohibited as sefichim.

WHY NOT FRUIT?

Chazal did not extend the prohibition of sefichim to fruit, because there was less incentive for a cheating farmer. Although trees definitely thrive when pruned and attended to, they will produce even if left unattended for a year. Thus, the farmer has less incentive to tend his trees.

PERENNIALS

Similarly, perennials that do not require planting every year are not included in the prohibition of sefichin. Although perennials benefit when pruned and cared for, most will produce, even if left unattended for a year, and the farmer has less incentive to violate shmittah by caring for such plants.

Thus, tree fruits, nuts, strawberries and bananas do not involve the prohibition of sefichin. If they grew in a field whose owner was not observing shmittah, they might involve the prohibition of shamur, as explained below.)

“GUARDED PRODUCE”

I mentioned above that a farmer must allow others to help themselves to the produce that grows on his trees and fields during shmittah. What is the halacha if a farmer refused to allow others access to his produce during shmittah?

The rishonim dispute whether this fruit is forbidden. Some contemporary poskim prohibit the use of heter mechirah fruit on the basis that since heter mechirah is invalid, this fruit is now considered shamur, “guarded,” and therefore forbidden. Other poskim permit the fruit, because they rule that working an orchard or treating it as private property does not prohibit its fruit (see Shu’t Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 1:186).

BACK TO OUR CARROT MUFFINS

What about our carrot muffins? If we remember our original story, the company had unwittingly purchased heter mechirah carrots. The hechsher required the company to return all unopened boxes of carrots to the supplier and to find an alternative source. However, by the time I discovered the problem, muffin mix using these carrots had been produced bearing the hechsher’s kashrus symbol and had already been distributed. The hechsher referred the shaylah to its posek, askingwhether they were required to recall the product from the stores as non-kosher, or whether it was sufficient to advertise that an error occurred and allow the customer to ask his individual rav for halachic guidance.

What would you advise?

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The Fateful U-Turn

ACT I – THE FATEFUL U-TURN

Location: The highway

Reuven missed his exit off the highway. Since it was a bright, clear day, he decided to make a U-turn to get back in the right direction. Although this was illegal, he did not consider it dangerous, since the road was virtually deserted, except for a car coming in the other direction which seemed to be quite a distance away.

Reuven was mistaken. His car collided with the other vehicle. Fortunately, no one was injured, but both cars suffered significant damage.

The other driver, Shimon, considered Reuven responsible for the damage to his vehicle, although Reuven insisted that Shimon must have been speeding for the accident to have occurred. Shimon insisted that he was not speeding.

To complicate matters, the car Reuven was driving was not his own. That morning, his friend Yaakov had asked Reuven to drive him to the airport using Yaakov’s car. On the way to the airport, Yaakov mentioned that, since he was leaving for a week, Reuven could borrow the car while he was gone.

After the accident, Reuven discovered that Yaakov’s car had no collision insurance, and worse yet, no liability insurance for any driver except Yaakov. Thus, there was no insurance coverage for the damage done to either vehicle.

Because Reuven would never have driven the car had he known it was uninsured, he claims that he never assumed responsibility for the value of the car when he borrowed it.

Is Reuven liable for the damage to both vehicles? Although Reuven is over his head in debt, if he is halachically obligated to pay either Yaakov or Shimon, he will do so. But if he is not required to do so, he feels that he is not in a financial position to make the compensation.

Reuven, Shimon, and Yaakov submit the shaylah to a beis din for arbitration. They schedule an appointment and come prepared to present their cases.

ACT II – THE COURTROOM

Location: The offices of the beis din

On the appointed day, the three litigants appear in the beis din. Shimon claims that Reuven must compensate him for the damage to his car, and that Yaakov should also be liable as the owner of an improperly insured vehicle. Reuven claims that Shimon is responsible for all the damages, since the accident happened because of Shimon’s speeding. Yaakov claims that Reuven damaged his vehicle and is therefore obligated to pay for its repair.

Yaakov presents his claim against Reuven first, stating that he has claims against Reuven for two different reasons:

1. First, Reuven should be liable as the borrower of the car, even if the damage was not his responsibility.

2. Second, Reuven is liable as a mazik, one who damages, since his negligence caused an accident.

Let us examine the validity of each claim separately, and then we will see what Reuven counters.

SHO’EIL

A sho’eil, a borrower, is responsible for almost any damage that takes place to the item he borrows, even if the damage is accidental and not caused by the borrower. (There are two circumstances where a sho’eil is not liable, but they do not apply here, and I am therefore omitting them from our discussion.) Yaakov claims that Reuven is responsible to make full restitution for the value of the car, since he borrowed it.

REUVEN’S DEFENSE

Reuven turns to the dayanim and explains, “I believe that I am not a sho’eil according to halacha, but I have the halacha of a socheir, a renter, notwithstanding the fact that I paid no money. Furthermore, I claim that as a socheir I am not responsible for the damages sustained, as I will explain.”

WHAT ARE THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF A SOCHEIR?

A socheir is liable for damage if the item is lost or stolen, or if he is negligent, but he is not responsible for accidental damage. There is also another major difference in halacha between a sho’eil and a socheir that Reuven uses as an essential component of his defense, as explained below.

WAS REUVEN A SHO’EIL OR A SOCHEIR?

In order to analyze this question, we need to explain why a sho’eil carries so much responsibility. The Gemara mentions that a sho’eil’s liability is so great because he gains all the benefits of the loan, without any responsibilities in return. (This is called kol hana’ah shelo, “all benefits are to the borrower.”) Since the borrower receives all the benefits, the Torah obligates him to compensate the owner for any damage whatsoever, even if it was beyond his control. Put in other terms, a lender who receives no benefits has a right to assume that his item, or its value, is returned to him.

However, any time the lender receives some compensation, even non-monetary, the arrangement is not kol hana’ah shelo, and the borrower is not liable for accidental damage. In our situation, Yaakov received a chauffeured ride to the airport in exchange for Reuven’s borrowing the car. Halacha views this as if Reuven rented the car from Yaakov, paying him for the rental by driving him to the airport. This is enough to make Reuven into a socheir rather than a sho’eil, and exempts him from paying for accidental damages (see Shu’t Haran #20).

BUT WAS THIS A CASE OF NEGLIGENCE?

Yaakov objects to Reuven’s defense. “Even if I received some benefit and you are not a sho’eil, you are still liable as a socheir, because the damage was caused by negligence!”

Furthermore, you are a sho’eil because giving me a ride to the airport was not an exchange for using the car; it was a chesed that you did for me.

However, Reuven has done his homework. He knows that there is another distinction between a renter and a borrower with regard to assumption of responsibility.

DID REUVEN ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CAR?

Reuven claims he would never have driven the car, had he known it was uninsured. Therefore, he never assumed any responsibility for the car’s value, and he is not liable for the damage. Does this defense have any merit?

The Gemara discusses a case where someone assumed responsibility for an item assuming it was worth far less than it actually was. If the item is subsequently lost, he is only responsible for as much value as he originally thought the item was worth (Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 291:4). Thus, Reuven can legitimately claim that he was not responsible as a socheir of the car, because he never assumed responsibility for its value.

BUT WHY DID REUVEN INSIST THAT HE WAS NOT A SHO’EIL?

Reuven first claimed that he was not a sho’eil because Yaakov had received benefit. Only then did he claim that he wasn’t even a socheir, because he never assumed any responsibility. The first claim seems like an unnecessary step in his defense — let him simply claim that he never assumed any responsibility, whether as a sho’eil or as a socheir.

The answer is that there is a halachic difference between borrowing and renting. A borrower becomes responsible for all damages, even if he did not assume responsibility; that is, the fact that he uses the item without providing the lender any compensation makes him responsible (Machanei Efrayim, Hilchos She’eilah #1; Milu’ei Mishpat 346:8; cf. however Nesivos HaMishpat 346:8, who implies that even a sho’eil is not responsible under these circumstances).On the other hand, a renter’s liability is limited to how much responsibility he assumed.

WHY IS A BORROWER DIFFERENT FROM A RENTER?

A sho’eil is responsible because of the concept of kol hana’ah shelo, “all benefits are to the borrower.” The circumstances are what make him liable, not necessarily his agreement. (Although the lender can agree to exempt the borrower from all damages, in the absence of such an agreement, the borrower is responsible for all damages.) Thus, a borrower claiming that he never assumed responsibility, or that he was unaware of the liability, may not be a defense. However, a socheir’s liability results from his agreement to be responsible as a socheir. Therefore, claiming that he never assumed responsibility is a valid defense.

Thus, Reuven claims that he is not responsible as the borrower of the car for the following reasoning:

1)      He is not a sho’eil, but a socheir, since Yaakov received benefit from the “loan.”

2)      As a socheir, he can claim that he never accepted responsibility for the value of the car, because he assumed that insurance was covering the financial liability.

WHAT ABOUT A MAZIK, SOMEONE WHO DAMAGED SOMEONE ELSE’S PROPERTY?

Reuven has successfully demonstrated that he is not obligated to pay as a borrower. However, this does not exonerate him from Yaakov’s claim that he damaged the vehicle. His defense against this claim was that Shimon caused the accident. Is this claim a sufficient defense? Moreover, is it Yaakov’s responsibility to prove who caused the accident, in order to collect the damages from Reuven?

First, we must clarify two shaylos:

1. If someone damaged property in a traffic accident, is he considered a mazik who must pay for damages?

2. When two parties are involved in a collision, how do we assign financial responsibility?

The following incident that happened over seven hundred years ago resolves one of our questions.

ACT III – SOME HORSEPLAY

Location: Thirteenth century Germany

The Rosh (quoted by Tur, Choshen Mishpat 378:9) discusses the following din Torah:

During a wedding celebration, the groom was riding a very expensive mule that he had rented from a non-Jew for the occasion. (This was the thirteenth-century equivalent to renting a white Cadillac for a newlywed couple.) One of his well-wishers galloped up the street on horseback, unintentionally crashing his horse into the groom’s mule. Baruch Hashem, the groom emerged unscathed from the collision, but the mule suffered severe damage. Under civil law, the groom, as renter of the mule, was obligated to pay not only damages, but also a sizable penalty. Must the reckless rider compensate the groom for the damages and the penalty?

The horse rider refused to pay, contending that he was exempt from damages, since he was riding on a public thoroughfare. Furthermore, he had not done the damage; the horse was responsible. He claimed that this case is comparable to that of an animal that tramples on property while walking through a public area. In that instance, the halacha does not obligate the owner of the animal to pay if his animal tramples property left in a public area.

The Rosh ruled that there is a difference between an animal walking and a rider galloping on a horse. In the latter case, the rider, himself, is the damaging party, and the horse is the “tool” with which the rider damaged. A person is required to use a public thoroughfare in a responsible way, and galloping on a horse when other people are nearby is irresponsible. Since the rider acted irresponsibly, he must pay damages. (For reasons beyond the scope of this article, the Rosh absolved the rider from paying for the penalty that the groom incurred.)

When two cars collide, who is responsible for the damage?

Based on the above ruling, any damage performed by an automobile is considered damage performed by its driver, and the automobile is considered his tool. However, this does not tell us how we determine which driver is responsible, and for how much damage.

For this we will have to refer to an older discussion that traces back to the time of the Gemara.

ACT IV – A COLLISION

Location: Bavel, seventeen hundred years ago

The Gemara (Bava Kamma 32a; 48a) and the poskim discuss at length the case of two people colliding into one another on a city street, both of whom sustain injuries. Who is held responsible to pay for the damages?

We will simplify a very complicated discussion by providing some general rules that apply to our case:

If one party acted responsibly and the other acted irresponsibly, and the two parties collided, the party acting irresponsibly is liable for damages. Thus, if one person is running through the street and the other is walking, and the two people collide, the running person is liable, since that is considered acting irresponsibly. (There is an exception. The halacha acknowledges that someone is permitted to run through the streets late Friday afternoon, in order to complete his Shabbos preparations. Such running is not considered irresponsible.)

If both parties acted irresponsibly, the poskim dispute how we determine liability. Rashi (Bava Kamma 48b s.v. chayovin) rules that when the two parties collided into one another, each person is liable for the damage he did. Thus, if Levi and Yehudah collide, Levi is responsible for Yehudah’s injuries, and Yehudah for Levi’s.

Tosafos (Bava Kamma s.v. shenayim) disagrees, contending that in a case where both parties acted irresponsibly and the damage was accidental, neither party must pay for damages, since the damaged party also acted negligently. However, if someone injured or damaged intentionally, he must pay, even if the other party was negligent.

How do we pasken?

The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 378:7) rules like Rashi,whereas the Rema (421:8) rules like Tosafos.

Let us now apply the rules just mentioned to our case. By his own admission, Reuven made an illegal turn, which certainly qualifies as negligent driving. Thus, even if we accept Reuven’s claim that Shimon was speeding, it is still a case of both drivers acting irresponsibly. According to Rashi’s opinion, this would still make Reuven responsible for the damages to Shimon’s vehicle. In addition, Reuven would be responsible for the damage to the car he was driving, since he acted negligently. Reuven is claiming that Shimon should be responsible for those damages, a claim that he cannot substantiate.

According to Tosafos, Reuven is claiming that both parties contributed to the damage and that, therefore, he is not liable for the damages to Shimon’s vehicle. However, he would certainly be liable for the damages caused to the car that he was driving.

This is all assuming that we accept Reuven’s contention that Shimon was speeding. However, Reuven cannot prove that Shimon was speeding, and Shimon denies it. Since we know that Reuven made an illegal turn, the beis din ruled that Reuven acted negligently and is liable for the damage to both cars. Since there is no proof that Shimon was negligent, we cannot make any claim against him.

ACT V – EPILOGUE

Reuven was understandably disappointed with the beis din’s decision. However, as a G-d-fearing Jew, he knows that he is bound by their psak. Thankfully, there was only property damage involved, and he did not inadvertently suffer or cause any bodily harm. He now davens for Hashem’s help that he continue his driving career with no further incidents or accidents.

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Hunting for Meat

Parshas Re’eih includes the commandment that instructs us how to prepare our meat for our table (Devorim 12:15).

Question #1:

Sheis, the son of Adom Harishon, was traveling one day and realized that he had not packed enough peanut butter sandwiches for the trip. Now hungry, he witnessed a travel accident, which resulted in an animal being killed. Was he permitted to cook the carcass for lunch?

Question #2:

Sheis’s descendant, Linda, lives in the modern era and is Jewish. While traveling in an unfamiliar area, she hunts for kosher meat, discovering some with an unfamiliar supervision, and calls her rabbi to ask whether he recommends it. What factors does he consider in advising her whether to use this product?

Question #3:

In a previous position, I was responsible for researching sources of meat that our local Vaad HaKashrus would accept. I traveled to many cities and visited many meat packing facilities. People have often asked why, sometimes, my hunt resulted in a new acceptable source, and why sometimes it did not. What was I looking for?

Before answering these questions, we need to understand what are the Torah’s requirements for allowable meat.

Upon Noach’s emerging from the teivah (the ark), Hashem speaks to Noach, notifying him that he and his descendants may now eat meat for the very first time. Prior to this time, no one had ever been permitted to sink his teeth into a steak or even a schnitzel (Sanhedrin 59b, based on Bereishis 1:29-30, 9:3; as interpreted by Rambam, Hilchos Melachim 9:1). In actuality, not all authorities agree that Adam and his pre-mabul descendants were required to be vegetarian – some maintain that they were permitted to eat the meat of animals that had already died, and were forbidden only to kill animals for meat (Rashi, Bereishis 1:29and Sanhedrin 57a s.v. limishri basar; Tosafos, Sanhedrin 56b s.v. achal). According to this last opinion, pre-Noach mankind may have eaten sushi, steak or schnitzel, provided that they did not take the animal’s life.

Thus, whether Sheis could barbecue the discovered road kill (Question #1 above) depends upon whether he held like Rashi, in which case he could, or like the Rambam, in which case he could not. According to the Rambam, he was restricted to a vegetarian diet, which included the responsibility to check that his veggies were insect-free. Presumably, he called the local Vaad HaKashrus to determine how to check each type of vegetable. I wonder what he did when he wanted to eat Brussels sprouts!

However, when Noach emerged from the teivah, he and his descendents were permitted to give up their vegetarian lifestyle, provided that they ate no meat that had been removed from an animal while it was still alive (eiver min hachai). Just think —  had Sheis lived after the time of Noach, he could have included some tuna sandwiches in his lunchbox or picked up a salami at the local grocery, instead of going hungry!

When the Torah was given, it both limited the species that a Jew may eat and created many other regulations, including that kosher meat and poultry must be slaughtered in the halachically-approved way (shechitah), and may be eaten only if they are without certain defects that render them tereifah. Even after ascertaining that the animal, itself, may be eaten, one must still remove the blood, certain fats called cheilev, and the sciatic nerve (the gid hanasheh). These last two prohibitions do not apply to fowl.

In the contemporary world, guaranteeing that one’s meat is appropriate for the Jewish table involves several trained and G-d-fearing people, including shochatim, bod’kim, menakerim, mashgichim, and knowledgeable rabbonim to oversee the entire process.

THE SHOCHEIT’S JOB

Aside from the shocheit’s obvious responsibility to slaughter the animal the way Hashem commanded, he must also fulfill another very important task: following the slaughtering, he must verify that he performed the shechitah correctly. This is a vitally important step; without this inspection, the animal or bird must be considered non-kosher – it will be acceptable for the table of Bnei Noach, but not for Klal Yisroel.

Next, the animal or bird is examined to ensure that it is not tereifah. Although common use of the word “treif” means something that is non-kosher, for any reason whatsoever, the technical meaning of the word refers to an animal with a physical defect that renders it non-kosher, even if it was the beneficiary of a proper shechitah.

THE BODEIK

In a meat packing plant (beef, veal or lamb), the individual accountable to check for these defects is called a bodeik (pl. bod’kim). Most bod’kim are trained shochatim, and, indeed, in most plants, the bod’kim and shochatim rotate their tasks, thus making it easier for them to be as attentive as the post requires. As a result, a person licensed both as a shocheit and as a bodeik is usually called a shocheit, although, technically, he should be called a shocheit ubodeik, to truly reflect the extent of his training.

THE SECOND BODEIK

The responsibility to check for tereifos is divided between two bod’kim. The first, the bodeik penim, checks the lungs in situ, which is the only way one can properly check that the lungs do not adhere to the ribs, to the membrane surrounding the heart (the pericardium), or to themselves in an improper way, all of which render the animal non-kosher. This checking is performed completely based on feel. The bodeik gently inserts his hand, and runs his fingers carefully over all eight sections of the lung, to see if he feels any adhesion between the lung and one of the other areas.

The second bodeik, the bodeik chutz, rechecks the lungs and makes a cursory check of other organs, upon their removal from the carcass, particularly the stomachs and intestines, for swallowed nails and for various imperfections that render the animal non-kosher.

After the two bod’kim are satisfied that the animal is kosher, the second bodeik or a mashgiach tags the different parts of the animal as kosher with lead or plastic seals. Longstanding practice is that, in addition, the bodeik or a mashgiach makes small slits between the ribs that identify the day and parsha of the week, to mark the piece as kosher. A mark made when the meat is this fresh appears completely different from one made even a few hours later, making it difficult to counterfeit. Of course, this mark is not, alone, used to verify that the meat is kosher, but it is an essential crosscheck, since the old-styled tags can be tampered with.

The modern kosher poultry plant is organized slightly differently: The shochatim perform shechitah only, whereas the bedikah inspection is performed by mashgichim trained to notice abnormalities. If they notice any, they remove the bird from the production line; a rav or bodeik then rules whether these birds are kosher.

For both animals and birds, one needs to check only for commonly occurring tereifos, but not for uncommon problems. For example, the established halachic practice of over a thousand years is to check an animal’s lungs, because of their high rate of tereifos, and today it is common practice in Israel to check legs. Animal lungs frequently have adhesions called sirchos, which render them non-kosher (Chullin 46b), although Ashkenazic custom is that easily removed adhesions on mature cattle do not render them treif (Rosh, Chullin 3:14; Rema, Yoreh Deah 39:13). An animal without any sircha adhesions is called glatt kosher, meaning that its lung is completely smooth – that is, without any adhesions, even of the easily removable variety.

The rav hamachishir’s responsibilities include deciding which problems are prevalent enough to require scrutiny and what is considered an adequate method of inspection.

Depending on the factory, the next steps in the preparation of beef, veal or lamb are occasionally performed in the same facility where the shechitah was performed, or alternatively, they are performed at the butcher shop.

TRABERING

Prior to soaking and salting meat to remove the blood, certain non-kosher parts of the animal, including the gid hanasheh (the sciatic nerve), non-kosher fats called “cheilev,” and certain large blood vessels, must be removed (Yoreh Deah 65:1). The Hebrew word for this process is “nikur,” excising, and the artisan who possesses the skill to properly perform it is called a menakeir (pl. menak’rim). The Yiddish word for this process is traberen,which derives from tarba, the Aramaic word for cheilev, the non-kosher fat. This step is omitted in the production of poultry, since it is exempt from the prohibitions of gid hanasheh and cheilev, and its blood vessels are small enough that it is sufficient to puncture them prior to the soaking and salting procedures.

Early in its butchering, a side of beef (which is half its carcass) is divided into its forequarter and hindquarter. Since the gid hanasheh and most of the cheilev are located in the hindquarter, trabering it is a tedious process that requires a highly skilled menakeir. (On RabbiKaganoff.com, there is an article on the history and halachic issues germane to this practice.) The forequarters must still be trabered prior to soaking and salting, to remove blood vessels and some fat (Rema, Yoreh Deah 64:1; Pischei Teshuvah 64:3). Although trabering is a relatively easy skill to learn, Linda’s rabbi might need to check whether the hechsher can be trusted that this was done properly, as the following story indicates.

I once investigated the kashrus of a certain well-known resort hotel, one not usually frequented by frum clientele. I called the hotel and asked who provided their hechsher, and was soon on the telephone with both the resident mashgiach and the rav hamachshir.

I began by introducing myself and the reason for my phone call, and then asked about the sources of the meat used in the hotel. In the course of the conversation, it became evident that neither the rabbi nor the mashgiach knew the slightest thing about traberen, although they were officially overseeing a staff of in-house butchers, none of whom was an observant Jew. I realized that the rather poor kashrus reputation of this establishment was, indeed, well deserved. The rabbi overseeing the hechsher, himself, did not know trabering, nor did he have any halachically reliable supervisor. What was he overseeing?

SOAKING AND SALTING

Returning to our brief overview of the proper preparations for kosher meat:  After the meat has been properly trabered, it is ready to be soaked and salted to remove its blood. In earlier generations, this process, usually called kashering meat, was performed exclusively at home, but today, common practice is that this is performed either by the butcher or at the meat packer. Almost all kosher poultry operations today soak and salt the meat immediately after shechitah, and it is becoming increasingly more common in beef operations.

To kasher meat, it should be rinsed well, soaked in water for half an hour, drained, salted for an hour, and then rinsed three times (Rema, Yoreh Deah 69:1, 5, 7). The halacha requires that the meat be covered with salt on all exposed surfaces (Yoreh Deah 69:4). Most packing plants do this job appropriately, although I have seen places where the salting was inadequate; entire areas of the meat were not salted. This is, probably, simple negligence; although when I called this problem to the attention of the mashgiach, he insisted that it was performed adequately, notwithstanding my observing the contrary. Needless to say, I did not approve this source.

WASHED MEAT

The Geonim instituted a requirement that meat be soaked and salted within 72 hours of its slaughter (Yoreh Deah 69:12). This is because of concern that once 72 hours have passed, the blood becomes hardened inside the meat, and salting no longer removes it. If more than 72 hours passed without the meat being salted, the Geonim ruled that if the meat is broiled, it may be eaten, since this process will still remove the blood, even though salting will not (Yoreh Deah 69:12).

A question that developed with time was whether wetting the meat prevents the blood from hardening inside. Some early authorities permitted soaking meat to extend the 72-hour period (Shach 69:53). However, this leniency often led to highly liberal interpretations. I have seen butchers take a damp rag and wipe the outside of the meat and considered it washed. Thus, there are two different reasons why most reliable kashrus operations do not allow the use of “washed meat,” either because they do not accept this lenience, altogether, or because of concern that once one accepts hosed meat, it becomes difficult to control what type of washing is acceptable.

THE RAV HAMACHSHIR

Thus far, I have described the tremendous responsibilities of most of the staff necessary to guarantee that the meat is of the highest kashrus standards. One person that I have not adequately discussed is the rav hamachshir, the supervising rabbi, who has the final say on the kashrus standards that the meat packer and butcher follow. Although a rav overseeing meat kashrus does not necessarily have to be a shocheit or trained menakeir himself, he certainly must be proficient in all of these areas, both in terms of thorough knowledge of halacha and in terms of practical experience. For most of Jewish history, the most basic requirement of every rav demanded that he be proficient in all the halachos of kosher meat production. As the local rav, his responsibility included all shechitah and bedikah in his town.

However, in the contemporary world of mass production and shipping, the local shul rav is rarely involved in the details of shechitah, and often has limited experience and training in these areas. Depending on the semicha program he attended, he may not have been required to study the laws of shechitah and tereifos. Thus, what was once the province of every rav has now become a specialty area, and, sometimes, rabbonim involved in the giving of meat hechsherim lack the proper training.

I was once given a tour of a meat packing plant by the supervising rabbi of the plant. During the course of the tour, I became painfully aware of the rabbi’s incompetence in this area of kashrus. For example, he was clearly unaware of how to check shechitah knives properly, certainly a basic skill necessary to oversee this type of hechsher. Would you approve this meat supplier for your local Vaad HaKashrus?

At this point, I want to address the third question I raised above: Sometimes, my visit to a meat packer resulted in a new, acceptable source, and sometimes it did not. What was I looking for, and why would I disapprove a source that a different rav was approving?

The answers to these questions are sometimes subjective, but I will provide you with some observations of mine.

IS THE SYSTEM WORKABLE?

There are many subtle and not-so-subtle observations that a rav makes when examining a meat packer. I could not possibly list in one article all the types of problems I have seen, but I will mention certain specific concerns to which I would always be attentive.

Is the production line too quick for the shocheit or mashgiach to do his job properly? Are the shochatim or mashgichim expected to perform their job in an unrealistic manner, either because of a shortage of trained manpower or because of the speed or organization of the production line?

QUALITY OF PERSONNEL

Are the shochatim knowledgeable? Do they appear to be G-d fearing individuals? Although it is impossible to know whether someone is, indeed, a yarei shamayim, it is unfortunately often very obvious that he is not. It can happen that one rav has questions about the staff, and for this reason, he does not approve a source of supply.

I will give you an example of this. While visiting a plant to determine whether we should allow this shechitah, we heard a conversation in which one of the shochatim showed a shortcoming in tzeniyus within his family. Although one could point to a specific law that disqualifies him as a shocheit, I, personally, was uncomfortable with entrusting him with decisions that would affect what I eat. After discussion with the other rabbonim in our community, we decided not to accept meat from this shechitah.

Does this mean that we considered this meat non-kosher? G-d forbid. It simply means that we were uncomfortable allowing it, and decided that we have that responsibility as rabbonim of our community.

Thus, it could indeed happen that what one rav considers acceptable, another rav feels is not. The differences may be based on the interpretation of halacha, or they may result from a rav’s inclination as to how a plant should be run.

CONCLUSION

Based on the above information, we can better understand many aspects of the preparation of kosher meat and why it is important to use only meat that has a proper hechsher. We can also gain a greater appreciation of how hard rabbonim and shochatim work to maintain a high kashrus standard. Now that we recognize the complexity involved in maintaining kosher meat standards, we should always hope and pray that the food we eat fulfills all the halachos that the Torah commands us.

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