Category: Mitzvahs

More on Bechor

Question #1: How Many?

How many gifts does a kohein receive?

Question #2: Petter rechem

Is there a difference between something being firstborn and being a petter rechem?

Question #3: Uncertain Bechor

What is the status of someone (or something) who is uncertain if he meets the halachic qualifications of a bechor?

Foreword

After Korach challenges the rights of the kohanim, the Torah reinforces the rights that Hashem provides them by providing an extensive list of 24 gifts (Bamidbar 18:8-19, 26-28). These can be divided into the following categories (see Bava Kama 110b; Chullin 133b):

1. Those that may be eaten only in the Beis Hamikdash, of which there are ten, including various korbanos (kodashei kodashim), the twelve loaves of the lechem hapanim that were eaten on Shabbos, the korban omer brought on the second day of Pesach, the two loaves brought on Shavuos (shetei halechem), the leftovers of the mincha offerings and the leftovers of the oil brought by the recuperated metzora. All the items on this list may be eaten only by male kohanim.

2. Those that must be consumed within the walls of the halachic city of Yerushalayim: The bikkurim (annual first fruit of the seven species), the firstborn kosher animals (bechor), the designated portions from the various types of korbanos shelamim. Some of these may be eaten only by kohanim and their families, whereas others may be eaten by anyone.

3. Those with sanctity that may be consumed anywhere: Terumah, terumas maaser and challah. These may be eaten only by the kohanim and their families.

4. Those for consumption that have no sanctity: the maw, jaw and paw of non-kodashim animals. These are the property of the kohein but he may give or sell them to anyone to eat. Since the tongue is included, this would provide kohanim with a predominant market in selling pickled tongue, although I know of no sources that say that the kosher deli business was exclusively kohanim’s domain.

5. Non-foods: The money of pidyon haben; the redemption of the firstborn male donkey (pidyon petter chamor), the hides of the kodashei kodashim, the first of the wool shearing (reishis hageiz); certain consecrated properties that the kohanim received at the time that there was yoveil, and a rarely-received gift called gezel hageir.

Since the members of Kelal Yisrael were required to presents these gifts to the kohein, this caused the “common” Jew to interact with kohanim on a regular basis. It seems clear that this was so that the kohein provide regular spiritual instruction and direction, perhaps as the rebbi or admor of the people.

Introduction – More on Bechor

In our previous article on the rites of the firstborn, we studied some of the laws of bechor; this will continue the discussion of those mitzvos.

Parshas Korach teaches that “Every petter rechem (literally, that which opens the womb), among all flesh that is brought close to Hashem, whether human or animal, shall be yours (i.e., to Aharon and his descendants). The firstborn among humans should be redeemed as well as the firstborn of the non-kosher animals. The redemption (of the firstborn child): from when he is a month old, you should redeem his value at five shekalim of silver, using the shekel of holy items – whose value is twenty geirah. However, the firstborn calf, lamb or kid shall not be redeemed because it is holy; you shall throw its blood onto the altar and you shall burn its fat as a fire offering as a pleasant fragrance for Hashem. But its meat will be yours (Bamidbar 18:15-18).” At this point, the Torah teaches that the flesh of the bechor animal has the halachic status of kodashim kalim that belong to the kohein and can be eaten within Yerushalayim, not only by the kohein, but even by his family members.

The pasuk first states that these laws apply to a petter rechem, that which “opens the womb,” and then states that they apply to a bechor, a “firstborn.” Are these two terms identical?

Indeed, they are not. A petter rechem is born through natural delivery, which excludes  birth via caesarian section or its equivalent for an animal. In other words, the mitzvos of pidyon haben, pidyon petter chamor and bechor for korban do not apply to a firstborn who was surgically removed from his mother or born as the result of an unfortunate rupture. There is halachic discussion as to whether or not a bechor removed via vacuum suction or forceps delivery has the status of a petter rechem, but the halachic background for this topic is beyond the scope of this article (see Chullin 70a; Bechoros 9b).

Another difference in halacha between the term petter rechem and the term bechor is that a petter rechem means that he/it was not preceded by a miscarriage. In this instance, the miscarriage is considered the petter rechem. Of course, since the miscarried offspring did not survive, there is no mitzvah to sanctify or redeem it, and therefore the halachic result is that the father or owner is exempt from redeeming the bechor.

Three types of kedusha

The three types of sanctified petter rechem: 1. petter chamor donkeys, 2. beheimah tehorah, kosher animals, and 3. pidyon haben, humans. These three mitzvos have three very different sets of rules. Allow me to explain this very briefly; I will follow the order of meseches Bechoros in doing so.

1. Petter chamor

Petter rechem donkeys have sanctity that must be removed by redemption. This mitzvah is called pidyon petter chamor. As is the rule regarding most of the 24 gifts of the kohein, the owner has the right to decide to which kohein he gives the redemption (see Rambam, Hilchos Bechoros 1:15), just as the father of a firstborn son has the right to decide to which kohein he provides the five sela’im of pidyon haben.

As the Gemara (Bechoros 12b; 51b) derives hermeneutically, there is an interesting halachic difference between pidyon haben and the redemption of a petter chamor. Pidyon haben involves only one step – the father recites a bracha on the mitzvah and then gives the kohein the five silver sela’im or their equivalent value. Until the father gives the money to the kohein, he has not fulfilled any mitzvah by setting aside the money for this purpose.

On the other hand, there are actually two stages in performing the mitzvah of petter chamor, (a) the redeeming and (b) the giving. In the redeeming step, the owner takes a lamb or kid (or other item worth as much as the donkey) and states that he is redeeming the donkey in exchange for the lamb, kid, or other item of value. Prior to making this statement, the owner recites a bracha, Asher ki’deshanu bemitz’vosav vetzivanu al pidyon petter chamor (Tosafos, Bechoros 11a; Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 321:6). The owner then declares that he is exchanging the seh or the other item for the kedusha of the donkey. As soon as he performs this exchange, the sanctity is removed from the petter chamor and one may use the donkey (Mishnah, Bechoros 12b). The donkey is redeemed at this point, notwithstanding that the kohein has not yet received the gift.

In the giving step, the owner gives the seh (or the item exchanged for the donkey) to the kohein as a gift. No bracha is recited on this step of the mitzvah, and there is much discussion among halachic authorities regarding why not (Taz, Yoreh Deah 321:7).

Although there are two different parts of this mitzvah, redeeming the kedusha from the firstborn, and giving the gift to the kohein, both parts of this mitzvah can be performed simultaneously, by giving the seh (or item of value) to the kohein and telling him that this is redemption for the donkey.

Safek

In the instance that there is an irresolvable question as to whether a donkey was a firstborn male, the owner sets aside a seh, either a sheep or a goat, to redeem the newborn male, but has no obligation to give the seh to a kohein. Since the foal may have sanctity, we redeem him, but since there is no proof that there is an obligation to give it to a kohein, the owner may keep the seh (Mishnah, Bechoros 9a). This is referred to in halacha as hamotzi meichaveiro alav harayah, he who wants to collect has the burden of proof. This principle, which the Gemara (Bava Kama 46a) refers to as “the major rule in adjudicating civil law,” means that one can insist on payment only when proof of the obligation is established without doubt. In our particular instance, the kohein can insist on payment only if he can prove that the animal is a petter rechem.

A practical case where this might happen is when a jenny’s first births are twins, one male and the other female, and the birth was unattended by a human. Assuming that there was no camera focusing on the birth, we have no way of knowing which twin was born first and whether there is a bechor.

2. Bechor beheimah tehorah

Petter rechem kosher animals have the sanctity of korbanos and are the property of the kohein. Should their sanctity be damaged by their becoming permanently blemished, they remain the property of a kohein, who is to have them shechted and eaten. (It may not be used for work, nor may it be shorn.) Unlike other korbanos that are redeemed when they become permanently blemished, a bechor is never redeemed, as stated in the pasuk that I quoted above “However, the firstborn calf, lamb or kid shall not be redeemed because it is holy” (Bamidbar 18:15-18).

Mum oveir

There are two types of blemishes that affect a korban. One is a temporary blemish, a mum oveir, that will eventually heal. An animal with a mum oveir cannot be offered as a korban until its blemish heals. The other type of blemish is a mum kavua, a permanent blemish. Once an animal has such a blemish, it may never be offered as a korban.

How do we know whether a blemish is permanent or temporary?

Some blemishes are obviously permanent and do not require expertise for their determination. However, it is often difficult to ascertain whether a blemish is permanent or temporary and the decision of an expert is required to ascertain that the animal has a permanent mum and may be shechted. As we see from the Gemara (Sanhedrin 5a), this expertise was regarded as the highest level of semicha, called yatir bechoros, and was granted only to rare individuals, even at the time of the Gemara.

There is a fundamental and fascinating passage of Gemara (Sanhedrin 5a-b). regarding the licensing of poskim in general, and specifically to authorizing slaughtering a bechor on the basis that the blemish it possesses is permanent. In this era, most of the Jewish population lived in Bavel, but all the yeshivos were in Eretz Yisrael. The level of Torah knowledge in Bavel was weak, and rabbonim moving to Bavel would be engaged heavily in teaching Torah and kiruv work. Prior to leaving for Bavel, there was a need to establish to what extent they could rule (pasken) on halacha. As the head of the Sanhedrin, only Rabbi Yehudah Hanasi, usually called simply Rebbi, the teacher of all of Kelal Yisrael, could render this decision and licensing.

“Rabbah bar Chonah (who was a nephew of Rav Chiya) was leaving for Bavel. Rav Chiya told Rebbi: ‘My nephew is going to Bavel. Does he have permission to pasken on kashrus matters?’ Rebbi permitted him.” The wording used by Rav Chiya to phrase his question, “Does he (Rabbah bar Chonah) have permission to pasken on kashrus matters?” [was yoreh?], was made with the tone voice of a question and not a statement. Rebbi responded — yoreh!, an affirmative statement. Ever since, this has become the terminology used to license someone who has sufficient halachic knowledge to interpret kashrus laws reliably and correctly, yoreh yoreh. Most people are surprised to discover that the doubling of the words yoreh yoreh was originally a question and answer: yoreh? yoreh! “Is he authorized to rule?” “Yes, he is.”

Continuing the passage of Gemara: Once Rebbi authorized Rabbah bar Chonah to rule on kashrus issues, Rav Chiya asked “yadin?” “Is he authorized to judge financial matters?” and Rebbi answered, “Yadin! Yes, he is.” At this point, Rav Chiya asked “yatir bechoros?,” “Is he authorized to permit the slaughter of a bechor because its blemish is permanent?” and Rebbi authorized this, also.

The Gemara continues: When Rav left for Bavel, Rav Chiya asked Rebbi “Yoreh?” and Rebbi answered affirmatively “Yoreh!” “Yadin?” “Yadin!”

“Yatir bechoros?,” Rebbi surprised everyone by answering “Al yatir bechoros,” “I do not authorize him to permit the slaughter of firstborn animals.” The Gemara inquires why, since Rav was known to be a greater scholar and, furthermore, he had extensive training in checking blemishes. The Gemara concludes that precisely because Rav was such an expert Rebbi did not authorize him. Rebbi was concerned that when Rav would permit blemishes, people would think that they understood why he had done so. In reality, they would not realize that the case in front of them was not similar to the case that Rav had permitted. This would result in people permitting temporary blemishes with the mistaken impression that Rav had permitted those same blemishes.

Today we do not consider anyone expert to rule on these laws. However, when there is a mum that is very obviously permanent, such as a broken leg or a blind eye, three shul attending people may rule together that the blemish is permanent and the animal may be slaughtered.

In this context, we find an interesting dispute in a Mishnah dating back to the era when there was a semicha allowing its recipient to rule whether a bechor had a permanent blemish. An animal fell into a pit, and in order to rule whether it has a blemish or not, we need to raise it from the pit. The tanna’im Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Shimon disagree as to whether this is permitted on Yom Tov (Beitzah 25b-26a). The Gemara then devotes a discussion regarding under which circumstances this would be permitted. Since we no longer allow an ordained expert to rule this law on his own, this case is not applicable (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 498:9).

Non-Jewish ownership

The tanna’im dispute whether partial ownership of a non-Jew of either the mother or the fetus exempts the offspring from the sanctity of bechor, either of a kosher animal or of petter chamor (Bechoros 2b-3a). The anonymous author of the Mishnah (Bechoros 2a, 13a, 16a) exempts these situations from the rule of bechor, whereas Rabbi Yehudah rules that the rule of bechor applies when the non-Jew owns only a small part. The halachic conclusion follows the Mishnah that these animals are exempt (Tosafos, Bechoros 3b).

There is an additional dispute among early amora’im (Bechoros 3a) how much of the mother must be possessed by the non-Jew to create this exemption. Rav Chisda and Rava rule that the non-Jew must own enough that, were his part to be removed, the animal would be unable to live, whereas Rav Huna exempts the animal even if the non-Jew’s portion is as small as the animal’s ear, whenever removing the part owned by the non-Jew would render the animal into a ba’al mum, a blemished animal inappropriate as a korban. The halacha follows the lenient opinion (Tosafos 3b s. v. Deka).

Since a bechor animal has sanctity that cannot be removed, having one around can potentially cause a lot of halachic problems. People might use the animal in ways that violate its sanctity, which is a Torah violation. To avoid these potential sins, the accepted practice is to carry out a sale of the pregnant mother before birthing so that the firstborn is not halachically a bechor. This can be done because the firstborn’s sanctity begins at the moment of its birth.

3. Pidyon haben

As I mentioned above, there are three types of petter chamor, and we have already discussed the firstborn donkey and the firstborn kosher animal. The third type is redeeming the firstborn son.

Safek pidyon haben

In the instance that there is an irresolvable question as to whether a baby boy was firstborn, there is no obligation altogether for the father to perform a pidyon haben because of the rule hamotzi meichaveiro alav harayah. Since no sanctity is being removed through the pidyon, it is simply a gift to the kohein, which Dad is under no obligation to do.

Conclusion

As we see from the stories of Yaakov and Eisav, Reuvein, and Efrayim and Menashe, that even before makas bechoros firstborn males had a special role in serving Hashem. At the time of makkas bechoros, firstborn male animals owned by Jews became sanctified. That moment also elevated the sanctity of the bechorim of Kelal Yisrael, particularly regarding the service to be performed in the Mishkan and the Beis Hamikdash. However, the bechorim lost their special status when they worshipped the eigel hazahav, and the Levi’im replaced them. The pidyon haben is to redeem the bechor from the “even higher level” of holiness that he received as a result of makas bechoros (see Seforno on Bamidbar 3:13). As a result, the bechor must undergo a redemption ceremony to make amends – this is both to compensate the kohein and to serve as a means of “redeeming” the kedusha. We see the everlasting benefits kept by the tribe of Levi for remaining faithful to Hashem at the time of the eigel hazahav.

The Rites of the Firstborn

Question #1: Firstborn Pachyderm

How does one redeem a firstborn elephant?

Question #2: The ten commandments

How many times does the Torah mention the mitzvos of bechor?

Question #3: Petter Chamor

“What are the laws of petter chamor?”

Question #4: Firstborn of the Levi

Is a levi required to redeem his firstborn donkey?

Foreword:

Parshas Bechukosai teaches that “No one may declare the firstborn among the animals that are to Hashem with a different status of holiness — whether it is a calf or a seh, it belongs to Hashem” (Vayikra 27:26).

The word seh has no accurate translation in English since it means both a lamb (a baby sheep) and a kid (a baby goat) (see Parshas Re’eih, Devarim 14:4). To minimize confusion, I will be using the word seh when referring to both lambs and kids.

To explain the halachic ramifications of the pasuk I just quoted, we need to define the word “firstborn.” In halacha, there are two different sets of laws that result from being firstborn, and the definition of firstborn is not the same for these two sets:

(I) Sanctity of the firstborn

From the time that the male firstborn in Egypt were eliminated in the last of the ten makkos, firstborn people, kosher beheimah animals and donkeys all have sanctity. This sanctity exists only when a mother produces a petter rechem, literally, the opener of the womb; i.e.,she gives birth naturally to a male firstborn, as opposed to a c-section.

(II) Financial rights of the firstborn

The rights of a bechor to a double portion in his father’s estate is only the father’s firstborn son and does not depend on whether he is a petter rechem (Mishnah, Bechoros 46a).

In other words, someone can be a bechor regarding the laws of receiving a double portion in his father’s estate, yet not have the sanctity of a bechor for pidyon haben purposes, and vice versa, one can be a bechor for pidyon haben purposes and not have any claim to a double portion in his father’s estate (Mishnah, Bechoros 46a).

The rest of this article will discuss the first category of firstborn, one who has sanctity — whether human, kosher beheimah or donkey — because he is a petter rechem.

The three types of sanctified petter rechem: humans, kosher animals and donkeys; have different rules. Allow me to explain this briefly.

1. Pidyon haben

Petter rechem boys born from parents, neither of whom is of a kohein or levi family (see Bechoros 4a), are “redeemed” by having the baby’s father pay the value of five silver sela’im to a kohein. In today’s currency, we follow the opinion of the Chazon Ish who considers five silver sela’im to be the equivalent of 100 grams of pure silver. (Silver coins are not pure silver, which can be bent and filed relatively easily, but are usually an alloy of 75% silver and 25% copper, which produces a harder coin.)

There is no prohibition to use the firstborn child even if he is not redeemed, nor does the kohein take the baby home if his father refuses to pay. Notwithstanding that the Torah and the Mishnah refer to this procedure as a “redemption,” it seems more accurate to describe this as a gift to the kohein (see Bamidbar 18:15-16).

2. Bechor beheimah tehorah

Petter rechem kosher animals have the sanctity of korbanos and are the property of the kohein. Should their sanctity be damaged by their becoming blemished, they remain the property of a kohein, and they are shechted and eaten. They may not be used for work, nor may they be sheared (Devarim 15:19). In other words, there is never any redemption of these petter rechem animals, as the Torah expresses in this week’s parsha, in the pasuk that I quoted above.

3. Petter chamor

Petter rechem donkeys have sanctity that must be removed by redemption. This mitzvah is called pidyon petter chamor. Should the owner not want to redeem his donkey, he is required to destroy it in a procedure called arifah, which is a specialized form of decapitation. It is prohibited min haTorah to derive any benefit from the remains of the beheaded donkey.

The redemption can be performed with either a sheep or a goat of any age, gender or value, or by paying the kohein the market value of the donkey at the time of its redemption with virtually anything of marketable value. (There are a few exceptions; for example, the donkey cannot be redeemed by giving the kohein a loan document or real estate.)

I mentioned above that the term seh of the Torah means either baby sheep or baby goat; the halacha is that redeeming the donkey may be performed with any sheep or goat – it is not limited to the young of either species (Mishnah, Bechoros 9a). The option of using a seh is to make the redemption less expensive for the owner of the petter chamor.

Firstborn pachyderm

The firstborn of kosher chayos, such as deer, antelope and giraffe, are not sanctified, nor are the firstborn of non-kosher animals sanctified, with the exception of donkeys (see Bechoros 5b). Therefore, we do not need be concerned about the difficulty or danger in performing arifah on a newborn elephant by decapitating him with a cleaver. This is exceptionally useful information since newborn male African elephants may weigh over 360 pounds and they are protected heavily both by mom and many aunts and cousins. Therefore, the answer to our opening question, “How does one redeem an elephant that is a bechor?” is, very simply, that one doesn’t.

The ten commandments

Now that we understand the basic laws of bechor, we should note how often the Torah mentions the mitzvos of sanctifying the bechor (the second of our opening questions). In all, I enumerate here ten times!!

1. Parshas Bo: “Make every bechor that opens any womb among the Benei Yisrael, whether it is human or animal, holy to Me; it is Mine” (Shemos 13:2). The importance of this pasuk is emphasized in that it is included in our tefillin, both of the arm and of the head. We should also note that this pasuk implies that the petter rechem of any animal, whether kosher or not, has sanctity. It also implies that the petter rechem of any non-kosher animal must be treated with sanctity, not exclusively donkeys. As I mentioned above, this is not the halacha, and we will mention at the end of this article why not.

2. Again in Parshas Bo: “When Hashem brings you to the land of the Canaanites that He swore to you and your forefathers and gives it to you, you shall hand over to Hashem every [human] male opener of the womb and every opener of the womb pushed out by your animal to Hashem. Furthermore, every donkey that opened the womb shall be redeemed with a seh, and, if you do not redeem it, you must decapitate it. Every firstborn human among your sons you shall redeem. In the future, when your child will ask you, ‘What is this (service)?’ you shall tell him that we perform these mitzvos because Hashem extracted us from the Land of Egypt… when Pharaoh stubbornly refused to release us, Hashem killed every firstborn in the land of Egypt, from the firstborn human to the firstborn animal. For this reason, I offer to Hashem every male (kosher animal) who opens the womb and I redeem the firstborn of my sons” (Shemos 13:10-15). This passage is also included in our tefillin. We should note that here it mentions specifically redeeming donkeys and no other non-kosher animals. Bear in mind, that, at the time of the Torah, camels and horses, both of which are non-kosher, were commonly owned by the Benei Yisrael. Therefore, it seems that when donkeys are mentioned in the Torah, it is to the exclusion of camels and horses.

3. Parshas Mishpatim: “The firstborn of your sons you shall give to Me — so shall you do to your ox and to your flock. For seven days it shall be with its mother, and on the eighth day you shall give it to Me” (Shemos 22:28-29).

4. Parshas Ki Sissa: “Every [human] opener of the womb is Mine, and all the males of your livestock, the openers of the bovines and flock. In addition, petter chamor shall be redeemed with a seh, but if you fail to redeem it, you must decapitate it. All the firstborn of your sons you shall redeem” (Shemos 34:19-20). Again, note here that, among the non-kosher animals, only donkeys are mentioned.

5. Parshas Bechukosai: “However, no one may declare the firstborn among the animals that are to Hashem with a different status of holiness — whether it is a calf or a seh, it belongs to Hashem” (Vayikra 27:26).

6. Parshas Bamidbar: “And behold, I have taken the levi’im from among the Benei Yisrael in lieu of each firstborn who opened the womb from the Benei Yisrael; the levi’im will be Mine. For every firstborn is Mine. On the day that I struck every firstborn in the land of Egypt I made holy to Me every firstborn in Israel, from man to animal. They are Mine, for I am Hashem” (Bamidbar 3:12-13).

7. Again in Parshas Bamidbar: “And Hashem spoke to Moshe saying: Take the levi’im in lieu of all the firstborn among the Benei Yisrael, and each animal of the levi’im in lieu of all their animals… and the redemptions of the 273 firstborn that there are more than there are levi’im, each should take five shekalim… and give it to Aharon and his sons as a redemption…” (Bamidbar 3:44-51).

8. Parshas Korach: “Every opener of the womb, among all flesh that is offered to Hashem, whether it is human or animal, shall be yours (i.e., to Aharon and his descendants). The firstborn among the humans should be redeemed, as well as the firstborn of the non-kosher animals. The redemption: from when he is a month old, you should redeem his value at five shekalim of silver, using the shekel of holy items – it is valued at twenty geirah. However, the firstborn calf or the firstborn lamb or the firstborn kid shall not be redeemed because it is holy; you shall throw its blood onto the altar and you shall burn its fat as a fire offering as a pleasant fragrance for Hashem” (Bamidbar 18:15-17). Note that this pasuk states, “firstborn of the non-kosher animals,” implying all non-kosher animals, not just donkeys.

9. Parshas Re’eih: “Every male firstborn that will be born to your cattle and your flock you shall sanctify to Hashem, your G-d. Do not work your firstborn ox and do not shear your firstborn flock. You shall eat it, you and your family, before Hashem, your G-d, each year in its year, in that very place that Hashem will choose. But should it have a blemish, such as it is lame or blind, any bad blemish – you shall not offer it to Hashem, your G-d. Instead, you shall eat it in your cities, whether you are tamei or tahor, just as [you eat] the antelope and the deer (Devarim 15:19-22).

10. Parshas Ki Seitzei: “He cannot provide the son of his beloved wife with the share of the firstborn instead of the firstborn son of the wife he loves less. He must recognize the firstborn son of the less loved wife who is the firstborn” (Devarim 21:16-17).

Other sources

In addition to these halachic sources, the Torah mentions the special status of the firstborn in many other places. For example, it emphasizes that Yishmael placed Yitzchak ahead of himself at Avraham’s funeral, notwithstanding that he, Yishmael, was firstborn (Bereishis 25:9). Chazal explain that this demonstrates that Yishmael had done teshuvah and recognized that Yitzchak was the more spiritually accomplished of the two.

Yaakov purchased from Esav his rights as firstborn (Bereishis 25:31-34); although they were twins born in the same childbirth, Eisav was the petter rechem.

Yosef assumed that his father will convey the greater intensity of his beracha on Menashe, his firstborn (Bereishis 48:13-19).

Petter chamor

At this point, let us examine the third of our opening questions: “What are the laws of pidyon petter chamor?”

There are two stages in performing the mitzvah of pidyon petter chamor, although they can be performed simultaneously. The two steps are (a) the redeeming and (b) the giving. In the redeeming step, the owner takes a lamb or kid (or other item worth as much as the donkey) and states that he is redeeming the donkey in exchange for the lamb, kid, or other item of value. Prior to making this statement, the owner recites a bracha, Asher ki’de’shanu bemitz’vosav vetzivanu al pidyon petter chamor (Tosafos, Bechoros 11a; Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 321:6). The owner has the right to decide to which kohein he gives the seh (see Rambam, Hilchos Bechoros 1:15). He then states that he is exchanging the seh or the other item for the kedusha of the donkey.

As soon as he performs this exchange, the sanctity is removed from the petter chamor and he may use the donkey (Mishnah, Bechoros 12b).

In the second step, the owner gives the seh (or the item exchanged for the donkey) to the kohein. No bracha is recited on this step of the mitzvah, and there is much discussion among halachic authorities why not (Taz, Yoreh Deah 321:7).

The two parts of this mitzvah are usually performed simultaneously by giving the seh to the kohein and telling him that this is redemption for the donkey.

Firstborn of the Levi

At this point, let us examine the last of our opening questions: Is a levi required to redeem his firstborn donkey?

The Mishnah teaches that the firstborn donkey of a kohein or of a levi is exempt from the mitzvah of pidyon petter chamor (Mishnah, Bechoros 3b). The Gemara (Bechoros 4a) derives this law from a hekeish, one of the hermeneutical rules whereby the laws of the Torah shebe’al peh, the Oral Torah, are included in the Torah shebiksav, the Written Torah. In this instance, the laws of pidyon haben are compared to those of pidyon petter chamor. There is no requirement to redeem a firstborn kohein or levi; similarly, there is no requirement to redeem a firstborn donkey that is owned by a kohein or a levi.

Non-Jewish ownership

The tanna’im dispute whether partial ownership by a non-Jew of the mother or the child of a kosher animal or donkey exempts the offspring from the status of bechor and petter chamor (Bechoros 2b-3a). The anonymous author of the Mishnah (Bechoros 2a, 13a, 16a) exempts these situations from the rule of bechor, whereas Rabbi Yehudah rules that the rule of bechor applies even when the Jew owns only a small part. The halachic conclusion follows the Mishnah that these animals are exempt (Tosafos, Bechoros 3b).

An additional dispute among the early amora’im (Bechoros 3a) concerns how much of the mother must be possessed by the non-Jew to create this exemption. Rav Chisda and Rava rule that the non-Jew must own enough that, were his part to be removed, the animal would be unable to live. Rav Huna disagrees, exempting the animal even if the non-Jew’s portion is as small as the animal’s ear. This is true, in his opinion, whenever removing the part owned by the non-Jew would render the animal into a ba’al mum, a blemished animal inappropriate as a korban. The halacha follows the lenient opinion (Tosafos 3b s. v. Deka). This is perhaps the most important aspect of the laws of bechor in today’s world, particularly for those who own livestock: performing a proper kinyan whereby a non-Jew owns part of the mother of any potential firstborn male lamb, kid or calf.

Why donkeys?

Why is there a special law requiring the redemption of petter rechem donkeys? Why is there no sanctity of firstborn camels, colts or elephant calves and no obligation to redeem them?

As I noted above, the Torah seems to contradict itself, in some places stating only that firstborn donkeys must be redeemed, whereas in others implying that this mitzvah applies to all firstborn non-kosher animals!

One answer provided to this question is that since all the firstborn animals owned by the Egyptians died, hundreds of thousands of firstborn camels, horses, dogs and cats also died. The Torah required redemption only for firstborn donkeys, making them the representative species for all the other non-kosher animals.

The Gemara (Bechoros 5b) states that this is to demonstrate our appreciation to the donkeys for assisting the Benei Yisrael upon our exiting Egypt. We left Egypt with massive amounts of booty, which were all packed on donkeys.

Appreciation of a donkey?

This is a bit strange. Does anyone think that a donkey appreciates that he has sanctity and therefore undergoes a redemption ceremony? He certainly does not appreciate it if someone refuses to redeem a donkey and beheads it instead. So, how does this demonstrate our hakaras hatov?

The answer is that our emphasizing the sanctity of donkeys in reward for the service they performed makes us realize the extent that we are required to have hakaras hatov. We owe this even to donkeys, notwithstanding that the chesed performed for us was so many thousands of years ago and that this particular donkey was certainly not involved! And we should certainly have hakaras hatov to Hashem, to our parents, teachers and all others who have helped us over the years.

For the continuation of our discussion on this topic, see “More on Bechor.”

Did Dovid Accept Lashon Hora?

A Narrative of Biblical and Halachic Intrigue

The Gemara quotes the great Amora, Rav, as saying: “Because Dovid HaMelech believed lashon hora, the Jewish kingdom was divided, the Jews worshipped idols, and we were exiled from our land” (Shabbos 56b). What does this enigmatic statement mean? Can Rav possibly be blaming Dovid, the author of Tehillim, the founder of the Jewish royal family and the ancestor of Moshiach, for causing the Churban? In connection with the prohibition of lashon hora, found in this week’s parsha (Vayikra 19:16), we should try to understand the sequence of events that led to Rav’s comments.

THE STORY

After successfully vanquishing the enemies of the Jewish people and solidifying his monarchy, Dovid HaMelech wants to find out if there are any surviving descendants of his predecessor and father-in-law Shaul, who was slain in battle with the Pelishtim. Dovid calls Tziva, a slave who has been managing Shaul’s properties, and inquires whether Shaul has any surviving offspring. Tziva informs Dovid that Yonasan, Shaul’s crown prince and Dovid’s closest friend, is survived by a lame and unscholarly son named Mefiboshes (not to be confused with a different Mefiboshes who was Shaul’s son, an outstanding Torah scholar, and a rebbe of Dovid [Berachos 4a]). Dovid meets Mefiboshes ben Yonasan and discovers that he is actually a talmid chacham (Shemuel II 9:1-5; Rashi, Shabbos 56a s.v. bilo davar). Thus, Dovid could already discern that Tziva has a tendency to libel Mefiboshes.

Dovid invites Mefiboshes ben Yonasan to join his royal household and to take all his meals with them. In addition, he awards him with the formal ownership of all of Shaul’s properties, thus making Tziva and all of Shaul’s other slaves into Mefiboshes’ property. In a few moments, Mefiboshes has been returned to the wealth and honor appropriate to the royalty into which he was born.

Shortly thereafter, Dovid’s own fortunes take a dismal turn when his own son Avshalom instigates a rebellion, forcing Dovid and his supporters to flee for their lives from Yerushalayim as Avshalom’s forces seize the capital.

IS MEFIBOSHES A TRAITOR?

As Dovid flees Yerushalayim, Tziva arrives with a team of donkeys laden with provisions for Dovid’s men. In answer to Dovid’s inquiries about Mefiboshes’ whereabouts, Tziva responds: “Behold, he remains in Yerushalayim, saying that now the Bnei Yisroel will coronate me, the scion of the true royal family, as their king.” In other words, according to Tziva, Mefiboshes feels that the Jews would prefer to restore the house of Shaul to the throne and abandon the infighting of Dovid’s fratricidal family (Metzudos David, Shemuel II 16:3). In reaction to Tziva’s report of Mefiboshes’ treachery, Dovid awards Tziva the property of Shaul that he had previously given to Mefiboshes (Shemuel II16:1- 4). If Mefiboshes has indeed rebelled, Dovid has the legal right to confiscate his property (see Rashi, Shabbos 56a s.v. devarim).

Was it correct for Dovid to grant Shaul’s estate to Tziva?

Although Dovid has the right to be concerned that Tziva’s account of Mefiboshes’ actions might have some basis, the Gemara quotes a dispute (soon to be analyzed) whether he was permitted to assume the story to be true. Acting out of concern is permitted and is halachically termed being chosheish (suspecting) that a story may be true (Niddah 61a). One may react defensively to even an unsubstantiated story, in order to protect one’s interests in the event that the story is true. However, accepting the story as definitely true and following up on that assumption violates the laws of lashon hora. One may not take definitive action, such as seizing property, as a result.

Thus, accepting Tziva’s account without sufficient proof seems to violate two serious prohibitions: (1) betzedek tishpot amisecha, judging people favorably,and (2) kabbalas lashon hora, believing lashon hora!

These issues become even more difficult when we recall that Dovid had already experienced Tziva’s maligning of Mefiboshes in a previous conversation. This was when Tziva reported to Dovid that Mefiboshes was unscholarly, and Dovid consequently discovered that Mefiboshes was a talmid chacham of stature. Furthermore, we know that Tziva had ulterior motives to unseat Mefiboshes from his place of honor. So how could Dovid act as if Tziva’s story was certainly true?

Before trying to understand Dovid’s actions, we will return to the chronicle of Avshalom’s revolt.

AVSHALOM’S DEFEAT

For a while, it appears that Avshalom will indeed wrest power from his father and establish himself as king. However, Dovid’s forces decimate Avshalom’s troops in battle and Avshalom himself is ignominiously trapped. While riding a mule, his hair becomes tangled in the branches of a tree and he is left swaying above ground as his mule continues without him. Yoav, Dovid’s commanding general, and his entourage dispatch Avshalom while he is hanging in midair.

MEFIBOSHES APPEARS

Upon Dovid’s triumphant return to Yerushalayim, a very unkempt Mefiboshes welcomes him. He has not trimmed his mustache, washed his legs, nor laundered his clothes since Dovid fled Yerushalayim (Shemuel II 19:25, as explained by Targum).

Dovid asks Mefiboshes why he failed to join Dovid’s men in their flight from Yerushalayim (Shemuel II 19:25- 26). After all, since Mefiboshes had been eating daily at Dovid’s table, remaining behind when Avshalom assumes control could be highly dangerous! (Malbim ad loc.).

Mefiboshes replies: “My lord the king, my slave (Tziva) tricked me by telling me that he would saddle the donkey so that I could join the king – for I am lame; and he (Tziva) slandered me to my lord the king. But My lord the king is as an angel of G-d, and should do as he sees fit. For all the members of my father’s household were guilty of the death penalty (for crimes we performed in Shaul’s service), yet you honored me to dine at your table. What right do I have to ever complain to the king?” (Shemuel II19:27- 29)

MEFIBOSHES’ LEGAL DEFENSE

Dovid is faced with a puzzling dilemma: If Tziva is correct, Mefiboshes is an ungrateful, scheming traitor. If Mefiboshes is correct, Tziva is the worst type of slanderer. One of them certainly deserves punishment; the question is which? Dovid is in the unenviable position of trying to determine which of them is guilty. Is there any way to resolve this dilemma?

Does circumstantial evidence imply who is guilty? Let us examine:

1. Although Mefiboshes’ alibi seems reasonable, certain aspects of it are weak. For one thing, it does not explain his untidy appearance when he came to greet Dovid. How could he appear before the king without first bathing, trimming his mustache and washing his clothes! Although he claimed to still be mourning Dovid’s flight from Yerushalayim, he should have tidied himself in Dovid’s honor. Not doing so implies that he is mourning Dovid’s successful return! (Rashi, Shabbos 56a s.v. devarim).

2. When questioned by Dovid as to why he remained in Yerushalayim under Avshalom, Mefiboshes responds, “My slave tricked me by telling me that he would saddle the donkey so that I could join the king – for I am lame. And he (Tziva) slandered me to my lord the king.” Granted that Tziva tricked Mefiboshes and took the donkeys with him, but how could Mefiboshes know that Tziva has been slandering him? If Mefiboshes was indeed abandoned in Yerushalayim when Tziva took the mounts, he would have no idea what transpired after that point (Binayahu). Unless, of course, he actually had done or said something scandalous in Tziva’s presence…

Although the evidence against Mefiboshes is not ironclad, it does leave a dissatisfying sense that he is not telling the whole story. Later in the article, I will present another piece of evidence against Mefiboshes.

DOVID’S RULING

Who should Dovid believe? Either Tziva is telling the truth, in which case Mefiboshes is a traitor and should certainly not be granted ownership of his late grandfather’s property, or Tziva is lying, in which case he is a lowlife and should certainly not be granted any new properties as reward!

What does Dovid do? He announces that Mefiboshes and Tziva should divide Shaul’s estate!

It is difficult to comprehend why Dovid divided the property between them.

TALMUDIC INSIGHTS

At this point, we will study the Gemara’s comments on this enigmatic story. The Gemara cites a dispute between Rav and Shemuel concerning Dovid’s actions. Rav states that Dovid violated the Torah’s prohibition of believing lashon hora, whereas Shemuel protests that Dovid was innocent (Shabbos 56a).

Why does Shemuel consider Dovid innocent? Does not confiscating the property show that he assumed Mefiboshes guilty without proof, which constitutes believing lashon hora?

Shemuel explains that Dovid had adequate anecdotal verification (devarim hanikarim) indicting Mefiboshes for treason. Although this is not evidence that a beis din could use for a ruling, since Dovid was judging as a king, and not as a beis din, he could base his decision on substantive circumstantial evidence (Be’er Mayim Chayim, Hilchos Lashon Hora 7:22).

There is a difficulty with this approach: If indeed Dovid was justified to consider Mefiboshes guilty, why did he divide the properties between Tziva and Mefiboshes. If Mefiboshes is guilty, Dovid should confiscate all the property, and if Mefiboshes is innocent, he (Mefiboshes) should keep it all. What does Dovid accomplish by depriving him of half and awarding it to Tziva?

The Maharsha offers an original approach to resolve this conundrum. Although Dovid felt his evidence against Mefiboshes was sufficient, he realized that he would never be able to prove absolutely whether Mefiboshes was a treacherous schemer or not. Therefore, Dovid treated the case as an unresolved issue — and divided the property between the two parties, knowing that one of them was receiving a highly undeserved reward.

The Maharsha then continues by explaining the next passage of this Gemara: When Dovid informed Mefiboshes that he was being deprived of half the estate, Mefiboshes reacted with tremendous fury, saying, “I just finished telling you that I was eagerly awaiting your return to the city in peace, and this is how you treat me? My complaints are not against you as much as they are against He who returned you in peace!”

The Maharsha concludes that Mefiboshes’ sacrilegious outburst sealed Dovid’s decision, demonstrating that Mefiboshes was not as faithful as he claimed. If he had been mourning Dovid’s flight, his happiness at seeing Dovid restored to his throne should have been great enough not to criticize Dovid for any wrongdoing. Indeed his outburst demonstrates that Tziva was indeed correct and that Mefiboshes was simply performing lip service.

(This last approach presents us with an unresolved problem. Dovid had already divided the estate between Mefiboshes and Tziva. If he now had further evidence of Mefiboshes’ treachery, why did he not therefore award the entire estate to Tziva? There are several possible ways one can attempt to resolve this difficulty.)

A DISPUTING OPINION

Until now, I have presented Shemuel’s approach that Dovid did not violate the laws of lashon hora. Rav disagrees, contending that Dovid violated halacha by accepting Tziva’s story; Dovid had no right to assume that Mefiboshes had done anything wrong and he therefore should not have confiscated any property.

HALACHIC QUESTION

There are two ways to explain Rav’s position, with a major halachic difference between them.

(1) Rav disagrees with the entire principle of accepting lashon hora when one has adequate circumstantial evidence.

(2) Rav accepts this principle, but disputes its application in this case. He feels that Dovid “convicted” Mefiboshes without sufficient evidence – thus violating the prohibition against accepting lashon hora.

Which of these two approaches is correct? Can we accept circumstantial evidence in halacha, or does this violate the laws of lashon hora?

This question concerns not only a judge or king, but also often affects each one of us. May we assume that someone we see behaving wrongly has indeed sinned, when the evidence indicates this, or do the mitzvos of judging favorably and not accepting lashon hora require positive evaluation even under these circumstances?

Many authorities conclude that if one sees absolutely convincing, circumstantial evidence one may assume that it is true (Sefer Yerayim #192; Smag, Lo Saaseh #10; Hagahos Maimoniyos, Dei’os 7:4; Magen Avraham 156:2). Others contend that we may not judge someone unfavorably unless we know for certain that he sinned, and one may never rely on circumstantial evidence to believe lashon hora (Menoras HaMaor, Lashon hora Chapter 18; Bris Moshe commentary to Smag, Lo Saaseh 10:5, explaining Rambam).

According to either interpretation of Rav’s opinion, Dovid should have rejected Mefiboshes’ guilt, and therefore confiscating his property was unjustified. Consequently, the division of Dovid’s royal legacy, the Jewish monarchy, was a personal punishment for Dovid. As we know, ten of the twelve tribes seceded from Dovid’s grandson, King Rechavam. The king appointed by the break-off tribes, Yeravam, later became concerned that his people might make pilgrimages to the Beis HaMikdash, and therefore established temples in his realm as alternative worship centers (Melachim I 12:28; note that the commentaries there dispute whether these temples were initially avodah zarah or only became avodah zarah later). Although this idolatry initially affected only the ten northern tribes, its nefarious influence ultimately spread to the two southern tribes of Yehudah and Binyomin. Eventually, this idol worship caused the destruction of the Beis HaMikdash, as Rav concludes in his statement:

“At the moment that Dovid said, ‘You and Tziva shall divide the property,’ a heavenly voice told him, ‘Rechavam and Yeravam will divide the monarchy’… Had Dovid not accepted the lashon hora, Dovid’s royal monarchy would never have been divided, the Jews would never have worshipped idols, and we would never have been exiled from our land.”

This quotation reflects Rav’s opinion. As mentioned above, Shemuel contends that Dovid was correct and that Rav’s blaming Dovid’s for the resulting tragedies is unfounded.

What lessons do we learn from this tragedy? On a halachic level, Shemuel derives from this discussion that when there are devarim hanikarim, strong circumstantial evidence, there is no requirement to judge someone favorably. From Rav’s perspective, we derive an almost opposite lesson: although Dovid certainly felt he has sufficient basis to “convict” Mefiboshes, he erred, and his error, albeit only a negligent mistake, caused terrible results.

We all know the enmity that believing lashon hora can cause. If we all emphasize judging one’s fellowman favorably, we will certainly assist the reconstruction of the house of Dovid in Yerushalayim!

Pesach Sheini II

Question #1: Pesach Sheini or Bahav?

Do we recite the selichos of bahav when it coincides with pesach sheini?”

Question #2: Bar mitzvah

Is someone who turned bar mitzvah after the 14th of Nisan obligated to offer the korban pesach on the 14th of Iyar, notwithstanding that he was included in a korban pesach on the 14th of Nisan?

Question #3: Out of sight

How far from the Beis Hamikdash does one need to be in order to be exempt from offering the korban pesach?

Foreword:

In some years, the 14th of Iyar, Pesach Sheini falls on the day that most Ashkenazim observe as the second Monday of bahav. These are three days of selichos that Ashkenazim traditionally observe during the months of Marcheshvan and Iyar. Originally these were fast days and are still kept as such by many individuals. Bahav (or bahab) is in Hebrew ב, ה, ב, and stands for Monday, Thursday, Monday.

What do communities to when Pesach Sheini falls on bahav? There is a very diverse variety of minhag practices. Some communities observe bahav, reciting selichos, avinu malkeinu and tachanun. Others omit tachanun because it is Pesach Sheini and therefore do not recite selichos or avinu malkeinu. This includes some who observe bahav otherwise — in other words, they observe only 2/3 of bahav because of Pesach Sheini. Still others observe both bahav and Pesach Sheini during the same tefillah by reciting the beginning of the traditional selichos, stopping in the middle and saying half kaddish, thereby omitting both tachanun and avinu malkeinu. (Those who recite the selichos in the middle of the shemoneh esrei of the chazzan follow a slightly different procedure.) The purpose of this article is not to paskin for any individual or community. Each should follow its own custom, and if there is any question what to do, should ask its rav or posek.

Pesach Sheini or Behav?

At this point, we can already answer our opening question: “Do we recite selichos of Behav when it coincides with Pesach Sheini?”

The answer is a definitive “it depends.”

Introduction

This article will explain the Torah’s mitzvah of pesach sheini, offering and eating the korban pesach on the 14th of Iyar. This is the day that the korban pesach is offered by those who missed bringing it a month earlier.

Note: To avoid confusion, throughout the rest of this article the holiday of Pesach will be capitalized, whereas the pesach offerings will be spelled lowercase (except when the word begins a sentence or a heading).

Someone who was ill on Sukkos and could not fulfill the mitzvah of sukkah cannot observe the mitzvah a month later after he recovers, nor does someone who was unable to fast on Yom Kippur have a second chance during the year. But the Torah teaches: “And Hashem spoke to Moshe in the Sinai Desert in the second year of their leaving the land of Egypt, in the first month [Nisan], saying: ‘The Bnei Yisroel shall offer the pesach in its correct time, on the 14th of this month, in the afternoon… They shall prepare it following all its laws and ordnances… (Bamidbar 9, 1-7).’” Further, Hashem instructs that an individual who was tamei or at a distance and unable to offer the korban pesach is commanded to offer it during the second month, Iyar, on the afternoon of the 14th. “It should be eaten together with matzos and bitter herbs. It should not be left over until morning, nor should any bone be broken; they should prepare it like all the laws of the pesach” (ibid. 11-12).

An interesting point is that the Torah appears to compare the details of offering pesach sheini to the korban pesach usually offered on the 14th of Nisan, yet the Torah never teaches how to observe the regular korban pesach. The only other description of the korban pesach in the Torah is when the Jews were still in Egypt, called Pesach Mitzrayim, and not all of the laws of that korban pesach are applicable when offering korban pesach on the 14th of Nisan after the Jews exited Egypt. For example, there was no requirement to observe Yom Tov in Egypt, nor was there any prohibition against owning or eating chometz.

What if you don’t?

The Mishnah states that anyone who missed offering korban pesach on the 14th of Nisan can offer it on Pesach Sheini instead. Then it asks, if this is so, why does the Torah single out those who missed offering the korban pesach because they were tamei or at a distance? Why not simply say that anyone who missed pesach rishon can observe pesach sheini? The Mishnah answers that there is a major difference between those who missed pesach rishon because they were tamei or at a distance and those who missed it because they deliberately didn’t offer it. The first category of people are exempt from the severe punishment of kareis that is received by someone who intentionally does not offer a korban pesach. Those who missed pesach rishon because they were tamei or at a distance, and then failed to offer pesach sheini are exempt from chiyuv kareis, even if they intentionally did not offer pesach sheini, as we will explain shortly. However, according to some tanna’im, someone who forgot about pesach rishon and then intentionally did not offer pesach sheini will be chayov kareis.

This last question is dependent on the following three-way dispute among the tanna’im concerning the relationship between the two mitzvos of pesach rishon and pesach sheini (Tosefta, Pesachim Chapter 8; Pesachim 93a).

1. Rabbi Yehudah Hanasi (also known simply as “Rebbi”) understands that these are two independent mitzvos, each containing its own chiyuv kareis for violation. In other words, someone who intentionally did not offer the korban pesach rishon and then did not offer the pesach sheini because of circumstances beyond his control is chayov kareis for not offering pesach rishon. Similarly, someone who could not offer pesach rishon because of circumstances beyond his control and intentionally did not offer pesach sheini is chayov kareis. This is because although he was anus for not offering pesach rishon, his violation of pesach sheini is a separate responsibility incumbent on those who did not offer pesach rishon that carries its own chiyuv kareis. (For reasons that I will not discuss in this article, there are two exceptions to these rules. The two instances that the Torah describes, someone who was tamei and therefore not allowed to offer pesach rishon and someone who was “at a distance” and therefore unable to make it to the Beis Hamikdash to offer his pesach rishon are not chayov kareis for missing pesach sheini, although they are both obligated to korban pesach on the 14th of Iyar.) The Gemara refers to this opinion as “the two times to offer the korban pesach are each a yom tov by themselves.” In other words, failure to offer the korban pesach intentionally can make one culpable of kareis, whether the intention was to miss the first korban pesach or the second.

2. Rabbi Noson understands that the mitzvah of pesach sheini is considered a repayment for not offering korban pesach when he was supposed to, but does not absolve the sinner of his chiyuv kareis. This has several ramifications:

A. Someone who was negligent and missed the korban pesach on Pesach Rishon because of circumstances beyond his control is exempt from the chiyuv kareis, regardless as to whether he brings or does not bring pesach sheini. He has a mitzvah to bring pesach sheini but failure to do so will not create a chiyuv kareis on him. This approach disagrees with Rebbi, who contends that should he fail to offer pesach sheini intentionally he is chayov kareis for violating pesach sheini, as I explained above.

B. Someone who intentionally did not bring korban pesach on Pesach Rishon is chayov kareis regardless as to whether he offered pesach sheini. He has a mitzvah to bring pesach sheini, but doing so does not release him from his chiyuv kareis – only sincere and complete teshuvah will accomplish that.

C. There is a third case in which Rebbi (the author of the first opinion) and Rabbi Nosson disagree: a geir tzedek who converted to Judaism between the 15th of Nisan and the 14th of Iyar. According to Rebbi, he is obligated to offer pesach sheini since it is an independent requirement incumbent on anyone who has not yet offered korban pesach this year. According to Rabbi Noson, he is exempt from pesach sheini since he was not obligated to offer korban pesach on pesach rishon. The same halacha is true concerning a presumably more common case: a boy who turned bar mitzvah between the 15th of Nisan and the 14th of Iyar. According to Rebbi, he is obligated to offer pesach sheini since it is an independent requirement incumbent on anyone who has not yet offered korban pesach this year, which he could not observe as an adult. According to Rabbi Noson, he is exempt from pesach sheini since he was not yet obligated to offer korban pesach on Pesach Rishon.

3. The third tanna in this dispute, Rabbi Chananya ben Akavyah, contends that pesach sheini rectifies the sin of violating pesach rishon. In practice this means that someone is chayov kareis only if he intentionally violated both pesach rishon and pesach sheini. Even if he did not bring any korban pesach this year, intentionally on either Pesach Rishon orPesach Sheini, but negligently on the other, he is exempt from chiyuv kareis, although he of course violated two mitzvos aseih, one intentionally and one negligently.

Although the Gemara does not mention how Rabbi Chananya ben Akavyah holds regarding a geir tzedek who converted to Judaism or someone who turned bar mitzvah between the 15th of Nisan and the 14th of Iyar, it would seem that he holds like Rabbi Noson — he is exempt from pesach sheini since he was not obligated to offer korban pesach on Pesach Rishon (see Ra’avad and Lechem Mishneh, Hilchos Korban Pesach 5:2).

At this point, we have the answer to our second question: Is someone who turned bar mitzvah after Pesach Rishon obligated to offer pesach sheini, notwithstanding that he was included in a korban pesach on Pesach Rishon? The answer is that the Gemara tells us that this is a dispute among tanna’im.

Out of sight?

We now discuss the third of our opening questions: “How far from the Beis Hamikdash does one need to be in order to be exempt from offering korban pesach?”

When the Torah says that someone was “distant” from the Mishkan or the Beis Hamikdash and therefore could not offer the korban pesach, how far were they from the Beis Hamikdash to be included in this exemption? The Mishnah (Pesachim 93b) notes that the tanna’im dispute what are the parameters of this law. Rabbi Akiva contends that someone is exempt from offering the korban pesach only if he spent the entire Erev Pesach afternoon (see statement of the amora Ulla, Pesachim 93b) in a place that was too distant for him to get to the Beis Hamikdash that day. Since the Mishnah is describing someone who could not use a motorized vehicle to arrive in Yerushalayim, this distance is measured as from the town of Modi’im or the equivalent distance in any other direction. This is far enough away that it would take him more than half a day to walk from where he is to the Beis Hamikdash. Apparently, halacha does not factor in speedier methods of transportation such as horse, camel, donkey or automobile.

On the other hand, Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yosi rule that saying someone was at a distance from the Beis Hamikdash and therefore could not offer the korban pesach is an exaggerated statement. If he never entered the Beis Hamikdash grounds the entire afternoon of Erev Pesach, he is exempt from the punishment of kareis for missing the offering of korban pesach. He has a mitzvas aseih to offer pesach sheini, but he is not chayov kareis if he fails to do so.

But not out of mind…

The Torah states that someone who was “at a distance and unable to offer the korban pesach” could bring a makeup korban on Pesach Sheini. The question is debated in the Gemara whether he could possibly fulfill pesach rishon by having other people include him in their korban pesach. As we know, each individual needed to be counted as a member of a korban pesach, but does that require him to be in the proximity of the mikdash? As the Gemara expresses it, “He was at a distance from the Beis Hamikdash and others had their korban pesach shechted and sprinkled with him in mind, Rav Nachman rules that he fulfilled his responsibility to offer the korban pesach, whereas Rav Sheishes rules that he did not.” The Rambam paskins according to Rav Sheishes that he did not fulfill his obligation and he is obligated to bring pesach sheini (Rambam, Hilchos Korban Pesach 5:3). The Kesef Mishneh and others explain that the halacha follows Rav Sheishes over Rav Nachman when we are dealing with matters of issur ve’heter, rather than financial cases in which we always rule according to Rav Nachman.

Why is this night different?

The Mishnah (Pesachim 95a) states: “What are the halachic differences between pesach rishon [the korban pesach offered on Erev Pesach] and that offered on Pesach Sheini? Bal yeira’eh and bal yimatzei [the prohibitions against owning chometz] apply to pesach rishon, whereas, when observing Pesach Sheini, he can have chometz and matzah together in his house. Pesach rishon requires the recital of Hallel during the time that one is eating the korban pesach, whereas pesach sheini does not. Both pesach rishon and pesach sheini require the recital of Hallel while preparing it, and are eaten roasted and together with matzah and bitter herbs. If the 14th falls on Shabbos, their shechitah and other steps required in offering them supersede Shabbos.”

In explaining the halachic differences between pesach rishon and pesach sheini, the Gemara returns us to the pesukim in Bamidbar 9 that we quoted above. The Torah states that the korban of Pesach Sheini should be brought kechol chukos hapesach, “like all the laws of the pesach.” The Gemara, then, is curious as to why the posuk finds it necessary to mention specifically:

(1) That pesach sheini should be eaten together with matzah and marror

(2) That no bone of the korban pesach sheini may be broken

(3) That the pesach sheini should be consumed during the night and not left uneaten until morning.

Are these not three laws that apply to the first korban pesach?

The Gemara concludes that mentioning of these laws teaches us that certain mitzvos related to the korban pesach itself, such as the requirement to roast it and eat it in one place, apply to pesach sheini, even though they are not mentioned specifically in the Torah. On the other hand, other mitzvos that are not directly part of the korban pesach, such as the requirement to dispose of all of one’s chometz before offering the korban pesach, apply only to a korban pesach offered on the 14th of Nisan and not to pesach sheini.

More on pesach sheini

How else is pesach sheini different from pesach rishon? When the korban pesach is offered on the 14th of Nisan, the Mishnah describes that the first and largest group of people entered to offer their korban and then the gates were closed, prohibiting entry to those who did not arrive on time to be part of this group. When the first group finished offering korban pesach, the gates were opened, allowing a second group to enter and offer their korban. Only when this group completed offering their korban pesach were the gates opened for a third group. The pesach rishon was always offered in three consecutive groups, and only three such groups. This is a requirement that the Gemara derives from the Torah.

Regarding pesach sheini, the Tosefta (Pesachim Chapter 8) notes that there is no requirement to divide those who offer it into three groups.

Similarities

On the other hand, there are other ways, not mentioned in the Torah, in which pesach sheini has similar laws to pesach rishon. Both require that you stay overnight in Yerushalayim until the following morning, the 15th, after offering their korban, a mitzvah called linah (Pesachim 95b). Both korbanos pesach rishon and sheini are offered on the afternoon of the 14th of the month, even when it falls on Shabbos (Pesachim 95b).

As the Rambam and others explain, all the laws regarding when and how the korban pesach is eaten — that it cannot be eaten until night, how it must be roasted directly in fire (which means it must be barbecued whole on a spit that is made from pomegranate wood and not, for example, on a metal spit that would apply the fire’s heat indirectly), and that it should be eaten with a hearty appetite (Rambam, Hilchos Korban Pesach 8:3-4) — apply equally to pesach rishon and sheini.

Conclusion

Observing Pesach Sheini involves many laws of the korban pesach, but not the laws of the Pesach holiday, an interesting combination. On the other hand, in a completely opposite way, we have become accustomed to keeping Pesach without its unique korban; which is perhaps the most central of the observances of Pesach. It is so significant that the men who were tamei and could therefore not be part of the communal korban pesach realized that they were deprived of a basic mitzvah observance. They understood its importance, and, in their honor, we were taught that there is a make-up date a month later, something unique among mitzvos, and this can even supersede Shabbos. We hope and pray to bring korban pesach quickly, bimheira biyameinu.

Kosher Species

Question #1: How many mitzvos?

“Is keeping kosher more than one mitzvah?”

Question #2: Food for thought

“Am I required to eat each of the kosher species?”

Question #3: Check your scales

“Must I check fish for scales each time I purchase one?”

Introduction:

The Torah says (in parshas Shemini), Zos hachayah asher tocheilu, “These are the living things from which you may eat,” which the midrashei halacha and the Rambam count as mitzvos aseih. The Rambam considers these as lav haba miklal aseih, a prohibition verbalized as a mitzvas aseih, which is sometimes called an issur aseih. We noted that the Rambam counts four different mitzvos aseih, one to eat only kosher animals, one to eat only kosher fish, one to eat only kosher fowl, and one to eat only kosher grasshoppers. We also learned that the Rambam explains that he wrote the Sefer Hamitzvos to explain the rules that govern what is included in the listing of the 613 mitzvos. We now continue with part two of our article.

What type of positive mitzvah?

The first half of Sefer Hamitzvos consists of fourteen rules, called sherashim, that the Rambam established to determine whether something is counted as one of the 613 mitzvos. In the sixth shoresh, the Rambam rules that if a mitzvah is commanded in the Torah both as a positive commandment and as a negative prohibition, then it is counted as two of the 613 mitzvos — both as a mitzvas aseih and as a mitzvas lo sa’aseih. The Rambam explains that there are three types of mitzvos aseih in which this occurs.

1. In some instances, there is a positive mitzvah that is a flipside of the negative prohibition. For example, someone who observes Shabbos or Yom Tov fulfills a positive mitzvah (Pesachim 84a). There is also a negative prohibition which one violates by performing prohibited activity on Shabbos or Yom Tov.

Similarly, there is a positive mitzvah to observe shemittah, and negative ones involving performing prohibited activity during shemittah. Another example is fasting on Yom Kippur, which involves both a positive mitzvah of afflicting oneself and a lo sa’aseh.

2. A second type of positive mitzvah that accompanies a lo sa’aseh is what is called a lav shekadmo aseih — there is a mitzvah to do something, but one who violates the intent of the positive mitzvah will, at that time, also violate a lo sa’aseh. Two examples of this rule are the cases of the oneis and the motzi shem ra, both of whom are required by a mitzvas aseih to marry and remain married to the wronged woman (should she agree). Should he subsequently divorce her, he will violate a lo sa’aseh, in addition to violating the asei to remain married to her.

3. A third type of positive mitzvah that accompanies a lo sa’aseh is called lav hanitak le’aseih, in which the mitzvas aseih is the instruction that the Torah provides if someone violates the lo sa’aseh. Here are two examples of this situation: The mitzvas lo sa’aseh of nosar is to make sure not to leave over edible parts of a korban past the time that the Torah established for that particular korban. One who does leave over and violates the lo sa’aseh now becomes commanded to observe a mitzvah aseih of burning the leftovers.

A second example is the mitzvah of shiluach hakein, in which one is prohibited from taking the mother bird while she is fulfilling her motherly duties to her eggs or young. One who violates this prohibition by seizing the mother bird is now required to observe the positive mitzvah of setting her free.

We are now faced with a question: If the word tocheilu is a positive mitzvah, what is the Torah commanding us to do? It certainly does not fit the second or third of the three categories mentioned above. The second category would mean that there is a positive mitzvah that one is required to perform whose result one now wishes to abrogate. The mitzvah of tocheilu certainly does not fit this category. Similarly, tocheilu cannot fit the third category, because this mitzvah is not correcting an error.  

If tocheilu is included in the first category, it would mean that one who eats non-kosher violates an aseih, also. Whether we can look at the mitzvah this way appears to be the point of departure between the Rambam and the Ramban. The Ramban wrote the earliest commentary to the Rambam’s Sefer Hamitzvos, with a goal of explaining the Behag’s approach and answering the questions that the Rambam asks on the Behag. At times, the Ramban takes issue with some of the Rambam’s 14 rules. However, the Ramban accepts the Rambam’s sixth rule that a mitzvah, such as Shabbos or Yom Tov, when expressed by the Torah both in a positive way and a negative one, is counted twice, both as a mitzvas aseih and as a mitzvas lo sa’aseh. However,  the Ramban disagrees with the Rambam regarding these four mitzvos of identifying kosher species.

To quote the Ramban, “I see in this matter a major dispute (between the Behag and the Rambam) and, without any question, one of the opinions is erroneous. There are instances in which there is both a lo sa’aseh and an aseih in the same topic; however, both are not counted as mitzvos. An example is the permitted and forbidden animals, fish and fowl, where the Torah includes a positive statement, ‘this is the animal that you may eat,’ and Chazal interpret this to be a mitzvas aseih. Similarly, when it says, ‘you may eat any pure bird,’ this is counted as a positive mitzvah. And again, when it says, ‘this you may eat, from whatever is in the water.’ It is obvious that the intent of the Torah is not to say that when one eats an animal or a fish with the proper kosher signs that one fulfills a mitzvah, and that someone who traps them and then does not eat them is in violation of his observance of a positive mitzvah. The intent, clearly, is that one may eat only these species and not the non-kosher ones. This is called a lo sa’aseh that is derived from a positive statement (in Hebrew, this is called a lav haba miklal aseih), whose purpose is to establish that someone who violates the lo sa’aseh also violates an aseih.”

The Ramban then notes that in all of these instances, the Rambam counts as positive mitzvos that one check whether a species of animal, bird, fish or grasshopper is kosher. However, concludes the Ramban, “The Behag did not count them, because they do not include a positive activity, whereas avoiding eating the prohibited is already included in the lo sa’aseh. Consequently, referring to the prohibition in a positive way does not add to the mitzvah count in these instances, just as repeating the lo sa’aseh several times does not add an extra lo sa’aseh to the mitzvah count.”

The last point raised by the Ramban is mentioned by the Rambam and others. The Torah often repeats a prohibition many times. When the additional pasuk does not add any new halachic information, the additional reference does not constitute an additional mitzvah.

Be positive!

Many authorities rally to address the final point of the Ramban, that the Rambam’s inclusion of these four positive mitzvos must include some additional component or ruling to the halacha. Support for this approach can be brought from the way the Rambam, himself, mentions these mitzvos. In all four instances, the Rambam writes that we are commanded to check for the signs that the particular species is kosher. And he writes this in two places, once in the Mishneh Torah and another time in the Sefer Hamitzvos. There is also one time in the Mishneh Torah where the Rambam writes that the mitzvah is to “know” the kosher signs. What exactly does this mitzvah of checking or knowing entail?

What does a mitzvah add?

Many approaches are suggested to explain what the positive mitzvah might be including, according to the Rambam. Some understand that the mitzvah requires that one be completely familiar with the simanim of the kosher species and have hands-on experience. Book knowledge that split hooves and chewing cud are kosher signs, without knowing what these two terms mean, does not fulfill the mitzvah (Darchei Teshuvah 79:1, quoting Korban Aharon and Yad David).

A second approach is that someone who consumes food from a certain species, not knowing if it is kosher or not, who then discovers that he indeed ate a kosher animal, violates the mitzvas aseih for not checking the indicative factors first (Sefer Hachinuch; Pri To’ar, Yoreh Deah 79:1; Kinas Sofrim; see also Darchei Teshuvah 79:1). To quote the Sefer Hachinuch (Mitzvah #153) “One who violates this mitzvah because he checked only one siman and relied on that without checking for the other siman, even though it turns out that he ate from a kosher species, has neglected his observance of this mitzvah of checking simanim.”

What’s in a horn?

When the Sefer Hachinuch mentions this approach to explain the Rambam’s position, he adds a further comment that appears somewhat strange. He writes that there is also a requirement to know the simanim that identify whether a particular species is a beheimah or whether it is a chayah. There are several laws that are affected by this distinction, and the Gemara provides criteria, depending on the appearance of the animal’s horns, whereby one can identify whether a particular kosher species is a beheimah or a chayah.

However, this comment of the Sefer Hachinuch is very surprising. The Torah, as explained by the above-quoted comments of the Sifrei and the Sifra, includes a mitzvah that we identify whether a species is kosher or not. No matter how we understand this mitzvah of the Torah — and I will soon provide several other approaches — the mitzvah applies only to places where the Torah states that we may eat a certain variety of creature and then provides a defining characteristic or nomenclature. However, where do we see any mitzvah requiring one to identify whether a specific kosher species is a beheimah or a chayah?

The Minchas Chinuch answers that, in fact, horns do function as a secondary siman to determine whether a beheimah is kosher, although they do not function as a siman to determine whether a chayah is kosher. In other words, there are no non-kosher beheimos that bear horns, although there are non-kosher chayos that do. Thus, a beheimah having horns can be used to determine whether a species is kosher.

This explanation of the Minchas Chinuch is also a novel interpretation. The Torah provides two criteria to determine whether a mammal is of a kosher species: does it ruminate, and does it have completely split hooves. Granted that horns are a secondary characteristic, but where do we see that this is included in the Torah’s mitzvah?

More positive attitudes

There are also numerous technical answers why the Rambam counted tocheilu as separate mitzvos. Some authorities explain that one who checks the simanim of an unfamiliar species that he would like to eat, to see if it is kosher, fulfills a mitzvas aseih. This author is inclined to think that, according to this opinion, he should recite a brocha before checking, because that is what the Torah commanded one to do. We do not recite a brocha because of the machlokes haposkim as to whether this act indeed fulfills a mitzvas aseih.

We should note that the halachic authorities accept that once one recognizes a particular species as kosher, there is no further requirement to continue checking the kosher signs of this species (Minchas Chinuch 153; Darchei Teshuvah 79:1). Thus, there is no mitzvah to check for the scales of an obviously identifiable salmon.

Other positive approaches

Still others explain that the meaning of the Rambam’s mitzvas aseih is that one may not rely on the fact that a specific species is probably kosher. In general, there is a halacha that one may rely on rov. Upon this basis, someone not knowing whether a certain variety of bird or fish is kosher could rely on the fact that most fishes with a certain appearance are kosher, or that most birds are kosher. Although, in general, the halachic rule is that one may assume that what is before you is from the majority that are kosher, one may not consume an unfamiliar species, based on the information that there is a rov that this species is kosher (Shu”t HaRivosh #192).

There are other technical ways to explain the Rambam’s position. Some explain that one violates the mitzvas aseih by eating less than a kezayis, even though this is too small an amount to be culpable for violating the lo sa’aseh (Pri Megadim, quoted by Minchas Chinuch, Mitzvah #470 and by Maharam Shik, Mitzvah #154). The Minchas Chinuch (ad loc.), himself, suggests an alternative approach: Although one who consumes a non-kosher species in an unusual manner does not violate a lo sa’aseh, he will violate the mitzvas aseih min haTorah if he eats something that is not normally edible. This would be a novel and stringent idea in halacha, which has ramifications regarding the consumption of medicines and vitamins, a topic we have discussed in the past.

Conclusion

We see that there are halachic ramifications to the dispute between the Rambam and the Ramban as to whether there is a positive mitzvah to keep kosher, or at least, to eat only from kosher species. We should always hope and pray that the food we eat fulfills all the halachos that the Torah commands us.

Mezuzah Mystery

Question: The Pantry Predicament

Several frum families have recently moved to an apartment complex where the residences are virtually identical. Each apartment has a small pantry off the kitchen, and we need to know whether its door requires a mezuzah, and if so, where to place it. Each family has asked this question from its posek and collectively there have been four completely different answers.

  1. Sarah was told that she should place a mezuzah on the righthand side of the door as one enters the pantry from the kitchen.
  2. Rivkah was told to place the mezuzah on the opposite side – on the righthand side as one leaves the pantry to reenter the kitchen.
  3. Rachel was told that she does not need a mezuzah at all.
  4. Leah was told to place two mezuzos, one on each side.

How can there be four different opinions how to place the mezuzah? Furthermore, since we know that one always places the mezuzah on the righthand side entering the room (Yoma 11b), why were Rivkah and Leah told to put mezuzos on the left side?

The “Ten Commandments” of Mezuzah

The laws governing where one places a mezuzah are indeed complicated. The Rambam (Hilchos Mezuzah6:1) codifies ten necessary requirements that must be fulfilled for a house or room to be obligated to have a mezuzah. The first of his ten rules is that the room must have a minimum area of four amos by four amos (which is about fifty square feet). In the Rambam’s opinion, it is not necessary that each side be at least four amos wide – if the room or building’s area is at least sixteen square amos one must place a mezuzah on its entrance. Thus, according to the Rambam’s opinion, a room that is three amos wide but six amos long requires a mezuzah.

However, the Rosh and others disagree, contending that a room three amos wide and six amos long does not require a mezuzah since it does not have four amos in each dimension. In other words, he contends that a normal living area must be at least four amos per side.

Although the authorities accept the Rambam’s position as primary halachic opinion, and therefore one is required to place a mezuzah at the doorway to a room that is sixteen square amos even if it is narrower than four amos (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 286:13), we do not recite a beracha when placing only this mezuzah. Instead, one should recite a beracha prior to placing a mezuzah on a different doorway that all authorities require a mezuzah, and after installing that mezuzah, put up a mezuzah on the door of the room that is narrower than four amos (Shach). (This is the general rule that is applied to any case when there is a safek whether one must install a mezuzah. One does not recite a beracha, but it is optimal to place this mezuzah immediately after putting a mezuzah on another doorway that requires a beracha, thereby including the safek situation with the beracha.)

The Gemara (Sukkah 3a) says that a house smaller than four amos squared is considered too small to qualify for what the Torah calls a house, which affects many laws, including that it does not require a mezuzah (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 286:13). A house this small is not large enough for human habitation.

However, there are several important discussion points:

What if the “house” is not meant for general habitation, but is intended for a specific use, for which it is indeed suited, notwithstanding that it is smaller than four amos squared? There are authorities who contend that an area smaller than four amos squared that is suitable for its intended purpose requires a mezuzah. According to those who accept this latter idea, since a pantry is suitable for human use even when it is smaller than fifty square feet, this pantry area requires a mezuzah (Chamudei Daniel, quoted by Pischei Teshuvah). This explains why Sarah was told that she should place a mezuzah on the righthand side entering the pantry. The rav she asked follows the approach of the Chamudei Daniel (see Chovas Hadar of Rav Yaakov Blau, page 38, who cites several other authorities who accept this approach).

Are You Coming or Going?

At this point, I want to explain the answer Rivkah received, which was that one should place a mezuzah on the right entranceway reentering the kitchen from the pantry. Many authorities do not accept the approach of the Chamudei Daniel, contending that since Chazal ruled that a house smaller than four amos squared does not require a mezuzah, this is an inviolate rule, without exception. However, some authorities maintain that although a room this small never requires a mezuzah in its own right, when it connects to a larger room that requires a mezuzah, the doorway between them requires a mezuzah as an entrance to the larger room (Rabbi Akiva Eiger). They contend that if we were to remove the pantry, the doorway to the pantry would still serve as an entrance to the kitchen, and as such it requires a mezuzah. In this case, the mezuzah should be placed on the righthand side entering the kitchen and not entering the pantry.

No Mezuzah Need Apply

At this point, we will explore a third approach to the above question. Rachel’s rav ruled that her pantry doorway requires no mezuzah on either side. This is because he agrees that there is no requirement to place a mezuzah entering the pantry notwithstanding that it is suitable to its purpose, since it is smaller than four amos squared. He also holds that there is no requirement to place a mezuzah entering the kitchen. Whereas Rabbi Akiva Eiger contends that we remove the pantry from the picture and still require a mezuzah because the doorway between the two rooms qualifies as a door entering the kitchen, this third approach understands that the doorway must be viewed exclusively as the entrance to the pantry and not to the kitchen. If the pantry is too small to necessitate a mezuzah, then this doorway does not require a mezuzah at all (Da’as Kedoshim 286:13).

Double Duty

What remains is to explain the answer that Leah received that one must place a mezuzah on both sides. This rabbi appears to be concerned that perhaps the Chamudei Daniel is correct that one must install a mezuzah on the right side entering the pantry, and perhaps Rabbi Akiva Eiger is correct that one must install a mezuzah on the right side entering the kitchen. Although many authorities object to this approach of having mezuzos on both sides (Shu”t Maharam Shik, Yoreh Deah 287), there are authorities who see no problem with having mezuzos on both sides when it is uncertain which side should have the mezuzah (see Shu”t Binyan Tzion 1:100). I would like to note that most authorities object to placing mezuzos on both sides of an entranceway.

Mezuzah Rewards

We touch the mezuzah whenever we enter or exit a building to remind ourselves of Hashem’s presence, which is a physical and spiritual protective shield. Whenever passing a mezuzah, we should remind ourselves of Hashem’s constant protection.

Advice Line #2

Question:

My husband keeps shooting himself in the leg at every job he gets. He comes in late, leaves exactly on time no matter how hectic things are in the office, and generally seems lazy when it comes to his jobs. Then he’s surprised when he’s the first to get laid off. He was recently fired from yet another job. Is there any way I can motivate him to change, or point out what’s going on, without destroying his fragile ego?

Rabbi Yirmiyohu Kaganoff:

Anything you try to do to change your husband will just lead to more frustration and cause shalom bayis difficulties. He undoubtedly knows the problem, but a person will only change if and when he wants to. Your nudging him will not motivate him. You are probably doing a reasonable amount of nudging without even realizing it and we can assume it’s taking its toll.

The one thing you can do is try to build your husband up with positive motivation and compliments. Help him feel better about himself. Find excuses to compliment him in a sincere way, specifically on the rare occasion when he shows initiative.

Although when he is unemployed one cannot compliment him for his bringing home income, I often find it surprising that women expect their husbands to compliment them for preparing supper, but a woman does not find it necessary to thank her husband for going to work. One cannot emphasize more how much it does for a man’s ego to be complimented for earning a living and going to work, particularly when it is a struggle for him to do so.

Question:

I’m almost twenty-one years old but have not yet started dating since I have an older sister who is still in shidduchim. My parents want me to start dating already, but I don’t want to. My sister also says I shouldn’t wait for her, but I disagree. I can’t picture myself as a kalla, getting married before her. I don’t want that to happen! And once I start dating it may happen. What should I do?

Rabbi Yirmiyohu Kaganoff:

I believe you should start dating. The bottom line is that, while it’s wonderful to care for your sister’s feelings, it is not easy for a girl to find a shidduch in today’s world, and there’s no need to make it any more difficult for yourself.

The harsh reality is that your sister is not yet married, but that’s no reason to prevent you from getting married. This is particularly the case when no one else in your family seems to mind; in fact, they are encouraging you to date. It’s misplaced to worry so much about your sister’s feelings that you put your own future in jeopardy.

However, I must point out that if you are very resistant to the idea of dating, it may make the process quite difficult. If you find that you continue to struggle with feelings of ambivalence and guilt, it would be best to seek out a rebbetzin, therapist, or life coach who can help you work through these feeling.

May you and your sister both find your zivugim b’karov.

Question:

I work in a large marketing company where nearly all the employees are frum. The staff meets once a week to discuss ideas and proposals. Once a month, that meeting includes the CEO, and all ideas are finalized. Numerous times, my immediate supervisor has presented my ideas as her own. This is very detrimental to me because the possibility of a promotion is to a certain extent based on the proposal of original ideas. Her stealing my ideas is hampering my growth in the company. It’s difficult for me to say anything to my supervisor because I will be risking her wrath, and she is the darling of the CEO precisely because he thinks she is very creative. When I once broached the subject, she said I was imagining things and that the ideas were really hers. What can I do?

R’ Yirmiyohu Kaganoff:

The specific situation you are presenting is a bit unusual, because it is uncommon for a frum person who is psychologically healthy to say an outright lie to a listener who knows he is lying. Thus, there is either a major misunderstanding, something difficult to explain when this has happened repeatedly, or, more likely, one of the two parties suffers from a psychological handicap. Since we do not know which party is having this difficulty, it is hard for me to advise you.

Assuming, however, that you are indeed the party being wronged here, and you’ve repeatedly discerned this type of unhealthy behavior in your immediate superior, you have an obligation to report this to the “big boss.” The reason here is simple: Halacha requires us to protect someone else’s money, and having either an unstable or dishonest employee could cause your boss long-term financial harm.

You should make a discreet appointment with the big boss and explain only what you have observed, without any added interpretation or exaggeration. It is a good idea to review the relevant parts of Sefer Chofetz Chaim before the meeting and think through carefully exactly what you may say and how you will say it. Make it clear to the big boss that you are only meeting because of concern for his interests. Indeed, it is strictly prohibited to talk to him because you are angry at your immediate supervisor and want to get even.

Question:

My mother-in-law and I have an excellent, warm relationship. However, there is one area of conflict, which, although it doesn’t damage the quality of our relationship, causes her anxiety and me irritation. The issue is chasunah attendance. My mother-in-law’s father is one of many siblings, and they are currently marrying off their grandchildren. I see no need to kill my precious nights – work time (I work at home), housework, and much needed sleep – to attend a stranger’s chasunah just because they are my mother-in-law’s uncle’s grandchild. To satisfy my mother-in-law’s feelings, and to show that I’m not rebelling against her family’s norms (as she claims I am), I go 2-3 times a year to a chassunah when it works out for me. When I do attend, I don’t know most people there, and don’t feel my presence appreciated enough for me to have killed a night. My mother-in-law feels that my attitude is wrong. She says if I would go to the chasunahs I would develop a relationship with her cousins and my second cousins, and they wouldn’t be strangers. I feel that I don’t have the emotional resources to have a relationship with so many people, to the extent that I’d attend their simchos. My mother-in-law agreed that I present this issue to you. Please advise.

Rabbi Yirmiyohu Kaganoff:

You seem to be asking whether you are obligated to acquiesce to your mother-in-law’s request. In response, I’d like to start by briefly reviewing the halachos of kibud av va’em. You do have an obligation of kibud av v’em towards your husband’s parents, although not on the same level as your obligation towards your own parents or your husband.

However, the mitzvah includes only two components – kibud and moreh. Kibud encompasses ensuring that your in-laws have their physical needs met. This involves providing them with food if needed, bringing them a drink if requested, taking care of their medical needs if relevant, and so on. Moreh requires you to show them respect by not contradicting them, not sitting in their set places, etc.

In the situation you describe, I don’t see how either kibud or moreh comes into play. One can claim that since your mother-in-law is insisting so strongly on this, there’s an element of moreh. However, that is only a result of her feeling so strongly that she insists on it, to the extent that your refusal is rude. Her position, even under these circumstances, is by no means obvious.

If you are like most frum women today, between caring for a large household, supplementing the family income, and taking care of all your other responsibilities, you are juggling the equivalent of two full-time jobs. It seems unfair for your mother-in-law to pile even more on your already overburdened shoulders. Women today are already far too stressed, and need to spend more, not less, time with their families. Encroaching on that time for the sake of fairly distant relatives is not a wise move.

I don’t know where you live. If you live in a city where it’s acceptable to merely show up, say mazel tov, and leave, and if your mother-in-law would be happy with that arrangement, perhaps you could do that on occasion. But I wouldn’t advocate any more than that.

Question:

I’m a sheitel macher, and recently opened up my own business. There’s a problem I keep running into – relatives and good friends often assume that I will either do their sheitels entirely for free, or give them a steep discount. In addition, they often expect priority, and that I should do their sheitels before others that came earlier. I’m trying hard to establish myself, and my prices are already on the low end. Every discount impacts my parnassah. And when I push one job before another, it can hurt my reputation with the woman who now has to wait longer. I’ve tried to explain all this, but from the cool responses I’ve received, I realize that friends and relatives perceive me as mercenary and callous. What can I do?

Rabbi Yirmiyohu Kaganoff:

As a rav, I’m going to approach this question from a halachic perspective, and leave the emotional issues involved to the other respondents.

It looks like your family members are unaware of the difficult predicament in which they are putting you. Their approach to utilizing your services is misguided. Just as we are told in hilchos tzedakah that relatives take precedence over someone not related, so, too, assuming that the quality of work is identical, we should bring our business to a relative before someone else. This is not for our personal benefit so that we can get a price break; it’s so we can perform the highest level of tzedaka – that of helping someone become self-sufficient.

It seems like your friends and relatives are acting in self-interest, not halachic interest. They are probably not aware that their actions can sabotage your nascent business. You’re trying to be responsible, build a client base, and earn a good reputation; giving their sheitels priority over those that came in earlier jeopardizes all that. In addition, as you may know, businesses that fail usually do so early. This is a critical period for you and cutting into your profits at this time is not wise.

I’m not saying that it’s wrong to give a break to a friend or a relative – but that’s a gesture you can only offer once you’ve established yourself and are on secure financial footing. Your primary responsibility is to your immediate family, and supporting them has to be your first objective. Iy”H, once you are well-established you can certainly offer your family and friends discounts, but it will be because you can afford to and wish to, not because you feel pressured to do so.

Until then, it may help to discuss the issue with your local rav. Assuming that he also feels that giving discounts is incorrect at this time, you can then tell your friends and relatives that you were given a psak not to give discounts until your business is established. This will hopefully deflect the negative feedback you’ve been receiving and will perhaps prompt your relatives and friends to examine their actions through the eye of halacha.

Question:

We are a young married couple with one child and living in Eretz Yisrael. Both of our parents live in the States but about a 3-4 hour drive apart. As Pesach approaches and we made our plans to visit the US, it became clear that only one set of parents was willing to pay towards our tickets to come home. After taking this into account, we decided that we still wanted to go and would pay the other half ourselves. However, when deciding where to be over Yom Tov we are expected to split it evenly, although we feel that we should only be going to the family that paid for us to come, or at least spend most of the time with them. Please help.

Rabbi Yirmiyohu Kaganoff:

There are no obvious halachic guidelines for such an issue; it falls into the category of the “fifth Shulchan Aruch.” I’m therefore offering you my personal thoughts and judgment. One family is paying for half of your tickets; the other side is not contributing. It does seem fair that you should spend some more time with the side that is putting up money. However, there are mitigating factors that must be kept in mind:

Firstly, I’m assuming that the side that isn’t paying is not doing so because they are stingy but rather because they simply don’t have the resources. This brings up an important question: Should a family be penalized for not having the financial wherewithal that another family has been blessed with?

Secondly, if one side has more resources than the other side, it’s probable that they come to visit in Eretz Yisrael on occasion, while the financially-strapped family probably comes rarely, if at all. This means that if you don’t go visit them, you may never see them.

These factors indicate that you and your spouse need to sit down and have an open, honest conversation about the issue and reach a decision together. Although such discussions are not easy, realize that the making of a strong marriage comes through discussing sticky situations and working out issues.

Try to depersonalize the discussion and really focus on the points that the other person is making. Sometimes, it’s helpful for each of you to “plead” the other side. Let the spouse whose parents are paying enumerate why the Yom Tov should be split, and let the one whose parents aren’t able to chip in list the reasons the lion’s share should be spent by the parents who are paying. Doing this will help you get out of your own headspace and see another perspective. Keep speaking until you reach a decision that you’re both comfortable with. I wish you much hatzlacha.

Rav Sa’adiyah Gaon and the Taryag Mitzvos

Question #1: Most Important

What is the most important mitzvah of the Torah?

Question #2: Once, Twice, or Thrice?

The prohibition against mixing milk and meat is mentioned three times in the Torah. How many times is it counted in the 613 mitzvos?

Question #3: Counter Encounter

What are some practical halachic implications of different countings of the Taryag mitzvos?

Foreword:

Since this week includes the first mitzvos that Kelal Yisrael is commanded, we have an opportunity to return to a topic we have studied in the past – the counting of the Taryag Mitzvos.

Today, the most commonly used count of the 613 is that of the Rambam and the Sefer Hachinuch. However, there are numerous other counters of the Taryag Mitzvos — beginning from the era of the geonim, through the rishonim and until the current day who count the Taryag Mitzvos. At the time of the Rambam, most followed the approach of the Baal Halachos Gedolos (usually abbreviated as Behag) in counting the Taryag mitzvos. The Rambam, who strongly disputed this approach, provided a system with rules to determine what qualifies as one of the 613 mitzvos.

Subsequent to the Rambam writing his Sefer Hamitzvos, his major work on this topic, most other authorities followed the Rambam’s general approach to counting the mitzvos, although the major writers on the topic, such as the Ra’avad, the Semag, the Ramban, the Tashbeitz, the Sefer Hachinuch, the Semaq and the Maharam Shick, all disagree occasionally with the Rambam on the details. Some, like the Sefer Hachinuch accepted almost all the Rambam’s count (he disagrees with only one mitzvah), whereas others, such as the Ramban, disagreed with many dozens of mitzvos, in which the Rambam counted something as a mitzvah and the Ramban disagreed, and vice versa. For example, whereas the Rambam does not count settling and living in Eretz Yisrael as one of the 613 mitzvos, the Ramban does.

Introduction:

This article will not focus on the Rambam’s counting of the mitzvos, but on an earlier counting of the mitzvos done by Rav Sa’adiyah Gaon. Whereas the Rambam wrote an entire sefer explaining the rules for counting the 613 mitzvos and then enumerated them, Rav Sa’adiyah Gaon left us with a couple of poems, written at different times of his life, in which he enumerates the mitzvos in a brief, poetic style. To the best of my knowledge, Rav Sa’adiyah Gaon’s approach to the enumeration of the 613 mitzvos was left without serious study until Rav Yehudah Yeruchem Fishel Perla, one of the greatest gedolim of early 20th century Poland, made studying and explaining Rav Sa’adiyah Gaon’s work his life’s ambition. Rav Perla, who was born in Warsaw in 1846, devoted forty years to this study and writing up his conclusions, at times going for years without even leaving his home so that he could proceed undisturbed. During those years he relied on an opening between his home and a nearby shul through which he fulfilled the mitzvos of hearing kerias hatorah and shofar.

Many of the details of Rav Perla’s life are shrouded in secrecy, and the brief biographies I have seen about his life, including those in recognized encyclopedia, notoriously contain many obvious factual errors. For example, in some of these biographies it is claimed that Rav Perla was a disciple of Rav Chayim Soloveichek at the time that Rav Chayim was the rav of Brisk. This is obviously impossible for several reasons:

1. Rav Chayim was seven years younger than Rav Perla.

2. Rav Chayim did not move to Brisk until 1892. Until that time, he had been a rosh yeshiva in Volozhin and he moved to Brisk (where his father, the Beis Halevi, was rav) when the Volozhin yeshiva was closed. In 1892, Rav Perla was already 46 years old, and had returned to Warsaw, his birthplace, more than twenty years before. He was married and had a family.

It is reported, probably reliably, that Rav Perla studied under Rav Yehoshua Leib Diskin when the latter was the rav of Lomza. (This is before Rav Diskin assumed the positions as rav in Mezeritch, Kovno, Shklov, and Brisk, and eventually moved to Eretz Yisrael in 1877. It was then that the Beis Halevi, Rav Yosef Dov Soloveichek, was asked to assume the rabbonus of Brisk in Rav Diskin’s stead, a position that the Beis Halevi held for the last fourteen years of his life. When he passed on, he was succeeded by his son, Rav Chayim, who became known to history as Rav Chayim Brisker.)

Rav Perla, whose family name was also sometimes spelled “Perlow” or “Perlman,” was offered to be the rav of the best paying and most prestigious rabbinic positions in Poland of his era, but he refused them all to be completely devoted to learning and writing his seforim. His financial support was from the rental income of real estate that he had received from his father, a very righteous and wealthy Polish businessman. (It appears that Rav Perla’s rebbitzen managed his real estate investments and collected the rents.)

Rav Perla specialized in early authors whose works had never had thorough commentaries written on them. He wrote very extensive works on the Ra’avan and the Kaftor Vaferech, but his magnum opus is his work on the counting of the mitzvos done by Rav Sa’adiyah Gaon.

Rav Perla’s insights are brilliant and often very original. For example, in one place he resolves a dispute between the Ramban and the Rambam concerning an opinion of the Behag by demonstrating that they had in front of them two different and conflicting versions of what that gaon had written. In another instance, he unravels a baffling comment of the Ketzos Hachoshen by correcting the text printed in our editions.

Rav Perla’s work eludicidating the count of the mitzvos according to Rav Sa’adiyah Gaon and explaining in great depth the differences between the approaches of all the early counters of the Taryag Mitzvos was published in three volumes between the years 1913 and 1917. When we realize that the last volumes were published in the middle of what was then called “The Great War,” when many of the Jewish communities in Eastern Europe, and particularly those ruled by the Czar’s Empire, were destroyed, we can only begin to appreciate the monumental undertaking to which Rav Perla devoted himself. His commentary on Rav Sa’adiyah’s enumeration of the commandments totals 1600 pages. Rav Yeruchem Perla examines thoroughly Rav Sa’adiyah’s choice of words and deduces from this Rav Sa’adiyah’s understanding of each mitzvah and the halachic consequences that result. Rabbi Yosef Chaim Sonnenfeld, with whom Rav Perla had begun a correspondence before the war, is reputed to have said: “Without the hasmadah of forty years of devotion to Torah study, no human being would have been able to author such a work.”

Rav Perla owned a massive library and added thousands of comments to his personal copies of these seforim. Quite clearly, Rav Perla intended for the glosses in the seforim in his personal library to be printed at some future time to benefit Klal Yisrael. Many of these comments were eventually published in the annual Noam and numerous other rabbinic journals. Periodically, one of the auction houses specializing in Judaica sells a sefer that Rav Perla once owned. The seforim are rarely in top condition. They show wear from frequent and constant use; yet his copies still fetch high prices at auction. To quote one such auction announcement: “Dozens of important marginalia [some long], in the fine tiny handwriting of the renowned Torah scholar Rabbi Yerucham Fishel Perla. Signatures and various stamps: ‘Yerucham Fishel Perla,’ ‘Yerucham Fishel Perlman,’ and: ‘Juda Perla – Warschau.’” I have no idea why Rav Perla used different stamps, with different spellings of his name, or why he stamped his seforim multiple times.

In the 1920’s Rav Perla was widowed, and his children lived far from Warsaw. As an eighty-year-old veteran gadol, he moved to Eretz Yisrael, where he continued his studying and writing. At this point in his life, the rebbitzen of Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank brought meals to Rav Perla daily, while the octogenarian scholar continued his work, particularly an extensive commentary on the Kaftor Vaferech, a three-volume work on the mitzvos of Eretz Yisrael written by one of the rishonim. Rav Perla also contributed numerous profound essays to various rabbinic journals.

Having completed our lengthy introduction, I will now share several places where Rav Perla explains the brief poetic words of Rav Sa’adiyah Gaon to demonstrate that he disagreed with other mitzvah counters.

Most important

Let me begin by addressing our opening question: “What is the most important mitzvah of the Torah?”

While no one will say that the Torah has a specific mitzvah that is more important than any other, according to the Rambam, one of the most important of the 613 mitzvos is vehalachta bidrachav, to walk in the ways of Hashem. At great length and in several places, the Rambam explains that this involves evaluating one’s personality and adjusting it and behaving so that it develops in the direction that the Torah wants. This mitzvah forms the foundation of the Rambam’s work Shemoneh Perakim, a lengthy essay that is part of his commentary to the Mishnah as an introduction to Mesechta Avos. It also forms the basis of Hilchos Dei’os, which is the second section of the Rambam’s magnum opus, the Mishneh Torah.

Notwithstanding that many halachic authorities consider vehalachta bidrachav to be perhaps the most important of the 613 mitzvos, Rav Sa’adiyah Gaon does not even count this as one of the 613 mitzvos! This unusual fact is not ignored by Rav Perla, who has a lengthy essay explaining Rav Sa’adiyah Gaon’s opinion. Rav Perla demonstrates that Rav Sa’adiyah Gaon did not count this as one of the 613 mitzvos because, in his opinion, there is no specific commandment in the Torah to evaluate and adjust one’s personality. The sources that the Rambam cites as basis for this mitzvah were viewed by Rav Sa’adiyah Gaon to be asmachtos, meaning, in this context, concepts of which a person should always be conscious, but not part of the Torah’s structure of commandments. As far as the words vehalachta bidrachav, Rav Perla presumes that Rav Sa’adiyah Gaon understood this as a general commandment to follow Hashem’s instructions on how to live one’s life that is not counted as one of the 613 mitzvos. We can compare this to the road sign that instructs us to “Keep Right,” a message with both safety and ethical value, but should not be counted as one of the 613 mitzvos.

Thus, whereas many authorities contend that the most important mitzvah of the Torah may be developing one’s character, according to Rav Sa’adiyah, this is not even one of the Torah’s 613 mitzvos.

Basar bechalav

Here is another instance in which Rav Perla analyzes the words of Rav Sa’adiyah Gaon and the other mitzvah counters and reaches a fascinating conclusion. The Torah mentions the prohibition against mixing milk and meat in three different places, each time with the exact same five words, lo sevasheil gedi bachaleiv imo, “Do not cook a kid in the milk of its mother.” Chazal explain that the Torah repeats this mitzvah three times to teach that there are three prohibitions min haTorah:

(1) To cook meat and milk together.

(2) To eat the mixture of meat and milk cooked together.

(3) To benefit from such a mixture.

Rav Yeruchem Perla notes that there is a three-way machlokes among the rishonim whether this counts in the listing of Taryag Mitzvos as one mitzvah (Behag; Rav Sa’adiyah Gaon), two mitzvos (Rambam; Sefer Hachinuch) or three (Zohar Harakia of the Tashbeitz). Although most of the laws of basar bechalav will not be affected by this dispute, there are several ramifications that do result, particularly regarding the validity as a witness of someone who violates some of these laws intentionally, but observes the others. An example of this would be someone who benefits from a cooked mixture comprising meat and milk, such as by selling such a product as a salesman, but who does not eat or cook it. According to all opinions, he is violating a Torah prohibition. However, for reasons beyond the scope of this article, being invalidated as a witness is dependent on how many mitzvos are counted here.

Another counter encounter

Here is another example of a practical halachic dispute that results from two opinions whether a mitzvah is counted in the 613. The Gemara states that someone who frees a Canaanite slave violates a lo sa’aseh of the Torah, referred to as le’olam bahem ta’avodu. Among the rishonim, there is discussion about this law, since the Gemara notes instances when great Torah scholars did emancipate their Canaanite slaves. Rav Perla demonstrates that Rav Sa’adiyah Gaon never counts le’olam bahem ta’avodu as one of the Torah’s 613 prohibitions, and reasons that the gaon considered this to be a rabbinic prohibition. In a mammoth essay on the topic, he demonstrates numerous halachic ramifications that result from this dispute.

Mitzvas peru urvu

Rav Yeruchem Perla notes that there is a three-way dispute between Rav Sa’adiyah, the Rambam and the Rosh (Kesubos 1:12) whether kiddushin, getting married, and having children are one mitzvah (Rav Sa’adiyah), two separate mitzvos (Rambam) or whether the mitzvah is having children (Rosh). There are several very fundamental results of this dispute, but explaining them takes us very far afield from our topic.

Lo sikom

Here is an example of Rav Perla’s analyses that is not about whether a mitzvah is in the count of 613 but about the nature of a mitzvah. In parshas Kedoshim, the Torah teaches that we are not to take revenge nor are we to bear a grudge against a fellow Jew. To clarify the difference between the two prohibitions, Chazal explain that someone violates lo sikom, “Do not take revenge” when they ask a neighbor to borrow a tool and are turned down, and then subsequently refuse to lend their neighbor an item because they are angry and want to “get back” at him. (Should you have a valid reason not to lend him the item, such as, you think he will not take good care of it or he may not return it, you are not required to lend it.) The second prohibition, mentioned in the same pasuk, is lo sitor, “Do not bear a grudge!” Chazal explain that one violates this prohibition when, instead of refusing to lend the item to your neighbor, you lend it to him, but tell him, “See — I am not like you. I am lending you an item, even though you refused to lend me your item previously.”

With his skillful analysis, Rav Yeruchem Perla demonstrates that the rishonim dispute whether the prohibition is the action, or whether it is the emotion, and harboring a vengeful feeling or a grudge against someone violates the Torah’s prohibition. According to Rav Sa’adiyah Gaon and most rishonim, the violation is the action — refusing to lend him an item or reminding him that previously he did not lend you. However, Rav Perla proves that the Rambam and others contend that the violation is for the emotion, the mindset, not the action (Rav Perla’s commentary to the Sefer Hamitzvos of Rav Sa’adiyah Gaon, Aseih 19). In the Rambam’s opinion, if you are angry at the person who did not lend you to the extent that you are not prepared to lend him something, you have violated lo sikom. Alternatively, if you are prepared to lend it to him together with a piece of your mind about how nasty and selfish he is, you have already violated the prohibition of lo sitor.

Conclusion

In conclusion, we have seen that much halachic literature is devoted to counting and understanding the various counts of the 613 mitzvos. Some people have the practice of reviewing the mitzvos that are included in the week’s Torah reading at the Shabbos table, a praiseworthy minhag.

Eating Before Feeding Your Animals

freeimages.com

Question #1: Coffee and the concierge

“Was Noach permitted to have his morning coffee before he brought all the animals breakfast?”

Question #2: Dog’s best friend

“I would like to eat an apple. Must I first feed Fido?”

Question #3: Fish on Shabbos

“On Shabbos, may I make kiddush before I feed the fish?”

Introduction

Considering Moshe Rabbeinu’s responsibilities to his “flock” provides an opportunity to discuss the ruling of the Gemara (Berachos 40a; Gittin 62a) that one may not eat without first feeding his animals. This is based on the Torah’s statement in the second paragraph of Shema, And I will provide grass in your field for your animals,and only subsequently does the Torah say, and you will eat and be satisfied (Devarim 11:15).

Analyzing the mitzvah

There are numerous questions about this mitzvah:

Is this required min hatorah or miderabbanan?

Are we forbidden to eat only a full meal, or even just a snack?

May I quench my thirst before I provide water or feed my animal? In other words, does the prohibition apply only to eating or also to drinking?

Does this mitzvah apply on Shabbos and Yom Tov?

These and other questions will be addressed in the course of this article.

Torah or rabbinic?

Let us start with a basic question: Is the obligation to feed my animals before I eat min hatorah or miderabbanan?

A prominent early acharon, Rav Yaakov Reischer (Shu”t Shevus Yaakov 3:13), rules that, although the Gemara cites a pasuk as the source for this halachah, it is required only as a rabbinic mitzvah, and the pasuk is an allusion, what Chazal call an asmachta. Although I have seen authorities quoted as holding that the requirement is min hatorah (see, for example, Sedei Chemed Volume I, page 40), I have not yet found anyone who rules this way clearly. Quite the contrary, the Rambam (Hilchos Avodim 9:8) states that feeding your animals before you eat is an exemplary way to act, but is not required.

Of course, this leads to another question: How can the Rambam rule that feeding your animals before you eat is merely an exemplary act, when the Gemara prohibits eating before you feed your animals? The Nishmas Adam (5:11) raises this question, answering that the Rambam, presumably, had a variant text of the Gemara, and suggests what he thinks that text was.

A full meal or a snack?

Are we forbidden to eat only a full meal before feeding our animals, or are we prohibited to eat even a snack?

This question is subject to a dispute among early authorities, which appears to be based on how one reads and understands the pertinent passage of Gemara. The two times the Gemara cites this mitzvah in our published editions, it quotes varying and conflicting passages. In Berachos, the Gemara reads, It is prohibited to eat before you provide food for your animals, whereas in Gittin the passage reads, It is prohibited to taste [food] before you provide food for your animals. In Chazal’s lexicon, eatingusually implies a full meal, whereas te’imah, tasting, implies a snack. Thus, the text in Berachos (eat) implies that the prohibition is limited to eating a full meal, but that one may eat a snack even though he has not yet fed his animals. On the other hand, the version in Gittin (taste) implies that even a snack is prohibited. However, I found variations on the Gemara texts, including versions in both places that prohibit tasting, and versions in both places that only prohibit eating. Most significantly, both the Rif and the Rosh, two of the most preeminent authorities, state in their comments to the passage in Berachos that tasting is prohibited. It seems that they prohibit even snacking prior to feeding one’s animals, which is also implied by the Beis Yosef (Orach Chayim 167).

The two major commentaries on the Shulchan Aruch seem to dispute whether one may snack prior to feeding one’s animals — the Taz (167:7) expressly permits snacking before feeding your animal, whereas the Magen Avraham (167:18) implies that it is prohibited.

An in-between meals snack

Some authorities endeavor to resolve the inconsistency between the two Talmudic versions of the text. The Nishmas Adam suggests that the two versions are not contradictory. It is prohibited to eat a meal without feeding your animal first, and that one who is planning to sit down to a meal may not taste anything of the meal without first feeding his animals. However, it is permitted to eat only a small snack prior to feeding your animals, when that is all one intends to eat. This approach is how the Nishmas Adam concludes in his magnum opus, the Chayei Adam (5:11), where he implies that one may eat a snack before feeding one’s animals.

The Nahar Shalom (167:4) answers the contradiction  in the two texts in a similar fashion, ruling that when it is meal time, one may not eat even a snack, out of concern that he’ll forget to feed his animals. If he starts eating between meals, one may eat a snack without feeding his animals first. This approach is also quoted by the Kaf Hachayim (167:52) as definitive halachah. However, the Shevus Yaakov, the Kesav Sofer (Shu”t Orach Chayim #32) and the Mishnah Berurah (167:40) all prohibit eating even a snack before feeding one’s animals.

At this point, we can address one of our opening questions: “I would like to eat an apple. Must I first feed Fido?”

According to the Taz, the Chayei Adam, the Nahar Shalom and the Kaf Hachayim, one may eat an apple or some other snack before feeding his dog, although the Nahar Shalom and the Kaf Hachayim permit this only when it is not meal time. On the other hand, many other authorities prohibit eating even a snack without first feeding one’s animals.

Is instructing enough?

The Nahar Shalom and the Kaf Hachayim also contend that if the owner commanded his servants to feed the animals, he may begin his meal. Since his instructions will be obeyed, he does not need to worry that his animals will go hungry. However, other authorities do not record this lenient ruling (see Mishnah Berurah).

Drinking before feeding

Is it permitted to drink before one feeds the animals, or is the prohibition limited to eating?

Based on the Torah’s description of how Rivkah greeted Eliezer, the Sefer Chassidim (#531) makes a distinction between eating and drinking. The Torah teaches that Eliezer asked her for a little bit of water, and she answered him, I will serve you water and also your camels. The Sefer Chassidim asks how Eliezer could drink without first providing the camels with water. He concludes that although one may not eatwithout first feeding one’s animals, it is permitted to drink. This conclusion is quoted by many later authorities (Magen Avraham 167:18; Birkei Yosef 167:6; Mishnah Berurah 167:40; Shu”t Har Tzvi 1:90), although several others (Pri Megadim, Mishbetzos Zahav 167:7; Shu”t Kesav Sofer, Orach Chayim #32) dispute it. The Pri Megadim rules that when the animals are thirsty, one is required to water them before one may drink. He contends that Rivkah offered the men to drink first, because the camels were not as thirsty. This was because the camels had been drinking roadside water that people would consider too dirty to drink. I will share with you that I also do not know how the Pri Megadim knows to make these assumptions.

Another approach is that of the Chasam Sofer, who contends that when someone is offered food by a host, he may eat without first feeding his animals, since the host has no obligation to feed the guest’s animals. This explains why Eliezer drank before watering his camels.

Yet another approach to explain Rivkah’s actions is that she assessed that it was dangerous for Eliezer and his men not to hydrate themselves immediately, and that pikuach nefesh certainly supersedes the requirement to feed or water the animals first (Or Hachayim, quoted by Yad Efrayim on Magen Avraham 167:18).

A drinking problem

Why should drinking be permitted before one feeds one’s animals when it is forbidden to eat, and, according to many authorities, even have a small snack? Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank (Shu”t Har Tzvi, Orach Chayim 1:90) provides two reasons for this distinction. First, suffering from thirst is far more uncomfortable than suffering from hunger, so the Torah did not require one to remain thirsty in order to make sure that the animals are fed. Second, the Torah forbade eating before feeding one’s animals out of concern that once one gets involved in eating, he may forget to feed his animals. Drinking does not create this concern, since it takes less time and is not as involved as eating.

Is Shabbos different?

May one eat on Shabbos and Yom Tov before feeding one’s animals? The Kesav Sofer rules that the prohibition of eating before one feeds one’s animals applies only to eating a meal that does not fulfill a mitzvah, but that one may eat on Shabbos and Yom Tov before one has fed one’s animals, since this eatingfulfills a mitzvah. Not all authorities appear to accept this ruling.

Dog’s best friend

Let us return to one of the questions we discussed above: “I would like to eat an apple. Must I first feed Fido?”

An anonymous questioner asked the great eighteenth-century halachic authority, Rav Yaakov Emden, whether one may eat before feeding his dog or cat. He responded that he does not know why his questioner thought that dogs and cats should be treated differently from any other of G-d’s creatures. He suggests two reasons that might explain why the questioner thought that one may eat before feeding one’s dog or cat. Each of these reasons requires an introduction.

Beheimah versus chayah

For certain laws, the Torah divides animals into two categories, beheimos and chayos. These two categories defy a clear translation in English, although often beheimos are called domesticated animal species and chayos are called wild species. Rav Yaakov Emden suggested that perhaps the questioner thought that the requirement to feed your animals before you eat applies only to species of animal that qualify as beheimah and not to those that are chayah, and that the questioner thought that both dogs and cats are categorized as chayos, thereby exempting the owner from the obligation of feeding his animals before eating. The Yaavetz does agree that both dogs and cats are categorized as chayos — the Mishnah (Kelayim 8:6) quotes a dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Sages regarding whether a dog is considered a chayah or a beheimah. According to the Sages, the halachic conclusion, dogs are chayos, and the Yaavetz endeavors to demonstrate that cats also qualify as chayos.

However, the Yaavetz notes that the prohibition to eat before feeding your animals applies equally to beheimos and chayos. Although there are several areas of halachah in which there is a difference between kosher beheimos and kosher chayos, there is only one Talmudic source that discusses what halachic difference it makes whether a non-kosher animal is categorized as a chayah or as a beheimah. This source is a Tosefta (Kelayim 5:5) that discusses the above-mentioned dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Sages whether a dog qualifies as a chayah or as a beheimah. The Tosefta’sasks, what difference does it make whether a dog is a chayah or a beheimah? The Tosefta explains that the difference applies to someone who gives all his chayos to his son, and we now need to know whether his dogs are included. According to the Sages, the dogs have now been given to the son, whereas, according to Rabbi Meir, they remain property of the father.

The Rash, one of the early Baalei Tosafos, adds another similar halachic difference that will result from the question as to whether a creature is a beheimah or a chayah.The case is where someone declared all his chayos to be kodesh, which means that they have all become property of the Beis Hamikdash. According to Rabbi Meir, since dogs are beheimos, in this situation his dogs will remain his property, whereas, according to the Sages, Fido and his buddies are now property of the Beis Hamikdash and require redemption.

Both the Tosefta and the Rash imply that the mitzvah of feeding your animals before you eat applies equally to beheimos and to chayos.

This Tosefta answers another question, which arises from a Mishnah(Kelayim 8:6) that states that a pig qualifies as a beheimah, whereas the elephant, the monkey and the arod, a type of wildass (very possibly the onager) are chayos. Since these are all non-kosher species, what difference does it make in halachah whether these species qualify as beheimah or as chayah? The answer is, what happens if Mr. Goldberg gave all the chayos in his personal zoo and petting farm to his son as a gift.  Who owns the pigs, the elephants, the monkeys and the onagers? The halachah is that Mr. Goldberg still owns the pigs but he has given the elephants, the monkeys and the onagers to his son. (I will not delve into the question as to why Mr. Goldberg owned a pig, when this is forbidden. Perhaps a non-Jewish business contact gave him a present and he had not yet had the opportunity to sell it.)

Feed your workers!

Having established that the prohibition of eating before feeding one’s animals applies equally to beheimos and chayos, the Yaavetz suggests another possibility why the questioner thought that dogs and cats might be excluded from the requirements of this mitzvah. Perhaps the requirement to feed your animal before you eat is because it is working for you, and the questioner thought that dogs and cats are not considered workers. According to this approach, one would be permitted to eat before feeding fish or canaries, since they are basically pension receivers, whereas one would be required to feed his carrier pigeons, cattle, sheep, goats, horses, donkeys and gaming falcons before eating.

However, the Yaavetz rejects both suppositions of this approach.

First, he contends that both dogs and cats qualify as workers, dogs because they serve as loyal watchmen and cats because they clear the house of mice.

Second, the requirement to feed your animal has nothing to do with whether the animal works for you; once you are responsible for the animal, the rules of tzaar baalei chayim, not to cause an animal to suffer, require you to provide it with food. Thus, even pension-receiving animals are entitled to be fed, and the owner must attend to them before he is permitted to eat.

Man’s best friend

So, is there any reason to treat dogs and cats differently from other animals?

Notwithstanding the Yaavetz‘s rejection of both of his suggestions why dogs and cats might be treated differently from other animals, he concludes that, although one is required to make sure that one’s dogs and cats are fed, one is not required to feed them prior to his own eating. He presents the following novel suggestion: Since both of these species do not have difficulty finding food on their own, the responsibility to feed them does not lie so heavily on the owner to feed them before eating. The prohibition to eat before feeding your animals is restricted to animals that, once domesticated, would not be able to find food without the owner feeding them. The Yaavetz contends that only animals that have difficulty finding their own meals create an onus to the extent that their owner must go hungry until he provides them with victuals.

By the way, I found very few later poskim who quote this position of the Yaavetz as the accepted halacha.

Conclusion

Why are we required to feed one’s animals before we eat? The Yad Efrayim (on Orach Chayim, Magen Avraham 167:18) suggests the following: One should always look at himself as unworthy to receive Hashem’s bounty. Perhaps one’s only merit to be fed is that we feed the animals that are dependent upon us. Thus, this mitzvah has a secondary goal – not only to teach us to be concerned about Hashem’s creatures, but also to teach us humility.

Ben Soreir Umoreh

Question #1: Same Voice

Can a man have a voice no deeper than his wife’s?

Question #2: Same Vice

Is an adolescent alcoholic automatically a ben soreir umoreh?

Introduction:

One of the most unusual parts of the Torah, both written and oral, is the passage concerning the ben soreir umoreh, the stubborn and rebellious son. The Torah teaches that this spoiled brat is beaten, which means that he receive malkus, up to 39 lashes, and if he still continues in his nefarious ways, he is executed via sekilah, stoning. Although many of us have considered even crueler ways to remove the presence of an unruly neighbor’s progeny, we probably did not entertain the idea seriously, even if the kid endowed the concept “teenager” or “adolescent” with a new level of meaning.

Let us understand how our Sages analyze the verses of this mitzvah (Devarim 22:18-21): When a man will have a wayward and rebellious son, who does not listen either to the voice of his father or to the voice of his mother. Subsequently, he was chastised and he still refuses to hearken to their admonishment. His father and his mother seize him and bring him to the elders of his city, whose local beis din is near the city gates. The parents declare to the judges of the beis din, “this son of ours is wayward and rebellious and does not listen to us. He eats an abundance of quality meat and drinks wine to excess.” All the people of the city shall stone him until he dies; you shall destroy the evil from your midst, and all Israel shall hear and be awestruck!

As Chazal and Rashi question: For what reason do we execute him? Because we see where his life is heading. Now, he finds it easy to steal from his parents, to find a good price on quality meat and wine and an undisturbed place to enjoy his ill-gained lifestyle. As he grows older, he will find it more difficult to maintain this, and once he is experienced at taking other people’s property to sustain his bad habits, he will hold people up for their valuables. Then, it is only a question of time until he murders. The Torah ruled: Let him die while he is still relatively innocent, rather than die a completely guilty scoundrel (Mishnah, Sanhedrin 71b). We will see much more on this repeated theme shortly.

Wayward daughters

What about a rebellious girl? Note that the Torah states that the mitzvah applies only to a wayward and rebellious son, but not to a daughter. As a menace to proper societal standards, Chazal recognize that a rebellious young lass is a much greater concern (Yerushalmi, Sanhedrin). Yet the Torah exempts all females from the status of ben soreir umoreh. As the Talmud Yerushalmi questions: “Who is more likely to become a communal liability of which we need to be concerned, a wayward son or a wayward daughter? A daughter! Yet the Torah exempts a daughter and obliges the son!”

Meat and wine

Let us review the basics of the case. The Mishnah (Sanhedrin 70a) mentions a dispute between tana’im. According to the Tanna Kamma, the youth is not obligated unless he consumes a tartimar of meat and half a log of Italian wine at one sitting. Rabbi Yosi says a maneh of meat and a full log of wine. (Please be aware that there are three different tanna’im named Rabbi Yosi whose opinions are mentioned in the relevant passage of Gemara Sanhedrin and in the course of this article. This one is Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Chalafta.)

The Gemara mentions that he drank Italian wine, which was apparently a boutique product. (However, the Rambam omits mention of this, and the Ramah understands the passage of Gemara differently.) The Mishnah mentions a peculiar rule: If he ate non-kosher meat of any type, he is not ruled to be a ben soreir umoreh, notwithstanding that he consumed the quantities and in the manner that we will soon describe.

The  opposite is also true: He is not punished as a ben soreir umoreh when his eating was at a seudas mitzvah, even though all the other requirements of ben soreir umoreh are met.

If he eats meat that was salted to preserve it, he is exempt. How much time must the meat have been salted to exempt our lad from gruesome results? If the meat remained salted for at least a day and a half, it is no longer considered quality meat whose consumption leads to conviction of the ben soreir umoreh. This means that if a lad performs all the misdeeds of a ben soreir umoreh, but prefers huge amounts of pickled tongue, corned beef, pastrami, hot dogs, bologna or aufschnit to rare barbecue, he is exempted from the law of ben soreir umoreh, since his habit is to consume preserved meats.

Rav Huna adds that he must buy the meat inexpensively.

Where in the posuk does Rav Huna see that the ben soreir umoreh purchased meat at a good price? Although we learned this halacha via an oral tradition from Moshe Rabbeinu, the posuk contains a hint: The word זולל, which means glutton, also implies זול, inexpensive.

The Talmud Yerushalmi asks: “Who is more likely to become a communal problem, he who buys at a discount, or he who is a big spender? The big spender! Yet, the Torah exempted the big spender and obliged the lad who purchased his meat at a discount!” The Bavli explains that acquiring top quality meat at a reduced price will more likely trap the ben soreir umoreh into bad habits. He will figure out how to fund these vices by purchasing the meat inexpensively and stealing the small amounts that he needs from his father. Initially, he will be able to sustain his habits this way. However, ultimately, he will exhaust his parents’ resources and need to find other means with which to fund his vices. This will lead him to a life of serious crime.

Other rules

The Mishnah (Sanhedrin 71a) teaches that if he stole from his father and ate in his father’s domain, or stole from others and ate in other people’s domain, he is exempt from the ruling of ben soreir umoreh. Only if he stole from his father and ate in other people’s domain is he categorized as a ben soreir umoreh.

Why are these conditions necessary for the wayward youth to be ruled a ben soreir umoreh? What difference does it make from whom he stole or where he ate and drank? To quote the Talmud Yerushalmi: “Logically, who should be more guilty? He who steals from others or he who steals from his parents? I would say, he who steals from others. Yet the Torah exempts from ben soreir umoreh he who steals from others and punishes only he who steals from his parents.”

The Talmud Bavli explains that a child who steals only from others does not qualify as a ben soreir umoreh because it will not prove easy for a youth to steal to support his vices. And, if he eats his repast in his father’s domain, there remains a possibility that he might still be disciplined, since his father may catch him and successfully bring him under control. Once he has developed the habit of stealing from his father and eating on other people’s premises, the Torah considers him incorrigible.

The Mishnah continues that he is not punished as a ben soreir umoreh when his eating was at a seudas mitzvah, even if he used money that he stole from his father to pay for his food. Something about the atmosphere of a seudas mitzvah might influence him in a positive way.

Returning to our Mishnah, Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Yehudah ruled that there is yet one more condition for him to fulfill before he qualifies legally as a ben soreir umoreh – he must steal from both his father and his mother. This leads the Gemara (Sanhedrin 71a) to a discussion as to how is it possible for him to steal from his mother? After all, if she is still married to his father, the earnings of a married woman are the property of her husband, since he is responsible to support her. The Gemara provides two approaches how this could happen, but explaining them is beyond the scope of our article.

If he develops other expensive tastes — drinks strong alcoholic beverages, uses psychodelic drugs, gambles or engages in other addictive or destructive behavior — he does not qualify as a ben soreir umoreh. Only for eating meat and drinking wine does he qualify as a ben soreir umoreh. All these laws are already taught in the Mishnah (Sanhedrin 70a).

Thirteen and a quarter

There is another condition to the law of ben soreir umoreh that I have not yet discussed. The ben soreir umoreh must be at least thirteen years old, the age of maturity and responsibility for all mitzvos, at the time that he steals from his father and purchases the meat and wine. The entire saga, including condemning him to execution, must occur before he turns the age of thirteen years and three months (Mishnah Sanhedrin 68b, 71b). In other words, everything we have described above must occur in three months or less. In today’s court system in which it takes years for a criminal case to come to trial, ben soreir umoreh could never happen.

The Talmud Yerushalmi asks: Who is more dangerous to society, a young child aged barely thirteen who commits these acts, or someone older? Unquestionably, someone older is more of a menace! Yet the Torah exempted anyone older than thirteen years and three months. The Yerushalmi explains that this mitzvah is a gezeiras hamelech, a decree of G-d, and we will have difficulty explaining the rationales of its details.

Diabled parents

Here is another unusual condition: The Mishnah (Sanhedrin 71a) rules that both parents must be without any disabilities. To quote the Mishnah, “If either parent is missing part of a hand, or is lame, mute, blind or deaf, (the son) does not become a ben soreir umoreh.”

What difference does it make whether his parents have disabilities? Rav Shamshon Raphael Hirsch wrote extensively on the subject of ben soreir umoreh in his commentary on the Chumash and in essays that are published in his Collected Writings, Volume VII. Throughout this article there are hashkafic questions that I have left unanswered in order to encourage our readers to invest the time to read Rav Hirsch’s extensive and beautiful explanation.

Same voice

According to Rabbi Yehuda (Sanhedrin 71a), there are yet other conditions that must be met to rule that he is a ben soreir umoreh. His two parents must be similar to each other in voice, appearance and height. The Bach understands the Gemara very literally, that it means that either his father has an extremely high-pitched voice, or his mother has an unusual low-pitched voice. Rav Hirsch explains this to mean that “they are in the same place” educationally – they have been giving their son the exact same educational message, which he has been ignoring. However, if one parent is more lenient than the other (as is often the case), he cannot be ruled a ben soreir umoreh.

The Gemara notes that Rabbi Yehudah contends that there never was an actual case of ben soreir umoreh. The Bach explains that since a healthy man’s voice will always be deeper than his wife’s, Rabbi Yehudah’s statement that his two parents must be similar to each other in voice makes the incidence of ben soreir umoreh impossible. Thus, in his opinion, we have a negative answer to our opening question: Can a man have a voice no deeper than his wife’s?

The Gemara teaches that another tanna, Rabbi Shimon, also holds that the mitzvah of ben soreir umoreh never happened and never will happen, yet the Torah presents this mitzvah so that we should study the case and receive reward for understanding what the Torah teaches. However, Rabbi Yonasan retorted, “I saw a ben soreir umoreh, and I sat on his grave.”

Similarly, Rabbi Yosi Hagalili (this is a third tanna named Yosi, who was earlier than the others mentioned) asks: “Because he ate a tartimar of meat and drank half a log of Italian wine, the Torah states that he should be stoned to death? Rather, the Torah understands what will be the later decisions of the ben soreir umoreh. Eventually, he will exhaust his father’s property, and supporting his expensive habits without resources will become difficult. At that point, he will become a bandit who murders people in order to take their possessions. The Torah said let him die while he is still relatively innocent (Sanhedrin 72a).

There is an interesting explanation of the Chasam Sofer in which he understands that there is no dispute among the tanna’im whether a ben soreir umoreh situation was ever ruled on. He contends that even Rabbi Yonasan agrees that no ben soreir umoreh ruling was ever issued. What Rabbi Yonasan means is that there once was a youth who qualified as a ben soreir umoreh and should have been executed when he was young, but his parents had mercy on him. As a result, they caused great calamities to themselves and to the Jewish People, and the wayward son ultimately suffered a violent death. It was on this child’s grave that Rabbi Yonasan sat, explains the Chasam Sofer.

Procedure

Shortly after reaching his thirteenth birthday (Mishnah Sanhedrin 68b), this lad, whose parents note that he never obeys them, steals money from his father. He used the stolen money or property to purchase kosher, quality meat and wine, which he is able to buy at a good price. He eats a large quantity of this meat cooked very rare, and at the same sitting drinks large quantity of the wine, while not on his parents’ premises. Both parents warn him that his actions are completely unacceptable, and this has no obvious effect. In addition, two kosher witnesses see him, admonish him and warn him that beis din will punish him for his actions (Sifrei).

Who presses charges?

Who raises and presses the charges against the ben soreir umoreh? The Mishnah teaches that it is his own parents! Furthermore, he is ruled a ben soreir umoreh only if both of his parents “press charges” against him. To quote the Mishnah, “If his father wants, but his mother does not; if his mother wants, but his father does not, he is not ruled a ben soreir umoreh (Sanhedrin 71a).

According to the Sifrei, he must violate not only what his parents teach him, but also what the Torah, the prophets and the judges warn him.

Both parents must present to the beis din that their son is wayward, a thief, and eats the quantities and type of meat and wine that we have described in the style mentioned. Beis din then gives him malkus, 39 lashes with a strap made of calf leather — a stern blow to the muscles on his back and shoulders to motivate some change in his behavior patterns. If, after receiving the malkus, he continues to steal from his parents and enjoy himself in the way we have described, it is the parents’ responsibility to bring him back to beis din for his final judgment. Small wonder that some tanna’im rule that the situation never happened.

After being lashed for his intolerant behavior and ignoring all warnings to correct his lifestyle, we make sure that he can never continue his activities. Rather than break or amputate just his arms and his legs, he is executed by the beis din.

Conclusion

We see that there are many perplexing specific criteria that categorize a ben soreir umoreh. We mentioned above that the purpose of the Torah’s parsha of ben soreir umoreh is to teach many of the rules of education. In this context, I encourage our readers to read Rav Hirsch’s comments on the parsha and his essays on education in Volume VII of the Collected Writings. There, he analyzes many of the halachos of ben soreir umoreh, and, in his typical style, develops brilliant insights into proper Torah education.

The mitzvah of ben soreir umoreh teaches a very deep lesson in education: “These words hold the key to the secret of proper child-raising. A father and a mother united as one in their love for their child and in complete agreement on the principles by which he should be raised – herein lies the strength and the hope of all education…But such unity can be achieved only if the child’s father and mother are united also in their own subordination to the Will of G-d; if they view the sacred function of child-rearing as their most sacred task, to be performed for Hashem and in keeping with His holy Will; and if His judgments will, as a matter of course, serve to resolve any disagreements in their views and attitudes” (Collected Writings of Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch, Volume VII, Page 348).

image_print