Category: Parsha Related

Gifts to the Poor

Question #1: Living in Chutz la’aretz

“I live in chutz la’aretz. Am I required to leave peah in my backyard vegetable patch?”

Question #2: Leaving in Today’s World

“Is there a requirement to leave leket, shich’cha and peah in your field today?”

Question #3: Cluster Alms

“Why is it important to know how a typical cluster of grapes looks?”

Introduction

While harvesting grain and other produce, the Torah presents six different mitzvah opportunities to provide for the poor: leket, shich’cha, peah, peret, oleilos, and maaser ani. These mitzvos, as well as many of the basic laws of the mitzvah of tzedakah, are discussed in the second mesechta of seder Zera’im, mesechta Peah, and in the commentaries thereon, including the Talmud Yerushalmi. As is the case with all the mitzvos hateluyos ba’aretz, the agricultural mitzvos of the Torah, there is no Talmud Bavli on Peah, although many of its topics are discussed, sometimes in great detail, in scattered places.

This article will provide a basic understanding of some of these six mitzvos and cover a few select details. In so doing, we will answer some of the questions asked above and leave the others for a future article.

Let us begin by quoting the pesukim that introduce these mitzvos. In parshas Kedoshim, the Torah mentions the mitzvos of peah, leket, peret and oleilos: When you reap the harvest of your land, do not complete harvesting the corner of your field, and the “leket” of your harvest you should not collect. From your vineyard, do not remove the “oleilos,” and the “peret” of your vineyard you should not collect. Leave them for the poor and the stranger (Vayikra 19:9-10).

I deliberately did not translate the words leket, oleilos and peret, since I will explain what these technical terms mean. Two of these mitzvos, peah and leket, are repeated in parshas Emor (Vayikra 23:22), in the midst of the Torah’s discussion about the festival cycle (parshas hamo’ados): When cutting the harvest of your land, do not complete the reaping of the corner of your field while you are harvesting, and the “leket” of your harvest you should not collect. Leave them for the poor and the stranger. In addition, the two mitzvos of peret and oleilos are again discussed at the end of parshas Ki Seitzei (Devorim 24:21), immediately following the Torah’s instructing the mitzvah of shich’cha. (We will quote the sources for the mitzvos of shich’cha and matanos aniyim later in this article.)

Several halachos are quite clear from these pesukim, even without any commentary. The mitzvah is to leave behind these four items: peah, leket, oleilos and peret and allow the impoverished to help themselves. This implies that the owner may not choose or favor one pauper over another in the distribution of these gifts, and that neither he, nor anyone else, is even permitted to assist one poor person over another. To quote the Mishnah: He who does not allow the poor to collect, or allows one of them to collect but not another, or helps one of them is stealing from the poor (Peah 5:6). This law applies equally to anyone, not only the field owner, who assists one poor person over another (see Peah 4:9).

Corner

At this point, we will explain the basics of the mitzvah of peah. The requirement of peah is to set aside a portion of your field that you do not harvest. There is no minimal requirement min haTorah regarding how large a section of the field must be designated as peah. In other words, the Torah’s mitzvah is fulfilled if someone sets aside only one stalk of grain. To quote the Mishnah: These items have no measured requirement: Peah, bikkurim, appearing in the Beis Hamikdosh on the festivals, performing kind deeds and studying Torah (Peah 1:1). This Mishnah is the basis for a halachic passage that we say every morning after we recite birkas haTorah, but what we say daily has other parts added to it from other statements of Chazal.

Why does the Mishnah mention only these five mitzvos? Are there no other mitzvos that have no “minimum amount” required in order to fulfill them?

Indeed, these are the only five mitzvos that fulfill the statement that they have no measured requirement, because min haTorah, these mitzvos have no minimum and also no maximum, whereas all other mitzvos have either a minimum or a maximum, min haTorah. The commentaries on this Mishnah raise questions about several other mitzvos that seemingly should be included in this list, making it more than five, and explain why each of these other mitzvos is not mentioned (Rash; Tosafos Yom Tov; Mishnah Rishonah).

Not all produce

Returning to the laws of peah, not everything that is grown must have peah separated from it. The Mishnah notes that only produce that has five specific characteristics is included in the mitzvah of peah. To quote the Mishnah: They (the earlier authorities) stated a rule regarding peah. Anything that (1) is food, (2) is guarded, (3) is nourished from the ground, (4) is reaped at one time, and (5) is brought in for long-term storage is obligated in peah. Grain and legumes are always assumed to be included (Peah 1:4).

In other words, the following categories of produce are exempt from peah:

(1) Products grown for feed or for dyestuffs (such as woad or indigo).

(2) Produce that is hefker, meaning that it is evident that the owner has no concern if other people take it.

(3) Cultivated mushrooms, truffles, and other fungi, because they do not draw their nourishment from the ground.

(4) Some varieties of produce do not ripen all at once. Instead, they are harvested in stages, as each fruit ripens. These types of products, such as figs, are exempt from the mitzvah of peah.

(5) Many varieties of vegetables and other produce cannot be stored unless they are frozen or canned. Any of these types of produce are exempt from peah. However, items that can be dried or stored as is, such as grain, beans, peas, carobs, nuts, grapes (can be stored either as wine or as raisins), olives (as oil) or dates (dried) are obligated in peah.

How much peah?

Earlier, we quoted the Mishnah that ruled that the Torah requirement of the mitzvah of peah has no minimum size. The Mishnah subsequently teaches that although the Torah did not require a minimum to fulfill this mitzvah, Chazal did, enacting a rule requiring the owner to set aside at least 1/60 of his field as peah. Furthermore, he is required to set aside a larger part than this for peah under some special circumstances, such as, he had a bumper crop, he is exceptionally wealthy, there are a lot of poor or the impoverished are exceptionally needy (Peah 1:2 according to various commentaries).

Corner

Must peah be in a corner of the field?

Notwithstanding that the Torah calls the mitzvah peah, and that, in the context of other mitzvos of the Torah, the word peah means a corner of some type, it is not required to set aside peah in a corner of the field, nor does it necessarily have to be set aside when the harvest is finished. In addition, at the beginning of the harvest, the owner may designate a part of his field as peah. To quote the Mishnah: You can give peah from the beginning of the field or from its middle (Peah 1:3).

Three times a day, the owner must appear at his field to allow the poor to collect what they are entitled (Peah 4:5). The three times of the day are in the morning, at midday and towards the late part of the afternoon. There appears to be a dispute among halachic authorities exactly what this Mishnah is ruling. According to some authorities, the poor may not enter the field unless the owner, or his representative, is there, but the owner is required to be there at these three times, or otherwise appoint a representative in his stead, who will be in the field these three times every harvest day (Rashas; Mishnah Rishonah).

The Rambam appears to understand the Mishnah and the halacha somewhat differently: The poor may not enter the field at any other time, but during these three times they are free to enter, whether or not the owner or his representative are there (Hilchos Matanos Aniyim 2:17). In his opinion, the Mishnah should be understood as follows: “Three times a day the pauper may appear at the field.”

Nobody get hurt!

The halacha is that the poor people reaping the peah may not use sickles or spades to gain access to the leftover produce. Since many poor people are in the field, and they are not coordinating their activities, using a heavy tool could cause someone to get hurt (Peah 4:4).

Exceptional distributions

As noted above, peah and the other matanos aniyim that we have so far discussed should be left for the poor to take for themselves. However, there are exceptions:

(1) Something that is dangerous for the poor to harvest themselves. The Mishnah (Peah 4:1) chooses two examples of fruit — dates and grapes growing on trellises — where it might be dangerous for the poor to harvest the peah themselves (Rosh, Rav and Rashas ad loc.). Dates grow only on the new growth of a date palm. Since the dates will be only on the top of the tree and a palm tree can grow quite tall, it could certainly endanger the poor people, should they have to harvest the dates themselves.

Similarly, grapes grow on vines which are basically runners, rather than strong trees. To maximize the quantity and quality of their crop, it is common that vinedressers (people who cultivate grapevines) construct wooden frames called trellises, looking something like a jungle gym, and train the grape vines, which are very easy to educate, to grow on these trellises. However, it is not safe to allow the poor people to come collecting the peret grapes by themselves from trellises. Numerous poor people may attempt simultaneously to collect the grapes left on a trellis, and a trellis may not be strong enough to hold their collective weight.

To avoid people endangering themselves, in these instances the harvester cuts down the peah fruit and distributes what is there evenly among the poor who have assembled (Peah 4:1).

(2) A second case where the owner should harvest and distribute the produce is when all of the poor people who have arrived at the field want it divided evenly (Peah 4:2).

Maaser ani

Maaser ani is mentioned in parshas Ki Savo, where the Torah states: When you complete the tithing of all the tithes of your produce in the third year, the year of the special tithe, then you shall make certain to give it to the Levi, the stranger, to the orphan and the widow, and they shall eat it within the gates of your cities and be satisfied (Devorim 26:12).

This posuk talks about creating at least two different tithes, and mentions that the third year has a special tithe that the earlier years do not have. In the third year, you must then give one maaser to the Levi, which we call maaser rishon, and a second maaser to the stranger, orphan or widow, which is clearly meant to be a maaser for the poor. This mitzvah of maaser ani is also mentioned in an indirect way, in parshas Re’eih (Devorim 14:28-29).

Thus, there is a fundamental difference between maaser ani and the other gifts to the poor in that, in general, the others are left for the poor people to help themselves. In other words, a poor person who is more agile and willing to work hard can collect a great deal more leket, shich’cha, peah, peret and oleilos then someone who has difficulty getting around. However, the posuk in parshas Ki Savo states that the owner gives the maaser ani to the poor. This implies that he can choose which poor person he wants to provide. In general, it is his to distribute to the poor, as he chooses.

Answering questions

At this point, we have enough background to the general laws of these mitzvos that we can return to of our opening questions.  The first question was: “I live in chutz la’aretz. Am I required to separate peah on my backyard vegetable patch?”

In other words, do any of these mitzvos of matanos la’aniyim apply outside Eretz Yisroel?

Matanos aniyim in chutz la’aretz

Although these mitzvos are halachically categorized as mitzvos hateluyos ba’aretz, agricultural mitzvos, and the general rule is that these mitzvos apply only in Eretz Yisroel (Mishnah Kiddushin 36b), the Gemara (Chullin 137b) mentions that the mitzvah of peah applies in chutz la’aretz as a rabbinic injunction, and the Rambam explains that this includes all matanos aniyim (Hilchos Matanos Aniyim 1:14). We find this applies to several other of the mitzvos hateluyos ba’aretz, including challah, chodosh, terumos and maasros (because of space constraints, the details and definition of these different mitzvos will be left for other articles).

However, this does not yet resolve our question; regarding rabbinic injunctions germane to mitzvos hateluyos ba’aretz that are extended to chutz la’aretz, we find two different sets of rules:

In the case of challah, the mitzvah is applied to anywhere in chutz la’aretz. This is why, no matter where you live, you are obligated to separate challah from a large enough dough.

On the other hand, in the case of terumos and maasros, the requirement to separate them in chutz la’aretz applies only in lands near Eretz Yisroel, such as Mitzrayim, Amon, and Moav – today corresponding to parts of Egypt, Jordan and the Sinai and Negev deserts. There is no requirement to separate terumos and maasros from produce grown in Europe, anywhere else in Africa, the vast majority of Asia, and certainly not from produce grown in the Americas or Australia. (Which rule applies to chodosh is a topic for a different time.)

The question at hand is whether the matanos aniyim have the same halacha that applies to terumos and maasros, and therefore they apply only in lands near Eretz Yisroel, or whether they are treated like challah and apply everywhere. Most authorities conclude that the obligation of matanos aniyim applies only in places near Eretz Yisroel.

At this point, let us focus on the other question that we posed: “Is there a requirement to leave leket, shich’cha and peah in your field, today?”

Answering this question correctly requires that we explain another principle. Above I mentioned the Mishnah that states that if all of the poor people in a certain place want the peah to be divided evenly among them, rather than being available for each to forage as best he can, indeed the peah is divided evenly among the local poor. We can ask a question: Granted that the local poor people all agree to divide the matanos aniyim equally, however, these gifts do not belong only to them. All poor people, no matter where they live, are entitled to these matanos. If so, how can the locals decide to divide among themselves the matanos aniyim without taking into consideration the rights of those elsewhere, who are also potential owners of the matanos aniyim?

The answer is that the poor people who are not here have clearly been me’ya’eish, implicitly given up their legal right to the matanos aniyim that are here (see Bava Metzia 21b). The poskim conclude that any situation in which the owner can assume that the poor will not come to collect the matanos aniyim that are left in the field, he is permitted to collect them (Derech Emunah, Hilchos Matanos Aniyim 1:62).

Conclusion

In the days of King Munbaz there was a drought, and he distributed the entire royal treasury, accumulated over several generations, to the poor. His family members protested, saying that his predecessors had all increased the wealth of the monarchy, and Munbaz was disbursing it. Munbaz responded, “My ancestors stored below, and I stored above. They stored their wealth in a place where it could be stolen, and I stored in a place from where it cannot be stolen. They stored items that do not produce profits and I stored items that do. They stored money, and I stored lives. They stored for others, and I stored for myself” (Bava Basra 11a).

Planting Kil’ayim

Question #1: Spelt

I understand that spelt is a type of wheat. May I plant a small patch of it next to my wheat field?

Question #2: Trees and Ornamentals

I purchased a property in Israel that has grapes and other trees and ornamentals growing on it. What do I do to avoid violating the prohibition of kil’ayim?

Question #3: Tomatoes

May I plant various types of tomatoes next to one another?

Foreword:

In parshas Ki Seitzei, the Torah teaches the mitzvah not to plant your vineyard with kil’ayim (Devarim 22:9), after which the Torah mentions two other kil’ayim prohibitions: doing work with different animal species together and wearing shatnez. In parshas Kedoshim, the Torah introduces several mitzvos called kil’ayim when it says, “You shall keep my laws. You shall not breed your animals as kil’ayim, you shall not plant your field as kil’ayim and you shall not wear kil’ayim shatnez garments” (Vayikra 19:19).

I have written many times about the prohibitions of wearing shatnez, grafting one tree min (species) onto another and crossbreeding animals, but I have never written an article devoted to this week’s topic — the kil’ayim prohibitions in a vineyard and in a field. Please note that this article is only a general introduction to these mitzvos and not halacha le’maaseh — the topics are far more complex than can be covered in one article. For this reason, the opening questions in this article are going to be left unanswered.

Kil’ei hakerem

Kil’ei hakerem is the prohibition of planting an herbaceous (meaning non-woody, i.e.  – a plant other than a trees or a shrub), cultivated plant in a vineyard or adjacent to a grapevine. This mitzvah applies min haTorah in Eretz Yisrael and as a rabbinic prohibition in chutz la’aretz (Orlah 3:9; Kiddushin 39a). It also includes planting above or below grapes, such as, if the vine is trained onto a trellis or other framework.

Kil’ei hakerem is the only instance in which the Torah prohibits using what grows in violation of the kil’ayim prohibition. Other kil’ayim mitzvos prohibit only the act, but what grows or develops as a result may be used. (The Yerushalmi, Kil’ayim 1:4, permits using even the cutting developed from a forbidden graft.)

There is a major dispute among tana’im and rishonim whether kil’ei hakerem applies even when planting one species other than grapes in a vineyard, or only when two species other than the grapes are planted in a vineyard. Rav Yoshiyah rules that the lo sa’aseh of kil’ei hakerem applies only when planting both wheat and barley (or any two other species that are kil’ayim with one another) in a vineyard. Since the Torah says, “You shall not plant kil’ayim in your vineyard,” Rav Yoshiyah understands this to mean that someone is planting two varieties that are kil’ayim with each other, in a vineyard, which compounds the prohibition.

Vineyard vs. vines

There are major halachic differences between a few grapevines and what is halachically called a vineyard. The most prominent difference is that it is prohibited to plant any type of grain or most vegetables within four amos (about seven feet) of a vineyard, whereas it is forbidden to plant only within six tefachim, which is less than two feet, of a grapevine that is not part of a vineyard.

What is a vineyard?

So, what is a vineyard?

The halacha is that a vineyard must have at least five grapevines growing, four of which are positioned in a rectangle or square. Exactly how the fifth vine is planted is unclear from the Mishnah (Kil’ayim 4:6), and is disputed by the halachic authorities. The Chazon Ish rules that a vineyard requires that the fifth vine continues in a straight line from two of the other vines. In other words, the minimum definition of a vineyard is two parallel grape plantings, one of at least three plantings and the other of at least two.

Others contend that the fifth vine can also be similar to the way one would envision, from a bird’s eye view, the location of the tail relative to the four legs of an animal standing in rapt attention. The four legs form a rectangle, and the tail is alongside the rectangle, but opposite the middle of a side rather than the continuation of one of its sides (Rambam, Peirush Mishnayos, Kil’ayim 4:6; Tosafos Yom Tov; cf., however, Rambam, Hilchos Kil’ayim 7:7).

If five vines have been planted this way, and alongside them many more vines were planted haphazardly, the disorganized vines might not be considered a vineyard, but individual vines. The practical difference is whether vegetables and grains may be planted nearby, as long as they are more than six tefachim from the vines, or whether the laws of a vineyard apply, which requires a much more substantive distance of four amos. In both instances, construction of a tzuras hapesach or other mechitzah will allow planting the vegetables or grains alongside the vines, as long as the mechitzah separates between the vines and the vegetables or grains.

One row of grapevines is not considered a vineyard, even if it contains hundreds of plantings (Kil’ayim 4:5). This means that one may plant vegetables or grains alongside the grapes, as long as there is a six tefachim distance between them.

Kil’ei hakerem in chutz la’aretz

The rules of kil-ei hakerem in Eretz Yisrael are stricter than they are in chutz la’aretz. In chutz la’aretz, there is a rule, kol hameikil ba’aretz, halacha kemoso bechutz la’aretz. For our purposes, this rule means that since the law of kil’ei hakerem in chutz la’aretz is only miderabbanan, Chazal ruled that whenever a recognized scholar ruled that a particular situation is not considered kil’ayim in Eretz Yisrael, even when the halachic conclusion rules against him, one may follow this minority position in chutz la’aretz. For example, since Rav Yoshiyah rules that kil’ei hakerem is prohibited only when planting two species (that are already prohibited together) in a vineyard, this is the only act of kil’ei hakerem prohibited in chutz la’aretz. However, in Eretz Yisrael, there is concern over planting even a single type of vegetable in a vineyard.

Kil’ei zera’im

Kil’ei hasadeh or kil’ei zera’im (two ways of referring to the same prohibition) is planting two non-woody (also called “herbaceous”) commonly cultivated plants or seeds near one another, planting one species very close to another, already-planted species, or planting the seeds of one species on top or inside a specimen of another species. This mitzvah applies only in Eretz Yisrael. In chutz la’aretz, it is permitted to plant two herbaceous plants next to one another, although some authorities prohibit planting the seed of one species on top of or inside another in chutz la’aretz (Rambam, Hilchos Kil’ayim 1:5; Tosafos Chullin 60a s.v. Hirkiv). Therefore, in Eretz Yisrael, someone planting a garden patch must be very careful to keep the different species separate.

Both prohibitions, kil’ei hakerem and kil’ei zera’im exist, even if the species are not intentionally planted together, but grew on their own (Kil’ayim 2:5). In this instance, if the two species are too close together, one either must pull out one, or, as we will see shortly, build a mechitzah between them.

Introductions

Several important introductions will facilitate understanding the laws of these mitzvos.

A. Firstly, many assume that kil’ayim prohibits hybridization or crossbreeding (two ways of saying the same thing) of unlike species, or, in simpler terms, attempting to mix genetic material and create new species. However, this approach is inaccurate, since only one of the many kil’ayim prohibitions, crossbreeding animals, attempts to create something that does not occur in nature. All the other mitzvos ban the appearance of mixing two species. This distinction is very important in understanding many of the laws of kil’ayim.

B. Secondly, for clarity’s sake, I will use the word “species” in this article to mean items that halacha prohibits “mixing.” The dictionary definition of the word “species” is “a pool of individuals that breed together and will not breed with other individuals.” However, neither halacha nor science uses this definition. Since this article is a halachic talk about kil’ayim, I will discuss only aspects of the halachic definition germane to these mitzvos.

What defines a halachic species? Although there is a great degree of uncertainty about this, certain principles can be derived from the various passages, particularly of the Talmud Yerushalmi Kil’ayim.

(1) Two varieties that naturally cross-pollinate are halachically considered one species (see Yerushalmi Kil’ayim 1:2).

(2) At times, similarity of leaves or appearance or taste of the fruit are sufficient evidence to consider two varieties as members of the same species (Yerushalmi Kil’ayim 1:5). Small differences are never considered significant (Bava Kama 55a). Thus, different varieties, one of which grows wild and the other of which is cultivated, are usually one species (Mishnah Kil’ayim 1:2). Frequently, the rules are difficult to define and, therefore, most authorities recommend not growing two similar varieties of squash or beans together.

C. It is also important to note that the definition of “species” for the laws of kil’ayim is not the same as it is for the laws of challah. Spelt and wheat are considered different minim for the laws of kil’ayim, notwithstanding that they are the same min for the laws of challah. (This means that dough made of spelt and wheat flour can combine to create enough dough to be obligated to separate challah, notwithstanding that wheat and spelt cannot be planted next to each other.)

Cultivated

D. As I mentioned above, kil’ei zera’im and kil’ei hakerem apply only to species that are cultivated or maintained in your location for food, forage, clothing, dye or other similar purposes. The Mishnah states that the laws of kil’ayim apply to a species called zunin,usually understood to be darnel, a ryegrass that, in earlier generations, was used as bird seed. Planting zunin in a field of barley, rye, oats or spelt violates the prohibition of kil’ei zera’im. (Why it is permitted to plant zunin in a wheat field [Mishnah Kil’ayim 1:1] is a topic that we will leave for a different time.)

Proximity

Planting two crop species together or near one another is prohibited as kil’ayim. How far apart the two species must be depends on several factors, including the layout of the planting and what and how much was planted. In some situations, when growing small amounts of certain vegetables, planting the two species in alternate patterns is sufficient to permit the planting, notwithstanding that the different species grow alongside one another (Kil’ayim 3:1; Shabbos 84b ff.).

Between two grain fields of different species — for example, one growing spelt and the other rye — there needs to be an empty area greater than ten amos squared, approximately twenty feet by twenty feet, between the two fields. On the other hand, between two kinds of vegetables, the requirement is that the separating area be only six tefachim squared, approximately two feet by two feet. And even the size of this requirement is only miderabbanan. Min haTorah there is a dispute among rishonim whether the distance is one tefach squared, or 1.5 tefachim squared (Raavad, Hilchos Kil’ayim). The Chazon Ish (5:1) ruled according to the Rambam, the lenient opinion, that requires only one tefach squared, approximately four inches by four inches.

Mechitzah

Although we usually think of mechitzah as a separation necessary in a shul, the word has significance in several other areas of halacha, and particularly in the laws of kil’ayim. For the purposes of kil’ayim, whenever one wants to plant two species and there is not enough space to allow this, a halachically acceptable separation between the plantings permits the planting (Kil’ayim 2:8; 4:6). The rules here are similar to what is called a mechitzah for other halachos, including permitting carrying on Shabbos, although, for the laws of Shabbos, the entire area must be enclosed by mechitzos on all sides. For the laws of kil’ayim, it suffices that there is a halachic divider separating the plantings from one another. Among the many ways that someone can separate the two areas is by building a wall that is ten tefachim tall (approximately 32-40 inches) or piling rocks to a height of ten tefachim. Another option is a furrow or crevice in the ground, either natural or dug, that is ten tefachim deep.

The Mishnah (Kil’ayim 4:4) notes that lavud, openings that are smaller than three tefachim (about ten inches), does not invalidate a mechitzah, and therefore a fence that is more open than closed, but is ten tefachim tall, is a valid mechitzah for kil’ayim purposes. Similarly, one may build a “wall” with sticks placed either horizontally or vertically every three tefachim, and it is a satisfactory mechitzah.

This means that someone may have a vineyard on one side of a fence, in which the grapes grow alongside the fence, and plant grain or vegetables on the other side of the fence; it is completely permitted, even though the two crops may be growing within inches of one another.

Gaps

Large gaps in the middle of a mechitzah may not invalidate it. The general halachic principle is that an area that is mostly enclosed is considered “walled,” even in its breached areas (Kil’ayim 4:4; Eruvin 5b). For example, a yard enclosed by hedges tall enough to qualify as halachic walls may be considered enclosed, notwithstanding that there are open areas between the hedges, since each side is predominantly enclosed either by the hedges or by the house. This is true as long as the breach is smaller than ten amos,about 17 feet (Kil’ayim 4:4). This means that someone may have a vineyard on one side of the hedges (inedible growths usually do not create prohibited kil’ayim), and grain or vegetables on the other side of the hedges, even though the two crops may be extremely close to one another.

Tzuras hapesach

The Gemara (Eruvin 11a) rules that a tzuras hapesach, which we customarily use to make to enclose an area to permit carrying on Shabbos, may be used to separate two species, so that there is no prohibition of kil’ayim. A tzuras hapesach consists of two vertical side posts and a horizontal “lintel” that, together, vaguely resemble a doorway. Thus, it is permitted to grow a vineyard on one side of the tzuras hapesach and grain or vegetables on the other side.

Weeding

What about weeds? Do weeds present a kil’ayim concern?

As anyone who gardens knows, the definition of a “weed” is whatever the gardener does not want in his garden. Halachically, if the “weed” is from a species that is not maintained in your area, it is not a kil’ayim concern.

Conclusion

Targum Onkelos (Vayikra 19:19 and Devarim 22:9) understands the word kil’ayim to mean “mixture.” However, other commentaries explain the origin of the word from the Hebrew root כלא, the same as the word beis ke’le “prison” (see Bamidbar 11:28). Rav Hirsch (Vayikra 19:19) explains that the root כלא means to hold something back, and that the plural form kil’ayim — similar to yadayim, hands, or raglayim, feet — means a pair. Therefore, the word kil’ayim means to pair together two items that should be kept apart.

Concerning this, Rav Hirsch (Vayikra 19:19) writes, “The Great Lawgiver of the world separates the countless numbers of His creations in all their manifold diversity, and assigns to each one of them a separate purpose and a separate form for its purpose.”

In addition, observing the laws of kil’ayim helps us remember how various species obeyed Hashem’s instructions to remain separate during their creation. This reminds the contemplative Jew that if the plants heeded Hashem’s word during the Creation, how much more are we obligated to obey His instructions!

Specific Species

Question #1: Wolf and Dog

Are wolves and dogs members of the same species?

Question #2: Bactrian and Dromedary

May I haul a wagon with two camels, a Bactrian and a dromedary?

Question #3: Tangelo

Is it permitted to crossbreed tangerine and grapefruit to create a tangelo?

Question #4: Crabapples

May I graft an apple branch onto a crabapple trunk?

Foreword:

At the beginning of parshas Noach, Rashi teaches us that, during the moral chaos that led to the Mabul, even members of the animal kingdom mated outside their species (min), something that no self-respecting and ethical animal would ever do.

At this point, we need to ask what is meant by min, which is usually translated as species. The dictionary definition of the word “species” is a pool of individuals that can breed together and do not breed with other individuals.

However, we will soon see that neither halacha nor science uses this definition. It is important that, when studying the Talmudic, aggadic and halachic topics germane to kil’ayim, we must understand properly the Torah’s meaning of the term “species.”

Crossbreeding

Many halachically knowledgeable people assume that the purpose of the laws of kil’ayim is to prohibit the hybridization or crossbreeding (two ways of saying the same thing) of unlike species, or, in simpler terms, not to attempt creating new biological species or to mix genetic material of different species. However, we will soon demonstrate that this assumption is specious, since it is inconsistent with halachic accuracy for two completely different reasons:

A. Most kil’ayim prohibitions have nothing to do with creating new species.

B. In numerous instances, the laws of kil’ayim permit mingling two varieties that are biologically different species, and there are situations in which the laws of kil’ayim prohibit mingling two varieties that are biologically considered members of the same species.

Types of kil’ayim

First, we will demonstrate that kil’ayim prohibitions rarely have anything to do with creating new species (point A). Mesechta Kil’ayim deals with six different mitzvos involving the intermingling of species:

1. Crossbreeding animal species. This prohibition is called harva’as beheimah, or sometimes simply harva’ah. In this instance, as in most of the cases of kil’ayim, there is no prohibition against using the product created by someone who violated the prohibition. Thus, it is permitted to use a mule, notwithstanding that mating a donkey with a mare to produce a mule violates a lo sa’aseh min haTorah.

2. Using two animal species to haul or work together. This mitzvah is usually called lo sacharosh, as in the words of the Torah: lo sacharosh beshor uvachamor yachdav,“Do not plow with an ox and a donkey together” (Devarim 22:10).

3. Grafting different tree species, harkavas ilan, which prohibits inserting a shoot or scion of one species into the wood stock, or lower trunk, of another species. Note that it is completely permitted to plant different species of trees next to each other (Yerushalmi, Peah 1:4).

4. Planting a non-woody edible plant, such as a vegetable or grain, in a vineyard. (A “non-woody” or “herbaceous” plant is a plant other than a tree or a shrub.) This prohibition is called kil’ei hakerem, and applies min haTorah only in Eretz Yisrael, although it does apply in chutz la’aretz as a rabbinic prohibition. This mitzvah is atypical in that it is the only prohibition of kil’ayim whose product is prohibited to use, min haTorah.

5. Planting two non-woody edible plants near one another. This mitzvah, called kil’ei hasadeh, kil’ayim of the field, applies only in Eretz Yisrael. In chutz la’aretz it is permitted to plant two herbaceous plants next to one another.

6. Wearing shatnez, clothing that includes both wool and linen. The prohibition is limited to wearing such clothing.

The two mitzvos of kil’ei hakerem and kil’ei hasadeh, apply min haTorah only in Eretz Yisrael, whereas the others apply min haTorah both in Eretz Yisrael and in chutz la’aretz.

I stated above that kil’ayim prohibitions usually have little or nothing to do with the creation of new species. Crossbreeding of plants involves pollinating the flower of one species with pollen from a different species. But none of the agricultural mitzvos listed above has anything to do with hybridization.

Let’s take a more careful look at the three agricultural prohibitions: 3, 4, and 5, above. In the cases of herbaceous, or non-woody, plants, kil’ayim is planting two crop species near one another (#5) or planting them inside a vineyard (#4). But planting the seeds of different species in close proximity does not change the DNA of the species or cause any hybridization, nor does it cause anything to grow of a variety different from either parent.

In the case of trees and shrubs, harkavas ilan (#3) means grafting one species onto another. When you graft a branch of one species onto the stock of another, the fruit that grows has the DNA of the scion branch and no DNA material of the species of the stock.

Also note that these three kil’ayim prohibitions are limited to species in which some part of the plant is edible.

Wool and linen

Wearing a garment that contains both wool and linen (#6) does not cause any hybridization. Wool grows on sheep, and linen is the product of a flax plant. Combining the two textiles in a garment does not affect their genetic material.

Lo sacharosh

Although some wish to explain that the prohibition of using two animal species to haul or otherwise be worked together is out of concern that someone will house them together or otherwise cause them to mate (Alshich, Devarim 23), there are many other ways to explain the “reason” for this prohibition (see, for example, Ibn Ezra, Devarim 22:10).

Harva’as Beheimah

The only one of the six kil’ayim prohibitions that involves hybridization is harva’as beheimah. But I presume that my readers agree that it is very strange to provide a reason for six different mitzvos that does not apply to five, or, possibly, not to four of them!

And, although we usually translate the word kil’ayim as “mixture,” some commentaries associate this word with the root כלא, as in the word “prison,” beis ke’le. Rav Hirsch explains the root word ke’le as holding something back, keeping someone incarcerated. The plural form kil’ayim is structurally similar to yadayim, raglayim or kesafayim,and means “a pair.” Thus, the word kil’ayim means pairing together items that should be kept apart (Hirsch Commentary to Vayikra 19:19), a definition that fits all six categories of kil’ayim, but has nothing to do with hybridization.

Dogs and wolves

My second point above (point B) is that there are numerous instances where the laws of kil’ayim permit mingling two kinds that are biologically considered different species, and there are also many instances in which the laws of kil’ayim prohibit mingling two kinds that are biologically considered the same species.

To explain, I will first pick examples in the animal world and then in the plant world. The Mishnah (Kil’ayim 1:6) states that wolves and dogs are kil’ayim together; it is forbidden to crossbreed them or to have them haul a load together. Yet, wolves and dogs breed together freely in the wild. Thus, we see that kil’ayim is not dependent on whether the varieties breed together.

From the Yerushalmi and the halachic authorities it appears that several factors are used to determine whether two varieties are considered different species, including how mankind views them, as the Torah teaches, “Hashem had created… all the animals of the field and the birds of the sky and He brought them to the man to see what he would call them… And the man gave names to all the domesticated animals and the birds of the sky and the animals of the field (Bereishis 2:19-20). This implies that man understood the purpose or uniqueness of each species and how it should be categorized, separately, from all other species.

Scientific dogs

The scientific system for classifying species, developed by Carl Linnaeus in the eighteenth century, names every species by two words: the first, its genus, which is capitalized, and the second, a lower case word for its species. Occasionally, a third word, also lower case, is added to indicate subspecies, which can also be called race, ethnic group, breed, variety or cultivar. (Humans are divided into races and ethnic groups, dogs into breeds, fruits and vegetables into varieties – or cultivars for boutique products.) Linnaeus categorized dogs as Canis familiaris and wolves as Canis lupus,meaning that he considered them two separate species. Today, most scientists categorize domesticated dogs as Canis lupus familiaris, which means that Canis lupus refers to a single species that includes both wolves and dogs, and familiaris is added for any domesticated dog breed.

An interesting comparison can be made with the dingo, a non-domesticated Australian dog. I checked Wikipedia regarding the dingo’s classification, and found the following: “The dingo, Canis familiaris, Canis familiaris dingo, Canis dingo, or Canis lupus dingo, is an ancient lineage of dog found in Australia. Its taxonomic classification is debated, as indicated by the variety of scientific names presently applied in different publications. It is variously considered a form of domestic dog not warranting recognition as a subspecies (Canis familiaris), a subspecies of either dog or wolf (Canis familiaris dingo or Canis lupus dingo), or a full species in its own right (Canis dingo).” I note that Wikipedia assumes that wolves and dogs are considered separate species.

The contemporary scientific world no longer defines a species by its ability to breed together and not to breed with a different species. As contemporary science has reinvented itself in the modern world, including its widespread misconceptions of spontaneous evolution of species and its unproved hypotheses regarding the origin of species, it can no longer use the definitions of breeds as its basis for defining species. This is because it accepts that species eventually mutate naturally into new species, which rejects or modifies the traditional definition of a species breeding within itself. As a result, science is forced to redefine “species” on the basis of similarity of DNA, but this piece of information has as yet not been communicated to the dictionary editors.

Camels

I have just demonstrated where, halachically, something can be considered two different species, notwithstanding that they breed together. I will now pick an example in which halacha considers two varieties to be the same species, notwithstanding that modern science categorizes them as separate species. The Gemara teaches that the one-humped Arabian camel, the dromedary, and the two-humped Bactrian camel (“Persian camel,” in Chazal’s lexicon) are, without question, one species. (By the way, “Bactria” was an area of ancient Persia; thus, Chazal’s method of distinguishing between the two varieties of camel is identical to modern nomenclature.) The Gemara states, rhetorically: “do you consider them different species, simply because one variety has a longer neck?” (Bava Kama 55a). Obviously, minor differences in physical characteristics are insufficient reason to treat two varieties as halachically different species.

Modern science counts three surviving species of camel, and, based on fossil remains, five extinct species. (How can one tell whether two extinct individuals could breed together or not?) The three existent species are Camelus dromedarius, the one-humped Arabian camel; Camelus bactrianus, the two-humped, domesticated variety; and Camelus ferus, the only remaining variety of wild camel, which lives today in desert areas of northwestern China and southwestern Mongolia. Formally, scientists will tell you that Camelus ferus is considered a separate species on the basis of genetic studies. Informally, they may admit that it is categorized as a separate species in order to facilitate research grants. Research money is more readily available to study “species” that are critically endangered than critically endangered “subspecies.”

Spelt wheat

Thus far, I have demonstrated that, in the animal world, halacha’s category “min,” and modern science’s nomenclature “species” do not necessarily coincide. Now, I will show that this is equally true in the plant world. Modern science does not consider wheat to be a species, but to be a genus, a group of related species, Triticum. Linnaeus categorized wheat into five different species, including spring wheat, winter wheat, Einkorn, and spelt as separate species. However, halacha recognizes spelt as one species and the other varieties as different forms of the species, wheat (Kil’ayim 1:1, see Rash and Rambam). Thus, it is permitted to plant different wheats together, or alongside one another, even in Eretz Yisrael, whereas one may not plant wheat and spelt together or alongside one another, without following the rules established for kil’ayim of two different species.

Citrus

Science treats the various citrus fruits as species of the same genus. Thus, esrogim are Citrus medica; grapefruits, Citrus paradise; lemons, Citrus limonia;and tangerines are a varietyof Citrus nobilis called Citrus nobilis deliciosa. Yet, based on his extensive analysis of halachic sources, the Chazon Ish (Kil’ayim 3:7) considers lemons, esrogim, grapefruits and oranges to be the same species as regards the laws of kil’ayim, which would permit grafting a grapefruit tree onto a lemon stock. (However, in a different place, the Chazon Ish is hesitant about this decision and rules against relying on it [Hilchos Kil’ei Ilan 178:9]. His concern in the latter place is the difference in appearance of the various fruits. He also rules that chushchash, a variety of wild orange, and the oranges that we eat and juice are the same min for halachic purposes [Hilchos Kil’ei Ilan 178:11].) The Chazon Ish notes that his discussion is germane only to the prohibition regarding harkavas ilan, meaning that it is permitted to graft an esrog branch onto the stock of a different citrus for the objective of consuming the produce. However, an esrog grown this way will not be kosher to use as one of the four minim on Sukkos. (See Shu’t Rema #117; #126:2; Shu’t Maharam Alshich #110; Levush, Orach Chayim 649:4; Taz and Magen Avraham, Orach Chayim 649; Shu’t Bach #135 et al., all of whom agree that an esrog grafted onto a different species is not kosher for Sukkos use. The Shu’t Panim Me’iros, Volume II #173, and the Saba Kadisha,are among the small minority of authorities who permitted using an esrog grafted onto non-esrog stock for the four minim on Sukkos.) In other words, according to most authorities, an esrog grafted on lemon stock is not kosher for the mitzvah on Sukkos, notwithstanding that the grafter may not have violated any prohibition.

Tangelo

We can now discuss the third of our opening questions: “May I create a tangelo by crossbreeding a tangerine and a grapefruit?” Although the Chazon Ish did not discuss tangerines, it would seem that, according to his comments in Kil’ayim 3:7, this would be permitted, and that, according to his comments to Yoreh Deah, it would not.

Crabapples

At this point, we should examine the last of our opening questions: May I graft an apple branch onto a crabapple trunk?

The regular eating-apple is usually called Malus pumila. There are numerous varieties of crabapples, most of which are also included in the genus Malus and are called names such as Malus coronaria, Malus angustifolia and Malus ioensis. Many of these crabapples freely hybridize in the wild with apple cultivars. Thus, we see again that the dictionary definition of a species is no longer accepted by the scientific community.

What is the halacha of grafting apples onto crabapple stocks?

The Mishnah states that apples are kil’ayim with chazrad, some type of wild apple or other fruit bearing some resemblance to, or characteristics, of an apple. Some rishonim believe that chazrad is a variety of wild apple that produced a fruit that was used as feed, but was not considered suitable for human consumption, even after pickling or stewing. However, we do not really have any idea what species or variety chazrad is.

In early nineteenth-century eastern and central Europe, we suddenly find several major halachic authorities debating whether some variety of crabapple or wild apple could be used as the stock on which to graft edible apple trees. The crabapple fruits were usually not considered edible.

The Torah scholar who addressed this question to the author of Shu’t Mishkenos Yaakov considered grafting apples onto crabapple stocks a problem, quoting the Levushei Serad (Chiddushei Dinim #106, also quoted by Piskei Teshuvah, Yoreh Deah 295:2) that this graft is prohibited as harkavas ilan. The Mishkenos Yaakov (Shu’t Mishkenos Yaakov, Yoreh Deah #69) discusses some of the varieties of crabapple that were commonly used for grafting apples, and permits grafting an apple scion onto the stock of any of the crabapples available in his area. This conclusion is accepted by several other authorities (Beis Efrayim, quoted by the Mishkenos Yaakov; Shu’t Tzemach Tzedek, Yoreh Deah #221; Aruch Hashulchan, Yoreh Deah 295:15). Thus, again, the difference in scientific species identification has nothing to do with the halachicdefinition.

Conclusion

In all six types of kil’ayim mentioned above, the general criterion is to avoid the appearance of different species being intermingled. Concerning this, Rav Hirsch (Vayikra 19:19) writes, “The Great Lawgiver of the world separates the countless numbers of His creations in all their manifold diversity, and assigns to each one of them a separate purpose and a separate form for its purpose.”

In addition, the laws of kil’ayim help us bear in mind how various species obeyed Hashem’s instructions to remain separate during their creation. This reminds the contemplative Jew that if the plants heeded Hashem’s word during the Creation, how much more we are obligated to obey all His instructions.

Toiveling Keilim

Question #1:

“Last time I went to immersesome cutlery, a lady immersing some aluminum bowls asked me to include her with my beracha. When I asked her whether she wanted me to help her recite her own beracha on the mitzvah, she responded softly that she received a psak not to recite a beracha when toiveling aluminum, although she did not know the reason. Why would she not recite the beracha?”

Question #2:

“I have a gift business in which I sell candy dishes with candies, fruits, and nuts already in the glass dishes. Must I toivel these dishes before I fill them?”

Introduction:

In Parshas Matos, the Torah teaches: Only the gold and the silver; the copper, the iron, the tin and the lead: any item that was used in fire needs to be placed in fire to become pure [meaning “kosher”], yet it must also be purified in mikveh water. And that which was not used in fire must pass through water” (Bamidbar 31:22-23). These verses serve as the basis for teaching three different sets of laws:

  1. Absorbing Concepts

How to kasher vessels that were used to cook non-kosher foods. An item that was used directly in fire, such as a spit or grate that broiled non-kosher, is kashered only by burning it directly in fire; an item used to cook on top of a fire, such as a pot that cooked non-kosher, may be kashered via a process similar to the way it was used, etc.

  1. Tainted Metal

Which items are susceptible to tumah. The Torah here teaches that implements made of metal become tamei (spiritually impure) through contact with a tamei item (such as an animal carcass), and that immersing them in a mikveh restores them to tahor status. An item is susceptible to tumah only when the Torah informs us of this fact – if the Torah never taught that an item can become tamei,it does not, and therefore most items in the world are not susceptible to tumah. (Unfortunately, these laws have limited practical application until Moshiach comes and we again have the parah adumah. At that time, we will be able to live according to the tahor status necessary to observe the mitzvos related to the Beis Hamikdash, terumah and maaser sheini.)

  1. Immersed in Holiness

The mitzvah to immerse implements in a mikveh or spring prior to using them for food. The Gemara (Avodah Zarah 75b) notes that this immersion is required even if the vessel has never been used. In other words, this mitzvah is unrelated to the requirement of kashering equipment that was used to prepare non-kosher food and to the laws related to purifying implements that became tamei.

Materials that require tevilah

The Torah teaches that utensils owned by a non-Jew that are made of gold, silver, copper, iron, tin or lead require immersion in a kosher mikveh or spring when they are transferred to Jewish ownership. According to most authorities, this mitzvah is a Torah requirement, although there is a minority opinion that this mitzvah is required only miderabbanan (Rambam, as understood by Pri Chadash). We will assume that the requirement to immerse gold, silver, copper, iron, tin and lead implements is Torah-ordained. (Bear in mind that, although we would not use lead as an ingredient because of valid concerns about lead poisoning, this medical problem was not discovered until the nineteenth century. Therefore, we find much earlier halachic literature discussing immersion of lead or lead-lined utensils.)

There is no requirement to immerse food utensils made of wood, earthenware, ivory, bone, leather, stone or most other materials. We will soon discuss glass and plastic.

Mechiras Chometz and Tevilas Keilim

As we all know, before Pesach one is required to rid one’s house and all one’s possessions of chometz. However, some items, such as toasters, mixers, wooden kneading bowls, and flour bins are difficult, if not impossible, to clean. Shulchan Aruch and Rema (Orach Chayim 442:11) recommend giving wooden kneading bowls and flour bins and the chometz they contain as a gift to a non-Jew before Pesach, with the understanding that the gentile will return them after the holiday. Today, the standard mechiras chometz that we perform includes selling this chometz and these appliances in the sale. However, what do I do if I have metal appliances that may be full of chometz, such as mixers and toasters? If I sell these appliances to a gentile and then purchase the appliance back from him, will I now need to immerse the appliance in a mikveh?

The halachic authorities note that someone selling his or her chometz to a gentile before Pesach should be careful not to sell utensils that require tevilas keilim. Instead, one should rent the appliances to a gentile and sell the chometz they contain (Chachmas Odom; Noda Beyudah, cited in Pischei Teshuvah, Yoreh Deah 120:13). An item rented to a gentile does not require immersion when it is returned to the Jewish owner.

Cleavers versus Graters!

The Gemara (Avodah Zarah 75b) quotes Rav Sheishes as suggesting that anything purchased from a gentile, even a clothing shears, should require immersion. Rav Nachman responded that the mitzvah of tevilas keilim applies only to kelei seudah — literally, implements used for a meal, which includes both utensils used to prepare food, such as pots and knives, and those utilized to eat or drink, such as drinking cups and tableware (Avodah Zarah 75b).

Grates and Grills

One is required to immerse only those items that usually touch the food directly. Therefore, stove grates, blechs, hotplates, knife sharpeners, trivets, can openers and corkscrews do not require tevilah (see Yoreh Deah 120:4), but grills, peelers, funnels, strainers, salt shakers, pepper mills and tongs do require tevilah, since they all touch food.

What about storage vessels?

Is one required to immerse a metal container or glass jar used to store foodstuffs, but that is not suitable for preparing or consuming food?

Rabbi Akiva Eiger (on Yoreh Deah 120:1, quoting Keneses Hagedolah [Beis Yosef 18]) discusses whether storage vessels require tevilah, and concludes that it is unclear whether they should be immersed. Therefore one should immerse them without reciting a beracha, because in case there is no mitzvah to immerse them, reciting a beracha al tevilas keilim before immersing them is reciting a beracha levatalah, a beracha in vain. A better solution is to immerse them at the same time that one immerses an item that definitely requires a beracha.

Kelei Sechorah — “Merchandise”

The halachic authorities note that a storekeeper does not toivel vessels he is planning to sell, since for him they are not kelei seudah, but items he intends to sell. Later authorities therefore coined a term “kelei sechorah,” utensils used as merchandise, ruling that these items do not require immersion until they are purchased by the person intending to use them (based on Taz, Yoreh Deah 120:10). Furthermore, several halachic authorities contend that the storekeeper cannot immerse the vessels prior to sale, since there is as yet no requirement to immerse them (Shu’t Minchas Yitzchak 8:70). This is based on a statement of the Rema that implies that a tevilah performed before one is obligated to immerse a vessel, such as while it is still owned by the gentile, does not fulfill the mitzvah and must be repeated after it becomes the property of a Jew (Rema Yoreh Deah 120:9).

Based on this discussion, we can now address one of our above-mentioned questions:

“I have a gift business in which I sell candy dishes with candies, fruits, and nuts already in the glass dishes. Must I toivel these dishes before I fill them?”

This question is a modification of a situation in which I was involved. I once received a glass candy dish from someone, with a note from the business stating that the dish has already been toiveled. I called the proprietor of the business to inform him that, in my opinion, not only is he not required to toivel the dish, but I suspect that it does not help. My reasoning is that, although the proprietor fills his dishes with nuts and candies, from his perspective this is still merchandise that he is selling. The dish therefore qualifies as kelei sechorah which one need not immerse, and, therefore, immersing them does not fulfill the mitzvah. As a result, not only is the proprietor not obligated to immerse the dishes, but doing so fulfills no mitzvah, and it is a beracha levatalah for him to recite a beracha on this immersion. Including a note that the dish was toiveled is detrimental, since the recipient will assume that he has no requirement to toivel this dish, whereas, in fact, the end-user is required to immerse it. For these reasons, I felt it incumbent on myself to bring this to the attention of the owner of the business.

The proprietor was very appreciative. He told me that, in truth, it was a big hassle for him to toivel the dishes, but he had been assuming that halacha required him to do so before he could fill the dishes.

Some Immersing Details

When immersing the utensil, one should not hold it very tightly in one’s hand, since this will cause the part of the utensil he is holding to not be immersed properly. Instead, one should either hold the utensil somewhat loosely, or alternatively, one should dip one’s hand into the mikveh water before holding the utensil that will be immersed (Rema, Yoreh Deah 120:2; see Taz and Shach).

Prior to immersing a utensil, one must remove all rust and dirt from the utensil. If one immersed the utensil and it had rust or dirt that most people would not want on the appliance, one must clean it, and then re-immerse it (Yoreh Deah 120:13).

When one is immersing an item that definitely requires tevilah, immediately prior to dipping it, one should recite the beracha, Asher kideshanu bemitzvosav vetzivanu al tevilas keili. If one immerses more than one vessel he should conclude instead al tevilas keilim (Yoreh Deah 120:3). Although some authorities mention alternative texts to the beracha, I have quoted the commonly used text, which follows the majority opinion.

If it is uncertain whether the item requires tevilah, one should not recite a beracha. It is preferable, if possible, to immerse it at the same time that one immerses a different utensil that definitely requires tevilah, so that both items are included in the beracha.

May a child toivel keilim?

If a child tells you that he immersed a vessel in a kosher mikveh, may you rely that this indeed happened?

The halacha is that if an adult supervised the child immerse the vessel correctly, one may use the utensil, but one may not rely on the child attesting that he or she immersed the utensil properly (Yoreh Deah 120:14; see also Gr”a ad locum and Pri Megadim, Orach Chayim, Mishbetzos Zahav 451:6). Apparently, this is not a well-known halacha, since one often finds children being used as agents to immerse utensils for their parents.

People eating from glass dishes…

The Gemara teaches that food utensils made of glass must be immersed prior to use, since glassware is similar to metalware in that when it becomes broken it can be melted and repaired, what we usually call recyclable.One recites a beracha prior to immersing glassware, just as one recites a beracha prior to immersing metalware.

Of course, this leads us to a question about plasticware, since many forms of plastic are recyclable in ways very similar to metal and glass. Does repairable plasticware require tevilah just as glassware does? Most people assume that plasticware is not included in the mitzvah of tevilas keilim, but why?

This takes us to an earlier discussion between 19th-century poskim concerning a type of boneware, which, when broken or cracked, could be repaired by melting and melding it. (I personally have no experience with this material, but I imagine that one could probably melt and repair bone, just as one can repair horn by melting and melding. There is much halachic discussion about the repair of a damaged shofar by melting and melding the crack.) Rav Avraham Shaag, the rebbe of Rav Yosef Chayim Sonnenfeld (later the Rav of the old Yishuv of Yerushalayim and Eretz Yisrael), concluded that just as one is required to immerse glassware because it is repairable, one is required to immerse boneware (Shu’t Ohel Avraham #24, quoted by Darkei Teshuvah). This position was disputed by Rav David Zvi Hoffman, the preeminent posek of Germany in his day, who contended that since the immersion of glassware is required only miderabbanan, one need immerse only those items that Chazal specifically required, but a newly developed material, albeit similar to glassware, would not require immersion (Shu’t Melamed Leho’il, Yoreh Deah #49).

The late authorities debate whether plastic items require immersion prior to use. Indeed, some authorities (Shu’t Minchas Yitzchak 3:76) require the immersion of reusable plastic plates and the like, because they follow the logic of Rav Avraham Shaag — although without a beracha, since perhaps Rav Dovid Hoffman is halachically correct. Nevertheless, most authorities conclude that one is not required to immerse plasticware (Shu’t Yabia Omer 4: Yoreh Deah: 8; Tevilas Keilim page 226).

Other Metals

When teaching that metal implements become tamei and that one must immerse food utensils before use, the Torah specifies the six metals that were available in ancient times: gold, silver, copper, iron, tin and lead. (Bronze and brass are both alloys whose main component is copper; in bronze, the most significant minority element is tin, and in brass it is zinc.) However, over the last two hundred years, mankind developed the means to extract and process several other metals, including platinum, chromium, aluminum, and titanium. Do these “new” metals have the same halachic status as the six mentioned in the Torah? Are platinum rings, aluminum urns and titanium airplanes susceptible to tumah?  Do chrome pots and aluminum trays require tevilas keilim?

The Tiferes Yisrael, in his extensive introduction to the Order of Taharos, rules that the newly discovered metals have the same halachic status as the six mentioned explicitly by the Torah, and they are all capable of becoming tamei (Yevakeish Daas #44). It follows from his line of reasoning that one is required min haTorah to immerse food vessels made of the new types of metal, and indeed this is how many authorities rule (Tevilas Keilim page 225). Many authorities contend that, although one is required to immerse aluminum pots, one is not required to immerse aluminum items that are disposable. Since they are meant to be disposed after use, they are not considered “keilim” that require immersion.

On the other hand, other poskim dispute the Tiferes Yisrael’s conclusion that all types of metal become tamei, contending that since the Torah mentions six specific metals (and the Torah could certainly have used a generic term for all metal items that would have been much briefer), choosing a lengthy way of listing six types of metal demonstrates that these are the only types of metal that become tamei, and that any newly developed metals are not susceptible to tumah (Shu’t Igros Moshe, Yoreh Deah 2:164; letter from Rav Yaakov Kamenetsky published at end of the sefer Tevilas Keilim).

According to the latter approach, one can argue that chrome pots and aluminum implements do not require tevilas keilim. The prevalent accepted practice is to assume that they do require tevilas keilim, although some authorities consider this a sufficient enough doubt to omit the beracha prior to immersing these items.

Conclusion

According to Rav Hirsch, metal vessels, which require mankind’s mining, extracting and processing, represent man’s mastery over the earth and its materials. Whereas vessels made of earthenware or wood only involve man shaping the world’s materials to fit his needs, the manufacture of metal demonstrates man’s creative abilities to utilize natural mineral resources to fashion matter into a usable form. Consuming food, on the other hand, serves man’s most basic physical nature. Use of metal food vessels, then, represents the intellectual aspect of man serving his physical self, which, in a sense, is the opposite of why we were created, which is to use our physical self to assist our intellect to do Hashem’s will. Specifically in this instance, the Torah requires that the items hereby produced be immersed in a mikveh before we use them, in order to endow them with increased kedusha before they are put to food use. This demonstrates that although one may use one’s intellect for physical purposes, when doing so one must first sanctify the item, to focus on the spiritual.

Kerias HaTorah

Since Parshas Pinchas includes all the maftir readings of the holidays, and also the reading of Rosh Chodesh…

Question #1: Twice on Shabbos!

“Why do we read the Torah twice every Shabbos?”

Question #2: Missed a posuk

“What is the halacha if we began an aliyah a posuk later than the previous aliyah had ended?”

Question #3: Skipped a posuk

“After davening on Shabbos morning, we realized that the baal keriah skipped a posuk during the last aliyah. What do we do now?”

Question #4: Torah or rabbinic?

“Can there be a takanas chachamim that originates in the Torah itself? Isn’t this a contradiction?”

Introduction: The Four R’s

The mitzvah of reading the Torah that we perform regularly during davening in shul incorporates at least four different takanos, two of which were established while the Jews were in the Desert, a third which was created in the days of Ezra, when the Jews returned to Eretz Yisroel to establish the second Beis Hamikdash, and the fourth, which may have the halachic status of “custom” and which has an uncertain history. Answering our opening questions adequately will require that we examine the basic structure of these takanos; we will then be in a position to understand better the issues involved. But first, an overview of the four takanos:

  1. Regular reading – The requirement to read the Torah three times a week.
  1. Festive reading – Reading on the festivals something that relates to the holiday.
  1. Mincha reading – The requirement to read the Torah at mincha every Shabbos.
  1. Complete reading – The practice of completing the Torah every year.

Reminder reading

According to Rav Moshe Feinstein, there is another type of kerias haTorah, whose purpose is to make announcements – such as the four parshiyos and maftir on Shabbos Rosh Chodesh (Shu”t Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 1:101:2). Since almost all these applications concern the maftir reading and not the primary Torah reading, I will not discuss them in this article.

1. Regular reading

One of the earliest takanos made by Chazal was the requirement to read the Torah three times a week. The Gemara (Bava Kama 82a) teaches this in an unusual passage that combines both halacha and midrash. In explaining the posuk in parshasBeshalach, And they (the Jewish nation) traveled three days without finding water (Shemos 15:22), the Gemara expounds:

The dorshei reshumos, those who “interpret hidden passages” (Toras Chayim), explain that water can mean only ”Torah,” as we find in Scripture, Behold, whoever is thirsty go to the water (Yeshayahu 55:1). Once the Bnei Yisroel had traveled three days without studying Torah, they immediately weakened in their commitment to Hashem. The prophets among them established that they read the Torah on Shabbos, on Monday, and again on Thursday, so that they should not  go three days without studying Torah.

Every Monday and Thursday

Yiddish has a popular expression – yeden Montag und Donnerstag,every Monday and Thursday – which means something that occurs fairly frequently. This expression may originate from the takanah that the Torah is read on these weekdays. But there are other ways that could guarantee that the Jews not go three days without studying Torah. Chazal could have established reading the Torah on Tuesday and Thursday, or on Monday and Wednesday; or, they could have left it up to each community to decide what to do. Why establish that the reading be specifically on Mondays and Thursdays?

Based on a Midrash, Tosafos (Bava Kama 82 s.v. Kedei) explains that Moshe ascended Har Sinai to receive the second luchos on a Thursday and descended with them on a Monday. Since these luchos created a tremendous closeness between Hashem and the Jewish people, these days are called yemei ratzon (literally, days of favor). Therefore, the leaders of that generation felt it most appropriate to establish the mitzvos of reading the Torah on these days. For the same reason, these days are often observed as fasts.

Min HaTorah or not?

Because there is Bibical origin for this mitzvah, one authority, the Bach (Orach Chayim, Chapter 685), considers the requirement to read the Torah three times a week to be min haTorah. However, the consensus of halachic authorities is that this requirement has the status of an early, and perhaps the earliest of, takanos chachomim, obligations established by the Sages.

2. Festive reading

Thus far, we have explained the origin of reading the Torah three times a week. The reading that takes place on a Yom Tov, each of which is about the festival on which it is read, has a different reason. The Mishnah (Megillah 31a) cites a Torah source for this requirement, that we should read on the Yom Tov about its mitzvos and its theme.

The following Mishnah (ibid. 21a) embellishes some of the details of these two mitzvos, the takanah to read the Torah on Monday and Thurday, and the special festival reading on holidays:

“On Mondays, Thursdays and Mincha on Shabbos, three people read the Torah. You may not have either less or more people read… The first person to read and the last one both recite berochos. On Rosh Chodesh and Chol Hamoed, four people read the Torah. You may not have either less or more people read… The first and the last person to read both recite berochos.”

Rashi explains that on Monday and Thursday we limit the reading to three aliyos to avoid inconveniencing people, since it is a workday.

The Gemara (Megillah 21b) explains the Mishnah’s statement that the first person to read and the last one both recite berochos to mean that the first person reading the Torah on any given day recites the berocha before the reading (Asher bochar banu…) and the last person recites the berocha after the reading (Asher nosan lonu…. Rashi, in his commentary to the Mishnah, explains this to mean that only the first person and the last person were required to recite berochos, but that the others who read the Torah may recite the berochos, if they want.

Later, Chazal instituted that each person who reads from the Torah recites a berocha, both before and after his own aliyah. This was instituted out of concern that individuals who left shul before the completion of the Torah reading will think that there is no berocha after the reading; similarly, if only the first person recites a berocha before reading, those people who arrive after the reading of the Torah has begun will think that there is no berocha prior to the reading.

It is interesting to note Chazal’s concern for people whose behavior is not optimal. It is forbidden to leave in the middle of kerias haTorah, and we certainly hope that people come to shul on time. Yet, Chazal made new takanos so that these people not err.

Returning to the Mishnah (Megillah 21a), it then explains: “This is the rule: any day on which there is musaf, yet it is not Yom Tov, four people read. On Yom Tov, five (people read the Torah), on Yom Kippur, six, and on Shabbos, seven. You may not have less people read, but you may have more”. We see that the more sanctity the day has, the more people read from the Torah. Musaf demonstrates that the day has some kedusha, and therefore, on Rosh Chodesh and Chol Hamoed, four people read. Yom Tov, which has greater sanctity than Rosh Chodesh or Chol Hamoed, requires that five people read. Since Yom Kippur has greater sanctity than other yomim tovim, it requires that six people read the Torah, and Shabbos, with even greater sanctity, requires that seven people read the Torah. That is why when Yom Kippur falls on Shabbos, we call up seven people for the Yom Kippur reading in parshas Acharei Mos, whereas when it falls on a weekday, we call up only six, not including maftir.

According to Rashi, the statement that you may have more people read applies not only on Shabbos but on Yom Tov and Yom Kippur as well. This means that you may call up to the Torah more than five aliyos on Yom Tov and more than six on Yom Kippur. According to other rishonim (mentioned by the Ran), only on Shabbos may we add extra aliyos. In general, we follow the latter opinion and do not add extra aliyos on Yom Tov, with the exception of Simchas Torah, when most Ashkenazic communities follow Rashi’s opinion and add many aliyos (Rema, Orach Chayim 282:1).

In actuality, there is a dispute among tana’im whether Shabbos has greater sanctity than Yom Kippur, or vice versa. According to the tana who contends that Yom Kippur has greater sanctity, six people read the Torah on Shabbos and seven on Yom Kippur (Megillah 23a). The Turei Even explains that this tana considers Yom Kippur to be holier because of the extra prayer that we daven, tefillas neilah.

The Gemara mentions a dispute whether the maftir aliyah is considered one of the aliyos counted in the Mishnah or not, but this is a topic that we will leave for a future article.

Although the Mishnah does not mention how this is applied on fast days, Chanukah and Purim, since there is no musaf on any of these days, we conclude that only three people read.

Rosh Chodesh reading

The discussion of the festivals in parshas Emor does not make overt mention of Rosh Chodesh. Is there indeed a Torah requirement to read the Torah on Rosh Chodesh? This matter is disputed among acharonim, the Penei Moshe ruling that it includes Rosh Chodesh, and Rav Moshe Feinstein ruling that it does not (Shu”t Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 1:101:2; 2:8).

3. Mincha reading

The Mishnah (Megillah 21a) I quoted above also mentions that we read from the Torah at mincha on Shabbos. The Gemara (Bava Kama 82a) notes that this mitzvah is of later origin than the requirement to read the Torah on Monday, Thursday and Shabbos mornings. Reading the Torah at mincha on Shabbos was instituted by Ezra, at the beginning of the second Beis Hamikdash period. Its purpose was to accommodate the spiritual needs of those individuals whose business enterprises precluded them from making it to shul for kerias haTorah on Monday and Thursday (as explained by Shitah Mekubetzes). This reading provides these individuals with another opportunity to study Torah. A different approach is that this was instituted for people who spend their Shabbos afternoon in wasteful activity, and to provide them with an opportunity to be influenced by Torah to use their “free time” more wisely (Me’iri, Kiryas Sefer, 5:1). According to either interpretation, we see another situation in which Chazal created an obligation for everyone, because of concern for some individuals.

How much, how many?

The Gemara explains (Bava Kama 82a) that, although the original takanah when the Jews were in the Desert required reading the Torah three times a week, on Monday, Thursday and Shabbos, there was no requirement as to how much should be read. When Ezra instituted the additional reading at mincha on Shabbos, he also established several rules germane to that reading and to the reading on Monday and Thursday. He instituted that at least three people must be called to the Torah and that each reading must include at least ten pesukim. The Gemara explains that three people are called up to represent the Kohanim, Levi’im and Yisroelim, presumably to show that all three sub-groups within Klal Yisroel need to be involved in the fulfillment of this takanah.

With time, the custom developed that, on Shabbos mincha, Monday and Thursday, we read from the beginning of the next parsha (Me’iri, Kiryas Sefer, 5:1). Usually, we read what will be the kohein’s aliyah on the next Shabbos morning, but there are weeks when this is not followed precisely, either because the kohein’s aliyah is too short to accomodate three aliyos, or because his aliyah is longer than we want to read on Monday and Thursday.

4. Complete reading

The reading on Shabbos morning that was originally established when the Jews were in the Desert eventually included a custom that the entire Torah would be read in a cyclical pattern. Exactly when this was established is unclear; but it is very clear that, initially, there were at least two customs how often the entire Torah was completed in the weekly Shabbos readings. One custom completed the entire Torah as we do, every year, whereas the other approach completed it only every three years (Megillah 29b; Rambam, Hilchos Tefillah 13:1). At some point in Jewish history, it became common practice to complete the reading of the Torah every year, and to finish this reading on Simchas Torah (Megillah 31a; Rambam, Hilchos Tefillah 13:1). At that time, the division of the Torah into our current weekly parshios occurred, and the system of “double parshios” developed to accommodate the completion of the Torah whether it is a leap year or not.

After the practice to complete the entire Torah annually became universally accepted, the following became an issue: What is the halacha if you mistakenly skipped a posuk while reading the Torah — or the baal keriah misread something in a way that invalidates the reading — but it was not realized until later. Must you reread the Torah portion for the week?

Missed a posuk

At this point, we can return to one of our opening questions: “What is the halacha if we began an aliyah a posuk later than the previous aliyah had ended?

Based on Mesechta Sofrim (11:6) and Hagahos Maimoniyos, the Shulchan Aruch rules as follows:

On Monday, Thursday, Shabbos mincha or Yom Tov, the rule is as follows: Provided each person called to the Torah had an aliyah of at least three pesukim, and the reading of the Torah was at least ten pesukim, there is no need to repeat the reading. However, if this happened on Shabbos morning, even if we already returned the sefer Torah and davened musaf, we must take out the sefer Torah again and read the missed posuk and two more pesukim next to it, to make it into a proper aliyah (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 137:3).

Thus, to answer this question, “What is the halacha if we began an aliyah a posuk later than the previous aliyah had ended,” we need the following information:

1. During which keriah did this happen?

2. Did the two aliyos, the ones before and after the skipped posuk, still have three pesukim?

3. Were at least ten pesukim read for the entire kerias haTorah?

Assuming that the answers to questions 2 and 3 were both Yes, and this happened to any keriah other than Shabbos morning, there is no need to do anything. If either of these rules was not observed, meaning that one of the people received an aliyah of less than three pesukim, or the entire reading was less than ten pesukim, then the sefer Torah should be taken out, one person should be called to the Torah, and he should read at least three pesukim (if rule 2 was broken) or four pesukim (if rule 3 was broken).

If this happened during a Shabbos morning keriah, and, as a result, one posuk from the week’s parsha was not read, then they should take out the sefer Torah and read the skipped posuk, together with two other pesukim next to it. There is no need to reread the entire aliyah.

Skipped a posuk

At this point, let us address a different one of our opening questions:

“After davening on Shabbos morning, we realized that the baal keriah skipped a posuk during the last aliyah. What do we do now?”

The brief answer to this question is that it is the subject of a dispute between early acharonim. The Keneses Hagedolah, by Rav Chayim Benveniste of Turkey, one of the most prominent poskim of the 17th century, rules that we do not take out a new sefer Torah to read the end of the parsha in this instance. He is disputed by the Maharif, Rav Yaakov Feraji Mahmah, who was the rov, av beis din and rosh yeshiva of Alexandria, Egypt, in the early eighteenth century. The Maharif’s contention is that once it is established practice where we stop reading the Torah each Shabbos, which the Levush (Orach Chayim 137:5) calls a takanas chachamim, we are required to complete that reading on Shabbos, even if we need to take out a sefer Torah a second time to fulfill it. The Keneses Hagedolah apparently holds that we are required to call up seven aliyos, but once the baal keriah completed the seventh aliyah and the sefer Torah was returned, we can fulfill the takanah of completing the entire Torah by beginning the next week’s parsha early; thereby making up for the missing pesukim.

Conclusion

In the introduction to Sefer HaChinuch, the author writes that the main mitzvah upon which all the other mitzvos rest is that of Talmud Torah. Through Torah learning, a person will know how to fulfill all of the other mitzvos. That is why Chazal instituted a public reading of a portion of the Torah every Shabbos twice and on Mondays and Thursdays. Knowing that the proper observance of all the mitzvos is contingent on Torah learning, our attention to kerias haTorah will be heightened. According the Torah reading the great respect it is due should increase our sensitivity to the observance of all the mitzvos.

Medicines on Shabbos

Question #1: Vitamin E oil

“May I rub Vitamin E oil on Shabbos into my skin to alleviate some discomfort?”

Question #2: Mixed before Shabbos

“May I mix a medicine into food before Shabbos and then take it on Shabbos?”

Introduction

In parshas Chukas, the Torah teaches that when the Bnei Yisroel complained against Hashem and Moshe for taking them through the desert without adequate provisions and for providing them with mann, a plague of poisonous snakes was unleashed among them and killed many Jews. When the Jews did teshuvah and asked Moshe to daven on their behalf, Hashem commanded him to make a snake out of copper and place it on top of a pole. Subsequently, anyone bitten by a poisonous snake would look at the copper snake and live.

The Mishnah (Rosh Hashanah 29a) comments: Does the copper snake determine life and death? No, it does not. When people looked in its direction, they were reminded of Hashem, prayed to Him and survived the bite.

Later in history, an image of a snake wrapped around the upper end of a pole became the international symbol of an apothecary or other medical facility. Obviously, this is the perfect week to discuss the halachos of using medicines on Shabbos, particularly since the work of the pharmacist is the basis for this halachic discussion.

Don’t take your medicine!

The Mishnah and Gemara allude to a prohibition that Chazal instituted not to take medicines on Shabbos. For example, the Mishnah (Shabbos 111a) records the following:

Someone whose teeth are causing him pain may not sip vinegar as a remedy, but is permitted to dip his food into vinegar in his usual method of eating; there is no concern if this accomplishes his purpose of using the vinegar as an analgesic.

From this Mishnah, we see that Chazal prohibited doing anything that is clearly performed to alleviate pain or discomfort. This prohibition is called “refuah” by the poskim.

The Gemara concludes that it is prohibited to sip vinegar only if he spits it out, but it is permitted to sip vinegar and swallow it, since people sometimes do this to arouse a greater appetite.

From a different passage of Gemara (Beitzah 22a), we see that this prohibition also exists on Yom Tov. This article will attempt to clarify the rabbinic prohibition of refuah on Shabbos. Explaining this topic adequately requires two introductory lists:

Hierarchy of prohibitions

To begin with, we need to understand that there are different levels of prohibition that are set aside for the needs of a person who is ill. First, I will list these, and then afterward, we will see what rules apply to permit these activities – in other words, how ill must a person be to permit them.

A. De’oraisa – A Jew performing an action that is usually prohibited on Shabbos min haTorah.

B. Derabbanan – A Jew performing a rabbinic prohibition.

C. Derabbanan with a shinuy – A Jew performing a rabbinic prohibition in an unusual way.

D. Amirah lenachri – Asking a non-Jew to do something that a Jew is not permitted to do.

E. Refuah – An action that is prohibited solely because it serves a medical purpose.

Hierarchy of conditions

According to most poskim, levels of “illness” or “wellness” are classified under five categories (cf. Eglei Tal, Meleches Tochein 17, 18 and notes who disagrees). I am listing these beginning from the category that is most severe medically, where the halacha is most lenient:

  1. Choli she’yeish bo sakanah

Any medical condition or situation that might be a threat to life, even if remote, is called a choli she’yeish bo sakanah. In this situation, we perform whatever is necessary to make the patient safe and properly treated. In other words, none of the categories of activities above is prohibited, and it is meritorious and required to perform whatever is necessary as quickly as possible to save the patient (pikuach nefesh).

What type of condition qualifies as choli she’yeish bo sakanah?

In general, an internal injury is assumed to be pikuach nefesh until determined otherwise (Avodah Zarah 28a, see Tur, Orach Chayim 328). Excess or unusual internal pain is similarly assumed to be pikuach nefesh until determined otherwise. The extensive details germane to these situations will not be dealt with in this article.

2. Sakanas eiver

This is a situation in which there is no threat to a person’s life, but he runs the risk of losing the use of part of his body irreversibly, if it is left untreated. Contemporary authorities rule that this category includes a patient in which the result may be a limp or permanent weakness in a limb (Chut Hashani, Volume 4, 89:27), and even if this result is only a possibility (Minchas Shelomoh, Volume 2:34:36).

The Shulchan Aruch quotes several opinions regarding what the halacha is germane to this situation. He concludes that although violating Torah law is permitted only when there is risk, albeit remote, to someone’s life, violating any rabbinic prohibitions is permitted in a situation of sakanas eiver (Orach Chayim 328:17). This includes asking a non-Jew to do anything for his needs (Ran, Shabbos 39b s.v. Umeiha). It goes without saying that the prohibition not to take medicines does not apply to this category. In other words, to treat this patient, all categories of prohibitions listed above, except for level A, are permitted.

To the best of my knowledge, the approach preferred by the Shulchan Aruch is accepted by all the subsequent authorities (Rema, Magen Avraham, Taz, Gra, Nishmas Adam 69:1, et al.).

3. Choleh kol gufo she’ein bo sakanah

This refers to a condition in which someone is ill in a way that affects his entire body, such as he is ill enough to go to bed (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 328:17). It also includes situations in which the discomfort is intense enough that he feels that his entire body is affected (Rema ad locum), he is running a fever that is higher than his usual body temperature (Shemiras Shabbos Kehilchasah 33:1) or if, without medical intervention, he will end up with a condition similar to one of those mentioned above (Shemiras Shabbos Kehilchasah 33:1). In addition, a child, an elderly person or someone whose general condition is weak may be in this category.

In this situation of choleh kol gufo, we find differing opinions among the rishonim regarding how lenient the halacha is. All authorities agree that a choleh kol gufo may ask a non-Jew to do something for him (level D), and it is prohibited for a Jew to perform on Shabbos or Yom Tov a melacha min haTorah for this patient (level A).

The Rosh was uncertain whether you can perform an issur derabbanan other than asking a non-Jew, and Rashi may have been stringent regarding this issue (levels B and C, see Eglai Tal, Meleches Tochein #36 and #38). On the other hand, the Rambam rules that any issur derabbanan is permitted. The Ramban splits the difference, permitting a Jew to do a melacha only with a shinuy, in other words, permitting level C and forbidding level B.

The Shulchan Aruch concludes, according to the Ramban, that an activity that is ordinarily prohibited because of a rabbinic injunction may be performed by a Jew in an indirect way (i.e., with a shinuy). Furthermore, a non-Jew can be asked to do anything for his needs (Ramban and Rashba, Shabbos 129a). In addition, the prohibition of performing a refuah activity does not exist for this person when no other melacha activity is involved. In other words, to treat this patient, all categories listed above, except for levels A and B, are permitted.

4. Meichush

The word meichush means an ache, and carries with it the inference that it is a relatively minor discomfort. The term also includes someone who is mildly ill, but does not pass the threshold of the previous category of choleh kol gufo. One of the terms used to describe this category is that the person is walking around like a healthy person – he does not appear to be ill, but he is suffering from some minor ailment. If it is clearly noticeable that he is in pain or that he is experiencing discomfort, he is not in the category of meichush, but in the previous category of choleh kol gufo.

A meichush does not permit performing any melacha activity, even one that is prohibited only because of a rabbinic decree. Furthermore, he may not attempt to alleviate the discomfort by use of any treatment being performed for that purpose. This is referred to as the prohibition against refuah, established by Chazal. In other words, to treat this patient, all categories listed above are prohibited.

5. Bari

This refers to someone who is perfectly healthy, but would like to do something that is usually considered a medicinal-type act to maintain or bolster his health. All authorities agree that a person may not perform a melacha activity for this purpose, whether the activity is forbidden min haTorah or miderabbanan. There is a dispute between the Shulchan Aruch and the Magen Avraham whether the special prohibition of refuah, i.e., preparing or taking medicinal aids or doing healing acts, applies to someone who is not sick. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 328:37) rules that it does not; the prohibition to perform refuah applies only to someone who qualifies as being a bit ill. The Magen Avraham concludes that the prohibition of refuah applies, also, to someone who is completely well, but wants to do something that would usually be considered a medicinal type of activity.

In other words, a person who is healthy may certainly not do anything in categories A-D to enhance or bolster his health. Whether the prohibition of refuah, category E, applies is a dispute between the Shulchan Aruch, who is lenient, and the Magen Avraham, who rules strictly. As there does not appear to be a consensus among halachic authorities which approach to follow, I recommend that our readers consult with their rav or posek for halachic guidance.

Why are medicines prohibited on Shabbos?

The rest of this article will focus on explaining what I called above “Category E”: the rabbinic prohibition to do anything on Shabbos that is usually performed for medical reasons.

First we want to understand: Why did Chazal establish this prohibition?

The Gemara (Shabbos 53b) implies that the reason for the prohibition of refuah on Shabbos is because preparing medicines often involves crushing raw herbs, thus violating the melacha of grinding. This reason is mentioned by the primary early rishonim in several places (Rashi, Brachos 36b, Shabbos 108b, Beitzah 11b, Avodah Zarah 28a; Tosafos, Shabbos 64b, 93a, Eiruvin 102b; Rambam, Hilchos Shabbos 21:2; Rashba, Shabbos 129a; Rosh, Avodah Zarah 2:10). Other authorities provide an additional reason for the prohibition: at times, the application of a medicinal preparation involves a different melacha activity, that of memarei’ach, smearing and smoothing the salve onto the skin (Chayei Adam 69:1).

The discussion about this prohibition is scattered across many different places in the Gemara, and the conclusions are explained in Shulchan Aruch in Orach Chayim, Chapters 327 and 328.

At this point, we will return to the Mishnah I quoted above (Shabbos 111a): Someone whose teeth are causing him pain may not sip vinegar as a remedy, but he is permitted to dip his food into vinegar in his usual method of eating; there is no concern if this accomplishes his purpose of using the vinegar as an analgesic. Someone experiencing pain in the sides of his body may not smear wine or vinegar as a remedy, but he may apply oil as long as it is not rose oil.

Based on our previous discussion, we now know that this Mishnah is discussing someone who is uncomfortable because of a toothache or minor irritation on his side, but who does not qualify as a choleh kol gufo — in other words, what we called before someone suffering from a meichush (category 4). We also see another very important principle: An activity that would commonly be done for a non-medical reason may be done notwithstanding that the person intends to alleviate thereby pain or discomfort — a medical reason.

Rashi explains that people smear oil on their bodies for other than medical reasons, but not wine, vinegar or rose oil. Wine and vinegar were smeared only for medical reasons, and rose oil was not smeared for non-medical reasons, because it was too expensive to use for this purpose. Therefore, smearing wine, vinegar or rose oil is clearly for a medical reason, and is included under the rabbinic prohibition of refuah, but smearing other oils is not.

Incidentally, we see from this Mishnah that there is no prohibition of memarei’ach when rubbing oil into your skin on Shabbos. This is explained by halachic authorities to be permitted because oil is too thin to smooth out surfaces. Since this is not our topic for today’s article, we will not spend more time on it.

Individual circumstances

Whether something is done usually for medical purposes or not might be subjective. In certain societies, there are things that are considered a normal activity, whereas in others, the same activity would not be done except as a medical treatment. How do we determine what is a “normal activity?”

The answer to this question is found in the continuation of the Mishnah, which states: Princes may smear rose oil on their injuries, because they smear it on regular days, even without a medical purpose. Rabbi Shimon rules that all Jews are treated like princes, and that therefore they may all smear rose oil as a medical treatment.

Both the first tanna and Rabbi Shimon agree that an activity that is sometimes performed for non-medical reasons may be done to alleviate a discomfort. Therefore, princes, who might apply rose oil not as a medical treatment, may use it to alleviate discomfort, whereas, according the first tanna, common folk ,may not. Rabbi Shimon permits someone to do something that a different person would be doing for non-medical reasons, whereas the first tanna requires that he, himself, would do this activity on other occasions when not uncomfortable.

Notwithstanding Rabbi Shimon’s position, the majority of early authorities and the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim) conclude according to the first tanna’s opinion: someone can do something to alleviate discomfort only if he, himself, might do the same for a non-medical purpose.

Vitamin E oil

Thus, we can now answer our opening question: “May I rub Vitamin E oil on Shabbos into my skin to alleviate some discomfort?”

The answer is that it will depend: If people do rub Vitamin E oil when there is no medical discomfort, this would be permitted. I believe that this is not standard practice, and therefore it would seem to me that this is prohibited on Shabbos, unless the person is a choleh kol gufo.

Local circumstances

We see from this part of the Mishnah that when an act is performed commonly for non-medical reasons, someone may do it on Shabbos to alleviate discomfort or for a different medical reason. The Gemara expands this by noting that Rav permitted people in his town to smear rose oil on Shabbos, because where he lived it was plentiful, inexpensive and was used commonly without medical need. We see that local circumstances can determine what is permitted typical use.

Does this concept apply only lekula or even lechumrah? Is an activity that is common for non-medical reasons, be performed in a geographic location where it is done only to alleviate discomfort? The answer is that this concept is true also lechumrah: the Rema (Orach Chayim 327:1) prohibits rubbing oil on the body on Shabbos if locally this is done only for medical reasons.

From this discussion, we see that a Shabbos prohibition existed even to use a medicinal process or aid whose preparation did not involve the melacha of grinding. We also see that an item that might be used by a healthy person is not included in the prohibition, and that determining whether a substance may be used or not can be dependent on local circumstances.

May I mix?

At this point, let us address the second of our opening questions: “May I mix a medicine into food before Shabbos and then take it on Shabbos?”

Based on an extensive analysis of one of the sugyos, Rav Moshe Feinstein permits mixing a medicine into food before Shabbos and eating the food on Shabbos, since people see him eating regular food. Rav Moshe demonstrates that the mixing of the food must be before Shabbos, not on Shabbos itself (Shu”t Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 2:86).

Conclusion

The Gemara teaches that the rabbinic laws are dearer to Hashem than the Torah laws. In this context, we can explain the vast halachic literature devoted to understanding this particular prohibition, created by Chazal to protect the Jewish people from major sins.

Red, White and Green

In Parshas Naso, the Torah requires the banishing of a metzora from the camp. Chazal understand this to mean that he is not permitted to be within any city that was walled from the time of Yehoshua (Keilim 1:7).

Question #1: Red

“I was told that some nega’im are red or pink. What color are they really, since pink is about the color of our usual Caucasian skin?”

Question #2: White

“I saw someone who had a discoloration on his arm that was white as snow. Is it possible that he could be a metzora, even though we do not yet have the Beis Hamikdash?”

Question #3: Green or Blue?

“Does the word yarok mean green, yellow or blue?”

Introduction:

Contrary to many Biblical translations, tzaraas is not leprosy. The symptoms described by the Torah do not fit Hansen’s disease, which is another term for the condition more commonly called leprosy (see Rav Hirsch’s Commentary, Vayikra 13:59). Tzaraas is a miraculous occurrence that strikes members of the Jewish people as a punishment, but more so, as a Divine admonition to improve our behavior. The root of the word nega means to be “touched” – in this instance, to be touched by Hashem and reminded of the need to improve and do teshuvah. It occurred when the Jewish people in Eretz Yisroel were on a high spiritual level. That it does not occur today is because we are not on the spiritual level to receive these kinds of direct messages from Hashem (Sefer Hachinuch, Mitzvah 169), just as we no longer experience prophecy or obvious miracles for the same reason. (However, see Tiferes Yisrael, Mar’ei Kohein introduction to Nega’im, #39). This may very well be the reason why only someone Jewish is susceptible to tzaraas, and cloth or houses are susceptible to tzaraas only when owned by someone Jewish.

All instances of tzaraas require that a kohein declare them tamei, and to become tahor afterwards also requires the declaration of a kohein. In other words, the symptoms do not make the person, cloth or house tamei — it is the declaration of the kohein that does.

Tzaraas blemishes must be a minimum size to be tamei, but I will not be focusing on these requirements, nor on others, such as that the entire blemish must be visible, the details of what lighting is used to view a nega, and how and when these nega’im are metamei everything in the same room as they are.

We should also note that there is no difference between a man and a woman regarding the laws of tzaraas: both can become tamei any time after they are born. For simplicity’s sake, I will refer to the person with nega symptoms in the masculine.

Difference between musgar and muchlat

To begin with, we need an overview of the basic rules of tzaraas. All types of tzaraas, whether they affect people, cloth or houses, are divided into two general categories: metzora musgar, literally a “closed” metzora, and metzora muchlat, literally, “decided” or “definite” metzora. In the case of a person, a metzora musgar can be tamei for up to two weeks (actually thirteen days, because the seventh day of the first week is also the first day of the second week), after which, if no new symptoms develop, the person immerses himself in a mikveh or spring and becomes completely tahor at the next nightfall. (All immersions germane to tzaraas may be either in a mikveh, which usually consists of rainwater, or in a spring. Throughout the article, I will refer to a mikveh, but in each of these instances, it could also be a spring.) However, someone with nega symptoms that are ruled tahor must remain vigilant that his nega not grow any larger in the future or develop any other tamei symptoms. Should this happen, he will become tamei as a metzora muchlat, which means that he could remain tamei forever, if his tamei symptoms do not go away.

It is a lo saaseh of the Torah for someone to remove the symptoms of a nega, even when he has already been ruled tahor (Tosefta, Nega’im 3:1; Rambam, Hilchos Tumas Tzaraas 10:1). The Torah forbids this in parshas Ki Seitzei, where it says Hishameir benega hatzaraas, “Be careful concerning a tzaraas affliction” (Devorim 24:8).

This lo saaseh is a bit unusual since it is not worded in the more common way of a lo saaseh with the words lo or al but, rather, with the word hishameir. The Gemara teaches that a lo saaseh can also be worded either with the word hishameir or the word pen, which means “lest” (Shabbos 132b; Eiruvin 96a; Makkos 13b).

In all instances of tzaraas, the tumah generated by a metzora musgar is the same as that of a metzora muchlat. Therefore, one could  describe  a musgar as someone who is temporarily tamei, and a muchlat as someone who remains tamei until the symptoms that made him tamei disappear. The procedure for becoming tahor after being muchlat are those described in the beginning of parshas Metzora and are far more expensive, more complicated and take longer to perform than for someone becoming tahor after being musgar.

Tzaraas on a person

At this point, we need to explain the basic categories of tzaraas. There are three types of tzaraas that can affect a person:

(1) Tzaraas on healthy skin

(2) Tzaraas on injured skin

(3) Tzaraas on the scalp or beard

In the case of tzaraas on healthy skin, a nega appears, meaning that someone finds on his skin a blemish that is of a color that is very white, at least as bright as the membrane of an egg. The Mishnah (Nega’im 1:1) explains that there are four shades of white that can make someone tamei as a metzora. In order of increasing intensity, they are:

–          White as the membrane of an egg

–          White as a whitewashed wall

–          White as the cleaned, bleached wool of a newborn lamb (Shavuos 6b)

–          White as fresh clean snow

By the way, there is an unusual shade of white, called bohak by the Torah, that is not a symptom of tumah. Simply explained, although it is a bright white, a blemish this shade is completely tahor, since it is duller than the color of the membrane of an egg, and certainly than the other nega’im colors (Vayikra 13:39).

Pinks

In a few places, the Torah refers to nega’im that are reddish in color (13:19, 24, 43). The halacha is that all nega’im on people that are temei’im if they are white are also te’mei’im if they are reddish or pinkish, and that there are four shades of red, or more accurately, pink, that are tamei, just as there are four shades of white, as I mentioned above. However, the commentaries dispute exactly which four shades are temei’im, with a wide difference of opinion among them, ranging from a very light pink, to shades that are much redder (Ravad to Sifra 13:19; Kesef Mishneh, Hilchos Tumas Tzaraas 1:4; Eliyahu Rabbah and Tiferes Yisroel, Nega’im 1:2; Aruch Hashulchan He’asid 80:6-7) .

To the kohein

Contrary to popular opinion, there is no requirement that there be a Beis Hamikdash for someone to become tamei with tzaraas. In point of fact, should a kohein be knowledgeable about the laws of tzaraas and declare someone with a proper nega shade to be tamei, the person would become tamei (She’eilas Yavetz #136). However, this last scenario would be highly unlikely, since ruling someone tamei for tzaraas requires that an individual have extensive training in all the details of the laws of tzaraas, including personal experience in identifying the differences among the four white shades mentioned above (Rambam, Hilchos Tumas Tzaraas 1:3).

Musgar

Any of the types of tzaraas, whether on a person, garment, or house, must be shown to a kohein, who rules on the status of the nega (Nega’im 3:1). If he rules that the color is tahor, the person is tahor, and no further steps are necessary. If the kohein rules that the nega is musgar, then in the case of a person, he is fully tamei for seven days, counting the day that the kohein ruled on it as the first day. Anything he touches becomes tamei, and, in addition, if he enters a room or building during this week, everything in the room capable of becoming tamei will become tamei. It will require being immersed in a mikveh and will become tahor the nightfall following.

On the seventh day, the metzora must go to the same kohein for him to rule on the nega again (Tosefta, Nega’im 1:12; Rambam, Hilchos Tumas Tzaraas 9:4; 11:6). If the kohein rules that the nega is muchlat, the metzora must go outside of the city (if it is a walled city) and live by himself until the symptoms that created the ruling that it is muchlat disappear.

A person can be tamei musgar for a total of two weeks, which is actually thirteen days, as I explained above. On the thirteenth day, the metzora shows the nega to the kohein. If no symptoms have appeared to make the nega tamei, the person becomes tahor, notwithstanding that he still has the nega symptoms (see below). He immerses in a mikveh and becomes completely tahor the nightfall after his immersion.

Muchlat

What makes a metzora muchlat?

There are three symptoms that can make a metzora muchlat:

(1) His tzaraas spreads.

(2) Two dark or other non-white hairs that are within the nega turn white.

(3) There is a healthy-looking area of skin with a certain minimal size inside of the white nega.

Obviously, the first time the kohein sees the nega, he can rule muchlat only because of either the second or third symptom; ruling a nega muchlat because it spread can be only for a person who has been seen previously by the kohein.

Injuries, scalps and beards

I mentioned above that there are two other types of nega’im that can affect a person, tzaraas on injured skin and tzaraas on the scalp or beard. Each of these categories has two subcategories.

Injured skin

The Torah mentions two types of nega’im on injured skin, one in which the injury was the result of a blow and the other in which it was the result of a burn or other heat. There is no difference in halacha between these two types of nega’im. Whether someone finds a nega on an injury received through a burn or on an injury received as a result of a blow, both have almost the same rules as regular nega’im on healthy skin, with two exceptions, both of them leniencies.

(1) A nega musgar on injured skin is tamei for only one week. If, on the seventh day, the nega has not changed, the kohein rules the nega to be tahor. The metzora then immerses himself in a mikveh and becomes tahor at the next nightfall.

(2) The second lenience is that healthy skin inside the nega is not a muchlat sign. In other words, a nega on injured skin that has healthy skin inside will either be musgar or tahor, depending on the size and shape of the nega.

Scalp and beard

There are three types of nega’im that can affect the scalp or beard areas. In two of these situations — karachas, baldness on the back of the head, and gabachas, baldness on the front and top of the head — the halacha is that once someone’s hair falls out to the extent that part of the scalp is completely bald, it is treated the same as other areas of the body germane to nega’im. In other words, when someone becomes bald, that area that once had hair and now does not has the same halacha for nega’im purposes as other parts of the body. There is one exception, again a leniency. In this instance, white hairs inside the nega are not symptoms of tumah.

The other type of nega on the scalp or beard areas is called nesek, which is described at length both in the Torah and the Mishnah. Unfortunately, nowhere in Tanach or Chazal is it clarified how this is halachically different from bald areas. As a result, the rishonim dispute exactly what is the difference (see Rambam, Hilchos Tumas Tzaraas 5:8-11, 8:1; Rash, Nega’im 10:10; Ramban, Vayikra 13:30). Since the halachic conclusion is unclear, I will not discuss this issue.

Nega’im on clothing and houses

In addition to tzaraas on a person, there can be tzaraas on cloth, thread, or leather, and also on houses. In this instance, the indication of tzaraas is not a white discoloration, but adamdom, which is deep red, or yerakrak (Vayikra 13:49; 14:37). The color yarok in Tanach and Chazal can mean blue, green, gold or yellow (Tosafos, Chullin 47b s.v. Ela; Sukkah 31b s.v. Hayarok; Niddah 19b s.v. Hayarok). In a Tosefta (Nega’im 1:3), we find a dispute between tana’im what color is yerakrak that renders a garment tamei:

According to Rabbi Elazar, it is a yellow shade — the color of wax, egg yolk, or a variety of yellow gourd (dependent on varying texts to the Tosefta). According to Sumchus, it is the color of the wing of a peacock or the leaf of a palm tree, both shades of deep green. The color is the indication that the nega is musgar. Nega’im on cloth and houses can never become muchlat the first time they are seen by a kohein.

Yarok

How can so many different shades of color — blue, green, gold or yellow – all be called by the same word yarok? One answer is that the Torah’s descriptions refer to the various shades of the refracted light spectrum that is visible to humans, which range from violet to red (see Rav Hirsch, Collected Writings, Volume III, page 127). Yarok would refer to the middle of the spectrum, “techeiles” to the violet and blue-violet part, which are the shorter waves of light, and adom to the red, or longer waves. (According to this approach, the gold color here probably means a yellowish gold, rather than reddish.)

Differences between cloth and people

Aside from the differences in the color of the nega, there are several other distinctions between the laws of nega’im germane to garments and those germane to people.

In all types of nega’im, a nega that appears without any muchlat signs is musgar for the first week, and then examined by the kohein on the seventh day. A nega on cloth that appears the same after a week has passed is removed from the cloth, and the area of the cloth that became torn when the nega was excised is sewn closed. A similar halacha is true in the case of a nega on a house – the nega area and the stones on which it appears are removed to a tamei place, the area is replaced with stone and mortar and becomes musgar for a second week.

This halacha is the exact opposite from a nega on a person, in which case it is prohibited min haTorah to excise the nega, and the person continues in the state of musgar for another six days.

A person whose nega remains the same for two weeks becomes tahor. However, a garment whose nega remains the same for two weeks has the status of tamei muchlat. Another critical difference is what is done to the person or item that becomes muchlat. As explained before, a person who becomes muchlat remains tamei until the symptoms of his nega change. A garment that becomes muchlat is burnt.

There are other halachos that apply to a nega on cloth that do not apply to nega’im on people. A person whose nega is musgar is not banished from the city – this halacha is reserved for a person whose nega is muchlat. However, cloth that is tamei tzaraas must be removed from the city – even when it is only musgar. A related strict ruling that applies to a cloth nega (and does not apply to nega’im on people) is that a cloth that has tzaraas must be removed from any city – whether or not the city is walled, whereas a person who is muchlat is banished from a walled city (Keilim 1:7), but is not required to leave an unwalled city (Tosefta Nega’im, 7:14; Rambam, Hilchos Tumas Tzaraas 13:15).

Nega’im on houses

In addition to the laws of tzaraas on people and on cloth, the Torah presents the laws of nega’im on the inside of a house. Tzaraas applies only to a house built from wood, clay and earth (Nega’im 12:2) and only to a house in Eretz Yisroel. The color of the nega is, as the law of nega’im on cloth, adamdom, bright red, or yerakrak, as explained above.

There are several unique features about the laws of nega’im on houses. One is obvious: whereas the person with a nega or the owner of cloth with a nega goes to the kohein to show him the nega, in the case of a nega on a house, the kohein comes to the house to see the nega. Whereas other nega’im are always ruled on outdoors, in sunlight, nega’im on a house are ruled as the light can be seen through the windows and open doors of the house.

A nega on a house can have the status of musgar for up to three weeks, something not possible with any other nega (Nega’im 3:8, see also 13:1).

According to many authorities, nega’im on houses can render tamei even items inside the house that can never otherwise become tamei (Rambam, Hilchos Tumas Tzaraas 14:4; Rashi and Tosafos, Mo’eid Katan 8a s.v. Deha; Eliyahu Rabbah, Mishnah Acharonah and Tiferes Yisroel, Nega’im 12:5 in explanation of Rabbi Yehudah; however, cf. Bartenura who disagrees).

Conclusion

The Gemara mentions tzaraas as a punishment for many types of prohibited behavior, which all share a common thread that they are antisocial activities. In other words, they all violate both mitzvos bein adam lamakom and bein adam lachaveiro. To quote the Rambam, “Tzaraas is a generic term comprising many things that are not comparable to one another… These changes that the Torah collectively calls tzaraas are not within what normally happens in the world. They are miraculous things that happen to the Jews to warn them away from loshon hora. Someone who speaks loshon hora — the walls of his house change color. If he changes his actions, the house becomes tahor. If he persists in his evil actions, his house will be destroyed, and then the leather items in his house that he sits and lies upon change color. If he changes his actions, they become tahor. If he persists in his evil actions until they are burnt, then the clothes that he wears change color. If he changes his actions, they become tahor. If he persists in his evil actions, until they are burnt, then his skin changes color, and he himself becomes a metzora. Therefore, someone who wants to develop himself spiritually should distance himself from these types of people, not to be influenced by their foolishness” (Hilchos Tumas Tzaraas 16:10).

Unfortunately, we no longer have these Divine reminders to keep us on the straight and narrow. Instead, we must try to inspire ourselves to grow in these areas.

Miscellaneous Mitzvah Matters

The midrash at the beginning of this week’s parsha mentions that the details of all mitzvos were taught at Sinai, making this topic extremely timely…

Question #1: Choosing your Mitzvos

“I don’t have enough money for all the mitzvah objects that I need. Which should I purchase?”

Question #2: Extra Mezuzos

“I have extra mezuzos. May I use them for tefillin?”

Question #3: When Do We Recite a brocha?

“Why don’t we recite a brocha when we put tzitzis onto a garment, yet we recite a brocha when we affix a mezuzah to a door?”

Introduction

The first two of our opening questions deal with a very interesting issue: Are there hierarchies among our mitzvos? In other words, are some mitzvos more important than others?

We do not usually attempt to judge which mitzvah is more important, since it is our obligation to observe all the mitzvos to the best of our ability. Nevertheless, there are occasional circumstances when we must decide which mitzvah is more “valuable.” One example when this could happen is when we must choose between observing one mitzvah and another. The Gemara (Rosh Hashanah 34b) discusses a situation in which one has to choose whether to spend Rosh Hashanah in a place where there is someone to blow shofar, but no Rosh Hashanah davening, or in another place where there is Rosh Hashanah davening, but no shofar. The Gemara concludes that it is more important to spend Rosh Hashanah in a place where there might be an opportunity to fulfill the mitzvah of shofar, than to go somewhere else where there will definitely be davening but no shofar blowing. This is because safek d’oraysa, a possibility of fulfilling a mitzvah min haTorah,carries more weight than definitively fulfilling that which is required only miderabbanan.

Yerushalmi

A more revealing and detailed discussion is in the Talmud Yerushalmi, at the very end of Mesechta Megillah, which quotes a dispute between Shmuel and Rav Huna concerning someone who has only sufficient money to purchase either tefillin or mezuzah, but not both. The question debated in the passage of the Yerushalmi is: Which mitzvah is it more important to fulfill? The explanations provided in this passage of the Yerushalmi provide insight into other mitzvos, should these rules need to be applied. For example, should someone have to choose between purchasing the four species for Sukkos or materials for a sukkah, which takes precedence? (For simplicity’s sake throughout the rest of this article, I will refer to the purchasing of the four species for Sukkos as simply the mitzvah of “lulav.”) Or, should one have to choose between purchasing a lulav or purchasing tefillin, which takes precedence? This passage of Yerushalmi provides foundation for subsequent halachic discussion on these issues.

Let us quote the passage of the Yerushalmi:

Tefillin and mezuzah, which comes first? Shmuel said, “Mezuzah comes first.” Rav Huna said, “Tefillin comes first.” What is Shmuel’s reason? Because mezuzah applies on Shabbos and Yom Tov. What is Rav Huna’s reason? Because tefillin applies to people traveling on the seas and in deserts. A beraisa (teaching of the era of the Mishnah, but not included in the Mishnah) supports Shmuel, which says that if tefillin have worn out, one may use its parshiyos (written parchments) for mezuzah, but one may not use a mezuzah for tefillin, since we have a general rule that one increases but does not decrease sanctity.

To explain the Yerushalmi’s conclusion: The mitzvah of tefillin requires use of four sections of the Torah, two in parshas Bo, and two others, the first two of the three parshiyos of kerias shma, which are from parshas Va’eschanan and parshas Eikev. A mezuzah includes only these last two sections of the Torah. May one take the pieces of parchment that were used as a mezuzah and use them for tefillin, or vice versa — if they were used for tefillin can they be used for a mezuzah?

Understanding Shmuel

Shmuel contends that since mezuzah applies every day of the year, it is a greater and holier mitzvah than tefillin. The Gemara quotes two ramifications of this ruling:

(1) Should one be able to fulfill only one of these two mitzvos, mezuzah is preferred.

(2) Parshiyos once used for tefillin may be used for a mezuzah, but a mezuzah may not be used for parshiyos in tefillin. Since mezuzah is a holier mitzvah, using a mezuzah for tefillin decreases its sanctity, which is not permitted. This is because of a general halachic rule, maalin bekodesh velo moridim:something may be elevated to a use that is of greater sanctity, but it may not be reduced to a lower level of sanctity. For example, a kohein gadol can never return to being a kohein hedyot, a regular kohein. Since the beraisa quoted by the Yerushalmi states that one may not use mezuzah parshiyos for tefillin, the conclusion is, like Shmuel, that mezuzah is more important.

There is a question on Shmuel’s explanation. In what way does mezuzah apply on Shabbos and Yom Tov, when one is not permitted to put a mezuzah on a door on either of these holidays, because of the melacha involved? The answer is that, if someone is required to affix a mezuzah but did not, he is not permitted to spend Shabbos in that house unless he has nowhere else to live (see Pri Megadim, Orach Chaim, Eishel Avraham 38:15; Aruch Hashulchan, Yoreh Deah 285:5). In other words, although one may not install a mezuzah on Shabbos or Yom Tov, the mitzvah still applies on those days.

Understanding Rav Huna

Rav Huna explains that on days that one is obligated to wear tefillin, there are no exemptions from that responsibility. On the other hand, someone who has no residence is not obligated in mezuzah. In theory, one can exempt oneself from the mitzvah of mezuzah by avoiding living in a residence. Therefore, tefillin is a greater mitzvah than mezuzah.

This has two ramifications:

(1) Should one be able to fulfill only one of these two mitzvos, tefillin is preferred.

(2) A mezuzah may be used for parshiyos in a pair of tefillin, but parshiyos used for tefillin may not be used for mezuzah. Since tefillin is a holier mitzvah, using parshiyos of tefillin for a mezuzah decreases their sanctity, which is not permitted.

How do we rule?

The Rosh (Hilchos Tefillin, Chapter 30) rules that the mitzvah of tefillin is more important, and this approach is followed by the Tur, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 38:12), the Rema (Yoreh Deah 285:1) and the later authorities. The Rosh explains that tefillin is more important because a mitzvah de’gufei adif, literally “a mitzvah of your body is more important.” What does this mean?

One early acharon, the Beis Hillel (Yoreh Deah 285), understood the Rosh to mean that the mitzvah of tefillin is more important because one puts tefillin on his body, as opposed to mezuzah, which is on one’s house, not body. Based on his reason, the Beis Hillel concludes that tefillin is more important than sukkah or lulav, since neither of these mitzvos is performed on one’s body to the extent that tefillin is. Once the Beis Hillel is discussing which mitzvos are “more important,” he discusses whether tefillin is more important than tzitzis or vice versa, concluding that tefillin are more important, since the name of Hashem is in the tefillin.

However, most authorities understand that the Rosh means something else. They explain that the mitzvah of tefillin is inherently obligatory, whereas the mitzvah of mezuzah is circumstantial. Every weekday there is an obligation for every adult Jewish male to don tefillin. The mitzvah of mezuzah is not inherently obligatory, but is dependent on one’s living arrangements, and can be avoided completely (Gra; Rabbi Akiva Eiger, in his notes to Shulchan Aruch and Responsum 1:9; Aruch Hashulchan, Yoreh Deah 285:5). Furthermore, according to most authorities, mezuzah is obligatory min haTorah only if one owns the house in which he lives.

A big difference between these two approaches is germane to the mitzvos of lulav and sukkah. According to the Beis Hillel, these mitzvos carry less weight than tefillin. However, according to those who disagree with him, both of these mitzvos are inherently obligatory, just as tefillin. This would mean that, regarding the Rosh’s criterion, all three of these mitzvos should be treated on an equal footing, and we would need to find other criteria to decide which of them is more important.

Tefillin or Sukkah?

Rabbi Akiva Eiger notes that the above-discussed passage of Yerushalmi provides an answer to this question. There it stated that a mitzvah that occurs more frequently should be prioritized over one that occurs less frequently. Tefillin is far more frequently observed than either sukkah or lulav, and, therefore, should be treated with more priority than they are.

However, notes Rabbi Akiva Eiger, this question is usually moot for the following reason: When one has a mitzvah that he is obligated to observe immediately, he does not wait to fulfill it. Therefore, any time other than erev Sukkos, one who needs to choose between these mitzvos should use the funds to acquire tefillin, since he has that responsibility immediately, and the mitzvos of Sukkos will wait. If the situation occurs during chol hamoed Sukkos, the priority will be: sukkah, tefillin, lulav. This is because the mitzvah of sukkah is, at the moment, definitely min haTorah, whereas even those who wear tefillin on chol hamoed accept that it is disputed whether there is a mitzvah to wear them on chol hamoed. Therefore, sukkah, which is definitely a requirement min haTorah on all seven days of Sukkos, takes precedence over tefillin. Since the mitzvah of taking lulav is min haTorah only on the first day of Sukkos, but afterwards is required only miderabbanan (unless one is in or near the Beis Hamikdash grounds), tefillin will have precedence over lulav for those who wear tefillin on chol hamoed, which is the assumption that Rabbi Akiva Eiger makes.

Tefillin versus tzitzis

Rabbi Akiva Eiger agrees that tefillin is more important than tzitzis, but for a different reason than that provided by the Beis Hillel. Tzitzis is like mezuzah – there is only an obligation if he has a four-cornered garment, but it is not an automatic requirement. Although one is obligated to place tzitzis on any four-cornered garment that one owns and wears, one can avoid wearing four-cornered garments more easily than one can avoid living in a house that one owns. On the other hand, a man is required to wear tefillin every weekday.

Difficulty with the Rosh

Notwithstanding that all later authorities conclude that tefillin is considered a more “important” mitzvah than mezuzah, a difficulty is presented by the Rosh’s conclusion. Why would he rule according to Rav Huna, when the Yerushalmi’s conclusion is, like Shmuel, that mezuzah is a more important mitzvah?

The answer is that the Talmud Bavli (Menachos 32a) states the following: “A sefer Torah that wore out, or tefillin that wore out, cannot be used for a mezuzah, because one is not permitted to reduce something from a greater sanctity to a lower one.” Thus, we see that the Bavli ruled according to Rav Huna, that tefillin is a greater mitzvah than mezuzah, and the halacha follows the Bavli over the Yerushalmi (Beis Yosef, end of Orach Chayim, Chapter 38).

Practically speaking

The Magen Avraham (38:15), one of the major halachic authorities, notes that, although the mitzvah of tefillin is more important than mezuzah, in practice it might be better for someone to purchase mezuzos. Someone might be able to coordinate his schedule such that he can borrow tefillin from other people when he needs them for davening every day, something impractical to do with mezuzos. Thus, if he can thereby observe both mitzvos, he should purchase the mezuzos to allow this. This ruling is followed by the later authorities (Shulchan Aruch Harav; Mishnah Berurah; Aruch Hashulchan).

Nevertheless, the rule has not changed: Someone who will be unable to observe the mitzvah of tefillin should purchase tefillin first and wait until he has more resources before he purchases mezuzos (Shulchan Aruch Harav; Mishnah Berurah; Aruch Hashulchan).

Choosing your mitzvos

At this point, we can now address our opening question: “I don’t have enough money for all the mitzvah objects that I need. Which should I purchase?”

The halachic conclusion is:

He should first see which mitzvos he can fulfill without purchasing them. For example, he might be able to borrow tefillin, and he also might be able to use someone else’s sukkah. If he lives near someone else who is observant, he should be able to fulfill the mitzvah of lulav with someone else’s lulav. In earlier generations, it was common for an entire community to purchase only one set of four minim, and everyone used that set to fulfill the mitzvah. Mezuzah is more difficult to observe with borrowed items, and, therefore, he might need to purchase mezuzos ahead of tefillin, lulav, or sukkah, notwithstanding that they are obligatory mitzvos to a greater extent than mezuzah is.

Furthermore, which mitzvah he will need to observe first might be a factor, as we saw from Rabbi Akiva Eiger’s discussion about someone who needs to purchase tefillin, sukkah and lulav.

When Do We Recite a Brocha?

At this point, we can discuss the third of our opening questions: “Why don’t we recite a brocha when we put tzitzis onto a garment, yet we recite a brocha when we place a mezuzah on a door?”

This question is raised by the Magen Avraham, in his commentary on the following words of the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 19:1): “Until one dons the garment, one is exempt from putting tzitzis on it. For this reason, one does not recite a brocha when one places the tzitzis on the garment, since the mitzvah is only when you wear it.”

The Magen Avraham (19:1) asks why we do not recite a brocha when putting tzitzis onto a garment, yet we recite a brocha when we affix a mezuzah to a door? The Magen Avraham answers that the reason is practical. Usually, one moves into the house first, before he installs the mezuzah, and, since he already lives in the house, he is responsible to have a mezuzah on the door. Thus, placing the mezuzah on the door is the fulfillment of the mitzvah and warrants a brocha. On the other hand, one does not usually place tzitzis on a garment while wearing it, but before he puts it on, when there is no obligation yet to fulfill a mitzvah.

Based on his analysis, the Magen Avraham rules that should any of the tzitzis tear off a garment while someone is wearing it, and he attaches replacement tzitzis while he is still wearing it, he should recite a brocha prior to attaching the replacement. The brocha he would recite in this instance is Asher kideshanu bemitzvosav vetzivanu la’asos tzitzis, which translates as a brocha “to make tzitzis,” a text that we do not have recorded by any earlier authority.

Notwithstanding his conclusion, the Magen Avraham rules that this is not the preferable way to act, but, rather, he should remove the tzitzis once they become invalid and attach replacement tzitzis without a brocha. On the other hand, the Magen Avraham contends that if a mezuzah falls off or becomes invalid, the occupant is not required to relocate until he can replace the mezuzah. The difference between the two cases is how much tircha the person is required to undergo – one is required to remove a pair of tzitzis, which is a simple act, but not required to relocate himself and his family until he has a chance to replace or reaffix the mezuzah.

The Magen Avraham then suggests that if someone affixed a mezuzah before he moved into a house, he should not recite the brocha when he affixes the mezuzah, but when he moves in he should recite the brocha, Asher kideshanu bemitzvosav vetzivanu ladur babayis sheyeish bo mezuzah, “to live in a house that has a mezuzah,” again, a new text of a brocha not recorded by any earlier authority.

The Birkei Yosef (Orach Chayim 19:2) disagrees with the Magen Avraham, contending that we should not create texts of brochos that we do not find in early sources. In regard to the Magen Avraham’s question, why do we recite a brocha upon affixing a mezuzah but not upon placing tzitzis, the Birkei Yosef provides a different answer: Chazal required a brocha on the last act that you do to fulfill a mitzvah. In the case of tzitzis, it is when you put on the garment. In the case of mezuzah, it is when you affix it. However, if there is a mezuzah on the door already, one does not recite a brocha upon moving into a house, since one did not perform any act to fulfill the mitzvah.

Conclusion

A famous quotation from a non-Jewish source is: “Is G-d more concerned about what comes into our mouth or what comes out?” This question assumes that some of Hashem’s mitzvos are more “important” for us to observe than others. The Torah’s answer is that it is not for us to decide which of the mitzvos is more important. One grows in one’s relationship with Hashem through each opportunity to perform a mitzvah.

Hybrid or Kil’ayim?

Parshas Kedoshim contains one of the two places in the Torah where the mitzvos of kil’ayim are taught.

Question #1: Kil’ei beheimah

May one attempt to crossbreed a mule with a stallion?

Question #2: Kil’ei zera’im

May I plant the vegetables in my garden close together?

Question #3: Kil’ei hakerem

Is there any way that I can plant vegetables near my vineyard?

Question #4: Harkavas ilan

Must I be careful before I purchase a fruit tree?

Many people assume that the halachic definition of the mitzvah of kil’ayim is the crossbreeding of different species of plants or animals, but, as we will soon see, not all of the laws of kil’ayim have to do with what a farmer or a scientist would call crossbreeding or hybridization.

My desktop dictionary defines hybrid as “the offspring produced by breeding plants or animals of different varieties, species, or races.” Thousands of years ago, mankind crossbred horses and donkeys to create mules and hinnies. This hybrid, called a pered (female pirdah) is already mentioned many times in Tanach. As a pack animal, the mule — produced from a male donkey, called a “jack” and a mare (female horse) — has many advantages over either of its parents. It is usually as strong as a horse, sturdy, sure-footed, and, notwithstanding its reputation for being “stubborn as a mule,” is more reliable for hauling than draft horses. (A hinney, which has less commercial value, is produced from a stallion (male horse) and a female donkey, called a “jenny.” The word “hinney” comes from its parents – a horse and a jenny.)

Other crossbred animals

Artificial insemination has been used to crossbreed camels and llamas with the goal of producing a larger quantity of quality llama wool. Mankind has created such interesting creatures as ligers, crossbreeds of male lions and tigresses, tiglons (sometimes called tigons) from male tigers and lionesses, leopons (male leopards and lionesses), wholpins (whales and dolphins) and geeps (goats and sheep). Most of these have resulted in limited, if any, commercial value, although it was thought by some that they might.

Crossbreeding animal species is one of the prohibitions of the Torah when it declares behemtecha lo sarbia kil’ayim (Vayikra 19:19). It is one of the unusual mitzvos that even a non-Jew is required to observe (Rambam, Hilchos Melachim 10:6).

The prohibition is only to create the crossbreed; one may use a mule or any other crossbred animal. However, not only is it prohibited to crossbreed a horse with a donkey, it is even forbidden to attempt to breed a mule or hinney with either a donkey or a horse (Mishnah, Kil’ayim 1:6). In fact, it is rare that such an attempt will produce offspring, although it is claimed anecdotally that this can happen upon occasion. Nevertheless, someone who attempts to crossbreed them violates a Torah prohibition.

Crossbreeding of plants

Crossbreeding of plants, or, as it is usually called, cross-fertilization or cross-pollination, is when one pollinates the flower of one species with pollen from a different species, to produce offspring with some characteristics of each. Many fruits have been developed this way, although I want to share that a nectarine is not a crossbreed of a peach and a plum, as often mistakenly thought. A nectarine is an ancient variety of peach (Prunus persica) that has a smooth skin. Botanists consider it to be the same species as peaches.

What is interesting is that, in the discussions about kil’ayim in the Torah, the Mishnah and the writings of Chazal, nowhere does it say that it is prohibited to cross-pollinate from one plant species to another. This does not mean to say that there is no prohibition of kil’ayim germane to trees or plants. Quite the contrary, there are three such prohibitions min haTorah. They are referred to as kil’ei zera’im, kil’ayim in plants; kil’ei hakerem, kil’ayim in vineyards; and kil’ayim in trees, usually referred to as harkavas ilan. But, as we will soon see, none of these three prohibitions has anything to do with crossbreeding.

Kil’ei zera’im

Kil’ei zera’im is planting two or more different species of grains, vegetables or other edible herbaceous plants in close proximity. Exactly what defines “close proximity” is a very complicated halachic topic, and depends on factors such as the shape and size of the vegetable patch, and what variety of produce one is planting. We should note that, from a botanical point of view, planting two species in close proximity will not cause hybridization because it does not affect the genetic makeup.

This mitzvah applies only in Eretz Yisroel. Thus, someone in chutz la’aretz may plant his backyard garden with a wide variety of vegetables without any halachic concern, whereas in Eretz Yisroel someone planting a garden patch must be very careful to keep the different species separate.

Kil’ayim in a vineyard, kil’ei hakerem

Kil’ei hakerem is the prohibition against planting grains or vegetables in, near, above or below a vineyard. Again, this forbidden planting will not affect the genetic makeup of any of the plants involved. It is also clear that this was not the concern in halacha as we see from many of the halachic details. Here is one example: Although it is prohibited to plant grains or vegetables near a vineyard, there is a way to permit it by separating the vegetable patch from the vineyard with a halachic wall between them. For example, if one places two poles and a wire across the top, a tzuras hapesach, between the vegetable patch and the vineyard, it is permitted to plant vegetables right next to the vineyard (Eruvin 11a). This is similar to what we do when we construct an eruv to permit carrying on Shabbos. It is quite clear that, botanically, the tzuras hapesach does not accomplish anything to prevent the mingling of the species. Yet, with the tzuras hapesach, it is permitted to plant the crop; without the tzuras hapesach, it is a Torah prohibition to do so! This certainly cannot be explained on a scientific basis.

Even one grapevine is problematic near a crop plant, so care must be taken even in the home garden. For example, a pot with herbs or a vegetable under a trellised grapevine could forbid the grapes and the produce of the pot!

Unlike other forms of kil’ayim, the produce of kil’ei hakerem is forbidden to use.

The prohibition of planting grains or vegetables in a vineyard applies in chutz la’aretz, but only miderabbanan (Kiddushin 39a).

Harkavas ilan – grafting trees

The laws of kil’ayim also prohibit grafting one species of tree or plant onto the wood stock, or lower trunk, of another species. Although a town dweller may feel that this is a rare occurrence, in fact, contemporary plant nurseries and tree farmers usually graft branches of a species that produces delicious fruit onto the hardier stock of a different species.

For example, most peach and nectarine trees are produced by grafting a peach or nectarine branch onto the stock of a hardier tree, such as an almond. Someone who performs this, either in Eretz Yisroel or in chutz la’aretz, violates a Torah prohibition whether he is Jewish or not (Rambam, Hilchos Melachim 10:6). Most authorities rule that one may not own, water or prune a kil’ayim tree, whether or not it is in Eretz Yisroel or in chutz la’aretz (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 295:7 and Piskei Teshuvah).

However, many observant Jews purchased agricultural properties that contained kil’ayim trees and did not cut down those trees. Was there any justification for their actions? Numerous halachic responsa discuss what was apparently a widespread practice in the eighteenth and nineteenth century. Whereas most poskim rule that these Jews violated the halacha, some authorities justify the practice of owning these trees, at least in chutz la’aretz (Shu’t Chasam Sofer, Yoreh Deah #288; Aruch Hashulchan, Yoreh Deah 295:17-18).

Because so many trees are grafted nowadays, someone who owns a fruit tree should have a horticultural expert check whether its stock is from the same species or not. Often, even a non-expert can detect if a tree was grafted onto a different species by simply scrutinizing the tree. If the bark somewhere near the bottom of the tree looks different from the upper part of the tree, this indicates that the upper part of the tree was grafted. Often one can see a line separating the grafted scion from the rootstock, or a difference in thickness between the top and bottom. Before purchasing a new tree at a nursery, examine the trunk carefully for signs of grafting.

The prohibition of planting vegetables and other edible crops together applies only in Eretz Yisroel, whereas grafting trees applies equally min hatorah in chutz la’aretz and in Eretz Yisroel.

Although planting and caring for a kil’ayim tree is forbidden, the fruit from such a tree is permitted. Thus, one may purchase fruit in a market without worrying about kil’ayim.

Esrogim

Although space does not allow us to discuss this fascinating topic, there is a huge amount of halachic literature discussing the very common instance of using an esrog from a tree that was grafted onto a non-esrog tree. Most authorities rule that this esrog may not be used to fulfill the mitzvah on Sukkos.

Conclusion

Rav Hirsch (Vayikra 19:19) explains that the root word ke’le means to keep or hold something back, and that the plural form kil’ayim is similar to yadayim or raglayim and means a pair. Therefore, the word kil’ayim means to pair together two items that should be kept apart. This is to teach us that although we are given the world to develop, we must follow the rules that Hashem established for us to do so.

Mizmor Lesodah, Parshas Tzav and Erev Pesach

Question #1: Korban Todah or Bensching Gomeil?

“Which is the better way to thank Hashem for a personal salvation, by reciting birchas hagomeil, or by offering a korban todah?”

Question #2: The Breadwinner!

“Why is the korban todah accompanied by so many loaves of bread and so much matzoh?”

Question #3: Mizmor Lesodah and Pesach

“I recently assumed a position teaching in a small-town day school. Before Pesach, I mentioned that we do not recite Mizmor Lesodah on Erev and Chol Hamoed Pesach. One of the students afterwards told me that this is not his family minhag, but only Ashkenazi practice. Is he correct?”

Answer:

Although Chapter 100 of Tehillim is known by its opening words as Mizmor Lesodah, there actually are two different chapters of Tehillim, #100 and #107, that devote themselves to the thanksgiving acknowledgement of someone who has survived a major physical challenge. In Psalm 107, Dovid Hamelech describes four different types of treacherous predicaments — traveling through the desert, traveling overseas, illness, and imprisonment — in which a person would pray to Hashem for salvation. When the person survives the travails and thanks Hashem, this thanks is reflected in the passage , Yodu lashem chasdo venifle’osav livnei adam, “they acknowledge thanks to Hashem for His kindness and His wondrous deeds for mankind.”These words are repeated four times, once after each of the four situations is described.

The Gemara cites this Psalm as the source for many of the laws of birchas hagomeil, the brocha we recite when surviving these calamities. To quote the Gemara: Four people need to acknowledge thanks to Hashem.

Actually, someone who survived these predicaments should offer a korban todah, which is described in parshas Tzav. The birchas hagomeil is recited in place of the korban todah that we cannot bring, since, unfortunately, our Beis Hamikdash lies in ruin (Rosh, Brachos 9:3; Tur, Orach Chayim 219).

What are the unusual features of the korban todah?

The korban todah is a specialized variety of shelamim, whose name means, according to the Toras Kohanim, that it creates peace in the world, since the owner, the kohen and the mizbeiach (the altar) all share in consuming it (quoted by Rashi, Vayikra 3:1). A shelamim, which was perhaps the most common korban in the Beis Hamikdash, was offered to express the desire to draw closer to Hashem from a sense that he lacks nothing in his physical life (see Commentary of Rav Hirsch, Vayikra 3:1).

The korban todah is offered following the general procedures and rules of a shelamim; however, it has several unique features. The first is that the korban is accompanied by a huge amount of bread, called korbanos mincha (plural, menachos), a total of forty loaves. Thirty of these comprise ten loaves each of three varieties of matzoh. However, the remaining ten loaves are highly unusual: first of all they are chometz, and this is the only instance of a private korban that includes chometz. (There is only one other korban that is chometz, and that is the two loaves offered by the community on Shavuos.) As a result, the korban todah could not be offered on Erev Pesach or on Pesach itself.

The chometz loaves are unusual in another way, in that each of them is three times the volume of the matzoh loaves (see Menachos 76b). Thus, the ten chometz loaves were, together, of equal size to the thirty matzohs.

Of the four varieties of mincha that accompany the korban todah, one of each type of loaf is given to the kohen to take home and consume together with his family and friends. The other 36 loaves are given to the offerer of the korban.

There is another unusual facet of the korban todah offering. Whereas a korban shelamim may be eaten until nightfall of the next day after it is offered, the korban todah must be eaten before the morning after it was offered, a much shorter period of time. Chazal further shortened the time it may be eaten — permitting it to be eaten only until halachic midnight — to assure that no one eat the korban when it is forbidden to do so.

Thus, there are three ways in which the korban todah is treated differently from an ordinary shelamim: 1) the todah is accompanied by an absolutely huge amount of bread, made from a total of twenty isronim of flour, which is twenty times the amount of flour that requires one to separate challah; 2) half of this bread is chometz and half matzoh; and 3) the korban and its bread must be consumed within a very short period of time.

Why would the Torah “impose” these additional requirements on the offerer of the korban? Well, let us figure out what is he going to do. He has a significant amount of holy meat that must be eaten by midnight, and a huge amount of accompanying bread with the same restrictions. What will he do?

Presumably, he will invite a large crowd to join him in his feast and will thereby explain to them the reason for his repast. Thus, we increase the appreciation of others forthe salvation that Hashem has provided him, which is the cause of this thanksgiving. This now leads us directly into our discussion of the chapter of Tehillim that begins with the words Mizmor Lesodah.

Mizmor Lesodah

Whereas the above-mentioned Chapter 107 of Tehillim describes the background behind korban todah and birchas hagomeil, the 100th chapter of Tehillim, Mizmor Lesodah, is a sample praise that the saved person recites. Although only five verses long, this psalm, one of the eleven written by Moshe Rabbeinu (see Rashi ad locum), captivates the emotion of a person who has just survived a major ordeal. The first verse expresses the need for everyone on Earth to recognize Hashem, certainly something that conveys the emotions of someone very recently saved from a major tribulation. The second verse shares the same passion, since it calls upon everyone to serve Hashem in gladness and to appear before Him in jubilation. The third sentence continues this idea. In it, the thankful person calls on everyone to recognize that Hashem is the personal G-d of every individual, that we are His people and the sheep of his pasture. He then calls on all to enter into Hashem’s gates and His courts, so that we can thank and bless Him. We should note that the gates of the Beis Hamikdash were meant for all of mankind, not only the Jewish people, as mankind is specifically included in Shlomoh Hamelech’s prayer while inaugurating the Beis Hamikdash (Melachim I 8:41-43).

The closing sentence of Mizmor Lesodah is also very significant: “For Hashem is good, His kindness is forever, and our trust should be placed in Him in every future generation.” (We should note that the word olam in Tanach means “forever” and never means “world,” which is a meaning given to this word by Chazal. The most common Tanach word for “world” is teiveil; see, for example, Tehillim 19:5; 33:8; and 90:2 — all of which are recited during the Pesukei Dezimra of Shabbos and 96:10, 13; 97:4; 98:7, which are part of kabbalas Shabbos.) The celebrant calls upon those he has assembled to spread the message that Hashem is the only Source of all good, and that we should recognize this at all times, not only in the extraordinary situations where we see the manifestation of His presence!

We can now understand better why the Mizmor Lesodah chapter of Tehillim is structured as it is. It provides the beneficiary of Hashem’s miracle with a drosha to present at the seudas hodaah that he makes with all the bread and meat that he does not want to go to waste — complete with encouragement to others to internalize our thanks to Hashem.

Clearly, then, this psalm was meant to be recited by the thankful person prior to offering his korban, and this is his invitation to others to join him as he thanks Hashem. The Avudraham notes thatHashem’s name appears four times in the psalm, corresponding to the four people who need to thank Him for their salvation.

Mizmor Lesodah on Shabbos

We find a dispute among early authorities whether one should recite Mizmor Lesodah on Shabbos (Shibbolei Haleket, quoted by Beis Yosef, Orach Chayim 281). Why should this be?

Since the korban todah is a voluntary offering, it cannot be offered on Shabbos. The Tur mentions that established custom is to omit Mizmor Lesodah on Shabbos and Yom Tov, out of concern that when the Beis Hamikdash is rebuilt, someone may mistakenly offer the korban todah on these days. On Shabbos, of course, it is prohibited to offer any korban other than the required daily tamid and the special Shabbos korbanos, whereas on Yom Tov one may offer only voluntary korbanos that are brought because of the Yom Tov (Beitzah 19b).

The Tur does not agree that this is a valid reason to omit reciting Mizmor Lesodah on these days, contending that we need not be concerned that people will mistakenly offer a korban todah on Shabbos or Yom Tov (Orach Chayim, Chapter 51 and Chapter 281). Others explain that we recite Mizmor Lesodah to remind us of the korban todah, and since it was not offered on these days, there is no point in reciting it (see Pri Megadim, Eishel Avraham 51:11). Perhaps this is done as an aspect of u’neshalma parim sefaseinu (Hoshea 14:3), “may our lips replace the bulls (of offerings),” which is interpreted to mean that when we have no Beis Hamikdash, we recite passages that commemorate those offerings. For this reason, the custom developed among Ashkenazim to omit Mizmor Lesodah on days that the offering could not be brought in the Beis Hamikdash.

Mizmor Lesodah on Chol Hamoed Pesach

For the same reason that Mizmor Lesodah is omitted on Shabbos, Ashkenazim omit reciting it on Chol Hamoed Pesach. Since the korban todah contained chometz, it could not be offered on Pesach; therefore Ashkenazim refrain from saying Mizmor Lesodah.

Mizmor Lesodah on Erev Pesach

Ashkenazic custom is to omit Mizmor Lesodah on Erev Yom Kippur and on Erev Pesach. The korban todah and its breads can usually be eaten until the midnight after the day it was offered. However, were one to offer a korban todah early on Erev Yom Kippur or on Erev Pesach, one would be restricted to eating its chometz for only a few hours. Since one may not offer a korban whose time limit is curtailed, one may not offer a korban todah on these days, and, following Ashkenazic practice, Mizmor Lesodah is omitted then, also. The common custom among Sefardim is to recite Mizmor Lesodah on Erev Yom Kippur, Erev Pesach and Chol Hamoed Pesach (Pri Chodosh 429:2; Kaf Hachayim 51:51-52).

With this background, I can now return to the third question raised above.

“I recently assumed a position teaching in a small town day school. Before Pesach, I mentioned that we do not recite Mizmor Lesodah on Erev and Chol Hamoed Pesach. One of the students afterwards told me that this is not his family minhag, but only Ashkenazi practice. Is he correct?”

Indeed, in this instance, the student is correct. Hopefully, the rebbe was not that badly embarrassed.

Mizmor Lesodah and our daily davening

In order to make sure that this thanks to Hashem takes place daily, the chapter of Mizmor Lesodah was introduced into our daily pesukei dezimra. We should remember that miracles happen to us daily, even when we do not realize it (quoted in name of Sefer Nehora; see also Beis Yosef, Orach Chayim 281). Although Mizmor Lesodah was not part of the original structure of the daily prayers established by the Anshei Keneses Hagedolah, long before the time of the Rishonim, it was already common practice to include it as part of the daily recital of pesukei dezimra and to say it almost at the beginning. The importance of reciting this psalm should not be underestimated. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 51:9), states: One should recite Mizmor Lesodah with song, since eventually all songs will cease, except for Mizmor Lesodah. This statement of Chazal is explained by Rav Hirsch (Commentary to Psalm 100) in the following manner: One day in the future, everything on Earth will be so ideal that there will be no reason to supplicate Hashem for changes. Even then, prayers of gratitude and thanksgiving will still be appropriate.

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