Hallel in Shul on Seder Night

Question #1: When I visit Eretz Yisroel, I notice that even Nusach Ashkenaz shullen recite Hallel on the first night of Pesach. Should I be reciting Hallel with them when my family custom is not to? Question #2: Should a woman whose husband recites Hallel in shul on Seder night recite Hallel with a bracha […]

Spilling the Beans

Questions: Is Cottonseed Oil kitniyos? I know that, in America, everyone uses cottonseed oil on Pesach. However, when I was in Israel for Pesach I was told that they don’t use cottonseed oil because it is kitniyos. Why is there a difference in practice? Lecithin in Pesach Products When I was a child, it was […]

How Do We Make Kosher Wine?

Kashrus is significant to this week’s parsha, and right after Purim and beginning our Pesach preparations. This seems like the perfect week to discuss: How Do We Make Kosher Wine? By Rabbi Yirmiyohu Kaganoff Question: Business Lunch "On a business visit to Israel, I needed to take out some non-Jewish business contacts to a top-quality […]

Is it Time for Maariv?

Question #1: When is the correct time to daven maariv? Question #2: Why is there no repetition of shmoneh esrei for maariv? Question #3: Must women daven maariv? Introduction: In citing the source for our three daily prayers, the Gemara quotes two approaches. Rabbi Yosi ben Chanina explains that our three daily prayers were founded […]

The Significance of Vehu Rachum

Rosh Chodesh Adar I falls on Shabbos. I have written two articles on subjects that relate to Shabbos Rosh Chodesh, one about the unique text of the Musaf that we recite and the other about the practice of having a special food prepared for Shabbos in honor of Rosh Chodesh. Both of these articles are […]

The Saga of the Expired Ticket

PART I: The Saga of the Expired Ticket Two yeshiva students, Beryl Bernstein and Aaron Adler*, make an appointment to discuss a financial matter with me. Thank G-d, there is no ill feeling between them, just a practical question regarding who is required to pay for a plane ticket. Here is the background to the […]

Should I Recite Ga’al Yisrael Aloud?

Question #1: As a child in shul, I noticed that shortly before the Shemoneh esrei was begun, some of the older European Jews would wait before reciting the words "Shirah chadasha” until the chazzan completed the entire beracha and said "Ga’al Yisrael." They would answer "Amen" to the chazzan’s beracha, then complete the beracha themselves […]

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It’s About Time

Quiz Question #1: Whose bris is first?

Mrs. Unger* gave birth to two healthy twin boys, both of whom had their brissin on the first day that halacha mandates, yet the younger Unger had his bris several days earlier than his older brother. How can this happen?

Question #2: Isn’t he too late?

I have often wondered why my chassidishe brother-in-law davens mincha after sunset, when the Mishnah Berurah rules that one should not daven this late!

Question #3: Frum receptionist

“My sister and I live in the same yishuv (community), and the nearest hospital is Laniado, in Netanya. She went into labor on Shabbos and left for the hospital. Immediately after Shabbos, I phoned the hospital to find out how she was and if she had a boy or a girl, and was told by the gentile receptionist that she could not put the call through until after ‘Rabbeinu Tam’ time arrives, which would not be for another half an hour. Why was the non-Jewish receptionist so frum?"

What does our parsha have to do with time?

This week’s parsha includes the mitzvah of establishing the Jewish calendar, providing an excellent opportunity to discuss what to do when there is an uncertainty what day it is.

Bein Hashemashos

As we know, observing bris milah overrides even Shabbos. However, this is so only for a bris bizmanah; that is, a bris that transpires on the eighth day of the child’s life, but not a bris that is delayed. A bris that is delayed should take place at the earliest opportunity that halacha allows, but not on Shabbos or Yom Tov (see Shu’t Dvar Avraham 1:33; 2:1-3). One reason why a bris may be delayed is because of a medical concern, a topic we will leave for a future article. Another common reason why a bris is delayed: The baby was born during bein hashemashos, a halachic "twilight zone," a time when we are unsure if it is already Shabbos or not, since we are uncertain whether this period of time belongs to the previous day or the next.

The Mishnah (Shabbos 137a) addresses this issue:

A child is circumcised on the eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, or twelfth – no earlier and no later. How can this be? The normal circumstance is the bris is on the eighth. If he is born during halachic twilight (bein hashemashos), his bris is on the ninth. If [he is born]on Friday’s twilight, he is circumcised on the tenth [that is, Sunday]. If Yom Tov falls on Sunday, he is circumcised on the eleventh [Monday]. If Rosh Hashanah falls on Sunday and Monday, then he is circumcised on the twelfth [day after birth, which is Tuesday]."

We see that the only time we perform the bris on Shabbos is when we are certain that the baby was born on Shabbos. If a baby was born during bein hashemashos on Friday evening, then he was born at a time that we are uncertain whether it is still considered Friday or it is already Shabbos. As the Gemara (Shabbos 34b) expresses it: We are uncertain whether bein hashemashos is day or night… and we treat it strictly regarding both days. Therefore, when a baby is born during bein hashemashos on Friday evening, we cannot perform the bris on Friday, because maybe the baby was born on Shabbos, and Friday is only the seventh day, too early to perform the bris. We cannot perform the bris on Shabbos, either, because maybe the baby was born on Friday, and Shabbos is the ninth day, not the eighth, and only a bris bizmanah, a bris performed on the eighth day, supersedes Shabbos. Since there is no choice, we are forced to postpone the bris to Sunday, as the first available opportunity. However, if a Yom Tov falls on that Sunday, the bris cannot take place on that day, either, since only a bris bizmanah supersedes Yom Tov, and not a bris that is postponed to a time after the eighth day. As a result, the earliest day to perform this bris is Monday.

Rosh Hashanah Starting on Sunday?!

Continuing the explanation of the Mishnah: If Rosh Hashanah falls on Sunday and Monday, then he is circumcised on the twelfth. If the baby was born during bein hashemashos of the Friday evening ten days before Rosh Hashanah, and the two days of Rosh Hashanah fall on Sunday and Monday, then the bris is postponed until Tuesday the day after Rosh Hashanah, which is the twelfth day from the Friday on which the baby was born.

But one minute: the first day of Rosh Hashanah cannot fall on Sunday! How does the Mishnah say differently?

Although our calendar is set up such that Rosh Hashanah cannot fall on Sunday, so that Hoshanah Rabbah does not fall on Shabbos and thus does not jeopardize observance of Hoshanos, at the time of the Mishnah, Rosh Hashanah could and did sometimes transpire on Sunday. When Rosh Chodesh and Rosh Hashanah were determined by the testimony of witnesses who observed the new moon (Rambam, Hilchos Kiddush HaChodesh 1:1, 7; 5:1), it was halachically more important to have Rosh Hashanah fall on its more correct day than to be concerned about having Hoshana Rabbah fall on Shabbos (Ha’emek She’ailah 67:22; Gri’z, Hilchos Kiddush Hachodesh). Only once it became impossible to declare Rosh Chodesh on the basis of observation, and Hillel Hanasi created a permanent calendar, did he include some innovations, including making certain that Hoshanah Rabbah does not fall on Shabbos, by making sure that the first day of Rosh Hashanah does not fall on Sunday (Rambam, Hilchos Kiddush Hachodesh 5:2). (There is an alternative approach, that of Rav Saadiya Geon and Rabbeinu Chananel, to explain this subject, which will be left for another time.)

Why Did the Younger Baby have an Earlier Bris?

At this point, we already have enough information to answer Quiz Question #1 above: Why would a younger twin have his bris earlier than his healthy, older brother? The answer is that the older twin was born during bein hashemashos on Friday evening — at a time that we are uncertain whether he was born on Friday or on Shabbos. Because of this uncertainty, we cannot perform his bris on either Friday or Shabbos, as explained above, and his bris is postponed to Sunday. However, his younger brother was born at a time that is certainly Shabbos, and therefore his bris takes place on Shabbos.

When is Twilight?

This explains the fundamental principles, but still leaves a basic question: When is bein hashemashos?

Answering this question requires delving into the following issue: We all are aware that the Jewish date begins at the beginning of the night. But at what exact moment does one day end and another begin? Do we know the precise instant when one day marches off into history, and its successor arrives with its banner unfurled?

A verse in the book of Nechemiah might help resolve this question. There, it describes the unenviable circumstances in which the Jews were rebuilding the Second Beis Hamikdash, while protecting themselves from the enemies determined to thwart its erection: And we were continuing the construction work from daybreak until the stars come out [tzeis hakochavim], while half our men were holding spears… and at night we were on guard, while in the day we could proceed with the work (Nechemiah 4:15-16). Nechemiah implies that "night" begins from when the stars emerge. The time of dusk, before the stars are visible, is still considered the previous day (see Berachos 2b; Megillah 20b).

However, we still need more definition. Which stars? Can we pinpoint the moment that the stars come out since the stars of the firmament do not all become visible at the same time?

Additional confusion is caused by a different verse that implies that the day ends when the sun sets, as the Torah (Vayikra 22:7) proclaims: And when the sun sets, he shall become pure, stating that the final stage of purification from some types of tumah is the sunset after immersion in a mikveh. However, at sunset, no stars are yet visible, and the halacha is that this taharah transpires at nightfall, implying that the changing of the day transpires at sunset, not when the stars appear (see Berachos 2b).

What a Phenomenal Dusk!

Is there any discussion in the Gemara that can "shed light" on our question? Indeed, there are several passages, and much literature is devoted to understanding them. One passage (Shabbos 34b) describes certain celestial phenomena that define when bein hashemashos begins and when it ends. The commentaries debate exactly what occurrences are being described, and, unfortunately we derive little usable information from this passage.

When Three Stars Appear

Another passage indicates that the end of the day is determined by the appearance of stars. When one star appears, it is still day. When two appear, it is bein hashemashos, and when three appear, it is night. Not large stars that appear even in the day, and not small stars that appear even at night, but middle-sized stars (Shabbos 35b).

Now the job appears easy. Let us look at the darkening firmament this coming evening and count stars!

I am sure at times you have tried. Ever spent Shabbos on a camping trip and attempted to determine the end of Shabbos by stargazing? How did you decide which stars are considered "small," "large" and "middle-sized"? And this is assuming that one does not need to deal with light pollution!

Perhaps locating a Gemara discussion that indicates more objective criteria, such as units of time, can be more helpful in our search to determine the end of day. Does such a discussion exist in the Gemara?

Yes, it does — and not only one passage, but two. However, the two passages appear contradictory.

Conflicting Gemara Passages

The Gemara in Pesachim (94a) states that the time between shekiyah, a word usually translated as sunset, and tzeis hakochavim equals four mil, which we will assume is 72 minutes. (This concurs with the more obvious way of explaining the opinion of the Terumas Hadeshen [#123] and the Shulchan Aruch [Orach Chayim 459:2; Yoreh Deah 69:6 with Shach] that a mil, used as a unit of time, equals 18 minutes.) However, a different passage of Gemara (Shabbos 34b) quotes a dispute between Rabbah, who states that nightfall occurs three-quarters of a mil, or 13½ minutes, after shekiyah, and Rabbi Yosef, who rules that it transpires a bit earlier, two-thirds of a mil, or 12 minutes, after shekiyah. Obviously, we need to explain why one Gemara states that nightfall occurs 72 minutes after shekiyah, and another states that it occurs only 12 or 13½ minutes after shekiyah!

Rabbeinu Tam’s Explanation

Among the many resolutions to this conundrum, the two most commonly quoted are those of Rabbeinu Tam and that of the Gra. Rabbeinu Tam contends that these two passages of Gemara are using the word "shekiyah" to refer to two different phenomena which occur about an hour apart. The Gemara in Pesachim uses the term shekiyah to mean sunset — when the sun vanishes beyond the western horizon. Rabbeinu Tam refers to sunset as techilas shekiyah, literally the beginning of shekiyah. However, when the Gemara in Shabbos refers to "shekiyah," it does not mean sunset, but a point in time about an hour later when virtually all light of the sun’s rays has disappeared from the western horizon. Rabbeinu Tam refers to this later time as sof shekiyah, literally the end of shekiyah, and in his opinion, until sof shekiyah occurs, halachah considers it definitely day, notwithstanding the setting of the sun and the appearance of hundreds of stars in the firmament. All these stars are considered "large stars," whose appearance does not demonstrate that the day has ended. Only at sof shekiyah does it become bein hashemashos, the time when we are uncertain whether it is day or night. At sof shekiyah, bein hashemashos has begun, meaning that now there are two, but not three, visible "middle-sized" stars, and we await the appearance of the third "middle-sized" star to know that it is now definitely night. (However, cf. Minchas Kohen for a variant understanding of Rabbeinu Tam’s position.)

Since, according to Rabbeinu Tam, it is definitely still day until about an hour after sunset, there is no problem with davening mincha considerably after sunset. Thus, there are communities who base themselves on Rabbeinu Tam’s opinion and daven mincha well after sunset.

Rabbeinu Tam and a Friday Night Birth

According to Rabbeinu Tam, a baby born 58 minutes after sunset on Friday evening, and certainly any time earlier, was born halachically on Friday and not on Shabbos. In Rabbeinu Tam’s opinion, this baby’s bris takes place the following Friday. A baby making his appearance a bit later is considered to be born during bein hashemashos and cannot have his bris on Shabbos, because perhaps bein hashemashos is still Friday — which makes Shabbos his ninth day of life. This bris will be postponed to Sunday. However, if the baby is born a bit later on Friday evening, at a time when it is definitely Shabbos, then the bris is performed on Shabbos the next week.

It goes without saying that according to Rabbeinu Tam, one may not perform any melacha on Saturday night until a considerable time has passed after sunset. There are various opinions as to exactly when Shabbos is definitely over according to Rabbeinu Tam, but most people assume that Shabbos is over by 72 minutes after sunset (Biur Halacha).

By the way, at this point we can answer our third question above: why the telephone lines at Laniado Hospital are not open to non-pikuach nefesh related calls until more than a half hour later than the time Shabbos ends according to most calendars. The founder of the hospital, the Klausenberger Rebbe, insisted that Shabbos be observed at the hospital until the time at which Rabbeinu Tam would concur that Shabbos is over.

The opinion of the Gra

Since we know that many highly observant Jews do not wait this long for Shabbos to end, there must be another way of interpreting the two passages of Gemara that reaches a different halachic conclusion. Indeed, one such approach is that of the Gra, who presents a completely different approach to explain the seeming contradiction between the two passages of Gemara. He contends that both passages use shekiyah to mean sunset, and this is the same sunset to which we customarily refer — however, they are not referring to the same tzeis hakochavim. The Gemara in Pesachim that refers to tzeis hakochavim being 72 minutes after sunset means that all visible stars of the firmament can now be seen, a time that the Gra calls tzeis kol hakochavim, literally, when all the stars have come out, whereas the Gemara in Shabbos refers to the time at which three "middle-sized" stars are visible. The Gra concludes that sunset marks the beginning of bein hashemashos, the time when we are uncertain whether it is day or night, with tzeis hakochavim occurring when three "middle-sized" stars are visible. The Gemara in Pesachim that requires 72 minutes until the stars appear is not discussing when the day ends – the day ended much earlier — but was concerned about other laws that are affected by the appearance of a skyful of stars.

According to the Gra’s opinion, once sunset arrives on Friday, it may already be Shabbos, and we therefore refrain from performing any melacha from this time, and consider this time to be already bein hashemashos. In the Gra’s opinion, a baby born after sunset Friday will have his bris performed on Sunday nine days later unless he is born after three "middle-sized" stars appear, in which case his bris will be performed on Shabbos. (In practice, since we are uncertain exactly which stars are called "middle-sized," we wait a bit longer, see Biur Halacha to 393) According to Rabbeinu Tam, this same baby would have his bris performed on Friday, unless he is born at least 58½ minutes after sunset. If he is born between 58½ minutes and 72 minutes after sunset Friday evening, according to the Gra, his bris is on Shabbos, whereas according to Rabbeinu Tam, his bris will be on Sunday. Both agree that a baby born later than this on Friday evening will have his bris performed on Shabbos.

Mincha tima!

At this point, let us refer to our other opening question: “I have often wondered why my chassidishe brother-in-law davens mincha after sunset, when the Mishnah Berurah rules that one should not daven this late!”

The Gra rules that one should not daven mincha after sunset, since this is already a time at which the previous day may have already passed. Thus, it is already time to daven maariv. However, according to Rabbeinu Tam, one may daven mincha lechatchilah until 58½ minutes after sunset.

How do we rule?

Although in the past there were Torah communities who did not follow the Gra at all, even regarding the onset of Shabbos, today it is universally accepted to consider it Shabbos from sunset on Friday. Many communities follow the Gra’s opinion fully, and do not wait until 72 minutes after sunset on Saturday to end Shabbos. In a responsum on the subject, Rav Moshe Feinstein took great umbrage to this approach, contending that since a large number of Rishonim followed Rabbeinu Tam’s approach, one should act stringently and not end Shabbos until after Rabbeinu Tam’s time is over (Shu’t Igros Moshe, Yoreh Deah 4:17:26). As in all areas of halacha, the reader is encouraged to discuss the shaylah with his or her mara de’asra for a final ruling.

*all names have been changed to protect privacy

Special Tochacha Situations

Question #1: Talkative Boss

“My boss likes to gossip, and much of it is loshon hora. Am I required to tell him that this is prohibited according to halacha?”

Question #2: Admonishing a talmid chacham

“I saw a highly respected scholar talking during the repetition of the shemoneh esrei. Should I say something to him?”

Question #3: Public Tochacha

“I know of situations where great scholars protested in public what people did, embarrassing them publicly. Is this a proper way to observe the mitzvah of tochacha?”

Answer:

In this week’s parsha, Moshe admonishes a Jew for beating his fellow Jew, thus providing ample reason to continue our discussion on the mitzvah of tochacha, the Torah’s requirement to reprove someone for misbehavior. The two previous articles analyzed the basics of tochacha. We learned that the underlying principle of tochacha is the realization that fulfilling Hashem’s mitzvos is not merely an individual’s pursuit – it is a responsibility that I share with all of Klal Yisroel (see Sefer Hamitzvos #205). We are all members of the same people and share a common, collective mission.

In the previous articles, we also learned that, for tochacha to be successful, it must come from sincere caring about the person who has sinned, and should be conveyed in that tone. Tochacha should be presented in a way that is most likely to persuade the wrongdoer to mend his or her ways. We also learned that there are instances in which one should not admonish a sinner, such as when he/she does not realize that the action violates the Torah and it is clear that any reprimand will be ignored. On the other hand, we should note that the Chovos Halevovos (Shaar Cheshbon Hanefesh #17) quotes early sources (Shemos 2:13; Avodah Zarah 4a) that imply that, at times, one is required to protest, even when he knows that the offending party will not listen.

This article will discuss aspects of the mitzvah of tochacha that were not included in the previous essays, and with this information we will be able to answer our opening questions.

Someone who has wronged me

The mitzvah of tochacha applies when I was aggrieved by another person. If someone mistreated me, I may not resent, in silence, what that person did. This attitude violates the Torah’s prohibition of Lo sisna es achicha bilvavecha, “Do not hate your brother in your heart,” meaning, to bear the grudge in silence. Instead, there are two permitted courses of action from which I may choose:

1. I may tell the person that I am upset because he wronged me. This statement qualifies as a form of tochacha.

2. The other option is to forgive the evildoer for his ill-doing. This latter choice is the preferred course of action (Rambam, Hilchos Dei’os 6:9; see also Tosafos, Arachin 16b s.v. Va’anavah).

What is prohibited is for me to continue bearing a grudge silently against the person who perpetrated wrong against me. This is prohibited unless the person has the status of being a rosho, someone viewed as wicked according to halacha.

Repeat offender

In the previous article, we discussed what the halacha is if you see a person doing something wrong for which you have previously rebuked him. Are you required to rebuke him again? The Gemara rules that one is required to rebuke an evildoer repeatedly (Bava Metzia 23a). However, we find a dispute among rishonim whether or not this law applies in all situations when one is required to rebuke an evildoer (see Magen Avraham 608:3; Orach Meisharim, page 159), or whether it applies only to someone with whom you have a very close relationship, such as a sibling or parent (Sefer Chassidim #413).

In a situation when the Torah requires one to reproach the sinner repeatedly, is there no limit at all to how many times one must rebuke him? What if the sinner gets so angry that he curses, or even strikes, the person censuring him? Is the mochiach required to continue reproaching, even though he may be subjecting himself to physical or emotional abuse?

The Gemara cites a dispute among the three great, early amora’im, Rav, Shmuel, and Rabbi Yochanan, concerning the point at which one may refrain from rebuking the sinner. All three amora’im concur that there is a point at which the mochiach should refrain from admonishing. According to Rabbi Yochanan, once the evildoer becomes so upset that he responds with a nasty retort, the mochiach may refrain from further reprimand. Shmuel contends that angering the sinner to this extent is not sufficient reason to stop the censure, but one should continue until the sinner curses the mochiach. Presumably, Shmuel feels that, at this point, nothing is gained by the tochacha, since it is now causing the wrongdoer to sin even more by cursing a fellow Jew. Rav disagrees, contending that even if one is cursed by the sinner, one should continue to rebuke him, until one is concerned that the sinner may become violent (Arachin 16b).

I mentioned above that some authorities contend that one should not repeatedly rebuke anyone with whom one does not have a close relationship. According to this opinion, the dispute of Rav, Shmuel, and Rabbi Yochanan concerns only a close relative or friend who is rebuking, where the halacha is that he should reproach the sinner repeatedly – until the sinner responds either by shouting nastily, by cursing, or by striking, depending upon which opinion one follows. However, according to those who dispute this conclusion and contend that one must repeatedly admonish any sinner, the amora’im are discussing anyone who reproaches a sinner.

Becoming harsh

In the previous article, we learned that one should admonish in a gentle, soft way that conveys the message, “I care for you deeply; this behavior is not in your best interest.” One should never initiate reproach in a harsh manner. However, this halacha applies only in the initial stages of reproaching someone. When the repeated offender’s sin is bein adam lamakom, between himself and Hashem, and positive approaches have been unsuccessful, the authorities rule that one is required to become harsh with the evildoer, even to the point of embarrassing him in public to get him to do teshuvah (Rambam, Hilchos Dei’os 6:8; Sefer Hachinuch #239).

Other limitations

The Rema (Yoreh Deah 334:48) and the Mahari Weill (#157) rule that the Torah does not require one to spend money to fulfill the mitzvah of tochacha. They extend this idea to include that one does not need to be mochiach someone who might hurt you physically or financially. Someone who is being mochiach is not required to endanger himself or lose money to fulfill the mitzvah. (This appears to follow the approach of the Sefer Chassidim that the dispute among amora’im concerning to what extent one is required to be mochiach applies only when one is being mochiach close relatives, but not to others.) An extension of this law is that you are not required to be mochiach someone who might hurt you physically or financially (Rema, Yoreh Deah 334:48; Levush, Yoreh Deah 157:1; see Pischei Teshuvah, Yoreh Deah 157:5; cf., however, Teivas Gomeh, quoted by the above-mentioned Pischei Teshuvah, who disagrees.)

In the same context, the Darchei Teshuvah (157:20) quotes the following question in the name of the Tzemach Tzedek of Lubavitch: In a certain city, the local physician was a non-observant Jew. The question was whether there was a mitzvah to admonish him for his sins, knowing that such admonishment might cause him to relocate. This would endanger the populace, since they would now be without a physician to treat them. The Tzemach Tzedek ruled that they are not required to admonish him, since the result might imperil the community.

Admonishing the boss

At this point, we can address the first question we asked above:

“My boss likes to gossip, and much of it is loshon hora. Am I required to tell him that this is prohibited according to halacha?”

If the only concern here is the mitzvah of tochacha, it seems that there is no requirement to admonish one’s employer, if you are concerned that, as a result, he may fire you. However, there is probably a more serious question here: that of hearing loshon hora, since this boss probably enjoys sharing his gossip with you. There is discussion about such a shaylah in the sefer Chofeitz Chayim (Hilchos Loshon Hora 6:5). I refer the reader who has a specific question on this topic to his or her own rav or posek for a decision.

Tacit approval

Even though one is not required to admonish the evildoer, one should be careful not to imply that his actions are acceptable. This would violate the prohibition of chanufah, usually translated as flattery, which is a very serious Torah violation.

The story of Agrippas

The following story demonstrates how serious this prohibition is. King Agrippas, who reigned towards the end of the Second Beis Hamikdash, was an excellent ruler, highly respectful of the Gedolei Torah of his era and committed to the observance and spreading of Torah and mitzvos. Notwithstanding his many good qualities, calling himself “King” over the Jewish People violated halacha, since he was descended from gentile slaves, and the Torah states, lo suchal laseis alecha ish nachri asher lo achicha hu, “You may not place over yourselves a gentile who is not your brother” (Devarim 17:15). Agrippas, himself, realized that he was not permitted to be king, for when he observed the hakheil ceremony in the Beis Hamikdash on Chol Hamoed Sukkos (see Devarim 31:10-13 and Mishnah, Sotah 41a), he stood up while reading the Torah rather than read it while sitting, since sitting in the Azarah section of the Beis Hamikdash is a special privilege permitted only to kings who are descendants of David Hamelech. When Agrippas reached the words of the Torah that prohibit appointing a king who is not a Jewish native, his eyes began to tear, for he realized that he, himself, was violating this law. At that moment, the Sages present told him, “Don’t worry, Agrippas. You are our brother,” thus approving his reign, in violation of the Torah.

The Gemara (Sotah 41b) teaches that the leaders of the Jews should have been destroyed for violating chanufah, and that, at that moment, many catastrophic occurrences befell the Jewish people, resulting in extensive loss of life. Although, under the circumstances, the Sages were not required to admonish Agrippas for being king, they were forbidden to give the impression that they approved of his being a monarch. They were required to remain silent (Tosafos, Sotah 41b s.v. oso), which would constitute a respectful disapproval.

The Chovos Halevovos (Shaar Cheshbon Hanefesh #17) expands this concept. Although we have enumerated many instances where one is not obligated to be mochiach, in each of these situations one is required to internalize strong disapproval of the violations that one observes. The Chovos Halevovos bases this idea on the words of David Hamelech: I hated the gathering of evildoers (Tehillim 26:5).

Admonishing a talmid chacham

If someone who is not scholarly sees a talmid chacham do something that appears to be halachically incorrect, what is the proper thing for him to do? Does the non-scholarly person have a mitzvah to admonish the Torah scholar for his lapse?

The halacha is that one is required to rebuke the talmid chacham, and that even a disciple has a responsibility to be mochiach his own rebbe (Bava Metzia 31a). There are halachic details for giving such tochacha. The easiest approach is for the student to ask his rebbe respectfully what is the halacha in the situation (that was ostensibly violated). In this way, the disciple neither acts nor speaks disrespectfully since he did not tell his rebbe that he had committed a violation. If, indeed, the rebbe was in violation of a halacha, it has now been brought to his attention in an appropriate way. It also may be true that the rebbe is aware of opinions who permit the action under the specific circumstances involved.

The Gemara (Shabbos 55a) provides an example of this: Rav Yehudah was listening to the Torah lecture of his rebbe, the great amora Shmuel, when a woman entered and began screaming at Shmuel. Shmuel ignored the woman and continued his teaching. Rav Yehudah turned to his master, asking him: Does the master not accept the teaching of Mishlei (21:13): “One who closes his ears from the outcry of the poor will not be answered when he calls out (in prayer).” If Shmuel felt that the verse in Mishlei did not apply in his circumstance, he could have explained to his disciple why this is so.

There is an interesting sequel to this story, based on the following Talmudic passage. The amora, Rav Yosef the son of Rav Yehoshua, had an out-of-body experience in which he saw elyonim lematah vetachtonim lemaaleh, meaning that he had a vision of olam haba and saw that things there are often the reverse of how they appear in this world. Rabbeinu Chananel records that there was an oral tradition from the ge’onim, passed from one generation to the next, that what Rav Yosef saw was that in olam haba Shmuel was studying and imbibing Torah from Rav Yehudah, notwithstanding the fact that, in this world, Rav Yehudah was Shmuel’s disciple. In the world to come, the great amora Shmuel is treated as Rav Yehudah’s disciple, because of this one instance in which Rav Yehudah taught Shmuel the proper way to act (Tosafos, Bava Basra 10b s.v. Elyonim).

Here is another example:

A talmid sees his rebbe speak during the repetition of the shemoneh esrei. It is correct for the talmid to ask his rebbe: “Didn’t we learn that one may not talk during the chazaras hashatz?” Framing the rebuke as a question is milder than saying to his rebbe directly: “It is forbidden to talk during chazaras hashatz.”

As we noted above, someone who sees a person talking during chazaras hashatz is required to feel tremendous love for this person, so much so that it pains him to realize that the talker will be punished for his misdeed. Then, the mochiach tries to figure out what will be the most effective way of communicating both these feelings and the message to the wrongdoer.

Did the talmid chacham do teshuvah?

The Gemara shares with us an interesting insight: One who observes that a talmid chacham did something wrong should assume, by the next day, that the talmid chacham has already done teshuvah for his sin (Brachos 19a). Although it is possible that, in the passion of the moment, the talmid chacham may have sinned, he will certainly regret his failure afterwards and will do teshuvah for it.

The halachic authorities ask the following question: Does this insight, that a day after witnessing his misdeed one should assume that the talmid chacham has already done teshuvah, have ramifications as to whether one should admonish the talmid chacham when one next sees him? Should one assume that the talmid chacham has already performed a complete teshuvah and that admonishing him at this point is no longer necessary or correct?

We find a dispute among the acharonim concerning this question. Some rule that one should assume that the talmid chacham did teshuvah already, and that there is no more reason to be mochiach him (Yad Ha’ketenah, as explained by Zeh Hashaar and Shevilei Chayim 4:20). Others contend that one should be mochiach, unless one knows that the talmid chacham has already done teshuvah (Be’er Mayim Chayim, Hilchos Loshon Hora 4:18).

Conclusion

The Gemara tells us the following pithy statement: A talmid chacham is beloved by the other residents of his city not because he is so wonderful, but because he fails to admonish them on heavenly matters (Kesubos 105b). As we mentioned above, when admonishing people for not being careful about matters between man and fellowman, one rebukes only in private. However, when one needs to reproach people for violating their responsibilities to Hashem, one may be required to rebuke them even in public.

An Eruv Primer

There are still some choice dedication opportunities available for the next volume, tentatively entitled: “From Vanishing Importers to Vultures’ Wings,” (Fascinating Expositions on Contemporary Halachic Questions)

I am hoping to have it published by Feldheim Purim-time. Please let me know that you are interested.

This week’s parsha includes one of the major sources for prohibiting carrying on Shabbos, which provides a good opportunity to study some of the complicated halachos of carrying on Shabbos and the halachos of Eruvin. We cannot do justice to this vast and complicated topic in one short article. However, I will attempt to provide an introduction to some of the issues involved.

The Torah prohibits carrying from an enclosed area, called a “reshus hayachid,” to a public, non-enclosed area, a “reshus harabim,” or vice versa. It also prohibits carrying something for a distance of four amos (about seven feet) or more inside a reshus harabim. For our purposes, we will loosely define reshus hayachid as an area completely enclosed by walls, doors, or a combination of both, and a reshus harabim as an unenclosed area at least sixteen amos wide (about twenty-eight feet) meant for public use or thoroughfare. Many additional technical details define a reshus hayachid and a reshus harabim, some of which will be discussed later in this article.

A non-enclosed area that does not qualify as a reshus harabim is categorized as a “karmelis.” According to Torah law, one may carry inside, into and from a karmelis. However, Chazal ruled that a karmelis must be treated with the stringencies of both a reshus hayachid and a reshus harabim. This means that under most circumstances it is forbidden to carry inside, into, or from any area that is not completely enclosed. This is the way we are familiar with observing Shabbos – one does not carry in any unenclosed area. (I will later point out a significant halachic difference between a reshus harabim and a karmelis.)

Chazal also forbade carrying from one reshus hayachid to another when they are not owned by the same person. Thus, I may not carry on Shabbos from my house to my neighbor’s, even if both properties are completely enclosed. If both areas are owned by the same person, I may carry from one house to the other, as long as I don’t pass through an unenclosed area or an area owned by someone else. I may carry from my house to my neighbor’s if we make an “eruv” which allows the two areas to be treated as if they have common ownership.

BUT I THOUGHT “ERUV” REFERS TO A PHYSICAL STRUCTURE?

The word eruv refers to several different conventions instituted by Chazal. We just mentioned the “eruv chatzeiros” that permits carrying between different areas that are enclosed but have separate ownerships. We create this eruv by making the property owners partners in a loaf of bread or a box of matzohs, which for these purposes is sufficient to consider the properties jointly owned. Once this eruv chatzeiros is made, one may carry from one residence within the eruv to another, since the eruv gives them common ownership. Common practice is to make the eruv with matzohs since they last a long time. Custom is to renew the eruv every Erev Pesach so that it is not forgotten.

One must make sure that the matzohs remain edible. I know of instances where the eruv was forgotten about and long afterwards it was discovered that the matzohs were no longer edible. Who knows how long people were carrying in a prohibited way because no one had bothered to check the matzohs!

WHAT IF THE AREA IS NOT ENCLOSED?

Our discussion until now has been dealing with an area that is already fully enclosed. However, someone interested in carrying in an area that is not fully enclosed must close in the area before making an eruv chatzeiros. The most common usage of the word eruv is in reference to this enclosure.

HOW DOES ONE ENCLOSE AN AREA?

The area must be completely enclosed by halachically acceptable “walls” and “doors.” Walls, buildings, fences, hills, and cliffs can all be used to enclose an area. However, when using structures and land features that already exist, invariably there will still be gaps between the structures that must be filled in to complete the enclosure.

The most common method to bridge the gaps is to make a “tzuras hapesach.” A tzuras hapesach vaguely resembles a doorway, consisting of two sideposts and a lintel that passes over them, which are the basic components of a doorway. According to halacha, a tzuras hapesach is considered a bona fide enclosure. Thus, if all gaps between the existing “walls” are “closed” with tzuros hapesach, the area is regarded as fully enclosed.

Some opinions allow small gaps to remain within the eruv’s perimeter without a tzuras hapesach. Many eruvin in North America rely upon this leniency, whereas in Eretz Yisrael the accepted practice is not to.

A COMMON PROBLEM

The halacha is that a planted field the size of 5000 square amos (approximately 14,000 square feet) within an enclosed area invalidates the ability to carry within the eruv. Similarly, an area of this size that is so overgrown that one would not walk through it will invalidate an eruv. This is a very common problem that is often overlooked. Although every responsible eruv has mashgichim to check the perimeters of the eruv, there is also a need to check periodically within the eruv to see that no large areas are being planted or have become this overgrown. I know of numerous instances where, unfortunately, this problem existed for a while before it was detected.

OTHER DETAILS OF TZURAS HAPESACH

There are myriad details of how to make a tzuras hapesach, far more than can be detailed here. For example, most authorities accept the use of a wire for the lintel of a tzuras hapesach, although many opinions require it to be extremely taut (see Mishnah Berurah 362:66 and Shaar Hatziyun). Most eruvin use telephone wires as the “lintel” of the tzuras hapesach, although there are poskim who prohibit them (see Shu’t Yeshuos Malko, Orach Chaim #20). When telephone wires are used, posts or boards are placed directly below existing telephone wires, with care taken that the wire passes directly over the post. The lintel must pass directly above the sideposts, although the posts are not required to be tall enough to reach the “lintel” (Eruvin 11b). For example, if the wire used as lintel is twenty feet high and the side posts are only four feet tall, this is perfectly legitimate as long as the wire passes directly above the sideposts and that nothing intervenes between them. To guarantee that the wire remains above the posts, it is a good idea to use fairly wide “posts” and to periodically check that the wire is still directly above the posts. From personal experience I can tell you that as the posts or the telephone polls settle it is not unusual that they shift so that the post is no longer under the wire. This is also something that eruv mashgichim must periodically check but, unfortunately, often do not.

The tzuras hapesach is invalid if something intervenes in the gap between the top post and the side post. Thus, it is invalid to rest a side post against the side of a house and attach the top post to its roof, if any overhang of the roof extends below the lintel and above the side post. Similarly, the eruv is invalid if a sign intervenes between the sidepost and the wire being used as lintel.

I mentioned above that there is a major difference in halacha between a reshus harabim and a karmelis. A tzuras hapesach can only be used to enclose an area that is a karmelis where the prohibition against carrying is only rabbinic. It cannot be used to permit carrying in a reshus harabim where it is forbidden to carry min haTorah (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 364:2).

This leads us into our next discussion.

CONTROVERSIAL ERUVIN

A strange phenomenon of hilchos eruvin is that although Chazal created the concept of eruv to facilitate peace among the Jewish people, probably no other mitzvah has been involved in so much controversy. Why is this?

The details of hilchos eruvin are extremely complicated and often subject to dispute. It is not unusual to find a situation where one rav forbids a certain eruv min HaTorah, while another rav rules that it is perfectly kosher. Although both decisions are based on the same Gemara and halacha, one posek condemns as chilul Shabbos what the other considers a mere chumrah or less.

This is not a new phenomenon. Let us share a halachic discussion that is over a thousand years old.

600,000 PEOPLE

There is a very old dispute whether a reshus harabim (min haTorah) only exists if the area is used by at least 600,000 people, just as the reshus harabim of Klal Yisrael in the desert was used by 600,000 people, the members of the Jewish nation. (Indeed, the question is raised that a reshus harabim should require several million people because the 600,000 count only men over twenty and did not include the women and children.)

Rashi (Eruvin 59a) writes that only an area with this number of people constitutes a reshus harabim that cannot be enclosed with a tzuras hapesach. This excludes all the towns and cities inhabited by Jews from the Middle Ages until fairly modern times. They did not have 600,000 people and could therefore be enclosed by a tzuras hapesach. However, many rishonim disagree with Rashi and rule that any street or marketplace sixteen amos wide is a reshus harabim and cannot be enclosed with a tzuras hapesach. This issue is made more confusing since the Shulchan Aruch in Orach Chayim 345:7 rules strictly, whereas in 303:18 he appears to rule leniently. Many major authorities follow the lenient interpretation (Magen Avraham; Taz in 345), and it was upon this basis that most Eastern European communities constructed eruvin. However, according to most authorities this lenience cannot be used as the basis to permit an eruv today since most large Jewish communities are in places with more than 600,000 people.

A FIGHT OVER AN ERUV

In the thirteenth century, Rav Yaakov ben Rav Moshe of Alinsiya wrote a letter to the Rosh explaining why he forbade a tzuras hapesach eruv in his town. In his response, the Rosh replied that Rav Yaakov’s concerns were groundless and that he should immediately construct an eruv. Subsequent correspondence reveals that Rav Yaakov did not change his mind and still refused to erect an eruv in his town. The Rosh severely rebuked him for this recalcitrance, insisting that if he (Rav Yaakov) persisted he would be placed in cherem. The Rosh also ruled that Rav Yaakov had the status of a zakein mamrei, a Torah scholar who rules against the decision of the Sanhedrin, which is a capital offense (Shu’t HaRosh 21:8)! All this demonstrates that heated disputes over eruvin are by no means a recent phenomenon.

OVER-RELYING ON AN ERUV

Although there are many obvious advantages to having a kosher eruv, we should always be aware that there are also drawbacks. One major drawback is that people become unprepared if the eruv goes down one week. Suddenly, they cannot take their reading glasses to shul and their plans of pushing the stroller so they can eat the Shabbos meals at someone else’s house are disrupted.

Another disadvantage is that people become so used to having a eruv that they no longer pay serious attention to the prohibition against carrying. Children raised in such communities, and even adults who always lived in cities with an eruv, sometimes hardly realize that there is any prohibition against carrying.

In Israel, where virtually every town has an eruv, the assumption that there is always an eruv can be a tremendous disadvantage as the following story illustrates:

A moderately-learned frum Israeli moved to an American city with no eruv. He was hired by a yeshiva as cook and was responsible for the everyday kashrus of the yeshiva’s kitchen. The first Shabbos on his job, the new cook went for an afternoon stroll with his family, baby carriage and all. This raised a whirlwind in the yeshiva — people were shocked that they had entrusted the yeshiva’s kashrus to someone who openly desecrated Shabbos! Only later was it clarified that the cook was unaware that a city might not have an eruv. Living his entire life in cities with an eruv, he had automatically assumed that every city with a Jewish community had such a fixture!

In conclusion, we see that disputes among poskim over eruvin are not recent phenomena. In practice, what should an individual do? The solution proposed by Chazal for any such shaylah is “Aseh lecha rav, vehistalek min hasafek,” “Choose someone to be your rav, and remove yourself from doubt.” The rav can guide you to decide whether it is appropriate for you to carry within a certain eruv, after weighing factors including what heterim were used in the eruv’s construction, care of eruv maintenance and family factors. The psak and advice of one’s rav can never be underestimated!

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This Torah Article is Dedicated

Leilui Nishmas
Devorah bas Yaakov ע”ה
Olga Simons
By Her Granddaughter

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