Category: Mitzvahs

More on Chinuch

Question #1: His own Lulav?

father-and-son-with-lulav“Am I required to purchase for my son his own lulav?”

Question #2: Three-year old Tzitzis?

“At what age should my son start wearing tzitzis?”

Question #3: Minor Kohanim

“I know that one must be very careful that a kohen, even an infant, does not become contaminated with the tumah of a meis. Yet I rarely see a child under bar mitzvah duchen. Is this consistent?”

Question #4: Kiruv Kohanim

“We are in the process of being mekarev a fellow who is a kohen. He enjoys joining us for our family outings, and we love to visit museums. Could this present potential halachic issues?”

Answer:

In the beginning of parshas Tolados, the Torah mentions the birth and upbringing of Yaakov and Eisav. In what many consider the most controversial passage in his commentary on Chumash, Rav Hirsch criticizes the education that Eisav received. This provides an opportunity to continue our discussion on some of the aspects of the mitzvos of chinuch that we began a few weeks ago.

In this context, we find the following passage of Gemara:

“A minor who knows how to shake a lulav in the way that halachah requires is obligated to fulfill the mitzvah of lulav; one old enough to put on a talis properly is obligated in tzitzis; if he is old enough to protect his tefillin, his father must purchase for him tefillin; when he knows how to talk, his father teaches him Torah and the Shma” (Sukkah 42a; see also Arachin 2b and Tosefta, Chagigah Chapter 1).

We see from the Gemara that we should begin teaching a child Torah and training him to observe mitzvos at the earliest age possible for him to perform the mitzvah correctly. One of the first lessons of mitzvas chinuch that we see here is that the mitzvah is not simply to demonstrate to a child a few times before his bar mitzvah how the mitzvah is performed. The mitzvah is to train him from when he begins to be able to perform the mitzvah properly, and we then begin to encourage him to observe the mitzvos. Thus, as soon as he begins to speak, we should have him recite pesukim. When old enough to wear a talis properly, we should train him in the mitzvah of tzitzis, and when old enough to perform the mitzvah of lulav properly, we should train him to observe that mitzvah.

Why are tefillin different?

When the Gemara mentions that a child should begin to observe mitzvos, it teaches that his father is obligated to purchase tefillin for his son, but it does not say that the father is required to buy either tzitzis or a lulav for his son. This implies that only in the case of tefillin is the father required to make a purchase, but not for the mitzvos of tzitzis or lulav. Why are tefillin different?

The answer is that someone cannot observe the mitzvah of tefillin properly without owning his own pair, and it is obvious that a child would not have the means with which to purchase tefillin. Therefore, the mitzvah of chinuch requires the boy’s father to purchase a pair of tefillin for him.

However, Chazal did not require the father to purchase the four species or tzitzis for his son. Why not? In the case of the four species, the son should be able to perform the mitzvah by using his father’s, and it is therefore unnecessary to require the father to purchase his son a set (Tosafos, Arachin 2b).

What about tzitzis?

Regarding the mitzvah of tzitzis, Tosafos rules that, even for adults, Chazal did not require one to purchase a four-cornered garment in order to fulfill the mitzvah. Rather, someone wishing to wear a four-cornered garment is required to have tzitzis attached to it. In the days of Chazal, one did not purchase a garment with tzitzis, or even purchase tzitzis threads to place on a garment. Clothing was made at home, and tzitzis threads, which require being manufactured for the sake of fulfilling the mitzvah, were spun at home. Therefore, there was no requirement to purchase tzitzis for a child, but, that when the household provided all its members with home-made clothing, it provided the men-folk, including those under bar mitzvah, with four-cornered garments and spun tzitzis to attach to them (Tosafos, Arachin 2b).

“Protecting” tefillin

The Gemara rules that when a child is old enough to “protect his tefillin,” we should purchase for him a pair of tefillin. What does it mean that he is old enough to “protect his tefillin”? Some understand this to mean that he understands that he should not bring his tefillin into the bathroom (Rashi, Sukkah 42a). Others understand this to mean that he can keep a guf naki, meaning that he is old enough to be careful not to release flatulence while wearing tefillin, which is prohibited because of bizuy mitzvah, treating mitzvos with disdain (Rashi, Brachos 5b; Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 37:2). There is obviously a major difference between these two approaches: A fairly young child can be entrusted not to bring tefillin into a bathroom, whereas someone considerably older may still have difficulty maintaining control and awareness to remove his tefillin when he feels that his stomach is somewhat unsettled.

Contemporary practice

Following the second approach mentioned above, which is the conclusion of the Shulchan Aruch, common practice today is that we do not have a child wear tefillin until he is almost the age of bar mitzvah. This is because we are concerned that he will be unable to keep a guf naki. Therefore, we wait until the child is almost the age that he is required min haTorah to wear tefillin, and only then do we train him how to wear tefillin.

Minor kohanim

At this point, let us address one of our opening questions.

“I know that one must be very careful that a kohen, even an infant, does not become contaminated with the tumah of a meis. Yet I rarely see a child under bar mitzvah duchen. Is this consistent?”

This question needs to be dealt with as two different headings. The first topic is the prohibition of causing someone to violate a halachah. The second topic is understanding how the mitzvah of chinuch applies to the specific mitzvah of birkas kohanim. I will first discuss the topic of causing a minor kohen child to become tamei.

Causing someone to violate the Torah

It is prohibited min haTorah to be the direct cause of a child violating a prohibition of the Torah (Yevamos 114a). For example, providing a child with non-kosher food or bringing a minor kohen into a house that contains tumas meis causes the child to violate what the Torah says. The Torah prohibits doing this, even when the child himself is too young to be responsible to fulfill the mitzvah and is not commanded to observe it. As a matter of fact, this law applies min hatorah even to a newborn (Magen Avraham 343:2). It also applies even when a child is, unfortunately, being raised in a non-observant way. Therefore, it is forbidden for someone who has a babysitting job to feed a Jewish child non-kosher food, or to serve non-kosher food to a Jewish child in a school cafeteria. Similarly, it is prohibited to dress a baby in a blanket or clothes made of shatnez (Shu”t Beis Yehudah, Yoreh Deah #45).

Tumah is worse

In the particular instance of causing a kohen to become tamei, there is an additional violation, specific to this mitzvah. The Rambam rules that it is forbidden for someone to make an adult kohen tamei and, at times, this may involve violating a prohibition min haTorah (Rambam, Hilchos Aveil 3:5). The Rambam rules: “If the kohen is unaware that what he did is forbidden, and the person who made him tamei knows that it is, then that person violates the lo saaseh. If the kohen knows that it is forbidden, then the other person violates only lifnei iveir lo sitein michshol, do not place a stumbling block before a blind person (Vayikra 19:14).” Chazal interpret this pasuk to mean that one may not give someone bad advice, nor cause him to violate a prohibition.

Kiruv kohanim

Thus, we can now also address another of our opening questions. “We are in the process of being mekarev a fellow who is a kohen. He enjoys joining us for our family outings, and we love to visit museums. Could this present potential halachic issues?”

In a different article published in this column many years ago, I discussed at length the shaylos that exist concerning whether a kohen may visit a museum. (A copy of that article, entitled Finding a Compatible Place for an Extended Family Outing, is available on the website RabbiKaganoff.com.) Based on our current discussion, we are now aware that the same issues exist if I cause a kohen to enter a museum. Thus, taking a nephew who is a kohen on a family trip to a museum may involve the same halachic problem, and I should consult my rav or posek. Bringing our friend the kohen involves the same halachic issues, notwithstanding the fact that he, himself, has no concerns about the matter. As we saw above in the Rambam, it is actually a more serious problem for me when I know that the kohen is not concerned about the prohibition.

What if the child does it on his own?

The Gemara (Yevamos 113b-114a) relates that Rav Yitzchak bar Bisna lost the keys of the beis medrash in a reshus harabim, an area into and from which it is prohibited min haTorah to carry on Shabbos. Thus, there was no way to unlock the doors and use the beis medrash on Shabbos. Rabbi Pedas suggested that Rav Yitzchak bar Bisna bring some children to play in the area where the keys were lost, hoping that one of them might find the keys and bring them to the beis medrash. According to Rabbi Pedas, one is not obligated to prevent a child from violating a mitzvah of the Torah, provided that one does not ask or enable the child to do so. In other words, although it is prohibited to cause a child to violate a mitzvah, we have no obligation to prevent the child from violating a mitzvah, nor are we prohibited from placing a child in a place where he may choose to violate a mitzvah on his own.

The rishonim ask why the mitzvah of chinuch does not require preventing the child from violating Shabbos. Here I will present three widely-held approaches to answering this question.

Under age

One answer is that Rabbi Pedas’ rule that we are not required to prevent children from choosing to violate prohibitions applies only when they are very young — meaning that the child is below the age of chinuch, when we are required to educate him about the mitzvah (Tosafos, Shabbos 121a, s.v. shema). Thus, Rav Yitzchak bar Bisna brought only fairly young children to play in the area where the keys were lost. It would be prohibited, according to this approach, to cause older children who understand that we do not carry on Shabbos to carry the keys in a reshus harabim. This approach is quoted by the Rema (Orach Chayim 343).

Mitzvos Asei

A second approach to answer this question is more lenient, contending that the mitzvah of chinuch applies only to positive mitzvos, but does not apply to prohibitions (Rabbi Eliezer miMetz, the author of the Sefer Yerei’im, quoted by Tosafos Yeshanim, Yoma 82a; the same position is quoted by several rishonim to Yevamos 114a). According to this understanding, there are three levels:

  1. We are prohibited min haTorah from directly causing a child to violate a prohibition.
  2. We are required miderabbanan to train a child to perform mitzvos.
  3. There is no requirement at all to prevent a child from performing violations of the Torah that a child is doing on his own.

Isn’t this counterintuitive?

Is this approach not counterintuitive? In general, prohibitions are treated more strictly than positive mitzvos, and the punishments for violating them are usually more severe (Terumas Hadeshen #94). Why, in this instance, is the positive mitzvah being treated more stringently than the prohibition?

Some explain that the reason is because performance of a positive mitzvah usually requires more effort, and these mitzvos will be more difficult for him to observe when he becomes an adult. Therefore Chazal required the father to make certain that his child is habituated to perform mitzvos. They did not require chinuch on lo saaseh prohibitions, since they are passive (Terumas Hadeshen #94).

Only the father

I promised that I would share with you three approaches to explain how Rabbi Pedas permitted placing children somewhere where they will likely end up performing melachah activity on Shabbos. Is there not a mitzvah of chinuch?

A third approach to answer this question understands that when Chazal introduced the mitzvah of chinuch, they obligated the father, but no one else, to train a child to perform mitzvos. Since other people have no obligation of training a child to perform mitzvos, they are permitted to place a child somewhere where he may, of his own volition, violate a prohibition (Tosafos Yeshanim, Yoma 82a; Rambam, Hilchos Maachalos Asuros 17:28). This last approach is the one followed by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 343:1), who writes: “If a child is eating non-kosher, beis din is not commanded to prevent him, but his father is commanded to rebuke him and prevent him.” The Rema cites this opinion also.

Remember, as we taught above, that all opinions prohibit directing a child to violate a prohibition. What is permitted is placing him in a position where he will, of his own volition, violate a prohibited activity.

In conclusion, we are prohibited from causing a male child to become tamei from contact with a corpse. According to the conclusion of the Shulchan Aruch, you are not obligated to prevent a child from making himself tamei, unless the child in question is your son.

What about duchening?

At this point, let us return to the question raised above: “I know that one must be very careful that a kohen, even an infant, does not become contaminated with the tumah of a meis. Yet I rarely see a child under bar mitzvah duchen. Is this consistent?” Now, that we have explained the background to the first part of the question, let us discuss the second part: Our questioner reports not seeing many minor kohanim perform the duchening.

The Mishnah (Megillah 24a) states that a child does not duchen, which Rashi explains is  because it is not respectable for a congregation to have a child bless them. Our question is whether the Mishnah means that a child should never duchen, or does it mean that he should not duchen when he is unaccompanied by an adult kohen? The issue being debated is whether the lack of dignity for the tzibur is any time a child is blessing the congregation or only when he does so by himself.

This issue is the subject of a dispute among early rishonim. Rashi (Sukkah 42a) rules that a child should never duchen, whereas Tosafos contends that it is fine for a child to duchen, as long as he does so together with adult kohanim (Tosafos, Megillah 24a s.v. Ve’ein). According to the latter opinion, it would follow that there is a mitzvah to train a minor kohen to duchen, just as there is a mitzvah to train him to perform other mitzvos. However, according to Rashi, since Chazal ruled that it is not a kavod to have a child duchen, then, clearly, there is no mitzvah of chinuch to train him to duchen. There were many places in Europe where the custom was to follow Rashi in this law. This is why our questioner has rarely seen a minor duchen. However, this is by far not a universally held practice. I have been in many places where I have seen kohanim who are under bar mitzvah duchen alongside adult kohanim.

Conclusion – Avraham and chinuch

We now know that there are specific halachic rules directing us how to educate and train  children in the observance of mitzvos, and also about our interactions that might cause an adult to violate a prohibition of the Torah. It is interesting to note that the only verse in the Torah that uses the word chinuch in relation to people is in parshas Lech Lecha, and there the verse refers to training and teaching adults to perform mitzvos. There the Torah teaches about Avraham that, in order to save his nephew Lot, vayarek es chanichav, literally, he emptied out those whom he had trained. As Rav Hirsch points out, the situation of saving Lot required Avraham to change direction from what he had been doing heretofore to develop his following to serve Hashem. Prior to this point, Avraham had taken his following, his disciples, and moved them away from civilization, into the mountains, so that they would not be influenced by the nearby social environment of Canaan, which was antithetical to proper values. Avraham’s previous chinuch had involved isolationism to grow the spirituality of his students. At this moment, serving Hashem required Avraham to expose his following to improper mores, albeit only temporarily, for the sake of saving Lot.

 

Yehudah, Dovid and Moshiach

Since the mitzvah of hakheil is in this week’s parsha, I present:

Yehudah, Dovid and Moshiach

Vector parchment with a pen and ink. Icon for recordsIn parshas Vayechi, Yehudah is blessed by his father Yaakov: “The scepter will not depart from Yehudah, nor will the lawmaker [depart] from his descendants, even when Shiloh [Moshiach] arrives. To him will the nations gather” (Bereishis 49:10). Some explain the pasuk in the following way: “Both the monarchy and the teaching of Torah will remain among the descendants of Yehudah, both in the short term, and certainly when Moshiach (Shiloh) arrives. Also, he will be the one who teaches the Jewish people when they gather every seven years for hakheil.” Thus, the blessing received by Yehudah is: Dovid Hamelech and the royal Jewish family will be his descendants, they will reign over the Jewish people, both early in Jewish history as the monarchs of the Kingdom of Judea; later, for a thousand years in Bavel, under the title of Reish Gelusa; and then, eventually, for the rest of history, when Moshiach rules over the Jewish people and, indirectly, over the entire world.

One of the manifestations of this rule will be the mitzvah of hakheil, when the entire Jewish people — men, women, and even babies — gather to the grounds of the Beis Hamikdash to hear the king of the Jewish people read selections of the book of Devorim to the entire nation. This was done on Chol Hamoed Sukkos in the year following shemittah (see Devorim 31:10-13 and Mishnah, Sotah 41a). Indeed, one of Shelomoh Hamelech’s names is Koheles, because of his central role in the mitzvah of hakheil. Similarly, we have a Biblical allusion to the fulfillment of this mitzvah by Yoshiyahu Hamelech in Divrei Hayamim (2:34:29-33).

Questions:

With this introduction, let us examine the following questions:

What exactly is done at hakheil?

When is hakheil performed?

Why was hakheil not observed on Shabbos?

Who is obligated to attend hakheil?

Was the reading of hakheil performed only by kings of the house of Dovid?

Is hakheil one mitzvah or two?

What is done at hakheil?

Hakheil is a public gathering and ceremony whose focal point is a kerias haTorah read by the king of the Jewish people on the grounds of the Beis Hamikdash. When we have a Beis Hamikdash, bimheirah veyameinu, this mitzvah will again be performed. The king of the Jews will read selections of the book of Devorim from a special sefer Torah kept in the Beis Hamikdash area.

The procedure

As reported by the Tosefta (a source of halachah dating back to the era of the Mishnah), prior to the reading, “a wood platform was constructed in the Azarah (an inner section of the Beis Hamikdash), and the king sat upon it” (Tosefta, Sotah 7:8). The fact that anyone was permitted to sit in the Azarah area was unique, because no one other than a king of the line of Dovid Hamelech was ever permitted to sit in the Azarah or any of the holier sections of the Beis Hamikdash (Yoma 25a et al.). This halachah is derived from a verse in the Book of Shemuel (2:7:18).

According to an alternative opinion quoted by the Tosefta, the platform was constructed on the Har Habayis, the Temple Mount area, which is outside the Beis Hamikdash, and, therefore, anyone may sit there. Thus, we have a dispute whether hakheil was performed in the Beis Hamikdash itself, or right outside. Either way, the area where hakheil is performed requires that all the people who attend be tehorim, ritually pure as defined by halachah.

The kohanim and hakheil

As should be appropriate for a public reading of the sefer Torah, there was much pomp and circumstance preceding the mitzvah of hakheil. To continue the Tosefta: “On that day, the kohanim stood on the fences (of Yerushalayim), and in the breaches (between the fences), holding golden bugles. (I translated the word chatzotzeres as bugle, because trumpets that use valves or keys were not invented until relatively recently. The word trumpet used to mean an instrument that had no valves, but today all trumpets have valves.) They blew tekiah, teruah, tekiah. People said that any kohen who was not holding a bugle might be accused of being an imposter. The people of Yerushalayim made considerable money by renting the golden bugles at the price of a golden dinar each.” The kohanim’s blowing was to make sure everyone remembered to come for hakheil, somewhat reminiscent of the soundtrucks that blast their way through Yerushalayim to announce everything from funerals, sifrei Torah dedications, and tzedakah collections to sales and chol hamoed entertainment.

There is a question here about the bugles, because the Torah requires that chatzotzeros be manufactured from silver, not gold. Why should inviting people for hakheil require gold bugles?

I was told an answer in the name of Rav Avraham Sherman, a prominent dayan in Eretz Yisroel, that the chatzotzeros for hakheil were, indeed, made of silver, not gold. They were called the “golden chatzotzeros” not because they were made of gold, but because the rental fee was charged in gold, as the Tosefta states.

Taking out the sefer Torah

The sefer Torah was taken out with much ceremony, as should always be done. On the occasion of hakheil, the sefer Torah was first brought by the gabbai, called the chazzan hakenesses, who then handed it to a higher official, called the rosh hakenesses. In turn, the rosh hakenesses handed the sefer Torah to the segan, the associate kohen gadol, who handed it to the kohen gadol, who then handed the sefer Torah to the king. The king received the sefer Torah while standing and then sat down to read, which, as we mentioned above, was a special prerogative allowed only to kings who were descendants of Dovid Hamelech (Sotah 41a). The king recited a brocha as we do before the reading when we receive an aliyah. He was the only person to receive an aliyah for this reading, and he himself read the Torah. After the reading, he recited a series of eight brachos (Sotah 40b-41a).

Date of hakheil

When exactly is hakheil performed?

Actually, there are two versions of the Mishnah as to exactly on which date hakheil took place. According to the more common text, hakheil was performed on the first day of chol hamoed Sukkos, or, in the words of the Mishnah, motza’ei Yom Tov harishon shel chag, the sixteenth of Tishrei (which corresponds to the second day of Yom Tov in chutz la’aretz). However, there is another text that reads motza’ei Yom Tov ha’acharon shel chag (cited by Yerushalmi, Sotah, and Rashi, Megillah 5a). According to this text, hakheil occurred on isru chag, the day after Yom Tov, the 23rd of Tishrei. (This date corresponds to the date celebrated in chutz la’aretz as Simchas Torah.) From the wording of the Rambam (Hilchos Chagigah 3:1), it appears that one could fulfill the mitzvah either way, although he rules that one should perform hakheil at the beginning of Chol Hamoed.

Hakheil on Shabbos

The Mishnah (Megillah 5a) notes that sometimes hakheil was postponed. When and why was it postponed? The Gemara Yerushalmi and Rashi explain that when the preferred day for hakheil (which was the day after either the first or last day of Sukkos) fell on Shabbos, hakheil was postponed to the next day.

But, check your calendar — neither the second day of Sukkos, the 16th of Tishrei, nor the 23rd of Tishrei can ever fall on Shabbos! Since this can occur only if Rosh Hashanah were to fall on a Friday, this violates the calendar rule of lo adu rosh, that the first day of Rosh Hashanah can never fall on Sunday, Wednesday or Friday.

The answer to this question is historical. The mitzvah of hakheil was observed while the Beis Hamikdash stood, which was prior to the establishment of our current calendar. Our contemporary Jewish calendar was instituted by Hillel Hanasi, the great-grandson of Rabbi Yehudah Hanasi (not to be confused with Hillel Hazakein, who was their ancestor), about 250 years after the destruction of the second Beis Hamikdash (Rambam, Hilchos Kiddush Hachodesh 5:3). In our current calendar, the second day of Sukkos cannot fall on Shabbos. However, prior to Hillel Hanasi, the Jewish calendar was determined by the Sanhedrin, and Rosh Hashanah, Sukkos and all other holidays could fall on any day of the week. When Rosh Hashanah and Sukkos fell on Friday, the first day of chol hamoed and isru chag in Eretz Yisroel would fall on Shabbos. It is this situation that the Mishnah is discussing.

Never on Saturday

Why was hakheil not observed on Shabbos?

Several reasons are provided:

  1. As I mentioned above, to help the people hear the recital of hakheil, a platform from which the king read the Torah was constructed in the Beis Hamikdash. This platform could not be constructed on Shabbos or Yom Tov. Furthermore, were they to construct it before it was needed, it would have gotten in the way of the crowds that attended the Beis Hamikdash on the yomim tovim. Therefore, if the first day of chol hamoed fell on Shabbos, hakheil was postponed to Sunday, so that the platform could be built that day (Yerushalmi, Megillah 1:4, quoted by Rashi, Megillah 5a).
  2. Another opinion, also quoted in the above-mentioned passage of Talmud Yerushalmi, contends that hakheil was postponed from Shabbos so that the bugles could be blown.
  3. A third reason is that the people were required to carry their young children to hakheil, which they would have been unable to do on Shabbos (Rashi, Megillah 5a).

Who is obligated to attend hakheil?

The Torah states clearly that “Men, women and children” are obligated in hakheil. Even someone who does not understand any Hebrew is obligated to join the assembly for hakheil (Rambam, Hilchos Chagigah 3:6). Nevertheless, not all men and women are obligated to make the trip to Yerushalayim to hear hakheil. The mitzvah of hakheil does not obligate people who are exempt because of medical reasons from the mitzvah of re’eiah — the commandment incumbent on all Jewish male adults to come to the Beis Hamikdash and offer korbanos on the three regalim (Pesach, Shevuos, and Sukkos). Therefore, the elderly, the ill, someone who has difficulty walking, one who cannot hear (even if only out of one ear), and someone who cannot see (even if only out of one eye) — all of whom are exempt from the mitzvah of re’eiah — are exempt from hakheil (Rambam, Hilchos Chagigah 2:1, 3:2). Many authorities rule that someone who does not own land in Eretz Yisroel is similarly exempt from hakheil (Turei Even, Chagigah 3a s.v. Kedei). However, the Rambam rules that this is not a factor, and that someone who does not own land in Eretz Yisroel is required to observe hakheil.

Someone who is tamei is exempt from coming to hakheil, and, indeed, is forbidden to do so, since he is forbidden to enter the Beis Hamikdash where hakheil was held (Rambam, Hilchos Chagigah 2:1, 3:2).

There is a major difference between the various categories of exemptions from hakheil. People excused from the mitzvah for medical reasons may perform the mitzvah, and if they do so, they will be rewarded as einam metzuvim ve’osim, those who perform a mitzvah that they are not obligated to perform. However, someone who is tamei is forbidden to participate in hakheil, since doing so would cause him to violate the sanctity of the Beis Hamikdash. He should try to make himself tahor as soon as possible.

Unfortunately, in our day, it is very common for people to desecrate this sanctity, as there are groups actively involved in causing and encouraging Jews to ascend Har Habayis, notwithstanding the halachic prohibitions involved.

Which children should hear?

There is a dispute among the acharonim whether every child is required to be brought to hear hakheil, or only children who, when they become adults, will be obligated in the mitzvah. According to this latter opinion, held by the highly respected author of the classic work, Shaagas Aryeh, one is usually not obligated to bring children to hakheil, unless the child already owns his own real estate in Eretz Yisroel (Turei Even, Chagigah 3a s.v. Kedei). However, other, later authorities contend that one is required to bring any minor to the hakheil ceremony (Minchas Chinuch, Mitzvah 612). Indications are that a much earlier authority, the Rambam, held in accordance with the second approach.

House of David?

Could the reading of the hakheil be recited by anyone other than a king of the House of Dovid? The explanation I shared above to interpret Yehudah’s blessing in parshas Vayechi suggests that the hakheil reading could be done by Dovid and his descendants.

However, this approach runs contradictory both to a Mishnah and to a passage of Gemara. The Mishnah teaches that when Agrippas, who was not a descendant of David, was king over the Jews, he read hakheil, although he read it while standing, because he was not of David’s royal line (Sotah 41a). This demonstrates that a Jewish king not from David’s dynasty could read hakheil. Thus, hakheil was performed during the entire period of the second Beis Hamikdash, notwithstanding that there was no king descended from Dovid Hamelech.

Moreover, the following passage of Talmud Yerushalmi implies that someone not descended from malchus beis Dovid could read hakheil, even when there is a king from David’s dynasty!

“Rabbi Yosi ben Yaakov said: Yeravam became king over the Kingdom of Israel in the year after shemittah. He realized that should he arrive in Yerushalayim and demand the honor due him as king, the local gentry of Yerushalayim would contend that the local king (Rechavam, the son of Shelomoh) comes first. Yeravam then said: ‘If I read second, I will feel mortified, and if I do not read at all, it will be a public humiliation. If I allow the people to go on their own to Yerushalayim, they will accept Rechavam, Shelomoh’s son, as king.’ What did Yeravam do? He constructed two golden calves” (Yerushalmi, Avodah Zarah 1:1; see also Sanhedrin 101b). This passage of Yerushalmi explains the events of Melachim I 12-27.

Yeravam was not from the tribe of Yehudah, and yet the Gemara implies that, even with Rechavam, David’s grandson, as Jewish monarch, it would have been appropriate for Yeravam to have read part of the hakheil.

Thus, from the Mishnah and this passage of Gemara we see mitzvas hakheil could be fulfilled even when the Torah was read by someone other than a king descended from Yehudah (Minchas Chinuch).

By the way, the Talmud Bavli (Sanhedrin 101b) recounts the story of Yeravam with a slightly variant version: “We have a tradition that no one may sit in the Azarah area of the Beis Hamikdash but kings who are descended from Yehudah. When the people see Rechavam sitting in the Azarah while I am standing, they will say that he is the king and I am his subject. If, on the other hand, I sit down, they will kill me for rebelling against his monarchy.”

Too distant

As mentioned above, almost all of the Jewish people came to hakheil. The number of people was vast, and the king’s voice could carry only so far. How did the people hear him, in the days before the invention of a microphone?

The answer is that one was required to strive to hear the king to the best of one’s ability. If you tried as hard as you could, and you could not hear the reading, you fulfilled the mitzvah (Lechem Mishneh, Hilchos Chagigah 3:6 and Shu”t Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 1:32).

Is hakheil one mitzvah or two?

We are all aware that the Torah commanded the Jewish people to observe 613 mitzvos. These mitzvos are listed by many different early authorities, and, in many instances, there are disputes among them as to what qualifies as a mitzvah, or how to count them. In the case of hakheil, there is a dispute whether hakheil should be counted as one or as two of the 613 mitzvos. According to many authorities, hakheil is counted as two of the 613 mitzvos. One mitzvah is that it is incumbent upon the king (or other leader) to read the Torah, as described above. The other mitzvah is for the Jews to assemble – thus requiring each individual member of the Jewish people to make sure that he attends the hakheil service, and to bring along his children (Behag, Yerei’im). According to the Rambam’s opinion, both of these aspects of the mitzvah are included under the heading of one mitzvah (Rambam, Chinuch, Semag). In other words, there is a mitzvah for the individuals of the Jewish community to perform hakheil, with each individual having a different aspect of the mitzvah to observe. The king is required to do the reading, whereas the individual members of klal Yisroel have a requirement to attend and to listen.

Conclusion

As Rav Hirsch notes (Commentary, Devorim 31:11), the mitzvah of hakheil is not intended to teach people the basic laws of the Torah. Rather, its special purpose is to have the nation’s supreme representative develop in our people an awareness of the goals of Hashem’s nation. When the king, the “political leader,” led the religious ceremony of reading from the Torah, it reinforced to the whole nation the idea that the Torah is our guiding light.

 

May I Divine?

Question #1: Skipping the Thirteenth Floor

“May a frum builder skip the number 13 when naming the floors of a building?”

Question #2: Snakes and Ladders

“Is there a halachic source that one should change his plans if he sees a snake when he leaves on a trip?”

Question #3: Monkey Business

As I was preparing this article, Reuvein asked me the following question: “I am in the middle of negotiating the acquisition of a business. On the way to the meeting, a quirk accident happened. Should I interpret this as a reason to avoid the deal?”

Introduction:

Several mitzvos of the Torah prohibit different practices used to predict the future. Many of these are mentioned in parshas Kedoshim, including the prohibitions against ov and yide’oni, both ancient methods of necromancy (Vayikra 20:27), and the commandments: Lo senachashu velo se’oneinu (Vayikra 19:26), which I will translate as Do not make use of omens and do not divine times. These four prohibitions are repeated together with three similar ones in parshas Shoftim (Devorim 18:10-11): Lo yimatza’ei becha… koseim kesamim, me’onein, umenacheish umechasheif… vesho’eil ov veyide’oni vedoreish el hameisim, “There shall not be found among you… a soothsayer, a diviner of times, an interpreter of omens or a sorcerer… or one who asks of ov or of yide’oni or one who consults the dead.” Subsequently, in parshas Shoftim, the Torah commands Tamim tih’yeh im Hashem Elokecha, “You shall be whole-hearted with Hashem, your G-d” (Devorim 18:13). This means that we should not allow our relationship with Hashem to become diffused by placing confidence or decision-making in the hands of superstitions or worse.

Practicing omens –in Hebrew, nichush or nachash — includes taking action or avoiding taking action because of superstitious reasons. Divination, me’onein, can be defined as “attempting to foretell future events by use of supernatural powers,” although, as we will soon see, the Torah’s prohibition is more inclusive. According to the Rambam (Moreh Nevuchim 3:37), all of these practices are forbidden because they are similar to idol worship.

The basics of the prohibition of nichush are that one should not use methods that are outside of Torah to try to determine whether one should pursue a particular course of action. What exactly is included within these prohibitions? As we will see shortly, the rules here are not at all obvious and, indeed, are often disputed by the rishonim.

First source

A beraisa, quoted by the Gemara (Sanhedrin 65b-66a), presents the following list of situations that are prohibited because of nichush. In each of these, someone was planning a course of action, perhaps leaving on a business trip or similar mission, and then, because something occurred, he changed his plans. The situations listed are:

–          His bread fell out of his mouth.

–          He dropped his walking stick.

–          His son called him from behind (presumably as he was leaving the house).

–          He heard the call of a raven.

–          A deer crossed his path.

–          He saw a snake on his right side or a fox on his left.

Apparently, during the time of the Gemara, there were superstitious beliefs that any of these events bode poorly for the results of the trip. One can compare this to contemporary superstitions about black cats or the number thirteen. This Gemara teaches that one may not base a decision on an omen or other factor that bears no rational influence on the planned course of action. In all of the above cases, someone who changes his plans because he feels that he has just seen a bad omen violates a Torah law.

Snakes and ladders

At this point, we can answer one of our opening questions: “Is there a halachic source that one should change his plans if he sees a snake when he leaves on a trip?”

Quite the contrary, there is a halachic source prohibiting changing one’s plans under these circumstances.

Should I pay my taxes?

The above-quoted passage of Gemara continues with several other applications of this prohibition:

Someone requests from the tax collector, “Don’t begin your collecting with me,” because he feels that this is a bad omen. Similarly, someone who postpones paying a debt at the beginning of the week or the month, because of a belief that this will portend a bad week or month, also violates the prohibition of nichush.

The Gemara (Sanhedrin 66a) concludes its discussion there by quoting a different beraisa: The Rabbis taught, “Do not use omens or lucky times – such as those who use omens of weasels(in Hebrew, chuldos), birds or stars.” (Although our text of the Gemara says fish, the Rambam, Commentary to Mishnah, Avodah Zarah 4:7, and other rishonim cite stars as the correct version.) Similarly, a person who changed his plans because a black cat crossed his path has violated a prohibition of the Torah. Someone who knowledgeably does this would be invalid as a witness for a wedding, because he has violated a lo saaseh of the Torah.

No causal connection

The Ran (Sanhedrin ad loc.) explains that nichush is prohibited when there is no logical causal connection between the event that transpired and the plans that one is changing. The only reason one is changing his plans is because of a belief that the events (the bread falling, the deer crossing the path, etc.) are meant to foretell something.

On the other hand, it is permitted to change your plans because of a logical reason. For example, someone planning a trip who sees thunderclouds on the horizon may change his travel plans for the day because it appears that it will rain, making travel unpleasant or even potentially dangerous. Since this is a logical reason to postpone his trip, it has nothing to do with the prohibition against nichush (Ran). Similarly, it is permitted to follow a procedure that can be shown to have medical benefit, as we will now explain (Moreh Nevuchim; Meiri, Shabbos 67a).

Locust eggs and fox teeth

The Mishnah (Shabbos 60a) rules that an ill person may wear a ke’meia, an amulet, whose efficacy is established, into or through a reshus harabim, a public area on Shabbos. For someone ill, this is considered the halachic equivalent to wearing an ornament or a garment (Rashi ad loc.). A later Mishnah (Shabbos 67a) cites a dispute whether one is permitted to walk through a public area on Shabbos while wearing the egg of a grasshopper, the tooth of a fox or the nail used to hang someone from a gallows. The tanna who permits this considers these items halachically the same as an amulet whose efficacy is established. The tanna who forbids wearing these items prohibits doing so even on a weekday, because he considers this to be a form of nichush (see Rashi). The Gemara concludes that, since the medical value of this treatment is demonstrable, wearing it does not violate the laws prohibiting nichush. We rule according to this tanna.

Dispute among rishonim

At this point, we need to introduce a dispute concerning the extent of what the Torah prohibited. The precise question is whether the Torah prohibits being influenced only by prevalent superstitious practices, or whether any method of foretelling the future not firmly grounded in Torah is forbidden. In other words, we know that the Torah provided methods to foretell the future by consulting the urim vetumim worn by the kohen gadol or via information gained from a prophet. These are certainly permitted. There is, however, a dispute regarding whether one may create one’s own method as a basis to decide whether to proceed with a specific course of action. In the Rambam’s opinion, anything that one would rely upon to base one’s decision or plan of action is prohibited (Hilchos Avodas Kochavim 11:5). However, according to the Radak (Shemuel I 14:9), only practices that are based on superstition, sorcery, idol worship or similar nefarious bases are prohibited. It is permitted to do something as a sign or symbol, because this strengthens one’s resolve. (See also Ra’avad, Hilchos Avodas Kochavim 11:4, 5, who also follows this approach.) Shortly, I will show a few examples of this dispute.

Dependent on this dispute will be two very different ways of understanding the following passage of Gemara (Chullin 95b), quoting the great amora, Rav: “Any nachash that is unlike what was performed by Eliezer, the slave of Avraham, and unlike that performed by Yonasan, the son of Shaul, is not a nachash.” Prior to presenting the two approaches to understanding this Gemara, let us examine the two events quoted.

The story of Eliezer

When Eliezer was on his mission to find a wife for Yitzchak, the Torah describes that upon his arrival in the city of Nachor, he asked Hashem for a specific sign to identify the woman he was seeking. Eliezer prayed for G-d to send him the chosen woman on the following basis: Should he ask her to provide him with a bit of water, and she would respond, “I will also provide water for your camels,” this girl is to be Yitzchak’s bride, without any other questions or research (Bereishis 24:14). According to some rishonim, what Eliezer did qualifies as an act of nichush, since he made his action totally dependent on an outside factor.

The story of Yonasan

The other example mentioned by the Gemara is that of Yonasan, the crown prince son of King Shaul. At a time when the Jews had almost no weapons and were the underdog in an incredibly lopsided war against the Pelishtim, Yonasan, accompanied only by his armor-bearer, advanced towards a garrison of Pelishtim soldiers. Yonasan told his armor-bearer, “If they say to us, ‘wait until we reach you,’ we should remain in our place and not advance towards them. However, if they say, ‘come forward to us,’ then we should attack, because this is our sign that Hashem has given them over to our hands (Shemuel I 14:8-10).” This, not withstanding that Yonasan and his armor-bearer were only two attacking an entire garrison!

Why did the Gemara refer to what Yonasan did as an act of nachash, divining?

We find a major dispute among the rishonim how to interpret the words of the Gemara, “Any nachash that is unlike what was performed by Eliezer, the slave of Avraham, and unlike that performed by Yonasan, the son of Shaul, is not a nachash.”

Most early rishonim (Rashi, Rambam, Tosafos) understand the Gemara to mean that anyone who follows an approach similar to what Eliezer or Yonasan did has violated the prohibition of nichush. These rishonim contend that other than prophecy or the use of the urim vetumim, using events over which I have no control to determine my course of action is included under the prohibition of nichush.

Of course, the obvious problem with this approach is that if these actions indeed violate the prohibition of nichush, why were Eliezer and Yonasan permitted to perform them? Here are some of the answers provided for this question:

Eliezer’s heter

The prohibition against nichush applies only to Jews and not to benei Noach, and Eliezer had the status of a ben Noach (Tosafos, Chullin 95b s.v. Ke’eliezer). According to this approach, the story of Yonasan is difficult to explain, since he certainly did not qualify as a ben noach.

Another problem with this answer is that the Gemara (Sanhedrin 56b) records a dispute whether the prohibition against nichush applies to gentiles. Should one hold that the prohibition against nichush does apply to gentiles, one would answer that Eliezer did not rely on Rivkah’s offering the water to propose the marriage to her, but waited until he had verified that she was indeed from Avraham’s family (Tosafos, Chullin 95b s.v. Ke’eliezer).

Yonasan’s heter

Tosafos and the Ran (ad loc.) explain that Yonasan was planning to attack and was not using the nichush to make a decision. He used the nichush only so that his armor-bearer would be more confident that their attack would be successful. Since Yonasan was planning to proceed regardless of the outcome of his test, it was permitted to make the sign.

The Radak’s approach

On the other hand, other rishonim dispute the understanding of the mitzvah of nichush and, furthermore, understand the passage of Gemara in a very different way. In their opinion, the prohibition of nichush applies only to things that are commonly perceived to have predictive value, either because of superstition, sorcery, idolatry or a similar reason. However, to base a decision on a sign that has no superstitious or clairvoyant basis is permitted. Therefore, neither Eliezer nor Yonasan was in violation of any halachic issue by using their signs to divine. The Gemara’s purpose, when referring to Eliezer and Yonasan as examples of nichush, has nothing to do with the prohibition of the Torah banning nichush, but is teaching us that the simanim used by Eliezer and by Yonasan were both effective (Ra’avad, Hilchos Avodah Zarah, 11:4). This opinion holds that proper use of simanim is halachically permitted, but, as a matter of advice, should not be used, unless one can be reasonably certain that the siman is effective.

The entire passage

Having explained the dispute defining what is included within the prohibition of nichush, I’ll now present the entire passage of Gemara in which we find this quote.

Rav was traveling to the house of his daughter and son-in-law, Rav Chanan. The trip required crossing a river, which usually meant getting to the riverbank and waiting until appropriate transport showed up. As Rav approached the river, he saw that a ferry was approaching; this would shorten the time for him considerably. Rav then said: “The ferry came in my direction; we will have a celebration as a result!”

When Rav arrived at his daughter’s house, they were in the process of butchering an animal. With the meat of that animal, Rav’s family made a lavish meal in his honor, yet Rav did not partake in any of the meat. The Gemara suggests that Rav did not eat any of the meat because, since Rav had declared that the ferry’s proximity had indicated a good omen which would be a reason for celebration, this would violate the Torah’s law against nichush. The Gemara retorts that Rav himself had defined nichush as something similar to what was done by Eliezer, Avraham’s slave, or by Yonasan the son of Shaul; any other practice does not constitute nichush. The Gemara’s conclusion is that Rav did not eat meat for a completely unrelated reason — because he never participated in a festive meal unless it was a seudas mitzvah (Chullin 95b).

According to the Radak, Rav’s original statement would never be a prohibited nichush practice, since the proximity of the ferry was not commonly used as a superstitious omen. Therefore, one may use such a sign as a means of deciding on a future course of action.

How do we rule?

The Rema (Yoreh Deah 179:4) cites both opinions without reaching a clear conclusion, and then closes by saying that one who lives his life sincerely and is confident in Hashem’sways will be surrounded by kindness, thus implying that it is better not to follow such signs.

The pesukim of children

The Gemara (Chullin 95b) shares with us that Shmuel “checked with seforim” and Rabbi Yochanan “checked with children.” What does this mean? According to most authorities, this means that when planning what to do, Shmuel used some method of having the words of seforim assist him in his decision what to do. This is probably similar to, or identical with, the famous goral haGra, literally, the Gra’s lottery, which involves turning pages a certain way for divine direction as to what to do in difficult circumstances. Rabbi Yochanan relied on a different approach, in which he would ask children what verses of the Torah they had just learned and would rely on their answer for direction. Some early authorities explain that relying on a pasuk of a child is like relying on the answer of a prophet, which is permitted (Semag; Ran; Shach, Yoreh Deah 179:5). Notwithstanding this approach, the Rambam still feels that one should not use either holy books or children’s verses to choose what to do, and Shmuel and Rabbi Yochanan also did not do so. They would simply note, after the fact, that what resulted could have been foretold on the basis of these methods, but they would not use these methods to plan in advance what to do.

Conclusion

As Rav Hirsch explains, serving Hashem is something that we must do in a whole-hearted way, and includes understanding that all that Hashem does is for the good. Hashem alone decides our future, directs and guides our actions. The sole criterion to decide whether we should or should not do something is Hashem’s Will. The goal of the truly sincere person is to perform what Hashem wants from him at the moment, and he will thus be impervious to worry (Commentary, Devorim 18:13).

Tzaar Baalei Chayim

In Chutz La’aretz, this week parshas Balak is read, and in Eretz Yisroel, this is one of the rare years when we read parshas Pinchas before the Three Weeks. Since both parshiyos include allusions to tzaar baalei chayim, I present:

Tzaar Baalei Chayim

Question #1: Scientific experimenting

“Are there halachic laws governing when and how one may conduct scientific or medical experiments on animals?”

Question #2: Licensed to kill!

“Are there any halachic concerns that I should know about becoming an exterminator?”

Question #3: Oversized rider

pony“On visiting day in camp, we went pony riding, accompanied by some parents. One of our campers’ fathers is very obese, and the ponies were small, meant to carry the weight of children or, at most, average-sized adults. Fortunately for the pony involved, Mr. Big decided to forgo the ride. But does halachah address whether he would have been permitted to ride one of the ponies?”

Answer:

The topic of tzaar baalei chayim, the responsibility to alleviate, avoid and prevent the suffering of animals, is discussed fairly extensively by the halachic authorities. One early source, the Sefer Chassidim, discusses this mitzvah in regard to this week’s parshah — within the context of Bilaam striking his donkey.

All authorities agree that it is forbidden to cause animals to suffer unnecessarily, such as to strike an animal out of anger or frustration (Sefer Chassidim #666). If an animal that is normally well-behaved and responsive to its vocation refuses to work one day, one should not beat it to get it to cooperate – rather, one should consider the possibility that it might be ill (Sefer Chassidim #668). Animals do get sick and, as we see from the story of Bilaam, they may have difficulty expressing themselves. Thus, the Sefer Chassidim teaches that Bilaam was punished for striking his donkey (Sefer Chassidim #668). This esteemed early authority thereby implies that a gentile is required to observe the laws of tzaar baalei chayim, an aspect of the mitzvah that we will leave for a future article.

One should not work his pregnant animal too hard when he knows that it is ready to give birth (Sefer Chassidim #667). It goes without saying that it is prohibited to raise livestock in an inhumane way, such as by feeding them an unusual diet or depriving them of proper ventilation or exercise. Also, tzaar baalei chayim includes alleviating the suffering of an animal (Orach Meisharim Chapter 15:1).

Using animals

One may use an animal to service people, even though doing so involves inflicting pain on the animal (Nimukei Yosef, Bava Metzia 32b; Terumas Hadeshen 2:105; Rema, Even Ha’ezer 5:14; these authorities base their rulings on Talmudic sources, see Chagigah 14b; Shabbos 110b and 154b; Avodah Zarah 13b). The rationale provided is that animals and the rest of creation were created in order to service mankind (Terumas Hadeshen, based on Kiddushin 82a).

How much suffering?

A question raised by earlier authorities: Is there a limit to how much pain one may cause an animal, if the goal is for human benefit? We find a dispute among rishonim whether it is prohibited to burden an animal excessively, so that humans can benefit. For example, may I place a load on an animal that is greater than it should be carrying? According to the Sefer Chassidim #666, this constitutes tzaar baalei chayim. On the other hand, the Terumas Hadeshen (1:105) rules that this is permitted. He further discusses whether one may remove the down, which is the soft feathers, from live geese. Is this halachically the same as shearing sheep, which is certainly permitted, or is it prohibited because of the level of discomfort? The Terumas Hadeshen concludes that although any use of an animal is permitted and does not violate tzaar baalei chayim, the custom is not to remove the down from live birds because this is very painful. This conclusion is quoted by the Rema as standard halachah (Even Ha’ezer 5:14).

Scientific experimentation

Is it permitted to use animals to run tests for medical research or other scientific experimentation? The earliest discussion I found on this question dates back over three hundred years, in a responsum penned by Rav Yaakov Reisher (Shu”t Shevus Yaakov 3:71), who permitted it. A much lengthier and very thorough analysis of the topic is found in a more recent work, the twentieth-century responsum of the late rav of Zurich, Rav Yaakov Breisch (Shu”t Chelkas Yaakov, Choshen Mishpat #34). He concludes that one may use animals to test products to see if they are safe, although it seems that this is permitted only when there is a direct research benefit and the potential suffering of the animals cannot be avoided. In other words, it is permitted to test a new medicine or cosmetic item on an animal to see if medical problems develop, but one may only do this to the extent necessary to see if the product is safe. One may not, while experimenting, abuse the animals in any way that is not necessary for the test being performed.

What is the halachah if the medical testing will cause excessive pain to the animals? Is this still permitted? As mentioned above, all opinions forbid inflicting or causing any unnecessary pain to animals. Whether one may conduct medical test or research that will cause considerable pain to the animal might be the subject of a dispute between the Sefer Chassidim and the Terumas Hadeshen. The Terumas Hadeshen rules that this is permitted, as long as there is human benefit. The Sefer Chassidim states that even human benefit permits only a degree of normal discomfort to the animal, but not an excessive amount.

However, it is possible that the Sefer Chassidim agrees that one may test a medicine under these circumstances, since the importance of the potential benefit is great. It would seem that he would prohibit testing a new cosmetic item that will cause an animal to suffer tremendously, whereas the Terumas Hadeshen would permit it.

The Shevus Yaakov concludes that testing a medicine or cosmetic item on a living creature to see if it is safe for humans is permitted, even if it causes much suffering to the animal (Shu”t Shevus Yaakov 3:71). This is because one is not causing pain to the animal directly, and one is trying to research whether this product is safe for people.

Shimshon

Some authorities bring evidence from the story of Shimshon that, when necessary, one may even cause excruciating pain to an animal. The book of Shoftim tells us that Shimshon captured 300 foxes and tied together their tails in a way that each knot held a torch; he then sent the foxes into the fields and orchards of the Pelishtim, burning everything to the ground (Shoftim 15:4-5). Thus, we see that one can cause tremendous pain to animals when necessary for human need.

However, others question this proof, since during warfare, much is permitted that is not otherwise allowed. Thus, in general, causing this degree of pain to an animal would certainly be forbidden (Shu”t Chelkas Yaakov).

Furthermore, I question this proof, since nowhere does it say that the foxes themselves were on fire – the torches that they transported set fire to the fields and orchards of the Pelishtim.

Animals or even insects?

Does the prohibition of tzaar baalei chayim apply to all living creatures? We find a dispute among the acharonim concerning this issue.

Rav Moshe Feinstein (Shu”t Igros Moshe, Choshen Mishpat 2:47) discusses whether one is permitted to work as an exterminator of unwanted mice, insects and other such wildlife. He rules that this is permitted when it is necessary for people, but that one should try to avoid killing the unwanted creatures directly.

Rav Moshe’s reason is that although it is permitted to eliminate pests when they are harmful to mankind, killing them still remains an act of cruelty that makes an impression on the neshamah of the person who does it. Rav Moshe demonstrates this from the fact that after we fulfill the mitzvah of destroying the ir hanidachas, the city that goes wayward, the Torah promises that Hashem will provide rachamim to the Jewish people (Devorim 13:18). Rav Moshe quotes the Ohr Hachayim, who says that notwithstanding that this destruction is necessary and fulfills a mitzvah, it still affects the neshamah of those involved, because doing brutal things makes one into a nasty person. However, the Torah promises that Hashem will provide us with rachamim, meaning that He will restore us to being our usual, merciful selves. In other words, He will remove from our neshamos the harm created by what we were forced to do. (To the best of my knowledge, this is one of only three places in all of Rav Moshe’s responsa that he quotes the Ohr Hachayim.) Similarly, exterminating varmints, even though it is necessary and therefore permitted, will affect one’s neshamah. Therefore, it is better to do the exterminating in an indirect way, which makes less of an impression on the neshamah. According to Rav Moshe, we can conclude that killing a fly, moth or other insect that is not bothering anyone is prohibited.

(Rav Moshe contends that shechting for food will not cause a person to become cruel, since this act fulfills a mitzvah, notwithstanding that one is not required to perform it. Rav Moshe seems to hold that since the Torah sometimes requires shechitah, such as, when offering a korban, its performance could never cause someone to become cruel.)

Insects should not apply

However, we find that an earlier authority, Rav Yaakov Emden, who sometimes referred to himself by his acronym Ya’avetz* (Yaakov ben Tzvi), did not understand that the concept of tzaar baalei chayim extends this far. He rules that tzaar baalei chayim does not apply to insects, but only to creatures large enough that mankind can use them for work (She’eilas Ya’avetz 1:110). Although Rav Yaakov Emden quotes the Arizal as having commanded his students not to kill even lice, the Ya’avetz explains this to be a midas chassidus, beyond the strict requirements of the halachah. In his understanding, it could be that the Arizal prohibited this destruction because it causes harm to one’s neshamah, the same line of reasoning that Rav Moshe applied to discourage an exterminator from killing insects in a direct way.

Is it prohibited min hatorah?

The tanna’im dispute whether the law of tzaar baalei chayim is min hatorah or whether it is only of rabbinic origin (Bava Metzia 32b; Shabbos 154b). One of the differences that results from this dispute is as follows: Let us assume that in order to avoid causing an animal pain or distress, one would need to violate a rabbinic prohibition. May one supersede the rabbinic prohibition in order to avoid tzaar baalei chayim? The answer is that if tzaar baalei chayim, itself, is only a rabbinic prohibition, one cannot violate one rabbinic mitzvah for the sake of another. However, if tzaar baalei chayim is prohibited min hatorah, then preventing suffering to an animal overrides a rabbinic prohibition (Shu”t Maharam meiRottenberg 3:181).

The following discussion of the Gemara will demonstrate this to us:

Rabban Gamliel’s donkey was laden with barrels of honey, and he did not want to unburden it until Shabbos was over. The Gemara asks why Rabban Gamliel waited until Shabbos was over, since this was clearly causing unnecessary discomfort for the animal. The Gemara replies that the honey had hardened and was therefore no longer suitable as a food, which would make it muktzah on Shabbos. The Gemara then asks why didn’t Rabban Gamliel release the ropes binding the barrels to the donkey so that they could fall off the donkey on Shabbos, something he could do without moving the muktzah. The answer was that Rabban Gamliel did not want the barrels to break. The Gemara, still not satisfied, asks why didn’t he place pillows under the barrels, thus cushioning their fall so that they would not break? The Gemara answers that the pillows would get dirty this way and become useless for the rest of Shabbos, and doing this on Shabbos is prohibited because of a rabbinic proscription called bitul kli meiheichano, literally, nullifying a tool from its use. The Gemara then asks that the prohibition of tzaar baalei chayim should supersede the rabbinic prohibition of bitul kli meiheichano. To this the Gemara replies that Rabban Gamliel held that the law of tzaar baalei chayim is only rabbinic, and therefore it does not supersede a different rabbinic prohibition (Shabbos 154b).

The Gemara’s conclusion

Notwithstanding Rabban Gamliel’s position that tzaar baalei chayim is forbidden only as a rabbinic injunction, there are other tanna’im who rule that it is forbidden min hatorah. The following passage of Gemara implies that Rabban Gamliel’s position is rejected by the later authorities in the time of the Gemara:

Rav Yehudah said in the name of Rav: One may place cushions and pillows underneath an animal that fell into an irrigation ditch to enable it to get out by itself. However, it is preferred to bring food and water to the animal for the rest of Shabbos, if possible, and if this will satisfy the animal’s needs, rather than place cushions and pillows underneath the animal, which will violate bitul kli meiheichano (Shabbos 128b).

This Gemara implies that if we can avoid both transgressing the law of bitul kli meiheichano and avoiding tzaar baalei chayim, we strive to accomplish both, but if that option does not exist, then tzaar baalei chayim supersedes the rabbinic prohibition of bitul kli meiheichano. Since this passage reflects the conclusion of the amora’im, we see that we do not rule in accordance with Rabban Gamliel, but rather we rule that tzaar baalei chayim is min hatorah. This is the halachic conclusion reached by most, if not all, halachic authorities (Shu”t Maharam of Rottenberg 3:181; Mordechai, Shabbos #448; Nimukei Yosef, Bava Metzia 32b; Sefer Chassidim #666; Shiltei Hagiborim, Shabbos chapter 18, pg. 51a note 3, quoting Riaz; Kesef Mishneh, Hilchos Rotzeach 13:9; Rema, Choshen Mishpat 272:9; Sma 272:12, 15; Gra, Choshen Mishpat 272:11). This law is also codified in Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 305:19).

The Shulchan Aruch, reflecting this conclusion, cites a different halachah that results from the fact that tzaar baalei chayim is prohibited min hatorah. Although there is a rabbinic injunction prohibiting mounting or dismounting from an animal on Shabbos or Yom Tov, if someone did mount an animal, he is required to get off. (If this were forbidden, he would be required to remain on horseback the rest of Shabbos or Yom Tov, which would certainly cause tzaar baalei chayim.) This is true, notwithstanding that the act of dismounting constitutes a rabbinic violation of Shabbos (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 305:18). This ruling is consistent with our previous analysis. Since we conclude that tzaar baalei chayim is prohibited min hatorah, it can, when necessary, supersede a rabbinic prohibition, such as that of dismounting from an animal on Shabbos.

Violent rooster

Here is a related question, culled from the more contemporary responsa literature. If one discovers on Shabbos that one rooster is attacking other chickens, may one remove it from the coop on Shabbos, notwithstanding that a live animal is muktzah on Shabbos (Shu”t Har Tzvi, Orach Chayim 1:205)?

This question was asked of the late Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank, then rav of Yerushalayim. In his analysis of the topic, he quotes the previously mentioned conclusions of the Shulchan Aruch, that someone who mounted an animal on Shabbos should dismount it, because of tzaar baalei chayim, and that one must remove a burden from an animal, even by moving muktzah if no other method will work, because of tzaar baalei chayim. Therefore, Rav Frank concludes that it is permitted to remove the treacherous rooster from the others. He writes that it is preferred to have a gentile worker remove it, but if there is no gentile available, a Jew may remove it, notwithstanding that a rooster is muktzah on Shabbos. In other words, tzaar baalei chayim supersedes the prohibition of muktzah, when there is no way to accommodate both laws.

Conclusion:

Shlomoh Hamelech teaches (in Mishlei 12:10) Rachamei re’sha’im achzari, that the compassion of the evil is cruelty. What does this mean, particularly since the context of the pasuk implies that it is discussing the care one takes of his animals? The example chosen by the Sefer Chassidim (#669) is of an evil person who fed his animal well, but then expects it to perform beyond its capabilities – after all, he treated it so nicely. When the owner’s expectations are not realized, he beats the animal mercilessly. It turns out that his initial compassion caused him to be cruel.

The Tosefta (Bava Kama, end of Chapter 9) states that Rabbi Yehudah said in the name of Rabban Gamliel: “Know this sign well: as long as you act with mercy, Hashem will have mercy on you.” Sefer Chassidim #666 notes: If we are merciful to our animals, Hashem and others will be merciful to us.

*Note that several different scholars are referred to by this acronym.

 

Earthware and Earthenware

This week, the parsha reading in Eretz Yisroel is Chukas, and in chutz la’aretz, Korach. Since the earth is a major player in both parshiyos, I present:

Earthware and Earthenware

potteryQuestion #1: How is Earthenware Different?

In what ways are the laws of earthenware very different from other materials?

Question #2: Horseshoes, Hand Grenades and Hedgehogs

There is an old expression that “‘Almost’ counts only in horseshoes and hand grenades.” Why would someone add hedgehogs to this list, other than the fact that it also starts with the letter “h”?

Question #3: Inside, Outside

When does the halachah of something’s inside and its outside appear to be so radically different?

Answer:

Moshe Rabbeinu davened to Hashem for the earth to perform a Kiddush Hashem and swallow up Korach and his entire entourage. It therefore behooves us to be makir tov, acknowledge the earth’s cooperation in fulfilling Hashem’s will, by studying some of the very unique halachos applicable to different types of wares manufactured from earthen materials.

Earthenware, also called pottery, figured very prominently in the ancient world. The clay used in manufacturing these vessels was readily available. From numerous discussions of the Mishnah (Keilim, Chapters 2-10), we see that earthenware was commonly used for pitchers, ovens, stoves, pots, dishes and other utensils. It is also interesting to note that much of our knowledge of ancient peoples is due to the widespread use of pottery. Since broken pieces of earthenware can last for millennia, archeologists glean much of their knowledge of early societies by studying the potsherds, or leftover broken pieces of earthenware, which survive for generations after wooden utensils have long decomposed.

In halachah, earthenware presents several atypical rules that are particularly significant to the laws of tumah and taharah (the rules of purity and spiritual contamination) and the laws of kashrus. Unfortunately, since we are all tamei today, we cannot apply the laws of tumah and taharah to the extent that we would like, but we fervently hope and pray to observe these laws again soon, when the Beis Hamikdash is restored and the purification of the parah adumah is reinstituted. This article will serve as a kind of primer so that we are better prepared to observe these laws. Let us begin with an introduction to the laws of tumah and taharah as they affect utensils, so that we can better understand the unusual status of earthenware.

Tumah and taharah

When explaining how the laws of tumah and taharah affect utensils, we categorize utensils according to the raw material from which they are manufactured. Halachah places most materials under two general headings:

1) Those that cannot become tamei, called keilim she’einam mekablim tumah.

2) Those that can become tamei and subsequently be made tahor again by immersion in a mikveh, called klei shetef, literally, utensils that can be immersed.

What we will see shortly is that earthenware vessels have their own unique halachic rules and fit under neither category.

  1. Utensils that cannot become tamei

Several types of utensils, including items made of stone or unfired earth (see Keilim 10:1; Ohalos 5:5), or of the bones or skin of birds (Keilim 17:14), fish or sea creatures (Keilim 17:13) cannot become tamei. I will henceforth refer to utensils in this category as non-contaminable utensils.

Kohanim at the time of Beis Hamikdash, who had many valid reasons to avoid tumah, often used bowls and plates made of stone, which is not susceptible to tumah. This information has been validated at archeological digs in Israel.

The following anecdote bears this out. A secular archeologist, well-educated in her profession, but, unfortunately, not sufficiently versed in the world of Torah, called a press conference in which she presented what she thought was a startling breakthrough. She “discovered” that a sect of people living in Jerusalem 2000 years ago was apparently cut off from the civilized world around them. While everyone else was using metal and earthenware utensils, these people were still living in the Stone Age, and used only stone vessels. Several religious members of the press burst out laughing, and the poor woman was at a loss to explain what was so funny. Finally, someone explained to her that the “sect” she was describing was composed of kohanim and others concerned about tumah and taharah, who were using only stone vessels that cannot become tamei.

  1. Utensils that become tahor in a mikveh

Most utensils and clothing made of natural materials, including those made of metal, leather, glass, animal bone, reeds, wood, cloth or other fibers, can potentially become tamei in a variety of ways.

Tumah hierarchy

The Mishnah, in the first chapter of Keilim, lists a “hierarchy” of ten sources of tumah, with a corpse rendering the highest level and a sheretz, the remains of one of the eight small creatures listed by the Torah in parshas Shemini (Vayikra 11:29-32), as the lowest. One of the general rules of tumah is that items that become tamei from a higher source of tumah become tamei in a greater way than items that become tamei from a lower level of tumah. For example, a vessel that becomes tamei from a corpse is significantly more tamei than if it became tamei from a sheretz. The two obvious manifestations of something being “more” tamei are:

More ways

(1) It contaminates more things in more ways. For example, a corpse, which is a high form of tumah, contaminates items (or people) through direct physical contact (by touch, called tumas maga), by being lifted by them (tumas masa), or by being under the same cover, roof or overhang (tumas ohel). Sheretz, a lesser form of tumah, contaminates items or people only through direct physical contact, but not via any of the other methods of contact.

More purifying processes

(2) Something that becomes tamei to a greater degree may require more processes and take a longer amount of time to make it tahor again. For example, to restore to tahor status a vessel that became tamei via contact with a corpse requires at least a seven-day procedure, including two sprinklings (on the third and seventh days) with spring water mixed with the ashes of the parah adumah, followed by immersion in a mikveh or spring and the onset of nightfall. Until its immersion, if it touches another utensil, the second utensil also becomes contaminated, and sometimes the second utensil can even contaminate a third utensil (Ohalos 1:1-3). According to some opinions, under certain circumstances, if the vessel that became tamei via contact with a corpse is in a room or house, it contaminates all utensils that are in the same room or house (Tosafos, Nazir 53b s.v. cherev).

On the other hand, a utensil that became tamei from a sheretz or other lesser degree of tumah can become completely tahor again in less than a day and, at times, within minutes, provided that one immersed it in a mikveh and waited until nightfall.

As I mentioned above, because these utensils become tahor after they are immersed, they are categorized as klei shetef, immersible utensils, which means utensils that can become tahor by submersion in a mikveh. I will henceforth refer to this category as immersible utensils. This includes utensils manufactured from the following materials: metal, leather, glass, animal bone, reeds, wood, cloth or other fibers.

Earthenware is different from all other wares

Whereas all other utensils fall under one of the above two categories (1) non-contaminable utensils or (2) immersible utensils, earthenware vessels have their own laws, different from both of the above categories. In general, earthenware vessels are susceptible to tumah, so they cannot be treated as non-contaminable utensils. On the other hand, although earthenware vessels are susceptible to tumah, they have very different rules than do immersible utensils. In some ways, the rules regarding earthenware are more lenient than those regarding immersible utensils, and sometimes the rules are more stringent. Earthenware truly marches to the beat of a different drummer. In what ways is it different?

Contaminate from outside

Immersible utensils become contaminated when they come in contact with a tamei source, whether they are touched on their internal surface or on their outside. This means that if something tamei touched the outer surface of a desk, bed or fork, the desk, bed or fork became tamei. However, if something tamei touched the outside of an earthenware vessel, it remains tahor. An earthenware vessel contracts tumah only from its inside, and only when it possesses an area that can service as a “container.” As a result, a flat earthenware board will not be able to become tamei, since it has no “inside,” nor will an earthenware fork, since it is not made to hold liquid.

Levels of tumah

Here is a second way that earthenware vessels are treated more leniently than are other utensils. Immersible utensils are susceptible to becoming tamei at a high level and also at a lower level. The higher level, called av hatumah (and sometimes even avi avos hatumah) makes other utensils and even people tamei, whereas the lower level (rishon latumah) contaminates only foods and beverages, but does not affect people or other utensils. On the other hand, earthenware vessels are susceptible only to the lower type of tumah – they can only become a rishon latumah, contaminating foods and beverages – even if they became tamei from the highest levels of tumah. Therefore, if a corpse or part of a corpse touched the inside of an earthenware vessel, it becomes a rishon latumah that can contaminate food or beverages. However, a tamei earthenware vessel that touches another utensil or a person does not render either of them tamei.

Earthenware is stricter

Until now, we have been studying areas in which the laws germane to earthenware vessels are more lenient that those of immersible utensils. Now, we will discover two halachos in which earthenware vessels are treated more strictly than utensils manufactured from other materials.

Airspace

Earthenware vessels have an unusual law. They become tamei and spread tumah from their inside airspace, even without direct contact. In other words, if a tamei item is dangled inside an earthenware vessel, the vessel becomes tamei, and it will contaminate, subsequently, any food or beverage that hangs inside it. (As we mentioned before, any tumah of an earthenware vessel contaminates only food and beverages. It never renders other utensils or people tamei.)

Horseshoes, Hand Grenades and Hedgehogs

At this point, we can answer one of our opening questions: There is an old expression that “‘Almost’ counts only in horseshoes and hand grenades.” Why would someone add hedgehogs to this list, other than the fact that it also starts with the letter “h”?

First let us appreciate the expression. “Almost” knocking down a pin in bowling does not add to your score, and “almost” waking up early enough to daven in shul means that the person davened at home. However, in the game of horseshoes, one scores points even if he does not throw a “ringer,” and throwing a hand grenade so that it explodes almost on target is usually a successful enough lob to accomplish one’s objective.

At this point, we can explain the similarity between “almost” touching an earthenware vessel from its inside and actually touching it. The laws of contaminating earthenware vessels are that one can make them tamei, even if one does not touch them, as long as the tamei item, such as a dead hedgehog, was inside the airspace of the earthenware vessel. Thus, dead hedgehogs share a common characteristic with horseshoes and hand grenades in that “almost” can sometimes be as effective as being right on the money.

Breaking of the vessels

There is another way in which the laws regarding earthenware vessels are stricter than those of immersible vessels. Once they become tamei, immersible vessels can all be made tahor again through immersion in a mikveh or spring, provided that the correct procedure is employed. If the level of tumah is light, all that is required is to immerse the tamei vessel in a spring or a mikveh and then wait until nightfall for it to become tahor again. If the level of tumah is greater, such as because it became tamei from a corpse (see Bamidbar 19:17-19), it requires additional procedures. For example, an immersible utensil that became tamei from a corpse is rendered tahor by sprinkling it with the ashes of the parah adumah according to a specific procedure, followed by immersion in a spring or mikveh.

On the other hand, earthenware vessels that become tamei have no solution for making them tahor other than breaking them in a way that renders them useless. Immersing them in a mikveh does not make them tahor, nor do any of the other procedures, such as sprinkling on them ashes of the parah adumah. (Min haTorah, breaking any utensil renders it tahor. However, because of a rabbinic injunction, some immersible utensils remain tamei after they are broken [Keilim 11:1]. Since this is not an issue germane to earthenware vessels, we will leave it for a different time.)

Earthware vs. Earthenware

Until this point in this article, we have been discussing the status of earthenware, or pottery, which means vessels that are made of clay and then fired in a kiln. However, there is a vast difference in halachah between items made from earth without being fired, which are called klei adamah, and earthenware, called klei cheres. One can make very inexpensive vessels and utensils from earth, without firing them. These klei adamah items are not susceptible to tumah at all. (They fall under the category of non-contaminable utensils.)

Kashrus

Having discovered the anomalous world of tumah and taharah that applies to earthenware vessels, we will no longer be surprised to discover that earthenware utensils, also, have unusual laws relevant to kashrus. The Gemara (Pesachim 30b; Avodah Zarah 33b-34a) quotes the following discussion:

They asked Mareimar, “Can you use [chometz-dik] vessels made of coated earthenware on Pesach?” We are not asking you about the green ones – those certainly cannot be used. We are asking you about the black ones and the white ones. Furthermore, we are not asking you about those vessels whose surfaces are cracked, since they, also, certainly cannot be used. We are asking you about the ones that have smooth surfaces…. He answered them that they do absorb and that they are prohibited to use on Pesach, since the Torah testified that food that is absorbed by the walls of an earthenware vessel cannot be removed.

Apparently, there were at least three types of clay used in the time of the Gemara for producing “coated” earthenware (green, black and white), something that we would probably call “overlaid” or “plated.” “Coated” earthenware means that a layer of a less porous material was overlaid onto the clay prior to firing it to become earthenware. There is a dispute among rishonim as to what type of coating the Gemara is referring: Rashi explains that the earthenware was coated with lead, whereas Rabbeinu Tam understands that it was a glass coating (Tosafos, Kesubos 107b s.v. hani; Tosafos, Avodah Zarah 33b s.v. kunya; also see Rashi there).

Absorption and earthenware

According to all opinions, the halachah is that once a non-coated earthenware pot was used to cook chometz or non-kosher food, one will never be able to fully remove the flavor that has been absorbed in its walls. The basis for this concept is taught to us by a gezeiras hakasuv, an inference of the Torah itself. This means that residue of the chometz or non-kosher food absorbs into the porous earthenware, and, once absorbed, it leaches out gradually, and cannot be fully removed by kashering. Anything cooked subsequently in that pot may contain chometz or a non-kosher product. The only way to remove all the prohibited substance is by placing the earthenware into a kiln where the heat is so great that it burns out the prohibited substance, until none of the absorbed product remains. (Some contemporary authorities contend that one can kasher earthenware today via the cleaning cycle of a self-cleaning oven. However, before doing this, I recommend checking with your posek or rav and also ascertaining whether running the self-cleaning cycle with something inside the oven invalidates the manufacturer’s warranty.)

Understanding the Gemara

The Gemara assumed that earthenware vessels cannot be kashered, but inquired as to whether it is possible to kasher them when they are plated with a material that can be kashered. At first, the Gemara suggests that it might make a difference what type of clay was used in the construction of the pottery — some are apparently more porous than others — and the Gemara felt that this might influence how absorbent the vessel is, even after it has been plated. Those vessels manufactured from the “green” type of clay were the most absorbent, and even the Gemara’s initial position assumed that this type of pottery would be problematic. The Gemara’s conclusion is that one cannot kasher any earthenware vessels for Pesach, even if they are overlaid, regardless of the type of clay used in the earthenware.

Conclusion

This article has served as an introduction to some of the basic rules that affect earthenware. We should always hope and pray that the food we eat and the utensils in which we prepare it fulfill all the halachos that the Torah commands us.

 

Can We Identify the Techeiles?

Parshas Shelach includes the mitzvah of wearing techeiles on our tzitzis. Rashi, in the beginning of Parshas Korach, mentions that the followers of Korach donned garments that were completely techeiles. Therefore, whether we are in a place that reads Shelach this week or one that reads Korach, it is appropriate to read about:

Can We Identify the Techeiles?

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When we are commanded about wearing tzitzis, the Torah includes two mitzvos. In addition to the mitzvah of wearing tzitzis threads on the corners of the garment, there is an additional mitzvah that some of the tzitzis threads should be dyed with a special dye called techeiles. (There is a dispute among the Rishonim how many of the tzitzis threads are to be dyed techeiles.) This dye must be made from a species called chilazon (Tosefta Menachos 9:6).

Although the use of techeiles stopped over a thousand years ago, there have been a few attempts within the last 140 years to reintroduce the practice of wearing techeiles threads alongside the white threads. This article will present the differing opinions on this question and some of the issues that have been raised.

At the time of the Gemara, the nature of chilazon and its manufacture was still known and practiced (see Menachos 42b). However, some time after the period of the Gemara, the use of techeiles ended. By all indications, techeiles fell into disuse sometime between the end of the period of the Rabbonim Sabora’im, who completed the editing of the Gemara around the year 4330 (570), and the time of Rav Ahai Gaon, the author of the She’iltos, around 4520 (760).

It is unclear why the Jewish people stopped using techeiles. Numerous theories have been suggested why wearing techeiles ended. The wording used by the midrashim is “now we have only white tzitzis, since the techeiles was concealed” (Medrash Tanchuma, Shelach 15; Medrash Rabbah, Shelach 17:5). Some poskim understand that there are halachic or kabbalistic reasons why techeiles should not be worn until moshiach comes (Shu”t Yeshuos Malko #1-3). According to this opinion, the Medrash means that the source of the techeiles was concealed and it is only to be revealed in the future at a time when Hashem again wants us to wear it.

Other poskim disagree and contend that we should still attempt to fulfill the mitzvah of wearing techeiles on the tzitzis. They explain that the Medrash means that techeiles became unavailable. Rav Herzog zt”l, who followed this approach, speculated that persecution by anti-Semitic governments ended the production of techeiles. Still another possibility is that the knowledge how to produce the techeiles was lost, or that there was no longer availability or access to the chilazon, the source of the techeiles.

The Radziner Rebbe’s research

In 5647 (1887), the Radziner Rebbe, Rav Gershon Henoch Leiner, zt”l, published a small sefer, Sefunei Temunei Chol, wherein he discusses the importance of fulfilling the mitzvah of wearing techeiles even today. In his opinion, the Medrash quoted above means that techeiles became unavailable. The Radziner encouraged wearing something that might be techeiles even if it is uncertain that one is fulfilling the mitzvah. In his opinion, one who is wearing questionable techeiles should do so, because he may be fulfilling a mitzvah min hatorah. Thus, he contended that if he could identify a species that might be the chilazon, and he could extract a dye from it, one should wear tzitzis that are dyed with this product.

The Radziner himself analyzed every place in the Gemara where the word chilazon is mentioned, and defined what characteristics would help us identify the chilazon. Based on his analysis, he drew up a list of eleven requirements by which the chilazon used for techeiles can be identified. Among other requirements, these included that the chilazon would be located in the eastern Mediterranean Sea; that it is a marine animal and not a fish; that it must be able to live on land, at least for a brief period of time; that it produces a black ink and that it must have fins, bones, and sinews. The Radziner concluded that if one located a marine animal that meets all eleven requirements, one can assume that it is the chilazon.

Having completed his halachic research, the Radziner then began his scientific research to identify the chilazon. He traveled to Naples, Italy, the location of a major aquarium and marine research institute, to study marine animals that would meet all the requirements of techeiles. In Italy, he decided that the cuttlefish, which in many languages is called an inkfish, is indeed the chilazon from which one produces techeiles. The cuttlefish meets every one of the Radziner’s requirements for chilazon, including that it emits a dark dye, which is the reason why it is called an inkfish. The cuttlefish is not a true fish and is capable of living on land for brief periods of time.

The Radziner then published his second volume on the subject, Pesil Techeiles, in which he announced his discovery of the chilazon and his proofs why the cuttlefish meets all the requirements of the chilazon. Subsequently, the Radziner published a third volume, Ein Hatecheiles, whose purpose was to respond to all the questions he had been asked concerning what he had written in his previous volumes.

Reaction to the Radziner’s proposal

Although the Radziner had presented his case in an extremely convincing manner, most of the Gedolei Yisroel did not support his theory. The Radziner attempted to convince the poskim of his era of the validity of his approach, particularly, Rav Yitzchok Elchonon Spector of Kovno, the Beis Halevi (then the rav of Brisk), Rav Yehoshua Kutno (author of Yeshuos Malko), the Maharil Diskin (who had been rav of Brisk and was living in official retirement in Yerushalayim), and Rav Shmuel Salant (the rav of Yerushalayim). None of these rabbonim accepted the Radziner’s proposal. Their reasons for rejecting his proposal are significant.

Rav Yehoshua Kutno and Rav Yitzchok Elchonon disagreed with the Radziner because they both held that the Medrash quoted above should be understood literally — techeiles has been placed in genizah until Hashem again wants us to observe this mitzvah. Rav Yehoshua Kutno suggests several reasons why this happened, which are beyond the scope of this article.

Others were opposed to wearing techeiles because of sources in the writings of the Ari and other mekubalim that we are not to use techeiles until the rebuilding of the Beis Hamikdash, bimheira beyameinu. The Radziner did not agree with their interpretation of these sources.

An additional objection was raised against the Radziner’s position that one should wear questionable techeiles since one might be fulfilling the mitzvah. This is based on the poskim who contend that one who places on a white garment blue tzitzis that are dyed with a dye other than techeiles is not yotzei the mitzvah of tzitzis. Therefore, it is preferable to wear white tzitzis if one is uncertain (see Rema, Orach Chayim 9:5).

There were also objections to the Radziner’s conclusions on other grounds. Some objected to his choosing a non-kosher species as the source of the techeiles, since there are early poskim who contend that the techeiles must come from a kosher species. This subject is an old dispute, which can be traced back to the time of the rishonim and early acharonim.

Others contended that the color of the Radziner’s techeiles was wrong, since Rashi seems to indicate that the color of techeiles is green. However, it should be noted that the word yarok that Rashi uses can also mean gold, yellow or blue, as indicated by numerous sources in Chazal and rishonim. (Many of the sources as to whether the correct color of techeiles is green, blue or black are discussed in the article by Dr. Zvi Koren, which I refer to later in this article.)

The Beis Halevi’s approach

The Beis Halevi took issue with the Radziner on the basis of mesorah, but there is a dispute as to exactly what was his objection. The way the Radziner quotes the Beis Halevi, his concern was that the species identified by the Radziner was well-known, and, if it indeed was the correct source, this mesorah should not have been lost.

Rav Yosef Dov Soloveichek of Boston, himself named for the Beis Halevi, wrote a different understanding of the Beis Halevi’s opinion. He contends that we cannot identify the chilazon on the basis of research. When the Torah requires a specific type or species to fulfill a mitzvah, one cannot fulfill this mitzvah without a mesorah that this is the correct object with which to perform the mitzvah. Attempting to identify the type or species on the basis of research, analysis, or proofs will not help; nothing can be substituted for mesorah. Thus, no matter how compelling the evidence is that a specific species is the chilazon of techeiles, one will not fulfill the mitzvah of wearing threads dyed with this color. When Eliyahu Hanavi returns as the precursor to the mashiach, he will identify for us the mesorah he received from his rabbei’im and thereby we will be able to identify the proper techeiles.

The Maharsham

There was one gadol who considered the merits of the Radziner’s position. The Maharsham, Rav Shalom Mordechai Schvadron, rav of Bruzan, wore a talis with the Radziner’s techeiles, although apparently he did so only in private. However, in the final result, only the Radziner’s own chassidim and some Breslever chassidim wore the techeiles that the Radziner introduced.

Rav Herzog’s research

More than twenty years after the Radziner’s passing, Rav Yitzchak Isaac Herzog (who became the first Chief Rabbi of Israel several decades later) researched the source for the techeiles. He wrote up this research as his doctoral dissertation.

In his analysis of the halachic issues involved, Rav Herzog accepted most of the Radziner’s opinions and interpretations. However, there are some aspects of the Radziner’s approach with which Rav Herzog took issue. Whereas the Radziner assumed that every place in the Gemara where it refers to chilazon, it means the chilazon that was used in making techeiles, Rav Herzog assumes that chilazon means a sea snail, and not necessarily the snail used in making the techeiles. (By the way, in Modern Hebrew, Ben Yehudah decided to use the word chilazon for snail, rather than the original Hebrew word, shavlul.) Thus, in Rav Herzog’s opinion, not all of the Radziner’s requirements in determining the species for the techeiles are accurate. Therefore, Rav Herzog focused on analyzing the numerous species of sea snails for the most likely candidate to produce techeiles.

Rav Herzog took issue on one major point of the Radziner’s research. Rav Herzog took samples of the dye recommended by the Radziner as techeiles and had them chemically tested. Based on results that he received from the laboratories, Rav Herzog concluded that the blue color that results from the Radziner’s method of producing techeiles is not caused by anything in the cuttlefish ink. The chemists he consulted contended that the color is an artificial dye named Prussian blue, which is created by the chemicals added as part of the processing. In Rav Herzog’s opinion, since he could not discern anything in the cuttlefish that causes the blue coloring, he reached the conclusion that the cuttlefish is not the source of the techeiles. There are answers how the Radziner might have responded to this concern, but it is inappropriate for others to speak on his behalf.

In his dissertation, Rav Herzog analyzed various sea snails, concluding that none of them fit as sources for the techeiles. Apparently, decades later, Rav Herzog was still grappling with which species might be the correct source.

It should be noted that all the poskim who disagreed with the Radziner’s proposal would disagree with Rav Herzog’s proposals – the reasons that they rejected the inkfish would also apply to a sea snail.

Many scientific researchers have suggested that the species of sea snail currently called Hexaplex trunculus might indeed be the source for techeiles. (Since most people who write on this topic usually refer to this species by its earlier name, Murex trunculus, I will use the latter term.) It is curious that this is one of the species of sea snail that Rav Herzog considered. Most people who today have their tzitzis dyed blue are using an indigo color derived from Murex trunculus.

Nevertheless, there are strong technical objections to this. Some of these arguments might be resolved based on a brilliant article published recently by Professor Zvi Koren in Tradition. However, in Professor Koren’s opinion, both the method used to extract dye from Murex trunculus and the color used is erroneous, and is certainly not the proper color of techeiles.

We note that the method currently used to process the dye from the Murex trunculus cannot be the correct method of dyeing techeiles threads, as performed by our ancestors, for the following reasons:

  1. The current method of extracting dye from Murex trunculus involves removing a gland from the snail, which would involve the melacha of gozeiz, removing part of a living creature. (According to many poskim, one violates this also by removing part of a creature that has died.) Clearly, this could not have been the method of removing the dye from chilazon in earlier days, as can be proved from the Gemara (Shabbos 75a), since no mention is made of this prohibition in the Gemara, although it mentions other prohibitions that are transgressed in the capture and processing of the chilazon on Shabbos.
  2. Another objection is based on the fact that it can be demonstrated from the Gemara that the removing of the dye liquid from the chilazon kills it, although one would prefer that the chilazon remain alive for as long as possible. However, in the process used to remove the dye from Murex, the snail can remain alive for several hours after the process is complete.
  3. A third problem with the current method of using Murex trunculus dye requires an introduction. At the time of the Gemara, there were unscrupulous individuals who sold threads dyed with a coloring called kla ilan. This coloring is not kosher as techeiles, and someone wearing it on his tzitzis would not fulfill the mitzvah of wearing techeiles. According to the Aruch, kla ilan is indigo, a vegetable dye that has a blue color. Thus, the Gemara was concerned about someone selling indigo-colored threads as techeiles threads to an unsuspecting buyer. The Gemara describes a test that can be used to check whether the threads are kla ilan or techeiles, by testing the threads for colorfastness: kla ilan would fade, whereas techeiles would remain fast. However, the dye used currently by Murex trunculus enthusiasts is chemically identical to indigo. How, then, can a chemical test for colorfastness be used to determine what was the source of the indigo?
  4. The Rambam describes that the “blood” that is the source of the techeiles is black when removed from the chilazon. The gland extract removed from Murex trunculus is clear when it is removed and changes color afterwards.

Obviously, I am not the first one to note these difficulties with the process of extracting dye from Murex trunculus. However, the responses I have seen to answer these questions are very tenuous.

We see that there has been a significant amount of research about the source of techeiles and the possibility of fulfilling this mitzvah in our day. Due to the above mentioned considerations, those who follow the approach of the majority of the poskim of earlier generations and wear only white tzitzis have a substantive basis in halacha.

The Mitzvah of ViKidashto – To Treat a Kohen with Respect

Since the kohen’s role is significant in parshas Naso, read this week in chutz la’aretz, I present…

The Mitzvah of ViKidashto – To Treat a Kohen with Respect

Question: I know the Torah teaches that we are to treat a kohen with honor, yet I always see people asking kohanim to do them favors. Am I permitted to ask a kohen to do a favor for me?

Answer:

You are asking a very excellent and interesting question. It is correct that a look at the early poskim implies that one should not ask a kohen to do him a favor, yet the prevalent custom is to be lenient. Let us explore the subject to see whether this practice is correct.

In Parshas Emor, after listing many specific mitzvos that apply uniquely to the Kohen, the Torah states: “And you shall make him (the kohen) holy, because he offers the bread of your G-d. He shall be holy to you because I, Hashem, Who make you holy, am Holy” (VaYikra 21:8). We are commanded by the Torah to treat a kohen differently, since he is charged with bringing the offerings in the Beis HaMikdash (Gittin 59b; Rambam, Hilchos Klei HaMikdash 4:2).

There are both positive and negative aspects to this mitzvah. On the negative side, a kohen who violates his kedushah by marrying a divorcee or other woman prohibited to him must divorce his prohibited wife. The Gemara states that “you shall make him holy,” even against the kohen’s will. Thus, when the Jewish community and its beis din have control over Jewish affairs, they are required to force a kohen to divorce his wife under these circumstances and to physically remove him from the household if necessary (Yevamos 82b).

There is also the positive aspect of this mitzvah, which is to treat the kohen with honor. According to the Rambam, this responsibility is considered a mitzvah min hatorah (Sefer HaMitzvos Aseh 32; Hilchos Klei HaMikdash 4:2), whereas other rishonim contend that this aspect of the mitzvah is only midarabanan (Tosafos, Chullin 87a end of s.v. vichiyivu; Tur, Yoreh Deah 28: Bach ad loc.). Later poskim rule that the mitzvah to treat a kohen with respect is indeed min hatorah (see Magen Avraham 201:4 and Mishnah Berurah op. cit.).

How should the kohen be honored?

The Gemara explains that this respect manifests itself in several ways: “The kohen should open first (liftoach rishon), he should bless first, and he should take a nice portion first” (Gittin 59b, Moed Katan 28b). Similarly, the Talmud Yerushalmi (Berachos 5:4) teaches that when a yisroel walks alongside a kohen, the kohen should be given the more honorary place, which is on the right.

What is intended by the Gemara when it states that “the kohen should open first”? Some commentaries explain that this means that the kohen should be the first speaker, whether in divrei Torah or at a meeting (Rashi, Gittin 59b). Others explain it to mean that the kohen should receive the first aliyah, when the Torah is read (Rambam, Hilchos Klei HaMikdash 4:2 and Rashi in Moed Katan 28b).

The kohen should make the brocha on the meal first (Rashi, Gittin 59b), make kiddush for everyone (Mishnah Berurah 201:12) and lead the benching (Rashi, Moed Katan 28b; Ran and other Rishonim, Nedarim 62b). If he is poor, he is entitled to choose the best portion of tzedokoh available or of the maaser given to the poor (Tosafos, Gittin 59b). According to some opinions, when dissolving a partnership, after dividing the property into two portions of equal value, the kohen should be offered the choice between the two portions (Rashi, Gittin 59b). However, the accepted approach is that this is not included in the mitzvah, and it is also not in the kohen’s best interest (Tosafos ad loc.). However, when a group of friends are together, they should offer the kohen to take the best portion.

Similarly, poskim rule that a kohen should be chosen ahead of a levi or a yisroel to be chazan (Pri Megadim, Eishel Avraham 53:14). Presumably, he should also be given preference for a position to be a Rav, Rosh Yeshiva, or Magid Shiur in a yeshiva, if he is qualified for the position.

It should be noted that the kohen deserves special respect only when he is at least a peer to the yisroel in learning. However, if the yisroel is a Torah scholar and the kohen is not, the Torah scholar receives the greater honor.

There is one exception to this ruling. In order to establish peace and harmony in the Jewish community, the first aliyah to the Torah is always given to a kohen, even when there is a Torah scholar in attendance (Shulchan Aruch Orach Chayim 135:4). As far as other honors go, the Torah scholar should always be given honor ahead of the kohen. (It is interesting to note that, at the time of the Gemara, the gadol hador was given the first aliyah, even if he was not a kohen.)

If the yisroel is a greater talmid chochom than the kohen, but the kohen is also a talmid chochom, some rule that one is required to give the kohen the greater honor (Shach, Yoreh Deah 246:14). Others rule that it is preferred to give the kohen the greater honor, but it is not required (Rema, Orach Chayim 167:14 and Mishnah Berurah 201:12).

According to the Gemara, the kohen should be seated in a place of honor at the head of the table. The Gemara that teaches us this halacha is very instructive. “Rav Chama bar Chanina said: ‘How do we know that a choson sits at the head of the table, because the verse states: ‘kichoson yechahen pe’er, like a choson receives the glory of a kohen (Yeshaya 61:10)’. Just like the kohen sits at the head of the table, so, too, the choson sits at the head of the table” (Moed Katan 28b). Contemporary poskim contemplate why we do not follow this halacha in practice (Rav Sholom Shvadron in his footnotes to Daas Torah of Maharsham 201:2). Although our custom is to seat the choson in the most important place at the wedding and sheva berachos, we do not place the kohanim in seats that demonstrate their importance!

Asking a favor

From the above discussion, we see that I am required to treat a kohen with honor and respect, but we have not discussed whether I may ask him to do me a favor. Perhaps I can treat the kohen with honor and respect, and yet ask him to do things for me. However, the Talmud Yerushalmi states that it is forbidden to have personal benefit from a kohen, just as it is forbidden to have personal benefit from the vessels of the Beis HaMikdash (Berachos 8:5). This Yerushalmi is quoted as halacha (Rema, Orach Chayim 128:44).

However, many authorities note that there appears to be evidence that conflicts with the position of the Yerushalmi. Specifically, the Gemara Bavli refers to a Hebrew slave (eved ivri) who is a kohen. How could someone own a Hebrew slave, if one is not permitted to have personal benefit from a kohen (Hagahos Maimonis, Hilchos Avadim 3:8)?

Several approaches are presented to resolve this difficulty. Some early poskim contend that there is no prohibition in having personal benefit from a kohen, provided that he does not mind. These authorities contend that a kohen may be mocheil on his honor (Mordechai, Gittin #461). On the other hand, many authorities rule explicitly that it is forbidden to use a kohen, even if he is mocheil (Rambam, Sefer HaMitzvos Aseh #32; Smag, Mitzvas Aseh #83).

Other poskim explain that although it is forbidden to use a kohen without paying him, one is permitted to hire a kohen (Smag, Mitzvas Aseh # 83). According to this approach, it is prohibited to use a kohen only when the kohen receives no benefit from his work. In a situation where the kohen gains from his work, one may benefit from him. Thus, the kohen is permitted to sell himself as a slave, since he gains material benefit from the arrangement.

This dispute, whether a kohen has the ability to be mocheil his kovod, is discussed by later poskim also. Rema (128:44), Magen Avraham (ad loc.), and Pri Chodosh (in his commentary Mayim Chayim on Gemara Gittin 59b) rule that a kohen can be mocheil on his honor, whereas Taz (Orach Chayim 128:39) disagrees. However, Taz also accepts that the kohen can be mocheil when he has benefit from the arrangement, as in the case of the Hebrew servant.

Thus, as a practical halacha, the majority opinion permits having a kohen do a favor, provided he is mocheil on his honor. According to the minority opinion, it is permitted only if he is paid for his work.

There is another line of reasoning that can be used in the contemporary world to permit asking a kohen for a favor. The Torah requires giving a kohen honor because he performs the service in the Beis HaMikdash, and, therefore, he has a halachic status similar to that of the vessels of the Beis HaMikdash, which have sanctity. However, only a kohen who can prove the pedigree of his lineage may perform the service in the Beis HaMikdash. Such kohanim are called kohanim meyuchasim. Kohanim who cannot prove their lineage are called kohanei chazakah, kohanim because of traditional practice. These kohanim fulfill the roles of kohanim because they have a family tradition to perform mitzvos, like a kohen does. However, they cannot prove that they are kohanim.

Since today’s kohanim are not meyuchasim, they would not be permitted to perform the service in the Beis HaMikdash and they do not have sanctity similar to the vessels of the Beis HaMikdash. Therefore, some poskim contend that one may have personal benefit from today’s kohanim (Mishneh LaMelech, Hilchos Avadim 3:8, quoting Yefei Mareh).

In this context, the Mordechai records an interesting story (Gittin #461). Once, a kohen washed Rabbeinu Tam’s hands.  A student of Rabbeinu Tam asked him how he could benefit from the kohen, when the Yerushalmi prohibits this. Rabbeinu Tam responded that a kohen has kedushah only when he is wearing the vestments that the kohen wears in the Beis HaMikdash. The students present then asked Rabbeinu Tam: if his answer is accurate, why do we give the kohen the first aliyah even when he is not wearing the kohen’s vestments? Unfortunately, the Mordechai does not report what Rabbeinu Tam answered. The Mordechai does cite R’ Peter as explaining that a kohen can be mocheil on his kovod, something this kohen had clearly done. Thus, we have explained why it is permitted to have a kohen do a favor for a yisroel.

The unresolved question is: why don’t we demonstrate honor to a kohen whenever we see him? This question is raised by the Magen Avraham (201:4), who explains that the custom to be lenient is because our kohanim are not meyuchasim. However, he is clearly not comfortable with relying on this heter. Similarly, the Mishnah Berurah (201:13) rules that one should not rely on this heter. On the contrary, one should go out of one’s way to show honor to a kohen.

A kohen who is blemished (a baal mum)

Does the mitzvah of treating a kohen with kedushah apply to a kohen who is blemished (a baal mum) and thus cannot perform the avodah in the Beis HaMikdash?

After all, the Torah states: “And you shall make him (the kohen) holy, because he offers the bread of your G-d” (VaYikra 21:8). Thus, one might think that only a kohen who can offer the “bread of Hashem” has this status. Nonetheless, we derive that these laws apply even to a kohen who is blemished (Toras Kohanim to VaYikra 21:8). Apparently, the other special laws of being a kohen are sufficient reason that he should be accorded honor.

Is there any mitzvah to give honor to a kohen who is a minor?

This matter is disputed by early poskim. Some poskim feel that, since a child is not obligated to observe mitzvos and furthermore cannot perform the service in the Beis HaMikdash, there is no requirement to give him honor. On the other hand, there are poskim who contend that the Torah wanted all of Aaron’s descendants to be treated with special honor, even a minor.

This dispute has very interesting and commonly encountered ramifications. What happens if there is no adult kohen in shul, but there is a kohen who is a minor? If the mitzvah of vikidashto applies to a minor, then the kohen who is under bar mitzvah should be called to the Torah for the first aliyah! This is indeed the opinion of an early posek (Shu”t Maharit #145). However, the prevalent practice is that there is no mitzvah of vikidashto on a kohen who is under bar mitzvah, since he cannot bring the korbanos in the Beis HaMikdash (Magen Avraham 282:6)

A very interesting minhag

A fascinating discussion about the mitzvah of calling the kohen for the first aliyah is found in the responsa of the Maharik (#9). Apparently, there was a custom in his day (the fifteenth century) in many shullen in France and Germany that on Shabbos Breishis they would auction off the first aliyah in order to help pay for community needs. This was considered a major demonstration of kovod hatorah, to demonstrate that people value the first aliyah of the year by paying a large sum of money for it. Maharik compares this practice to a custom we are more familiar with: The selling of Choson Torah on Simchas Torah for a large sum of money.

If a non-kohen bought the first aliyah of the year, the custom was that the kohanim would either daven in a different shul or they would walk outside the shul, so that the non-kohen donor could be called up to the Torah for the aliyah.

In one congregation with this custom, a kohen refused to leave the shul and also refused to bid on the donation. Instead, he insisted that he be given the aliyah gratis. The members of the shul called upon the city government authorities to remove the recalcitrant kohen from the premises, so that they could call up the donor for the aliyah.

The issue was referred to the Maharik, as one of the greatest poskim of his generation. The Maharik ruled that the congregation is permitted to continue their practice of auctioning off this aliyah and calling the donor to the Torah, and they may ignore the presence of the recalcitrant kohen. Since this is their well-established minhag, and it was established to demonstrate kovod hatorah, in such a case a minhag can override the halacha; specifically, the requirement to call the kohen to the Torah as the first aliyah.

In the same tshuvah, Maharik mentions another related minhag that was well-accepted in his day. Apparently, during this period and place, most people fasted on bahav, the three days of fasting and saying selichos that take place during the months of MarCheshvan and Iyar. In addition, the custom on these fast days was to call up for an aliyah only people who were fasting, similar to the practice we have on our fast days. Maharik reports that if all the kohanim who were in shul were not fasting, the kohanim would exit the shul to allow them to call up a non-kohen who was fasting. He rules that this custom is halachically acceptable, since it is a kovod hatorah to call to the Torah on a community-accepted fast only people who are fasting.

Thus, we see from the Maharik’s responsum that, although it is a mitzvah to honor the kohen, there is a greater mitzvah to safeguard the community’s minhag. Nevertheless, the conclusion of the Mishnah Berurah and other late poskim is that one should, in general, try to show at least some honor to a kohen, following the literal interpretation of the statement of Chazal.

 

Post-Shmittah Awareness for the Eretz Yisroel and Chutz La’Aretz Consumer

If you are in Eretz Yisroel, you should be receiving this article on Parshas Behar. If you are in chutz la’aretz, you are receiving it the same week, but a parshah earlier.

 

How can we pass Parshas Behar immediately following a shmittah year without discussing the laws of shmittah? Yet many chutz la’aretz residents see no need to learn these laws, assuming that locally available produce is never affected.

Well — guess again. Although, according to the halacha, one may not export shmittah produce outside Israel (Mishnah Shvi’is 6:5), much produce finds its way there. And, even in chutz la’aretz, we must treat fruit of Eretz Yisroel with kedushas shvi’is, according to all of the laws we will now discuss.

Situation #1: WHAT A ROAST!!

Traditional English Sunday roast with Yorkshire pudding and summer vegetables macro close up isolated on white

When I was a rav in America, a knowledgeable housewife cooked a delectable roast, using wine whose label indicated that it had kedushas shvi’is. Although she had no idea what this term meant, her son pointed out that they needed to ask a shaylah what to do with the roast. To make a long story short, the entire roast had to be treated with kedushas shvi’is; I will soon explain what this means.

Situation #2: WHAT ARE SEFICHIN?

“I noticed a sign in shul that the fruits and vegetables in the local supermarket are from Israel and must be treated appropriately. Someone told me that the vegetables are prohibited because they are sefichin. What does that mean?”

Situation #3: WHAT WOULD YOU RULE?

Several shmittah cycles ago, I was working as a mashgiach for a properly-run American hechsher. One factory that I supervised manufactured breading and muffin mixes. This company was extremely careful about checking its incoming ingredients: George, the receiving clerk who also managed the warehouse, kept a careful list of what products he was to allow into the plant and what kosher symbols were acceptable.

On one visit to the plant, I noticed a problem, due to no fault of the company. For years, the company had been purchasing Israeli produced freeze-dried carrots with a reliable hechsher. The carrots always arrived in bulk boxes with the Israeli hechsher prominently stamped in Hebrew and the word KOSHER prominently displayed in English. George, who always supervised incoming raw materials, proudly showed me through “his warehouse” and noted how he carefully marked the arrival date of each new shipment. I saw crates of the newest shipment of Israeli carrots, from the same manufacturer, and the same prominently displayed English word KOSHER on the box. However, the Hebrew stamp on the box was from a different supervisory agency, one without the same sterling reputation. The reason for the sudden change in supervisory agency was rather obvious, when I noted that the Hebrew label stated very clearly “Heter Mechirah.”

First, let us discuss the basics:

LAWS OF THE LAND

In this week’s parsha, the Torah (VaYikra 25:1-7) teaches that every seventh year is shmittah; we are prohibited from working the land of Eretz Yisroel and must leave our land fallow (Avodah Zarah 15b). Just as observing the seventh day, Shabbos, demonstrates our belief in the Creator, so too, observing every seventh year as shmittah demonstrates this faith. The landowner must treat whatever grows as ownerless, allowing others to enter his field or orchard to pick and take its produce. The picker may take as much as his family will eat, and the landowner himself also may take this amount (see Rambam, Hil. Shmittah 4:1).

LAWS OF THE FRUIT

Although shmittah observance today is mandated only miderabbanan (see Moed Katan 2b; Chazon Ish, Shvi’is 3:8), nevertheless, most of its laws are the same as they will be when observing shmittah will again become a mitzvah min hatorah. The Torah imbues shmittah produce with special sanctity, called kedushas shvi’is, declaring vihaysa shabbas ha’aretz lochem le’ochlah, “the produce of the shmittah should be used only for food” (VaYikra 25:6). According to accepted opinion, one is not obligated to eat shmittah food – rather, the Torah grants us permission to eat it, and we must treat it accordingly (Chazon Ish, Hil. Shvi’is 14:10). There is much halachic detail involved in correct use of shmittah produce. For example:

  1. One may not sell shmittah produce in a business manner (Rambam, Hil. Shmittah 6:1). Although one may pick shmittah produce for one’s personal consumption, one may not harvest it to sell commercially (Tosefta, Shvi’is 5:7).
  2. One may not export shmittah produce outside Eretz Yisroel (Mishnah Shvi’is 6:5). There are opinions that allow exporting shmittah wine and esrogim; however, the rationales permitting this are beyond the scope of this article (Beis Ridbaz 5:18; Tzitz HaKodesh, Volume 1 #15:4).

III. Shmittah produce is intended for Jewish consumption; you may not give or sell kedushas shvi’is produce to a gentile, although you may allow him to join you for your meal (Rambam, Hil. Shmittah 5:13 and Mahari Korkos ad loc.).

  1. If one trades or sells the shmittah produce, the food or money received in exchange also has kedushas shvi’is (Sukkah 40b). (Because of space constraints, I will leave details of these halachos for another time.)
  2. One may not ruin shmittah produce (Gemara Pesachim 52b).

What types of “ruining” did the Torah prohibit? One may not cook foods that are usually eaten raw, nor may one eat raw produce that is usually cooked (Yerushalmi, Shvi’is 8:2; Rambam, Hil. Shvi’is 5:3). Therefore, one may not eat raw shmittah potatoes, nor may one cook shmittah cucumbers or oranges. Contemporary authorities dispute whether one may add shmittah orange or apricot to a recipe for roast or cake. Even though the roast or cake is delicious because of the added fruit, many poskim prohibit this cooking or baking, since these fruit are usually eaten raw (Shu”t Mishpat Cohen #85). Others permit this, if it is a usual way of eating these fruits (Mishpetei Aretz page 172, footnote 10).

One may feed shmittah produce to animals only if it is not considered fit for human consumption. This includes varieties grown for fodder, as well as peels and seeds that people do not usually eat (Rambam, Hilchos Shmittah 5:5). A neighbor of mine, whose finicky pet turtle prefers to eat lettuce, had a problem what to feed it. Before shmittah he was trying to get it to eat grass, but the turtle preferred lettuce. Oi, is shver tzu zein a turtle!

Similarly, juicing vegetables and most kinds of fruit is considered “ruining” the shmittah produce and prohibited, although one may press grapes, olives and lemons, since the juice and oil of these fruits are considered improvements. Many contemporary authorities permit pressing oranges and grapefruits, provided one treats the remaining pulp with kedushas shvi’is. Even these authorities prohibit juicing most other fruit, such as apples and pears (Minchas Shelomoh, Shvi’is pg. 185).

RUINING VERSUS EATING

How do we determine whether processing a food “ruins” it or not? Many poskim contend that if the processing changes the food’s preferred bracha, one may not perform such processing on shvi’is produce (Shu”t Mishpat Cohen #85, based on Gemara Brachos 38a and Rambam, Hilchos Shvi’is 5:3). Since turning apples to juice reduces their bracha from ha’eitz to shehakol, this would be considered “ruining” the apples. Similarly, the fact that one recites the bracha of shehakol prior to eating a raw potato or cooked cucumbers or oranges demonstrates that treating them this way ruins the produce. According to this approach, one may not press oranges or grapefruits either, since one recites shehakol and not ha’eitz on the juice (Shu”t Mishpat Cohen #85).

Those who permit squeezing oranges and grapefruits apply a different criterion, contending that since this is the most common use of these fruit, it is permitted (Minchas Shelomoh, Shvi’is pg. 185).

One must certainly be careful not to actively destroy shmittah produce. Therefore, one who has excess shvi’is produce may not trash it in the usual way. Similarly, peels that are commonly eaten, such as cucumber or apple, still have shmittah kedusha and may not simply be discarded. Instead, contemporary practice is to place these peels in a plastic bag and then place the bag in a small bin or box called a pach shvi’is, where it remains until the food is inedible. When it decomposes to this extent, one may dispose of the shmittah produce in the regular garbage.

When eating shmittah food, one need not be concerned about the remaining bits stuck to a pot or an adult’s plate that one usually just washes off; one may wash these pots and plates without concern that one is destroying shmittah produce. However, the larger amounts left behind by children, or leftovers that people might save should not be disposed in the garbage, but should be scraped into the shmittah bin.

WHY DECOMPOSE?

This leads us to a question: If indeed one may not throw shmittah produce in the garbage because it has sanctity, why may one do so after the produce decomposes? Does decomposition remove kedusha?

Indeed it does. Kedushas shvi’is means that as long as the food is still edible, one may not make it inedible or use it atypically. This is because shmittah food is meant to be eaten, even though there is no requirement to do so. However, once the shmittah food is inedible, it loses its special status, and may be disposed of as trash.

SANCTITY UNTIL SPOILAGE

This sounds very strange. Where do we find that something holy loses its special status when it becomes inedible?

Although the concept that decay eliminates sanctity seems unusual, this is only because we are unfamiliar with the mitzvos where this principle applies. Other mitzvos where this concept exists are terumah, challah, bikkurim, revai’i and maaser sheini, all cases where, in today’s world, we, unfortunately, cannot consume the produce because we are tamei (Rambam, Hilchos Terumos Chapter 11; Hilchos Maaser Sheini 3:11). Of these types of produce that are holy, but meant to be eaten, only shvi’is may be eaten by someone tamei. Even though someone tamei may not consume tahor terumah, challah, or maaser sheini, in these cases, as well, one may not dispose of or burn them. Instead, one must place them in a secure place until they decay and only then dispose of them (Tur, Yoreh Deah 331). (We burn the special challah portion after separating it only because it has become tamei. If it did not become tamei, we could not destroy the challah portion, but we would place it somewhere until it decays on its own, just as we do with unused shvi’is produce.)

A SHMITTAH ROAST IN AMERICA

We can now explore the first question I mentioned:

1a: May one use shmittah wine to season a roast?

Although one improves the roast by adding the wine, the wine itself is ruined. Thus, some poskim prohibit using the wine in this way, whereas others permit it, since this is a normal use for wine (see commentaries to Yerushalmi, Terumos 11:1).

1b: What does our American housewife do with her shmittah wine-flavored roast?

If one uses shmittah food as an ingredient, one must treat everything that absorbs its taste according to the laws of kedushas shvi’is (see Mishnah Shvi’is 7:7). Therefore, one who used shmittah potatoes in cholent or shmittah onions or bay leaves in soup must treat the entire cholent or soup according to shvi’is rules. One may not actively waste this food, nor may one feed any of it to animals, until the food is spoiled to the point that people would not eat it.

Therefore, our housewife who added shmittah wine to her roast must now consider the entire roast, even the gravy and vegetables cooked with it, to have kedushas shvi’is. One serves the roast in the regular way. As mentioned above, the small scrapings left on an adult’s plate may be washed off; but the larger amounts left behind by children should not be disposed of in the garbage, nor should the leftovers in the pot or on the platter.

Although one may not dispose of the leftover kedushas shvi’is roast in the garbage, it is unclear whether one may remove these leftovers from the refrigerator in order to hasten their decay, even to place them in a shmittah bin (see Chazon Ish, Shvi’is 14:10). However, if one removed leftover roast to serve, one is not required to return the leftovers to the refrigerator. Instead, one may simply place the leftovers somewhere until they have spoiled. To avoid the malodor that this may cause, one may place them in a plastic bag until they decay and then dispose of them.

SEFICHIN

At this point, we should address the second question I mentioned:

“I noticed a sign in shul that the some fruits and vegetables in the local supermarket are from Israel and must be treated appropriately. Someone told me that the vegetables are prohibited, because they are sefichin. What does that mean?”

The Torah permits the use of any produce that grew during shmittah by itself, without anyone working the field. However, an unfortunate fact is that, even in the days of Chazal, one could find Jews who deceitfully ignored shmittah laws. One practice of unscrupulous farmers was to plant grain or vegetables, and then market them as produce that grew on its own. To make certain that these farmers did not benefit from their misdeeds, Chazal forbade all grains and vegetables, even those that grew by themselves, a prohibition called sefichin, or plants that sprouted. Sefichin are treated as non-kosher food and forbidden to eat, even requiring one to kasher the equipment if they were cooked!

Chazal made several exceptions to this rule, including that produce of a non-Jew’s field is not prohibited as sefichin.

Since Shmittah fruits and vegetables may be sold only to someone who will properly observe the laws, and, also, there is a prohibition of shipping this produce outside Eretz Yisroel, the growers of the Shmittah produce being sold in an American grocery presumably ignored the prohibition of Shmittah. There is also the possibility that they relied on heter mechirah, a topic that I dealt with extensively in a different article.

As a practical matter, few contemporary chareidi poskim permit heter mechirah, and, even among non-chareidi authorities, support for its use is waning. Thus, if the heter mechirah is considered a charade and not a valid sale, the grain and vegetables growing in a heter mechirah field are prohibited as sefichin.

WHY NOT FRUIT?

Chazal included in the prohibition of sefichin only crops that could be planted and yield a harvest in one year. They did not extend the prohibition of sefichin to tree fruits and other perennial crops, such as bananas and strawberries, because there was less incentive for a cheating farmer. Although trees definitely thrive when pruned and cared for, they will produce, even if left unattended for a year. Thus, the farmer has less incentive to tend his trees.

“GUARDED PRODUCE”

I mentioned above that a farmer must allow others free access to help themselves to any produce that grows on his trees and fields during shmittah. What is the halacha if a farmer treats this produce as his own and refuses access to it during shmittah?

The Rishonim dispute whether this will make the fruit forbidden. Some late poskim permit the fruit, because they rule that the forbidden working of an orchard or treating it as private property does not prohibit its fruit (see Shu”t Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 1:186). Others rule that one should prohibit “guarded fruit.”

What about our carrot muffins? If we remember our original story, the company had unwittingly purchased heter mechirah carrots. The hechsher required the company to return all unopened boxes of carrots to the supplier and to find an alternative source. However, by the time the problem was discovered, muffin mix using these carrots had already been produced and distributed, bearing the hechsher’s kashrus symbol. The hechsher referred the shaylah to its posek, asking whether they were required to recall the product from the stores as non-kosher, or whether it was sufficient to advertise that an error had occurred, advising the customer to ask his individual rav for halachic guidance. The posek asked permitted them to follow the latter procedure.

For someone living in Eretz Yisroel, observing shmittah properly involves assuming much halachic responsibility, education and often great commitment, since shmittah-permitted produce is often many times more expensive than its alternative. Those living in chutz la’aretz should be aware of the halachos of shvi’is and identify with this demonstration that the Ribbono Shel Olam created the world in seven days, and that the seventh year is holy.

 

Mixed Breeds

muleQuestion: Mule Inventors

“Who invented, or should I say ‘discovered,’ the mule?”

Question: The Hybrid or the Hybridization?

“Is it permitted to use the product of a prohibited hybridization (crossbreeding) of animals?”

Question: Buy me a Mule!

“May I purchase a mule from a gentile? May I hire him to produce it for me?”

Question: Crossbreeding Pro

“Before I became frum, I was well experienced at hybridizing and raising crossbred birds. Is there any way that I can use this skill to earn a livelihood, now that I have become a baal teshuvah?”

Question: Roommates

“Is the zoo permitted to house different species together?”

Introduction:

Two mitzvos of the Torah deal with the mixing of animal species. In parshas Kedoshim, the Torah teaches: Behemtecha lo sarbia kil’ayim, “Do not crossbreed your animal” (Vayikra 19:19). This prohibition applies to beheimah, usually translated as domesticated species; chayah, usually but somewhat inaccurately translated as wild or non-domesticated* species; birds; and sea chayos, such as sea mammals (Mishnah, Baba Kama 54b and Gemara 55a). Violating this proscription is punishable by malkus, as is true for most lo saaseh violations of the Torah, but only if one mates them physically. Encouraging the mating process less directly is prohibited and is the source of a dispute between early authorities whether it is prohibited min haTorah (Drishah, Yoreh Deah 297:1) or only miderabbanan (Taz, ad locum). It is permitted to house two species together, and one has no requirement to separate them if they mate on their own (Yerushalmi Kelayim 8:2, quoted by Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 297:3). (Those checking the references should note that there are two chapters in Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah numbered 297, and the laws we are discussing are in the second of those chapters.)

Lo Sacharosh

There is also another mitzvah of the Torah, mentioned in the context of Kelayim prohibitions in parshas Ki Seitzei: Lo sacharosh beshor uvachamor yachdav, You may not plough with an ox and a donkey together (Devorim 22:10). This mitzvah prohibits working two species of animals together. According to the opinion of the Rambam, the Torah prohibition of this law is violated only when one species is kosher and the other is non-kosher – other circumstances are prohibited, only because of a rabbinic injunction. Other authorities dispute this ruling of the Rambam, contending that working two species together is prohibited min haTorah, even when both are kosher or both are non-kosher. There is much to discuss about this topic, but we will leave it for a different article.

Which species?

The Mishnah (Kelayim 1:6) lists several combinations of species that one may not crossbreed, such as wolves and dogs, or mules and donkeys, and the Gemara (Bava Kama 55a) notes several other examples, including two varieties of geese where some physical differences determine that they are different species for halachic purposes. On the other hand, the Gemara (Bava Kama 55a) mentions that Persian camels and Arabian camels are not Kelayim together, even though the length of the neck of the two breeds are noticeably different. Furthermore, the Rambam rules that a species with wild and domesticated varieties, such as wild and domesticated oxen or horses, may be crossbred, even when the domesticated variety has some obvious differences from the wild variety (Rambam, Hilchos Kelayim 9:5).

We are left with a question: how does halachah define what is considered a variety of a species versus what is considered a different species? One may crossbreed or work together two animals that are considered two different varieties, but one may not crossbreed or work together two animals that halachah considers different species. However, the Mishnah never provides defining characteristics that we can use. It is also interesting to note that the Gemara (Bava Kama 55a) states that even two species that freely mate together in the wild may not be hybridized. Thus, an animal’s social life, also, does not determine what is considered its species.

Rashi on the mule

At the end of parshas Vayishlach, the Torah recounts how Anah, Sei’ir Hachori’s grandson, shepherded donkeys for his father, and, while doing so, discovered yeimim (Bereishis 36:24), which Rav Saadia Gaon, Rashi and others translate as mules. Rashi and the Ibn Ezra explain that Anah’s “discovery” means he developed the science of crossbreeding a male donkey (called a jackass) and a mare (a female horse) which produces a mule. (See the Targum Onkelos and the Ramban, who explain the verse very differently.) Rashi explains that Anah, who himself descended from a scandalous relationship, was the first to crossbreed two different species, also a scandalous act.

This statement of Rashi presents two questions:

  1. What is wrong with Anah having crossbred donkeys and horses? This is not one of the seven Noahide laws.
  2. Rashi’s comment that Anah was the first to create a mule implies that this was a newfangled “invention” and not yet commonly used. Yet Rashi himself, in parshas Tolados, mentions that when Yitzchak became well respected, people said that “the manure of Yitzchak’s mules is more valuable than Avimelech’s gold and silver” (Bereishis 26:13). Obviously, this means that mules were commonplace in the days of Yitzchak. Can both of these statements of Rashi be accurate?

Furthermore, the statement of Rashi in parshas Tolados presents yet another question, since it implies that it is not considered unbecoming to mention that Yitzchak owned mules, notwithstanding the fact that the Torah prohibits a Jew from producing them. Why, then, are Anah’s mules considered to be so scandalous?

To answer the question why Rashi criticizes Anah for creating mules, when a ben Noach is permitted to crossbreed animals, we need some broader Talmudic background.

Bnei Noach and crossbreeding

Although the seven mitzvos are the most basic mitzvah requirements that apply to bnei Noach, there are other mitzvos that apply to them, at least according to some opinions. Some tanna’im rule that the laws prohibiting sorcery apply to them, and others understand that they are prohibited from grafting one species onto the rootstock of a different species.

There is a tanna, Rabbi Elazar, who contends that bnei Noach are forbidden to crossbreed animals of different species, even though this prohibition is not treated as severely as are the seven mitzvos (Sanhedrin 56b). The Gemara (Sanhedrin 60a) explains that Rabbi Elazar derives that bnei Noach are forbidden to crossbreed animals from  the pasuk (partially quoted above), Es chukosai tishmoru behemtecha lo sarbia kil’ayim (Vayikra 19:19), which Rabbi Elazar interprets to mean, “You should be careful to observe the laws that I previously prohibited: Do not breed your animals — one species with another!” However, there is no previous place in the Torah where we are commanded not to crossbreed animals. Rabbi Elazar reasons that this must mean that when Noach left the teivah and was commanded concerning other laws, he was also told that he may not crossbreed animals. Thus, it would appear that when Rashi, in our parshah, bemoans Anah’s activities, he is assuming the halachah is as understood by Rabbi Elazar that all of mankind is prohibited from crossbreeding two species.

Halachic conclusion

The Rambam rules that a ben Noach is prohibited from crossbreeding animals (Hilchos Melachim 10:6). According to his approach, Rashi’s comments about Anah introducing something forbidden into the world are halachically accurate.

Asking a gentile

May one ask or hire a gentile to create hybrid animals? According to the Rambam, who rules according to Rabbi Elazar, this is certainly prohibited, because one is thereby causing a gentile to violate the Torah (Drishah).

The authorities conclude that asking or hiring a non-Jew to crossbreed is prohibited, even according to those who disagree with Rabbi Elazar and contend that a gentile is permitted to crossbreed. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 297:4), as understood by most authorities, prohibits having a gentile crossbreed for a Jew, because of the prohibition of having a gentile perform something that a Jew is not permitted to do myself, which is called amirah lenachri (Rema, Shach and others, based on Bava Metzia 90a).

There is a difference in halachah that results from the dispute why one may not hire a gentile to crossbreed for you. May one teach a gentile how to crossbreed animals for the gentile’s benefit (see Shach, Yoreh Deah 297:4)? According to the Rambam, this is prohibited, since one will be teaching him to do something that he may not do. However, according to those who contend that a gentile may crossbreed animals, it is permitted to advise or instruct the gentile how to do so, even if he uses a Jew’s animals, since he is not doing so in order to benefit a Jew.

Crossbreeding pro

At this point, we can address another one of our opening questions: “Before I became frum, I was well experienced at hybridizing and raising crossbred birds. Is there any way that I can use this skill to earn a livelihood, now that I have become a baal teshuvah?”

The answer is that one can practice breeding of the same species, assuming one can figure out what is considered the same species according to halachah. Whether one can be paid to train a gentile how to crossbreed two different species will depend on the above-quoted dispute. It would appear that the Shach rules that one may, whereas the Derishah and others prohibit. I refer an individual with this question to his own rav or posek.

Using a hybrid

Whether we rule according to Rabbi Elazar or the differing tanna, the halachah remains that even when an animal is created by prohibited hybridization, one may benefit from the crossbred animal (Taz, Yoreh Deah 297:2). Even according to Rabbi Elazar, one may purchase a mule, once it has been produced, and use it, and even a person who violated the halachah and created a mule may use it. Thus, Yitzchak may have purchased many mules to assist him, and the fact that people praised the quality of Yitzchak’s mules is not disturbing.

The beefalo

Relatively recently, a new hybrid was developed, which is a cross between the ordinary beef cattle and a North American bison, which Americans colloquially call a buffalo. Is it permitted to make this crossbreed? One major authority contends that whether one may crossbreed buffalo and cattle depends on whether one is required to perform kisuy hadam, the mitzvah of covering the blood of shechitah, after slaughtering a buffalo. Kisuy hadam is required only on fowl and chayos but not on beheimos, such as cattle. If there is no requirement to perform kisuy hadam on buffalo, this demonstrates that it is considered a beheimah. Since there are only three species of beheimah — sheep, goats, and cattle, then ruling that a buffalo does not require kisuy hadam means that halachah considers it to be a beheimah, and, if it is a beheimah, the process of elimination proves that it must be considered a variety of cattle, since it is certainly not a sheep or a goat.

Sefardim, Ashkenazim and buffalos

Is kisuy hadam required on a buffalo? This is a dispute between the Shulchan Aruch and the Rema, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 28:4) concluding that there is no requirement to perform kisuy hadam, whereas the Rema rules that one should do so without a brocha  since we are uncertain whether it is considered a chayah. The Aruch Hashulchan (Yoreh Deah 297:8) notes that this dispute between the Shulchan Aruch and the Rema will also affect whether one is permitted to crossbreed buffalo with ordinary cattle, since the Shulchan Aruch, by concluding that it is a beheimah, must hold that they are halachically considered to be the same species. On the other hand, since the Rema is concerned that buffalo might be a variety of chayah, one would not be permitted to crossbreed it with cattle.

Halachic conclusion: According to the Aruch Hashulchan, a Sefardi would be permitted to crossbreed buffalo with cattle, and an Ashkenazi would not.

Who invented the mule?

Was Anah the first one to create a mule, or did it precede him?

The Gemara (Pesachim 54a) cites a dispute among three tanna’im regarding who created the first mule. According to Rabbi Yosi, Adam created the first mule on the first motza’ei Shabbos of Creation. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel disagrees, contending that Anah created the first mule. In a different beraisa, the Gemara quotes Rabbi Nechemiah, who contended that mules were created by Hashem at the very end of the Six Days of Creation. The passage Rashi quotes in parshas Vayishlach is indeed originally from Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, in the Gemara. However, when Rashi in parshas Tolados quotes the Bereishis Rabbah about Yitzchok’s mules, presumably that passage accords with one of the other opinions among the tanna’im, who date the creation of the mule much earlier.

By the way, it is possible that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel accepts the essence of the statement about Yitzchok, but simply does not include the word mules in his version. Tosafos (Bava Metzia 85a) quotes the Midrash Rabbah that Rashi quotes in parshas Tolados, but with one change: In his version, people complimented the manure of Yitzchok’s animals, rather than specifically his mules. This approach would reflect the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.

Meet the mule

Although most people use the term mule to refer both to the offspring of a stallion (male horse) and a jenny (female donkey) and to the offspring of a jackass (male donkey) and a mare (female horse), this is technically inaccurate. A mule is the offspring of a jackass and a mare. The offspring of a stallion and a jenny is called a hinny. However, Chazal use the word pered to describe either a mule or a hinny; a mule is called pered ben susya, the offspring of a mare (see Chullin 114b) and a hinny is called pered ben chamorah, the offspring of a jenny. (The word pered, itself, is of Tanachic origin — for example, Avshalom rode on a pered — but there is no indication in Tanach regarding its specific parental origin.)

There are visible differences between a mule and a hinny, particularly in the appearance of their ears, tail and voice (Chullin 79a). Mankind has found mules useful, because they are very strong and often easier to train and work with than horses, and withstand difficult hardships better than do horses.

On the other hand, hinnies are sometimes no more useful than donkeys, and sometimes have a reputation for being of difficult temperament. In size and strength, they usually approximate donkeys. Since they are usually no more useful than donkeys, and they are virtually always sterile, it is far less common for farmers to breed them. In general, neither mules nor hinnies produce offspring, although there are anecdotal instances of female mules reproducing after mating with stallions or jackasses.

One is permitted to mate a male mule with a female one (Rambam, Hilchos Kelayim 9:6). However, whether one may mate a mule and a hinny is the subject of a dispute among tanna’im (Chullin 79a). The Rambam (Hilchos Kelayim 9:6) and the Shulchan Aruch rule that this is prohibited, just as it is prohibited to breed animals of different species. This is prohibited, even though it is almost certain that this match will not produce offspring.

Difference between pered and mule

Now that we are well educated about the difference between a mule and a hinny, we can answer another of our opening questions: “What is the difference between the Hebrew pered and the mule?” The answer is that the word pered is used by Chazal to mean either a mule or a hinny. Rashi, on the verse in parshas Vayishlach, says clearly that Anah crossbred a male donkey with a female horse, which means that he created a mule.

Conclusion

Speaking of mules reminds me of the passage of Gemara (Bechoros 8b) that recounts a puzzling conversation that transpired between the scholars of Athens and the tanna Rabbi Yehoshua. The Athenians asked Rabbi Yehoshua: “When salt spoils, with what do you salt it?” To this, Rabbi Yehoshua answered, “With the afterbirth of a mule.” They then asked him, “Does a mule have an afterbirth?” To this he replied, “Does salt spoil?”

What is meant by this short but very enigmatic debate?

The Athenian scholars were challenging the fact that the Jews maintain that we will eventually be redeemed. The scholars claimed: “You Jews did not keep your end of the deal with G-d, and therefore your deal is abrogated. Indeed, it was to have been a covenant forever, like salt, but your salt spoiled!”

To this, Rabbi Yehoshua replied: “Our children (our afterbirth) continue to study Torah, and that is our guarantee.”

The Athenians retorted: “But you are a mule. You do not have a future that will have a relationship with G-d.”

Rabbi Yehoshua responded: “You are mistaken. You claim that our covenant with Hashem is abrogated. This is not true. Salt does not spoil, and our covenant with Hashem is forever!” (See Commentary of the Vilna Geon to Aggados Hashas.)

* The Gemara (Chullin 59b) mentions several characteristics that distinguish beheimos from chayos, mostly dependent on the animal’s horns. Reindeer, although domesticated, are clearly chayos since they have branched antlers, whereas there are non-domesticated species that are almost certainly categorized as beheimah.

 

Bnei Noach and Korbanos

Question #1: Rite or Wrong?

“My neighbor is not Jewish and believes in G-d, but she has rejected any of the existent organized religions. She often burns incense, which she learned about in Eastern religions, and she says that she does this to feel G-d’s presence in her life. May I enter her house while the incense is burning?”

Question #2: Joining the Sprinklers

“This must be the strangest question that I have ever asked. While camping, I met a group of sincere non-Jews who told me that they believe in one G-d and have regular getaways to discuss how they can live more in His image. While I was with them, they sprinkled some wine and oil on a campfire in commemoration of the Biblical sacrifices. They invited me to join them, which I did not, but I am curious to know whether I could have sprinkled with them.”

Question #3: The Doubting Moslem

“My coworker, who still considers herself a Moslem, confides in me a lot of her doubts about her religion. Should I be encouraging her away from Islam, or is it not necessary to do so, since they do not worship idols?”

Answer: Mitzvos Bnei Noach

All the questions asked above were by Jews about non-Jews. Indeed, although it may seem strange for a non-Jew to ask a rav a shaylah, it should actually be commonplace. After all, there are hundreds of gentiles for every Jew in the world, and each one of them should be concerned about his or her halachic responsibility. As a matter of fact, there are many non-Jews who are indeed concerned about their future place in Olam Haba and, had the nations not been deceived by spurious religions, thousands and perhaps millions more would observe the mitzvos of Bnei Noach that they are commanded. It is tragic that they have been misled into false beliefs and practices.

Fortunately, there is a revival of interest among gentiles to observe the requirements given them in the Torah. There are now many groups and publications devoted to educating non-Jews about their halachic responsibilities. The mitzvah requirements of non-Jews are usually referred to as the “Seven Mitzvos of the Bnei Noach,” although in actuality, these “Seven Mitzvos” are really categories. A gentile is required to accept that these commandments were commanded by Hashem to Moshe Rabbeinu (Rambam, Hilchos Melachim 8:11). A non-Jew who follows these instructions qualifies to be a “righteous gentile,” one of the Chassidei Umos Ha’olam who merits a place in Olam Haba.

Jews should be familiar with the halachos that apply to a non-Jew, since it is forbidden to cause a gentile to transgress his mitzvos. This is included under the Torah’s violation of lifnei iver lo sitein michshol, “Do not place a stumbling block before a blind person.” In this context, the verse means: Do not cause someone to sin if he is blind to — that is, unaware of — the seriousness of his violation (Avodah Zarah 6b). For example, a Jew may not sell an item to a gentile that he will use for idol worship, or an item that is designed for criminal activity.

Gentiles and the Beis Hamikdash

May a gentile pray in the Beis Hamikdash?

The Beis Hamikdash was meant to serve gentiles as well as Jews, as the pasuk states: Ki beisi beis tefila yikarei lechol ha’amim; My house shall be called a house of prayer for all the nations (Yeshaya 56:7). This sentiment was expressed by Shlomoh Hamelech in his public prayer whereby he dedicated the Beis Hamikdash, “…and also to the gentile who is not from Your people Israel, and who comes for the sake of Your name from a distant land. When they will hear of Your great Name, Your powerful hand and Your outstretched arm and come to pray in this house, You will hear from Heaven, the place of Your abode, and do whatever the gentile requests of You, so that all the nations of the Earth will know Your Name and fear You (Melachim I 8:41- 43).

Gentiles and Sacrifices

Not only was the Beis Hamikdash a place where gentiles could pray and serve Hashem, it was also a place where they could offer korbanos (Zevachim 116b). A gentile who desired to bring a korban in the Beis Hamikdash could do so, and, when it is rebuilt, their offerings will be welcome. The laws governing how these korbanos are offered are fairly similar to what governs voluntary korbanos offered by a Jew. Allow me to explain.

A Jew may voluntarily offer several types of korbanos in the Beis Hamikdash. He may offer a korban shelomim (sometimes called a “peace-offering”), in which case the owner receives most of the meat to eat in Yerushalayim when he is in a state of purity (taharah). A Jew may also offer a korban olah, which is offered in its entirety on the mizbei’ach, the altar, in a specifically prescribed fashion.

A gentile may offer a korban olah in the Beis Hamikdash, but he may not offer a korban shelomim. When this olah is offered, the procedure of its offering is virtually identical to that of a Yisrael. This means that any Jewish shochet may slaughter the korban, but it may not be slaughtered by a gentile, since a gentile’s slaughtering is, by definition, invalid as shechitah. The Kohanim then proceed to offer the korban of the gentile, just as they would offer the korban of a Jew, following all the halachos of a korban olah.

Gentiles and Imperfections

The animal that a gentile offers in the Beis Hamikdash must be completely unblemished (Vayikra 22:25). An animal suffering from visible impairments or injuries is called a baal mum and is invalid. Some examples of this are an animal with a broken limb, one that cannot walk in a normal way, one whose limbs are noticeably disproportionate to one another or relative to its species, or a blind animal. All told, there are 73 different imperfections that invalidate a korban as a baal mum (Sefer Hachinuch). Were a kohen to offer the imperfect offering of a gentile, he would be violating the Torah’s express prohibition and be liable for the resultant punishments. For an in-depth discussion of this topic, the intrepid reader is referred to Minchas Chinuch, Mitzvah 292. The same author mentions that the laws governing a gentile’s korban may, in one situation, actually be more stringent that those governing a Jew’s korban. The details of how this could happen are beyond the scope of this article.

Treatment of Holy Bulls and Sheep

There are a few differences in halachah between the korban olah offering of a Jew and that of a gentile. Prior to a Jew offering a korban, he rests his hands on the head of the animal and presses down on the animal’s head. This procedure is called semichah, and, while doing so, the owner of the korban recites viduy, confessing his sins. However, when a gentile’s offering is brought, no semichah is performed (Temurah 2a).

There is another curious difference between the olah offered by a gentile and that offered by a Jew. When a Jew consecrates an animal as a korban olah, someone who subsequently uses the consecrated animal, such as one who sheared the wool of a consecrated ram or worked a consecrated bull, violates a serious prohibition of the Torah called me’ilah. The individual who committed this prohibition negligently must offer a special korban called an asham as atonement. However, when a gentile donates an olah there is no prohibition min haTorah to use the animal and there is no violation of the prohibition of me’ilah. The Gemara concludes that using the consecrated animal is prohibited only miderabbanan (Temurah 3a).

Gentile Exceptions

A Jew may also offer wine to the Beis Hamikdash, which is then poured onto the mizbei’ach. However, a gentile may not offer wine or other similar offerings (Temurah 2b, as explained by Rashi). On the other hand, a gentile may donate any item of value or cash to the Beis Hamikdash to assist in its upkeep (Bedek Habayis). This leads to a very surprising halachah. Although, as I mentioned above, there is no prohibition of me’ilah should one use the korban of a gentile, property that he donates to the Beis Hamikdash is subject to this prohibition in the same way that a Jew’s donation is (Temurah 3a).

Outside the Beis Hamikdash

Once the Beis Hamikdash was constructed, the Torah prohibited a Jew from offering korbanos anywhere else in the world (Devarim 12: 13, 14, 26, 27). Someone who sanctifies an animal to be a korban and then offers it on an altar outside the Beis Hamikdash violates two grave prohibitions of the Torah called shechutei chutz, slaughtering a korban outside the approved area, and ha’ala’ah bachutz, offering a korban outside its approved area. As a result, since our Beis Hamikdash unfortunately still lies in ruins, we cannot offer any korbanos to Hashem, and we must await its rebuilding to offer them.

A gentile is not required to observe these mitzvos, and, consequently, he may offer korbanos anywhere he chooses: in his backyard, on his camping trip or even in a shul! A Jew, however, may not assist in this endeavor, since this violates his mitzvos shechutei chutz and ha’ala’ah bachutz, notwithstanding the fact that the korbanos were sanctified by a gentile (Zevachim 45a; Rambam, Hilchos Maasei Hakorbanos 19:16).

Although a Jew may not offer these korbanos for the gentile, he may instruct the gentile how to offer them correctly. To quote the Rambam, “A gentile is permitted to offer korbanos olah to Hashem anywhere he would like, provided that he offers them on an altar that he constructed. A Jew may not help him, since a Jew is prohibited from offering korbanos outside the Beis Hamikdash. Nevertheless, a Jew may teach him how to bring the korban to Hashem properly” (Rambam, Hilchos Maaseh Hakorbanos 19:15).

The Rambam adds a requirement to this halachah — this korban must be offered on some type of constructed altar.

Blemished Offerings

Whereas the korban of a gentile offered in the Beis Hamikdash must be performed by kohanim, a gentile who offers a korban outside the Beis Hamikdash may perform the procedures himself, and actually must have the procedures performed by a non-Jew. In addition, he may offer from any kosher species (Bereishis 8:20 with Bereishis Rabbah and Rashi), whereas in the Beis Hamikdash one may offer only sheep, goats, bovines, turtledoves and pigeons. Furthermore, most of the 73 blemishes that invalidate a korban as a baal mum do not apply to what a gentile offers outside the Beis Hamikdash. The only such restriction that applies outside the Beis Hamikdash is a missing limb, but any other injury or physical impediment does not invalidate the korban (Temurah 7a; Avodah Zarah 5b).

Gentile Mitzvos

We need to address one more point before we can answer our opening questions: May a gentile observe mitzvos of the Torah, and may he create his own observances?

A gentile may not keep Shabbos or a day of rest (meaning, a day that he refrains from doing any activity that is forbidden on Shabbos, melachah) on any day of the week (Sanhedrin 58b). This is considered a very grievous violation of the Torah. I am aware of three approaches provided by the Rishonim to explain this law.

Rashi’s Reason

Rashi explains that a non-Jew is obligated to work every day, because the Torah writes, “Yom valayla lo yishbosu,” which can be interpreted to mean, “Day and night they (i.e., the non-Jews) may not rest.” According to his understanding, this prohibition has nothing to do with any ban against a gentile performing religious practices to Hashem. There is a specific requirement for gentiles to work every day – or, at least, to perform melachah.

Meiri’s Reason

The Meiri presents a different reason why a gentile may not observe a day of rest — that a Jew may mistakenly learn from him that it is acceptable to create his own mitzvos. Of course, creating one’s own mitzvos, which is a very popular idea among contemporary religions, defeats the entire reason of observing the Torah and keeping mitzvos. The purpose of the Torah is for us to become close to Hashem by following what He instructs us to do. Creating one’s own mitzvos implies that I can somehow bribe G-d to do what I want. Although we realize the foolishness of this approach, this idea underlies all of idolatry and greatly influences the way most of mankind views religion.

Rambam’s Reason

The Rambam’s approach is similar to the Meiri’s, in that he explains that a gentile is prohibited from making his own holiday or any other religious observance, because the Torah is opposed to the creation of man-made religions (Hilchos Melachim 10:9). In the words of the Rambam, “A non-Jew is not permitted to create his own religion or mitzvah. Either he becomes a righteous convert (a ger tzedek) and accepts the observance of all the mitzvos or he remains with the laws that he has without adding or subtracting.” Any attempt to create a mitzvah other than that of the Torah runs counter to Hashem’s goals for mankind, as I will soon explain.

Contradiction in Rambam

However, many authorities ask if the Rambam seems to be contradicting himself. The Mishnah states that the terumah or maaser separated by a gentile from his own crops is halachically valid, and his declaring his property to belong to the Beis Hamikdash (hekdesh) is similarly valid (Terumos 3:9). In his Commentary, the Rambam states that even though a gentile is not obligated to keep mitzvos, observing them allows him a small degree of reward. This statement implies that a gentile can receive reward for fulfilling mitzvos of the Torah.

There are several approaches to answer this seeming contradiction. According to Rav Moshe Feinstein, there are a few very specific mitzvos that a gentile is permitted to observe, and only in these instances will he reap any reward for observing them. Those are mitzvos where we find that a gentile was specifically included, such as tzedakah, prayer, offering korbanos and separating terumos and maasros (Shu”t Igros Moshe, Yoreh Deah 2:7). In Rav Moshe’s opinion, a gentile who observes any other mitzvah receives no reward. However, should he perform these mitzvos knowing that he is not commanded to do so, we do not stop him. On the other hand, if he performs these activities because he wants to consider himself obligated to keep them, we should prevent him from doing so if we can, and we should certainly discourage his observing them.

Others contend there are ways whereby a gentile can become obligated in Torah mitzvos (Biur Halachah, end of 304, in explanation of the Magen Avraham), and there are others who feel that a gentile who observes mitzvos, knowing that he is not required to do so, receives reward for his endeavor (see Sefer Hamafteiach, Melachim 10:10). Among those authorities who follow the last approach, some exclude a gentile from observing certain mitzvos. For example, the Radbaz (Hilchos Melachim 10:10) prohibits a gentile from wearing tefillin or placing a mezuzah on his door, and the Taz (Yoreh Deah 263:3) and the Levush prohibit him from performing bris milah (but see the Shulchan Aruch 268:9, Nekudos Hakesef ad locum, and the Shach, Yoreh Deah 263:8 and 268:19 who disagree).

Answering our Questions

At this point, we are equipped to examine the opening questions. The first question was:

“My neighbor is not Jewish and believes in G-d, but she has rejected any of the existent organized religions. She often burns incense, which she learned about in Eastern religions, and she says that she does this to feel G-d’s presence in her life. May I enter her house while the incense is burning?”

Is the neighbor doing something idolatrous? It may be, depending on what her understanding is of G-d. If, indeed, her acts comprise avodah zarah, then one should not be in her house when the incense is kindled, because one is benefiting from idol worship.

On the other hand, if she understands G-d similar to the way a Jew does, there is no idolatry in her act. Assuming that this is true, then there is nothing wrong with enjoying the fragrance of her incense.

Joining the Sprinklers

The second question was: “This must be the strangest question that I have ever asked. While camping, I met a group of sincere non-Jews who told me that they believe in one G-d and have regular getaways to discuss how they can live more in His image. While I was with them, they sprinkled some wine and oil on a campfire in commemoration of the Biblical sacrifices. They invited me to join them, which I did not, but I am curious to know whether I could have sprinkled with them.”

It is good that you did not join them. For a Jew to effect any type of korban outside the Beis Hamikdash is prohibited, although, because of certain halachic details, this situation would not have involved the severe violation of ha’ala’ah bachutz. Similarly, these individuals did not fulfill a gentile’s mitzvah of offering korbanos, because their fireplace did not meet the halachic requirements of an altar.

The Doubting Moslem

“My coworker, who still considers herself a Moslem, confides in me a lot of her doubts about her religion. Should I be encouraging her away from Islam, or is it not necessary to do so, since they do not worship idols?”

Without question, observing Islam is a grievous sin, even for a gentile, despite the fact that there is no idolatry involved (see also fRitva, Pesachim 25b). Hashem gave very specific instructions of how He wants mankind to worship Him, and any other attempt is prohibited. Therefore, if your coworker is asking you for direction in her life, you should explain to her the fallacies of Islam and how she could indeed fulfill Hashem’s wishes by becoming a proper bas Noach.

Conclusion

We are meant to be “a light unto the nations,” which charges us with the responsibility to act in a manner that we create a kiddush Hashem. If we have the opportunity to educate non-Jews how to live their lives as proper, G-d-fearing Bnei Noach, that is surely within the scope of our directives.

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