May I Smell My Esrog and Hadasim on Sukkos?

Although this question may seem trivial, it is indeed a serious shaylah that requires explanation. Sometimes, one may smell an esrog, while at other times one may not. Why is this true? Also, when it is permitted to smell an esrog, do I recite a bracha beforehand? If I do, which bracha do I recite?

We may ask similar questions regarding the hadasim, although the answers are not always the same. May I smell my hadasim, and which bracha do I recite before smelling them?

In order to explain the background to these questions, I first need to explain two very different areas of halacha, one concerning the laws of muktzah, and the other concerning the laws of brachos on fragrances.

MUKTZAH

The Gemara teaches us the following: One may not smell (during Sukkos) the hadas that is set aside for the mitzvah, but one may smell the esrog. The Gemara asks, “Why is there a difference between the hadas and the esrog?” The Gemara replies that since the main use of a hadas is for fragrance, it becomes muktzah, and one may not smell it. But since the main “use” of an esrog is for food, one may not eat it, but one may smell it (Sukkah 37b). This is the explanation of what the Gemara means.

This Gemara teaches that an item used for a mitzvah becomes muktzah machmas mitzvah; that is, designated solely for its specific mitzvah and not for a different use. This category of muktzah is different from the more familiar types of muktzah in several ways:

  1. As the Gemara teaches elsewhere (Sukkah 9a), this type of muktzah is prohibited min Hatorah, whereas other forms of muktzah are prohibited only miderabbanan.
  2. These items are muktzah only to the extent that one may not use them, but one may move them. This is different from most types of muktzah, which one may not move on Shabbos or Yom Tov.
  3. These items are muktzah only with regard to their primary, normal purpose: for example, one may not smell a hadas that is muktzah machmas mitzvah because the primary purpose of a hadas is for fragrance. However, one may use it (or them) for a secondary use, and that is why, according to the Gemara, one may smell the esrog. (A person who is interested in purchasing a fragrant item would consider buying hadasim, not an esrog.)
  4. This type of muktzah is prohibited even on Chol Hamoed, whereas other types of muktzah are prohibited only on Shabbos and Yom Tov.

Thus, it would seem that we may answer the original question I asked: May I smell my esrog and hadas on Sukkos? And the answer is that I may smell my esrog, but I may not smell my hadas, because it is muktzah for its mitzvah.

However, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 653:1) rules that I should also avoid smelling my esrog on Sukkos. Why does the Shulchan Aruch prohibit something that the Gemara explicitly permits?

The answer to this question takes us to the other topic — when does one recite a bracha before smelling a fragrance? Although the Gemara explicitly permits smelling an esrog on Sukkos, the Gemara does not mention whether one recites a bracha before smelling it.

Indeed, the Rishonim dispute whether one is required to recite a bracha before smelling an esrog. Rabbeinu Simcha, one of the late baalei Tosafos, rules that one may not recite a bracha before smelling an esrog that is being used for the mitzvah on Sukkos, whereas the Ravyah, an early Ashkenazi posek, rules that one must recite a bracha. The later poskim conclude that this dispute is unresolved, and that, therefore, one may not smell an esrog during Sukkos, when reciting a bracha would be a question. This topic requires some explanation: Why should an esrog on Sukkos be different from an esrog any other time of the year?

FRAGRANCES THAT ARE NOT FOR THE PLEASURE OF SMELL

One recites a bracha only on a fragrance that is avida lereicha, literally, “made for fragrance” (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 217:2). In the words of the Chazon Ish (Orach Chayim 35:1), “Anything whose current purpose is not for aroma is not considered a fragrance” (regarding recitation of a bracha). Therefore, one does not recite a bracha before smelling a deodorizer, even if it has an extremely pleasant fragrance, since its purpose is not aroma, but to mask unpleasant odor. Similarly, smelling the tantalizing aroma of a food or food flavoring does not warrant a bracha, since its purpose is not enjoyment of their aroma, per se. (I have written several other articles germane to the brachos on fragrances, which are available on the RabbiKaganoff.com website; to find them, use the search word fragrance.) Furthermore, when the halacha rules that one is not required to recite a bracha, one is not permitted to recite the bracha, as doing so constitutes a bracha l’vatalah, a bracha recited in vain.

EXAMPLE:

When showing a house that is for sale, some people toast cinnamon in the oven or open essential oils and other fragrances around the house to make the house more appealing. Since the purpose of these fragrances is to give the house a pleasant aroma and not to entice people to smell or purchase the fragrance, one does not recite a bracha.

Based on the foregoing introduction, we can now explain the above-quoted dispute whether to recite a bracha before smelling an esrog on Sukkos. Rabbeinu Simcha contends that although one may smell an esrog on Sukkos, and it is not prohibited due to its being muktzah, this does not warrant making a bracha. The esrog on Sukkos is still primarily intended for the mitzvah, and not for fragrance; therefore, smelling it does not require a bracha. In Rabbeinu Simcha’s opinion, reciting a bracha in this case constitutes a bracha l’vatalah.

The Ravyah disagrees, maintaining that since it is permitted to smell an esrog, it is considered to be meant for fragrance, and requires one to recite a bracha before smelling it (Mordechai, Sukkah #751; Tur Orach Chayim 653).

This dispute places us in a predicament. The halacha is that one may not benefit from something in this world without first reciting a bracha, and if, indeed, one is required to recite a bracha before smelling an esrog, then one may not smell it without reciting a bracha (Brachos 35a; Hagahos Smaq 193:11). On the other hand, if one is not required to recite a bracha before smelling it, then one may not recite the bracha, and doing so involves reciting a bracha in vain, a bracha l’vatalah.

Since we are not in a position to resolve this dispute, the poskim contend that one should avoid smelling the esrog used for the mitzvah during Sukkos (Shulchan Aruch 653), even though there is no muktzah violation in smelling it. Furthermore, one may smell the esrog if he first recited a bracha on a different fragrant fruit.

ESROG ON SHABBOS

As I mentioned above, Rabbeinu Simcha contends that an esrog is not considered avida lereicha, meant for fragrance, and therefore one does not recite a bracha before smelling it. Does this halacha apply the entire week of Sukkos, or only when I pick up the esrog to fulfill the mitzvah? What if I smell the esrog on Shabbos, when there is no mitzvah to perform, or I pick it up on a day of Sukkos after I have already fulfilled the mitzvah? Do I recite a bracha before smelling it, according to his opinion?

Let us compare this shaylah to the following case:

Someone who enters a spice merchant’s store recites a bracha, because the owner wants customers to smell his wares so that they will purchase them (Berachos 53a). If these items are in his warehouse, where he is not soliciting customers, one does not recite a bracha (Magen Avraham 217:1).

Why does one recite a bracha on the spices in the store, but not on those that are in the warehouse? This is because the spices in the store are there to be smelled and enjoyed, and are therefore avida lereicha. However, the spices in the warehouse are not meant to be smelled – therefore, they are not avida lereicha. Note that we are discussing the same spices, and the only difference is where they are located.

PUTTING INTO YOUR HAND

Let’s assume you are back in the spice merchant’s warehouse or in a flavor factory, and you know that you do not make a bracha on the incredible fragrance that is wafting through the air. What happens if you approach some of the spices to take a pleasant whiff, or you pick up some of the spice in order to smell it? Do you recite a bracha?

The poskim dispute what to do in this case. The Mishnah Berurah (217:1) contends that whenever you do something to smell the fragrance, such as moving towards the source of the fragrance in order to smell it, picking it up, or putting some into your hand, you should recite a bracha. Any such act makes the fragrance avida lereicha.

However, the Chazon Ish disagrees, maintaining that if you will return the spice afterwards to the storage bin in the warehouse, it is not avida lereicha, and you do not recite a bracha (Chazon Ish, Orach Chayim 35:1). The Chazon Ish agrees that if the manufacturer has samples available that he wants people to smell and buy, one does recite a bracha on them, and he also agrees that if you remove some of the spices to smell and will not return them, you do recite a bracha.

SPICES IN THE KITCHEN

There is a common, practical difference in halacha between the approaches of these two Gedolim regarding kitchen spices. Suppose you want to enjoy the smell of the cinnamon or the oregano on your kitchen shelf. According to the Mishnah Berurah, if you remove a container from the shelf to smell it, you recite a bracha on the spice, even though you intend to return the spice to the shelf after smelling it, and it will eventually be added to food. (By the way, the poskim dispute which bracha one recites before smelling cinnamon. The accepted practice is to recite borei minei besamim.) However, according to the Chazon Ish, you do not recite a bracha on this spice, unless you no longer intend to cook with it. Someone who wants to avoid the dispute should sprinkle a little bit of spice into his hand and make a bracha on that. Since you are neither going to return this spice to the container nor cook with it, according to all opinions, one recites a bracha before smelling it.

Some poskim explain that this opinion of the Chazon Ish is the reason for the widespread minhag to set aside special besamim for havdalah on Motza’ei Shabbos (Shemiras Shabbos Kehilchasah, Vol. 2 pg. 262).

WHAT ABOUT MY ESROG ON SHABBOS?

A dispute similar to the one quoted above exists concerning smelling my esrog on Shabbos, or picking up the esrog to smell it after I have fulfilled the mitzvah for the day.

The Magen Avraham rules that I recite a bracha before smelling the esrog under these circumstances, even according to Rabbeinu Simcha. Therefore, in his opinion, one may pick up the esrog specifically to smell it, and one recites the bracha before smelling it.

However, the Taz implies that one may not smell the esrog anytime during Sukkos. According to the Chazon Ish’s analysis of the subject, one can explain the Taz’s approach as follows: Since the esrog is meant for the mitzvah, it is not considered avida lereicha that warrants a bracha, unless one permanently makes it into a fragrance. Thus, if an esrog became pasul, or for some other reason can no longer be used for the mitzvah, it will be called avida lereicha and warrant a bracha. Under any other circumstance, it remains a safek bracha, and one should not smell it until Yom Tov is over. One may recite a bracha and smell it on Shemini Atzeres or Simchas Torah, since it no longer serves any mitzvah purpose. Thus, it appears that the dispute between the Magen Avraham and the Taz is identical to the dispute between the Mishnah Berurah and the Chazon Ish.

WHICH BRACHA DO I RECITE ON AN ESROG?

Everyone agrees that one may smell an esrog that will no longer be used for the mitzvah, and that one must recite a bracha before smelling it. In such a case, which bracha do I recite?

Chazal established five different brachos that relate to scent, each for a different category of fragrance.

  1. Borei shemen areiv, “The Creator of pleasant oil,” is recited only on the fragrant oil extracted from the balsam tree (Mishnah Berurah 216:22). Because this tree was important and grew in Eretz Yisroel, Chazal established for it a special bracha (Rabbeinu Yonah, Brachos 43a).
  2. Hanosein rei’ach tov ba’peiros, “He who bestows pleasant fragrances in fruits” (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 216:2). We recite this bracha before smelling fragrant, edible fruits and other foods (Rama 216:14). Some poskim rule that the proper text for this bracha should be in past tense: Asher nasan rei’ach tov ba’peiros, “He who bestowed pleasant fragrances in fruits” (Mishnah Berurah 216:9). This is the bracha one recites before smelling an esrog.

Many poskim state that the custom today is to not make a bracha on smelling a fruit, unless it has a pronounced aroma (see Vezos Haberacha pg. 174). For this reason, one should be certain that the esrog one holds has a strong, pleasant fragrance before reciting a bracha. If one is uncertain, one may smell the esrog first to see that it is fragrant, and then, if it is fragrant, recite the bracha hanosein rei’ach tov ba’peiros and smell it again.

  1. Borei atzei besamim, “The Creator of fragrant wood (or trees).” One recites this bracha before smelling fragrant, woody plants and trees, or their leaves, flowers, wood, or oils. Hadasim are certainly in this category. Although we mentioned above that it is prohibited to smell a hadas that is being used for the mitzvah on Sukkos, hadasim that one does not intend to use for the mitzvah may be smelled on Sukkos, and he should recite this bracha before smelling them.

Incidentally, the correct bracha to recite before smelling citrus blossoms or flowers is Borei atzei besamim, since the flower is not edible.

  1. Borei isvei besamim, “The Creator of fragrant grasses.” We recite this bracha before smelling non-woody plants, their parts or extracts. Before smelling a fragrant hyacinth, narcissus, or lily one recites this bracha. The custom among Sefardim is to recite this bracha before smelling mint, although, for reasons beyond the scope of this article, Ashkenazim recite borei minei besamim before smelling mint.
  2. Borei minei besamim, “The Creator of different types of fragrances.” This is the “catch-all” bracha for all fragrances, the equivalent of reciting a shehakol on food. Sometimes, it is the preferred bracha, and sometimes it is the bracha used to resolve uncertainties. Although I have not seen poskim discuss this case, it would seem to be permitted to recite a bracha on an item whose bracha is borei minei besamim and have in mind to include the esrog and then be able to smell the esrog. This would provide a method whereby one could smell one’s esrog on Yom Tov, according to all opinions.

Question: Why did Chazal create a unique bracha prior to smelling aromatic fruits?

Answer: Whenever one benefits from this world, one must recite a bracha. Thus, Chazal instituted brachos that are appropriate for fragrances. However, the other brachos on fragrance are not appropriate for smelling fragrant foods, since they praise Hashem for creating fragrances, whereas fruits are not usually described as fragrances, but as foods that are fragrant. Therefore, Chazal needed to establish a special bracha for aromatic fruits (see Beis Yosef, Orach Chayim end of Chapter 297).

Conclusion

The Gemara (Berachos 43b) teaches, “How do we know that one must recite a bracha on a fragrance? Because the pasuk (Tehillim 150:6) says, ‘Every neshamah praises Hashem,’ – What exists in the world that the soul benefits from, but not the body? Only fragrance.”

Because fragrance provides some physical pleasure, but no nutritional benefit, the sense of smell represents an interface between the spiritual and the physical. Similarly, we find that we offer korbanos as rei’ach nicho’ach, a fragrance demonstrating one’s desire to be close to Hashem. We should always take advantage of the opportunity to smell fragrant items as a steppingstone towards greater mitzvah observance and spirituality.

 

The Seder Avodah of Yom Kippur

Rav Goldberg was discussing the tefilos of Yom Kippur with the shul’s chazan, Reb Hershel.

“Probably the least understood part of the Yom Kippur davening is the Seder Avodah recited in the repetition of Musaf,” the rav began. “Although it is one of the most important parts of the Yom Kippur davening, I have seen many shuls race through it at a pace too fast for comprehension.”

“Let me quote you the Me’am Loez,” continued Rav Goldberg, pulling a sefer off the shelf. “He writes, ‘Many people doze off during the recital of the Avodah. They don’t realize that the most important part of Yom Kippur is during the repetition of the Sh’moneh Esrei, when the Seder Avodah is recited.’”

“I didn’t realize it was that important,” admitted Reb Hershel, “but it is very hard to understand.”

“Dozens of piyutim (liturgical pieces) have been written describing the Seder Avodah,” explained Rav Goldberg. “Most shuls that daven Nusach Ashkenaz recite the piyut that begins with the words Amitz Koach, which is indeed a very difficult, poetically-written piyut. The piyut used in Nusach S’fard, Atah Konanta, is much easier to comprehend.”

“So why do we recite Amitz Koach?”

“That is an excellent question that I cannot answer fully. Already in the time of the Gemara, we see that the Seder Avodah was recited, presumably from some type of piyut, although the text they used is long lost. The Geonim and Rishonim refer to many different piyutim that they had in their times. Amitz Koach was authored by Rabbeinu Meshulam ben Klonymos, who is quoted by Rashi with the greatest respect (see Rashi, Bava Metzia 69b s.v. Mafrin; Zevachim 45b s.v. h”g). In the course of time, Minhag Ashkenaz accepted the use of Amitz Koach, presumably out of respect for the author.”

“Why is it so important to recite the Seder Avodah? Is it a Takanas Chachomim?”

“There is no specific takanah requiring the recital of the Seder Avodah. However, reciting it fulfills the concept of ‘U’neshalma parim sefaseinu,’ ‘And let our lips replace the (sacrificial) bulls’ (Hoshea 14:3). The Midrash teaches that when we are unable to offer korbanos, our recital of the Avodah is accepted by Hashem as a replacement for the korbanos (Midrash Rabbah, Shir HaShirim 4:3). This implies that we accomplish kaparah (atonement) by reciting the Seder Avodah with kavanah. Therefore, a person who recites the viduy of the Seder Avodah and truly regrets his sins can accomplish atonement; this would be similar to the viduy recited by the Cohen Gadol.”

THE ATONEMENT OF YOM KIPPUR

Reb Hershel was curious. “What did the viduy of the Cohen Gadol accomplish?”

“Different korbanos offered by the Cohen Gadol atoned for different sins (see Gemara Yoma 61a). However, the greatest atonement was accomplished by the goat sent to Azazel, which atoned for all the sins of the Jewish people (Rambam, Hilchos Teshuvah 1:2; Mishnah Shevuos 2b).”

“Do you mean that a person could achieve atonement, even if he did not do Teshuvah?”

“Although there is such an opinion in the Gemara, the halacha is that Yom Kippur’s kaparah is effective only for those who do Teshuvah (Shevuos 13a). A person who does complete Teshuvah — which means that he regrets his sins, makes a decision that he will never commit this sin again, and recites viduy — is forgiven for his sins.”

“Does this mean that he will never be punished for them?”

“Not always. For very serious sins, including Chilul Hashem (desecrating Hashem’s name), he may still be punished in this world. But someone who completely repented his sins in this world is guaranteed that he will suffer no punishment in the next world (Rambam, Hilchos Teshuvah 1:3-4).”

“At the time of the Beis HaMikdash, did people know when their sins were forgiven?”

“When the Cohen Gadol was a tzadik, part of the Yom Kippur Avodah included a procedure that showed Klal Yisrael whether or not they were forgiven. Let me provide some background. The Beis HaMikdash treasurers purchased two goats at the same time that were identical in height, appearance and value (Mishnah Yoma 62a). One of these goats was a Yom Kippur korban, offered in the Beis HaMikdash, and the other was the Azazel goat.”

CHOOSING THE GOAT FOR AZAZEL

“The Cohen Gadol drew lots to determine which goat would be the korban for Hashem and which would be the Azazel. This was an elaborate procedure. The Cohen Gadol stood in the courtyard of the Beis HaMikdash, near the courtyard’s entrance, facing the two goats, one opposite his right hand, and the other opposite his left. The S’gan, the Associate Cohen Gadol, stood on the Cohen Gadol’s right, and the Rosh Beis Av, the head of the family unit of Cohanim on duty that week, stood on the Cohen Gadol’s left.

“The Cohen Gadol thrust his hands into a small wooden box containing two gold lots, one marked ‘for Hashem’ and the other ‘for Azazel,’ and removed the lots, one in each hand. He then raised his hands, exposing the lots to the S’gan and Rosh Beis Av. If the lot saying ‘for Hashem’ was in his right hand, the S’gan announced, ‘Master Cohen Gadol, raise your right hand.’ If it was in his left hand, the Rosh Beis Av announced, ‘Master Cohen Gadol, raise your left hand.’

“The Cohen Gadol then placed each lot on the head of the goat nearest that hand, and decreed, ‘For Hashem, a Chatos offering.’ The Cohen Gadol used the Ineffable Name of Hashem in this declaration, and everyone assembled responded by shouting ‘Baruch Shem K’vod Malchuso L’Olam Vo’ed’ (Mishnah Yoma 37a and 39a).”

THE RED THREAD

“The Cohen Gadol then tied a red thread to the horn of the Azazel goat, and another red thread around the neck of the Chatos goat (Mishnah Yoma 41b). Much later in the

procedure, the Cohen Gadol rested his hands and full weight on the head of the Azazel goat, and recited aloud a viduy on behalf of the entire Jewish people. He concluded his viduy by stating, ‘Because on this day He will atone and purify you from all your sins. Before Hashem shall you become pure (Vayikra 16:30),’ once again using the Ineffable Name of Hashem. When the assembled people heard the Name uttered in purity and holiness by the Cohen Gadol, they all bowed and prostrated themselves, until their faces were pressed to the ground. They then recited again, ‘Baruch Shem K’vod Malchuso L’Olam Vo’ed’ (Mishnah Yoma 66a).

“At one point in the procedure, the red thread tied to the Azazel goat was removed, torn in half, and one part tied again onto the Azazel goat’s horns. At the exact moment that the Jews were forgiven, both halves of the thread turned white” (Yoma 67a).

“You mentioned that the red thread was torn in half,” Hershel asked. “What happened to the other half?”

“This depends on the period of Jewish history. When the Cohen Gadol was a great tzadik, the Jews were forgiven on Yom Kippur, and the red thread turned white. During those years, the thread was left displayed in a prominent place in the Beis HaMikdash for everyone to see the miracle. However, in the later years of the Second Beis HaMikdash, when the Cohanim Gedolim were often not suitable for the position, the thread did not turn white. To save themselves embarrassment, the thread was placed where it would not be seen (Yoma 67a).

“How frequently did the thread turn white?”

“Apparently, during the period of the Bayis Rishon and the early period of the Bayis Sheni, the thread always turned white. In this period, the position of Cohen Gadol was awarded on the basis of merit. However, after the Cohanim Gedolim in the Bayis Sheni began purchasing the position, often, the thread did not turn white.”

THE COHANIM GEDOLIM OF THE SECOND BEIS HAMIKDASH

“You mentioned that there was a vast difference between the Cohanim Gedolim of the First Beis HaMikdash and those of the Second. Could you explain this more fully?”

“Yes, gladly. The Cohanim Gedolim of the First Beis HaMikdash were all great tzadikim who were worthy of their exalted position. Most of them had a long tenure as Cohen Gadol. In contrast, most of the Cohanim Gedolim of the Second Beis HaMikdash bribed the government for the position. Because they lacked the kedusha the position required, they died within a year of securing the appointment (Yoma 8b; 9a).”

“And yet they were eager to bribe the government for the job?”

“People do very strange things for kavod. As Chazal teach us, it is one of the three things that remove a person from this world.”

MUST BE DONE BY THE COHEN GADOL

Reb Hershel had many other questions. “What part of the Avodah of Yom Kippur was the Cohen Gadol obligated to perform himself?”

“Certain procedures took place in the Beis HaMikdash every day, such as clearing the two mizbeichos (altars); bringing the daily offerings (Korban Tamid); burning k’tores (incense) twice a day; and cleaning, setting up and lighting the Menorah. In addition, on Shabbos and Yom Tov, there were special korbanos called Korban Musaf, the origins of our Musaf prayers. The Torah mentions these korbanos in Parshas Pinchas. All these could be performed by any cohen.

“On Yom Kippur, in addition to the daily and Musaf korbanos, there was a special procedure unique to Yom Kippur, which is called the Seder Avodah, or the Seder Avodas Yom Kippur. This Avodah, involving the offering of several special korbanos and a unique offering of incense, is described in Parshas Acharei, the Keri’as HaTorah for Yom Kippur morning, and in great length in Mesechta Yoma. For this Avodah, the Cohen Gadol wore special white garments that were worn no other time. Although it was preferred that the Cohen Gadol perform everything in the Beis HaMikdash on Yom Kippur himself, the only part absolutely mandatory for him to perform was the special Yom Kippur Avodah.”

WERE LOTS USED ON YOM KIPPUR?

“I am confused,” admitted Hershel. “The Piyutim of Seder Avodah mention a lottery to determine which cohanim will bring korbanos on Yom Kippur. But why such a procedure, if the Cohen Gadol was doing everything anyway?”

“A lottery system was used each day to determine which cohanim would perform the different tasks in the Beis HaMikdash. Most poskim contend that the Cohen Gadol performed ALL the service in the Beis HaMikdash by himself on Yom Kippur (even though he was only required to perform the special Yom Kippur Avodah). In their opinion, there was no lottery on Yom Kippur to determine who performed any tasks. Other poskim contend that although the Cohen Gadol was to perform all the tasks in the Beis HaMikdash himself, if he was unable to perform the entire Avodah himself, other cohanim could do some parts of it, in his place. When this happened, the lottery system would determine which cohen was appointed to perform the avodah.”

CHANGING CLOTHES

“It is interesting to note,” continued the Rav, “that to perform every part of the special Seder Avodah of Yom Kippur, the Cohen Gadol was required to wear his special Yom Kippur vestments (described in Parshas Acharei). However, for every part of the service that was not part of the Yom Kippur Avodah, he wore the eight vestments described in Parshas Te’tzaveh. Thus, the Cohen Gadol changed his clothes five times during Yom Kippur. According to a special commandment received by Moshe Rabbeinu (Halacha l’Moshe mi’Sinai), he immersed himself in a mikveh each time he changed his clothes and also performed a special procedure involving washing his hands and feet twice each time.”

“I understand that when the Cohen Gadol entered the Kodesh HaKodoshim (The Holy of Holies), no one was allowed to be inside the entire Beis HaMikdash building, even the Kodesh (Vayikra 16:17),” interjected Hershel.

“Not only were no humans allowed in, even angels could not enter (Yerushalmi Yoma 1:5, cited by Tosafos Yeshanim, Yoma 19b).”

THE COHEN GADOL SWEARING

“I remember learning that the Cohen Gadol had to swear an oath before Yom Kippur,” queried Hershel. “Why was that?”

“The first time the Cohen Gadol entered the Kodesh HaKodoshim, he did so with a ladle of specially refined k’tores (incense) and a censer, a type of coal pan for burning incense. According to Halacha L’Moshe M’Sinai, he had to enter the Kodesh HaKodoshim first and then burn the k’tores inside. However, the Tzedukim, who did not accept Torah she’be’al peh, believed that he should kindle the k’tores first and then enter the Kodesh HaKodoshim. In the period of the Second Beis HaMikdash, when the position of Cohen Gadol was often purchased, there was concern that the Cohen Gadol might be a clandestine Tzeduki. Since no one could enter the Beis HaMikdash building while the k’tores was offered, there was no way of knowing what the Cohen Gadol actually did while inside. Therefore, he was required to swear before Yom Kippur that he would perform the service as instructed by the Gedolei Yisrael.”

“Were there any recorded instances of a Cohen Gadol who was a Tzeduki?”

“The Gemara records two such instances. In one case, the Cohen Gadol proudly told his father, who was also a Tzeduki, that he had offered the k’tores according to their practices. The Gemara records that this Cohen Gadol soon died a very ignominious death.”

“What happened in the other instance?”

“The Gemara records that the cohanim heard a loud sound in the Beis HaMikdash. They raced in to find the Cohen Gadol dead, with obvious signs that he had been killed by an angel (Yoma 19b).”

“But I thought even angels could not enter the Beis HaMikdash while the Cohen Gadol offered the k’tores?”

“This is an excellent question, and it is asked by the Gemara Yerushalmi. The Gemara answers that since the Cohen Gadol had performed the service incorrectly, the angels were permitted to enter.”

MULTIPLE ENTRIES INTO THE KODESH HAKODOSHIM

“How many times did the Cohen Gadol enter the Kodesh HaKodoshim on Yom Kippur?” asked Hershel.

“Most people don’t realize that the Cohen Gadol entered the Kodesh HaKodoshim four times on Yom Kippur. The first time was with the special Yom Kippur k’tores, the second time to begin the kaparah of his special Yom Kippur bull offering, and the third time to attend to the kaparah of the goat offering. During each of these last two visits he sprinkled eight times. These sprinklings have a significant place in the piyutim. These are the places when the chazan, followed by the congregation, shouts out, ‘Achas, achas v’achas, achas u’shtayim,’ until ‘achas va’sheva’ to commemorate this part of the Avodah.”

“You said that the Cohen Gadol entered the Kodesh HaKodoshim four times, but we mentioned only three.”

“Much later in the day, the Cohen Gadol changed into a different set of special Yom Kippur white garments and entered the Kodesh HaKodoshim to pick up the censer and the ladle that he had brought in earlier. This was a required part of the Yom Kippur service.”

“I reviewed the description of the Avodah mentioned in Parshas Acharei,” continued Hershel. “I notice that the Torah does not mention Yom Kippur until the twenty-ninth pasuk of the discussion. Why is this?”

“Although Aaron and the later Cohanim Gedolim never entered the Kodesh HaKodoshim, except on Yom Kippur, the Midrash says that Aaron was permitted to enter it at other times, provided he followed the procedure described in Parshas Acharei. On Yom Kippur, he was obligated to offer these korbanos and enter the Kodesh HaKodoshim. Thus, the beginning of the reading explains how Aaron could enter the Kodesh HaKodoshim, whereas the end teaches that this procedure must be performed on Yom Kippur.” (Note that Rashi, in his commentary on these verses in Chumash, seems to have a different approach to this question.)

“Is it true that a rope was tied around the Cohen Gadol’s waist before he entered, so that they could pull him out if he died?”

“In actuality, the source, which is a quotation in the Zohar, mentions that a rope was tied around his foot,” responded Rav Goldberg.

“Thanks a lot for all your time,” Reb Hershel concluded.  “I now understand the importance of reciting the Seder Avodah carefully, and why some people study the mishnayos of Meseches Yoma before Yom Kippur.”

“You are absolutely correct. Indeed, the Mateh Efrayim maintains that one’s main learning during the entire month of Elul should be devoted to understanding the Seder Avodah properly. So, don’t forget to study the mishnayos and gemaros we’ve just been discussing.”

 

Pas Yisroel and the Aseres Yemei Teshuvah

Question #1: Aseres Yemei Teshuvah

“Must I use pas Yisroel during the Aseres Yemei Teshuvah?”

Question #2: Friendly Baker

“A group of neighbors, both Jewish and non-Jewish, are getting together to make a surprise birthday party for one of the non-Jewish people on the block who has been incredibly helpful to us all. Since there are some frum people on the block, the party will be strictly kosher. One of the non-Jewish neighbors is a baker by trade and will be baking everything in one of the kosher houses. Is there any problem with his doing this, when the frum people are supplying all the ingredients?”

Question #3: Why Now?

Why are we discussing this topic before Rosh Hashanah?

Background

Pas Yisroel means bread baked by a Jew or with Jewish participation. The Mishnah teaches: The following items of a non-Jew are forbidden to be eaten, but are permitted for benefit: milk milked by a non-Jew without a Jew supervising; their bread and their oil, although Rebbe and his beis din permitted the oil; and cooked items (Avodah Zarah 35b). Thus, we see that Chazal prohibited consumption of bread made by gentiles. This bread, commonly called pas akum, means bread made by a non-Jew, without Jewish involvement. Yet, we will soon see that there are many unusual and confusing rules governing when this bread is prohibited and when not. Aside from our need to know how to apply these laws, understanding the reasons will allow us to appreciate several other areas of both halachah and hashkafah, including how a takanas Chazal is made. Furthermore, we need to know how to apply these laws during the aseres yemei teshuvah, when they have special significance. So, let us roll up our sleeves to get deep into this doughy topic!

Takanas Chachamim

When Chazal implement a takanah prohibiting an item or activity, it is binding on all Jews and remains so, permanently. This means that, as a general rule, a takanah cannot later be annulled. However, there are some limited instances in which something prohibited because of a takanah can later be permitted.

There are two ways that a takanas chachamim may be rescinded, both of which require the decision of a major beis din of klal Yisroel with the power of the Sanhedrin. One instance is when the rescinding beis din consists of greater Torah scholars who have a larger following of disciples than did the original beis din that created the takanah. However, even this method of rescinding an earlier takanah does not apply to a list of takanos created by the disciples of Hillel and Shammai. To quote the Gemara, no later beis din could rescind these takanos, which are called The Eighteen Matters. (The details of this topic we will leave for a different time.)

The second situation in which a takanas chachamim may be rescinded is when the original takanah had not been accepted – meaning that it was not kept properly by the Jewish people. In the latter situation, since the takanah was not observed, the major beis din of klal Yisroel has the ability to withdraw the original takanah.

Basic background

With this initial background, we can now examine the history and the halachah of the takanah of pas akum. In the days of the disciples of Hillel and Shammai, when the Second Beis Hamikdash still stood, Chazal forbade eating pas akum – even when there are no kashrus concerns about the ingredients or the equipment used to prepare the bread (Avodah Zarah 36a). The reason for this enactment was to discourage social interaction that can lead to intermarriage.

We find a dispute among the rishonim whether the prohibition was limited to bread that gentiles baked or whether it included even dough prepared by a gentile that was then baked by a Jew. According to the Ran and the Tur, the prohibition of pas akum includes even when a non-Jew mixed or otherwise prepared dough that was then baked by a Jew. The logic is that the reason for the takanah could apply equally to bread in which the dough was prepared by a gentile, and furthermore, the Mishnah does not limit the prohibition to bread baked by a gentile, but states simply their bread.

Resolving this dispute directly impacts the second of our opening questions:

“A group of neighbors, both Jewish and non-Jewish, are getting together to make a surprise birthday party for one of the non-Jewish people on the block who has been incredibly helpful to us all. Since there are some frum people on the block, the party will be strictly kosher. One of the non-Jewish neighbors is a baker by trade and will be baking everything in one of the kosher houses. Is there any problem with his doing this when the frum people are supplying all the ingredients?”

According to the Ran and the Tur, this bread would be prohibited, because it was prepared by a gentile, regardless of who baked it. However, notwithstanding their opinion, most authorities rule that pas akum is limited to bread baked by a gentile. Thus, as long as this bread is baked by a Jew, it will be kosher, regardless as to who mixed the dough and the ingredients. However, if the gentile neighbor baked the bread in a Jewish house without any Jewish participation, it is prohibited according to most authorities, even when all the ingredients are kosher.

Sometimes permitted?

We have seen that the Mishnah lists the prohibition of pas akum, and does not imply that this ban has any exceptions. Yet, we find passages in both the Talmud Bavli and in the Talmud Yerushalmi implying that the prohibition was not observed universally. Apparently, this was because bread is such a staple and, Jews often found themselves living in a place where there were no Jewish commercial bakeries; baking all one’s bread at home was impractical.

In the Bavli (Avodah Zarah 35b), we find the following:

Rav Kahana, quoting Rav Yochanan, said: “The prohibition of pas akum was not rescinded by beis din.” This statement implies that someone held that it was, and that Rabbi Yochanan, one of the greatest amora’im, is rejecting that approach. The Gemara then explains that, indeed, some people had, in error, understood that the prohibition of pas akum no longer applies.

To explain what happened, the Gemara shares with us some history: One time, while Rebbe (Rabbi Yehudah Hanasi, the author of the Mishnah) was traveling, a non-Jewish person brought him a large, nice loaf of bread. Subsequently, Rebbe was heard to exclaim: “What a nice loaf of bread this is! What did Chazal see to prohibit it?”

Based on this comment, some people understood Rebbe’s comment to mean that the takanah of pas akum indeed no longer applied. Although more than a hundred years before Rebbe the disciples of Hillel and Shammai had prohibited it, they understood that Rebbe had rescinded the takanah, and, therefore, he mused why Chazal had once declared this bread to be prohibited. The Gemara concludes that the understanding of these people was erroneous. Rebbe’s comment was whimsical; he never intended to permit pas akum (Avodah Zarah 35b).

Yerushalmi versus Bavli

The just-quoted passage of Gemara Bavli implies that there is no heter to use pas akum. On the other hand, a passage in the Yerushalmi (Avodah Zarah 2:8) disputes this. There, it quotes an early statement to the effect that the laws concerning the prohibition of pas akum appear to be inconsistent. The Yerushalmi then suggests several possibilities to explain what inconsistency exists regarding the laws of pas akum. The Yerushalmi concludes that this is the inconsistency: In a place where pas Yisroel is available, one would assume that one is not permitted to use pas akum, yet one may.

It thus appears that we have discovered a dispute between the Talmud Bavli and the Talmud Yerushalmi, in which the Bavli ruled that pas akum is prohibited and the Yerushalmi ruled that it is permitted. If this is true, then we should rule according to the Bavli and prohibit all forms of pas akum.

Yet, the Rif, the major early halachic authority, cites both the passage of the Bavli and that of the Yerushalmi, implying that there is no disagreement between them.

Resolving the Rif

To explain how one early authority, the Rashba, resolves this difficulty, I will follow Jewish tradition by answering a question with a question. Although the Gemara (Avodah Zarah 35b) ultimately rejects this conclusion, it had entertained the possibility that Rebbe rescinded the takanah of pas akum. Upon what halachic basis could Rebbe have been able been able to rescind a takanah? Since this takanah was created by the disciples of Hillel and Shamai, it cannot be abrogated by a later beis din. The only other possibility is that the takanah of pas akum had not been properly observed. Therefore, a later beis din could rescind the takanah. Thus, the conclusion of the Bavli implies that, although Rebbe didn’t rescind the takanah of pas akum, he could have, since it was not properly established.

At this point, we can explain what the Rif meant. There is no contradiction between the Bavli and the Yerushalmi. The Bavli teaches two things:

  1. That the takanah of pas akum could have been rescinded.
  2. That Rebbe was not the one who did so, and that it was still valid in his time.

The Yerushalmi teaches that at some point after Rebbe, someone did, indeed, rescind the takanah to a certain degree (Rashba, quoted by Ran). The Ran himself explains that even the Bavli can be read in a way that it implies that the prohibition was rescinded.

To what extent?

Based on the Rif, we know that there was some rescinding of the takanah. Our next question is: To what extent was the prohibition rescinded?

Among the rishonim, we find various approaches defining to what extent the prohibition of pas akum was relaxed. Some contend that this depends on location – in some places the takanah was not initially accepted, and in these places Chazal relaxed the takanah to a greater extent than they did elsewhere.

However, even in places where the custom was to be lenient, not all pas akum was permitted. In all places, bread baked by a gentile for personal use and not for sale is prohibited. This bread is called pas baalei batim.

The dispute whether and to what extent one may be lenient concerns only bread baked for sale. This bread is called pas paltur, literally, bread baked for a merchant, and is sometimes permitted. To what extend it is permitted is the subject of a controversy that we will discuss shortly.

Invitation to the White House

The next case might be an application of this law: Someone receives an invitation to a meal at the White House that will be supervised, so that all the ingredients are kosher and the equipment is all brand new, special for the event. If the mashgiach did not participate in the baking of the breads, they might be prohibited because of pas baalei batim. (See a dispute about this matter in Birkei Yosef, Yoreh Deah 112:2, 3, 6). This is because the bread was not baked for sale, but for the “personal use” of the residents of the White House and their guests.

When is pas paltur permitted?

Returning to our discussion, what conditions need to be met for pas paltur to be permitted? There is a wide range of opinion among halachic authorities. According to the Shulchan Aruch, one may use pas paltur whenever no Jewish bakery is available, even in a city with a sizable Jewish community. If pas Yisroel becomes available, then the pas paltur should not be used until the pas Yisroel is no longer available, even if the pas paltur has already been baked (Yoreh Deah 112:4).

Less tasty

The authorities disagree whether one may eat pas paltur even when there is a Jewish bakery, but the pas Yisroel is less tasty than the bread of the gentile (Tur). The Shulchan Aruch rules leniently that if the pas paltur is of better quality or is of a variety that is not available from a Yisroel, one may use it (Yoreh Deah 112:5).

A more lenient approach

The Rema is more lenient than either the Rambam or the Shulchan Aruch, concluding that, where the custom is to permit pas paltur, one may consume it, even when pas Yisroel is available (Yoreh Deah 112:2). The Bach and the Gra follow the opinion of the Rema, whereas other opinions agree with the Shulchan Aruch and permit pas paltur only when pas Yisroel is not available and in a place where the custom is to be lenient (Shach). All of the above opinions agree that it is prohibited to use pas baalei batim, bread baked by a gentile for personal use (Yoreh Deah 112:7).

The prevalent approach among most hechsherim in North America is to follow the opinion of the Rema and permit pas paltur. As a rule of thumb, most Mehadrin hechsherim in Eretz Yisroel are strict and do not permit pas paltur.

When was it baked?

What is the defining factor determining whether bread is pas paltur or pas baalei batim? Is this determined by what was intended when the bread was baked, or what ultimately happens with the bread? For example, if a gentile baked bread to sell, but found no customer for it, and therefore kept it for himself, may a Jew eat this bread? Indeed, this is the subject of an early dispute, most halachic authorities contending that the defining factor is what was intended when the bread is baked. According to this approach, bread baked by a gentile for his own use who then decided to sell it is prohibited. On the other hand, if he baked the bread intending to sell it and then brought it home for his own use, it may be consumed (Toras Habayis 3:7). However, most authorities seem to conclude that when a gentile invited someone over to eat, it is forbidden to break bread with him, regardless as to whether it was originally baked for sale or not (Shach; Pri Toar).

Friendly baker

Here is an interesting ramification of our current discussion, slightly modified from one of our opening questions: “A group of neighbors, both Jewish and non-Jewish, are making a strictly kosher party. One of the non-Jewish neighbors owns and operates a bakery that has a hechsher, but it is not pas Yisroel. Can he bring bread that was baked at his bakery for the party?”

According to most opinions, this bread is forbidden, since it was not baked for sale.

Jewish participation

The entire issue of whether and under what circumstances a Jew can eat bread baked by a non-Jew is problematic only when the entire baking procedure is done without any participation of a Jew. However, if a Jew increases the heat of the oven in any way, even by merely symbolically adding a splinter to the fire, the bread baked is considered pas Yisroel. The Rema furthermore states that if a Jew increased the fire once, and the oven was not turned off for twenty-four consecutive hours, then all the bread is considered pas Yisroel.

In a large, modern, industrial bakery, it is usually very easy to arrange that everything baked there should be pas Yisroel. Since these bakeries operate seven days a week, whenever the mashgiach visits, he needs simply to adjust upward the thermostat or dial until he sees that he has added fuel to the fire, and then return the dial to its setting. This will make the bread pas Yisroel for the foreseeable future. I have done this personally numerous times and so have many others.

The reason why this is not usually done is very simple: The consumer is not clamoring for it to be done, and the hechsherim follow the approach that pas paltur is permitted. If consumers would demand that the bread under hechsher be pas Yisroel, it all would be.

Aseres Yemei Teshuvah

We can now answer Questions #1 and #3 which we posed earlier. Notwithstanding the conclusion that, at least under certain circumstances, pas akum is permitted, several rishonim record that one should be stringent during the Ten Days of Repentance to use only pas Yisroel, even in a place where the custom is to be lenient and use pas paltur (for example, Rosh, Rosh Hashanah 4:14, at very end; Tur, Orach Chayim 603). This approach is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 603) and all the later authorities. Those who rule leniently in allowing the use of pas paltur during the Aseres Yemei Teshuvah rely on the opinions that in a large, commercial bakery, where the consumer does not know any of the workers, there is no halachic concern of pas akum. One should be aware that this heter is not mentioned by most authorities, and it is disputed by many who quote it (see Birkei Yosef, Yoreh Deah 112:9). Shu”t Minchas Yitzchok 3:26:6 rules that one may combine this heter with another heter that would be insufficient on its own.

In conclusion, according to predominant opinion, if a Jew participated in the heating of the oven, the bread is considered pas Yisroel. If no Jew participated in heating the oven, the pas paltur bread baked by a non-Jew may be used, according to the Shulchan Aruch, when there is no pas Yisroel of equal quality available. According to the Rema, in a place where the custom is to be lenient, one may use pas paltur, even if pas Yisroel is available, except during the Aseres Yemei Teshuvah.

Conclusion

The Gemara teaches that the rabbinic laws are dearer to Hashem than the Torah laws. In this context, we can explain the vast halachic literature devoted to understanding this particular prohibition, created by Chazal to protect the Jewish people from major sins.

 

 

Who Knows Thirteen?

Question: What is the basis for the Selichos we recite before Rosh Hashanah and during the Aseres Yemei Teshuvah?

Answer:

From the beginning of Selichos, continuing with the closing sentences of the haftarah we recite on Shabbos Shuvah, and then again after Maftir Yonah, and climaxing with the Selichos we recite in ne’ilah, we repeatedly enumerate or allude to the thirteen attributes of Hashem’s kindness. The words mi keil kamochaalso allude to the thirteen attributes of Hashem’s kindness.

Why is the recital of the thirteen midos of Hashem’s mercy so important? Allow me to quote the relevant Talmudic passage:

Rabbi Yochanan said: “Were it not for the fact that the Torah itself wrote this, it would be impossible to say this. The Torah teaches that Hashem wrapped Himself in a talis like a chazzan and demonstrated to Moshe the order of prayer. Hashem told Moshe: ‘Whenever the Jews sin, they should perform this order, and I will forgive them”‘ (Rosh Hashanah 17b).

Rabbi Yochanan noted that the anthropomorphism of his own statement is rather shocking, and, without scriptural proof, we would refrain from saying it. Nevertheless, the Torah compelled us to say that Hashem revealed to Moshe a means whereby we can be pardoned for our iniquities. According to the Maharal, Moshe asked Hashem to elucidate, to the extent that a human can comprehend, how Hashem deals with the world in mercy. Hashem did, indeed, enlighten Moshe, and this enabled him to implore that the Jewish people be forgiven and taught him how to lead the Jews in their prayers (Chiddushei Agados, Rosh Hashanah 17b s.v. Melameid).

Source for Selichos

This, then, is the basis for Selichos. Indeed, it is not a takanah, but a custom; yet, who would not avail himself of the opportunity to prepare early for this chance? To quote the Leket Yosher: Someone who goes to daven on the High Holidays and did not say Selichos in preparation can be compared to an individual who desires to approach the king with an urgent request, and manages to acquire the key to the king’s inner sanctum, but fails to arrange how he will enter the outer office. All his efforts are therefore completely in vain, because he failed to prepare himself adequately. This can be compared to someone moving to an unsettled area who installs a modern kitchen, expecting to be able to turn on the tap and produce water, when there are no connecting water pipes!

A Word about Attributes

What, exactly, are the thirteen attributes? For that matter, can we attribute personality characteristics to Hashem?

Humans are not capable of understanding who Hashem is. The Torah requires that we understand that Hashem does not have moods (Rambam, Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah 1:11). When we describe Hashem’s different attributes, we are explaining Hashem in a way that we, as human beings, will be able to comprehend Him, since we cannot comprehend Him in any other way (Rambam, Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah 1:9). Thus, providing thirteen different attributes of Hashem’s mercy is simply a human way for us to appreciate more specifically and to a greater extent what Hashem does and has done for us, and what is our responsibility to fulfill the mitzvah of being like Hashem, which I will explain shortly.

To quote Rabbeinu Bachyei: Although we no longer know how to beseech nor do we properly understand the power of the thirteen attributes, and how they connect to Hashem’s mercy, we still know that the attributes of mercy plead on our behalf, since this is what Hashem promised. Today, when we are without a kohein gadol to atone for our sins and without a mizbei’ach on which to offer korbanos and no Beis Hamikdash in which to pray, we have left only our prayers and these thirteen attributes (Kad Hakemach, Kippurim 2).

Who Knows Thirteen?

To quote the Haggadah, “I know thirteen! Thirteen are the attributes.”

What are the thirteen midos?

The Torah says: Hashem, Hashem, Who is a merciful and gracious G-d, slow to anger, and abundant in kindness and truth. He preserves kindness for thousands of generations by forgiving sins, whether they are intentional, rebellious or negligent; and He exonerates (Shemos 34:6-7).

There are many opinions among the commentaries and the halachic authorities exactly how to calculate the thirteen merciful attributes of Hashem. The most commonly quoted approach is that of Rabbeinu Tam, who includes each of the Names of Hashem at the beginning as a separate attribute (Tosafos, Rosh Hashanah 17b).

What do I do?

At this point, I want to return to the above-quoted Talmudic source of the Selichos and note an important point.

Hashem told Moshe: “Whenever the Jews sin, they should perform this order and I will forgive them.” The Hebrew word that I have translated as should perform this order is yaasu, which means that the Jews must do something, definitely more than just reciting the words. If all that is required is reading the words, the Gemara should have said simply: They should read these words. Obviously, action, which always speaks louder than words, is required to fulfill these instructions and accomplish atonement. What does the Gemara mean?

Emulate Hashem

To answer this question, we need to realize that the most important of the 613 mitzvos is the commandment to emulate Hashem. To quote the Gemara: Just as Hashem is gracious and merciful, so should you become gracious and merciful (Shabbos 133b). When Hashem told Moshe: Whenever the Jews perform this order, I will forgive them, He meant that when we act towards one another with the same qualities of rachamim that Hashem does, He forgives us. Reciting the thirteen attributes of Hashem’s mercy is the first step towards making ourselves merciful people who emulate Hashem’s ways. Yaasu means learning to internalize these attributes by doing them, and thereby making ourselves G-dly people. “Doing” the thirteen attributes means not only understanding the absolutely incredible amount of tolerance that Hashem manifests, but includes, also, realizing how accepting we must be of people who annoy and harm us!

This sounds great in theory. What does it mean in practice?

Here are several examples, all taken from the sefer Tomer Devorah, to help us comprehend what our job is:

  1. Whenever someone does something wrong toward Hashem, at that very moment He provides all the needs of the offender. This is a tremendous amount of forbearance that Hashem demonstrates. Our mitzvah is to train ourselves to be accepting, to this great extent, of those who annoy and wrong us.
  2. We should appreciate the extent to which Hashem considers the Jews to be His people; we should identify with the needs of each Jew on a corresponding level.
  3. Hashem waits with infinite patience for the sinner to do teshuvah, always being confident in this person’s ability to repent and change, and continues to provide the sinner with all his needs. Similarly, we should not stand on ceremony to wait for someone who wronged us to apologize.
  4. Hashem emphasizes the positive acts that a person does and continues to shower the person with good, while, in the interim, He overlooks the sins a person has performed. Similarly, when I know that someone wronged me, but at the same time I have received chesed from him or her, I should ignore the fact that they wronged me – after all, they have also helped me. The Tomer Devorah emphasizes specifically the chesed that one receives from one’s spouse, which should, without question, supplant any criticisms one has of him or her.
  5. When a person does teshuvah after sinning, Hashem loves him more than He loved him before he sinned. As the Gemara states: In a place where baalei teshuvah stand, complete tzadikim are unable to stand. The parallel responsibility incumbent on a person to someone who wronged him is that when he sees that the person wants to makes amends, he should befriend and accept him at a greater level than he had previously.

We see that the recital of the thirteen attributes serves not only to help us appreciate all that Hashem does for us, but also as a training ground to teach how we should constantly treat our fellowman.

Conclusion

My rosh yeshivah, Rav Yaakov Ruderman zt”l, asked, Why do Ashkenazim not begin reciting Selichos until at most eight days before Rosh Hashanah? The custom of the Sefardim, who begin reciting selichos at the beginning of Elul, seems to make more sense. After all, the entire month is specially designated for doing teshuvah.

His answer was that proper prayer requires hachanah, proper preparation. We need the beginning of Elul to get prepared for properly reciting the Selichos (Sichos Avodas Halevi pg. 264). Now that we understand how much of a responsibility we are assuming when we recite the thirteen midos of Hashem, we can appreciate better why we need several weeks of preparation before we begin reciting the Selichos.

 

Aliyah Laregel for Shavuos

Since we all hope to be in a rebuilt Yerushalayim in time for Shavuos, we need to start planning…

Aliyah Laregel for Shavuos

Question #1: No Aliyah Laregel

“Someone once told me that when the Beis Hamikdash is rebuilt, the mitzvah of Aliyah Laregel will be optional. How can that be?”

Question #2: Women and Yaaleh Veyavo

“If a woman forgot Yaaleh Veyavo in bensching of Yom Tov, does she repeat the bensching?”

Question #3: No Tachanun

“Why does my shul omit the reciting of Tachanun during the week following Shavuos?”

Question #4: Have I gone nuts?

What do these questions have to do with one another?

Introduction:

When Bilaam’s donkey challenges him for beating her, she uses the following words: Meh asisi lecha ki hikisani zeh shalosh regalim, “What have I done to you, that you struck me three times!” (Bamidbar 22:28). The donkey does not use the common word for “times,” pe’amim, but the word regalim, which is unusual, even for a donkey. The Midrash Rabbah, quoted by Rashi, notes that the donkey was hinting to Bilaam, You are trying to destroy a nation that celebrates every year three regalim, alluding to the three times a year, Pesach, Shavuos, and Sukkos, when the Jewish people will fulfill the mitzvah of ascending to the Beis Hamikdash grounds, referred to as the mitzvah of Aliyah Laregel. This same idea is also borne out by the posuk in Shir Hashirim (7:2), Mah yafu fe’amayich bane’alim bas nediv, “How beautiful are your footsteps when you wear sandals, daughter of nobles,” which the Gemara explains as referring to the beauty of Klal Yisroel ascending to Yerushalayim to fulfill the mitzvah of Aliyah Laregel (Sukkah 49b; Chagigah 3a).

This mitzvah is described several times in the Torah. In Parshas Mishpatim (23:17), the Torah says, “Three times during the year, all of your males shall be seen (yeira’eh) before the Face of the Master, Hashem.” This theme of “being seen” by Hashem is repeated twice in Parshas Ki Sisa (34:23-24). The first posuk is virtually identical to the one cited above, while the second one reads: “No person shall desire your land when you ascend to be seen (leira’os) before the Face of Hashem, your G-d, three times a year.” There is yet another posuk in Ki Sisa (34:20) that also mentions the concept of “seeing”: “They shall not be seen (yeira’u) before My Face empty-handed.” Hence, the name of the korban offered when one ascends to the Beis Hamikdash grounds is olas re’iyah.

The Rambam writes (Hilchos Chagigah 1:1) that there is a positive command to come to the Beis Hamikdash during the regel and bring the olas re’iyah. One who comes but does not bring this korban, does not fulfill the mitzvas asei, and also transgresses a lo sa’aseh, “they shall not be seen before My Face empty-handed.”

The Sefer Hachinuch (Mitzvah #88) explains the significance of bringing the olas re’iyah: He writes that it is not proper to come before the King empty-handed. Although Hashem Yisborach has no need for our gifts, nevertheless, it is meant to teach us that, just as a person who has an audience with a mortal king would certainly bring a gift, we must be cognizant that we are coming to stand before The King.

Details of the mitzvah

In addition to the olas re’iyah that we just mentioned, other offerings are offered, including those called shalmei chagigah. Both the olas re’iyah and the shalmei chagigah should be offered on the first day of Yom Tov, unless it is Shabbos. If one failed to bring them that day, it is permitted to offer them during chol hamoed or even the last day of Yom Tov. This is true even on Sukkos – meaning that, even though Shemini Atzeres is a Yom Tov separate from Sukkos, regarding the laws of offering the special Yom Tov korbanos, it is considered part of Sukkos. Therefore, one who failed to bring the olas re’iyah or the Chagigah on the entire Sukkos, could still offer it on Shemini Atzeres.

In the case of Shavuos, one who failed to offer these korbanos on the holiday itself fulfills the mitzvah if he offers the korban after Yom Tov, provided he does so within six days after Shavuos is over.

No Tachanun

Although we cannot observe Aliyah Laregel until the Beis Hamikdash is rebuilt, many halachic observances result from the laws associated with this mitzvah.

Some communities have the custom not to recite Tachanun during the week after Shavuos. Their logic is that since, at the time of the Beis Hamikdash, one would be able to offer shalmei simcha on these days, those who follow this custom consider it inappropriate to recite the solemn prayer of Tachanun on such a happy occasion, similar to the practice of skipping Tachanun on Rosh Chodesh and when a choson is in attendance. We can therefore now provide the answer to the third of our opening questions: “Why does my shul omit the reciting of Tachanun during the week following Shavuos?”

No Aliyah Laregel

At this point, let us examine the first of our opening questions: “Someone once told me that when the Beis Hamikdash is rebuilt, the mitzvah of Aliyah Laregel will be optional. How can that be?”

The person who contended this may have been basing himself on the following statement of Chazal: mefunak people are exempt from the mitzvah of Aliyah Laregel. Who qualifies as mefunak? Rashi explains that someone who usually walks with shoes is exempt from Aliyah Laregel, since one is not permitted to walk on Har Habayis while wearing shoes. The Rambam (Hilchos Chagigah 2:1) explains the Gemara a bit differently: someone who is unused to walking very far and, therefore, cannot climb to the Har Habayis is exempt.

It is possible that this person who contended that the mitzvah of Aliyah Laregel is optional felt that, according to Rashi, since today many people do not walk around without shoes, anyone who does not usually walk without shoes is exempt from the mitzvah of Aliyah Laregel.

Another possibility is that he was assuming that only someone who owns land in Eretz Yisroel is obligated in Aliyah Laregel (Pesachim 8b; see Mishneh Lamelech, Chagigah 2:1).

Either approach does not mean that the mitzvah of Aliyah Laregel will be optional, only that, many people will be exempt from fulfilling it should they not want to. There are and definitely will be people who own land in Eretz Yisroel, and there are also people who are capable of walking the way the Rambam describes. Furthermore, even should one want to follow Rashi’s broader definition that exempts someone who does not usually walk without shoes on, there are people who can and do walk around without shoes, and they will be obligated to fulfill the mitzvah of Aliyah Laregel.

Women

Women are exempt from observing the mitzvah of Aliyah Laregel, meaning ascending to the Beis Hamikdash and offering the korban olah, although they certainly will be permitted to observe it, similar to their observing sukkah, shofar, esrog and other timebound mitzvos from which they are exempt. It is a dispute in the Gemara whether they are required to be partners and participants in the offering of the shalmei simcha. Part of this question is whether women are obligated to observe the mitzvah of celebrating Yom Tov or if they are exempt from the requirements of making sure that they have these korbanos, while it is a husband’s responsibility to see that his wife enjoys Yom Tov. The Rambam and the Raavad appear to disagree which approach should be accepted as normative halacha. The Rambam rules that women are obligated in the mitzvah of celebrating Yom Tov while the Raavad rules that they are not (Hilchos Chagigah 1:1).

Women and Yaaleh Veyavo

At this point, let us examine the second of our opening questions: “If a woman forgot Yaaleh Veyavo in bensching of Yom Tov, does she repeat the bensching?”

Whether one is required to repeat bensching when one forgot Retzei on Shabbos, or Yaaleh Veyavo on Yom Tov is dependent upon whether halacha requires that one eat a meal including bread then. Since all authorities require that one eat a meal including bread for the first two meals of Shabbos, someone who forgot to recite Retzei at either of the first two meals of Shabbos, one at night and one in the daytime, is required to repeat the bensching in order to recite Retzei. On the other hand, since there is no requirement to eat a meal including bread on chol hamoed, someone who forgot to recite Yaaleh Veyavo when bensching on chol hamoed is not required to repeat bensching.

Rabbi Akiva Eiger (Shu”t Rabbi Akiva Eiger 1:1 and hashmatos) proves that, even according to those who conclude that women are obligated in the mitzvah of simchas Yom Tov, this does not require them to eat bread. There is a different mitzvah, a rabbinic requirement called kavod Yom Tov, that requires having a bread meal, not the mitzvah of simcha. Rabbi Akiva Eiger rules that although women are obligated in the mitzvah of kavod Shabbos, they are exempt from the requirement to observe the mitzvah of kavod Yom Tov. A ramification of this distinction is that a woman is exempt from the requirement to eat bread on Yom Tov, and, if so, a woman who forgot to recite Yaaleh Veyavo during the recital of birchas hamazon on Yom Tov should not repeat the bensching. Rabbi Akiva Eiger agrees that a woman who forgot to recite Yaaleh Veyavo on the first night of Pesach is obligated to repeat the birchas hamazon. Since she is required to fulfill the mitzvah of matzoh that night, the eating of “bread” is not optional, thus requiring one to recite birchas hamazon.

Not all authorities agree with Rabbi Akiva Eiger’s conclusion that women are exempt from eating bread on Yom Tov. An early authority who did not hold this way is the Pri Megadim (Eishel Avraham 325:11), who mentions, in passing, that both men and women are obligated to eat bread on Yom Tov. Other authorities who agree with this position understand that women are obligated in any and all mitzvos that Chazal established on Shabbos or Yom Tov to make these days special (Shu”t Shoeil Umeishiv, 2:2:55), which includes all the responsibilities of kavod Yom Tov, including eating a bread meal.

The dispute between these halachic authorities results in the following: Should a woman forget to recite Yaaleh Veyavo during the bensching after the Yom Tov meals, according to Rabbi Akiva Eiger she is not required to repeat the bensching, whereas according to the Pri Megadim and the Shoeil Umeishiv, she is.

Conclusion

In parshas Ki Sissa, the Torah notes: “Three times a year, all your males shall appear before Hashem, the Master, the G-d of Israel. When I drive out the nations from before you, and I broaden your territories, no man will covet your land when you ascend to see Hashem your G-d three times a year.” The Torah here provides a solemn promise. The mitzvah of Aliyah Laregel is one of the mitzvos that proves the Divine origin of the mitzvos. No human would dare create a mitzvah that requires all of a nation’s men to be together in one place at one time, and certainly not at an internal point of the country! Who will provide military security on the periphery, at the places where a nation is threatened by its enemies? Only Hashem could promise that when the Jews observe the Torah according to His instructions, none of our enemies will even think of creating difficulties for us, and certainly not consider performing any acts of terrorism or an invasion. Thus, indeed, we understand the beauty of what the donkey was explaining to Bilaam: “Do you understand the sanctity of this nation that you seek to curse? Do you understand the special relationship that they have with Hashem?” Indeed, it would behoove the nations of the world today to listen to the donkey!

 

May I Enter the Room that I Sold to the Non-Jew

The style of this article is an experiment; it is somewhat different from what I usually send out, and I am looking for feedback from our readers. The article consists of an actual teshuvah that I wrote many years ago and is published in Shu”t Nimla Tal (Orach Chayim, #167), which is available for download on the website RabbiKaganoff.com. (The teshuvah begins on page 214 of the sefer.)

To create this article, the original Hebrew teshuvah was rendered by Google translate, and then edited. I am looking for feedback from our readership whether you enjoyed this style of article, and whether you would like to see it in the future on an occasional or even a regular basis.

The responsum was an answer to an actual question that I was asked:

“A room is rented to a non-Jew because it contains the chometz that was sold to him. Is it permissible to enter the room in order to remove something that was not included in the sale?”

The responsum, which was addressed to a Torah scholar, reads as follows:

The Magen Avraham (472:2) asked a question on the position of the Maharil, who permitted someone to use, in honor of the Seder, a very valuable item, perhaps made of gold or containing precious stones, that had been given by a gentile as collateral on a loan, what I will henceforth call a pawned item. The Magen Avraham questioned how the Maharil permitted the Jew to use the pawned item, when the halacha is that one may not use someone else’s property without permission. Since the Jew is holding the pawned item only to make sure that he can recoup the value of the loan should there be a default, the Magen Avraham assumes that the Jew is not permitted to use the pawned item without the explicit permission of the owner, until the loan is due. At that point, he is permitted to sell it or keep it.

The Magen Avraham answers that we can assume that the non-Jewish owner does not mind if one uses his pawned item only once, and, therefore, one may display the valuable item at the Seder as part of one’s celebration of this very special night.

Let us examine a related passage of Gemara. The end of tractate Avodah Zarah (75b) relates that Rav Ashi immersed a vessel he had received as collateral from a non-Jew, in fulfillment of the mitzvah of tevilas keilim, before using them for food. The Gemara inquires why Rav Ashi immersed the item when there is no  obligation unless the item is owned by a Jew. Was it because Rav Ashi contended that receiving the item as collateral is considered halachically as if the Jew already owns it? In other words, notwithstanding the borrower’s option to redeem it, the lender may assume that since most pawned items are not redeemed, he may already treat it as his property. An alternative position mentioned by the Gemara is that the lender may not assume that an item received as collateral can be treated as his. However, in Rav Ashi’s specific case, there were specific indications from the borrower’s actions that he did not intend to redeem the pawned item, and therefore Rav Ashi assumed that he had already acquired it.

Regarding the conundrum presented by the Gemara, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 120:9) assumes that the issue remained unresolved. He therefore concludes that if the Jewish lender notices any indication that the non-Jewish borrower does not intend to redeem the security, the lender should recite a brocha prior to immersing it. However, if there is no such indication, he should immerse the vessel before using it, but without reciting a brocha, since the borrower may return to redeem the security, in which case it was property of a gentile at the time of the immersion, and there was no requirement to immerse it. Halachically, only an item owned by a Jew requires immersion before use, not an item used by a Jew that is owned by a non-Jew. When there is uncertainty whether one is fulfilling a mitzvah with a certain action, the usual procedure is to perform the mitzvah but without reciting a brocha because of the principle of safek brochos lehakeil.

Returning to the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch, since it is uncertain whether the item requires immersing before use, one should immerse it, but without reciting a brocha.

At this point, this passage of Talmud and the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch present us with a question on the position of the above-quoted Magen Avraham. The Magen Avraham asked on the Maharil’s position how he can permit the lender to display at his Seder the valuable pawned items that he is holding, since one may not use an item without permission, and the lender has no explicit permission to use the collateralized valuables. The Gemara in Avodah Zarah that we just quoted is certainly assuming that Rav Ashi was permitted to use the collateralized item – the only question is whether he should assume that the item is already his property, and therefore he should recite a brocha when he immerses it, or whether he should not recite a brocha, because the property still belongs to the gentile. But no one questions Rav Ashi’s right to use the item.

The Taz (in Yoreh Deah) indeed questions how Rav Ashi could use the security and explains that halacha does not forbid using an item of a non-Jew that is already in your house. In other words, the prohibition not to use an item without permission does not apply to a non-Jew’s property that he is storing in a Jew’s house, whether as collateral or for any other reason.

Based on this above discussion, several halachic authorities (Chok Yaakov; Machatzis Hashekel) dispute the Magen Avraham’s assumption that one may not use collateral owned by a non-Jew without permission. According to these authorities, it would seem that it is permitted to enter the room that you have rented out to the non-Jew in order to use the room for your own purposes.

However, it might be prohibited to enter the room for other reasons, germane to the sale of the chometz. When the Terumas Hadeshen discusses how one should sell one’s chometz to a non-Jew, he states expressly that the chometz should be removed from the house of the Jewish seller. Many authorities question this requirement, noting that the Gemara states that it is permitted to have a non-Jew’s chometz  in one’s house on Pesach, provided that a barrier the height of ten tefachim (about forty inches) is constructed around the chometz, presumably to guarantee that no one mistakenly eat it. Why, then, does the Terumas Hadeshen insist that the chometz sold to the non-Jew be removed from the Jew’s residence?

Most later authorities explain that one is permitted to leave the non-Jew’s chometz in one’s house, provided that he has taken adequate care that no one mistakenly eat it. The reason that the Terumas Hadeshen insisted on removing the chometz from the Jew’s property was because of the technical laws that must be followed in order to change ownership of the chometz  to the non-Jew. However, should one accomplish changing ownership to the gentile without moving it out of your house, you are not required to do so.

One of the standard methods we use of guaranteeing that the sale of our chometz to the gentile is fully valid is to rent to the gentile for the entire holiday the area where the chometz is stored. However, even when one rented to the gentile the area where the chometz is stored, this rental should not preclude the Jew from entering this area for a short period of time. It therefore appears that, should the need develop, it is permitted to enter the room that was rented to the non-Jew.

Wishing everyone a chag kosher vesomayach!!

 

 

Matzoh Shoppers Guide Part II

The Four Questions of Matzoh Purchasing

The First Question Is: On all other nights of the year, we do not check our matzoh and bread, although we sometimes check our flour before we bake with it; on this night of Pesach, we check our matzoh before eating it. For what are we checking?

The Second Question Is: On all other nights of the year, we eat any kind of matzoh; on this night of Pesach, some people eat only hand matzoh, others eat only machine-made matzoh, and still others eat hand matzoh for the bracha and machine matzoh afterwards. What is the basis for these different practices?

The Third Question Is: On all other nights of the year, we prepare our food leisurely; on this night of Pesach, we eat matzoh advertised as special “18-minute matzoh.” But I thought that matzoh dough becomes chometz after 18 minutes, so all matzoh left around longer than 18 minutes before baking should be chometz. So what is special about 18-minute matzoh?

The Fourth Question Is: On all other nights of the year, no guests arrive early in order to “lift up” their food before Yom Tov, but on this night of Pesach, some guests arrive before Yom Tov in order to “lift up” the matzos they intend eating at the Seder. Why do only some of my guests ask me if they can do this?

In last week’s post, we answered the first of these questions. This week we continue…

Let us now answer the second question:

“On this night of Pesach, some people eat only hand matzoh, others eat only machine-made matzoh, and still others eat hand matzoh for the bracha and machine matzoh afterwards. What is the basis for these different practices?”

Although most people today accept the use of machine matzoh for Pesach, it is instructional to understand a major dispute that existed among nineteenth-century poskim over its use. Dozens of renowned poskim and rabbonim became involved in this dispute. Unfortunately, the machlokes over the use of machine matzos became as heated as the temperature of the matzoh ovens, with each side issuing tirades.

Those who opposed the use of machine-made matzoh on Pesach did so because of the following major concerns:

  1. The economic factor: There was concern that introduction of machine matzoh would seriously affect the livelihood of many Jewish poor who were employed kneading and baking matzos.
  2. The chometz factor: There were major concerns about whether the factories’ matzoh met all the above-mentioned halachic requirements. Among the concerns raised were: Is all dough cleaned off the machinery, or does dough stick to the equipment and remain in place for more than eighteen minutes? Does the machinery work the dough constantly, or does it sit after it has begun to be worked?

Apparently, this was a big concern in the early matzoh bakeries. In a teshuvah dated Monday, Erev Rosh Chodesh Nisan 5618 (1858), the Divrei Chayim (Shu’t 1:23) refers to machine matzoh as chometz gamur (unquestionably chometz), based on the way it was produced.

  1. The lishmah factor: Another issue involved in the manufacture of machine matzos is whether it is considered lishmah? Is the intent of the person operating an electrically-powered machine considered as making matzos lishmah? The same issue affects many other halachic questions, such as the spinning of tzitzis threads by machine, the manufacture of leather for tefillin straps and batim, and the making of hide into parchment. Some poskim contend that pushing the button to start a machine is not sufficient to make it lishmah, since the pushing of the button produces only the very first action, and the rest happens on its own and, therefore, is not considered being made lishmah (Shu’t Divrei Chayim 1:23). There is much discussion and dispute about this issue in the poskim (see for example, Shu’t Chesed L’Avraham 2:Orach Chayim:3; Shu’t Maharsham 2:16; Shu’t Achiezer 3:69 at end; Sdei Chemed Vol. 7 pgs. 396-398; Chazon Ish, Orach Chayim 6:10 s.v. vinireh d’ein tzorech; Shu’t Har Tzvi, Orach Chayim #10; Mikra’ei Kodesh, Pesach II pgs. 11-17). It is primarily for this reason that many people today who use machine-made matzoh on Pesach still use hand-made matzoh for the Seder.

It is also curious to note that the initial matzoh machines over which these poskim debated were nothing more than hand-turned rollers that quickly made a large quantity of thin dough into circles, the way a cookie cutter operates. They enabled a fantastic increase in the output of one small factory.

Thirty years after the original dispute, the issue was still heated, as evidenced by the following teshuvah of Rav Yehoshua Trunk of Kutno, widely acknowledged in the latter half of the nineteenth century as the posek hador of Poland.

“On the subject of the new idea brought to knead matzos by machine, G-d forbid that one should follow this practice. Over thirty years ago, all the Gedolei Yisroel in our country prohibited it. At their head were the Av Beis Din of Tshechnov; Rav Yitzchok Meir of Gur (The Chiddushei Rim, the first Gerer Rebbe); and Rav Meir, the Rav of Kalish; all of whom signed the declaration prohibiting their use. Not a single individual was lenient about this matter. I therefore say to our brethren, ‘Do not separate yourselves from your brethren, since all the gedolim in our country prohibited this machine and virtually all the people accepted this prohibition” (Shu’t Yeshu’os Molko, Orach Chayim #43). Thus, it appears that in central Poland, where these gedolim lived, hand matzos were used almost exclusively.

Similarly, in a teshuvah penned in the year 5635 (1895), the Avnei Nezer (Orach Chayim #372), renowned posek and gadol hador a generation later, echoed this sentiment with emphasis. He writes that although he had never seen a matzoh factory, he prohibited eating this matzoh based on the fact that the previous generation’s poskim had prohibited it, quoting Rav Yehoshua of Kutno.

At about the same time that the Avnei Nezer wrote his above-quoted responsum, the Maharsham (Shu’t 2:16) was asked by the Rav of St. Louis, Missouri, Rav Zecharyah Yosef Rosenfeld, about a matzoh machine that took a half hour to prepare the matzoh. Rav Rosenfeld was highly concerned about several problems regarding this machine. The Maharsham ruled that if all the equipment is kept cool and all the other requirements are met, then the matzoh may be used.

In the contemporary world, one can plan and construct a factory for baking matzos in such a way that a minimal amount of dough adheres to equipment, and mashgichim can supervise the swift removal of any dough that sticks to the machinery. Someone who purchases machine-made matzoh is relying on the supervising agency or rabbi to guarantee that the operation runs properly.

Many rabbonim and communities contend that it is preferable to use machine matzos, because one can control the product better – thus, in German communities and in “the old yishuv” in Eretz Yisroel, machine matzos were preferred. Rav Shlomoh Zalman Auerbach,  zt”l, and his brother-in-law, Rav Sholom Shvadron, zt”l, ate only machine matzos on Pesach, as did Rav Yosef Breuer, zt”l, and I have been told of many other gedolim who ate only machine matzos on Pesach.

Among the reasons quoted for favoring machine matzos are:

1) Kneading by hand takes considerably more time before the matzoh is ready for baking. In addition, the dough is likely to warm up considerably by the hands of the kneader, which may lead to it becoming chometz.

2) Hand matzos are of uneven thickness, so that some parts of the matzoh are burnt while other parts may still be incompletely baked; thus, there could be a problem of a matzoh being removed from the oven before it is fully baked.

3) Machine matzos are thinner and thus less susceptible to leavening.

Although the following may be unappetizing, I have witnessed someone leaning over the table, busily kneading the dough for his matzoh, while beads of perspiration are falling into the dough. Aside from the lack of sanitary conditions, there are also kashrus concerns about matzoh produced this way.

On the other hand, many Chassidic circles eat only hand matzos on Pesach, following the long list of Chassidic poskim who strongly opposed machine matzos. In between these two approaches are those who feel that the kashrus of machine matzos is fine or even preferred, but who are concerned about whether matzoh produced by a machine is considered lishmah. To avoid any halachic problem, they use hand matzos at the Seder, but eat machine matzoh the rest of Yom Tov.

At this point, my son, I can answer your Third Question:

On all other nights of the year, we prepare our food leisurely; on this night of Pesach, we eat matzoh advertised as special “18-minute matzoh.” But I thought that matzoh dough becomes chometz after 18 minutes, so all matzoh left around longer than 18 minutes before baking should be chometz. So what is special about 18-minute matzoh?

Ideally, one should stop every matzoh machine every eighteen minutes to guarantee that the equipment is completely clean. However, factory owners feel that this is a non-profitable way to operate a matzoh factory. Thus, the equipment usually runs constantly with the hope that no dough sticks to it and remains from one batch to the next. To avoid this problem, many people who use machine matzoh insist on using only matzoh produced after the equipment was stopped for a thorough cleaning and examination. This matzoh is usually called “eighteen-minute matzoh,” that is, the machine has not been running for eighteen minutes from the last time that it was thoroughly cleaned.

Different hechsherim have different standards – thus, whether some dough remains on the equipment longer than eighteen minutes will depend on how tight the hechsher’s standards are. It is fair to assume that if the factory is not stopped for cleaning every eighteen minutes, some dough remains on the equipment for more than eighteen minutes from one production to the next. However, even if dough was abandoned on the equipment for over 18 minutes, it is batail, nullified, in the final product.

To quote a friend’s recent observation: “I went to a major matzoh bakery a few years ago where they had two runs simultaneously. One was mehadrin, where they stopped the equipment every 16 minutes for cleaning. The other production was constant, and we witnessed piles of dough building up along the sides of the conveyor belt that eventually mixed into the production dough.”

The Fourth Question was basically asking:

“A guest once asked me if he could pick up the matzos on Erev Pesach that he was planning on eating at the Seder. Why did he request this, and why have I never heard of this before?”

The halacha is that to fulfill the mitzvah of eating matzoh, the matzoh must be your property. Thus, one cannot fulfill the mitzvah with stolen matzoh. Some have the practice of being certain that they have paid for their matzoh before Pesach to demonstrate that the matzoh is definitely theirs (based on Mishnah Berurah 454:15).

There is an interesting dispute between poskim as to whether a guest at someone else’s Seder fulfills the mitzvah with matzoh that belongs to the host. Sfas Emes (commentary to Sukkah 35a s.v. beGemara asya) contends that one can fulfill the mitzvah of matzoh only with matzoh that one owns to the extent that one would be able to sell it. Therefore, a host must give to each of his guests their matzoh as a present before they eat or they have not fulfilled the mitzvah. However, the universally accepted practice is to follow the opinion of the Mishnah Berurah (454:15), who states that one fulfills the mitzvah with borrowed matzoh.

May we all be zocheh to eat our matzoh this year together with the Korban Pesach in Yerushalayim.

 

The Matzoh Shoppers Guide

The Four Questions of Matzoh Purchasing

The First Question Is: On all other nights of the year we do not check our matzoh and bread, although we sometimes check our flour before we bake with it; on this night of Pesach we check our matzoh before eating it. For what are we checking?

The Second Question Is: On all other nights of the year we eat any kind of matzoh; on this night of Pesach, some people eat only hand matzoh, others eat only machine-made matzoh, and still others eat hand matzoh for the bracha and machine matzoh afterwards. What is the basis for these different practices?

The Third Question Is: On all other nights of the year we prepare our food in a leisurely manner; on this night of Pesach we eat matzoh advertised as special “18-minute matzoh.” But I thought that matzoh dough becomes chometz after 18 minutes. So what is special about 18-minute matzoh?

The Fourth Question Is: On all other nights of the year, no guests arrive early in order to “lift up” their food before Yom Tov, but on this night of Pesach some guests arrive before Yom Tov in order to “lift up” the matzos they intend on eating at the Seder. Why do only some of my guests ask me if they can do this?

“Father, what is the answer to my four questions?”

“Son, before I answer your excellent questions, hearken to how matzoh is made.”

WE WERE ONCE SLAVES IN EGYPT

Although matzoh is the simplest of products, containing simply flour and water, much detail is involved at every step to process it in a halachically correct way. In addition, halacha requires that the matzoh eaten to fulfill the mitzvah on Seder night must be produced with the intention that it is specially supervised not to become chometz for the purpose of fulfilling the mitzvah. Thus, even if we know by remote-control camera that matzoh was produced 100% kosher for Pesach, but a well-trained team of chimpanzees manufactured it, one cannot use this matzoh to fulfill the mitzvah on Seder night, because it was not produced lishmah. Only adult Jews can produce matzoh lishmah (Shulchan Aruch Orach Chayim 460:1). Therefore, before beginning work each day in a matzoh bakery the workers must say: Kol mah she-ani oseh hayom, hareini oseh lesheim matzos mitzvah, “Everything that I am doing today, I am doing for the sake of producing matzos that will be used for the mitzvah.”

Although the Gemara (Pesachim 40a) discusses preparing matzoh lishmah, it is unclear how early in its production this must be done. We need not plant the wheat for the sake of the mitzvah, since nothing at this stage can make the product chometz-dik. Until the grain can become chometz, there is no need to guard it lishmah from becoming chometz.

The early poskim have three opinions concerning the stage when one must prepare matzoh lisheim matzos mitzvah:

(1) From the time of harvesting, which is usually the earliest time the grain can become chometz.

(2) From the time of grinding, at which time it is more probable that the flour could become chometz. In earlier times, most flour mills were located alongside rivers and used the flow of the river as their power source. Thus, there is great concern that the flour could become wet and begin to leaven.

(3) From the time of kneading, when one must certainly be concerned about the possibility of chimutz (fermentation).

Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 453:4) concludes that it is preferable to guard the wheat lishmah from the time it is harvested, but that it is satisfactory to use wheat that is supervised only from the time it is ground. Other poskim require lishmah from the time of the harvest (Pri Chodosh). Nowadays, shmurah matzoh generally refers to matzoh that was supervised against chimutz from the harvest, and kosher-for-Pesach non-shmurah matzoh is supervised from the time of the grinding.

HARVESTING CONCERNS

Fully-ripe grain can become chometz even while still connected to the ground (Piskei Tosafos, Menachos 208). Thus, in order to guarantee that the grain harvested for matzoh does not become chometz, it is harvested early, before it is fully ripe (Chayei Odom 128:2; Mishnah Berurah 453:22; Bi’ur Halacha to 453:4 s.v. Tov) and when it is dry. Before cutting the wheat, someone checks to see that it has not yet sprouted. Furthermore, we cut the wheat in the afternoon of a dry day to allow the night’s dew to evaporate in the morning. A combine used to harvest shmurah wheat must be clean and dry.

The poskim dispute whether a non-Jew may operate the combine when it harvests the wheat, or whether a Jew must operate it (Sefer Matzos Mitzvah pg. 26). Those who contend that Jew must operate it is because they hold that operating a large combine is technically equivalent to swinging a sickle, and harvesting lishmah requires that someone who is commanded to observe the mitzvah actually cuts the grain.

Sometimes, it seems that life was simpler when people harvested wheat by hand. A friend of mine who was born in the Soviet Union once described how his father used a hand sickle to harvest wheat for matzoh baking. Even today, some people are mehader to use hand-cut flour for their Seder matzos.

After cutting, the wheat must be stored and transported in a way that guarantees that it remains dry (Sdei Chemed, Vol. 7 pg. 383), and one must make sure that it always remains shamur by an observant Jew (Bi’ur Halacha 453:4 s.v. ulipachos). Furthermore, one must be careful to store it a way that it does not become infested by insects. One must also check grain samples for signs of sprouting, which is a chimutz problem (see Rama 453:3). There is a well-established custom that an experienced posek checks the grains before they are ground (Daas Torah to 453:1 s.v. ve’od).

GRINDING THE FLOUR

As mentioned above, most poskim require supervising the grain lishmah from chimutz from the time it is ground into flour, and all matzoh sold today as kosher lePesach is supervised at least from the time it is ground. The mashgichim must verify that the wheat is not soaked before being ground, which is common practice for non-Pesach flour in many places. Furthermore, a mashgiach must carefully inspect the milling equipment to ensure that no non-Passover flour remains in the grinders and filters.

Chazal instituted many halachos to guarantee that the dough does not become chometz prematurely. For example, one should not bake matzoh with freshly-ground flour, but should wait a day or two after the grinding to allow the flour to cool so that it does not leaven too quickly (Shulchan Aruch 453:9). They were also concerned that one should not bag the Pesach flour in old sacks previously used for chometz-dik flour. In many countries, grains are covered with leaves before grinding in order that they be moist when they are ground. This facilitates separating the different parts of the kernel. Of course, this is prohibited for Pesach-dik flour.

SPECIAL WATER: MAYIM SHELANU

Pesach matzoh must be baked exclusively with mayim shelanu, water that remained overnight (Pesachim 42a), a topic that we explored in last week’s article.

KNEADING THE DOUGH

One may not knead matzoh dough in a warm area or in a place exposed to the sun. Similarly, one must cover the windows, so that no sunlight streams through (see Mishnah Berurah 459:2). Furthermore, one must be very careful that the tremendous heat from the oven does not spread to other parts of the bakery, warming dough before it is placed into the oven (Shulchan Aruch 459:1). Thus, a matzoh factory must accommodate that the dough can be transported to the oven quickly, without exposing the kneading area to heat from the oven.

Once the flour and the water are mixed, one must strive to produce the matzoh as quickly as possible (Shulchan Aruch Orach Chayim 459:1). If dough is left un-worked for eighteen minutes, it is regarded as chometz. However, if one works on the dough constantly, we are not concerned if more than eighteen minutes elapses before placing it into the oven. On the other hand, once one begins to work the dough, it warms up and may begin to leaven if left idle. Therefore the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 459:2) rules that once one begins working with the dough, it becomes chometz immediately if one leaves it idle. Although there are more lenient opinions as to whether the dough becomes chometz immediately, all agree that one must not allow unnecessary delay without working the dough (see Mishnah Berurah 459:18; Bi’ur Halacha ad loc.; Chazon Ish, Orach Chayim 121:16). Thus, practically speaking, it is far more important to work constantly on the dough to ensure that it does not begin to leaven, than to guarantee that it takes less than eighteen minutes from start to finish.

One should not assume that all hand matzoh bakeries have the same standard of kashrus. I once visited a hand matzoh bakery and observed dough sitting on the table ready for baking, without anyone working on it. I think that people paying the kind of money this bakery charges for its finished product should not receive matzoh that is kosher only bedei’evid (after the fact).

It is, of course, a much bigger concern if dough from an earlier batch is not cleaned off hands and equipment, and mixes into later batches. All equipment must be cleaned thoroughly after each batch to make sure this does not happen.

BAKING PROBLEMS

Several problems can occur during the baking of the matzos. If the baker leaves a matzoh in the oven too long it burns, and if he removes it too soon it becomes chometz. If he removes a matzoh from the oven before it is fully baked, he may not return it to the oven to finish (Rama 461:3).

Other problems can occur while matzoh is baking. Two very common problems are that matzoh becomes kefulah (folded) or nefucha (swollen). A matzoh kefulah is one that became folded inside the oven in such a way that the area between the folds is not exposed directly to the flame or heat of the oven. This area does not bake properly, making the matzoh chometz-dik (Rama 461:5). One may not use the folded part of the matzoh nor the area immediately around the fold (Mishnah Berurah 461:28).

A matzoh nefucha is a matzoh that swells up, usually because it was not perforated properly (Rama 461:5). During baking, air trapped inside the matzoh develops a large bubble. If the swollen area is the size of a hazelnut, the matzoh should not be used, whereas if it is smaller it may be used (see Mishnah Berurah 461:34 for a full discussion).

To avoid discovering these problems on Yom Tov, one should check one’s matzos before Yom Tov to ascertain that none of the matzos are kefulah or nefucha. I can personally attest to finding both among matzos that were meant for use at the Seder.

Of course you may ask, “Why didn’t the bakery mashgiach notice these matzos and remove them?” I, too, am very bothered by this question, but nevertheless, I and many other people have found that the matzos one purchases often include kefulos and nefuchos.

Now, my dear son, I am glad you have been so patient, because now I can answer your first question: “On this night of Pesach, we check our matzoh before eating it. What are we looking for?” We are checking that there are no folded matzos, or bubbles in the matzos the size of a hazelnut.

For part II of this article, click here.

 

 

The Mayim Shelanu Saga

Question #1: Who owns it?

Who owns mayim shelanu?

Question #2: Occupation or Preoccupation

“May I do something else while I bake my matzohs?”

Question #3: Mayim shelanu in Montevideo

“I have some experience at baking my own matzohs, and I will be spending Pesach in Uruguay. I intend to bake my own matzohs for the Seder. Must I use mayim shelanu for baking matzohs in the southern hemisphere?”

Answer:

Among the various instructions that the Gemara provides for baking matzoh is a requirement to use mayim shelanu, which should be translated as water that rested. This article will discuss the halachic requirements that Chazal instituted.

Who bakes the matzoh?

In the time of the Gemara, matzohs were baked fresh daily, and we see that the kneading and baking was usually the responsibility of the women of the household. Until fairly recently, this was common practice in many Sefardic communities, but among Ashkenazim, matzoh production has in most places become a commercial enterprise, since at least the nineteenth century. Today, few people bake their own matzohs, although I know people in Eretz Yisroel who still do so.

What is mayim shelanu?

Let us begin by quoting the Gemara that forms the basis of our discussion:

Rabbi Yehudah said, “A woman should knead dough for matzoh only with mayim shelanu.” Rav Masneh taught this in a public lecture in Papunia, a town in Bavel where the spoken language was Aramaic. Rav Masneh quoted Rabbi Yehudah’s exact Hebrew words, mayim shelanu, which can also mean our water. The next day, all the people came to him with their buckets, requesting that Rav Masneh supply them with his water, so that they could bake their matzohs. He then explained to them that he had meant water that rested, this time using the Aramaic words, maya devisu (Pesachim 42a).

The authorities debate whether Rav Masneh was teaching this as part of the traditional Shabbos Hagadol drosha, whose primary halachic purpose is to educate people regarding the details of the laws of Pesach, or whether he was delivering this discourse on Yom Tov. If it was on Yom Tov, why would Rav Masneh have waited until Yom Tov to tell them about an essential practice necessary to bake kosher-for-Pesach matzohs? The probable answer is that Rav Masneh was a visitor in Papunia on Yom Tov and chose to discuss this topic when asked to give a guest lecture.

Why the anecdote?

The rishonim ask why the Gemara needs (or should I say kneads?) to mention the story of Rav Masneh (Yerei’im). They do not answer that it is to teach us to have a sense of humor. What was the purpose of the story? There are several interesting answers to this question, two of which we will discuss at the end of this article.

But first, let us return to the continuation of the passage of Gemara:

“Rava taught in a public lecture: a woman should not knead her dough for matzoh under the sun, nor may she use hot water, even if it was heated only by being exposed to sunlight, nor may she use water that appears to be room temperature, if it was swept out of a water heater whose coals were removed. She should be careful not to ‘raise her hands’ from the oven until she completes making the matzoh,” which is another way of saying that she should remain focused on the matzoh production until it is finished, and certainly not do anything else in the interim (Pesachim 42a).

Occupation or Preoccupation

Thus, we can now answer one of our opening questions: “May I do something else while I bake my matzohs?”

The answer is that one may not.

After the fact

The Gemara then asks what is the halacha if someone made matzoh using water that did not meet the standards mentioned above, and cites a dispute between Mar Zutra and Rav Ashi whether the matzoh may be used. Mar Zutra permitted the matzoh thus prepared, whereas Rav Ashi prohibited it. The halachic authorities rule according to Rav Ashi, that this matzoh may not be used. The authorities then debate whether this ruling applies only to the latter cases — one who kneaded the matzoh outdoors or who used warm water — or does it apply even to someone who kneaded matzoh with water that was not mayim shelanu. Rashi is quoted as having ruled that matzoh prepared with water that was not mayim shelanu is permitted bedei’evid, after the fact, whereas most authorities prohibit this matzoh.

Mayim shelanu wherefore?

Why did Chazal prohibit using water for matzoh baking, unless it rested? The poskim cite two main approaches.

According to Rashi, mayim shelanu is required because, during the winter months, the sun traverses the earth much closer to the earth than it does in the summer. Thus, the areas of the earth in which there are open bodies of water become heated to a much greater degree in the winter than they are in the summer, making the water too warm for baking matzohs. Since Pesach in the northern hemisphere is at the end of the winter, it arrives when outside water is warmer than desired for matzoh baking, until it has had ample time to cool. Since the Gemara mentions specifically that the water was lanu, many authorities maintain that the water must rest in a cool place for a minimum of twelve hours (Gra).

Mayim shelanu in the southern hemisphere

It would seem that, according to Rashi, there is no need for mayim shelanu when making matzoh before Pesach in Argentina, Australia, South Africa and anywhere else in the southern hemisphere, since, in that part of the world, Pesach falls at the end of the summer, not the end of the winter. Similarly, someone baking Pesach matzohs in the summer months in the northern hemisphere would not require mayim shelanu. Although this last piece of information may not be germane to any existing kosher lePesach matzoh bakeries, it will be of interest to those producing matzoh for the grain offerings, the menachos, to be offered in the Beis Hamikdash when it is rebuilt, speedily and in our days, since, with only two exceptions, they may not be chometz.

River water

The rishonim quote that Rashi himself held that mayim shelanu is required only when using water from a spring or a cistern, but not when using water drawn from a river. Some explain that this is because we can assume that it has already had sufficient time to cool (Responsum of Rashi, quoted by Ravyah #485, as explained by Kolbo #48). However, later authorities (Ravyah #485; Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 455:1) do not accept this lenient ruling and require that river water wait several hours before use for baking matzohs.

Here comes the sun!

The second reason for mayim shelanu is that provided by Rav Eliezer of Metz, a disciple of Rabbeinu Tam and the author of Sefer Ye’rei’im, an important early halachic source. The Ye’rei’im explains that one should not use water for matzohs unless it rested, because water drawn at night from underground was heated by the sun, since the sun is on the other side of the earth at night. He rules that water drawn at the very beginning of the night can be used immediately, since it has not yet had opportunity to become hot. This lenience applies to water drawn at the very end of the day, during twilight (bein hashemashos), or at the beginning of the night.

Luck of the draw

Among the major halachic commentaries to the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch, we find three different ways of understanding the Ye’rei’im’s position:

  1. According to the Taz, the Ye’rei’im required that matzohs be baked only with water that was drawn during the evening, as described above. Any water drawn at any other time is considered to have become heated and may no longer be used for matzoh production. The Taz contends that one may not use for baking matzohs any water that was ever known to be hot, even if it was subsequently cooled and allowed to rest. Several other authorities, such as the Hagahos Semaq 222:9, and the Mizrachi, also rule this way (as understood by the Beis Yosef and the Taz.) The reason why we refer to the water as “water that rested overnight” is because usually one needs to draw it at least a day before one will use it, and prior to the night.
  2. According to the Bach’s understanding of the Ye’rei’im, one may never use water drawn at night, but water drawn in the daytime becomes usable after it has been allowed to cool until the following morning.
  3. According to the Beis Yosef’s understanding of the Ye’rei’im, water drawn any time other than twilight becomes permissible for matzoh production after it has been in a cool place overnight. Thus, water drawn at night becomes usable the morning after the following night, whereas water drawn in the daytime becomes usable the following morning.

According to all three opinions, the Ye’rei’im permitted immediate use of water that was drawn in the evening, whereas Rashi required this water to rest overnight. According to Rashi, water drawn in the daytime is acceptable for matzoh production after it has been left for twelve hours in a cool place, whereas according to the Ye’rei’im (as understood by the Beis Yosef and Bach), this water may not be used until the following morning, which is considerably more than 12 hours. The halachic authorities rule that lechatchilah one should draw mayim shelanu in the evening and then wait overnight until one uses it, which is basically following the stringencies of both Rashi and the Ye’rei’im.

This means that one draws water from a spring, well, or river immediately before twilight and leaves it in a cool place for a minimum of one complete night to allow it to cool (Shulchan Aruch Orach Chayim 455:1 and commentaries). One may draw water for several days at one time (Shulchan Aruch 455:1), provided one draws the water immediately before twilight and then stores it in a cool place, although some poskim prefer that the water be drawn freshly each night (Maharil quoted by Ba’er Heiteiv 455:7). The water should not be drawn or stored in a metal vessel since metal conducts heat and warms the water (Magen Avraham 455:9). In addition, the water should not be drawn or stored in a vessel that has been used previously to hold other liquids since some liquid may mix with the water, and this may cause the dough to rise faster than otherwise (Magen Avraham ibid.). Many contemporary poskim discourage using tap water for matzos because of concern that fluoride and other chemicals introduced into the water may cause the dough to rise more quickly (see Mo’adim U’zemanim 3:261). It is important to note that the requirement for mayim shelanu is not only for the matzos eaten at the Seder, but also for all matzos eaten during the entire Pesach.

Rav Masneh’s lecture

At this point, let us return to a previous question: The Gemara tells us the amusing anecdote concerning the misunderstanding that resulted from Rav Masneh’s lecture, where the people misunderstood mayim shelanu to mean Rav Masneh’s water, until he clarified that it meant water that rested overnight.  Why is it important for the Gemara to tell us this story? From the Ye’rei’im onward, many halachic authorities discuss this question, providing a variety of answers. Some explain that Rav Masneh delivered this lecture on Yom Tov, and they infer the following conclusion: If matzoh made without mayim shelanu is prohibited, Rav Masneh would have left the people of Papunia with nothing to eat – they would have had to destroy all the matzoh they had already produced, since it was not made using mayim shelanu, and they would have had nothing to eat the next day either, since they had no water with which to bake. Since the Gemara mentions nothing of the hardship that was imposed by his ruling, we should conclude that the Gemara’s purpose is to teach that mayim shelanu is required only lechatchilah, but, after the fact, matzoh made using water that was not mayim shelanu is permitted (Sefer Ye’rei’im).

Others contend that Rav Masneh taught this as part of the Shabbos Hagadol drosha, and that Pesach that year began on Sunday night. (In our current calendar implemented by Hillel Hanasi, Pesach cannot begin on Sunday night. However, Rav Masneh lived at a time when the central Beis Din still determined the calendar on a monthly basis, and, in that era, Pesach could begin on any day of the week.) On Sunday, the people came to fetch water from Rav Masneh, intending to bake their matzohs in the afternoon. This was the common practice in earlier days – matzohs for the Seder were not baked until the afternoon of Erev Pesach, a practice mentioned in Shulchan Aruch and still practiced by many.

Now that they had no water with which to bake their matzohs, what were they to do for matzohs for the Seder? Since the Gemara does not say that they had a matzoh-less Seder, there are a few options:

  1. As we mentioned above, it could be that mayim shelanu is only a lechatchilah rule, but, after the fact, one who has no mayim shelanu can bake matzohs with room temperature water (Raavyah; Semag).
  2. As long as several hours have elapsed since the water was drawn, it is called mayim shelanu, regardless as to when it was drawn. Thus, having heard Rav Masneh’s ruling, the people immediately drew water and began timing the cooling off period. Towards evening, they baked their matzohs (Ravyah #485), or possibly even in the middle of the Seder!

As we all know, matzoh is made of only two ingredients, kosher-for-Pesach flour and water. Although few of us bake our own matzohs, we now know that there are halachos germane to what water one must use for baking matzohs. This provides some information that enables us to understand what is involved in the kashrus of one of the two ingredients in the manufacture of matzoh.

Baking with Hallel!

While baking matzoh on erev Pesach, there is a custom of singing Hallel with tremendous emotion. The moments that we recite Hallel then, and on Pesach itself, can encapsulate the most fervent experience of His closeness. Reliving Hashem’s miracles rekindles the cognizance of Hashem’s presence. In the merit of joyously performing the mitzvos of Seder night, may we soon see the return of the Divine Presence to Yerushalayim and the rededication of the Beis HaMikdash, and be zocheh to fulfill all of these mitzvos, including the korban Pesach!

 

 

Purim Mishaps, Part II

Question #1: Purim Damage

An inebriated Purim drop-in damaged some property in our house. May we collect damages?

Question #2: Hurt at a Wedding

At a wedding, two people collided, causing one of them to break a leg and lose work time. Is the person who hurt him liable?

Question #3: Purim Dress

Is it permitted for a man to wear a woman’s dress on Purim?

Introduction:

In part I of this article, we discussed whether someone who damaged property in the course of festivities is required to make compensation. We learned that there are sources on this topic dating back to the time of the Beis Hamikdash!

As we noted in the earlier article, early sources in the Mishnah and Gemara discuss whether one is required to pay for harm that occurred in the course of a celebration. According to Rashi’s interpretation, after the completion of the hakafos in the Beis Hamikdash on Hoshanah Rabbah, the adults would grab the lulavim and esrogim from the children and eat the esrogim. Rashi explains that there was no prohibition involved, because this was part of the holiday festivities.

Most, but not all, authorities accept this approach. The Beis Yosef (Orach Chayim 695) quotes some of the sources that excuse the merrymaker from damages, but states that this immunity exists only in communities where this type of rowdy behavior is commonplace. He then notes that in the area in which he lives, this type of raucous celebrating does not exist. Therefore, we understand why he omits any discussion of exempting merrymakers from damages in the Shulchan Aruch. On the other hand, numerous other authorities, predominantly Ashkenazim, exempt a person from paying damages that occur as a result of mitzvah gaiety (e.g., Mordechai, Sukkah 743; Agudah, Sukkah; Terumas Hadeshen 2:210; Yam shel Shelomoh, Bava Kama 5:10). The Rema rules this way in three different places (Orach Chayim 695:2; 696:8; Choshen Mishpat 378:9), and it is accepted subsequently as normative halacha.

Limitations

Notwithstanding the generally accepted approach that a merrymaker is exempt from paying damages, there are exceptions.

Physical injury

Does this exemption of liability apply, even when there is physical injury? The Magen Avraham raises this question and notes that it is the subject of a dispute among halachic authorities. He quotes the Keneses Hagedolah, who rules that one is obligated to pay for physical harm, whereas the Agudah rules that one is not. I noted in the first part of this article that the Terumas Hadeshen appears to agree with the Agudah that one is exempt, even when there is physical injury. His case was someone who used holiday festivities as an excuse to push another person very hard, causing major injury. The Terumas Hadeshen obligated him to pay, because the injury was intentional, but seemed to accept that if the damage had been a result of merrymaking, there would be no obligation to pay.

Why is he exempt?

Until now, we have been talking about whether a merrymaker is excused from financial compensation for damages, and we have discussed sources that exempt him, at least under certain circumstances, and other sources that do not. The next step in our discussion is to understand why he should be exempt. The halachic rule is that odom mu’ad le’olam, a person is always responsible to pay for damage that he causes (Mishnah, Bava Kama 26a). Why is there an exception for a merrymaker?

I have found three halachic approaches that suggest why the person responsible for causing damage is exempt from paying. As we will see, there are practical differences in halacha that result from the different approaches.

  1. Implied mechilah

When people participate in an activity together, there is an implied mechilah that one will not collect damages.

  1. Hefker beis din hefker

In order to not put a damper on people’s celebrating, Chazal exercised their authority of hefker beis din hefker (Bach, Yoreh Deah 182).

  1. Mitzvos are different

There is a special exemption for people participating in a mitzvah.

Not mutually exclusive

We should note that the three reasons we have mentioned are not mutually exclusive. A halachic authority might hold that two or three of the reasons apply. In other words, someone might contend that whenever damage occurs in the course of a simcha shel mitzvah, the party responsible is exempt for any of the reasons provided.

  1. Implied mechilah

One possible reason to exempt the merrymaker from damages is because of a principle that when people participate in an activity together, there is an implied mechilah that one will not collect damages. Here is an early example of such a ruling:

Two people were wrestling. In the course of their bout, one of the combatants knocked the other to the floor and then pounced on him. Unfortunately, his opponent suffered serious permanent injury as a result. The question asked of the Rosh is whether there is an obligation to pay damages.

The Rosh ruled that two people who decide to wrestle agree implicitly that each is mocheil the other for damages that happen as a result of their activity. Therefore, one cannot afterward submit a financial claim for injury (Teshuvos HaRosh #101:6). The Rosh is teaching us a halachic principle that one cannot claim damages that result from an activity that he joined willfully. Similarly, if someone stomps inadvertently on another person’s foot during dancing at a wedding or on Simchas Torah, there is no requirement to pay damages. Everyone knows that, in the course of the dancing in a crowded shul on Simchas Torah or at a wedding, occasionally someone is going to step on your foot. It is quite clear that everyone accepts that this may happen and is mocheil the person responsible. If you want to be certain not to get hurt, don’t participate in the dancing.

Minor damage

Notwithstanding that the logic asserted by the Rosh is undoubtedly true, it cannot be the only reason for the halacha exempting merrymakers from damage, for the following reason: According to Rashi’s understanding of the Mishnah quoted above, adults took the lulavim and esrogim of children, and this was acceptable because it was part of the holiday celebration. Yet, children do not have the halachic ability to be mocheil. Thus, at least according to Rashi, the heter releasing a merrymaker from liability must be based on a different halachic principle.

  1. Hefker beis din hefker

The principle of hefker beis din hefker allows a rabbinic court, or someone with equivalent authority, the halachic ability to forfeit a person’s ownership or claims. In our instance, it means that they rescinded the claimant’s rights to collect for damages that he incurred. The Bach assumes that the reason for exempting a merrymaker from paying damages is because Chazal exercised their authority of hefker beis din hefker in order not to put a damper on people celebrating (Bach, Yoreh Deah 182). In other words, someone may be reluctant to join the dancing at a wedding or on Simchas Torah out of concern that he may inadvertently hurt someone and be liable for damages. In order that people celebrate without reservation, Chazal exempted participants in certain semachos from paying damages.

This approach explains why adults were permitted to commandeer the property of children as part the Sukkos celebration, even though children cannot be mocheil. Although a child’s statement that he forgives someone’s liability to him has no legal status, Chazal have the ability to forfeit such a claim.

  1. Mitzvos are different

Here is yet another explanation why a merrymaker is exempt from paying damages: This is because the merrymaker was performing a mitzvah whose proper fulfillment precludes being as careful about one’s actions as one ordinarily must be. We find a similar idea in the following passage of Gemara (Bava Kama 32a): Someone running through a public area – an action that is otherwise considered unacceptable and liable – is exempt from paying damages if, in his rush to be ready for Shabbos, he collides with another person. Since he is racing for a mitzvah, he is not liable (see Piskei Rid ad locum).

The same approach can be applied to our merrymaker. He will be unable to entertain properly if he is constantly thinking of the legal responsibility that might result from his actions. Therefore, as long as his celebrating is within normally accepted limits, he is exempt from damages that result. Later in this article, I am going to suggest that an early halachic authority, Rav Yehudah Mintz, usually called the Mahari Mintz, held this way.

Hurt at a wedding

At this point, let us examine the second of our opening questions: At a wedding, two people collided, causing one of them to break a leg and lose work time. Is the person who hurt him liable?

According to the Terumas Hadeshen and the Agudah, there is no requirement in this instance to pay damages, since they rule that a merrymaker is exempt from damages even if there was physical injury. In this instance, the Bach would also agree that he is exempt since, although there is physical injury, it is likely to heal, and he rules that as long as no permanent damage resulted, a merrymaker is exempt from making compensation. However, it would seem that the Keneses Hagedolah, who rules that physical injury is not included in this exemption from compensation, would require our merrymaker to pay.

Purim Dress

At this point, we will examine the third question asked above: “Is it permitted for a man to wear a woman’s dress on Purim?”

The Mahari Mintz was one of the greatest halachic authorities of 15th century Ashkenaz. Born in Germany, he was the rav of Padua, Italy, for 47 years, where he founded one of the most famous yeshivos of his era. (To play a bit of Jewish geography, the Maharam Padua, one of the Mahari Mintz’s renowned disciples, who married the Mahari Mintz’s granddaughter and also became his successor, was a cousin of the Rema.)

In a responsum, the Mahari Mintz addresses whether it is permitted for men to wear women’s clothing as part of the Purim celebration and, vice versa, whether a woman may wear men’s clothing. The Mahari Mintz quotes a mechutan of his, Rav Elyakim – whom the Mahari Mintz describes as knowing all areas of Torah and being the greatest halachic authority of his time – as having permitted this. The Mahari Mintz agrees with his mechutan, explaining that the prohibition against wearing other gender clothing is only when one’s interest is to dress or act like the other gender, but not when one’s goal is to celebrate. He quotes as proof an early ruling of the Riva, one of the baalei Tosafos, that all food grabbed by young men in the course of the Purim celebration is not considered stolen, provided that this happened sometime between the reading of the Megillah at night and the end of the Purim seudah (Shu”t Mahari Mintz, end of #16). Thus we see that celebrating Purim can sometimes exempt one from other obligations.

The Bach took great issue with the Mahari Mintz’s ruling permitting the wearing of other gender clothing on Purim. Allow me to quote some of the Bach’s discussion on the subject. “One should note that there is a practice on Purim that men wear women’s clothing, and vice versa, without anyone protesting that this is a violation of halacha. According to what I explained above, wearing clothing of the opposite gender to appear like them is certainly forbidden. Rav Yehudah Mintz already discussed this issue in his responsum, saying that, since their intention is to celebrate Purim, there is no prohibition, similar to the ruling that a man may shave his underarm hair when it is uncomfortable (an act that is usually prohibited, because of the prohibition of men wearing women’s clothing and performing activities that are considered feminine). However, it appears to me that what Rav Yehudah Mintz wrote is inaccurate, since Rabbi Eliezer of Metz [one of the baalei Tosafos, a disciple of Rabbeinu Tam, who lived in the 12th century] wrote explicitly that one may not wear clothing of the other gender in order to enhance the celebration of a choson and kallah… Without any question, had Rabbi Yehudah Mintz seen the words of Rabbi Eliezer of Metz, he would not have written what he did. Rabbi Yehudah Mintz also wrote that, since there is the established heter of grabbing food on Purim and it is not considered theft, similarly, changing clothing [to that of the other gender] is permitted. However, his logic here is erroneous, because in regard to money, there is a halachic rule of hefker beis din hefker… however, the city elders cannot permit something that is prohibited [such as wearing clothing of the other gender]” (Bach, Yoreh Deah 182).

Notwithstanding the Bach’s disagreement, the Rema (Orach Chayim 696:8) rules that it is permitted to wear clothing of the other gender as part of the celebration of Purim, provided that one does so only on the day of Purim itself. (We should note that the Mishnah Berurah and many other late authorities frown on the practice.)

The question that we need to address is, what did Rabbi Yehudah Mintz hold is the reason to exempt a merrymaker from paying for damage that he caused? He could not have held either of the first two reasons we mentioned above, since neither reason would allow someone to celebrate by wearing clothing of the other gender, and Rabbi Yehudah Mintz compares the two practices. Apparently, he understood that the basis for exempting someone from payment is because he was involved in performing a mitzvah (celebrating Purim), and that wearing clothes of the opposite gender is prohibited only when one’s motivation is to look somewhat like the other gender, but not when one is doing so to perform a mitzvah.

Conclusion

In general, we must realize that we should perform Hashem’s mitzvos with much enthusiasm. Although this is an important value, we must also always be careful that our enthusiastic observance of mitzvos does not cause harm. Nevertheless, we now know that there are instances when someone might be exempt from payment for damage he caused while he was performing a mitzvah, particularly when the mitzvah involved celebrating.