Category: Holidays

The Truth about Schach Mats

Question #1: A Slatted Outing

“We planned a Chol Hamoed outing near a communally available sukkah. Now that we got there, we discover that the schach is some type of mat made of wooden slats held together with regular string. What do we do now?”

Question #2: Perplexing Polyester

“I have heard conflicting information whether I may use polyester thread to tie down my schach. One rav told me that it is preferred to use it, whereas others have told me that one may not. What is the basis for this dispute?”

Question #3: Venetian Sukkah

“Someone told me that Rav Moshe Feinstein permitted using venetian blinds for schach. Is this true?”

Answer:

Over the last fifty years, schach mats have changed from being used rarely to the most commonly used schach. Many brands and types of schach mats are available. Depending on the type used, several different halachic issues may be involved. Let us begin by defining the basic requirements for schach.

Schach must be of vegetative material that has been disconnected from the earth, is not food, and has not been made into what halacha considers a “vessel” or a “utensil.” Neither of these words is an accurate rendition of the word kli, but I will use them out of necessity – there is no precise translation in English of the word kli.

The criterion of whether something is considered a kli or not is whether it can be mekabeil tumah, susceptible to becoming tamei (spiritually impure). The exact rules defining when something is susceptible to tumah are fairly complicated and far more than can be discussed in a single article. As a result, I will touch on only a few issues. The halachic literature discusses whether such diverse items as arrow shafts, wooden ladders, thread, and mats made of reeds may be used as schach. Are these items processed sufficiently that they can become tamei? Are they considered “utensils” for halachic purposes, which renders them invalid for use as schach?

The original schach mats

Here is an early example that has direct impact on the issue of schach mats. The Mishnah (Sukkah 19b) discusses whether one may use mats made of reeds as schach. Mats of any material used for sleeping, sitting or lying upon are susceptible to becoming tamei and are not valid schach. A topic discussed by and debated in the Gemara is whether the reed mats commonly used in its era were unacceptable as schach because they were commonly used for sleeping, sitting or lying upon. The Gemara (ibid. 20a) concludes that one should assume that small reed mats are intended for sleeping, and, therefore, are not kosher schach unless they were made specifically for roofing. Large reed mats are less likely to be made for sleeping. Therefore, one may use them for schach, unless one knows that they were manufactured for sleeping, sitting or lying.

A more contemporary case

Many years ago, a distributor of schach mats asked me to provide a hechsher for his product. The design he showed me was for large mats made of split bamboo tied together with nylon thread. His planned design involved two different halachic complications:

1. Since the mats were manufactured in China, where bamboo mats are used for sleeping or sitting, they might be invalid as schach, even if his intention is to sell them in the United States, where they are not used for this purpose. The background behind this question is as follows: If someone manufactures a mat for sale, does the intent of the consumer decide whether the mat is kosher schach? For example, a mat could be used either for sleeping or for schach; whose intention determines whether it is kosher schach or not?

The rishonim dispute this matter. Rabbi Yeshayah of Trani ruled that the customer determines whether this mat is mekabeil tumah or not. According to his approach, the fact that the Chinese sleep on bamboo mats does not invalidate the custom-made mats, since they were ordered specifically to use for schach.

However, the Rosh (Sukkah 1:37 at end) rules that in a place where mats are made for sleeping, they are invalid schach, even for someone who ordered a mat to be made specifically for sukkah use. Even if the mat is manufactured specifically for schach, it is still invalid because of a rabbinic concern that people may begin using mats that were manufactured for sleeping as schach, which are invalid schach min haTorah. And, logically, once these mats were invalid where they were made, in China, they should remain invalid after they are transported elsewhere.

To avoid this problem, I instructed the distributor to have the Chinese factory weave into his specially-ordered mats at six-inch intervals a piece of bamboo too thick to lie upon comfortably. Because of this additional feature, these custom-made mats could never be used for sleeping, even by the Chinese, rendering their status indisputably kosher for schach.

2. The distributor’s sample had the mats tied together with nylon thread, which does not grow from the ground. Thus, the thread holding the mat together was not kosher schach. The halachic concern involved here requires some explanation.

Maamid bedavar hamekabeil tumah

The Mishnah records a dispute among the tanna’im regarding the kashrus of a sukkah whose schach rests on bedposts. The first opinion of the Mishnah, authored by an anonymous tanna kamma, rules that such a sukkah is kosher, whereas Rabbi Yehudah invalidates it. The Gemara cites a dispute between the amora’im,Rabbi Zeira and Rabbi Abba bar Mamel, as to why Rabbi Yehudah invalidates this sukkah. One of them contends that Rabbi Yehudah rules that a sukkah must be a permanent structure, which this is not. The other opines that Rabbi Yehudah invalidates this sukkah because not only must schach be material not susceptible to tumah, but whatever holds up the schach must also not be mekabel tumah. This is called the maamid, that which supports the weight of the schach and maintains it in place.

Why must the maamid be of material that is not mekabel tumah? Rashi explains that this is equivalent to using something that is mekabel tumah for the schach itself. Some authorities understand that, according to Rashi, this sukkah may be invalid (according to this understanding of Rabbi Yehudah) min haTorah (Bach). Most explain that using an invalid maamid is a rabbinic injunction, to make sure that people do not use invalid schach (Milchemes Hashem; Ran).

How do we rule?

While some early authorities take the more stringent approach, prohibiting supporting schach with material that is, itself, mekabel tumah (Milchemes Hashem; Ran; Bach), most major rishonim rule that it is permitted to support the schach with material that itself is not acceptable schach. The majority opinion contends that one may construct a metal framework, rest the schach on it, and the sukkah is perfectly kosher.

However, the consensus of later halachic authorities follows the understanding of the Magen Avraham (629:9) — that although a sukkah whose schach is supported by mekabelei tumah is kosher, one should not construct a sukkah this way. In other words, one should try to construct a sukkah that is kosher according to all opinions by supporting the schach with material that itself is valid for schach. Nevertheless, a sukkah constructed without taking this concern into consideration is kosher.

This has many ramifications. For example: you are invited to someone’s house or visit a restaurant or recreational area for a meal sometime during Sukkos and discover that the schach is held up by metal or other material that is invalid as schach. Assuming that the sukkah is acceptable in other ways, you may enjoy your meal there, since the sukkah is kosher, regardless of the fact that it should not have been constructed this way.

Does the pesul of maamid apply to any pasul schach?

Does this interpretation of Rabbi Yehudah invalidate schach only if it is supported by something that is mekabel tumah, or does he invalidate schach supported by anything that is itself not kosher for schach. In a responsum, Rav Vozner contends that this opinion invalidates any sukkah whose maamid is not kosher schach (Shu”t Shevet Halevi 6:74). We will see shortly how this information affects the answers to our opening questions.

Pulling the strings

Every schach mat requires some type of string or cord to hold it together. Is this string considered a maamid of the schach? Several authorities ruled that it is considered a maamid when the mat would fall off the sukkah were it not tied together (see Shu”t Shevet Halevi 6:74; Shu”t Yechaveh Daas 1:64), which is the situation regarding every type of schach mat that I have ever seen.

Having established that the string is maamid (supporting) the schach, we need to clarify whether string and thread are susceptible to tumah. As we will see shortly, the answer depends on the type of fiber and the extent of its processing.

The Torah states that linen and woolen thread are susceptible to the tumah of nega’im (Vayikra 13:48). Wool, which does not grow from the ground, is certainly not valid schach, and nor is linen thread, because it is susceptible to tumah. Furthermore, Chazal prohibited using flax —  the natural, raw material from which linen is made — even when it is processed only partially (Sukkah 12b). Why did Chazal prohibit using partially processed flax, even though it is not susceptible to tumah?

The early authorities cite several reasons to explain this halacha. Some contend that semi-processed flax is invalid because it no longer appears as if it had grown from the ground (Rambam, Hilchos Sukkah 5:4). Others explain that it is invalid because it is used to stuff pillows, and, therefore, it is already susceptible to tumah (Raavad ad loc.). Yet another opinion rules that since semi-processed flax is almost completed linen threads, Chazal ruled that it should already be treated as if it were complete (Tosafos, Sukkah 12b s.v. Ba’anitzei).

Is there any halachic difference among these opinions? Indeed, there is. According to the first two opinions, the prohibition of using thread for schach applies also to semi-processed cotton, hemp, jute or other fibers. However, according to the third opinion, the prohibition applies only to flax, but not to natural thread of other materials(Shu”t Yechaveh Daas 1:64).

According to which opinion do we rule? The Mishnah Berurah (629:12) concludes that one should follow the more stringent position and not use threads of any materials for schach.

Cotton cord

However, assuming that one should not use cotton string for schach does not necessarily mean that one may not use a schach mat that is tied together with cotton twine. In the latter case, the twine is serving as a maamid, but not as the schach itself, which provides a basis to be lenient. Even though we usually follow the approach that a maamid should, lechatchilah, be made of material that is kosher for schach, there are early sources who invalidate only a maamid that is not kosher schach min haTorah. However, they contend that material prohibited for schach because of a rabbinic prohibition may be used as maamid (Ritva, Sukkah 11b s.v. Vechulan). On the other hand, there are well-respected authorities who are more concerned about this (Pri Megadim, Eishel Avraham 629:11).

The question of whether a material that is invalid for schach only miderabbanan may be used as a maamid was debated several decades ago germane to schach made of thin wood slats that were tied together with thread. Are these mats kosher schach?

I am aware of the following responsa that discuss whether these mats are kosher.

Rav Ovadyah Yosef, who was asked concerning a variety that used cotton twine, ruled that they are kosher. He contended that, although, as I explained above, some authorities are of the opinion that cotton thread is not kosher because of a rabbinic injunction, these mats were acceptable to use lechatchilah since the pesul of the maamid is only miderabbanan.

Rav Vozner was asked about a similar product that used nylon, rather than cotton, thread to hold the slats together. He rules that the thread has the status of maamid, since, without it, the mats would not remain on top of the sukkah, and that since nylon, being synthetic and not vegetative, is not kosher schach, one may not use this schach lechatchilah. Nevertheless, a sukkah using this schach is kosher.

At this point, we can address one of our opening questions: “I have heard conflicting information concerning whether I may use polyester thread to tie down my schach. One rav told me that it is preferred to use it, whereas others have told me that one may not.

What is the basis for this dispute?

Assuming that the schach will fall off if it is not tied down, one should not use polyester thread to hold it in place. As we see from the responsum of Rav Vozner, using synthetic thread in a case where the schach would not remain in place has the same halachic status as using a maamid that is mekabel tumah, which we do not do lechatchilah. However, using cotton or other natural thread other than linen is certainly less problematic. According to Rav Ovadyah Yosef, it is kosher lechatchilah. Someone who disagrees with Rav Ovadyah would still agree that it is preferable to using synthetic thread.

By the way, the schach mats sold today bearing the hechsher of the Eidah Hachareidis are produced from very coarse bamboo that would not be used either for roofing material or for sleeping. The mats are tied together with coarse, natural twine that is not spun into proper thread. The result is a schach mat that is kosher lechatchilah according to all opinions.

Venetian Sukkah

At this point, I would like to discuss a different one of our opening questions: “Someone told me that Rav Moshe Feinstein permitted using venetian blinds for schach. Is this true?”

First, some historical background. At the time that Rav Moshe wrote his teshuvah on the subject, venetian blinds were made from slats of wood held together by pieces of cloth. Apparently, someone had asked Rav Shimshon Zelig Fortman, who had been the rav and av beis din of Asipovitz, Russia, whether one could use these blinds or the wooden slats from these blinds as schach. Rav Fortman was a childhood friend of Rav Moshe Feinstein; they both grew up in the Russian town of Starobin, where Rav Moshe’s father, Rav Dovid Feinstein, was the rav from when Rav Moshe was 5 years old until Rav Dovid Feinstein’s passing in 1927. (Rav Moshe was born in 1895.) I have seen family photos of weddings of Rav Moshe’s children in which Rav Fortman is featured as a member of the Feinstein family. Rav Fortman arrived in the United States in 1930, several years before Rav Moshe, and became the rav of the “White Shul” in Far Rockaway, a position he held until his sudden, premature passing at the age of 55. (By the way, two of Rav Fortman’s sons-in-law [he had no sons] became very prominent rabbinic askanim on the American Torah scene: Rabbi David Hollander and Rabbi Moshe Sherer.)

Rav Moshe, in his teshuvah, refers to a telephone conversation that had previously transpired between himself and Rav Fortman, regarding using wide wooden boards as schach. Rav Moshe rules that whether these boards may be used for schach is dependent on whether they were previously used as part of a building or not. However, the wooden venetian blinds are certainly mekabel tumah and invalid as schach min HaTorah. This would be true even if one removed the wooden slats from the blinds (Shu”t Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 1:177). Thus, the statement of the questioner is inaccurate: Rav Moshe does indeed discuss the use of venetian blinds as schach, but rules them as unquestionably invalid.

Who may invalidate?

The halachic literature contains another curious responsum regarding the use of schach mats. Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank reports that he was asked regarding someone who lived outside Eretz Yisroel who owned mats that had been manufactured specifically for schach. Upon his moving to Eretz Yisroel and shipping his possessions there, he instructed the movers not to use the mats for any purpose whatsoever, out of concern that should they use the mats, this would give them the status of vessels and they would no longer be valid schach. Sure enough, when his movers arrived with his furniture, he discovered that the mover had used the schach mats to pack glassware, despite his admonition to the contrary. His question was whether using the mats as packing material made them into vessels and invalidated them for schach.

Although until now we have discussed mats used for sleeping, authorities note that mats that are used for storage or similar purposes would also be invalid schach (Aruch Hashulchan, Orach Chayim 629:13). Notwithstanding these potential concerns, Rav Frank ruled that the mats were still kosher for schach. He contended that when the owner does not want his items to be used except in a particular way, someone using it against his wishes will not invalidate the owner’s intentions. Thus, the mats remain kosher schach.

Conclusion

A review of our discussion teaches that schach mats may have several different problems. All these issues should be resolved if the mat bears a reliable certification. Certainly, a layperson grasps that the laws of sukkah are far more complicated than he realizes. It makes sense that he should have someone who understands the laws of sukkah look over his sukkah sometime before Yom Tov to make sure that his sukkah is 100% kosher.

Pesach Sheini II

Question #1: Pesach Sheini or Bahav?

Do we recite the selichos of bahav when it coincides with pesach sheini?”

Question #2: Bar mitzvah

Is someone who turned bar mitzvah after the 14th of Nisan obligated to offer the korban pesach on the 14th of Iyar, notwithstanding that he was included in a korban pesach on the 14th of Nisan?

Question #3: Out of sight

How far from the Beis Hamikdash does one need to be in order to be exempt from offering the korban pesach?

Foreword:

In some years, the 14th of Iyar, Pesach Sheini falls on the day that most Ashkenazim observe as the second Monday of bahav. These are three days of selichos that Ashkenazim traditionally observe during the months of Marcheshvan and Iyar. Originally these were fast days and are still kept as such by many individuals. Bahav (or bahab) is in Hebrew ב, ה, ב, and stands for Monday, Thursday, Monday.

What do communities to when Pesach Sheini falls on bahav? There is a very diverse variety of minhag practices. Some communities observe bahav, reciting selichos, avinu malkeinu and tachanun. Others omit tachanun because it is Pesach Sheini and therefore do not recite selichos or avinu malkeinu. This includes some who observe bahav otherwise — in other words, they observe only 2/3 of bahav because of Pesach Sheini. Still others observe both bahav and Pesach Sheini during the same tefillah by reciting the beginning of the traditional selichos, stopping in the middle and saying half kaddish, thereby omitting both tachanun and avinu malkeinu. (Those who recite the selichos in the middle of the shemoneh esrei of the chazzan follow a slightly different procedure.) The purpose of this article is not to paskin for any individual or community. Each should follow its own custom, and if there is any question what to do, should ask its rav or posek.

Pesach Sheini or Behav?

At this point, we can already answer our opening question: “Do we recite selichos of Behav when it coincides with Pesach Sheini?”

The answer is a definitive “it depends.”

Introduction

This article will explain the Torah’s mitzvah of pesach sheini, offering and eating the korban pesach on the 14th of Iyar. This is the day that the korban pesach is offered by those who missed bringing it a month earlier.

Note: To avoid confusion, throughout the rest of this article the holiday of Pesach will be capitalized, whereas the pesach offerings will be spelled lowercase (except when the word begins a sentence or a heading).

Someone who was ill on Sukkos and could not fulfill the mitzvah of sukkah cannot observe the mitzvah a month later after he recovers, nor does someone who was unable to fast on Yom Kippur have a second chance during the year. But the Torah teaches: “And Hashem spoke to Moshe in the Sinai Desert in the second year of their leaving the land of Egypt, in the first month [Nisan], saying: ‘The Bnei Yisroel shall offer the pesach in its correct time, on the 14th of this month, in the afternoon… They shall prepare it following all its laws and ordnances… (Bamidbar 9, 1-7).’” Further, Hashem instructs that an individual who was tamei or at a distance and unable to offer the korban pesach is commanded to offer it during the second month, Iyar, on the afternoon of the 14th. “It should be eaten together with matzos and bitter herbs. It should not be left over until morning, nor should any bone be broken; they should prepare it like all the laws of the pesach” (ibid. 11-12).

An interesting point is that the Torah appears to compare the details of offering pesach sheini to the korban pesach usually offered on the 14th of Nisan, yet the Torah never teaches how to observe the regular korban pesach. The only other description of the korban pesach in the Torah is when the Jews were still in Egypt, called Pesach Mitzrayim, and not all of the laws of that korban pesach are applicable when offering korban pesach on the 14th of Nisan after the Jews exited Egypt. For example, there was no requirement to observe Yom Tov in Egypt, nor was there any prohibition against owning or eating chometz.

What if you don’t?

The Mishnah states that anyone who missed offering korban pesach on the 14th of Nisan can offer it on Pesach Sheini instead. Then it asks, if this is so, why does the Torah single out those who missed offering the korban pesach because they were tamei or at a distance? Why not simply say that anyone who missed pesach rishon can observe pesach sheini? The Mishnah answers that there is a major difference between those who missed pesach rishon because they were tamei or at a distance and those who missed it because they deliberately didn’t offer it. The first category of people are exempt from the severe punishment of kareis that is received by someone who intentionally does not offer a korban pesach. Those who missed pesach rishon because they were tamei or at a distance, and then failed to offer pesach sheini are exempt from chiyuv kareis, even if they intentionally did not offer pesach sheini, as we will explain shortly. However, according to some tanna’im, someone who forgot about pesach rishon and then intentionally did not offer pesach sheini will be chayov kareis.

This last question is dependent on the following three-way dispute among the tanna’im concerning the relationship between the two mitzvos of pesach rishon and pesach sheini (Tosefta, Pesachim Chapter 8; Pesachim 93a).

1. Rabbi Yehudah Hanasi (also known simply as “Rebbi”) understands that these are two independent mitzvos, each containing its own chiyuv kareis for violation. In other words, someone who intentionally did not offer the korban pesach rishon and then did not offer the pesach sheini because of circumstances beyond his control is chayov kareis for not offering pesach rishon. Similarly, someone who could not offer pesach rishon because of circumstances beyond his control and intentionally did not offer pesach sheini is chayov kareis. This is because although he was anus for not offering pesach rishon, his violation of pesach sheini is a separate responsibility incumbent on those who did not offer pesach rishon that carries its own chiyuv kareis. (For reasons that I will not discuss in this article, there are two exceptions to these rules. The two instances that the Torah describes, someone who was tamei and therefore not allowed to offer pesach rishon and someone who was “at a distance” and therefore unable to make it to the Beis Hamikdash to offer his pesach rishon are not chayov kareis for missing pesach sheini, although they are both obligated to korban pesach on the 14th of Iyar.) The Gemara refers to this opinion as “the two times to offer the korban pesach are each a yom tov by themselves.” In other words, failure to offer the korban pesach intentionally can make one culpable of kareis, whether the intention was to miss the first korban pesach or the second.

2. Rabbi Noson understands that the mitzvah of pesach sheini is considered a repayment for not offering korban pesach when he was supposed to, but does not absolve the sinner of his chiyuv kareis. This has several ramifications:

A. Someone who was negligent and missed the korban pesach on Pesach Rishon because of circumstances beyond his control is exempt from the chiyuv kareis, regardless as to whether he brings or does not bring pesach sheini. He has a mitzvah to bring pesach sheini but failure to do so will not create a chiyuv kareis on him. This approach disagrees with Rebbi, who contends that should he fail to offer pesach sheini intentionally he is chayov kareis for violating pesach sheini, as I explained above.

B. Someone who intentionally did not bring korban pesach on Pesach Rishon is chayov kareis regardless as to whether he offered pesach sheini. He has a mitzvah to bring pesach sheini, but doing so does not release him from his chiyuv kareis – only sincere and complete teshuvah will accomplish that.

C. There is a third case in which Rebbi (the author of the first opinion) and Rabbi Nosson disagree: a geir tzedek who converted to Judaism between the 15th of Nisan and the 14th of Iyar. According to Rebbi, he is obligated to offer pesach sheini since it is an independent requirement incumbent on anyone who has not yet offered korban pesach this year. According to Rabbi Noson, he is exempt from pesach sheini since he was not obligated to offer korban pesach on pesach rishon. The same halacha is true concerning a presumably more common case: a boy who turned bar mitzvah between the 15th of Nisan and the 14th of Iyar. According to Rebbi, he is obligated to offer pesach sheini since it is an independent requirement incumbent on anyone who has not yet offered korban pesach this year, which he could not observe as an adult. According to Rabbi Noson, he is exempt from pesach sheini since he was not yet obligated to offer korban pesach on Pesach Rishon.

3. The third tanna in this dispute, Rabbi Chananya ben Akavyah, contends that pesach sheini rectifies the sin of violating pesach rishon. In practice this means that someone is chayov kareis only if he intentionally violated both pesach rishon and pesach sheini. Even if he did not bring any korban pesach this year, intentionally on either Pesach Rishon orPesach Sheini, but negligently on the other, he is exempt from chiyuv kareis, although he of course violated two mitzvos aseih, one intentionally and one negligently.

Although the Gemara does not mention how Rabbi Chananya ben Akavyah holds regarding a geir tzedek who converted to Judaism or someone who turned bar mitzvah between the 15th of Nisan and the 14th of Iyar, it would seem that he holds like Rabbi Noson — he is exempt from pesach sheini since he was not obligated to offer korban pesach on Pesach Rishon (see Ra’avad and Lechem Mishneh, Hilchos Korban Pesach 5:2).

At this point, we have the answer to our second question: Is someone who turned bar mitzvah after Pesach Rishon obligated to offer pesach sheini, notwithstanding that he was included in a korban pesach on Pesach Rishon? The answer is that the Gemara tells us that this is a dispute among tanna’im.

Out of sight?

We now discuss the third of our opening questions: “How far from the Beis Hamikdash does one need to be in order to be exempt from offering korban pesach?”

When the Torah says that someone was “distant” from the Mishkan or the Beis Hamikdash and therefore could not offer the korban pesach, how far were they from the Beis Hamikdash to be included in this exemption? The Mishnah (Pesachim 93b) notes that the tanna’im dispute what are the parameters of this law. Rabbi Akiva contends that someone is exempt from offering the korban pesach only if he spent the entire Erev Pesach afternoon (see statement of the amora Ulla, Pesachim 93b) in a place that was too distant for him to get to the Beis Hamikdash that day. Since the Mishnah is describing someone who could not use a motorized vehicle to arrive in Yerushalayim, this distance is measured as from the town of Modi’im or the equivalent distance in any other direction. This is far enough away that it would take him more than half a day to walk from where he is to the Beis Hamikdash. Apparently, halacha does not factor in speedier methods of transportation such as horse, camel, donkey or automobile.

On the other hand, Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yosi rule that saying someone was at a distance from the Beis Hamikdash and therefore could not offer the korban pesach is an exaggerated statement. If he never entered the Beis Hamikdash grounds the entire afternoon of Erev Pesach, he is exempt from the punishment of kareis for missing the offering of korban pesach. He has a mitzvas aseih to offer pesach sheini, but he is not chayov kareis if he fails to do so.

But not out of mind…

The Torah states that someone who was “at a distance and unable to offer the korban pesach” could bring a makeup korban on Pesach Sheini. The question is debated in the Gemara whether he could possibly fulfill pesach rishon by having other people include him in their korban pesach. As we know, each individual needed to be counted as a member of a korban pesach, but does that require him to be in the proximity of the mikdash? As the Gemara expresses it, “He was at a distance from the Beis Hamikdash and others had their korban pesach shechted and sprinkled with him in mind, Rav Nachman rules that he fulfilled his responsibility to offer the korban pesach, whereas Rav Sheishes rules that he did not.” The Rambam paskins according to Rav Sheishes that he did not fulfill his obligation and he is obligated to bring pesach sheini (Rambam, Hilchos Korban Pesach 5:3). The Kesef Mishneh and others explain that the halacha follows Rav Sheishes over Rav Nachman when we are dealing with matters of issur ve’heter, rather than financial cases in which we always rule according to Rav Nachman.

Why is this night different?

The Mishnah (Pesachim 95a) states: “What are the halachic differences between pesach rishon [the korban pesach offered on Erev Pesach] and that offered on Pesach Sheini? Bal yeira’eh and bal yimatzei [the prohibitions against owning chometz] apply to pesach rishon, whereas, when observing Pesach Sheini, he can have chometz and matzah together in his house. Pesach rishon requires the recital of Hallel during the time that one is eating the korban pesach, whereas pesach sheini does not. Both pesach rishon and pesach sheini require the recital of Hallel while preparing it, and are eaten roasted and together with matzah and bitter herbs. If the 14th falls on Shabbos, their shechitah and other steps required in offering them supersede Shabbos.”

In explaining the halachic differences between pesach rishon and pesach sheini, the Gemara returns us to the pesukim in Bamidbar 9 that we quoted above. The Torah states that the korban of Pesach Sheini should be brought kechol chukos hapesach, “like all the laws of the pesach.” The Gemara, then, is curious as to why the posuk finds it necessary to mention specifically:

(1) That pesach sheini should be eaten together with matzah and marror

(2) That no bone of the korban pesach sheini may be broken

(3) That the pesach sheini should be consumed during the night and not left uneaten until morning.

Are these not three laws that apply to the first korban pesach?

The Gemara concludes that mentioning of these laws teaches us that certain mitzvos related to the korban pesach itself, such as the requirement to roast it and eat it in one place, apply to pesach sheini, even though they are not mentioned specifically in the Torah. On the other hand, other mitzvos that are not directly part of the korban pesach, such as the requirement to dispose of all of one’s chometz before offering the korban pesach, apply only to a korban pesach offered on the 14th of Nisan and not to pesach sheini.

More on pesach sheini

How else is pesach sheini different from pesach rishon? When the korban pesach is offered on the 14th of Nisan, the Mishnah describes that the first and largest group of people entered to offer their korban and then the gates were closed, prohibiting entry to those who did not arrive on time to be part of this group. When the first group finished offering korban pesach, the gates were opened, allowing a second group to enter and offer their korban. Only when this group completed offering their korban pesach were the gates opened for a third group. The pesach rishon was always offered in three consecutive groups, and only three such groups. This is a requirement that the Gemara derives from the Torah.

Regarding pesach sheini, the Tosefta (Pesachim Chapter 8) notes that there is no requirement to divide those who offer it into three groups.

Similarities

On the other hand, there are other ways, not mentioned in the Torah, in which pesach sheini has similar laws to pesach rishon. Both require that you stay overnight in Yerushalayim until the following morning, the 15th, after offering their korban, a mitzvah called linah (Pesachim 95b). Both korbanos pesach rishon and sheini are offered on the afternoon of the 14th of the month, even when it falls on Shabbos (Pesachim 95b).

As the Rambam and others explain, all the laws regarding when and how the korban pesach is eaten — that it cannot be eaten until night, how it must be roasted directly in fire (which means it must be barbecued whole on a spit that is made from pomegranate wood and not, for example, on a metal spit that would apply the fire’s heat indirectly), and that it should be eaten with a hearty appetite (Rambam, Hilchos Korban Pesach 8:3-4) — apply equally to pesach rishon and sheini.

Conclusion

Observing Pesach Sheini involves many laws of the korban pesach, but not the laws of the Pesach holiday, an interesting combination. On the other hand, in a completely opposite way, we have become accustomed to keeping Pesach without its unique korban; which is perhaps the most central of the observances of Pesach. It is so significant that the men who were tamei and could therefore not be part of the communal korban pesach realized that they were deprived of a basic mitzvah observance. They understood its importance, and, in their honor, we were taught that there is a make-up date a month later, something unique among mitzvos, and this can even supersede Shabbos. We hope and pray to bring korban pesach quickly, bimheira biyameinu.

Chanukah Lights

Introduction

A peculiarity of the Mishnah is that there is no maseches devoted to discussing the laws of Chanukah, as opposed to other mitzvos derabbanan, such as Purim and Eruvin. There are several mishnayos that mention Chanukah, all tangentially, and in only one of these does it refer to the Chanukah lamp. A Mishnah in Bikkurim (1:6) states that the last time for bringing bikkurim to the Beis Hamikdash every year is on Chanukah. A Mishnah in Rosh Hashanah (1:3) states that beis din sent out messengers to advise people which day was Rosh Chodesh so that they could observe the holidays on the correct day. The Mishnah teaches that these messengers informed people when Rosh Chodesh Kislev was so that they could observe Chanukah on the correct day.

Another instance is a Mishnah in Bava Kama (6:6) that states that someone who placed a lamp outside his house is obligated to pay damages should an animal knock over the lamp and start a fire. However, Rabbi Yehudah states that if the lamp was someone’s neir Chanukah, he is exempt from paying damages since he had permission to place the lamp this low. It should be noted that only this last Mishnah is making any reference to the mitzvah of kindling the Chanukah lights.

The Gemara (Shabbos 21b) discusses whether this latter Mishnah proves that it is a mitzvah to place the Chanukah light near the ground. A subsequent passage of Gemara (Shabbos 22a) concludes that the neir Chanukah cannot be placed more than 20 amos above street level. If the menorah is placed more than 20 amos above street level, people will not notice the neir Chanukah, and publicizing the miracle will not be achieved.

Maseches Shabbos

Notwithstanding the lack of a maseches devoted to the laws of Chanukah, there is extensive discussion about it in the Gemara. The second chapter of Maseches Shabbos,Bameh Madlikin, which discusses the kindling of the Shabbos lights, discusses the laws of Chanukah. The Mishnah there explains which wicks and oils may be used for the Shabbos lights, and the Gemara states that the same wicks and oils may be used to kindle the Chanukah lights. Interestingly, when the Rif begins discussing the laws of Chanukah in his halachos to Maseches Shabbos, he has a subheading about neir Chanukah, something very unusual for him.

Using the Chanukah lights

Although sometimes the laws governing the Shabbos lights and those regarding the Chanukah lights are identical, there are many applications for which the laws are very different. For example, halacha requires that we use the Shabbos lights and that there should be light everywhere in the house that someone walks on Shabbos. However, the amora’im dispute whether one may use the Chanukah lights. Rav Huna and Rav Chisda permit using the neir Chanukah, whereas Rav prohibits it. Rava (Shabbos 21b) adds, that according to Rav’s opinion, one is required to have a lamp near the Chanukah lights, which we call the shamash. Rava rules that if a significant fire, such as an active fireplace, is near the Chanukah lights, there is no need to also have a shamash since the light of the fire is sufficient. Even so, for a prominent person, who would not use a bonfire or fireplace as his source of light, a shamash should be lit, notwithstanding that there is a bonfire.

Among the rishonim we find several opinions as to why it is forbidden to use the Chanukah lights. Some explain that this is because of a concept called bizuy mitzvah, treating a mitzvah object in a contemptuous manner. The source from a pasuk teaches that it is forbidden to perform the mitzvah of kisuy hadam by pushing the earth with your foot. The mitzvah should be done by picking up the earth with your hand and placing it atop the blood.

Another situation that violates this rule is to dispose of an object that was used for a mitzvah, such as worn-out sechach or tzitzis, by putting them in the regular trash. There is no requirement to place these items in sheimos (genizah), because they have no sanctity, but they should not be treated with disdain (Shabbos 21a-b); placing them in the regular garbage is demeaning for an object that was once used to perform a mitzvah.

Returning to the laws of neir Chanukah, the Ba’al Hamaor explains that it is prohibited to use them because of the law of bizuy mitzvah, and then explains that this is true only if one uses them for his own benefit. In his opinion, it is permitted to perform a mitzvah using the light of the neir Chanukah.

The Rosh seems to hold an approach similar to that of the Ba’al Hamaor. He rules that one may not use the light of the menorah to perform a permanent job or other work that he considers inappropriate. It is permitted to do something temporary when does not give the impression that he is treating the mitzvah disdainfully.

All halachic authorities agree that (1) there is a concept called bizuy mitzvah and (2) that it is probably prohibited min haTorah. However other rishonim do not consider this an adequate reason to explain why someone cannot benefit from the neiros Chanukah. Covering the blood of shechitah by kicking the soil rather than using your hand to perform the mitzvah demonstrates disdain for a mitzvah. But why is it disdainful to use the Chanukah lamp light to read or to perform a mitzvah? Even using this light to eat dinner does not seem to be treating these lamps with scorn! Thus, it is understandable that other rishonim propose other reasons to explain the prohibition against using the Chanukah lights.

Rashi (Shabbos 21b) explains that the reason we cannot use the Chanukah lamp is so that it is obvious that it was kindled to fulfill a mitzvah.

Yet another approach is that, since the neiros Chanukah are kindled to represent the lights kindled in the Beis Hamikdash, just as those lights may not be used for personal benefit, so, too, the lights of the menorah should not be used (Ran).

Differences in halacha

Are there any halachic differences among these various opinions? The Beis Halevi (commentary to the Torah, page 56) explains that there are. In his opinion, Rashi holds that the prohibition not to use the Chanukah lights is limited to the members of the household who kindled them for the mitzvah, whereas according to the Ran (and certainly those who prohibit its use because of bizuy mitzvah) no one may use the light of the Chanukah lamps.

Rav Ya’akov Molcho (Shu’t Ya’akov Molcho #49, quoted by Birkei Yosef 673:5) permits using the light of the neiros Chanukah to look up a halachic question about the neiros Chanukah themselves. Since this is a Chanukah need, it is permitted. It would seem that this opinion could hold like Rashi that we want it demonstrated that these lamps are designated for a mitzvah — using them to research a question about their observance does not take away from that acknowledgement. Alternatively, Rav Molcho could hold like those rishonim who prohibit using the lights because of bizuy mitzvah, and using them to research a Chanukah question is not a bizuy mitzvah. However, according to the approach of the Ran that it is because the Chanukah lights should be treated like the lights of the menorah in the Beis Hamikdash, one would not be allowed to use the Chanukah lights to research a halachic inquiry just as it is forbidden to use the Beis Hamikdash menorah lights for this purpose.

If they went out

The Gemara (Shabbos 21a-b) discusses the following question: If the Chanukah lights were all set up properly with the correct wicks and oil such that they should burn just fine, but for some reason they went out anyway before the required time that they should be lit, is one halachically required to rekindle the lights? This is referred to as kavsah zakuk la, if it becomes extinguished, he is obligated to rekindle it (Rav Huna) or kavsah ein zakuk la, if it becomes extinguished, he is not obligated to rekindle it (Rav and Rav Chisda). The halacha is kavsah ein zakuk la (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 673:2).

In a responsum related to this issue, the Rashba was asked: After reciting his berachos and kindling his Chanukah light, someone was trying to have it burn clearer. While doing this, he extinguished his lamp. Is he required to rekindle it, and, if he does, does he recite the berachos again? The Rashba rules that he is not required to rekindle his lamps, and, should he choose to rekindle them, he should not recite any berachos (Shu’t Harashba 1:539, quoted by Ran).

When to light?

The Gemara (21b) also states that the mitzvah is to kindle the lights from “sunset” until people are no longer walking in the marketplace. In earlier days, after it got dark, people basically remained home – there were no street lights. The Gemara states that there was an ethnic group, called the Tarmudai, who would remain in the streets selling people kindling wood. Someone who discovered that he was short of kindling wood to start his home hearth would go out in the street to purchase kindling wood from the Tarmudai. The Tarmudai were the last people on the unlit streets; when they disappeared, there was no longer any mitzvah to kindle the Chanukah lights, since no one was outdoors for whom to publicize the miracle. Thus, someone who neglected to kindle the Chanukah lights after the Tarmudai went home did not fulfill any mitzvah; if they recited a beracha, it would be a beracha in vain.

The halachic authorities note that since today people do go outdoors much later at night, there is a mitzvah to kindle Chanukah lights later in the evening, should one be unable to kindle them as it gets dark.

How many?

The Gemara presents a lengthy discussion regarding how many lights one should kindle oneach night of Chanukah. In halachic conclusion, the rule is that the mitzvah requires that one kindle only one light each night. However, the Gemara also presents mehadrin methods of fulfilling the mitzvah. In practice, there are two approaches:

Ashkenazim — each individual kindles the number of lights corresponding to the night of Chanukah.

Sephardim — the household as a whole kindles only one menorah, again with the number of lights corresponding to the night of the festival.

Public kindling

The Gemara (21b) states that it is a mitzvah to kindle the Chanukah lights outside. In general, this approach is observed today only in Eretz Yisrael, whereas in chutz la’aretz the accepted practice is to kindle the Chanukah lights in a window that can be seen from the public area. The poskim explain that, at the time of the Gemara the primary pirsumei nisa was for those outside. In chutz la’aretz today, the primary pirsumei nisa is for the members of one’s household (see Rema, Orach Chayim 672:2 and commentaries thereon). A consequence of this is that, in our generation, should one return home late at night, when no one is in the street but his household members are awake, he may kindle his Chanukah lights then.

What berachos?

What berachos does one recite prior to kindling neir Chanukah? The Gemara (23a) states that, on the first night of Chanukah, one recites three berachos, Lehadlik neir shel Chanukah, She’asah Nissim and Shehecheyanu. On the other nights, we recite only the first two. The Gemara teaches that someone who is not kindling the lights and is not fulfilling the mitzvah by having someone kindle the lights for him, recites the second and third beracha (on the first night) upon seeing the lights in someone else’s home. After the first night of Chanukah, someone who is not kindling his own menorah recites the beracha of She’asah Nissim upon seeing someone else’s lights burning.

The Gemara proceeds to ask how we can recite a beracha on neiros Chanukah that states that You Hashem commanded us concerning this mitzvah, when the mitzvah to kindle neiros Chanukah is a rabbinic requirement, not a Torah mitzvah. How can we say vetzivanu when Hashem did not command us? The Gemara concludes that, since the Torah commanded us to observe what Chazal teach us, when they command us to keep a mitzvah this is equivalent to the Torah commanding us – hence the wording vetzivanu is fully appropriate.

I saw an interesting question raised by Rav Meir Mazuz, the late rosh yeshiva and posek of the Tunisian community in Eretz Yisrael. As we learned at the very beginning of our article, the entire discussion of the laws of neir Chanukah is a tangential discussion in the second chapter of maseches Shabbos, whose focus is on the details of the mitzvah of lighting lamps for Shabbos. Since kindling Shabbos lights is also a mitzvah miderabbanan, Rav Mazuz asked: why does the Gemara (Shabbos 23a) discuss the wording of the beracha on a mitzvah derabbanan when discussing the mitzvah of kindling neir Chanukah? Why not ask the identical question about the beracha recited when kindling the Shabbos lights? This question should be asked first, since the entire chapter of mishnayos discusses kindling Shabbos lights, whereas kindling Chanukah lights is a side point discussed in the Gemara that is not mentioned in the Mishnah?

Rav Mazuz suggests that, at the time of the Gemara, no beracha at all was recited on kindling Shabbos lights – this practice developed later, during the era of the geonim.

House and two courtyards

The Gemara discusses a case of a house that opens onto two different courtyards, each of which has a separate entrance to the street. This passage of Gemara is based on what is called mar’is ayin, raising suspicion that one violated halacha. Another way of describing this is: “Oh, my goodness, what will the neighbors say?”

As mentioned above, in the time of the Gemara, kindling Chanukah lights was primarily to publicize the miracle of Chanukah to those outside the house. Every house and every courtyard had a lamp kindled that could be seen from the street. The Gemara rules that someone whose house opened on two different courtyards is required to kindle a menorah in both places. If he kindled only one, the people in the street that passes the other courtyard might think that he neglected to observe the mitzvah of kindling Chanukah lights, which is a violation of mar’is ayin.

Based on this passage, the Beis Halevi questions a ruling that we quoted above, in which it was concluded that kavsah ein zakuk lah – if the lamp went out after being properly prepared, halacha does not require you to rekindle it. The Beis Halevi questions why he is not required to kindle it because of mar’is ayin, the neighbors will think that he did not kindle a light?

Actually, this question is recorded earlier (Sha’arei Teshuvah 673:7, quoting Shu’t Shevus Yaakov 3:48) who answers that should the lamp go out early, he must leave the oil and the wick in place until the required time is passed. This way, those who see that no lamp is burning will also, upon inspection, see that there was a lamp set up, and realize that this was a case of kavsah, and that he indeed fulfilled his halachic requirement. (The Beis Halevi himself provides a different answer to this question, requiring that you rekindle the lamp because of mar’is ayin, notwithstanding that kavsah ein zakuk lah. He notes that his position is at odds with what is written in the halachic authorities, all of whom imply that, since we paskin kavsah ein zakuk lah, there is no obligation to rekindle a lamp if it was burning properly and then subsequently went out before a half hour transpired.)

Mixing lights

Some authorities contend that you should not kindle some of your lights from wax and others from oil on the same night, because people will think that this is two different people lighting (Shu’t Shaar Efrayim #39). However, the Birkei Yosef (673:2) disagrees, noting that there is no mar’is ayin since you are not required to kindle more than one light.

Women and neir Chanukah

The Gemara rules that women are obligated in neir Chanukah, because of the reason that they were also included in the miracle. Nevertheless, several prominent authorities rule that a married woman should not light if her husband is home and kindles the menorah (Mishnah Berurah 671:9); others contend that even single women should not kindle the menorah if there are men kindling in the house (Chasam Sofer, commentary to Maseches Shabbos 21b s. v. Vehamehadrin; however, cf. Shu’t Sha’ar Efrayim #42).

Conclusion

The Gemara (Shabbos 23b) states that someone ragil beneir will merit sons who are Torah scholars. Rashi explains that this refers both to the lights of Shabbos and those of Chanukah, whereas the Rosh mentions only those of Chanukah. The Gra says that the Rosh also meant the Shabbos lights, whereas the Maharitz Chayes disagrees.

Some authorities contend that ragil beneir includes having a nice menorah (Birkei Yosef 673:7, quoting earlier poskim).

Reign Dates and Rosh Hashanah

Question #1: Reign Date — The First of Nissan

How can the first of Nissan be Rosh Hashanah? Is there a halachic concept of a new half-year, as in, the world is now 5784½ years old?

Question #2: The Birthday of Elsie the Cow

“Can Rosh Chodesh also be Rosh Hashanah?”

Question #3: The First of Tishrei

Why does the Mishnah refer to this date as “The first of Tishrei,” rather than its more popular moniker, Rosh Hashanah?

Question #4: Is it the First or the Fifteenth of Shevat?

Or, a more basic question — why do the trees need a new year? Do they have a birthday party or shoot off firecrackers to celebrate?

Foreword

Mesechta Rosh Hashanah begins by declaring that there are four “new years” in the Jewish calendar year:

1. The first of Nissan is the new year for “kings and holidays.”

2. The first of Elul is the new year for tithing animals. This particular new year is disputed by the tanna’im Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon, who rule that the new year for tithing animals is the first of Tishrei.

3. The first of Tishrei is the new year for “years, shemittah, yoveil, planting, and vegetables.”

4. The first of Shevat is the new year for trees in Beis Shammai’s opinion, whereas Beis Hillel contends that it is on the fifteenth of Shevat.

Cutoff point

The word Rosh Hashanah is used by this Mishnah to mean a “cutoff point,” the date that separates one year from the next, germane to the particular laws mentioned. Each of these cutoff points has a halachic ramification. Let us look at these various categories.

Kings and holidays

In what way is the first of Nissan the “new year for kings?”

This requires an introduction, having to do with the needs of society to have efficient and reliable business practices. For a free-enterprise economy to function properly, it needs an established and accepted rule of law and a means for enforcing that law. This is axiomatic to economists and businessmen, and, indeed, the Torah established an efficient and reliable system for society to function properly. Among the requirements necessary are an effective system whereby debts can be collected and a means to enforce violations of contract law. These usually rely on written documentation, in halacha called shetaros. Should an individual or a business default on its obligations, halacha usually prioritizes outstanding financial commitments on a “first come, first served” basis. This means that an earlier debt is satisfied in full before a later one is dealt with. This makes it important to know the date that each obligation was created, so shetaros must be dated.

Establishing “reign dates”

Today, we use a standard accepted calendar, which makes it very easy to determine whose obligation was established first; however, that was not always the case. In the times of Chazal, dating of documents was usually performed according to the year of reign of the local monarch. This meant that, to know whose obligation was earlier, we needed to know the order of the monarchs. This is sometimes very easy to establish, since it is unlikely that Charles the 3rd reigned before Charles the 2nd. However, what might easily create confusion is when did the second year of Charles’ reign begin and when did it end? Using an actual date that Charles the 3rd assumed the throne, let me show you the difficulty that will result. If Charles assumed the throne on the 19th day of September, that date is now the 19th of September of the first year of the reign of Charles 3rd. But we now need to keep track that the 18th of September is the end of the first year of his reign, and that the 19th begins the second year of his reign. It is easy to see the problems that this creates.

Chazal avoided this problem by following an arbitrary date to begin the second year of a king’s reign. That means that, in the above example, the first year of Charles’ reign is only a few months long, and then the second year of his reign begins.

What date do we use as the arbitrary date for bumping a king’s reign to the next year? Chazal used the following approach: for Jewish kings they used the first of Nissan; after all, Pesach is the beginning of the Jewish calendar. This means that a Jewish king who ascended to the throne on the 29th of Adar reigns for only one day before contracts are dated “the 1st of Nissan of the 2nd year” of his reign. In other words, the “reign date” may have little to do with the actual number of months, days and hours that he has been king. Although this might (and at times certainly did) create confusion for historians, it keeps the contract and commerce world simplified and clear, which is why this system was established. After all, although historians are valuable, they are not that necessary for commerce.

For non-Jewish kings, Chazal used the first of Tishrei, the day we usually call Rosh Hashanah, as the cut-off date, and this explains the later statement of the Mishnah that the first of Tishrei is the new year for “years.”

For holidays

What does it mean that the first of Nissan is the “new year for holidays?”

Someone obligated to offer a korban must bring it in a timely fashion. There are two different mitzvos, each with its own timetable. The first is a mitzvas aseih that we should offer our korbanos before the first regel — that is the three yomim tovim of Pesach, Shavuos and Sukkos — passes. There is also a mitzvas lo saaseh of bal te’acheir, not to delay the offering of a korban (see Devarim 23:22). How much time does one have to offer the korban without violating this mitzvah?

Pesach, Sukkos and Shavuos, when we conduct pilgrimages to the Beis Hamikdash, provide an opportune time to satisfy any korbanos obligations. Although there are several tanna’ic opinions to the contrary, the Mishnah rules that one violates the lo saaseh only when one did not bring his korban before the three yomim tovim of Pesach, Shavuos and Sukkos have passed in that order. This makes Nissan the beginning of the year “for holidays” — if he could have offered the korban on Pesach, he violates bal te’acheir when the following Sukkos passes. However, if he first became obligated to offer this korban after Pesach, he will not violate bal te’acheir until the second time the festival of Sukkos goes by, after Pesach has come in the interim, which starts the bal te’acheir clock running.

We now have the answer to our opening question: “How can the first of Nissan be Rosh Hashanah? Is there a halachic concept of a new half-year, as in, the world is now 5784½ years old?” The answer is that we are using the word “new year” to mean an annual cut-off point, and the first of Nissan functions as such for two distinct areas of halacha: determining the way legal documents are dated when we have a Jewish king, and when we must bring korbanos.

Elsie the Cow

At this point, let us examine the second of our opening questions: Rosh Chodesh Elul is the day we begin reciting LeDavid Hashem Ori in preparation for the Yomim Nora’im. Isn’t this a month too early to be Rosh Hashanah?

Indeed, this question is the subject of a dispute among tanna’im and the cause of a change of mind of the Rambam. As I mentioned above from the Mishnah, the first of Elul is the new year for tithing animals. This particular new year is disputed by the tanna’im Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon, who rule that the new year for tithing animals is the first of Tishrei.

Let me provide background on this mitzvah: In Parshas Bechukosai (Vayikra 27:31), the Torah teaches about the mitzvah of ma’aser beheimah, tithing animals. When the Beis Hamikdash is standing, a farmer’s newborn calves are gathered together and sent through a narrow passageway or opening. The owner counts his animals, one at a time, marks the tenth one with a red dye and declares the animal to be ma’aser beheimah. Counting the tenth animal is what makes it kodosh as a korban. Until and unless the farmer counts his animals in this procedure, there is no kedusha on any of the animals in his herd (Mishnah Bechoros 58b). The farmer performs the same procedures with his newborn kids (baby goats) and lambs (together).

Just as one is required to separate terumos and ma’asros on produce each year separately, counting and designating ma’aser beheimah is only within each year’s “crop” of newborn animals, not from one year on the previous or following year (Mishnah, Bechoros 53a; Gemara ibid. 54a-b). How do we determine the difference in “crop years” of animals? That is the dispute between the first tanna in the Mishnah and Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon. The Tanna Kamma rules that the annual cutoff point for ma’aser beheimah is on Rosh Chodesh Elul, whereas Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon rule that it is on the first day of Tishrei, the day that we usually call Rosh Hashanah. What is very interesting is that the Rambam and the Bartenura in their respective commentaries on the Mishnah rule like the Tanna Kamma. However, in the Mishneh Torah, the Rambam rules like the second opinion, that of Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon, that the cut-off date for ma’aser beheimah is the first day of Tishrei. This means that, although the Mishnah opens by stating that there are four Rosh Hashanahs, we rule, like Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon, that there are only three.

Years

Above, I quoted the Mishnah’s statement that the first of Tishrei is the new year for “years, shemittah, yoveil, planting and vegetables.” What is meant by years, when I have already explained that the equivalent of our calendar year was expressed in terms of the number of years of the king’s reign and was increased automatically on the first of Nissan (in order to avoid confusion)?

As I mentioned above, for Jewish kings, Chazal used the first of Nissan; after all, Pesach is the beginning of the Jewish calendar. For non-Jewish kings, however, they used the first of Tishrei, the day we usually call Rosh Hashanah.

Shemittah

As we know, every seven years we are required to observe the mitzvah of shemittah in the land of Eretz Yisrael, a topic whose details I have written about in the past, prior to and during shemittah years. There is also a mitzvah that comes at the end of shemittah year that applies both in Eretz Yisrael and in chutz la’aretz: the mitzvah of shemittas kesafim, releasing debts. As the Torah teaches, in parshas Re’eih: “At the end of seven years you shall ‘make shemittah.’ And this is the ‘word’ of the shemittah: Every creditor must release his hand from what his fellow owes him. He may not demand payment from his fellow, his brother, because he has declared a release for Hashem” (Devarim 15:1-2). These verses teach that, rather than Rosh Hashanah of the eighth year ending shemittah with a whimper, the shemittah year ends with a bang. And the date of this mitzvah is determined by the first of Tishrei, the day that we usually call Rosh Hashanah.

Yoveil

The Torah establishes a fifty-year yoveil cycle: the year after the seventh shemittah is yoveil. During yoveil, the land that was given to every family in Benei Yisrael, upon our conquering the holy land in the days of Yehoshua ben Nun, returns to its original family, every Jewish slave (eved ivri) goes free and all the laws of shemittah apply. The annual calculation of the yoveil year uses Tishrei as its cutoff point.

This mitzvah applies only when all twelve tribes live in their original areas as determined by Yehoshua. Therefore, unfortunately, it does not apply today until we again return to that configuration of Eretz Yisrael.

Planting and vegetables

Produce grown in Eretz Yisrael and the lands nearby must have several portions, called terumos and ma’asros, separated from it before it may be consumed. As we learned above, one cannot separate the terumos and ma’asros from one year for the crop of a different year, and therefore we need to know when the cut-off date is for each crop. The cut-off date for grains and vegetables is on Rosh Hashanah, the New Year for these agricultural products.

During the 1st, 2nd, 4th, and 5th years of the seven-year shemittah cycle, one of the separations is called ma’aser sheini. During the other years — that is, the 3rd and 6th years of the shemittah cycle — this second ma’aser is given to poor people and is called ma’aser ani.

When in its growth cycle

Although the first of Tishrei, our Rosh Hashanah, is the agricultural new year for all crops other than tree fruits, another factor determines which year applies to the particular crop: the point in the plant’s growth cycle. This is a highly complicated topic that requires at least an entire book to explain in detail. I will mention now only that the years for some species are based on when they are planted, some by the first appearance of fruit, others by when the fruit is considered “one-third grown,” and still others not until they are ready for harvest.

Rosh Hashanah

Of course, as we all know, the first of Tishrei is the Day of Judgment for all of humanity. This halacha is not mentioned in the first Mishnah of Maseches Rosh Hashanah (the Mishnah I quoted and have been explaining), but in a later Mishnah of that chapter, in which it states: At four times of the year the world is judged… on Rosh Hashanah, all who have entered the world pass before him… (Rosh Hashanah 16a).

Tu Bishvat

The Mishnah states that, in Beis Shammai’s opinion, the new year for trees is the first of Shevat , whereas Beis Hillel contends that it is on the fifteenth of Shevat. We follow Beis Hillel’s ruling and therefore Tu Bishvat is the “Rosh Hashanah” for trees. But what does that mean? Do the trees ignite fireworks on their New Year? Do they coronate Hashem as their King on their Rosh Hashanah? Does Hashem judge their deeds and misdeeds and grant them a fruitful year or otherwise, chas veshalom? As an aside, the “judgment” for trees is on Shavuos, not Tu Bishvat (Mishnah Rosh Hashanah 16a.) This means that on Shavuos, mankind, both in general and individually, is judged regarding what his trees will produce in the coming year.

Obviously, since trees have no free choice, the Heavenly Tribunal does not judge them on their Rosh Hashanah, yet the arboreal new year does have major halachic ramifications other than the popular custom of eating fruit. Tu Bishvat functions as the cutoff point between two crop years. As we learned above, one cannot separate terumos and ma’asros of one year for a different crop year. For tree fruits, the cutoff point is not the first of Tishrei but Tu Bishvat. In addition, Tu Bishvat determines which year of the shemittah cycle the fruit is from and therefore whether it is obligated in ma’aser sheini or in ma’aser ani. As I mentioned above, what stage of development the fruit is at on Tu Bishvat depends on the particular species. Again, some species depend on the first appearance of fruit, others by when the fruit is one third grown, and still others by when it is ready for harvest.

It is also usually the cutoff point for determining whether a tree is producing forbidden orlah fruit and for determining the halachos of revai’i. The fruits appearing after Tu Bishvat of the fourth year of the life of this tree are not forbidden as orlah, and the fruits of the fifth year of a tree’s life do not have the sanctity of revai’i.

Conclusion

We discussed several mitzvos that apply only in Eretz Yisrael. Most generations of our forebears had to be content with reading about Eretz Yisrael and imagining what it might be like to visit. We are fortunate to live in a time when visiting and living in Eretz Yisrael is a reality, and we should be filled with hakoras hatov that we can traverse the land that was promised to our forefathers. Inhabiting our native land includes many special laws that apply within its borders; we should all be familiar with these special laws, whether or not we live in Eretz Yisrael, because its special mitzvos create a direct relationship with Hashem.

Shaving and Haircuts during the Three Weeks

Question #1: Bushy presenter

“My company sent me out of town to meet a new client, and I forgot to have my hair cut before Shiva Asar BeTamuz. May I have the bushier parts trimmed? Does it make a difference if I use a non-Jewish barber? May I shave?”

Question #2: Mixed shavers

“My son wrote me that, in his yeshiva in Eretz Yisroel, the Sefardic bochurim shave during the Three Weeks. Is this permitted?”

Question #3: Celebrating a bris!!

“Thank G-d, we will be celebrating the bris of a grandson during the Three Weeks, and I do not want to look disheveled for the bris photos. May I shave in honor of the occasion?”

Question #4: Tichel tattling

“My hair is sticking out beyond my tichel. May I trim it?”

The three-week period between Shiva Asar BeTamuz and Tisha B’Av is observed by klal Yisroel as a time of mourning. These three weeks heralded the beginning of the tragedies that took place prior to the destruction of both Batei Hamikdash. Prior to the destruction of the First Beis Hamikdash, the daily korban tamid ceased on Shiva Asar BeTamuz and did not resume until the Jews began constructing the Second Beis Hamikdash seventy years later (see Rambam, Hilchos Taanis 5:2). Before the destruction of the Second Beis Hamikdash, the walls of the city of Yerushalayim were breached on Shiva Asar BeTamuz, leading to the complete devastation that followed (Taanis 28b).

To commemorate these tragic events, the custom is to observe some mourning practices (aveilus) from the 17th day of Tamuz until Tisha B’Av (Rama, Darchei Moshe, Orach Chayim 551:5 and Hagahos 551:2; Ben Ish Chai, Parshas Devorim #4; Knesses Hagedolah; Sdei Chemed Vol. 5, pg. 279 #14). This three-week season is referred to by the Midrash Rabbah (Eicha 1:3) as the period of Bein Hametzarim. (It is noteworthy that neither the Mishnah nor the Gemara makes any mention of beginning the mourning period any earlier than Rosh Chodesh.)

WHAT ARE THE LAWS ABOUT HAVING HAIRCUTS AND SHAVING DURING THE THREE WEEKS?

The Mishnah (Taanis 26b) rules that it is prohibited to cut one’s hair from the Motza’ei Shabbos preceding Tisha B’Av until Tisha B’Av. These days are referred to as shavua shechal bo Tisha B’Av, the week in which Tisha B’Av falls. This year, when Tisha B’Av falls on Sunday, there is no shavua shechal bo Tisha B’Av. However, the Rama notes that the custom among Ashkenazim is that we do not cut our hair during the entire Three Weeks (Darchei Moshe, Orach Chayim 551:5 and Hagahos 551:4). As a general rule, the halachos of shaving and cutting one’s hair are the same.

There are different customs among Sefardim as to whether they get their hair cut during the Three Weeks. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 551:3) prohibits only that which is recorded in the Gemara, cutting hair from Motza’ei Shabbos until Tisha B’Av, and this is the prevalent practice among Sefardim today in Eretz Yisroel (Shu’t Yechaveh Daas 4:36), which means that there is no prohibition this year. Others shave and get haircuts until Rosh Chodesh, but stop after that point.

However, other Sefardic communities follow the Ashkenazic practice not to shave or get haircuts the entire period of Bein Hametzarim (Ben Ish Chai, Parshas Devorim #12). (Incidentally, the Shulchan Aruch [Orach Chayim 551:4] permits having one’s hair cut immediately after Tisha B’Av is over even when Tisha B’Av does not fall on Sunday, and does not require waiting until the next day.)

SEFARDIM LIVING IN AN ASHKENAZI COMMUNITY

May a Sefardi living in an Ashkenazi community be lenient, despite the prevalent custom?

This issue is discussed by contemporary authorities, involving the general halachic rule that a community should follow one established practice. This principle is referred to by the Gemara as “lo sisgodedu,” do not give the appearance that different Torah communities received different versions of the Torah, G-d forbid (Yevamos 14a, as explained by Rashi). This law prohibits a Jewish community from following two conflicting customs. Thus, it would seem that an Ashkenazi living in a Sefardic community or vice versa must observe the prevailing custom.

However, contemporary poskim rule that Ashkenazim living in Sefardic communities may observe Ashkenazic custom, and Sefardim living in Ashenazic communities may continue to follow Sefardic practice. Therefore, Sefardic bochurim studying in an Ashkenazic yeshiva are permitted to shave until Rosh Chodesh or during the entire Three Weeks, depending on their minhag. Even though most of the students in the yeshiva follow the Ashkenazic practice of not shaving during the entire Three Weeks, it does not violate minhag hamakom for the Sefardic bochurim to shave (Shu’t Yechaveh Daas 4:36).

WHY DOES THIS NOT VIOLATE LO SISGODEDU?

Even though there is a general rule that a community should follow one halachic practice, this is true when the community has one rav or follows the guidance of one beis din. However, when there are two different batei din in a community, each beis din is free to rule as it sees fit and does not need to change its decision to avoid lo sisgodedu. Thus, the prohibition of lo sisgodedu applies only when there are two different practices in one beis din.

Similarly, when it is well-known that there are different communities, each may observe its own well-established practice, even if they are in the same location. Therefore, Ashkenazim and Sefardim following different minhagim is not a violation of lo sisgodedu. As a result, Sefardic bachurim may shave during the Three Weeks, even if they study in an Ashkenazic yeshiva, since it is understood that they are following a different psak.

EXTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCES

There are several situations in which Ashkenazim are permitted to shave or take a haircut during the Three Weeks. For example, it is permitted to trim one’s mustache, if it interferes with eating (Ran; Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 551:13). Some poskim rule that a person who usually shaves every day is permitted to shave during the Three Weeks in honor of Shabbos (Shu’t Chasam Sofer, Yoreh Deah #348 s.v. Ve’i golach). Others permit a person to shave if his beard stubble makes him very uncomfortable (see Shearim Ha’metzuyanim Behalachah 122:5). However, since these last two psakim are not usually accepted, one should not rely on them without receiving a psak from a rav.

Someone who is in aveilos is not permitted to shave or have his hair cut until the end of the Sheloshim (30 days), and someone in aveilos for a parent, for several months. If the aveilos ended during the Three Weeks, he is permitted to have his hair cut, since he could not cut it before Shiva Asar BeTamuz (Be’er Heiteiv 551:18). Most poskim permit this even during the Nine Days, assuming his aveilos ended then (Bach; Taz; Mishnah Berurah 551:87; cf. however, Elyah Rabbah).

SHAVING BECAUSE OF FINANCIAL LOSS

Rav Moshe Feinstein rules that one may shave during the Three Weeks if he may lose his job or customers because he does not shave. However, if the only concern is that people will make fun of him, he is not permitted to shave. Rav Moshe Feinstein contends that since the prohibition not to shave the entire Three Weeks began as a minhag, the custom was originally established only when one would not suffer financially as a result. However, if he would suffer only embarrassment or harassment, but no loss of income, he is required to remain unshaven (Shu’t Igros Moshe, Choshen Mishpat 1:93; Orach Chayim 4:102). Thus, someone who makes a business trip may shave, since making a bad impression on the potential customer could cost him business. Certainly, one is not required to jeopardize his employment by avoiding shaving during the Three Weeks.

SHAVING FOR A SIMCHA

If a bris occurs during the Three Weeks, the father of the baby, the mohel, and the sandek who holds the baby during the bris are permitted to shave or take a haircut in honor of the festive occasion (Shu’t Chasam Sofer, Orach Chayim #158). According to some poskim, the kvatter, who brings the baby to the bris, and the sandek meumad (also called amida lebrochos), who holds the baby while he is being named, are also permitted to shave or take a haircut (Shearim Ha’metzuyanim Behalachah, Kuntrus Acharon 120:8, based on Elyah Rabbah 551:27 and Beis Meir, Orach Chayim 551). Thus, the grandfather who asked whether he may shave or cut his hair in honor of his grandson’s bris during the Three Weeks may do so, if he receives the honor of being sandek. If he receives a different honor, he should ask a shaylah as to whether he may shave in honor of the occasion.

The poskim dispute whether the baalei simcha are permitted to shave even if the bris occurs during the Nine Days or only if it occurs before Rosh Chodesh. (The Chasam Sofer, Shu’t Noda Biyehudah 1:28, Shaarei Teshuvah, and Sdei Chemed 5:278:3 permit, whereas the Be’er Heiteiv 551:3 prohibits.)

CHOSON

Question: May someone who got married before the 17th of Tamuz shave during his Sheva Brachos week? May someone attending a Sheva Brachos shave in honor of the occasion?

The week after a couple gets married is considered a Yom Tov for them, and they should wear Yom Tov clothing and eat festivemeals. Similarly, they are not permitted to go to work. Part of the celebration is that they should look like two celebrants. Thus, it would seem that the choson may shave during his Sheva Brachos week.

However, for the participant in the Sheva Brachos it is not a Yom Tov, so he would not be permitted to shave for the occasion.

Some poskim hold that a bar mitzvah bochur who needs a haircut may get one during the Three Weeks, as long as it is not during the week of Tisha B’Av. Others contend that it is better if he gets the haircut the day before he turns bar mitzvah and rely on the opinion that a minor may get a haircut during the Three Weeks, as I will discuss shortly (Shearim Ha’metzuyanim Behalachah, Kuntrus Acharon 120:8).

UPSHEREN

Although some poskim permit scheduling an upsheren (chalakah) during the Three Weeks if the child was born during the Three Weeks, the prevalent practice is to postpone the upsheren until after Tisha B’Av (Piskei Teshuvos 551:44; Chanoch Lana’ar, Chapter 21, ftn. 1).

Adults may not give children haircuts during the week of Tisha B’Av (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 551:14). There is a dispute whether a minor may get a haircut during the Three Weeks, some poskim contending that children were not included in the custom not to cut hair (Mishnah Berurah 551:82, quoting Chayei Odom), whereas others rule that one may not cut a child’s hair, just as one may not cut an adult’s (Elyah Rabbah 551:28).

There are different opinions among the poskim whether a woman may have her hair cut during the Three Weeks. The Mishnah Berurah rules that a woman may not have her hair cut during the week of Tisha B’Av, but he suggests that she may be permitted to trim the hair on her temples that sticks out from the tichel (Mishnah Berurah 551:79). Many poskim rule that a woman may tweeze her eyebrows and perform similar cosmetic activities, even during the week of Tisha B’Av (Halichos Beisah, Chapter 25, footnote 70; Piskei Teshuvos 551:43; however, see Shu’t Igros Moshe, Yoreh Deah 2:137, who appears to be more stringent).

MAY I CLIP MY FINGERNAILS DURING THE THREE WEEKS?

It is permitted to clip one’s fingernails during the Three Weeks and the Nine Days according to all opinions. There is a dispute whether one may clip one’s nails during the week of Tisha B’Av (Magen Avraham, 551:11 permits, whereas Taz 551:13 and Elyah Rabbah 551:7 prohibit).

CONCLUSION

The prophet Yeshaya declared: “Exult with Yerushalayim and rejoice over her, all those who love her. Rejoice with her rejoicing all those who mourned over her,” (Yeshaya 66:10). “From here we see,” says the Gemara, “that whoever mourns over Yerushalayim will merit to see her happiness, and whoever does not mourn over Yerushalayim will not merit to see her happiness” (Taanis 30b).

May we all merit to experience the happiness of Yerushalayim very soon!

May I Attend a Wedding During the Three Weeks?

Question:

I live in a predominantly Ashkenazic community where the “Three Weeks” are observed with no music, and certainly no celebrations or weddings. A Sefardic family in the neighborhood has scheduled a wedding during the Three Weeks.

(A) May they do so? Should we stop them from breaking the community’s custom?

(B) May an Ashkenazi attend the wedding? May he/sheremain while music is playing orjoin the dancing?

Answer:

Before answering these questions, we must first understand the halachic and historical background to the observances of the period between the Seventeenth of Tamuz and Tisha B’Av, whichthe Midrash refers to as the period of Bein HaMetzarim, between the troubles (Midrash Rabbah, Eicha 1:3).

WHAT DID THE MISHNAH FORBID?

It is noteworthy that neither the Mishnah nor the Gemara requires any commemoration of mourning during the month of Tamuz. The earliest source to mention a mourning period, the Mishnah, requires mourning only from the beginning of the month of Av since “Mishenichnas Av mema’atim b’simcha,” “Once Av enters, we decrease our happiness” (Taanis 26b). This includes the Nine Days that begin on Rosh Chodesh Av and continuethrough Tisha B’Av. The Mishnah makesno mention of any observances before Rosh Chodesh.

Although the Mishnah does not clarify what practices are forbidden during the Nine Days, simply stating that “we decrease our happiness,”the Gemara (Yevamos 43a)lists several activities that are consequently forbidden, including refraining from conducting weddings (see the Ramban in Toras HaAdam, page 244 of the Mosad Rav Kook edition). However, this proscription against weddings during the time leading up to Tisha B’Av prohibits them only during the Nine Days.

WHO FORBADE MARRYING DURING THE THREE WEEKS?

If neither the Mishnah nor the Gemara prohibited marrying before Rosh Chodesh Av, why do we observe mourning from the Seventeenth of Av?

The Rama (Darchei Moshe 551:5 and Hagahos 551:2) notes that accepted Ashkenazic practice forbids marriage from the Seventeenth of Tamuz onwards. Since the Tur (Fourteenth Century) mentions no such custom, it seems that Ashkenazim adopted the custom some time after the Tur’s era, extending the proscription against weddings for the entire three weeks. Thus, whereas mourning during the “The Nine Days” is already mentioned by the Mishnah and has the status of a rabbinic injunction (takanas chachamim), the Three Weeks developed only about 1300 years later and is therefore categorized as minhag, custom. (Of course, we must observe minhagim of this nature; but we often find that they do not apply under extenuating circumstances.)

Why did custom extend the takanas chachamim and prohibit these activities on these additional days? After all, if our Sages felt that nine days of commemoration of the Churban is sufficient, why should minhag extend it to an entire three weeks?

I once heard an explanation that since earlier generations were much more cognizant of the loss of the Churban, a few days were a sufficient memorial for them. Today, however, we require a greater reminder to reinforce our consciousness of the Churban.

SEFARDIC PRACTICE

Although the Rama, a primary Ashkenazic source, mentions the three-week mourning period, the Shulchan Aruch, the main Sefardic source, makes no mention of extending mourning before Rosh Chodesh. It appears that in his day and place there was still no observance of “Three Weeks”but only of “Nine Days.” However, other Sefardic authorities mention that this practice spread to their communities (Keneses HaGedolah, Hagahos Tur end of 551; Ben Ish Chai, Parshas Devarim #4; Kaf HaChayim 551:33, 101), and by the Nineteenth Century, it appears that most Sefardic communities observed the entire Three Weeks period, certainly to the extent of prohibiting weddings. For example, the Ben Ish Chai assumed that weddings are not performed the entire Three Weeks, as did the Sedei Chemed.

CRIMEAN CUSTOM

Although most of us associate Crimea with the war by that name, one of the many waged between the Moslem Ottoman Turks and Orthodox Christian Czarist Russia, there was actually a thriving Jewish community there for hundreds of years. The Sedei Chemed records that when he became Rav of the Crimea (then a Sefardic community) he was requested to perform a wedding at the end of Tamuz. At first, he refusedto do so, stating that this violates accepted custom. He then researched the community records and discovered several instances when weddings were conducted at the end of Tamuz. Concluding that the custom not to marry before Rosh Chodesh had never reached the Crimea, he permitted the wedding and performed the ceremony himself (Vol. 5, pg. 279 #14).

THE CUSTOMS OF BAGHDAD

Apparently, some of these practices varied within the very same community. For example, the Ben Ish Chai, who was the Rav of Baghdad in the nineteenth century, records that Sefardim do not marry during the entire three-week period, although Rav Ovadyah Yosef quotes from Rav Solomon Chugi Avodi, the Chief Rabbi of Baghdad in the 1940’s, that in his day they conducted weddings there until Rosh Chodesh. Of course, this is strange: once it became Baghdadi custom to ban weddings for the entire Three Weeks, how could one subsequently permit them? Rav Ovadyah suggests that indeed the Ben Ish Chai, a very holy person, was more involved with his halachic and kabbalistic studies than in noting the community practices.

Rav Ovadyah contends that many Sefardic communities permit weddings until Rosh Chodesh Av, and that this was the accepted practice among Sefardim in Eretz Yisrael. Furthermore, he maintains that Sefardim from communities in the exile that prohibited weddings during the entire Three Weeks may follow the more lenient practice upon moving to Eretz Yisrael. This follows the general approach that upon relocating permanently one follows the accepted practices, including even the leniencies, of one’s new domicile (Shu”t Yabia Omer 6: Orach Chayim #43). He further notes that upon becoming the Chief Rabbi of Tel Aviv in 5729 (1969), he discovered that the Chief Rabbinate there had banned weddings for the entire Three Weeks period. He instructed the administrators that they could henceforth schedule weddings for members of the Sefardic community from the Seventeenth of Tamuz until the end of the month, in accordance with the accepted practice among Sefardic communities in Israel. Of course, Ashkenazic practice, both in Tel Aviv and everywhere else, remained to prohibit marriages during the entire three-week period.

SOMEONE NEVER MARRIED BEFORE

Although the Gemara prohibits marrying during the first nine days of Av, there is halachic discussion whether this injunction applies even to someone who does not yet have a son and a daughter, and has therefore not yet fulfilled the mitzvah of peru urvu, be fruitful and multiply. Indeed, many prominent authorities permit such a man to marry during this period.

WHERE DO WE SEE SUCH A DISTINCTION?

When drought strikes a community, its leadership should declare a series of fasts and other mourning customs as a spur to teshuvah (Taanis 10a-12b). Included in these enactments is to not perform weddings during this period. However, this rule does not extend to those who have not yet fulfilled the mitzvah of peru urvu. The regulations do not apply, if as a result, people will not perform a mitzvah.

The Beis Yosef (Orach Chayim 551) asks why this exception is mentioned only regarding marrying during a drought, but not in the context of marrying during the Nine Days. He suggests three possible explanations why even someone who has not yet fulfilled peru urvu should not marry during the Nine Days:

1. There are two reasons why people do not marry during the Nine Days:

(A) It is a mourning period.

(B) It is not a good omen to marry during the season that tragic events befell the Jewish people.

Because people want to marry during a time of good omen, they refrain from marrying during the Nine Days even where it is halachically permitted, such as when one has not yet fulfilled peru urvu.

2. The Nine Days, as a period of public bereavement, are more stringent than a period of drought, which is a period of teshuvah rather than mourning. Therefore, weddings are not conducted during the Nine Days, even if this results in people postponing the mitzvah of peru urvu.

3. Since the prohibition against marriage caused by a drought may extend for a long time, we do not want people to postpone their weddings that long. But it is not unreasonable to postponeweddings for nine days, the limit enacted by Chazal.

There is a halachic difference among these reasons. If the basis is only that it is not a good omen, then someone who is not concerned may schedule a wedding during these days.

The Shevus Yaakov (2:35) discusses whether someone who has not yet fulfilled peru urvu may marry during the Three Weeks, even according to Ashkenazic custom. He conjectures that this wedding be permitted based on the fact that a mourner who has not yet fulfilled mitzvas peru urvu may marry even during his thirty days of sheloshim. However, he concludes that the wedding must be postponed until after Tisha B’Av, ruling that a public mourning season is stricter than an individual’s private mourning.

One can rally sources from earlier authorities both in favor of and in opposition to the Shevus Yaakov’s conclusion. The Shulchan Aruch does not mention whether someone who has not yet fulfilled peru urvu may marry during the Nine Days, implying that such a person may not. On the other hand, the Rama (551:2) rules that, in general, the prohibitions of the Three Weeks and the Nine Days do not apply to someone who is fulfilling a mitzvah. Upon the basis of this Rama, the Chayei Adam (133:11) rules that someone who has not fulfilled peru urvu may indeed marry even during the Nine Days, although he notes that the custom is not to. The Kaf HaChayim (551:33, 101) cites this Chayei Adam, but disagrees with him, quoting other authorities who conclude that even someone who has not yet fulfilled peru urvu should not marry during the Nine Days. It is interesting that the Kaf HaChayim concludes that a childless Ashkenazi has more basis to be lenient and marry than a childless Sefardi, since the Rama permits one to override restrictions of the Bein HaMetzarim period in order to fulfill a mitzvah, whereas the Beis Yosef concludes otherwise!

Other Sefardic authorities rule that someone who has not yet fulfilled peru urvu may marry even during the Nine Days and certainly during the Three Weeks (Shu”t Yabia Omer). (It is noteworthy that some authorities permit music and dancing at a sheva berachos celebrated during the Three Weeks because of the same rationale: that performing a mitzvah supersedes the mourning of the season [see Kaf HaChayim 551:40].)

Nevertheless, established practice in our locales is not to marry during the entire Three Weeks period, even for someone who has not yet fulfilled the mitzvah of peru urvu. Does this mean that a Sefardi who follows the practice of marrying before Rosh Chodesh (or those who permit marriage for someone who has not fulfilled peru urvu) may not marry if he lives in a predominantly Ashkenazi community?

We can now refer back to our original question:

I live in a predominantly Ashkenazic community wherethe “Three Weeks” are observed with no music, and certainly no celebrations or weddings. A Sefardic family in the neighborhood has scheduled a wedding during the Three Weeks. May they do so? Should we stop them from breaking the community’s custom?

This takes us into a different area of halacha – must the entire community observe the same practice?

LO SISGODADU – DO NOT FORM DISPARATE GROUPS

Generally, a community is required to observe one practice so that it does not appear that Hashem’s chosen people are following two different versions of the Torah, G-d forbid (Yevamos 13b). Because of this law, the Rama requires that an entire community observes the mourning of the sefirah period during the same dates (Darchei Moshe 493:3). It would appear that this same prohibition applies during the Three Weeks. This would result in prohibiting someone who has a different halachic custom from marrying during the Three Weeks, even if he has not yet fulfilled peru urvu, if this practice conflicts with the prevailing custom.

However, several prominent authorities note that a community that has only one beis din or one rav must universally follow the same interpretation of halacha. Where there are many kehillos in a city, each with its own custom or halachic authority, each community may follow its own accepted practice or authority (Yevamos 14a). For this reason, there is no requirement that everyone in a large city follow the same custom for sefirah, unless it has been accepted that the community has one standard practice (Shu”t Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 1:159).

Based on the same logic, it is usually accepted that Ashkenazim and Sefardim following different approaches is not a violation of lo sisgodadu. As a result, Rav Ovadyah Yosef permits Sefardic bachurim studying in an Ashkenazi Yeshiva to shave during the Three Weeks, since it is understood that they are following a different custom (Shu”t Yechaveh Daas 4:36). For the final ruling in your community, I defer to your local rav.

ATTENDING THE WEDDING

We may now address Question (B) that I asked at the beginning of this article: May an Ashkenazi attend the wedding of someone whose halachic authority permitted it? Assuming that one may attend, may one listen to music or dance at such a wedding, since music and dancing are generally prohibited during the Three Weeks (Magen Avraham 551:10; Elyah Rabbah 551:6)?

Authorities discuss whether one may attend and dance at a wedding during the period that one observes sefirah. Rav Moshe Feinstein and others permit attending such a wedding, including listening to music and dancing (Shu”t Igros Moshe 1:159). However, Rav Moshe rules that, when going to a wedding on a day that one keeps sefirah, he should not shave unless his unkempt appearance will disturb the simcha (Shu”t Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 2:95). So perhaps we can compare his ruling to a similar situation during the Three Weeks. On the other hand, since there is a distinction between the intensity of the mourning of the Three Weeks and that of sefirah, I suggest that anyone faced with this question ask his own shaylah.

FOCUS OF THE THREE WEEKS

The most important aspect of the Three Weeks is to focus on the tremendous loss we suffer because of the destruction of the Beis Hamikdash. In many kehillos, there is a minhag to sit on the floor each day of the Three Weeks just after midday and to recite part of Tikkun Chatzos that mourns the loss of the Beis Hamikdash. The Yesod VeShoresh HaAvodah even prohibits any laughing and small talk during these weeks, just as a mourner does not engage in laughter or small talk (Shaar 9, Ch. 11-12).

Although we may not be holding on such a madreigah, we should certainly contemplate the tremendous loss in our spiritual lives because we live without the Beis Hamikdash. Let us pray intensely for the restoration of the Beis Hamikdash and the return of the Divine Presence to Yerushalayim, speedily in our days!

What May I Not Write?

Question #1: Invitations

“I was told that I should not include quotations from pesukim on my daughter’s wedding invitation. Yet I see that ‘everyone’ does! Could you please explain the halacha?”

Question #2: Sukkah Decorations

“Someone told me that sukkah decorations should not include any pesukim. Is this true? My children bring home decorations like this from school.”

To answer these questions, we need to explain several halachic issues, including:

1. The original prohibition against writing Torah she’be’al peh, and the later “heter” to write and publish it.

2. The concern about producing divrei Torah that will not be treated appropriately.

The original prohibition against writing Torah she’be’al peh

Originally, it was prohibited to write down any Torah she’be’al peh (Gittin 60b), except for an individual’s personal notes recorded for one’s own review (Rambam, Introduction to Mishneh Torah; see also Rashi, Shabbos 6b s.v. Megilas). The Oral Torah was not permitted to be taught from a written format. Torah she’be’al peh was meant to be just that — Torah taught completely without any written text. Thus, Moshe Rabbeinu taught us the halachos of the Torah orally, and Klal Yisrael memorized them. Although each student wrote private notes for the sake of review, the Oral Torah was never taught from these notes.

The prohibition against writing Torah she’be’al peh included writing midrashim, prayers and the texts of berachos, as well as translations and commentaries of the Written Torah, since all these are considered Torah she’be’al peh. In those times, all these devarim she’be’kedusha were memorized, and the only parts of the Torah that were written were the pesukim themselves.

The Gemara (Gittin 60b) records this halacha as follows: Devarim she’be’al peh, iy atah resha’ie le’omram bichsav, “You are not permitted to transmit the Oral Torah in writing.” The Ritva (ad loc.) explains that this is because divrei Torah taught verbally are understood more precisely, whereas text learning is often misunderstood.

Another prohibition forbade writing the books of Tanach except when writing a complete sefer (Gittin 60a). Thus, one could not write out a parsha or a few pesukim for learning, although it was permitted to write an entire Chumash, such as Sefer Shemos. Similarly, one could not write out part of a sefer of Navi to study or to read the haftarah. In order to recite the haftarahs regularly, every shul needed to own a scroll of each of the eight Nevi’im (Yehoshua, Shoftim, Shemuel, Melachim, Yeshayahu, Yirmiyahu, Yechezkel, and Terei Asar) in order to read the haftarah from the appropriate sefer. Similarly, a person who wished to study Shiras Devorah or the prayer of Channah had to write the entire Sefer Shoftim or Sefer Shemuel.

Why do we no longer abide by this prohibition?

Chazal realized that it was becoming increasingly difficult for people to learn Torah and to observe certain other mitzvos, such as reading the haftarah. Therefore, they ruled that the prohibition against writing Torah must be superseded by the more vital need of keeping Torah alive in klal Yisrael. This takanah was based on the pasuk, Eis la’asos laShem heifeiru torasecha, which is understood to mean “It is the time to act for Hashem, since Your Torah is being uprooted” (Tehillim 119:126). In order to facilitate Torah study, they permitted writing individual verses and teaching Oral Torah from written texts. We will refer to this takanah, or heter, as “eis la’asos.”

The first part of the Oral Torah to be formally written for structured teaching was the Mishnah, edited by Rebbe (Rabbi Yehudah Hanasi) at the end of the period of the tanna’im (circa 3960/200 c.e.). To quote the Rambam, “Rebbe gathered all the laws and explanations that had been studied and interpreted by every beis din since the days of Moshe Rabbeinu and organized the Mishnah from them. He (Rebbe) proceeded to teach publicly the scholars of his generation from this text, so that the Oral Torah would not be forgotten from the Jewish people. Why did Rebbe change the method that had been used previously? Because he saw that the numbers of Torah students were decreasing, the difficulties facing the Jewish people were on the rise, the Roman Empire was becoming stronger, and the Jews were becoming increasingly scattered. He therefore authored one work that would be in the hands of all the students, to make it easier to study and remember the Oral Torah” (Introduction to Mishneh Torah).

We see that Rebbe instituted the first formalized use of a text to teach the Oral Torah, because of the new circumstances confronting klal Yisrael. After Rebbe’s days, Chazal gradually permitted writing down other texts, first Aggadah (ethical teachings of the Gemara), later the entire Gemara, and still later, the explanations and commentaries on the Gemara.

As a very important aside, we see from the end of the quoted Rambam, “to make it easier to study and remember the Oral Torah,” that even though it is now permitted to write down the Mishnah and Gemara, it is still important to know the entire Oral Torah by heart. The Rambam seems to explain that the Oral Torah that each individual is required to know includes all the accepted conclusions of the Torah she’be’al peh.

In the context of the rule of eis la’asos, the Gemara tells us the following story:

Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakeish (amora’im in Eretz Yisrael shortly after the time of Rebbe) were studying from a Talmudic anthology of ethical teachings, a “sefer Aggadah.”

The Gemara asks, “How could they study from such a book, since it is prohibited to learn Torah from a written text?” The Gemara replies, “Since it is now impossible (to retain all the knowledge of the Torah without a written text), ‘it is the time to act for Hashem, since Your Torah is being uprooted’” (Gittin 60a). We see that the Gemara initially assumed that it was still prohibited to study Torah from a written text, except for the study of Mishnah. The Gemara responded that the prohibition had been further relaxed because it had become even more difficult to learn Torah than it had been in the days of Rebbe.

The Gemara relates a similar episode concerning the recital of the haftarah. As mentioned above, it was originally forbidden to write part of a book of Tanach, and, therefore, every shul needed to own scrolls of all the Nevi’im in order to read the haftarahs. However, as communities became more scattered, making this increasingly difficult, the Gemara permitted the writing of special haftarah books that contained only the haftarah texts, but not the text of the entire Nevi’im. This, too, was permitted because of eis la’asos (Gittin 60a).

What else is permitted because of eis la’asos?

We see that in order to facilitate Torah learning, Chazal permitted the writing of the Oral Torah and parts of the books of the Written Torah. To what extent did they override the original prohibition?

This is a dispute among early poskim, some contending that it is permitted to write only as much as is necessary to prevent Torah from being forgotten. According to this opinion, it is prohibited to write or print even tefillos that include pesukim, when they are not intended for learning Torah (Rif and Milchemes Hashem, Shabbos Chapter 16). This opinion also prohibits writing or printing a translation of Tanach into any language other than the original Aramaic Targum, because a proper translation constitutes Torah she’be’al peh. In addition, this opinion prohibits the printing of a parsha of Chumash in order to teach Torah, since one could write or print the entire sefer (Rambam, Hilchos Sefer Torah 7:14; Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 283:2).

Other poskim permit the writing of any Torah that one uses to learn. Thus, they permit writing a single parsha in order to teach Torah (Taz, Yoreh Deah 283:1; Shach, Yoreh Deah 283:3) and the translating of Tanach into any language. These poskim rally support to their opinion from the fact that Rav Saadya Gaon wrote sefarim in Arabic, including commentaries on Tanach (Ran, Shabbos,Chapter 16).

Both opinions agree that it is prohibited to publish translations of Tanach that will not be used to spread Torah knowledge (Ran, Shabbos, Chapter 16).

How does this prohibition affect us?

All of the opinions quoted above prohibit writing disparate parts of the Written Torah and any of the Oral Torah in situations where there is no Torah benefit. For this reason, early poskim note that one may not embroider a pasuk or a beracha on a talis, since writing thisdoes not serve to teach Torah (Rabbeinu Yerucham, quoted by Beis Yosef, and Taz, Yoreh Deah 283:3. It should be noted that the Levush is more lenient, see Shach, Yoreh Deah 283:6.).

Another concern

There is an additional reason why one should not embroider pesukim on a talis. Since the talis could be brought into an unclean place, it is not proper to have a pasuk written on it.

A third concern – causing the words of Torah to be destroyed

To explain this concept, we must first introduce a surprising statement of the Gemara: Ko’sevei berachos kesorfei Torah, “Those who write berachos (to enable people to recite them) are considered as if they burnt the Torah” (Shabbos 115b). What does this Gemara mean? We would think that these individuals have performed a tremendous mitzvah, since they have enabled people to recite berachos correctly!

This statement was authored at the time when it was still prohibited to write down the Oral Torah. At that time, it was forbidden to teach any halachos in written form, even the correct text of a beracha. Everything had to be taught orally. Therefore, the Gemara states that by writing a beracha, even without the name of Hashem (Shu’t Tashbeitz #2), one is violating the halacha by teaching Torah she’be’al peh in writing.

But why is it considered like “burning the Torah”?

This Gemara introduces a new prohibition. Someone who writes prohibited Torah works is considered culpable afterwards, if those divrei Torah become consumed by a fire! Writing unnecessarily, which results in subsequent destruction, is akin to burning Torah.

We know that it is prohibited to erase or destroy the Name of Hashem (Shabbos 120b), and that this prohibition includes erasing or destroying words of Torah and all other holy writings, including notes of Torah classes, stories of Chazal, sefarim for learning, “benschers,” etc., even if they do not include Hashem’s Name (Shu’t Tashbeitz #2). Therefore, even small benschers, tefillos haderech and similar items published with abbreviated names of Hashem are still considered divrei Torah imbued with kedusha. For the above reason, one must treat these items with proper care and dignity and place them in sheimos when they become unusable.

It is also prohibited to cause destruction of words of the Torah indirectly by writing or publishing divrei Torah that might subsequently be destroyed. This prohibition exists whenever there is insufficient reason to write or publish the divrei Torah.This explains the Gemara’s statement, quoted above, that someone who wrote berachos when it was prohibited to do so is held responsible, if the words of Torah are subsequently destroyed.

Although, nowadays, we are permitted to write and print berachos and siddurim to enable people to recite them properly, it is forbidden to produce these items unnecessarily. It is certainly prohibited to put pesukim, parts of pesukim, or divrei Torah in places where it is likely that they will be treated improperly. Both of these reasons preclude writing pesukim on Sukkah decorations, unless one can assume that they will be properly cared for.

How much of a pasuk is considered to be divrei Torah?

Even three words in a row are considered a pasuk that may not be written without sufficient reason (see Gittin 6b). However, if the letters are improperly or incompletely formed or spelled, it is permitted (Shu’t Tashbeitz #2).

For this reason, some people print on invitations the following, Naaleh es Yerushalayim al rosh simchaseinu, “We will place our memories of Yerushalayim above our celebrations.” This is permitted, because it is not a quotation of a pasuk, although it is similar to the posuk in Tehillim 137:6.

There is another solution that may be used: rearranging the words of the pasuk so that they are not in the correct order. When doing this, one must be certain that one does not have three words in the proper order.

I once received an invitation which stated on the cover, Yom zeh asah Hashem nismecha venagila bo, “This day was made by Hashem. We shall rejoice and celebrate on it.” The person who prepared this quotation had done his halachic research. Although very similar to the pasuk, “Zeh hayom asah Hashem nagilah v’nismecha bo” (Tehillim 118:24), the words of the original pasuk were transposed in such a way that there were no longer three consecutive words together!

Some authorities permit printing pesukim if marks are placed between the words, or if the words are not in a straight line. They feel that these arrangements of words do not constitute pesukim (cf. Shu’t Tashbeitz #2 who disagrees).

Some producers of “lulav bags” are meticulous not to quote three words of the pasuk in order. Thus, they write, “Ul’kachtem lachem… kapos temarim…us’machtem” avoiding writing three consecutive words of a pasuk (Vayikra 23:40). This is permitted.

Invitations

Perhaps people who print pesukim on invitations rely on the fact that this is considered mere poetic writing style, or that the printer has no intent to produce divrei kedusha. However, recent authorities prohibit this practice. In Sivan 5750/June ’90, an open letter signed by the poskei hador warned that advertisements, invitations, receipts, signs, and raffle tickets should not include pesukim or parts of pesukim, except when the pasuk is written as part of literary style, with no connection to its context.

We live in an age of proliferation of written material. Many pamphlets have the positive value of spreading Torah. We must be careful to show our honor to Hashem by treating pesukim and divrei Torah with proper respect. May we always merit to demonstrate Hashem’s honor in the appropriate way!

Eating before Kiddush

Question #1: Reuven calls me: I have not been well, and I need to eat something shortly after awaking. On weekdays, I go to shul to daven when I wake up and can wait until after davening to eat, but I do not have this option on Shabbos. What should I do?

Question #2: Ahuva asks: It is difficult for me to wait for Kiddush until my husband returns from shul. May I eat something before he arrives home?

Question #3: Someone told me that a woman may not eat in the morning before she davens, but I remember being taught in Beis Yaakov that we may eat once we say the morning berachos. Is my memory faulty?

Answer:

This week’s parsha mentions the korban musaf of Shabbos. Observing Shabbos includes the mitzvah of reciting Kiddush Friday evening: borei peri hagafen and the special beracha of Kiddush, preceded by the passage of the Torah beginning with the word Vayechulu (Rambam, Hilchos Shabbos 29:7). This Kiddush fulfills the Torah’s mitzvah of Zachor es yom haShabbos lekadsho, Remember the day of Shabbos to sanctify it.

There is another Kiddush, introduced by our Sages, which is simply reciting borei peri hagafen and drinking wine prior to the Shabbos day meal. This article will discuss under what circumstances one may eat before reciting the daytime Kiddush.

First, we need to clarify that there are two related subjects here:

May one eat before reciting Kiddush?

May one eat before davening in the morning?

May one eat before reciting Kiddush, either at night or day?

May one eat or drink prior to reciting the Torah-required evening Kiddush? Although the Tanna, Rabbi Yosi, holds that someone eating a meal when Shabbos begins is not required to interrupt, but may complete his meal and then recite Kiddush afterwards, the Gemara concludes that we do not follow this approach. Once Shabbos arrives, it is forbidden to eat or drink anything until one recites or hears Kiddush (Pesachim 100a). The poskim conclude that one may not even drink water before Kiddush (Shulchan Aruch Orach Chayim 271:4).

What is the halacha regarding eating or drinking before daytime Kiddush? This matter is disputed by the two great pillars of halacha, the Rambam and the Raavad. The Rambam  (Hilchos Shabbos, 29:10) declares that one may not taste anything before reciting the daytime Kiddush, whereas the Raavad contends that this prohibition applies only to the evening Kiddush, but not to the morning Kiddush.

What is the underlying issue of this difference of opinion? At first glance, it would seem that the Rambam and the Raavad are disputing the following question: When our Sages required Kiddush in the daytime, did they provide it with all the rules of evening Kiddush? After all, there is a general halachic principle Kol detikun rabbanan ke’ein de’oraysa tikun, whatever the Sages instituted they followed the pattern of the Torah’s mitzvos. (For brevity’s sake, I will henceforth refer to this concept simply as Kol detikun rabbanan.) Kol detikun rabbanan would indicate that just as one may not eat or drink before evening Kiddush, similarly one may not eat or drink anything before morning Kiddush. It would seem that the Rambam is contending that Kol detikun rabbanan applies to daytime Kiddush, whereas the Raavad disputes this for some reason that we will soon explain.

However, a careful reading of the Rambam demonstrates that this analysis is somewhat oversimplified, since the Rambam himself does not fully apply the concept Kol detikun rabbanan to daytime Kiddush. Whereas he introduces Chapter 29 of Hilchos Shabbos by stating: It is a positive mitzvah of the Torah to sanctify Shabbos with words, when he begins discussing the daytime Kiddush, he says: It is a mitzvah to recite a beracha over wine on Shabbos morning before one eats the second meal of Shabbos, and this is called Kiddusha Rabbah. Evidently, the daytime Kiddush is not a second mitzvah of Kiddush, but simply introduces that the daytime meal is in honor of Shabbos. (The early commentaries note that the term Kiddusha Rabbah [literally, the great Kiddush] for the daytime Kiddush, whose origin is in the Gemara itself [Pesachim 106a], is intentionally overstated.) We could say that the evening Kiddush is a sanctification of Shabbos, whereas the daytime Kiddush is a proclamation about the coming meal.

Reciting Kiddush over Bread

Now that we understand that evening Kiddush and daytime Kiddush serve different functions, we can explain why there are other halachic differences between them. For example, one may recite evening Kiddush over the challah-bread that one is using for the meal, but one may not use the bread of the day meal as a substitute for the daytime Kiddush. After all, if daytime Kiddush is to proclaim that the coming meal is in Shabbos’s honor, this proclamation must precede the meal and be somewhatdifferent from the meal itself.

So now we need to ask: If daytime Kiddush serves a different function than does evening Kiddush, why does the Rambam prohibit eating before daytime Kiddush? The answer is that he understands that some laws of Kiddush still apply in the daytime. The dispute between the Rambam and the Raavad is the degree to which daytime Kiddush is compared to evening Kiddush.

The Halacha

The accepted halacha follows the Rambam that one may not eat before daytime Kiddush (Shulchan Aruch Orach Chayim 289:1), although, as we will soon see, the Raavad’s opinion is not completely ignored by later authorities. They often factor the Raavad’s opinion when other mitigating circumstances exist, a halachic concept called tziruf. For example, the Elyah Rabbah (286:9) rules that a weak person who has no beverage available on which to recite Kiddush may rely on the Raavad together with another opinion who contends that there is no obligation to make Kiddush until one has completed davening Musaf. According to this opinion, someone who eats or drinks after completing Shacharis has no requirement to recite Kiddush before eating.

May one drink water before Kiddush?

In regard to the evening Kiddush, the halacha is that one may not drink anything, even water, once Shabbos begins before reciting Kiddush. Does the same law apply to morning Kiddush? The Tur cites a dispute whether one may drink water before davening on Shabbos morning, since one has as yet not recited or heard Kiddush. He quotes the Avi HaEzri as prohibiting this, whereas the Tur’s own father, the Rosh, permitted drinking water before Kiddush, and he himself drank before Shabbos morning davening. The Rosh reasoned that drinking before Kiddush is prohibited only once the time for reciting Kiddush has arrived, which is not until one has davened. Prior to davening, one is prohibited from eating and it is therefore too early for the Shabbos meal and too early for Kiddush. As we will soon see, one may drink even tea or coffee before davening on weekdays, and the Rosh permits this also on Shabbos morning.

May one eat before morning davening?

At this point, we can discuss the first question raised above: I have not been feeling well lately, and find that I need to eat something shortly after awaking. On weekdays, I go to shul to daven shortly after I wake up and can wait to eat until after davening, but there is no available minyan for me to attend early Shabbos morning. What should I do?

Reuven’s question involves an issue that we have as yet not discussed: May one eat before davening in the morning?

The Gemara (Berachos 10b) states: “What do we derive from the verse, You may not eat over blood? That you may not eat (in the morning) before you have prayed for your ‘blood’… The verse states, in reference to someone who eats and drinks prior to praying: You have thrown me behind your body (Melachim 1 14:9). Do not read your body (in Hebrew gavecha), but your arrogance (gai’echa). The Holy One said: After this person has indulged in his own pride (by eating or drinking), only then does he accept upon himself the dominion of heaven!?”

The halacha that results from this Gemara is codified by all authorities. To quote the Rambam: “It is prohibited to taste anything or to perform work from halachic daybreak until one has prayed shacharis” (Hilchos Tefillah 6:4).

Would you like tea or coffee?

Although all poskim prohibit eating and drinking before morning davening, we find early authorities who permit drinking water before davening since this is not considered an act of conceit (Rosh quoting the Avi HaEzri; the Beis Yosef cites authorities who disagree, but rules like the Avi HaEzri). Most later authorities permit drinking tea or coffee, contending that this is also considered like drinking water, but the poskim dispute whether one may add sugar to the beverage. The Mishnah Berurah and others prohibit this, whereas the Aruch Hashulchan and other later authorities permit it. They are disputing whether adding sugar to the beverage promotes it to a forbidden beverage or whether it is still considered water that one may imbibe before davening.

Hunger

The Rambam rules that someone who is hungry or thirsty should eat or drink before he davens so that he can daven properly (Hilchos Tefillah 5:2).

Similarly, some authorities contend that anything eaten or drunk for medical reasons may be done before davening. They explain that the Gemara prohibited only eating or drinking that demonstrate arrogance, whereas that done for medical reasons is, by definition, not done for arrogance (Beis Yosef, quoting Mahari Abohav). This approach is accepted as normative halacha by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 89:3).

I will be hungry!

What is the halacha if someone is as yet not hungry, but he knows that he will be so hungry by the end of davening that it will distract him from davening properly. Is he permitted to eat before davening so that the hunger does not distract him? This question impacts directly on Reuven’s question.

The answer to this question appears to lie in the following Talmudic discussion (Berachos 28b):

“Rav Avya was weak and, as a result, did not attend Rav Yosef’s lecture that took place before Musaf. The next day, when Rav Avya arrived in the Yeshiva, Abayei saw Rav Avya and was concerned that Rav Yosef may have taken offense at Rav Avya’s absence. Therefore, Abayei asked Rav Avya why he had failed to attend the previous day’s lecture. After which the following conversation transpired:

Abayei: Why did the master (addressing Rav Avya) not attend the lecture?

Rav Avya: I was not feeling well and was unable to attend.

Abayei: Why did you not eat something first and then come?

Rav Avya: Does the master (now referring to Abayei) not hold like Rav Huna who prohibits eating before davening Musaf?

Abayei: You should have davened Musaf privately, eaten something and then come to shul (Berachos 28b).

We see from Abayei’s response that someone who is weak should daven first and then eat, even if this means that he davens without a minyan. Based on this passage, several noted authorities rule that someone who will not be able to wait until after davening, and cannot find an early minyan with which to daven, should daven privately (beyechidus), eat and then attend shul in order to hear the Torah and fulfill the mitzvos of answering Kaddish and Kedusha (Be’er Heiteiv 89:11; Biur Halacha 289; Da’as Torah 289 quoting Zechor Le’Avraham; Shu”t Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 2:28 at end of teshuvah). Thus, it seems that we can positively answer Reuven’s question: If he cannot wait to eat until davening is over, he should daven Shacharis be’yechidus, make Kiddush and eat something, and then come to shul to answer Borchu, Kedusha, Kaddish and hear keri’as haTorah.

May a woman eat before Kiddush?

At this point, we have enough information to discuss Ahuva’s question: It is difficult for me to wait for Kiddush until my husband returns from shul. May I eat before he arrives home?

Of course, Ahuva may recite Kiddush herself and eat something before her husband returns home. To fulfill the mitzvah, she needs to eat something that satisfies the halacha of Kiddush bimkom seudah¸ a topic we will have to leave for a different time. However, Ahuva either does not want to recite Kiddush, or does not want to eat something to accompany the Kiddush. Is there a halachic solution to permit her to eat or drink before Kiddush?

Some authorities suggest approaches to permit Ahuva to eat or drink before Kiddush. Here is one approach:

Although most authorities obligate a woman to recite the daytime Kiddush and prohibit her from eating before she recites Kiddush (Tosafos Shabbos 286:4, 289:3; Pri Megadim, Mishbetzos Zahav 289:1; Mishnah Berurah 289:6), this is not a universally held position. One early authority (Maharam Halavah, Pesachim 106, quoting Rashba) contends that women are absolved of the requirement to recite daytime Kiddush, for the following reason:

Since the daytime Kiddush is not an extension of the mitzvah of evening Kiddush but is to demonstrate that the meal is in honor of Shabbos, this requirement does not devolve upon women. Although this approach is not halachically accepted, some authorities allow a woman to rely on this opinion, under extenuating circumstances, to eat before reciting morning Kiddush (Shu”t Minchas Yitzchak 4:28:3).

When does a married woman become obligated to make Kiddush?

Rav Moshe Feinstein presents a different reason to permit a married woman to eat before Kiddush. He reasons that since a married woman is required to eat the Shabbos meal with her husband, she does not become responsible to make Kiddush until it is time for the two of them to eat the Shabbos meal together, meaning after davening (Shu”t Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 4:101\2). However, the Shemiras Shabbos Kehilchasah (Chapter 52, note 46) quotes Rav Shelomoh Zalman Auerbach as disputing Rav Moshe’s conclusion that a married woman has no obligation yet to make Kiddush. Firstly, he is unconvinced that she is halachically required to eat her meal with her husband. Furthermore, even if she is, this duty may not permit her to eat before Kiddush.

If we do not follow the lenient approaches mentioned, when does a woman become obligated to recite Kiddush and, therefore, at what point may she no longer drink tea, coffee, and water? The Acharonim debate this issue, but understanding their positions requires an understanding of a different topic:

What must a woman pray?

All authorities require a woman to daven daily, but there is a dispute whether she is required to recite the full shemoneh esrei (I will call this the “Ramban’s opinion”), or whether she fulfills her requirement by reciting a simple prayer, such as the morning beracha that closes with the words Gomel chasadim tovim le’amo Yisrael. (I will refer to this as the “Magen Avraham’s opinion.”) Allow me to explain.

When may she eat?

According to the Ramban’s opinion that a woman is required to recite the full shemoneh esrei, she may not eat in the morning without first davening (see the previous discussion), whereas according to the Magen Avraham’s opinion that she fulfills her requirement once she has recited a simple prayer or morning berachos, she may eat once she recited these tefilos.

Some authorities rule that a woman becomes obligated to hear Kiddush as soon as she recites berachos, since she has now fulfilled her requirement to daven and she may therefore begin eating her meals. According to this opinion, once she has recited morning berachos she may not eat or drink without first making Kiddush (Tosafos Shabbos 286:4, 289:3). This approach contends that before she recites morning berachos, she may drink water, tea or coffee, but after she recites morning berachos she may not even drink these items without first reciting Kiddush.

There is another view that contends that a woman can follow the same approach that men follow, and may drink water, tea or coffee even after she recited berachos before she has davened (Pri Megadim, Eishel Avraham 289:4 as understood by Halichos Beisah page 204).

At this point we can address the third question I raised above:

“Someone told me that a woman may not eat in the morning before she davens, but I remember being taught in Beis Yaakov that we may eat once we say the morning berachos. Is my memory faulty?”

Many authorities contend that although a woman should daven shemoneh esrei every morning, she may rely on the opinion of the Magen Avraham in regard to eating, and may eat after reciting morning berachos. In many institutions, this approach was preferred, since it accomplishes that the tefillah that the girls recite is a much better prayer and they learn how to daven properly.

Conclusion

According to Rav Hirsch, observing Shabbos, and declaring its holiness, means recognizing that the arrival of Shabbos signifies that man’s activity has attained its goal. Now it is time to recognize Hashem’s creation and devote ourselves to developing our spirituality. When we recite Kiddush, we should internalize this message.

Seudah Shelishis on Erev Pesach

Question #1: When?

When should I eat my morning meal on Shabbos Erev Pesach?

Question #2: How?

How do I fulfill the mitzvah of eating three meals on this Shabbos?

Question #3: Who?

May someone who has a family minhag not to eat matzoh after Purim or after Rosh Chodesh Nissan eat egg matzoh, kneidelach, cheremzelach (fried matzoh meal latkas) or boiled matzoh on this Shabbos?

Answer

This year, the first day of Pesach falls on Sunday, which means that Erev Pesach falls on Shabbos. When Erev Pesach falls on Shabbos, there are numerous changes from what we do other years, such as:

(1) The traditional Shabbos Hagadol drosha is delivered a week early, on the 7th of Nissan, although technically Shabbos Hagadol is the following Shabbos, Erev Pesach.

(2) We perform our search for chometz on Thursday night, the eve of the 13th of Nissan, with a bracha, notwithstanding that, in other years, someone who performs bedikas chometz on the eve of the 13th does so without a bracha. The first bitul chometz is recited after the bedikah is completed, as it is done in a typical year.

(3) The chometz is burnt on Friday morning, the 13th of Nissan, not the 14th. The bitul chometz that is usually performed after the chometz is burned is postponed to actual Erev Pesach, which is on Shabbos.

(4) The fast and siyum of the firstborn is observed two days early, on Thursday, the 12th of Nissan, the morning before bedikas chometz, not the 14th.

(5) Haircuts and shaving, activities that are prohibited on Erev Pesach in the afternoon, are permitted on the afternoon of Friday the 13th, the day before Erev Pesach.

In addition to these changes in our usual practice, there are many shaylos that occur on Erev Pesach when it falls on Shabbos. For example, an entire literature is devoted to questions such as:

May you eat on your chometz–dik dishes on Erev Pesach, and what you should do with them after you finish eating?

Is it permitted to have hamotzi in one part of the house and then eat a meal that is Pesach-dik in a different part of the house?

Is it permitted to cook kitniyos on your Pesach-dik dishes, and then serve them on Erev Pesach?

Three meals

Perhaps the most unusual changes occur relative to eating the Shabbos meals on Erev Pesach, when our houses are all ready for Pesach. In most households, all food prepared for Shabbos will be Pesach-dik and served on disposable or Pesach-dik utensils. But how are we going to have three Shabbos meals, particularly since the majority opinion requires hamotzi for all three meals?

In a different article, I discussed the mitzvah, which may be min haTorah, of eating three meals on Shabbos as a fulfillment of the mitzvah called oneg Shabbos, treating Shabbos as a delightful experience, which is first recorded in the Book of Yeshayahu. Several interesting aspects of fulfilling this mitzvah come into play when Erev Pesach falls on Shabbos. The two major issues are:

(1) When to eat the Shabbos morning meal?

(2) How should we fulfill the mitzvah of eating the third Shabbos meal?

The majority of rishonim require eating the first of the three meals on Friday evening, the second in the morning, and the third in the afternoon. Many poskim contend that there should be bread at each of the three meals; the Shulchan Aruch and most later authorities rule this way.

Putting aside the logistical difficulties of having bread in your house on Erev Pesach, we need to contend with the Torah prohibition against eating chometz on Erev Pesach, which begins min haTorah at halachic midday (chatzos), but miderabbanan begins hours earlier. Eating matzoh for the three meals is impossible, because of a takanas Chazal prohibiting eating matzoh on Erev Pesach. (Some authorities contend that the prohibition of eating matzoh on Erev Pesach is only in the daytime, and not at night. According to this opinion, you could eat matzoh for the Friday night meal.) Another consideration is that Chazal prohibited eating a large meal three hours before Pesach (Pesachim 99b). This last takkanah was instituted so that a person eats the matzoh on seder night with a good appetite.

Latest time to eat chometz

Let us begin by defining the latest time to eat chometz on Erev Pesach. According to the Gemara, Targum Onkelos, Rashi and many others, the verse in Parshas Bo (Shemos 12:15) should be translated as saying, “Seven days you are to eat matzoh, but (ach) on the day before you shall cease having sourdough (a form of chometz) in your houses, for whoever eats chometz from the first day until the seventh day (of Pesach), that person will be cut off from Yisrael.” Chazal explain that the prohibition of the “day before,” that is, Erev Pesach, is min haTorah only from midday (Pesachim 4b-5a).

Two hours

Chazal prohibited eating chometz from two hours before midday. This gezeirah was instituted so that people not miss the deadline and mistakenly eat chometz after midday, when it is prohibited to do so min haTorah (Pesachim 11b). There are many opinions how to calculate the latest time to eat chometz on Erev Pesach.

In an ordinary year, avoiding this issue is relatively easy. If you really want to eat chometz on Erev Pesach, get up early, daven, make or attend a siyum if you are firstborn, and eat breakfast. If you want to sleep in, don’t plan on eating chometz for breakfast. However, when Erev Pesach falls on Shabbos, the logistics are more complex; since we want to eat a nice Shabbos morning meal, we cannot eat it with matzoh, and we need to finish eating chometz by approximately a third of the day.

Many people divide the morning meal, when we are still able to eat bread, into two meals, and complete the chometz part of the later meal when it is still permitted. Although most authorities rule that seudah shelishis must be eaten in the afternoon, some opinions contend that one can fulfill eating three meals on Shabbos with a bread meal at night and two bread meals in the morning. Although the later authorities rule that, in general, seudah shelishis must be eaten in the afternoon, when Erev Pesach falls on Shabbos, some recommend dividing the morning meal into two halves (Magen Avraham 444:1). Since there are many opinions how to do this, someone following this approach should ask his rav or posek what to do.

Bear in mind that, assuming you will be eating chometz at the Friday night and/or the Shabbos morning meal, you should have a system planned for disposing of the leftover chometz. I suggest purchasing pitas, bagels or a similar bread product that does not produce many crumbs, calculate carefully how many you need, and then carefully brush off the crumbs in an open area or flush them down the toilet. If your rav or posek advises differently, please follow his instructions.

After eating the last of the chometz, it is very important to remember to recite the second bitul chometz, which, in an ordinary year, is recited after the chometz is burnt.

Third meal on Erev Pesach

Hundreds of years ago, a vast literature developed concerning how one fulfills eating the third meal on the Shabbos that coincides with Erev Pesach. Simply put, how can the third meal of Shabbos be eaten in the afternoon and consist of bread, if one may not then eat either chometz or matzoh?

Several options present themselves.

Tosafos (Pesachim 99b s.v. Lo) suggests eating matzoh ashirah, which is a matzoh produced using juice as its liquid, rather than water. According to the Gemara (Pesachim 36a), matzoh ashirah cannot be used to fulfill the mitzvah of eating matzoh at the seder. Therefore, it might not be included in the prohibition against eating matzoh on Erev Pesach, since this prohibition should be limited to matzoh that can be used to fulfill the mitzvah seder night.

In practical terms, the most common variety of matzoh ashirah available in North America is a product called “egg matzoh.” This is really a misnomer, because the two main ingredients in egg matzoh are flour and 100% pure apple juice (not made from concentrate). In Israel, there are other varieties of matzoh ashirah available, including matzoh baked with grape juice (instead of water or apple juice), and matzoh ashirah cookies, baked with juice and chocolate (instead of water). The last of these products has a decided taste advantage over the other matzoh ashirah products, in my opinion as an avid consumer.

Although a Sefardi can fulfill the mitzvah of seudah shelishis by eating matzoh ashirah in the afternoon of Erev Pesach, Ashkenazic custom, going back to the times of the late rishonim (but not as far back as the time of Tosafos), is to refrain from eating matzoh ashirah on all of Pesach, except for the elderly, the ill and children. The main reason for this prohibition is because even a small amount of water mixing into a dough made with juice might make this dough into chometz.

Although some authorities permit Ashkenazim to eat matzoh ashirah on the afternoon of Erev Pesach (Shu’t Noda BiYehudah, Orach Chayim #21), conventional practice is not to.

By the way, those who use matzoh ashirah for Erev Pesach meals should be aware that most authorities rule that matzoh ashirah has the status of pas haba’ah bekisnin. While this is a topic beyond the scope of this article, those who decide to use matzoh ashirah should get direction from their rav or posek how much matzoh ashirah they need to eat in order to recite hamotzi, bensch, and fulfill the mitzvos of eating seudos Shabbos.

Seudah shelishis on Erev Pesach

So, if chometz is out, matzoh is out, and matzoh ashirah is out, does that eliminate all options of fulfilling the mitzvah of seudah shelishis in the afternoon of Shabbos that is Erev Pesach?

Actually, there are still several possibities.

The first one, which most people find surprising, is to eat cooked matzoh. No, I do not mean keneidlach, nor do I mean what some people know as cheremzelach. Let me explain the practical difference and the halachic ramifications:

Kneidelach, in English, matzoh balls, are made from matzoh meal, usually mixed with eggs and cooked in a soup. According to most authorities, kneidelach may be eaten on Erev Pesach, even in the afternoon, and even by those who have the custom not to eat matzoh from Purim or from Rosh Chodesh.

There are several halachic considerations regarding eating kneidelach for seudah shelishis in the afternoon of Erev Pesach.

1. According to those who rule that all three meals on Shabbos must be hamotzi, kneidelach do not qualify, since they are not hamotzi. They are also not pas haba’ah bekisnin, and remain mezonos regardless of how many of them you eat.

2. According to some authorities (see Gra, Orach Chayim, 444:1), they may not be eaten on Erev Pesach because of the prohibition against eating matzoh on Erev Pesach. As I noted before, most authorities do not rule this way, including the Mishnah Berurah, who recommends eating kneidelach as part of your seudah shelishis on Erev Pesach.

3. Remember that Chazal prohibited eating a meal in the afternoon of Erev Pesach after three quarters of the day to make sure that people eat matzoh on seder night with an appetite (Pesachim 99b). The Mishnah Berurah rules that kneidelach are included in this prohibition.

4. Those who do not eat gebroktz, should check with their rav or posek whether they are permitted to eat kneidelach on Erev Pesach afternoon and how to prepare and serve them.

Cheremzelach

Cheremzelach are a type of latka made of fried matzoh meal. May these be eaten on Erev Pesach, or are they included in the prohibition against eating matzoh on Erev Pesach? Some poskim consider them to have the same halachic status as kneidelach and permit eating them in the afternoon of Erev Pesach for seudah shelishis (Chayei Adam).

However, the Mishnah Berurah paskens that they may not be eaten on Erev Pesach. In his opinion, although cheremzelach are not matzoh and we could not fulfill the mitzvah of eating matzoh on the seder night by eating them, they are close enough to matzoh to be included in the prohibition of eating matzoh on Erev Pesach.

Cooked matzoh

Kneidelach are made of cooked matzoh meal. Cheremzelach are fried latkas made from matzoh meal. So, what is cooked matzoh? It is a large piece of matzoh that is placed in a pot or pan on top of the stove, covered with water and then cooked gently, making sure that it does not disintegrate. (Obviously, this entire procedure needs to be performed before Shabbos.) As long as the matzoh does not disintegrate, the bracha recited on a large piece of cooked matzoh is hamotzi. According to most authorities, it is permitted to eat cooked matzoh on Erev Pesach, since you cannot fulfill the mitzvah of eating matzoh on seder night with cooked matzoh. Thus, it should be permitted to eat cooked matzoh on Erev Pesach, even if you have the custom not to eat matzoh from Purim or from Rosh Chodesh.

Although there are Sefardim who have an old mesorah to prepare their matzohs this way for seudah shelishis on Erev Pesach, this method of fulfilling seudah shelishis is unheard of among Ashkenazim. The question is why?

To the best of my knowledge, the earliest authority who mentions the possibility of using cooked matzoh for seudah shelishis on Erev Pesach is the Maharil, often considered one of the primary sources for recording minhagei Ashkenaz. He simply notes that he does not know why there is no custom to use cooked matzoh.

I know of several approaches to answer his question. One approach is that the mitzvah of eating three meals on Shabbos does not require that you prepare a product that you have no interest in eating.

Another approach is that eating three meals on Shabbos is a fulfillment of oneg Shabbos, making Shabbos a delight, and eating a product that most people do not enjoy does not fulfill the mitzvah, or is certainly not required. Unless you know of a really great recipe for cooked matzoh, most people would not consider this an appetizing solution.

A third approach is that it may, indeed, be prohibited to eat cooked matzoh on Erev Pesach. The Gra implies that, notwithstanding the opinion of Tosafos quoted above, eating matzoh ashirah or cooked matzoh on Erev Pesach violates Chazal’s prohibition to eat matzoh on Erev Pesach.

If you intend to eat this cooked matzoh in the afternoon of Erev Pesach, you should use Pesach-dik matzohs. Those who do not eat gebroktz and are careful not to cook matzoh in their Pesach pots, yet want to eat cooked matzoh for seudah shelishis on Erev Pesach, should discuss with their rav or posek how to prepare and serve it.

How do we pasken?

The primary authority for Ashkenazic practice is the Rema, who usually follows the decisions of the Maharil. Here, in two different places, the Rema reports that the accepted practice is to fulfill the mitzvah of eating seudah shelishis on Erev Pesach that falls on Shabbos by eating in the afternoon meat or other filling foods (Orach Chayim 291:5; 444:1).

It is interesting to note that the Mishnah Berurah advocates eating kneidelach for seudah shelishis on Erev Pesach. This is curious, because of the following: As opposed to cooked matzoh, whose bracha is hamotzi, the bracha on kneidelach is mezonos. I noted that the Shulchan Aruch and the Mishnah Berurah ruled that, in general, we should eat hamotzi for seudah shelishis. Yet the Mishnah Berurah advocates fulfilling seudah shelishis on Erev Pesach by eating kneidelach as the best of our options.

Review

Although the Shulchan Aruch himself rules that, in general, one should eat bread to fulfill the mitzvah of eating seudah shelishis, the Rema rules that when Erev Pesach falls on Shabbos, we may rely on the opinions that permit fulfilling the mitzvah by eating other foods. Therefore, the following options exist regarding eating seudah shelishis on Erev Pesach:

Most Ashkenazim follow the opinion that you eat a Shabbos meal that includes everything but the hamotzi. Eating kneidelach as part of this meal is preferable, at least according to the Mishneh Berurah.

Sefardim fulfill this meal by eating either cooked matzoh or matzoh ashirah. If the decision is to fulfill seudah shelishis by eating matzoh ashirah, consult a posek how much matzoh ashirah must be eaten to recite hamotzi.

For those eating cooked matzoh, matzoh ashirah or kneidelach, it is required to eat this meal before three quarters of the day has passed, measuring the day from sunrise to sunset.

Conclusion

According to Kabbalah, searching for chometz is symbolic of searching within ourselves to locate and remove our own arrogant selves. As we go through the mitzvos of cleaning the house, searching and destroying the chometz, we should also focus on the spiritual side of this “search-and-destroy” mission.

Contemporary Pesach

Many years ago, there existed a land in which man worked to dominate both nature and other men. His labor met with a great degree of success. To this day, certain achievements of this nation have baffled modern scientists. The sages of this nation could explain the phenomena of the cosmos and understood, in a most comprehensive way, extremely sophisticated concepts of construction, irrigation and marketing. Modern science looks with amazement at their undertakings, and to this day does not understand how this supposedly “primitive” nation accomplished much of their technology.

This nation allowed all decisions relative to the agricultural wellbeing of its inhabitants to be made by professionals. These professionals were not dependent on the wind or the clouds, on weather factors that, to this day, evade accurate forecasting. These professionals figured out how to fertilize and water their land despite the vagaries of unpredictable weather. When their river rose, they harnessed its resources and watered and fertilized their fields. The river provided fresh, nourishing soil that guaranteed that their own soil produced when there was no rain and did not deplete its own nutrients. The government authorities controlled the river’s blessings as they wished, using reservoirs and ditches built in an exceptional manner.

However, “order” in this country was not only the first duty of a citizen: it was his only duty. The citizens of the state were organized according to a very specific plan. The resulting system completely destroyed the individual’s right to self-development, self-reliance, and self-determination. “Normal” humans were no longer born. Everyone was assigned a role from birth, and they were to become “farmers,” “soldiers,” “priests,” or “laborers,” dependent not on their own inclinations but upon “society’s needs” as perceived by the “experts.”

This society was dependent on an agricultural system that required its members to remain on their lands. Therefore, they despised shepherds, who represent a profession independent of any specific land, as they wander nomadically from one pastureland to the next. Not only did the leaders of this people despise shepherds, they exercised mind control, training their society so that everyone despised shepherds. This they did because they could not control the actions or the minds of the shepherds. Free thought, different from what the intellectuals believed, was anathema to this society.

By now I presume that you have figured out that this ancient land was Egypt — perhaps the oldest culture known to history. Science and the knowledge of heaven and earth was the wisdom of the sages of Egypt. They were able to build pyramids, embalm mummies, and had many other skills that have baffled modern science!

At the same time, and perhaps this was the source of their “success,” Egyptian society utilized highly subtle and highly effective means of mind control. No one interested in their own professional success could consider thinking independently of what was accepted. That would lead to professional ostracism, and, after all, everyone’s goal is professional and financial success.

A friend of mine decided against pursuing a doctorate in an academic area in which he is highly qualified, because of the realization that his independent (and Torah-dik) ideas would probably result in him being unable to ever land a paying academic position. He can easily refute what is accepted in his area of academia as being scientifically inaccurate. He has written a book on the subject, but he cannot find a publisher because his approach is not accepted by those who rule the academic world.

Note that this control of ideas runs completely against the “bible” we were all taught regarding the objectivity and importance of applying the “scientific method” in an impartial manner. This problem exists in a wide range of academic disciplines.

If we apply our minds to learn and use Torah as our means of growth, we will indeed be able to grow as human beings, as Torah Jews, and also as honest scientists.

Let us use the pedagogy of Pesach to grow and to influence others to grow in Torah!

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