Category: Editor’s Pick

Four of Rabbi Yishmael’s Principles

Davar shehayah bichlal veyatza

Question #1: Lelameid al haklal kulo yatza — to teach about the entire category

Aside from being a major mouthful, what does the following statement mean? Davar shehayah bichlal veyatza min haklal lelameid, lo lelameid al atzmo yatza ela lelameid al haklal kulo yatza, “That which was part of a category and was specified to teach, not to teach for itself was it specified but to teach about the entire category.”

Question #2: Melachos of Shabbos

Are the 39 melachos treated like 39 different mitzvos?

Question #3: Davar shehayah bichlal veyatza

In Rabbi Yishmael’s passage, he mentions four middos (numbers 8-11) that begin with: Davar shehaya bichlal veyatza, followed by distinctions that are difficult to understand for most readers. What do these middos mean?

Introduction

Prior to the kaddish derabbanan closing the korbanos section, we enumerate the thirteen middos of Rabbi Yishmael, a listing of methods whereby the laws of the Torah shebe’al peh are derived from the Written Torah (see also Sanhedrin 86a). Without these rules of interpretation, there would be a greater chance that the laws of the Torah shebe’al peh might be forgotten, and it would also be more difficult to apply halacha to new situations and questions that develop. These are some of the advantages of the system of these thirteen rules that we were taught via mesorah from Moshe Rabbeinu at Har Sinai.

Davar shehayah bichlal veyatza

At this point, I will address my opening question: “What does the following statement mean? Davar shehayah bichlal veyatza min haklal lelameid, lo lelameid al atzmo yatza ela lelameid al haklal kulo yatza, ‘That which was part of a category and was specified to teach, not to teach for itself was it specified but to teach about the entire category?’” In other words, a case that was included in a category and is then singled out for a new teaching, it is not singled out to teach the new law only regarding itself. Rather, the new law applies to everything in its original category.

Notwithstanding the rather cumbersome title, this eighth rule of Rabbi Yishmael is actually fairly straightforward. In one place in the Torah, a group of similar mitzvos or items used for a mitzvah are listed. In a different place in the Torah, a new law is taught and only one example from the first list is mentioned. The rule teaches that the halacha applies to all cases in the first list.

The Toras Kohanim itself provides the following example to explain this rule. After teaching us concerning the various offerings brought in the Beis Hamikdash, the Torah concludes by saying: “This is the law for olah (offerings burnt on the altar in their entirety except for the hide), for mincha (grain offerings), for chatas and asham (both offerings brought as atonement for different types of sins), for miluim (offered when the Mishkan was dedicated) and for shelamim offerings (offerings from which the owner and the kohanim eat most of the meat) [Vayikra 7:37].” In a different place (Vayikra 7:20), the Torah teaches that someone who is tamei when he eats meat from the korban shelamim will receive the punishment of kareis. Thus, the Torah mentions only shelamim when it introduces this new law. Because of rule #8, we understand that the punishment of kareis applies to a person who is tamei and eats from any of the other korbanos included in the listing of Vayikra 7:37, but not if he eats something else (see also Yevamos 7a; Kerisus 2b). An example of something excluded from the new law is kodashei bedek habayis, something declared to be property of the Beis Hamikdash, which is sold and its received value is used to pay for repairs and upkeep of the Beis Hamikdash grounds. Although it is prohibited min haTorah to eat from an item that was declared property of the Beis Hamikdash, someone who eats it when he is tamei is not culpable of kareis.

There are numerous applications of this rule in all sorts of types of laws. For example, the halacha that we are not required to eat matzah after the first night of Pesach is derived via this rule (Pesachim 120a). Also, the requirement to bring nesachim (wine offerings) alongside korbanos olah and shelamim, but not alongside asham and chatas, is derived by an application of this rule (Sifrei, Bamidbar 15:3). The fact that the lo saaseh prohibiting making parts of grain korbanos into chometz applies to all stages of the korban’s production is similarly derived from an application of this rule (Menachos 55b).

Here is another example: The Torah states in several places that we are not to perform any melacha on Shabbos. As we derive from several sources, the definition of a melacha is one of the 39 categories of work that were performed in the construction of the Mishkan. Yet, the Torah specifically states independently, lo seva’aru eish bechol moshevoseichem beyom haShabbos, “Do not kindle fire anywhere that you reside on the Shabbos day” (Shemos 35:3). Kindling fire is one of the 39 melachos; therefore, it is included under the general prohibition not to do melacha on Shabbos. If so, why does the Torah need to mention it separately as its own prohibition? This is to teach us that this melacha, on its own, is treated with all the stringencies of melacha. But this answer only begs the question; what is being added to the prohibition of violating Shabbos by having hav’arah, kindling, mentioned specifically?

The halachic conclusion is that this pasuk teaches that hav’arah should be treated as if it was one of the 613 mitzvos and not simply as a category of melachos Shabbos. But since hav’arah is one of the many other melachos that are all included under the heading of melacha, applying rule #8 teaches that each of the 39 melachos is treated as if it is an independent mitzvah of the 613.

What difference does this make? A vast difference. Someone who performs melacha on Shabbos negligently is obligated to offer a korban chatas as atonement for his sin.

Unfortunately, we do not have a Beis Hamikdash today, but when the Beis Hamikdash is iy”H rebuilt, very soon, he will be required to bring a korban chatas. This law is true regarding negligent violation of almost any prohibition for which violating it intentionally brings the punishment of kareis. Whoever violates negligently a potential kareis prohibition must offer a korban chatas.

However, someone who violates the same prohibition many times because he was unaware that what he was doing was against the Torah does not require repeated korbanos chatas, but only one korban chatas.

Now, what is the law concerning someone who violated negligently several different melachos on Shabbos? Since the Torah states, lo seva’aru eish bechol moshevoseichem beyom haShabbos, we derive that all 39 melachos are treated as if they are separate Torah prohibitions. The ramification of this ruling is that someone who violated negligently several different melachos will be obligated to bring a korban chatas for each melacha that he has violated (Shabbos 70a)! We have now explained the second of our opening questions:Are the 39 melachos treated as 39 different mitzvos?

Principles 9-11

At this point, I will explain the next three principles together, since doing so will make it easier. In each of these cases, the interpretation of how the principle is applied depends on how the law that was part of a category and was specified outside that category is different from the laws with which we are already familiar from the category.

Principle #9: Davar shehaya bichlal veyatza lit’on to’an echad shehu che’inyano, yatza lehakeil velo lechachmir. The new case is not noticeably different from an already known case, yet rules that would make this case completely similar to the already known case are omitted.

When nothing new is mentioned, but some halachos are simply omitted, we derive only lenient rulings.

Principle #10: Davar shehaya bichlal veyatza lit’on to’an acheir shelo che’inyano, yatza lehakeil ulehachmir.

The halachic difference in the new case appears to be the opposite of what we would have expected based on the already known case. When the new case includes a ruling that contradicts what we knew previously, we derive both strict and lenient rulings.

Principle #11: Davar shehaya bichlal veyatza bedavar heh’chodosh, iy atah yochol lehachziro lichlalo ad she’yachazeerena hakosuv lichlalo befeirush.

The new case introduces a completely new innovation that was unheard of in any previous application. We do not apply rulings from the original category unless and until the Torah tells us that the new case is still part of that category.

I will now demonstrate applications of each of these three rules:

Principle #9 applied:

All types of tzara’as are divided into two general categories: musgar, a tumah that is temporary, and muchlat, a tumah that remains until the symptoms of tzara’as disappear or the tamei item is destroyed. Usually, musgar can be tamei for up to two weeks (actually thirteen days, because the seventh day of the first week is also the first day of the second week), after which, if no new symptoms develop, the person or garment undergoes immersion in a mikveh or spring and becomes completely tahor at the next nightfall. (In the case of a house, it undergoes a different procedure.) A muchlat could remain tamei forever, and the procedure for becoming tahor after being muchlat is far more expensive, more complicated and is considerably longer to perform than becoming tahor after being musgar. In the case of nega’im on clothing and houses, the status of muchlat will eventually require burning the clothing or razing the house.

For most types of nega’im on a person, there are three symptoms that can make a metzora muchlat:

(1) The tzara’as spreads.

(2) Two dark or other non-white hairs within the nega turn white.

(3) There is a healthy-looking area of skin with a certain minimal size inside of the white nega.

The Torah presents the case of nega’im on healthy skin and its rules and then teaches of nega’im on injured skin, which seem to be the same as the laws of regular nega’im, except:

(A) Whereas regarding other nega’im, the Torah refers to two consecutive weeks of when someone can potentially be a musgar, regarding a nega on injured skin it mentions only being musgar for one week.

(B) There is no mention of healthy skin inside the nega being a sign of muchlat.

Now we can understand how the 9th Principle applies: “Something that became an exception with a detail that fits its general topic teaches lenience but not strictness.” No striking new rules were taught regarding the nega’im on injured skin; simply some details that apply to other nega’im are missing. Therefore, no strict rules that apply to other nega’im apply here unless the Torah specifically mentions them, but lenient rules do apply. As a result of the 9th Principle, a nega on injured skin will never require a second week of musgar;if the signs of the nega are unchanged after seven days, the nega is ruled tahor and requires only immersion. Similarly, healthy-looking skin within a white nega on injured skin is not a sign that it is tamei.

Principle #10 applied:

This is where a case seems to be part of a general rule, but a halachic detail is dissimilar from the laws that apply to the cases of the general rule. In this situation, the new case may have some laws that are stricter and others that are more lenient than the previous known general rule.

As an example, the Toras Kohanim picks another case from the laws of tzara’as. A blond hair has no halachic significance to a regular nega or to any other rules of tzara’as on the body. Yet the Torah gave it much significance regarding a nega on the scalp or face. As mentioned above, a nega that develops two white hairs renders the afflicted person muchlat. Later, when discussing tzara’as found on the scalp or face, the Torah teaches that a blond hair is a sign of tumah (Vayikra 13:30). This example is virtually the opposite from the general rule of negaim on the body, in which white hair, not blond hair, renders it tamei. The Toras Kohanim explains that the 10th principle of Rabbi Yishmael teaches that this case has both lenient and stringent ramifications: a white hair on the scalp or face does not make him muchlat, but a blond hair does.

Principle #11 applied

Something that is part of a general rule but that has a novel detail is no longer considered part of the original category until the Torah explicitly returns it to that category. What does this mean and how is it different from the previous principle (Ra’avad; Halichos Olam; Shlah)? Principle #11 discusses a case which has laws completely dissimilar from the typical experience with these laws.

Here is an example: Every korban, including the asham, must have its blood received into a vessel. However, the law of the korban asham of a metzora includes a ruling that is very different from any other korban. Some of theblood of the korban asham of the metzora is caught by a kohein in his right hand! This striking difference implies that we should not derive any halachos concerning this asham from the laws of other korbanos asham unless the Torah teaches us to do so (see also Zevachim 49a; Sifrei, Bamidbar 6:20, end of piska 37; Malbim #134).

Another example: When teaching what parts of a korban shelamim sheep are burnt on the mizbei’ach, the Torah (Vayikra 3:9) adds the alyah, a fat tail unique to Mid-Eastern sheep. (You won’t find it on American sheep – they have scrawny tails.) Once this detail has been taught regarding this variety of korban shelamim, the Torah needs to teach that the other laws of shelamim are identical, whether it is a sheep, cattle or a goat.

A third example of this rule is that the shelamim offering of the nazir has a special law that its right forearm is cooked before the rest of the korban is offered (Bamidbar 6:19). Once this distinction has been made, we would not apply the other laws of shelamim to this korban until we have a halachic source to do so (Pesikta Zutrasa, Vayikra 3:10).

Conclusion

When the Gemara tells us that the teachings of the rabbonim are dearer to Hashem than the laws of the Torah, it certainly includes the vast halachic literature devoted to understanding the thirteen middos. The Gemara expresses this notion by saying that what is derived from a drasha is more cherished even than the Written Torah (Yevamos 2b; 3a; see also Ritva and Aruch Laneir, Makkos 13a; Maharam Lublin, Bava Kamma 17b). To quote Rav Chaggai in the name of Rav Shmuel bar Nachman: “Torah refers to that which is taught in the Oral Torah and that which is taught in the Written Torah, yet we do not know which is more cherished. When the pasuk states, ‘according to these words I sealed the treaty with you and with Yisrael’ (Yirmiyahu 33:25), this teaches us that the Oral Torah is more dear” (Yerushalmi, Peah 2:4).

International Dateline, Part II

Question #1: International

Does the International Dateline have any halachic ramifications?

Question #2: Date

Can you change your date?

Question #3: Line

Did the Torah create a line where, if you crossed it, you could mysteriously leave Shabbos and then cross it back and return to Shabbos?

The International Dateline follows a path near the 180° longitude but deviates to accommodate national borders.

In part 1 of this article, I presented the first half of this article on the concept of whether there is a halachic international dateline, and if there is, where is it located. As I explained, two people starting from the same point anywhere on earth, one traveling eastward and the other westward, wherever they meet again on the globe, they will be observing different days of the week. The reason is that one has been observing sunset later each day as he moves west, whereas the other has been observing it earlier each day as he moves east. Eventually, the combined differences of their travels add up to a full day.

In the nineteenth century, nations decided to establish an accepted demarcation line, east of which would be considered the day earlier, and west of which would be the day later. This line is the International Date Line (IDL) and it runs from the North Pole to the South Pole, approximately halfway around the world from the prime meridian (0°  longitude), which runs through Greenwich, UK. However, the IDL is not straight, but curves around landmasses and national borders.

Our question is whether and where is the halachic dateline? Although halachic authorities have wrestled with this question for almost a thousand years, its relevance to practical halacha began in the nineteenth century, when Jews began populating Alaska, Australia, China, Hawaii, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, the Philippines, Siberia and similar areas. Literally, dozens of books and essays have analyzed the topic, and many different conclusions have been reached.

By the 1870’s, so many articles had been written on the subject of the dateline that seforim were published to anthologize the opinions. At least a dozen different shitos were presented concerning the halachic dateline, but they can be grouped into six major approaches:

Ninety degrees east of Yerushalayim

1. For the purpose of the laws of Shabbos and Yomim Tovim, the dateline follows what is written in the Kuzari, discussed in last week’s article, and follows a north-south line 90 degrees east of Yerushalayim.

Ninety degrees, with a twist

2. The Chazon Ish (Orach Chayim, Chapter 64) interprets the halacha similar to this approach, although he adds a very original and individualistic twist. In his opinion, when the imaginery line 90 degrees east of Yerushalayim goes through a landmass, the section of the landmass east of the 90-degree marker is treated as if it is west of it. In other words, in Eurasia and Australia, where the 90-degree marker runs through northeastern China, the extreme eastern part of Siberia, and western Australia, the halachic dateline border is the point at which the eastern border of these landmasses (Eurasia and Australia) touch the sea. Islands in the seas and oceans east of these landmasses date themselves as if they are the western part of the Americas.

Thus, in the Chazon Ish’s opinion, Sydney and Melbourne follow Asia, although the islands near them, including much of Indonesia, New Guinea, New Zealand and Tasmania observe Shabbos on Sunday, not Saturday. Take a boatride off most of the Australian eastern coast on a Sunday and you may be traveling into Shabbos.

A bit more than ninety

3. Aside from the Yesod Olam, numerous other authorities place the halachic dateline at different points “slightly” farther east than did Rav A. M. Lapidus (mentioned in last week’s article). Among those who wrote their opinions in the twentieth century, we can include Shu’t Benei Tziyon by Rav Dovid Shapiro, and Rav Shelomoh Goren.

Bering Strait

4. Some authorities place the halachic dateline at the easternmost point on the Eurasian landmass, which is the Bering Strait (Rav Yonah Merzbach in Noam volume 14; Atzei Sadeh). One practical advantage of this opinion is that this halachic dateline does not cross any landmass in which there is any notable Jewish population. Another practical advantage is that it does not vary significantly from the international dateline.

One hundred and eighty degrees

5. Rav Yechiel Michal Tukachinsky (Hayomam Bekadur Ha’aretz) holds that the halachic dateline is 180 degrees east of Yerushalayim and travels in an unbroken imaginary line from north to south. A disadvantage of this approach is that Hawaii, most of the Aleutian Islands and probably most of Alaska must keep Shabbos on their Friday.

First come, first served

6. Although in practical halacha this opinion is not too dissimilar from opinion #4, conceptually, it disputes completely the idea that there is any halachic dateline. This approach, which probably has the most rabbinic scholars following it, contends that the Torah never established a line, but that each individual, when traveling, counts six days from his last Shabbos and observes Shabbos on the seventh day. In theory, two individuals who started at the same place and arrived at the same destination could observe Shabbos on two different days, because one traveled eastward and the other westward. When a community is established in any new place, Shabbos is determined by the community’s count of seven days. Once a community established its Shabbos, anyone visiting observes Shabbos on the day that the community does, regardless of his individual seven-day count. Among the many luminaries who followed this approach, we can count the Radbaz (Shu’t Haradbaz 1:76), Rav Yaakov Emden (Mor Uketziyah, 344), the Sefas Emes and his son the Imrei Emes (the second and third Gerer Rebbes), Rav Yosef Shaul Natanson (Shu’t Sho’eil Umeishiv, Volume IV, Mahdura IV #2:154), Rav Shmuel Mohliver and Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank (Shu’t Har Tzvi, Orach Chayim #138).

International

At this point, let us address our opening question: Does the International Dateline have any halachic ramifications?

As we just noted, this will depend on which opinion we follow. Let us assume, for a moment, that someone concludes that there isn’t any way he can decide among these great authorities – therefore, he will follow all of the opinions in their strictest conclusions. He would need to consider fully 25% of the earth’s surface to be a safek as to which day it is and would need to observe two consecutive days of Shabbos when in 25% of the world. Fortunately for him, there are Jewish communities in only a few cities that are in that 25% section, but he still would be forced to observe two days of Shabbos in Melbourne, Sydney and in all of Alaska, Hawaii, New Zealand and virtually anywhere else in the Pacific.

The shaylah becomes practical

By the beginning of the 20th century, there already were Jews and communities in the areas under question. Harbin, a city in China, had a frum community that grew until it numbered about 15,000 Jews and had a well-respected rav and posek, Rav Aharon Moshe Kisilav. He was also viewed as the posek for all the Jews who lived in the Far East, and, by this time, small Jewish communities were scattered throughout the area. The accepted ruling was to follow the local dating for Shabbos and Yomim Tovim. This situation continued with the increase of the Jewish community in Japan and China that developed during the First World War and then, in the 1930’s, as Jews fled Nazi Germany.

When the Mir Yeshiva escaped Europe during its miraculous flight from Poland through Lithuania, via the Trans-Siberian railroad to Vladivostok and then to Kobe, Japan, they were concerned when they should observe Yom Kippur. Among them were significant talmidei chachamim aware of the writings of the Kuzari and the Ba’al Hama’or that imply that they were now east of the halachic dateline. They were also presumably aware of the controversy among the more recent poskim whether one should observe Shabbos in Japan on the same day that was considered Friday night and Saturday on the local calendar (the opinion of the Radbaz, Rav Yaakov Emden [Mor Uketzi’ah, 344], Rav Shmuel Mohliver and many others) or a day later, which would follow the more obvious understanding of the Kuzari and the Ba’al Hama’or, and was the conclusion of Rav Alexander Moshe Lapidus. That year, Yom Kippur was on a Wednesday everywhere, and the question was whether they should observe Yom Kippur on the day that was considered Wednesday in Japan, or on the following day, which would synchronize the date with that observed in the United States. Among those in Kobe was Rav Dovid Kronglas, eventually to be the mashgiach and a reish mesivta in Yeshivas Ner Yisrael, who ruled that Jews in Japan should observe their date as if they were part of the United States, which was east of them, rather than according to mainland Asia, which was west of them. This position was different from that accepted by most authorities, but agreed with the psak of the Chazon Ish and the Brisker Rav, who contended that the halachic dateline is 90 degrees east of Yerushalayim.

Some of those in Japan sent a telegram to Eretz Yisrael asking what to do. Bear in mind that, by this time, the vast majority of halachic authorities had concluded that all parts of Asia and Oceania (Australia and other island nations of the western Pacific) should observe all dates as done in mainland Asia.

The Chazon Ish answered their telegram with his own, instructing them to eat on Wednesday – that it was Erev Yom Kippur, and that Wednesday night local time was when Yom Kippur commences. This was against the accepted psak halacha. Rav Herzog, then the Chief Rabbi of Eretz Yisrael, called a meeting to which he invited the Chazon Ish, all the major poskim and gedolim of Eretz Yisrael and those rabbanim who had published written opinions on the subject. The meeting was attended by over twenty rabbanim, including: Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank, the rav of Yerushalayim and the recognized posek hador; Rav Isser Zalman Meltzer, the recognizedgadol roshei yeshivos; Rav Yechiel Michel Tukachinsky, then considered the supreme authority on halachos involving calendars and astronomy; the Gerrer Rebbe, Rav Yonah Merzbach, Rav Menachem Kasher, Rav Dovid Shapiro, author of Benei Tziyon, and Rav Shelomoh Goren; the latter two had already published halachic articles on the topic. The Chazon Ish did not attend the meeting, but instead sent Rav Chayim Ze’ev Finkel, son of Rav Lazer Yudel Finkel, the rosh yeshiva of Mir in Yerushalayim, as his representative to present his position.

All the rabbonim at the meeting were intimately familiar with the entire halachic topic and all of them (I presume with the exception of Rav Finkel) agreed that Japan should observe Yom Kippur on Wednesday. Rav Herzog, who sent their collective response telegram to Japan, added, in a hint, that on Thursday they should eat less than the minimal shiur throughout the day. After all, this might be the opinion of the Kuzari, and one who is able should try to be machmir. Apparently, a total of over thirty rabbonim signed off on the psak that Japan should follow Asia.

Subsequent to this event, several of those who met at this conference wrote up the basis for their halachic conclusions.

A monumental work on the topic, entitled Agan Hasahar (the title is based on a pasuk in Shir Hashirim 7:3), was authored by Rav Chaim Zimmerman, at one point therosh yeshiva of Beis Medrash LaTorah in Skokie, Illinois. Rav Zimmerman noted a major discrepancy between the opinion of the Yesod Olam and how the Chazon Ish understood it. The Chazon Ish’s analysis is based on quotations of the Yesod Olam that he found in Hayomam Bekadur Ha’aretz (authored by Rav Yechiel Michal Tukachinsky), but he never saw the actual lengthy full text of the Yesod Olam. Rav Zimmerman himself, aside from acknowledging the approaches of the Kuzari and the Yesod Olam, suggests that the halachic dateline might be at the eastern edge of Siberia, where it touches the Bering Strait. Based on their understanding of the opinions of the Kuzari and the Yesod Olam, and in light of what we know today about the borders of the Eurasian landmass, others have also agreed with this border (Rav Yonah Mertzbach in Noam #14; Atzei Sadeh). Aside from the advantages that this approach has from a cohesive, logical approach to the sugya and the rishonim, it also is fairly close to the IDL, allowing that all major landmasses and virtually all islands observe Shabbos according to the accepted calendar days of Friday and Saturday.

A talmid chacham that I know well was offered to work for a few months in Japan doing kashrus work. He went to ask Rav Elyashiv, zt”l, whether he should take the job – is this an opportunity or a nisayon? – and if he did, what he should do for Shabbos. Rav Elyashiv told him that he could take the job. As far as Shabbos goes, Rav Elyashiv told him to keep Friday night and Saturday local time as Shabbos in regard to davening and seudos, and to be machmir not to perform melachos min haTorah on Saturday night and Sunday. This way, he would be stringent like the position of the Kuzari and those who follow his approach regarding Shabbos. When I showed this talmid chacham this article and asked him whether I had quoted Rav Elyashiv correctly, he responded, “Exactly.”

Halacha instructs us what to do when confronted by a situation in which there is no universally accepted ruling. Explaining the details that govern this arena is its own complicated topic that we will need to deal with at a different time.

Conclusion

The issue of the halachic dateline is perhaps the most original of any shaylos that have occurred in the modern era. According to most authorities, this is a question with no sources in Chazal. Therefore, we build our analysis on passages of Gemara based on people who became lost and did not know which day is Shabbos. Yet, there are others who contend that the rishonim had a mesorah that governs the halacha here. Certainly, an area in which we must accept the decisions of our rabbonim.

Avraham, Father of the Nations

Question #1: Names

When praying or making a mishebeirach for a geir, how should we refer to him?

Question #2: Vows

If someone vowed not to benefit from the descendants of Avraham, is he permitted to benefit from a geir, who is not descended from Avraham?

Question #3: Shemoneh Esrei

Can a geir refer to Hashem as the G-d of our forefathers?

Foreword

In parshas Lech Lecha, Hashem told Avraham Avinu that his name was being changed to Avraham because He has appointed him the spiritual father of all nations (Bereishis 17:5). As the Gemara (Yerushalmi Bikkurim 1:4) expresses it, when he was called Avram, he was the “father” of the Arameans, interpreting Avram as a contraction of av Aram. When he was promoted to Avraham, he became the av hamon goyim, the “father” of all the many nations.

This name change is not merely an added title or an intangible tribute, but it incorporates a status that contains halachic ramifications, which is the subject of today’s article. Among the shaylos we will discuss is whether a geir is able to refer to Hashem as the G-d of our forefathers, when Avraham was not his biological father, nor was Yitzchak or Ya’akov.

Names

At this point, let us examine our opening question: “When praying or making a mishebeirach for a geir, how should we refer to him?” May we use his given, non-Jewish name? Should we use his biological mother’s name? Should we pray for a geir as the son/daughter of Avraham Avinu or as the son/daughter of Sarah Imeinu?

When providing the names of geirim in documents, such as kesubos and gittin, we refer to them as the son (or daughter) of Avraham. To quote the Beis Yosef (Even Ha’ezer 66): “In kesubos, the custom is to identify geirim as ploni ben Avraham.” In a get, the halacha is to write “ploni ben Avraham Avinu” (Even Ha’ezer 129:20). The Beis Shemuel explains that we should not write simply ben Avraham because this might create confusion that his biological father’s name is Avraham; a get must be written with precise identification. The Beis Shemuel suggests an alternative approach, to state in the get that he is a geir.

The universal practice when praying for a geir or a geyores for a refuah sheleimah or similar request, or upon reciting a mishebeirach is to refer to them as ben (or bas) Avraham. Similarly, a geir is called up to the Torah as ben Avraham. I am aware of people who pray for geirim or recite a mishebeirach for them as ben/bas Sarah. I am unaware of any halachic source for this practice, and I believe that it is based on an error. People make  the assumption that since we usually pray for people by their mother’s name, we should use Sarah’s name instead of Avraham’s. However, I am unaware of anywhere in Tanach or Chazal that says that Sarah should be treated as the mother of the nations. The special status of being considered the “father” of all the nations was granted to Avraham Avinu only.

I will point out that Rav Moshe Feinstein had the following practice regarding the name used in a get for a geir. If the geir tzedek was halachically observant, then Rav Moshe referred to him or her in the get as ben Avraham Avinu or bas Avraham Avinu. If the person who “converted” to Judaism was never observant or is no longer observant, Rav Moshe referred to them in the get as giyura or giyurta, a term that is not disparaging and is used frequently in the Gemara as a highly respectful term to refer to geirim (Kiddushin 76b; Bava Basra 149a; Avodah Zarah 70a). Rav Moshe considered it a special honor to refer to a geir as ben or bas Avraham Avinu and he did not feel it proper to associate Avraham Avinu with someone who is not halachically observant, even if they once were. My experience is that this approach was followed by Rav Moshe’s talmidim and is followed today by their talmidim.

Vows

If someone vowed not to benefit from the descendants of Avraham, is he permitted to benefit from a geir, who is not descended from Avraham? The answer is that he may not (Rosh, Nedarim 31a; Tur and Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 217:40). The Rosh explains that geirim are included in this term because of the pasuk of av hamon goyim and also because Avraham Avinu is considered the first convert, and therefore anyone who observes the mitzvos is considered his (spiritual) progeny.

Shemoneh Esrei

At this point, we can discuss another of our opening questions: “Can a geir refer to Hashem as the G-d of our forefathers?”

We find a dispute among tana’im and rishonim regarding this question. Explaining these disputes will require an extensive introduction. We must first discuss a seemingly unrelated mitzvah, that of bringing the bikkurim. Each year, a property owner in Eretz Yisrael brings the first produce of the seven species grown in his land to the Beis Hamikdash.There, he presents his produce to the kohein and makes what we will refer to as a pilgrim’s declaration, thanking Hashem for His many salvations and gifts (Devarim 26:1-11). The Mishnah (Bikkurim 1:1) teaches that there are three levels of requirement to observe this mitzvah, depending on the extent of possession that the owner has of his parcel of land:

1. Meivi vekorei – Bring and read

The highest level is when the owner has two mitzvos, one of bringing the bikkurim and a second of reciting the pilgrim’s declaration, called mikra bikkurim by the Mishnah (Sotah 32a). This is performed when the fruit grew completely on land owned by one of the Benei Yisrael.

2. Meivi ve’eino korei – Bring but cannot read

The secondary level is when the owner brings the bikkurim to the Beis Hamikdash but may not recite the pilgrim’s declaration. One example of this is when the fruit grew in a way that it was not completely nourished by land owned by the pilgrim, but by land owned by someone else – even when the pilgrim has permission to use it (Mishnah Bikkurim 1:1 and Yerushalmi ad loc.). Another example is when the pilgrim sold his land before he brought the bikkurim to the Beis Hamikdash (Bikkurim 1:7). The author of the Mishnah places a geir into this category because, in that tanna’s opinion, a geir cannot declare that Hashem promised this land to his forefathers (Bikkurim 1:4).

3. Eino Meivi – May not bring

There is a lower level in which there is no mitzvah of bikkurim and therefore there is no sanctity on the fruits. An example of this is someone who owned the trees on which the new fruit grew, but does not own the land on which the trees grow (Bikkurim 1:6). Since his fruit are not the produce of land that Hashem gave him, he is excluded from the Torah’s definition of someone obligated to bring bikkurim.

From bikkurim to bensching

As I mentioned above, the Mishnah contends that a geir cannot declare that he received Eretz Yisrael as the land that Hashem gave to “us,” meaning the Jewish people, when neither the geir nor his ancestors received land when the Jewish people entered Eretz Yisrael. This tanna also holds that a geir must recite a modified form of the shemoneh esrei:since he is not a biological descendant of Avraham Avinu, he cannot recite the words Elokei avoseinu, “the G-d of our fathers,” at the beginning of the shemoneh esrei. The Mishnah implies that a son of  parents who are both geirim also cannot recite Elokei avoseinu in the shemoneh esrei.

Some rishonim therefore rule that a geir may not be a chazzan or ba’al tefillah, which requires him to state Elokei avoseinu in order to be motzi someone who doesn’t know how to recite shemoneh esrei. The Mordechai (Mordechai, Megillah 786) mentions that, in his day (13th century), the city of Würzburg (in Bavaria) did not permit a geir to be the chazzan.

On the other hand, the Talmud Yerushalmi quotes Rabbi Yehudah, who disputes the conclusion of the Mishnah and these other rulings, contending that since Avraham Avinu is called the father of all the nations, a geir may and should recite the bikkurim declaration. The Yerushalmi then quotes both Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi and Rabbi Avahu, who rule according to Rabbi Yehudah, against the Mishnah. This ruling is quoted by the Rambam, the Rash and Rav Ovadyah of Bartenura in their commentaries and by many other rishonim (Sefer Yere’im; Ramban; Semag; Sefer Hachinuch; Mordechai, Megillah 786). From this it would appear that a geir may recite the declaration on the bikkurim and should recite the shemoneh esrei as any other Jew would. This approach disagrees with the Würzburg custom that I cited above.

Nevertheless, the Tosefta (Bikkurim 1:3) appears to have understood Rabbi Yehudah’s opinion differently, stating that although Rabbi Yehudah rules that most geirim bring bikkurim, they do not recite mikra bikkurim, since they cannot state “the land that You, Hashem, gave me” (Devarim 26:10). However, geirim who are descended from Yisro do recite mikra bikkurim.

Why is Yisro different from all other gentiles?

Since Yisro and his descendants received land in Eretz Yisrael, as implied by the pasuk in Bamidbar (10:32) and stated there in the Sifrei and by Rashi (see also Rashi, Shoftim 16:1), they can declare “the land that You, Hashem, gave me.”

Rabbeinu Tam’s opinion

In general, the opinion of Rabbeinu Tam carries much weight among the rishonim and the poskim, as is manifest in a long list of halachic practices where his approach is accepted over the rishonim who preceded him. (I am deliberately not listing any of these rulings so as not to take us off our topic.) Rabbeinu Tam (quoted by Tosafos, Bava Basra 81a s.v. Li’me’utei) questions how any geir could recite mikra bikkurim. This bikkurim passage states Arami oveid avi, vayeired Mitzrayma “my father was a lost Aramean, who then descended to Egypt;” according to Chazal, this refers to Ya’akov Avinu. Furthermore, the pilgrim refers to the travails of the Jewish people as the experiences of his own family. Rabbeinu Tam concludes that the Tosefta which permits a descendant of Yisro to recite mikra bikkurim refers to someone whose father’s side of his family is descended from Yisro and his mother’s side descended from Ya’akov Avinu. Rabbeinu Tam’s reasoning is that this person descended from geirim can recite mikra bikkurim on the basis of his mother’s side of the family. However, mikra bikkurim also states “the land that you gave me,” which is inaccurate for someone whose father is a geir even if his mother is from a Jewish family. Therefore, someone of this status cannot declare mikra bikkurim. Nevertheless, since Yisro’s descendants received land in Eretz Yisrael, a geir whose father’s side is descended from Yisro and his mother’s side includes descendants from Ya’akov Avinu may bring bikkurim and recite the parsha.

Based on this Tosefta, and on a passage in the Talmud Bavli (Makkos 19a) that quotes the Mishnah in Bikkurim without the disputing opinion of Rabbi Yehudah, Rabbeinu Tam concludes that a geir cannot recite any prayers or declarations that refers to our ancestors receiving the land or being descended from the avos. Rabbeinu Tam even bans someone descended from geirim from reciting these passages unless he also has antecedents born from the avos. Thus, Rabbeinu Tam rejects the opinion of the Yerushalmi, even suggesting that our text of this passage of Yerushalmi is erroneous and should be expunged. Following this approach, a geir may also not lead services; his approach was implemented by the community of Würzburg, as I cited above.

Bensching

Tosafos (Bava Basra 81a s.v. Li’me’utei) and the Tur (Orach Chayim 199) record a dispute among the rishonim how a geir recites bensching. Rabbeinu Tam and the Behag contend that a geir cannot recite the words she’hinchalta la’avoseinu, “that You bequeathed [Eretz Yisrael] to our fathers.” In their opinion, he cannot recite the exact same text of the bensching that Jews descended from Avraham Avinu do.

Leading a zimun

The next factor requires a bit of an introduction. In earlier generations, the person leading the zimun recited the entire bensching for the others, who fulfilled their mitzvah by listening to his bensching. This is the practice we follow for fulfilling the mitzvos of kiddush and havdalah, which we perform by listening to what is recited by the head of the household. Thus, Rabbeinu Tam rules that a geir cannot lead a zimun for bensching. The reason for this is that Rabbeinu Tam holds that a geir cannot be motzi someone else in bensching since it requires stating that we received from Hashem the wonderful land of Eretz Yisrael (see Devarim 8:7-10; and also Berachos 20b, Rashi s.v. Oh Derabbanan and Tosafos s.v. Nashim).

This opinion of Rabbeinu Tam is recorded by the Tur (Orach Chayim 199), along with the disputing position of Rabbeinu Tam’s disciple (and nephew), Rabbeinu Yitzchak, usually called simply the R’Y.

How do we paskin?

The consensus of the rishonim rejects Rabbeinu Tam’s approach, ruling like the R’Y that Avraham Avinu’s status as the av hamon goyim allowsa geir to recite the same version of birkas hamazon and shemoneh esrei that everyone else does, to be motzi others in birkas hamazon and shemoneh esrei, and to lead the services (Rambam, Hilchos Bikkurim 4:3; Tosafos, Bava Basra 81a s.v. Li’meutei; Ramban, Rashba and Ran in their respective commentaries to Bava Basra; Hagahos Maimoniyos, Hilchos Tefillah 8:20; Bartenura, Bikkurim 1:4; Beis Yosef, Orach Chayim 53). Uncharacteristically, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 53:19) makes a very strong statement rejecting Rabbeinu Tam’s approach: “There are those who refuse to allow a geir to be the chazzan, but their opinion is rejected.”

There is an important conclusion to be brought from the fact that the Shulchan Aruch writes this in such a strong way. The Gemara states that a guest who refuses to lead the bensching when requested to by the host causes himself great harm (Berachos 55a). This is because Avraham Avinu was given a beracha that those who bless him would always be blessed. But, the opposite is also true – those that deny blessing Avraham Avinu or his descendants are cursed. This does not bode well for someone who has the opportunity to bless the benefactor of the se’udah and turns down the opportunity. Thus, since we conclude unlike Rabbeinu Tam, a geir should not turn down the opportunity to lead the bensching, an opportunity he would be unable to take advantage of  according to Rabbeinu Tam.

Technically, the ill effect of declining to lead the bensching may apply only when the others do not recite birkas hamazon on their own. If they do recite birkas hamazon,including the blessing that the guest gives to the host, turning down the honor of leading the birkas hamazon may not have such dire consequences.

The Rambam’s rulings

Not all our questions are fully resolved, because we have an apparent contradiction in the rulings of the Rambam. Whereas he concludes that a geir brings bikkurim and recites the mikra bikkurim (Hilchos Bikkurim 4:3), he rules that a geir does not recite what is called viduy ma’asros (Hilchos Ma’aser Sheini 11:17). This is the declaration that a farm owner in Eretz Yisrael recites after the three year ma’aser cycle (two consecutive years of ma’aser sheini, which have sanctity and must be eaten in Yerushalayim, followed by a year in which ma’aser ani to be distributed to the poor is separated instead) that he has properly separated all that he is required to and has dealt with them all appropriately (Devarim 26:12-15). In the viduy ma’asros, we request from Hashem to “bless Your people, Yisrael, and the land that you swore that you would give us.” Because of this statement, the Rambam rules that a geir does not recite viduy ma’asros, even though he rules that a geir does recite the mikrah bikkurim, which also refers to the land given to our forefathers.

This question is asked by several early acharonim, who propose a variety of answers (Kapos Temarim, Sukkah 38; Bach, Yoreh Deah; Shu’t Sha’ar Efrayim #14; Magen Giborim; Birkei Yosef). I will share the answer provided by the Mahari Kurkus: The last Mishnah in Mesechta Ma’aser Sheini rules that a geir cannot recite the viduy of ma’aser sheini and there is no mention there of a dispute. Ma’aser Sheini should be treated differently from all the other laws mentioned because there the declaration states, “the land that you swore that you would give us.” Although a geir is considered the progeny of Avraham Avinu, he cannot say that Hashem swore to him that He would give him the holy land.

Conclusion

Once his name has been changed, the Gemara forbids calling Avraham by his earlier name, Avram. The question is asked that we do not find such a prohibition of calling Ya’akov by this name, even after his name was change to Yisrael. Quite the contrary, the pasuk itself refers to him as Ya’akov.

The Seforno (Bereishis 17:5) explains that the name Yisrael represents the goal of the world situation. Ultimately, the world will recognize his mission as Yisrael, but at the moment it does not. This is different from Avraham, who, from the moment his name is changed has a new role in the world – and, as we have seen, this role includes many halachic ramifications.

Reign Dates and Rosh Hashanah

Question #1: Reign Date — The First of Nissan

How can the first of Nissan be Rosh Hashanah? Is there a halachic concept of a new half-year, as in, the world is now 5784½ years old?

Question #2: The Birthday of Elsie the Cow

“Can Rosh Chodesh also be Rosh Hashanah?”

Question #3: The First of Tishrei

Why does the Mishnah refer to this date as “The first of Tishrei,” rather than its more popular moniker, Rosh Hashanah?

Question #4: Is it the First or the Fifteenth of Shevat?

Or, a more basic question — why do the trees need a new year? Do they have a birthday party or shoot off firecrackers to celebrate?

Foreword

Mesechta Rosh Hashanah begins by declaring that there are four “new years” in the Jewish calendar year:

1. The first of Nissan is the new year for “kings and holidays.”

2. The first of Elul is the new year for tithing animals. This particular new year is disputed by the tanna’im Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon, who rule that the new year for tithing animals is the first of Tishrei.

3. The first of Tishrei is the new year for “years, shemittah, yoveil, planting, and vegetables.”

4. The first of Shevat is the new year for trees in Beis Shammai’s opinion, whereas Beis Hillel contends that it is on the fifteenth of Shevat.

Cutoff point

The word Rosh Hashanah is used by this Mishnah to mean a “cutoff point,” the date that separates one year from the next, germane to the particular laws mentioned. Each of these cutoff points has a halachic ramification. Let us look at these various categories.

Kings and holidays

In what way is the first of Nissan the “new year for kings?”

This requires an introduction, having to do with the needs of society to have efficient and reliable business practices. For a free-enterprise economy to function properly, it needs an established and accepted rule of law and a means for enforcing that law. This is axiomatic to economists and businessmen, and, indeed, the Torah established an efficient and reliable system for society to function properly. Among the requirements necessary are an effective system whereby debts can be collected and a means to enforce violations of contract law. These usually rely on written documentation, in halacha called shetaros. Should an individual or a business default on its obligations, halacha usually prioritizes outstanding financial commitments on a “first come, first served” basis. This means that an earlier debt is satisfied in full before a later one is dealt with. This makes it important to know the date that each obligation was created, so shetaros must be dated.

Establishing “reign dates”

Today, we use a standard accepted calendar, which makes it very easy to determine whose obligation was established first; however, that was not always the case. In the times of Chazal, dating of documents was usually performed according to the year of reign of the local monarch. This meant that, to know whose obligation was earlier, we needed to know the order of the monarchs. This is sometimes very easy to establish, since it is unlikely that Charles the 3rd reigned before Charles the 2nd. However, what might easily create confusion is when did the second year of Charles’ reign begin and when did it end? Using an actual date that Charles the 3rd assumed the throne, let me show you the difficulty that will result. If Charles assumed the throne on the 19th day of September, that date is now the 19th of September of the first year of the reign of Charles 3rd. But we now need to keep track that the 18th of September is the end of the first year of his reign, and that the 19th begins the second year of his reign. It is easy to see the problems that this creates.

Chazal avoided this problem by following an arbitrary date to begin the second year of a king’s reign. That means that, in the above example, the first year of Charles’ reign is only a few months long, and then the second year of his reign begins.

What date do we use as the arbitrary date for bumping a king’s reign to the next year? Chazal used the following approach: for Jewish kings they used the first of Nissan; after all, Pesach is the beginning of the Jewish calendar. This means that a Jewish king who ascended to the throne on the 29th of Adar reigns for only one day before contracts are dated “the 1st of Nissan of the 2nd year” of his reign. In other words, the “reign date” may have little to do with the actual number of months, days and hours that he has been king. Although this might (and at times certainly did) create confusion for historians, it keeps the contract and commerce world simplified and clear, which is why this system was established. After all, although historians are valuable, they are not that necessary for commerce.

For non-Jewish kings, Chazal used the first of Tishrei, the day we usually call Rosh Hashanah, as the cut-off date, and this explains the later statement of the Mishnah that the first of Tishrei is the new year for “years.”

For holidays

What does it mean that the first of Nissan is the “new year for holidays?”

Someone obligated to offer a korban must bring it in a timely fashion. There are two different mitzvos, each with its own timetable. The first is a mitzvas aseih that we should offer our korbanos before the first regel — that is the three yomim tovim of Pesach, Shavuos and Sukkos — passes. There is also a mitzvas lo saaseh of bal te’acheir, not to delay the offering of a korban (see Devarim 23:22). How much time does one have to offer the korban without violating this mitzvah?

Pesach, Sukkos and Shavuos, when we conduct pilgrimages to the Beis Hamikdash, provide an opportune time to satisfy any korbanos obligations. Although there are several tanna’ic opinions to the contrary, the Mishnah rules that one violates the lo saaseh only when one did not bring his korban before the three yomim tovim of Pesach, Shavuos and Sukkos have passed in that order. This makes Nissan the beginning of the year “for holidays” — if he could have offered the korban on Pesach, he violates bal te’acheir when the following Sukkos passes. However, if he first became obligated to offer this korban after Pesach, he will not violate bal te’acheir until the second time the festival of Sukkos goes by, after Pesach has come in the interim, which starts the bal te’acheir clock running.

We now have the answer to our opening question: “How can the first of Nissan be Rosh Hashanah? Is there a halachic concept of a new half-year, as in, the world is now 5784½ years old?” The answer is that we are using the word “new year” to mean an annual cut-off point, and the first of Nissan functions as such for two distinct areas of halacha: determining the way legal documents are dated when we have a Jewish king, and when we must bring korbanos.

Elsie the Cow

At this point, let us examine the second of our opening questions: Rosh Chodesh Elul is the day we begin reciting LeDavid Hashem Ori in preparation for the Yomim Nora’im. Isn’t this a month too early to be Rosh Hashanah?

Indeed, this question is the subject of a dispute among tanna’im and the cause of a change of mind of the Rambam. As I mentioned above from the Mishnah, the first of Elul is the new year for tithing animals. This particular new year is disputed by the tanna’im Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon, who rule that the new year for tithing animals is the first of Tishrei.

Let me provide background on this mitzvah: In Parshas Bechukosai (Vayikra 27:31), the Torah teaches about the mitzvah of ma’aser beheimah, tithing animals. When the Beis Hamikdash is standing, a farmer’s newborn calves are gathered together and sent through a narrow passageway or opening. The owner counts his animals, one at a time, marks the tenth one with a red dye and declares the animal to be ma’aser beheimah. Counting the tenth animal is what makes it kodosh as a korban. Until and unless the farmer counts his animals in this procedure, there is no kedusha on any of the animals in his herd (Mishnah Bechoros 58b). The farmer performs the same procedures with his newborn kids (baby goats) and lambs (together).

Just as one is required to separate terumos and ma’asros on produce each year separately, counting and designating ma’aser beheimah is only within each year’s “crop” of newborn animals, not from one year on the previous or following year (Mishnah, Bechoros 53a; Gemara ibid. 54a-b). How do we determine the difference in “crop years” of animals? That is the dispute between the first tanna in the Mishnah and Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon. The Tanna Kamma rules that the annual cutoff point for ma’aser beheimah is on Rosh Chodesh Elul, whereas Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon rule that it is on the first day of Tishrei, the day that we usually call Rosh Hashanah. What is very interesting is that the Rambam and the Bartenura in their respective commentaries on the Mishnah rule like the Tanna Kamma. However, in the Mishneh Torah, the Rambam rules like the second opinion, that of Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon, that the cut-off date for ma’aser beheimah is the first day of Tishrei. This means that, although the Mishnah opens by stating that there are four Rosh Hashanahs, we rule, like Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon, that there are only three.

Years

Above, I quoted the Mishnah’s statement that the first of Tishrei is the new year for “years, shemittah, yoveil, planting and vegetables.” What is meant by years, when I have already explained that the equivalent of our calendar year was expressed in terms of the number of years of the king’s reign and was increased automatically on the first of Nissan (in order to avoid confusion)?

As I mentioned above, for Jewish kings, Chazal used the first of Nissan; after all, Pesach is the beginning of the Jewish calendar. For non-Jewish kings, however, they used the first of Tishrei, the day we usually call Rosh Hashanah.

Shemittah

As we know, every seven years we are required to observe the mitzvah of shemittah in the land of Eretz Yisrael, a topic whose details I have written about in the past, prior to and during shemittah years. There is also a mitzvah that comes at the end of shemittah year that applies both in Eretz Yisrael and in chutz la’aretz: the mitzvah of shemittas kesafim, releasing debts. As the Torah teaches, in parshas Re’eih: “At the end of seven years you shall ‘make shemittah.’ And this is the ‘word’ of the shemittah: Every creditor must release his hand from what his fellow owes him. He may not demand payment from his fellow, his brother, because he has declared a release for Hashem” (Devarim 15:1-2). These verses teach that, rather than Rosh Hashanah of the eighth year ending shemittah with a whimper, the shemittah year ends with a bang. And the date of this mitzvah is determined by the first of Tishrei, the day that we usually call Rosh Hashanah.

Yoveil

The Torah establishes a fifty-year yoveil cycle: the year after the seventh shemittah is yoveil. During yoveil, the land that was given to every family in Benei Yisrael, upon our conquering the holy land in the days of Yehoshua ben Nun, returns to its original family, every Jewish slave (eved ivri) goes free and all the laws of shemittah apply. The annual calculation of the yoveil year uses Tishrei as its cutoff point.

This mitzvah applies only when all twelve tribes live in their original areas as determined by Yehoshua. Therefore, unfortunately, it does not apply today until we again return to that configuration of Eretz Yisrael.

Planting and vegetables

Produce grown in Eretz Yisrael and the lands nearby must have several portions, called terumos and ma’asros, separated from it before it may be consumed. As we learned above, one cannot separate the terumos and ma’asros from one year for the crop of a different year, and therefore we need to know when the cut-off date is for each crop. The cut-off date for grains and vegetables is on Rosh Hashanah, the New Year for these agricultural products.

During the 1st, 2nd, 4th, and 5th years of the seven-year shemittah cycle, one of the separations is called ma’aser sheini. During the other years — that is, the 3rd and 6th years of the shemittah cycle — this second ma’aser is given to poor people and is called ma’aser ani.

When in its growth cycle

Although the first of Tishrei, our Rosh Hashanah, is the agricultural new year for all crops other than tree fruits, another factor determines which year applies to the particular crop: the point in the plant’s growth cycle. This is a highly complicated topic that requires at least an entire book to explain in detail. I will mention now only that the years for some species are based on when they are planted, some by the first appearance of fruit, others by when the fruit is considered “one-third grown,” and still others not until they are ready for harvest.

Rosh Hashanah

Of course, as we all know, the first of Tishrei is the Day of Judgment for all of humanity. This halacha is not mentioned in the first Mishnah of Maseches Rosh Hashanah (the Mishnah I quoted and have been explaining), but in a later Mishnah of that chapter, in which it states: At four times of the year the world is judged… on Rosh Hashanah, all who have entered the world pass before him… (Rosh Hashanah 16a).

Tu Bishvat

The Mishnah states that, in Beis Shammai’s opinion, the new year for trees is the first of Shevat , whereas Beis Hillel contends that it is on the fifteenth of Shevat. We follow Beis Hillel’s ruling and therefore Tu Bishvat is the “Rosh Hashanah” for trees. But what does that mean? Do the trees ignite fireworks on their New Year? Do they coronate Hashem as their King on their Rosh Hashanah? Does Hashem judge their deeds and misdeeds and grant them a fruitful year or otherwise, chas veshalom? As an aside, the “judgment” for trees is on Shavuos, not Tu Bishvat (Mishnah Rosh Hashanah 16a.) This means that on Shavuos, mankind, both in general and individually, is judged regarding what his trees will produce in the coming year.

Obviously, since trees have no free choice, the Heavenly Tribunal does not judge them on their Rosh Hashanah, yet the arboreal new year does have major halachic ramifications other than the popular custom of eating fruit. Tu Bishvat functions as the cutoff point between two crop years. As we learned above, one cannot separate terumos and ma’asros of one year for a different crop year. For tree fruits, the cutoff point is not the first of Tishrei but Tu Bishvat. In addition, Tu Bishvat determines which year of the shemittah cycle the fruit is from and therefore whether it is obligated in ma’aser sheini or in ma’aser ani. As I mentioned above, what stage of development the fruit is at on Tu Bishvat depends on the particular species. Again, some species depend on the first appearance of fruit, others by when the fruit is one third grown, and still others by when it is ready for harvest.

It is also usually the cutoff point for determining whether a tree is producing forbidden orlah fruit and for determining the halachos of revai’i. The fruits appearing after Tu Bishvat of the fourth year of the life of this tree are not forbidden as orlah, and the fruits of the fifth year of a tree’s life do not have the sanctity of revai’i.

Conclusion

We discussed several mitzvos that apply only in Eretz Yisrael. Most generations of our forebears had to be content with reading about Eretz Yisrael and imagining what it might be like to visit. We are fortunate to live in a time when visiting and living in Eretz Yisrael is a reality, and we should be filled with hakoras hatov that we can traverse the land that was promised to our forefathers. Inhabiting our native land includes many special laws that apply within its borders; we should all be familiar with these special laws, whether or not we live in Eretz Yisrael, because its special mitzvos create a direct relationship with Hashem.

Advice Line #2

Question:

My husband keeps shooting himself in the leg at every job he gets. He comes in late, leaves exactly on time no matter how hectic things are in the office, and generally seems lazy when it comes to his jobs. Then he’s surprised when he’s the first to get laid off. He was recently fired from yet another job. Is there any way I can motivate him to change, or point out what’s going on, without destroying his fragile ego?

Rabbi Yirmiyohu Kaganoff:

Anything you try to do to change your husband will just lead to more frustration and cause shalom bayis difficulties. He undoubtedly knows the problem, but a person will only change if and when he wants to. Your nudging him will not motivate him. You are probably doing a reasonable amount of nudging without even realizing it and we can assume it’s taking its toll.

The one thing you can do is try to build your husband up with positive motivation and compliments. Help him feel better about himself. Find excuses to compliment him in a sincere way, specifically on the rare occasion when he shows initiative.

Although when he is unemployed one cannot compliment him for his bringing home income, I often find it surprising that women expect their husbands to compliment them for preparing supper, but a woman does not find it necessary to thank her husband for going to work. One cannot emphasize more how much it does for a man’s ego to be complimented for earning a living and going to work, particularly when it is a struggle for him to do so.

Question:

I’m almost twenty-one years old but have not yet started dating since I have an older sister who is still in shidduchim. My parents want me to start dating already, but I don’t want to. My sister also says I shouldn’t wait for her, but I disagree. I can’t picture myself as a kalla, getting married before her. I don’t want that to happen! And once I start dating it may happen. What should I do?

Rabbi Yirmiyohu Kaganoff:

I believe you should start dating. The bottom line is that, while it’s wonderful to care for your sister’s feelings, it is not easy for a girl to find a shidduch in today’s world, and there’s no need to make it any more difficult for yourself.

The harsh reality is that your sister is not yet married, but that’s no reason to prevent you from getting married. This is particularly the case when no one else in your family seems to mind; in fact, they are encouraging you to date. It’s misplaced to worry so much about your sister’s feelings that you put your own future in jeopardy.

However, I must point out that if you are very resistant to the idea of dating, it may make the process quite difficult. If you find that you continue to struggle with feelings of ambivalence and guilt, it would be best to seek out a rebbetzin, therapist, or life coach who can help you work through these feeling.

May you and your sister both find your zivugim b’karov.

Question:

I work in a large marketing company where nearly all the employees are frum. The staff meets once a week to discuss ideas and proposals. Once a month, that meeting includes the CEO, and all ideas are finalized. Numerous times, my immediate supervisor has presented my ideas as her own. This is very detrimental to me because the possibility of a promotion is to a certain extent based on the proposal of original ideas. Her stealing my ideas is hampering my growth in the company. It’s difficult for me to say anything to my supervisor because I will be risking her wrath, and she is the darling of the CEO precisely because he thinks she is very creative. When I once broached the subject, she said I was imagining things and that the ideas were really hers. What can I do?

R’ Yirmiyohu Kaganoff:

The specific situation you are presenting is a bit unusual, because it is uncommon for a frum person who is psychologically healthy to say an outright lie to a listener who knows he is lying. Thus, there is either a major misunderstanding, something difficult to explain when this has happened repeatedly, or, more likely, one of the two parties suffers from a psychological handicap. Since we do not know which party is having this difficulty, it is hard for me to advise you.

Assuming, however, that you are indeed the party being wronged here, and you’ve repeatedly discerned this type of unhealthy behavior in your immediate superior, you have an obligation to report this to the “big boss.” The reason here is simple: Halacha requires us to protect someone else’s money, and having either an unstable or dishonest employee could cause your boss long-term financial harm.

You should make a discreet appointment with the big boss and explain only what you have observed, without any added interpretation or exaggeration. It is a good idea to review the relevant parts of Sefer Chofetz Chaim before the meeting and think through carefully exactly what you may say and how you will say it. Make it clear to the big boss that you are only meeting because of concern for his interests. Indeed, it is strictly prohibited to talk to him because you are angry at your immediate supervisor and want to get even.

Question:

My mother-in-law and I have an excellent, warm relationship. However, there is one area of conflict, which, although it doesn’t damage the quality of our relationship, causes her anxiety and me irritation. The issue is chasunah attendance. My mother-in-law’s father is one of many siblings, and they are currently marrying off their grandchildren. I see no need to kill my precious nights – work time (I work at home), housework, and much needed sleep – to attend a stranger’s chasunah just because they are my mother-in-law’s uncle’s grandchild. To satisfy my mother-in-law’s feelings, and to show that I’m not rebelling against her family’s norms (as she claims I am), I go 2-3 times a year to a chassunah when it works out for me. When I do attend, I don’t know most people there, and don’t feel my presence appreciated enough for me to have killed a night. My mother-in-law feels that my attitude is wrong. She says if I would go to the chasunahs I would develop a relationship with her cousins and my second cousins, and they wouldn’t be strangers. I feel that I don’t have the emotional resources to have a relationship with so many people, to the extent that I’d attend their simchos. My mother-in-law agreed that I present this issue to you. Please advise.

Rabbi Yirmiyohu Kaganoff:

You seem to be asking whether you are obligated to acquiesce to your mother-in-law’s request. In response, I’d like to start by briefly reviewing the halachos of kibud av va’em. You do have an obligation of kibud av v’em towards your husband’s parents, although not on the same level as your obligation towards your own parents or your husband.

However, the mitzvah includes only two components – kibud and moreh. Kibud encompasses ensuring that your in-laws have their physical needs met. This involves providing them with food if needed, bringing them a drink if requested, taking care of their medical needs if relevant, and so on. Moreh requires you to show them respect by not contradicting them, not sitting in their set places, etc.

In the situation you describe, I don’t see how either kibud or moreh comes into play. One can claim that since your mother-in-law is insisting so strongly on this, there’s an element of moreh. However, that is only a result of her feeling so strongly that she insists on it, to the extent that your refusal is rude. Her position, even under these circumstances, is by no means obvious.

If you are like most frum women today, between caring for a large household, supplementing the family income, and taking care of all your other responsibilities, you are juggling the equivalent of two full-time jobs. It seems unfair for your mother-in-law to pile even more on your already overburdened shoulders. Women today are already far too stressed, and need to spend more, not less, time with their families. Encroaching on that time for the sake of fairly distant relatives is not a wise move.

I don’t know where you live. If you live in a city where it’s acceptable to merely show up, say mazel tov, and leave, and if your mother-in-law would be happy with that arrangement, perhaps you could do that on occasion. But I wouldn’t advocate any more than that.

Question:

I’m a sheitel macher, and recently opened up my own business. There’s a problem I keep running into – relatives and good friends often assume that I will either do their sheitels entirely for free, or give them a steep discount. In addition, they often expect priority, and that I should do their sheitels before others that came earlier. I’m trying hard to establish myself, and my prices are already on the low end. Every discount impacts my parnassah. And when I push one job before another, it can hurt my reputation with the woman who now has to wait longer. I’ve tried to explain all this, but from the cool responses I’ve received, I realize that friends and relatives perceive me as mercenary and callous. What can I do?

Rabbi Yirmiyohu Kaganoff:

As a rav, I’m going to approach this question from a halachic perspective, and leave the emotional issues involved to the other respondents.

It looks like your family members are unaware of the difficult predicament in which they are putting you. Their approach to utilizing your services is misguided. Just as we are told in hilchos tzedakah that relatives take precedence over someone not related, so, too, assuming that the quality of work is identical, we should bring our business to a relative before someone else. This is not for our personal benefit so that we can get a price break; it’s so we can perform the highest level of tzedaka – that of helping someone become self-sufficient.

It seems like your friends and relatives are acting in self-interest, not halachic interest. They are probably not aware that their actions can sabotage your nascent business. You’re trying to be responsible, build a client base, and earn a good reputation; giving their sheitels priority over those that came in earlier jeopardizes all that. In addition, as you may know, businesses that fail usually do so early. This is a critical period for you and cutting into your profits at this time is not wise.

I’m not saying that it’s wrong to give a break to a friend or a relative – but that’s a gesture you can only offer once you’ve established yourself and are on secure financial footing. Your primary responsibility is to your immediate family, and supporting them has to be your first objective. Iy”H, once you are well-established you can certainly offer your family and friends discounts, but it will be because you can afford to and wish to, not because you feel pressured to do so.

Until then, it may help to discuss the issue with your local rav. Assuming that he also feels that giving discounts is incorrect at this time, you can then tell your friends and relatives that you were given a psak not to give discounts until your business is established. This will hopefully deflect the negative feedback you’ve been receiving and will perhaps prompt your relatives and friends to examine their actions through the eye of halacha.

Question:

We are a young married couple with one child and living in Eretz Yisrael. Both of our parents live in the States but about a 3-4 hour drive apart. As Pesach approaches and we made our plans to visit the US, it became clear that only one set of parents was willing to pay towards our tickets to come home. After taking this into account, we decided that we still wanted to go and would pay the other half ourselves. However, when deciding where to be over Yom Tov we are expected to split it evenly, although we feel that we should only be going to the family that paid for us to come, or at least spend most of the time with them. Please help.

Rabbi Yirmiyohu Kaganoff:

There are no obvious halachic guidelines for such an issue; it falls into the category of the “fifth Shulchan Aruch.” I’m therefore offering you my personal thoughts and judgment. One family is paying for half of your tickets; the other side is not contributing. It does seem fair that you should spend some more time with the side that is putting up money. However, there are mitigating factors that must be kept in mind:

Firstly, I’m assuming that the side that isn’t paying is not doing so because they are stingy but rather because they simply don’t have the resources. This brings up an important question: Should a family be penalized for not having the financial wherewithal that another family has been blessed with?

Secondly, if one side has more resources than the other side, it’s probable that they come to visit in Eretz Yisrael on occasion, while the financially-strapped family probably comes rarely, if at all. This means that if you don’t go visit them, you may never see them.

These factors indicate that you and your spouse need to sit down and have an open, honest conversation about the issue and reach a decision together. Although such discussions are not easy, realize that the making of a strong marriage comes through discussing sticky situations and working out issues.

Try to depersonalize the discussion and really focus on the points that the other person is making. Sometimes, it’s helpful for each of you to “plead” the other side. Let the spouse whose parents are paying enumerate why the Yom Tov should be split, and let the one whose parents aren’t able to chip in list the reasons the lion’s share should be spent by the parents who are paying. Doing this will help you get out of your own headspace and see another perspective. Keep speaking until you reach a decision that you’re both comfortable with. I wish you much hatzlacha.

Advice Line

I am sharing responses to people who asked me for advice.

Question:

We are a young couple living in E”Y. Over the past few years my younger brother has been learning here and we’ve gotten to know him quite well. Now he’s back in Lakewood and my mother is pursuing shidduchim for him. She told me she thinks he’s the catch of the century. She’s only looking for the best, smartest, most serious girl, and has narrowed her list to very specific seminaries and standards. The problem is that my husband and I know my brother pretty well by now, and he’s not a very serious learner. He’s a lovely boy, a great uncle to my kids, and a fun person to have around, but he definitely does not keep to his sedarim and would much rather sit on my couch and shmooze than go to the beis medrash. Should I tell my mother what I know about my brother? I can’t imagine that she’d believe me. Is there anything else I can do?

Rabbi Yirmiyohu Kaganoff answered:

It seems from your description that your brother would not be servicing Klal Yisrael or himself well by being a long-term, full-time learner. He should ideally be directing his kochos towards harbatzos Torah. You mention his love of children. He’d very possibly shine in chinuch (and I mean chinuch in the broad sense of harbatzos Torah, be it teaching, kiruv, or rabbanus) but he’s being forced into a mold that isn’t a good fit.

The burning question is who can direct this bachur and help him make these crucial life decisions? To address this, I’d need to know more about your family dynamics. Are his future plans heavily influenced by your parents? If they understand fully who he is, will they be able to direct him properly?

Your mother seems to view the world in a very black and white way (I don’t know if this is coming from a great appreciation of learning or from the pressure to have her son in a frum “Ivy League” environment). How would she react if your brother would choose to be a third-grade rebbe or an out-of-town high school teacher (possibly the way he can serve Hashem best)?

It also sounds like your mother is not easily influenced. Does she not take direction from anyone or will she just have a hard time listening to you because you’re her child and she doesn’t take you seriously? You haven’t mentioned your father. Where does he stand in this situation?

The last element to consider is the girls being redt to your brother. Today, a girl often feels that she can only be a good, frum girl if she marries a boy who is a full-time learner, with either she or her parents supporting him. The Torah is actually that, while a woman should enable and assist her husband and children to learn and should keep the atmosphere in the home Torahdik, she should not be supporting the family. That is the husband’s halachic responsibility.

These beliefs, in my opinion, are contributing to both the shidduch crisis and to shalom bayis issues. The bottom line is that there are far fewer boys capable of long-term learning than there are girls who want to marry them, and this mismatch causes shidduch problems. The desire to marry only a person in full-time learning, or to have a son like that, sometimes stems not from a place of idealism, but from gaavah. A girl should want a boy who is serious about his Yiddishkeit, but that doesn’t mean that he needs to be rosh yeshiva material.

Because the shidduch market is what it is, your mother may find the type of girl she wants for your brother, despite his true colors. If the girl’s family does proper research, they will no doubt find out the truth. However, the girl may still choose to marry him.

If he does date a girl who thinks he is what he is not, it’s not your responsibility to open her eyes. It’s her family’s job to research the aspects that are important to them. If the couple does get married and the girl is disappointed, she won’t be alone. Many girls are disappointed in the Torah level of their husband; at least this girl will be getting a solid ben Torah, and hopefully they will build a Torah true home together, whatever your brother chooses to do.

It’s hard for me to give a final response, because I don’t have sufficient information. The answer is dependent upon a few subtle points which you haven’t included. I do think you should try to clue your mother in to your brother’s true nature. It would be good for him if your mother knows where his strengths do and don’t lie; she can then direct him in the right way both in shidduchim and in life.

This may best be accomplished by speaking with your father, who perhaps can hear the truth more easily. You know your parents best, and will know what approach will be most likely to yield results.

Question:

I have a friend to whom I feel very close but who does not live nearby. From our phone conversations I get the sense that her husband has very unrealistic expectations of her. For example, a few days after she gave birth, she was serving hot breakfast to her father-in-law. Her husband leaves the house at 6:30 a.m. and comes home close to midnight, leaving her to take care of a houseful of small children, errands, shopping, cooking, cleaning — totally on her own. Now he wants her to take a job since money is tight. On hectic Friday afternoons he expects her to serve him lunch.

I don’t want to, chas v’shalom, interfere in her shalom bayis or threaten her marriage. However, I see that she has a submissive personality and does not assert herself. When she was serving breakfast days after giving birth, it wasn’t because her husband demanded it, but because she knew that he expected it; she didn’t think of saying no. When she was cooking and cleaning on Erev Shabbos with 102-degree fever, kids jumping all over, and husband nowhere in sight, it wasn’t because he was trying to be evil, but rather because she didn’t tell him that she needed help or that he should buy takeout. Should I encourage her to say no more often and assert herself? Should I point out that husbands should be helping more? Or should I just empathize and provide a listening ear?

Rabbi Yirmiyohu Kaganoff answered: This is a difficult question to answer since there are several core elements we do not know.

First, is the man clueless how to relate to his wife and as a result acts in a way that is grossly inconsiderate, or is he malicious, or is he something in between? Some men are completely unaware of how to deal with marriage and a wife. Often, when someone enlightens them, they are willing, and sometimes even happy, to work on change. On the other hand, some men have tendencies towards emotional abuse, and will never see themselves as being in the wrong.

The second important factor is how does your friend feel about this? Are her stories of what’s going on in her home a cry for help, or simply a description of what’s going on during the course of the day? Is she at a breaking point, or basically managing? Last, what would be the price of involvement? If you open up her eyes and help her realize the unjustness of the situation she is in, you will be opening a Pandora’s box that may be best left closed. Bringing her to realize how insensitive her husband is can jeopardize a marriage that, while not joyous, may be quite bearable and far preferable to divorce (which can certainly happen if she becomes unhappy enough).

I once heard from a gadol of the previous generation that if a couple is not arguing, even if we don’t think their marriage is good, we should not get involved. The exception, as I see it, is if abuse is taking place, since in most cases of abuse, there is no arguing taking place. This situation, however, is very gray. While it sounds very much like abuse, without more details, it’s hard to say that’s what is going on here.

Rather than bring the difficulty of the situation to her attention, I’d recommend that you find a way to have someone speak to the husband. Find someone he respects — a rebbi figure, a rav, a family member — and appraise them of what is going on; see if they can carefully speak to him about the way a man is meant to treat his wife.

If he insists that he does nothing wrong and whatever is wrong is her fault, or if he gets angry at the interference and takes it out on his wife, then you would have a clear sign that you are dealing with an abusive personality. However, if he is as you describe him – clueless but not evil — it’s very possible that opening his eyes can help rehabilitate this marriage. In the latter situation, the possibility exists that he will willingly go to therapy. This is even more likely if he has Asperger’s, or as the professionals prefer to call it today, is “on the spectrum,” which may be a possibility here.

In addition, as her friend, you should give her whatever support you can, be it a listening ear or any physical help you can offer. If you feel that the situation is worsening, or if you think that there are already elements of emotional abuse, then you should definitely seek the advice of a rav as to how to proceed.

What May I Not Write?

Question #1: Invitations

“I was told that I should not include quotations from pesukim on my daughter’s wedding invitation. Yet I see that ‘everyone’ does! Could you please explain the halacha?”

Question #2: Sukkah Decorations

“Someone told me that sukkah decorations should not include any pesukim. Is this true? My children bring home decorations like this from school.”

To answer these questions, we need to explain several halachic issues, including:

1. The original prohibition against writing Torah she’be’al peh, and the later “heter” to write and publish it.

2. The concern about producing divrei Torah that will not be treated appropriately.

The original prohibition against writing Torah she’be’al peh

Originally, it was prohibited to write down any Torah she’be’al peh (Gittin 60b), except for an individual’s personal notes recorded for one’s own review (Rambam, Introduction to Mishneh Torah; see also Rashi, Shabbos 6b s.v. Megilas). The Oral Torah was not permitted to be taught from a written format. Torah she’be’al peh was meant to be just that — Torah taught completely without any written text. Thus, Moshe Rabbeinu taught us the halachos of the Torah orally, and Klal Yisrael memorized them. Although each student wrote private notes for the sake of review, the Oral Torah was never taught from these notes.

The prohibition against writing Torah she’be’al peh included writing midrashim, prayers and the texts of berachos, as well as translations and commentaries of the Written Torah, since all these are considered Torah she’be’al peh. In those times, all these devarim she’be’kedusha were memorized, and the only parts of the Torah that were written were the pesukim themselves.

The Gemara (Gittin 60b) records this halacha as follows: Devarim she’be’al peh, iy atah resha’ie le’omram bichsav, “You are not permitted to transmit the Oral Torah in writing.” The Ritva (ad loc.) explains that this is because divrei Torah taught verbally are understood more precisely, whereas text learning is often misunderstood.

Another prohibition forbade writing the books of Tanach except when writing a complete sefer (Gittin 60a). Thus, one could not write out a parsha or a few pesukim for learning, although it was permitted to write an entire Chumash, such as Sefer Shemos. Similarly, one could not write out part of a sefer of Navi to study or to read the haftarah. In order to recite the haftarahs regularly, every shul needed to own a scroll of each of the eight Nevi’im (Yehoshua, Shoftim, Shemuel, Melachim, Yeshayahu, Yirmiyahu, Yechezkel, and Terei Asar) in order to read the haftarah from the appropriate sefer. Similarly, a person who wished to study Shiras Devorah or the prayer of Channah had to write the entire Sefer Shoftim or Sefer Shemuel.

Why do we no longer abide by this prohibition?

Chazal realized that it was becoming increasingly difficult for people to learn Torah and to observe certain other mitzvos, such as reading the haftarah. Therefore, they ruled that the prohibition against writing Torah must be superseded by the more vital need of keeping Torah alive in klal Yisrael. This takanah was based on the pasuk, Eis la’asos laShem heifeiru torasecha, which is understood to mean “It is the time to act for Hashem, since Your Torah is being uprooted” (Tehillim 119:126). In order to facilitate Torah study, they permitted writing individual verses and teaching Oral Torah from written texts. We will refer to this takanah, or heter, as “eis la’asos.”

The first part of the Oral Torah to be formally written for structured teaching was the Mishnah, edited by Rebbe (Rabbi Yehudah Hanasi) at the end of the period of the tanna’im (circa 3960/200 c.e.). To quote the Rambam, “Rebbe gathered all the laws and explanations that had been studied and interpreted by every beis din since the days of Moshe Rabbeinu and organized the Mishnah from them. He (Rebbe) proceeded to teach publicly the scholars of his generation from this text, so that the Oral Torah would not be forgotten from the Jewish people. Why did Rebbe change the method that had been used previously? Because he saw that the numbers of Torah students were decreasing, the difficulties facing the Jewish people were on the rise, the Roman Empire was becoming stronger, and the Jews were becoming increasingly scattered. He therefore authored one work that would be in the hands of all the students, to make it easier to study and remember the Oral Torah” (Introduction to Mishneh Torah).

We see that Rebbe instituted the first formalized use of a text to teach the Oral Torah, because of the new circumstances confronting klal Yisrael. After Rebbe’s days, Chazal gradually permitted writing down other texts, first Aggadah (ethical teachings of the Gemara), later the entire Gemara, and still later, the explanations and commentaries on the Gemara.

As a very important aside, we see from the end of the quoted Rambam, “to make it easier to study and remember the Oral Torah,” that even though it is now permitted to write down the Mishnah and Gemara, it is still important to know the entire Oral Torah by heart. The Rambam seems to explain that the Oral Torah that each individual is required to know includes all the accepted conclusions of the Torah she’be’al peh.

In the context of the rule of eis la’asos, the Gemara tells us the following story:

Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakeish (amora’im in Eretz Yisrael shortly after the time of Rebbe) were studying from a Talmudic anthology of ethical teachings, a “sefer Aggadah.”

The Gemara asks, “How could they study from such a book, since it is prohibited to learn Torah from a written text?” The Gemara replies, “Since it is now impossible (to retain all the knowledge of the Torah without a written text), ‘it is the time to act for Hashem, since Your Torah is being uprooted’” (Gittin 60a). We see that the Gemara initially assumed that it was still prohibited to study Torah from a written text, except for the study of Mishnah. The Gemara responded that the prohibition had been further relaxed because it had become even more difficult to learn Torah than it had been in the days of Rebbe.

The Gemara relates a similar episode concerning the recital of the haftarah. As mentioned above, it was originally forbidden to write part of a book of Tanach, and, therefore, every shul needed to own scrolls of all the Nevi’im in order to read the haftarahs. However, as communities became more scattered, making this increasingly difficult, the Gemara permitted the writing of special haftarah books that contained only the haftarah texts, but not the text of the entire Nevi’im. This, too, was permitted because of eis la’asos (Gittin 60a).

What else is permitted because of eis la’asos?

We see that in order to facilitate Torah learning, Chazal permitted the writing of the Oral Torah and parts of the books of the Written Torah. To what extent did they override the original prohibition?

This is a dispute among early poskim, some contending that it is permitted to write only as much as is necessary to prevent Torah from being forgotten. According to this opinion, it is prohibited to write or print even tefillos that include pesukim, when they are not intended for learning Torah (Rif and Milchemes Hashem, Shabbos Chapter 16). This opinion also prohibits writing or printing a translation of Tanach into any language other than the original Aramaic Targum, because a proper translation constitutes Torah she’be’al peh. In addition, this opinion prohibits the printing of a parsha of Chumash in order to teach Torah, since one could write or print the entire sefer (Rambam, Hilchos Sefer Torah 7:14; Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 283:2).

Other poskim permit the writing of any Torah that one uses to learn. Thus, they permit writing a single parsha in order to teach Torah (Taz, Yoreh Deah 283:1; Shach, Yoreh Deah 283:3) and the translating of Tanach into any language. These poskim rally support to their opinion from the fact that Rav Saadya Gaon wrote sefarim in Arabic, including commentaries on Tanach (Ran, Shabbos,Chapter 16).

Both opinions agree that it is prohibited to publish translations of Tanach that will not be used to spread Torah knowledge (Ran, Shabbos, Chapter 16).

How does this prohibition affect us?

All of the opinions quoted above prohibit writing disparate parts of the Written Torah and any of the Oral Torah in situations where there is no Torah benefit. For this reason, early poskim note that one may not embroider a pasuk or a beracha on a talis, since writing thisdoes not serve to teach Torah (Rabbeinu Yerucham, quoted by Beis Yosef, and Taz, Yoreh Deah 283:3. It should be noted that the Levush is more lenient, see Shach, Yoreh Deah 283:6.).

Another concern

There is an additional reason why one should not embroider pesukim on a talis. Since the talis could be brought into an unclean place, it is not proper to have a pasuk written on it.

A third concern – causing the words of Torah to be destroyed

To explain this concept, we must first introduce a surprising statement of the Gemara: Ko’sevei berachos kesorfei Torah, “Those who write berachos (to enable people to recite them) are considered as if they burnt the Torah” (Shabbos 115b). What does this Gemara mean? We would think that these individuals have performed a tremendous mitzvah, since they have enabled people to recite berachos correctly!

This statement was authored at the time when it was still prohibited to write down the Oral Torah. At that time, it was forbidden to teach any halachos in written form, even the correct text of a beracha. Everything had to be taught orally. Therefore, the Gemara states that by writing a beracha, even without the name of Hashem (Shu’t Tashbeitz #2), one is violating the halacha by teaching Torah she’be’al peh in writing.

But why is it considered like “burning the Torah”?

This Gemara introduces a new prohibition. Someone who writes prohibited Torah works is considered culpable afterwards, if those divrei Torah become consumed by a fire! Writing unnecessarily, which results in subsequent destruction, is akin to burning Torah.

We know that it is prohibited to erase or destroy the Name of Hashem (Shabbos 120b), and that this prohibition includes erasing or destroying words of Torah and all other holy writings, including notes of Torah classes, stories of Chazal, sefarim for learning, “benschers,” etc., even if they do not include Hashem’s Name (Shu’t Tashbeitz #2). Therefore, even small benschers, tefillos haderech and similar items published with abbreviated names of Hashem are still considered divrei Torah imbued with kedusha. For the above reason, one must treat these items with proper care and dignity and place them in sheimos when they become unusable.

It is also prohibited to cause destruction of words of the Torah indirectly by writing or publishing divrei Torah that might subsequently be destroyed. This prohibition exists whenever there is insufficient reason to write or publish the divrei Torah.This explains the Gemara’s statement, quoted above, that someone who wrote berachos when it was prohibited to do so is held responsible, if the words of Torah are subsequently destroyed.

Although, nowadays, we are permitted to write and print berachos and siddurim to enable people to recite them properly, it is forbidden to produce these items unnecessarily. It is certainly prohibited to put pesukim, parts of pesukim, or divrei Torah in places where it is likely that they will be treated improperly. Both of these reasons preclude writing pesukim on Sukkah decorations, unless one can assume that they will be properly cared for.

How much of a pasuk is considered to be divrei Torah?

Even three words in a row are considered a pasuk that may not be written without sufficient reason (see Gittin 6b). However, if the letters are improperly or incompletely formed or spelled, it is permitted (Shu’t Tashbeitz #2).

For this reason, some people print on invitations the following, Naaleh es Yerushalayim al rosh simchaseinu, “We will place our memories of Yerushalayim above our celebrations.” This is permitted, because it is not a quotation of a pasuk, although it is similar to the posuk in Tehillim 137:6.

There is another solution that may be used: rearranging the words of the pasuk so that they are not in the correct order. When doing this, one must be certain that one does not have three words in the proper order.

I once received an invitation which stated on the cover, Yom zeh asah Hashem nismecha venagila bo, “This day was made by Hashem. We shall rejoice and celebrate on it.” The person who prepared this quotation had done his halachic research. Although very similar to the pasuk, “Zeh hayom asah Hashem nagilah v’nismecha bo” (Tehillim 118:24), the words of the original pasuk were transposed in such a way that there were no longer three consecutive words together!

Some authorities permit printing pesukim if marks are placed between the words, or if the words are not in a straight line. They feel that these arrangements of words do not constitute pesukim (cf. Shu’t Tashbeitz #2 who disagrees).

Some producers of “lulav bags” are meticulous not to quote three words of the pasuk in order. Thus, they write, “Ul’kachtem lachem… kapos temarim…us’machtem” avoiding writing three consecutive words of a pasuk (Vayikra 23:40). This is permitted.

Invitations

Perhaps people who print pesukim on invitations rely on the fact that this is considered mere poetic writing style, or that the printer has no intent to produce divrei kedusha. However, recent authorities prohibit this practice. In Sivan 5750/June ’90, an open letter signed by the poskei hador warned that advertisements, invitations, receipts, signs, and raffle tickets should not include pesukim or parts of pesukim, except when the pasuk is written as part of literary style, with no connection to its context.

We live in an age of proliferation of written material. Many pamphlets have the positive value of spreading Torah. We must be careful to show our honor to Hashem by treating pesukim and divrei Torah with proper respect. May we always merit to demonstrate Hashem’s honor in the appropriate way!

Klal Hatzarich Lifrat

Question #1: Klal hatzarich lifrat

What is the difference between a klal ufrat and a klal shehu tzarich lifrat?

Question #2: Prat shehu tzarich lichlal

What is the difference between a prat uchlal and a prat shehu tzarich lichlal?

Question #3: Frequency

Which klal shehu tzarich lifrat is the most commonly occurring in Chumash?

Introduction

At the end of the korbanos section of our daily morning prayers, we quote a beraisa that cites the thirteen midos, hermeneutic (check your dictionary) rules of Rabbi Yishmael. These are a listing of methods whereby the laws of the Torah shebe’al peh are derived from the Written Torah. These midos were taught to Moshe Rabbeinu at Har Sinai as part of the Oral Torah. The midos are a backup system to recover the Oral Laws should, G-d forbid, any of them be forgotten.

The first six of Rabbi Yishmael’s list — kal vachomer, gezeirah shavah, binyan av, klal ufrat, prat uchlal, klal ufrat uchlal — are far more commonly used than are most of the others, and are familiar to someone who has studied a significant amount of Gemara. This article will focus on the difference between the fairly common rule of klal ufrat and the uncommon klal hatzarich lifrat, which appears only a few times in the entire Talmud. Explaining the difference between these two created much literature during the generations of the rishonim and the early acharonim. This article will attempt to be non-controversial, but to explain the differences in a clear way.

Klal ufrat refers to a klal, a generality, and a prat, a specification. The rule of klal ufrat applies when the Torah states a generality followed by a specification. The rule applied is ein bichlal ela mah shebe’prat, we derive only what the detail includes. For example, the Torah says: “A person who offers a korban from animals may bring cattle or flock” (Vayikra 1:2). “From animals” is a klal, since it implies that someone could offer any species of animal as a korban, whereas “from cattle or flock” is a prat, limiting the species that one can offer as korbanos to cattle, sheep and goats. Because the rule applied to a klal ufrat is ein bichlal ela mah shebe’prat, these three species are the only mammals that may be offered as sacrifices, even though there are many other kosher mammals, including antelope, bison, buffalo, deer, giraffe, musk ox and yak. Although these latter may be eaten, they cannot be offered as korbanos, even as voluntary donations.

Prat uchlal

Prat uchlal is the exact opposite of a klal ufrat; it involves a specific example followed by a general category. In this instance, the general category is all-inclusive and not limited to the specific example. To illustrate: The Torah teaches, “You may not see your brother’s ox or sheep wandering and hide yourself from them. You must return them to your brother…. You shall do so for his donkey, you shall do so for his garment and you shall do so for any item that your brother has lost” (Devarim 22:1 and 3). The general category “any item” follows several, specific examples – ox, sheep, donkey and garment. Because of the rule of prat uchlal, the obligation to return lost property applies to any lost item, not only to those specified in the verse.

Klal hatzarich lifrat

At this point, I need to explain my opening question, “What is the difference between a klal ufrat and a klal shehu tzarich lifrat?”

The next rule taught in the beraisa of Rabbi Yishmael is Klal shehu tzarich lifrat, prat shehu tzarich lichlal. Although the name of this rule may sound similar to klal ufrat above, this is a completely different rule and applies only in special circumstances. The word tzarich means that the klal cannot be understood without the subsequent prat. In other words, the original klal has more than one interpretation and bears widely ranging meanings and halachic applications. The correct interpretation of the klal can be achieved only by use of the prat (Rashi and Tosafos, Chullin 88b; Ra’avad, Introduction to the Sifra; Halichos Olam 4:32; Yavin Shemuah ad loc.).

It will be easiest to explain this concept with a few examples: The Torah (Vayikra 17:13) commands us that, after shechting fowl or chayos (such as deer or antelope), we are required וכסהו בעפר, vechisahu be’afar, “to cover the blood with earth.” The word “cover,” both in English and its Hebrew original root word כסה, can mean several different things. For example, let us examine the word as it is used in Parshas Vayeishev where the pasuk describes how Yehudah convinced his brothers not to murder Yosef: mah betza ki naharog es achinu vechisinu (shoresh כסה) es damo, “What do we profit if we kill our brother and ‘cover’ his blood” (Bereishis 37:26). The successful way of “covering” foul play is to obliterate the murdered man’s blood in a way that no one will ever see it again. This would mean that they would hide his blood, presumably by burying it deeply underground.

Similarly, in Parshas Vayeira (Bereishis 18:17), Hashem says, “Will I hide המכסה)) from Avraham what I am about to do” (Ra’avad to Toras Kohanim)? Yet another example is the following passage from Mishlei (11:13), Holeich rachil megaleh sod vene’eman ruach mechaseh (again with the shoresh כסה) davar, “A gossip reveals secrets, whereas someone reliable hides matters” (quoted in this context by Halichos Olam 4:32). In each of these instances, the word כסה means to “hide” in the sense of reducing visibility or making unknown. Understanding the word vechisahu this way in the context of kisui hadam would result in a mistake: that the mitzvah is to hide or obliterate the blood by pouring it down a drain or burying it upon bedrock in the bowels of the earth. One might think that the mitzvah is to make sure that Scotland Yard cannot detect that an animal was slaughtered here. Others explain that it might mean to place a board, plate or bowl on top of the blood, which also covers it.

When the word be’afar is added to the expression vechisahu, it now means to mix the blood with earth and to have the liquid of the blood absorbed by a powder or something similar (Rashi and Tosafos, Chullin 88b; Ra’avad, Sifra; Halichos Olam 4:32; Yavin Shemuah; cf. Rabbeinu Tam, Chullin op. cit.). The halacha is that any similar powder fulfills the mitzvah lechatchilah, including sawdust, sand, ashes or even gold dust (Chullin 88b), for those with expensive tastes. It is perfectly permitted to have the color of the blood, and thus its existence, completely noticeable, which would not “hide” the blood from Sherlock Holmes. Thus, the word be’afar changes the entire meaning of the word vechisahu, and the halacha that results is completely different. This is why it is called a klal shehu tzarich lifrat, meaning that the prat is necessary for the klal to be understood correctly.

Another example

The Toras Kohanim that quotes and explains the beraisa of Rabbi Yishmael provides the following example to help us understand this principle. Parshas Bo contains the following pasuk: “Sanctify for Me every firstborn, the first to descend from any womb among the Benei Yisrael, whether human or animal (Shemos 13:2). Another pasuk, states: “Every firstborn male that will be born among your cattle or your flock you shall sanctify to Hashem”(Devarim 15:19). The first pasuk attributes sanctity to “every firstborn,” which should also include every female firstborn. A literal reading of this pasuk implies that we are required to redeem a firstborn daughter just as there is such a mitzvah for the firstborn son. Additionally, the firstborn female lamb, kid, calf or donkey foal would have sanctity. Only the detail in the second pasuk teaches that this kedusha is restricted to male offspring, teaching that there is a mitzvah of pidyon haben only, but not of pidyon habas.

But what about a firstborn male born via Caeserian section? Is he not firstborn? Or, for that matter, the firstborn son who is born after an older sister? Doesn’t the pasuk in Devarim say that “Every firstborn male… you shall sanctify”? Is he not technically a “firstborn male” and he should require a pidyon haben?

The answer to this question is that the klal shehu tzarich lifrat teaches that we are not to explain either the words, “Sanctify for Me every firstborn,” or the words, “Every firstborn male,” literally, but that both klalim are to be explained according to the combined pratim of both pesukim. The result is that only a male, naturally born as his mother’s first offspring has the sanctity and laws of a bechor (Bechoros 19a).

Here is a third example of a klal shehu tzarich lifrat: In describing the punishment of the daughter of a kohein who commits adultery, the Torah teaches ba’eish tisareif, “She shall be burned in fire” (Vayikra 21:9). This is a slightly variant type of klal shehu tzarich lifrat, because the word ba’eish, “in fire,” the prat, comes before “she shall be burned,” the klal. It is still a klal shehu tzarich lifrat — the klal, tisareif, requires the prat to explain what it means.

By the way, the Torah says either ba’eish tisareif or ba’eish yisareif in five other places. Each of these instances is understood the same way halachically.

Prat shehu tzarich lichlal

Prat shehu tzarich lichlal is not a new, different rule, but another application of the rule of klal shehu tzarich lifrat. In this instance, the prat requires the klal to explain what it means. Without the klal, the prat would be misinterpreted.

In preparation of this article, I tried to find examples of prat shehu tzarich lichlal. Neither the beraisa of Rabbi Yishmael nor the Toras Kohanim that explains this beraisa provide any example; nor does the Ra’avad in his commentary. The only explicit example I found is an explanation of a case that we mentioned above, the case of bechor. Rashi (Bechoros 19a) notes that the words zachar, “male,” and peter rechem, the “first to descend from the womb,” are both pratim that, on their own, would include more cases than the halacha requires. Zachar would have included the oldest male born, even when he has an older sister or sisters. The prat, zachar, requires a klal, bechor, to explain that only when the oldest male is also the firstborn does he have kedusha.

Similarly, the prat, peter rechem, would mean the first to be born naturally, notwithstanding that he has older brothers who were born via Caeserian section. Only because we have the klal, bechor, do we know that the prat is limited to a firstborn who is born naturally. Therefore, the halachic conclusion is dependent not only on klal shehu tzarich lifrat but also on prat shehu tzarich lichlal.

Prat shehu tzarich lichlal

We now have enough information to answer the second of our opening questions: “What is the difference between prat uchlal and prat shehu tzarich lichlal?”

They are totally different methods of learning halachos. A prat uchlal widens the rule just taught to include anything that would be included in the klal, whereas a prat shehu tzarich lichlal is soemthing that would be misunderstood would it not be for both terms used by the pasuk. It allows us to zero in on what the Torah is teaching.

We can also now answer the third of our opening questions: “Which klal shehu tzarich lifrat is the most commonly occurring in Chumash?”

The answer is that the verses ba’eish tisareif or ba’eish yisareif show up six times in the Torah and are examples of klal shehu tzarich lifrat.

Be’ezras Hashem, we will continue this topic of analyzing the thirteen midos taught by Rabbi Yishmael in future weeks.

The Thirteen Midos of Rabbi Yishmael

Question #1: Reasoning

Can we restore a lost mesorah on the basis of logic?

Question #2: Kal vachomer

If an opening is large enough for a football tackle to rush through unimpeded, shouldn’t a healthy ten-year-old be able to walk through it?

Question #3: Gezeirah shavah

What is meant that something is an “equal decree”?

Foreword:

Immediately prior to the kaddish derabbanan recited at the end of the korbanos section of our davening, we recite a beraisa in which we enumerate the thirteen “midos” of Rabbi Yishmael, a listing of methods whereby the laws of the Torah shebe’al peh are derived from the written Torah. This beraisa is the beginning of the introduction to the Sifra (also called the Toras Kohanim), the halachic midrash of the book of Vayikra.

The goal of this article is to explain the beraisa of Rabbi Yishmael, but I must first explain what halachic midrash is. Halachic midrash is the method whereby the laws of the Torah shebe’al peh can be derived from the Written Torah. When Moshe Rabbeinu spent forty days on Har Sinai, Hashem taught him all the laws of the Oral Torah. Moshe then taught these laws to the Bnei Yisrael in a method that is described in the Gemara (Eruvin 54b) such that each adult male Jew would hear the laws four different times. Each person kept his own private notes to help him remember the laws of the Torah shebe’al peh.

The system was not perfect. When Moshe Rabbeinu passed on, the Jewish people realized collectively that they could not recall clearly thousands of laws that Moshe had taught them. The Gemara teaches that Asniel ben Kenaz was able to restore these laws to the collective memory by figuring them out bepilpulo, by use of dialectic reasoning.

To quote the passage of Gemara (Temurah 16a):

Immediately prior to his passing on to Gan Eden, Moshe Rabbeinu said to Yehoshua,

“Ask of me every doubt that you have!” Yehoshua answered, “Rebbe, have I left you for a moment and gone somewhere else? Did you not write about me that ‘his assistant, Yehoshua bin Nun, never left the ohel mo’eid’” (Shemos 33:11)? At that moment, Yehoshua weakened (as a punishment for the lack of humility implicit in his answer [Maharsha; cf. Rashi]): he forgot three hundred halachos and also now had seven hundred uncertainties (which were discovered after Moshe passed away). The entire people of Israel rose up against Yehoshua, planning to kill him… The beraisa taught: seventeen hundred cases of kal vachomer, gezeirah shavah, and derived halachic details were forgotten during the mourning period for Moshe. Rabbi Avahu responded that they were “retrieved by Asniel ben Kenaz with his dialectic reasoning.”

Thus, the opening question to our article: “How can we restore a lost mesorah on the basis of logic?”

The answer is that, alongside the Torah shebe’al peh and the written Torah, there is a mesorah of rules whereby the laws of the Torah shebe’al peh are derived from the written Torah. These laws were all part of the original Oral Torah, as were the rules, which provide a backup whereby the laws may be retrieved should they be forgotten.

The rules for deriving the laws fall into two categories:

Extra words — yalfusa

1. Some halachos are derived on the basis of extra words or parts of words in the Torah. An example of this is that, when the Torah provides lengthy instructions for offering the various korbanos each day of Sukkos, a discerning reader will notice that the template reading of the different days is not identical. While the wine libations on these days are identical, the word used to describe those libations varies, twice with a מ added and once with a י added. These extra letters spell the word מים, water, whence we derive that, on Sukkos, there is a unique service called nisuch hamayaim, pouring of water on the mizbei’ach. This law is not mentioned anywhere else in the Written Torah, but is expounded upon in the Oral Torah, the Torah shebe’al peh.

Clearly understanding the pesukim of the Torah provides the sources for these halachos, and this is a common way that these laws are derived by the Gemara and by the halachic midrashim. Understanding the grammar as Chazal understood the pesukim of the Torah is an essential way towards deriving these laws. The absolute master in explaining these rules is the Malbim, in his work entitled Ayeles Hashachar, usually printed as an introduction to his commentary to Vayikra. The Malbim writes that he had originally planned to provide a thorough explanation of the halachic exegesis process as a running commentary to the Sifra. However, after writing the commentary to just two pesukim, he discovered that the results of this work would be the length of a multi-volume encyclopedia. As a result, he wrote instead an introductory work, Ayeles Hashachar, elucidating the grammatical principles whereby Chazal derived the words of the Torah as a source for the laws of Torah shebe’al peh. Throughout his commentary to Vayikra, the Malbim refers to the Ayeles Hashachar to explain how Chazal understood each pasuk and arrived at their conclusion.

Midos

2. Other halachos are derived on the basis of hermeneutic rules, called midos,that are methods whereby halachos not obviously mentioned in the written Torah are taught. In other words, these halachos were included in the Torah shebe’al peh, but, again, as a backup, they could also be derived on the basis of the rules of Torah shebe’al peh. The thirteen rules that we recite in our davening is Rabbi Yishmael’s version of these rules. There are slight discrepancies or differences of opinion among tanna’im concerning some of the rules used to derive these laws, meaning that the details of how these rules work were occasionally disputed. That is why the midos are referred to as the thirteen rules of Rabbi Yishmael. This article will not address the disputes.

These are the thirteen rules that are mentioned in the beraisa of Rabbi Yishmael, as understood by the Ra’avad and most late commentators:

1. Kal vachomer

2. Gezeirah shavah

3. Binyan av

4. Klal ufrat

5. Prat uchlal

6. Klal ufrat uchlal

7. Klal shehu tzarich lefrat

8. Davar shehayah bichlal viyatza lelameid

9. Davar shehayah bichlal viyatza ke’inyano

10. Davar shehayah bichlal viyatza shelo ke’inyano

11. Davar shehayah bichlal viyatza bedavar chodosh

12. Davar halameid mei’inyano

13. Shnei kesuvim hamach’chishin.

Those familiar with the beraisa of Rabbi Yishmael will immediately note that I have omitted significant sections of the beraisa.

A. In some instances, the beraisa provides two variations of a rule, such as, it presents two types of binyan av. I will explain why there are two types, but they are both manifestations of the same hermeneutic principle.

B. Some of these rules are mentioned by the beraisa without any explanation as to how they work or what they mean. For example, four of the first five rules, kal vachomer, gezeira shavah, klal uprat and prat uchlal are not at all explained. On the other hand, the method of derivation of most of the other rules is mentioned in the beraisa, although they are never fully explained. Iy”H, I will be explaining these rules.

Frequency

We should also be aware that some of these rules have thousands of applications, whereas others of them appear very few times in all of Talmudic literature.

Kal vachomer

At this point, I will explain the first of Rabbi Yishmael’s midos,which is perhaps the most obvious rule in terms of logic: the kal vachomer. Among the thirteen rules, this one is unique, because it actually appears several times in the Chumash itself as part of someone’s logical argument. For example, to prove that they are innocent of stealing Yosef’s goblet, the brothers rally a kal vachomer. “If we returned the money that we found in our sacks, how could we possibly have considered taking something that is not ours?” (Bereishis 44:8).

Very simply put, a kal vachomer means that if something is true in a more obvious situation, it should certainly hold true in a less obvious situation. A simple application is as follows: If a burly, 6’ 10” football tackle weighing 350 pounds can race through a passageway unhindered, a 100-pound, 5’ person with no ambulatory difficulties should certainly be able to enter via the same opening.

Ein onshin min hadin

There are a few instances in which a kal vachomer cannot teach a halacha. Although a kal vachomer can prove that something is prohibited, it cannot be used to establish punishment, a principle called ein onshin min hadin. When the Torah imposes a penalty or punishment for violating a law, we cannot derive by means of a kal vachomer that this penalty or punishment applies to a newly derived law.

Why not?

We find two different reasons why ein onshin min hadin. One is that, although the punishment described by the Torah may be appropriate for a lesser crime, someone violating a more serious infraction should perhaps be punished in a harsher way. In other words, kal vachomer can teach that if the Torah prohibited a lesser sin, it certainly prohibited a more serious infraction. However, the more serious crime might require a more severe punishment than what the Torah meted out for the lesser offense.

Another reason explains that ein onshin min hadin is based on possible human logical fallibility. In general, we are obligated to apply our G-d-given intelligence when studying mitzvos, and kal vachomer is an example of this. However, prior to meting out judgment on the basis of a kal vachomer, we must recognize that there might be a reason why what appears as a kal vachomer is actually not. According to this approach, the Torah’s precept not to punish someone until and unless we are absolutely certain of his guilt requires that he not be punished on the basis of a kal vachomer.

These two approaches are not mutually exclusive; both factors might be true. We cannot punish someone on the basis of a kal vachomer because the kal vachomer itself may not be fully accurate; or the kal vachomer may be correct, and precisely because this act is a more serious crime its perpetrator should not be punished this way.

Dayo

There is another instance whereby someone might think he can apply a kal vachomer, but he cannot. This is referred to as a case of dayo laba min hadin li’heyos kanidon, which means that you cannot derive with a kal vachomer more than the original source teaches, regardless as to how compelling the kal vachomer might appear. The Sifra picks an example of this from a pasuk in Chumash. When Miriam complained to Aharon about Moshe’s behavior regarding his wife Tziporah, Miriam was guilty of saying loshon hora at that moment and turned white as a metzora. The pasuk then states, “Had her father spat in her face, would she not not have been ashamed for seven days” (Bamidbar 12:14). The Sifra completes the thought of the pasuk:for violating what Hashem has taught, she should be punished for fourteen days. Yet the Torah continues that her punishment is for seven days! Since the Torah concludes that she should be punished for no longer than she would have had her father censured her, any longer cannot be attributed to the kal vachomer.

Gezeirah shavah

The second principle of Rabbi Yishmael’s list is gezeirah shavah, which is a legal analogy based on the use of the same term in two separate cases. To explain this, we first need to translate and explain the words. Most people familiar with the concept of gezeirah shavah are not aware of the origin of the term. The word gezeirah in this context means “word structure;” the word shavah means “similarity.” Therefore, the term means “a similarity of words.”

Here is an example of a gezeirah shavah: through the use of the same term regarding the mitzvos of eating matzoh on Seder night and on sitting in the sukkah on Sukkos we derive that, although on the rest of the seven days of Sukkos a person may avoid eating bread and other foods that require him to eat in the sukkah, on the first night of Sukkos he is, indeed, required to eat a meal in the sukkah.

Please note that the halacha requiring that we eat in the sukkah on the first night was taught as a mesorah from Sinai. The gezeirah shavah is a means for making certain that this law would not be forgotten.

At this point, we can answer another of our opening questions: What is meant that something is an “equal decree”?

The answer is that this is a complete mistranslation and misunderstanding of the words gezeirah shavah, just as a “helicopter mom” does not require a pilot’s license. The word gezeirah shavah means “a similarity of words.”

Same meaning

Those who are familiar with studying the concept of gezeirah shavah as it surfaces in the Gemara know that sometimes a gezeirah shavah is the exact same word, other times it is the same root, but not the exact same word, and at other times it can even be two words or terms that mean the same thing but are completely different words. One example of this last case is a gezeirah shavah that the Gemara derives from the words shav and ba in the laws of metzora (which is cited by Rashi on Chumash, Vayikra 14:39). Another example is where the words shachat and zavach are used as a gezeirah shavah (Chullin 85a). The two words both mean to slaughter.

There are many rules governing how a gezeirah shavah may be used to derive laws, depending on such issues as whether the word is repeated in both instances of its application, the exact word is used in both places, and are there other places in which a more obvious comparison may exist. We will not study these differences in our article.

Most people do not realize how many gezeiros shavos actually exist. I am in possession of a lengthy manuscript that explains many of the usages and rules applying to gezeirah shavah, and includes an extensive list of every case of gezeirah shavah that its author identified — over four hundred instances of gezeirah shavah and thousands of applications.

Gezeirah shavah is unlike any of the other thirteen midos in one very important way: regarding every other midah, a general mesorah exists to use the midah to derive halachos. Gezeirah shavah, on the other hand, requires that there is also a mesorah via Moshe at Har Sinai that the specific words are a gezeirah shavah. Otherwise, ein adam dan gezeirah shavah mei’atzmo, someone cannot declare that certain terms or words are a gezeirah shavah on the basis of his own personal authority.

Exception

Based on a passage of Talmud Yerushalmi (Pesachim 6:1), we know that there is one exception to this rule. The Yerushalmi notes that, in an instance when we have a mesorah from an earlier source that a specific law is true, but we no longer know the hermeneutic origin for this law, someone may suggest a comparable word association, a gezeirah shavah that might be the hermeneutic source for this law.

However, in this instance, we cannot derive any new rulings with the gezeirah shavah. All we can do is suggest that perhaps the hermeneutic source of this law is the gezeirah shavah. (According to many rishonim, including Rashi, a similar concept exists relative to Halacha leMoshe miSinai. When we know that a halacha is true, but we are unaware that it has a hermeneutic source, we can suggest that its origin is a Halacha leMoshe miSinai [see Rashi, Bava Kama 3b].)

Be’ezras Hashem, we will continue this topic of analyzing the thirteen midos taught by Rabbi Yishmael in a future week.

Conclusion

When the Gemara teaches that the teachings of the rabbonim are dearer to Hashem than the laws of the Torah, it certainly includes the vast halachic literature devoted to understanding the thirteen midos. The Gemara expresses this notion by saying that what is derived from a drasha is more cherished even than the Written Torah (Yevamos 2b; 3a; see also Ritva and Aruch Laneir, Makkos 13a; Maharam Lublin, Bava Kamma 17b). To quote Rav Chaggai in the name of Rav Shmuel bar Nachman: “The Torah refers to that which is taught in the Oral Torah and that which is taught in the Written Torah, yet we do not know which is more cherished. When the pasuk states, ‘according to these words I sealed the treaty with you and with Yisrael’ (Yirmiyahu 33:25), this teaches us that the Oral Torah is more dear” (Yerushalmi, Peah 2:4).

Under the Big Top

Since parshas Ki Sissa shares with us the most we will ever understand about Hashem, it is an opportune time to discuss:

“Why do some people wear big yarmulkes that cover their entire head?”

“How large must my yarmulke be?”

“Is there a halachic difference between going bareheaded indoors versus outdoors?”

“Why don’t we clip a waterproof yarmulke to our heads while we swim?”

“May one swear an oath, using G-d’s Name, while bareheaded?”

Answer:

All of the above questions concern the laws regarding covering one’s head and walking bareheaded, a topic mentioned several times in the Gemara. For example:

“Rabbi Huna, the son of Rabbi Yehoshua, did not walk four amos (about seven feet) with an uncovered head, saying, ‘The Shechinah is above my head’” (Kiddushin 31a). Similarly, the Gemara says elsewhere that Rabbi Huna the son of Rabbi Yehoshua said about himself, “I will be rewarded, because I never walked four amos with an uncovered head” (Shabbos 118b).

“Ravina was sitting in front of Rav Yirmiyah of Difti when a man passed by and did not cover his head. Ravina said to Rav Yirmiyah of Difti, ‘How arrogant is this man (for walking bareheaded in the presence of Torah scholars)?’ Rav Yirmiyah responded, ‘Perhaps he comes from the town of Mechasya, where the people are so familiar with talmidei chachamim (that in their presence the townspeople do not cover their heads)” (Kiddushin 33a).

“An astrologer told the mother of Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak: ‘Your son will be a thief.’ To avoid this from happening, she made sure that his head was always covered, and cautioned him: ‘Cover your head, so that you will always be in fear of Heaven and always pray for Divine assistance in serving Hashem.’ Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak was unaware of the reason behind her instructions, but always followed them meticulously, from his youth and on into adulthood, when he became a great Torah scholar. One day, he was studying Torah under a date palm that was not his, when his head covering fell off. Raising his eyes, he saw the dates, and his yetzer hora overwhelmed him. It was so powerful that he snapped off dates with his teeth, thus fulfilling the prophecy of the astrologer” (Shabbos 156b).

Mesechta Sofrim, which is a collection of beraisos, or halachic teachings of the tanna’im not included in the Mishnah, quotes a dispute whether someone whose head is uncovered

may lead the services by being poreis al shema, which means to recite kaddish and borchu that follow the pesukei dezimra. (There are various opinions as to how much of the prayer is included in poreis al shema, a topic beyond the scope of this article.) The first opinion, mentioned anonymously, permits someone bareheaded to lead the services, whereas the second opinion prohibits doing so, because one may not say Hashem’s name with an uncovered head (Sofrim 14:15). In a dispute of this nature, the general rule is that we follow the first opinion, although, in this particular dispute, we find authorities who rule according to the second opinion.

The Rambam about being bareheaded

The Rambam prohibits praying the shemoneh esrei bareheaded (Hilchos Tefillah 5:5), and he also states that it is appropriate for a talmid chacham to cover his head at all times (Hilchos Dei’os 5:6).

Interpreting the Talmudic sources

Based on the above sources, most, but not all, halachic authorities contend that, in Talmudic times, covering one’s head was performed on special occasions, such as when praying, reciting blessings, and in the presence of a Torah scholar, but was not always otherwise observed (Tur, Orach Chayim 8, as explained by Darkei Moshe; Shu”t Maharshal #72; Gra on Orach Chayim 8:2). These rulings imply that someone other than a talmid chacham is not required to cover his head, except when davening. As we will soon see, most authorities conclude that, today, one is required to cover one’s head, because of reasons that did not apply in the time of the Gemara.

A minority opinion

We must note that one prominent late authority, Rav Shelomo Kluger, understands the Talmudic sources in a different way. He contends that, even in earlier times, it was forbidden to leave one’s head completely uncovered. In his opinion, the passages that imply that a person may go bareheaded are, in fact, allowing him to have his head partially covered (Shu”t Ha’elef Lecha Shelomo #3).

Protecting from sin

According to all opinions, covering one’s head helps achieve yiras shamayim, being in constant recognition and awe of G-d’s presence, as borne out by the anecdote of Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak that I quoted above. Let us understand this story in its context, which concerns the topic of ein mazal leYisroel.

Ein mazal leYisroel

Hashem set up the world in such a way that the events that transpire in one’s life, and even one’s personality and tendencies, are influenced by one’s mazal. However, because of the principle of ein mazal leYisroel, one can override this preordained fortune through prayer. Recognizing that Hashem is The Source of all, and praying to Him for help and assistance, can change one’s situation.

We now understand what Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak’s mother did. The astrologer understood the mazalos and knew that her son was born under a mazal that would influence him to steal. Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak’s mother knew that although mazalos have a strong influence on a person, their power is not absolute. Therefore, she understood, correctly, that the astrologer’s diagnosis presented her with a reason to treat her son in a special way. Since prayer and being careful about mitzvah observance can offset the influence of mazalos, this is what she taught him, knowing that covering one’s head provides a strong influence. She was proven correct, because her son developed into a great Torah scholar and yerei shamayim, despite the influences of his personal mazalos. Still, only when he remained on guard and kept his head covered was he able to combat his tremendous drive to steal. The moment his head became uncovered, the temptation to steal overwhelmed him. He now knew that, in spite of his tremendous accomplishments in ruchniyus, he could not relax his guard, even for a second. We also understand why the custom developed that people cover their heads at all times, even though the Gemara did not require it.

Responsum of the Maharshal

With this background, we can understand the following responsum, penned by the sixteenth-century halachic luminary, Rav Shelomo Luria, known as the Maharshal. “I am unaware of a prohibition to recite a beracha without a cover on one’s head. Although the Terumas Hadeshen was certain that it is prohibited to mention G-d’s Name without one’s head being covered, I am unaware of the source of this ruling. He writes that it is a dispute in Mesechta Sofrim, and, furthermore, Rabbeinu Yerucham writes that it is prohibited to recite a beracha bareheaded. Even though I do not dispute the earlier authorities unless I find a major scholar on my side of the dispute, I am inclined to be lenient in ruling that one may recite a beracha and even recite keri’as shema bareheaded. I can prove this from a Midrash Rabbah that states that a human king requires people to rise and uncover their heads in respect, prior to reading a declaration that he has issued, which they then read with great awe and trepidation. Hakadosh Baruch Hu told the Jews that when you read My declaration, the shema, you are not required to stand while doing so, nor are you required to expose your heads.” The Maharshal notes that this midrash implies that uncovering one’s head while reciting shema is not required, and it is certainly not prohibited.

The Maharshal continues: “Despite my own proofs to the contrary, what can I do that people consider being bareheaded to be prohibited? However, I am astonished at the custom of treating uncovering one’s head as a prohibited activity, even when not praying. I have no idea where they got this from. The only source that we find about having one’s head uncovered is regarding a woman; it is only a midas chasidus (exemplary conduct) to be careful not to walk four amos bareheaded — but this midas chasidus applies only to someone walking four amos and not to one walking a shorter distance, as implied by the statement of Rav Huna the son of Rav Yehoshua… . Furthermore, I found written that being bareheaded is a concern only when one is outdoors… . Avoiding reciting G-d’s Name with an exposed head is a midas chasidus, just as is avoiding walking four amos bareheaded. However, the Rif wrote that we should protest someone’s entering a shul bareheaded, and the Tur wrote that one should not pray bareheaded, but did not prohibit reciting shema bareheaded.”

The Maharshal then concludes: “I am powerless to change this approach. Since people are in the practice of not being bareheaded anywhere, I may not be lenient in their presence. I heard of a talmid chacham who used to study Torah bareheaded, saying that the covering bothered him. Although, technically, there is nothing wrong with being bareheaded, even from a perspective of exemplary conduct (midas chasidus), provided one is not saying G-d’s Name, nevertheless, a talmid chacham should be careful not to do this, since people may think that he is not serious about his observance of Torah and mitzvos. Therefore, a talmid chacham should not study Torah bareheaded, even in the privacy of his own home, lest someone see him and, as a result, treat him without the proper respect he is due.”

In his conclusion, the Maharshal rules that a talmid chacham is required to cover his head. He also contends that one may recite a beracha by placing his hand over his head, despite the rule that one part of the body is not considered a proper cover over another part (see Berachos 24b and Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 74:1). The Maharshal reasons that since, in his opinion, halacha does not require one to cover one’s head when saying Hashem’s Name, and the reason one needs to cover his head is only so that people not consider him to be someone who does not take the Torah seriously, it is sufficient to place one’s hand over one’s head to fulfill this concern.

Other authorities

Although the Gra (on Orach Chayim 8:2) echoes the Maharshal’s approach to the subject at hand, early poskim follow a more stringent approach. The Terumas Hadeshen (1:10), the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 91:3, 4) and the Rema (Orach Chayim 74:2) rule that it is prohibited to say Hashem’s Name bareheaded, following the second opinion of Mesechta Sofrim. As a result, they conclude that a person may not recite a beracha with only his hand on top of his head, although the Shulchan Aruch permits reciting a beracha with someone else’s hand covering your head. As I will explain shortly, the Taz agrees that one may not recite a beracha with only one’s hand on top of his head, but he permits standing or walking four amos with one’s hand on top of his head.

The Bach (comments to Tur Orach Chayim, Chapter 2) takes issue with a different lenient ruling of the Maharshal, contending that it is forbidden to walk bareheaded even less than four amos.

The Taz’s approach

Although the Maharshal concluded that the only reason one should not go bareheaded is because people will look at him askance, the Taz (Orach Chayim 8:3) concludes that, in our day, it is halachically prohibited to be bareheaded. In his opinion, since the gentiles of the Western world are meticulous to uncover their heads upon entering a building, being bareheaded violates the law of bechukoseihem lo seileichu (Vayikra 18:3), one may not follow the practices of the gentiles. This lo saaseh of the Torah is often called chukos akum. There are many opinions among the rishonim and the poskim as tothe exact definition of what is included under chukos akum. The Taz explains that since the gentiles consider it unacceptable to have one’s head covered indoors, uncovering one’s head violates this prohibition.

Thus, according to the Taz, there are two different reasons to have one’s head covered: to encourage one’s yiras shamayim and because of chukos akum. Placing one’s hand over one’s head is sufficient to avoid chukos akum, since this shows that one does not want to sit bareheaded, but it is not sufficient to allow one to recite a beracha.

Bareheaded indoors

Based on the Maharshal, the Be’er Heiteiv (Orach Chayim 2:6) rules that, under extenuating circumstances, one is permitted to have one’s head exposed while indoors. However, the Bechor Shor (Shabbos 118b) opposes this ruling, contending that having one’s head exposed indoors is a more serious violation of chukos akum than outdoors, since the practice of the gentiles is deliberately to be bareheaded indoors.

At this point, we can return to one of our original questions: “Is there a halachic difference between going bareheaded indoors versus outdoors?”

According to the Maharshal and the Be’er Heiteiv, although, under normal circumstances, one should cover one’s head in both venues, walking bareheaded outdoors is of greater concern. Under extenuating circumstances, the Be’er Heiteiv permitted walking indoors bareheaded. However, the Bechor Shor considers walking bareheaded indoors to be a more serious violation of halacha, since it violates chukos akum, whereas walking outdoors with one’s head exposed violates only the minhag Yisroel.

Livelihood

Although Rav Moshe Feinstein rules according to the Taz that one is required to cover one’s head whether indoors or outdoors, he concludes that when one’s employment or livelihood may be jeopardized, it is permitted to work bareheaded. This ruling applies only while someone is at his place of work, but once he leaves his place of employment, he must cover his head, since his livelihood is no longer jeopardized (Shu”t Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 1:1 and 4:2; Choshen Mishpat 1:93). (Those interested in seeing two very different approaches to this question are encouraged to compare Shu”t Nachalas Binyamin #30 and Shu”t Melamed Leho’il, Yoreh Deah, #56.)

Different gentiles

Some authorities note that the Taz’s reason should apply only in Western countries and other places where the gentiles have a specific practice to uncover their heads. However, in places where the gentiles have no such concerns, such as in Moslem countries, there is no prohibition of chukos akum in leaving one’s head uncovered (Shu”t Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 1:1). It may still be prohibited because of Jewish custom.

Swearing bareheaded

At this point, let us examine a different one of our opening questions: “May one swear an oath, using G-d’s Name, while bareheaded?”

This question returns us to the dispute in Mesechta Sofrim that I quoted earlier, whether one may recite Hashem’s Name bareheaded. According to the halachic authorities who rule like the first tanna, there is nothing technically wrong with reciting Hashem’s Name bareheaded. Even among those authorities, such as the Terumas Hadeshen (1:10), who rule like the second tanna and prohibit enunciating Hashem’s Name bareheaded, many, including the Terumas Hadeshen himself (2:203), rule that one may recite an oath bareheaded. For example, the Beis Lechem Yehudah (Yoreh Deah 157:5) rules that, when no other option exists, it is permitted to swear an oath while bareheaded.

Under the big top

At this point, we can examine two of our opening questions:

“Why do some people where big yarmulkes that cover their entire head?”

“How large must my yarmulke be?”

In the above-quoted responsum of Rav Shelomo Kluger, he ruled that one is required to cover one’s head completely when walking outdoors four amos or more. When walking less than this distance, or when walking indoors, one must cover one’s head, but it does not need to be covered completely. This explains why some people wear big yarmulkes that cover their entire head.

However, this ruling is not universally accepted. Rav Moshe Feinstein was asked how can people walk in the street wearing only a yarmulke, when Rav Shelomo Kluger required covering one’s entire head? Rav Moshe demonstrates that all the major authorities disagreed with Rav Kluger’s ruling. Rav Moshe concludes that even a small yarmulke meets the halachic requirements, but that individuals who would like to follow the more stringent opinion of Rav Kluger with regard to walking outside should cover their heads in a way that covers more than half the top of the head.

Swimming bareheaded

Previously, I quoted the following question: “Why don’t we clip a waterproof yarmulke to our heads while we swim?”

One of the authorities mentioned above, the Bechor Shor, rules that there is no requirement to cover your head while swimming or while walking from the changing room to the mikveh, not even as a midas chasidus. He demonstrates from passages of the Gemara that midas chasidus does not include covering your head in the mikveh, and also notes that swimming bareheaded does not violate chukas akum, since it is obvious that the uncovered head is not because one is trying to mimic gentile practice.

Conclusion

We see from the halachic sources that covering one’s head was a highly respected practice that assisted a person’s growth in yiras shamayim. With time, covering one’s head became part of the “uniform” of the Jewish man. In addition, there are other halachic reasons to keep one’s head covered, such as chukos akum. When donning a yarmulke or other head covering, one should avail himself of the opportunity to think about our Father in Heaven.

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