Tag: Shabbos

When May I Ask a Non-Jew for Help on Shabbos?

Each of the following questions is an actual situation about which I was asked:

Question #1: My car needs repair work, and the most convenient time to drop it off at Angelo’s Service Station is Friday afternoon. May I bring Angelo the car then, knowing that he is going to repair it on Shabbos?

Question #2: A gala Shabbos sheva brachos is being held at an apartment several flights of stairs below street level, a very common situation in hilly Yerushalayim. The kallah’s elderly grandmother arrived before Shabbos by elevator, intending to return home by using the Shabbos elevator (a subject I hope to discuss at a different time iy’H). Indeed, the building’s elevator actually has a Shabbos setting, but we discover on Shabbos that the Shabbos setting is not working. How does Bubby get home?

Question #3: My friend lives in a neighborhood that does not have an eruv. She arranges before Shabbos for a non-Jew to push the baby carriage on Shabbos. May she do this?

Question #4: “If this contract does not arrive at its destination ASAP, I could suffer huge losses. May I mail it as an express mail package on Friday?”

Question #5: “If a registered letter arrives on Shabbos, may I ask the letter carrier to sign for me?”

Many people are under the mistaken impression that one may ask a non-Jew to do any prohibited activity on Shabbos. This is not accurate. I know of many instances in which someone asked a non-Jew to do work in situations in which making such a request is prohibited. Our Sages prohibited asking a non-Jew to work for us on Shabbos out of concern that this diminishes our sensitivity to doing melacha ourselves (Rambam, Hilchos Shabbos 6:1). Also, Chazal considered the non-Jew to be my agent — thus, if he works for me on Shabbos, it is considered that I worked on Shabbos through a hired agent (Rashi, Shabbos 153a s.v. mai taama).

By the way, the halachos of amira lenochri, asking a non-Jew to perform a prohibited activity, are not restricted to the laws of Shabbos, but apply to all mitzvos of the Torah. Thus, it is prohibited to have a non-Jew muzzle your animal while it works (see Bava Metzia 90a; Shulchan Aruch Choshen Mishpat 338:6), ask him to graft fruit trees, nor  ask a non-Jew to do prohibited work on Chol Hamoed (Moed Katan 12a).

There are many complicated details governing when I may ask a non-Jew to do something on Shabbos and when I may not. These are some of the factors that one must consider:

A. Is the non-Jew my employee or is he an “independent contractor”?

B. What type of benefit do I receive from his work?

C. Did I ask the non-Jew directly or indirectly?

D. If a Jew were to perform the work, would it be prohibited min haTorah or only miderabbanan?

E. Why do I want him to do this work?

F. Could I do the work myself, albeit in a different way from how the non-Jew is likely to do it?

To show how these details affect a practical case, I will analyze the halachic issues involved in each of our cases mentioned above, starting with our first case — leaving the car over Shabbos at a non-Jewish mechanic. The important detail here is that I did not ask the non-Jew to do the work on Shabbos – it is prohibited to do so. Instead, I brought him the car and allowed him to decide whether to do the work on Shabbos. Is he now my agent if he works on Shabbos?

AGENT VERSUS CONTRACTOR

There is a halachic difference whether the non-Jew is working as my agent (or employee) or whether he is an independent contractor who makes his own decisions. If he is my agent, I may not allow him to do prohibited activity on Shabbos. However, if he is an independent contractor, under certain circumstances, I am not responsible if he actually does the work on Shabbos.

When is the non-Jew considered a contractor? If the non-Jew decides on his own when to do the work and I hired him by the job, he is a contractor. In these cases, I may give him work that he might decide to perform on Shabbos, provided that he could do the work on a different day and that he does the work on his own premises. (Under certain circumstances, the last condition is waived.)

What are examples of contractors? The mailman, the repairman who repairs items on his own premises, and the dry cleaner are all contractors. On the other hand, a regular employee whom I ask to do work on Shabbos is not a contractor unless I pay him extra for this job.

Thus, I may drop off my car at the auto mechanic before Shabbos and leave it over Shabbos, provided I allow him time to do the work when it is not Shabbos, either on Friday afternoon or Motza’ei Shabbos. Even though I know that the non-Jewish mechanic will not be working Saturday night and will actually do the work on Shabbos, I need not be concerned, since he could choose to do the work after Shabbos.

However, dropping off my car before Shabbos is permitted only when:

(1) He does the work on his own premises.

(2) He is paid a fee for the completed job.

(3) He decides whether or not he does the work on Shabbos. (It should be noted that some poskim prohibit doing this when the mechanic is closed Motza’ei Shabbos. Since I know that he is closed Motza’ei Shabbos, they consider it asking him to do the work on Shabbos, which is prohibited.)

In a similar way, I could bring dry cleaning in on Friday afternoon expecting to pick up the cleaned clothes Saturday night, provided enough time exists to clean the clothes before or after Shabbos.

We will now explore our second question:

An elderly woman cannot ascend the several flights of stairs necessary to get to street level. The building has a Shabbos elevator, but we discover on Shabbos that the Shabbos setting is not working. How does Bubby get home? Can we have a non-Jew operate the elevator to get her home?

Before answering this question, I want to share with you another story:

A DARK SIMCHAS TORAH SHABBOS

The following story occurred on a Simchas Torah in Yerushalayim that fell on Shabbos. (Although Simchas Torah outside Eretz Yisroel cannot occur on Shabbos, Shmini Atzeres, which can fall on Shabbos, is observed in Eretz Yisroel as Simchas Torah.) Just as the hakafos were beginning, the power in the shul went out, plunging the entire shul into darkness. The shul’s emergency lights went on, leaving the shul dimly lit — sufficient for people to exit safely and to dance in honor of Simchas Torah, but certainly making it more difficult to observe the usual Simchas Torah celebrations. The rav of the shul ruled that they could not ask a non-Jew to turn on the lights.

If any element of danger had been involved, one could certainly have asked a non-Jew to turn on the lights. But the rav felt that the situation was not dangerous, and therefore maintained that one may not ask a non-Jew to turn on the lights.

One of the congregants suggested a way to illuminate the shul. The same idea could get Bubby home! Before presenting his idea, I need to explain two concepts:

BENEFITING FROM A NON-JEW’S ACTION

If a non-Jew does melacha on Shabbos for his own benefit, a Jew may use the results. For example, if a non-Jew builds a ramp to disembark from a boat on Shabbos, a Jew may now exit the boat via the same ramp, since the non-Jew did no additional work in order to benefit the Jew. Similarly, if a non-Jew kindled a light so that he can read, a Jew may now use the light. One may use the light even if the non-Jew and the Jew know one another (Mishnah Shabbos 122a; Rambam 6:2; Shulchan Aruch Orach Chayim 325:11).

However, if the non-Jew gathered grass to feed his animals, the Jew cannot let his animals eat the leftover grass if the two people know one another. This is so that the non-Jew will not in the future come to do melacha for the sake of the Jew (Shabbos 122a).

WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE RAMP AND THE GRASS?

Why are these cases halachically different? Why may the Jew use the light or the ramp, but may not allow his animal to eat the grass?

In the first cases, no additional work is necessary for the non-Jew to provide a ramp or light for the Jew. Once the non-Jew has built the ramp or kindled the light, any number of people can benefit from them without any additional melacha. However, cutting each blade of grass is a separate melacha activity. Thus, allowing one’s animal to eat this grass might tempt the non-Jew to cut additional grass for the Jew’s animal, which we must avoid.

So far, we have calculated that if we can figure out how to get the non-Jew to turn on the light for his own benefit, one may use the light. Thus, we might be able to turn lights on in the shul for Shabbos, or have a non-Jew ride the elevator up to the main floor and hopefully have Bubby in the elevator at the same time. However, how does one get the non-Jew to turn on the light or the elevator for his own benefit when one may not ask him to do any work on Shabbos?

HINTING

May I hint to a non-Jew that I would like him to perform a prohibited activity on Shabbos? The poskim dispute this issue. Some rule that this is prohibited (Tur Orach Chayim 307), whereas others permit it (Bach, Orach Chayim 307 s.v. uma shekasav rabbeinu). Thus, according to the second opinion, one may ask a non-Jew on Shabbos, “Why didn’t you accompany Bubby on the elevator last Shabbos?” even though he clearly understands that you are asking him to take the elevator with her today. According to the first opinion, one may not do this, nor may one ask a non-Jew to clean up something in a dark room, since to do so he must turn on the light.

However, the majority of poskim accept an intermediate position, contending that, although one may not hint to a non-Jew on Shabbos, one may hint to him on a weekday (Smag). Thus one may ask him on Friday, “Why didn’t you do this last Shabbos? but one may not ask him this on Shabbos (Shulchan Aruch Orach Chayim 307:2; Rema Orach Chayim 307:22). According to this last ruling, one could tell the non-Jew during the week, “Why did you leave Bubby downstairs without taking her up in the elevator?” but one could not mention this to him on Shabbos.

PERMITTED HINTING VERSUS PROHIBITED HINTING

However, the poskim agree that one may tell a non-Jewish mailman on Shabbos, “I cannot read this letter until it is open.” What is the difference between the two types of hinting?

The difference is that the forbidden type of hinting implies either a command or a rebuke, whereas the permitted type does not (Magen Avraham 307:31). Telling a non-Jew to clean something up in a dark room on Shabbos is, in essence, commanding him to perform a prohibited activity — turning on the light. Similarly, when you rebuke him for not doing something last Shabbos, you are basically commanding him to do it the next Shabbos. However, one may make a statement of fact that is neither a command nor a rebuke. Therefore telling the non-Jew, “I cannot read this letter unless it is open” does not command him to do anything, and for this reason it is permitted.

However, if the non-Jew then asks me, “Would you like me to open the letter for you?” I may not answer “Yes,” since this is itself a command. (It is as if you said, “Yes, I would like you to open the letter for me.”) I may tell him, “That’s not a bad idea,” or “I have no objections to your opening the letter,” which does not directly ask him. I may even say, “I am not permitted to ask you to open it on my Sabbath.”

How does this discussion affect our dark Simchas Torah or getting Bubby home?

The congregant suggested the following: One could create a situation whereby turning on the light is beneficial for the non-Jew, and then hint to him that if he wants to, he could benefit by turning the light on. One may do this because the non-Jew is turning on the light for his own use, and the Jew did not ask him directly to turn on the light. Thus, if you placed a bottle of whiskey or a gift of chocolate in the shul, and then notified the non-Jew that the bottle or chocolate is waiting for him there, you can show him how to turn on the lights so that he can find his present. This is permitted because the non-Jew is turning on the lights for his own benefit, and you did not ask him, nor even hint to him that you want him to turn on the lights. You simply notified him that if he wants to put on the lights, he could find himself a very nice present.

The same solution may help Bubby return home. Someone may invite a non-Jew to the sheva brachos, and then told him that a present awaits him in the building’s entrance foyer. Does it bother him if Bubby shares the elevator with him while he goes to retrieve his present?

A word of caution: If one uses this approach, one must be careful that the non-Jew is indeed doing the melacha for his own purposes, such as to get the present as mentioned above. However, one may not ask the non-Jew to accompany you on a tour of the dark shul, and then he turns on the light to see his way. This is prohibited because the non-Jew is interested in the light only in order to accompany you on the walk, not because he gains anything (see Shulchan Aruch 276:3).

We will continue this topic next week…

As I mentioned above, the Rambam explains the reason that Chazal prohibited asking a non-Jew to do work on Shabbos is so that we do not diminish sensitivity to doing melacha ourselves. Refraining from having even a non-Jew work for me on Shabbos shows even deeper testimony to my conviction that Hashem created the world.

Can a Lens be Laundered? How do I Care for my Soft Contacts on Shabbos?

Certainly, on Shabbos Bereishis it is appropriate to discuss hilchos Shabbos.

Photo by Julia R. from FreeImages

Question: My friend and I both wear soft contact lens, but we received very different instructions how to care for them on Shabbos. Could you please explain the background to the shailohs involved?

Answer: From a halachic perspective, the question is whether cleaning soft lenses on Shabbos is different from washing the older, hard lenses or from cleaning ordinary eyeglasses, for that matter. The technical difference between them is that soft lenses absorb water, whereas the other lenses do not. Therefore, contemporary poskim dispute whether cleaning soft lenses involves a prohibition of laundering on Shabbos. To explain this dispute, we must first introduce the halachic concepts of laundering on Shabbos.

One of the activities necessary to construct the mishkan was cleaning and bleaching the wool for its curtains. Therefore, one of the thirty-nine avos melachos (main categories) of Shabbos is melabein, which translates either as laundering (Rashi, Shabbos 73a) or as bleaching (Rambam, Hilchos Shabbos 9:11). Both opinions agree that laundering fiber or clothing is prohibited min haTorah because it improves the wool’s appearance.

To illustrate this melacha’s details, we will first explain the halachos of regular laundering. Washing clothes involves three steps;

(1) soaking them in water or another cleaning liquid.

(2) scrubbing out the dirt. 

(3) wringing the water out of the clothes.

Each of these steps is prohibited min haTorah because of laundering.

SOAKING

The first step is soaking. Simply placing dirty clothes into water to soak is a Torah violation of melabein. In the words of the amora, Rava, “Someone who threw a handkerchief into water violated a Torah prohibition of laundering on Shabbos” (Zevachim 94b).

Some poskim forbid soaking clean clothes (Yerei’im; see Rema, Orach Chayim 302:9), since this whitens or brightens them. (For purposes of meleches melabein, a “clean garment” means one without noticeable stains or obvious dirt.) Others contend that soaking a garment is prohibited only if there is noticeable dirt that will thereby be removed (Tosafos Yeshanim and Rosh, Yoma 74b). Although most poskim are lenient, one should preferably follow the more stringent opinion (Mishnah Berurah 302:48).

Some later poskim contend that the opinion forbidding soaking a “clean garment” does so only when the soaking causes a noticeable change, e.g., the garment looks brighter afterward. However, it is permitted to soak a clean item that never brightens when it is soaked (Shu”t Avnei Nezer 159:10; Koveitz Teshuvos #18; cf. Graz 302:21 who disagrees.) Later in this article, we will see how this factor affects our discussion about contact lenses.

Sprinkling water on clothing is also considered soaking, and this is certainly so if one intends to clean it. Therefore, if food splatters on your shirt or blouse on Shabbos, placing some water or even saliva on the stain so that it does not set is a Torah violation of laundering.

The poskim dispute whether one may moisten cloth while making it dirty. For example, may one mop up spilled juice with a rag? If this is prohibited because it is considered melabein, then one is required to shake the excess water off one’s hands before drying them on a towel, even though drying one’s hands soils the towel.

Other poskim contend that it is permitted to moisten cloth while making it dirty. In their opinion, one may dry drenched hands on a towel. The halacha is like the latter opinion, and, therefore, it is permitted to throw a towel onto a spill (Shulchan Aruch and Rema, Orach Chayim 302:10).

To wipe up a spill, one should use a towel or rag, rather than a garment, if it will get drenched. This is out of concern that one might squeeze out a soaked garment (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 302 11). We are not concerned that he will forget and squeeze a towel or rag, since they are meant for this purpose.

When absorbent paper towels came on the market, there was a need to clarify their halachic status. Rav Moshe Feinstein rules that one may wipe up a spill with a paper towel because paper is not an item that is laundered (Shu”t Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 2:70). (However, one should not squeeze out the paper towel because of the prohibition of “mefareik,” extracting a liquid from a solid, which we will discuss a different time iy”H.)

SCRUBBING

The second stage of laundering is scrubbing, which actively dislodges dirt from the garment. This is the main step in cleaning a garment. Any type of scrubbing or scouring clothing or material violates the prohibition of laundering on Shabbos.

WRINGING

The final stage in laundering is squeezing out the water. This is prohibited because the garment’s appearance is improved by squeezing out absorbed liquid (Beis Yosef, Orach Chayim end of 301, quoting Kolbo). Thus, one can violate melabein by wringing out a garment, even if it is totally clean. Furthermore, when squeezing water out of a garment, one generally also squeezes out dirt (Shu”t Avnei Nezer 159:19, 23).

WASHING DISHES

Why are we permitted to wash dishes on Shabbos? Aren’t we removing dirt from the dishes and improving their appearance?

Laundering clothing is different because this removes dirt that became absorbed between the fibers of the fabric. However, the food and dirt on dishes sticks to their surface and does not absorb into the dish. Thus, washing dishes is halachically different from laundering (Shu”t Avnei Nezer, Orach Chayim 157:4).

(Note that it is prohibited to wash dishes on Shabbos when one is obviously washing them to use after Shabbos [Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 323:6]. However, this is a violation of preparing on Shabbos for after Shabbos and has nothing to do with the prohibition of laundering. Note also that since most poskim prohibit using hot water from the faucet in modern homes on Shabbos, we are discussing washing dishes in cold water or with hot water from an urn.)

LEATHER

We have seen that soaking, scrubbing, or wringing out clothing violates melabein on Shabbos and that soaking or scrubbing dirty dishes does not. There is a material that falls in between dishes and normal clothing: leather. It is permitted to soak leather, although it is prohibited to scrub it or to wring liquid out of it, as I will explain.

Halacha forbids scrubbing soft leather on Shabbos, although it is disputed whether this is prohibited min haTorah or only miderabbanan (Graz, Orach Chayim 302:19; Shu”t Avnei Nezer, Orach Chayim 157:2; Orach Chayim 302:9 s.v. Aval). Those who contend that it is miderabbanan are of the opinion that dirt never absorbs into leather – it merely adheres to its surface, like it does to dishes (Shu”t Avnei Nezer, Orach Chayim 157:5). However, since leather is not as hard as dishes, it is still prohibited miderabbanan to scrub dirt off the leather, even though it is permitted to scrub dishes clean.

All opinions agree that one may soak leather on Shabbos. Thus, one may pour water on shoes and leather jackets that became dirty on Shabbos and even rub lightly to remove the dirt. However, one may not scrub dirt off shoes and jackets (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 302:9). (Shoes and leather jackets are considered soft leather, whereas many leather-bound books are considered hard leather. One must check that the entire shoe is leather because many leather shoes have cloth parts that may not be soaked on Shabbos.)

Although soaking is generally considered the first step in laundering, this only applies to clothes and fabrics where the soaking begins the cleaning process. Leather is different because, although soaking dirty leather or hide loosens the dirt, it does not significantly improve the appearance of the leather.  Nevertheless, it is prohibited miderabbanan to squeeze wet leather (Rambam, Hilchos Shabbos 9:11).

HARD LEATHER

Most poskim allow scrubbing hard leather on Shabbos (and certainly soaking it), although some contend that this is prohibited miderabbanan (She’iltos, quoted by Mishnah Berurah 302:39). Thus, if a leather-bound book becomes soiled with mud on Shabbos, it is permitted to scrub it clean before the mud dries. Once the mud dries, this would be prohibited because of tochein, grinding (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 302:7).

PLASTIC

Hard plastic plates or cups are considered like dishes and may be washed on Shabbos.

What is the halachic status of soft plastic items, such as disposable tablecloth covers? Is there a prohibition of melabein in washing these plastic tablecloths? Are they considered like dishes, like leather, or like cloth?

The great poskim who lived after the invention of these tablecloths discuss whether they should be treated like leather or like dishes. They conclude that, although they are probably most comparable to dishes, one should be strict and treat them like soft leather. Thus, one may rinse or soak them, but should be stringent not to scrub them (Shu”t Igros Moshe, Yoreh Deah 2:76; Shulchan Shelomoh, Hilchos Shabbos I 302:15). Following this approach, children’s rubber pants (if anyone still has them) or plastic sheets can be soaked since they do not absorb liquid, but if one has a cloth item with a plastic lining, that cannot be soaked. 

PLASTIC LENSES

Now that we have explained these cases, we can return to our original question about cleaning contact lenses.

To the best of my knowledge, all contemporary poskim agree that hard contact lenses and eyeglass lenses, whether glass or plastic, may be washed on Shabbos, just like dishes. Since they are hard, we assume that the dirt adheres to their surface and does not absorb inside them.

The standard care of soft lenses is to remove them from the wearer’s eyes and place them in a special antiseptic solution overnight. In the morning, one removes the lenses from the solution, rubs a finger over them to remove any remaining dirt, and reinserts them.

The lenses are soaked for three reasons.

First, to sanitize the lens from microscopic germs that can cause infection. This is why the solution is antiseptic.

Second, to clean the lens from dirt and tears; although they are initially unnoticeable, eventually they collect on the lens and make it cloudy. Rubbing one’s finger over the lens before reinserting it removes the dirt and tears that are not always removed simply by soaking the lenses.

The third reason to soak the lens is to keep it soft and pliable. If the lens is not kept moist, it will dry out and become unusable. For this purpose, however, it is unnecessary to soak the lens in a cleaning solution – soaking it in a sterile saline solution suffices.

Under normal circumstances, no dirt is noticeable on the lens. It is unclear whether the dirt and tears are absorbed into the lens or lie on the surface, and this lack of clarity makes a big difference in our shailah.

The halachic question is whether placing the lenses into the solution, removing them from the solution, and rubbing them involve any violation of laundering on Shabbos. Does placing the lens into solution constitute soaking? Is removing them considered squeezing since the cleaning fluid is now being removed or “squeezed” out of the lens? Is rubbing them equivalent to scrubbing? Or do we say that these lenses are no different from hard lenses?

As mentioned above, the critical difference is that, whereas hard lenses do not absorb liquid, soft contact lenses do, and actually absorb considerably more liquid than leather does. Whereas some lenses absorb as much as 70% water content by weight, most leather absorbs little or no water at all. (Some leather absorbs liquid, but never this much.) Because lenses absorb so much water, it can be argued that they are like cloth and, therefore, all these steps should be prohibited.

However, every posek I saw disputes this conclusion because the lens remains unchanged when the liquid is added and removed. As mentioned above, soaking a clean garment is prohibited only when it causes a noticeable improvement, such as the garment looks brighter afterwards. However, the appearance of soft lenses are unchanged by the soaking, and therefore soaking alone does not violate any laws of Shabbos (Orchos Shabbos; Shu”t Yevakeish Torah 5:11).

Some poskim distinguish between the normal cleaning solution and a pure saline solution (Kovetz Teshuvos #18). In their opinion, placing leather in a powerful cleaning solution is equivalent to scrubbing leather and is prohibited on Shabbos. Similarly, since placing the lenses in the normal cleaning solution removes the dirt from them, it is considered as if one scrubbed them on Shabbos and is forbidden (Orchos Shabbos). However, placing them in a saline solution to keep them moist is permitted since no improvement is noticeable.

Poskim who follow this approach usually tell people to wash the lenses before Shabbos with cleaning solution, reinsert them, and then place the lenses into regular saline solution when removing them for the night on Shabbos.

However, if one follows this last opinion, one should be very careful. The saline solution does not prevent infection from developing on the lens, whereas the normal cleaning solution is also a disinfectant. A physician I spoke to advised someone using saline solution to place the solution containing the lenses into a refrigerator overnight. Even after removing the lenses from the saline solution Shabbos morning, one should keep the solution refrigerated the whole week until next Shabbos. He also recommended replacing the saline solution every few weeks.

Rav Shlomoh Zalman Auerbach zt”l had a different approach to this issue, contending that the soft contact lenses do not really absorb liquid. He maintained that plastic does not absorb liquid the same way that cloth does. Whereas the liquid actually enters the cloth and becomes absorbed inside, liquid does not actually enter into the plastic of the soft lenses, but remains between the strands of the plastic. Soft lenses are constructed of a plastic that has space between its strands to allow water to enter. However, the water never enters the “fiber” of the plastic the same way it enters the fiber of the cloth. Thus, in his opinion, it is permitted to clean soft contact lenses on Shabbos the same way one would on weekdays (Nishmas Avraham, Volume 5, pg. 20; see Shemiras Shabbos Kehilchasah pg. 181).

Rav Shlomo Zalman held that one must place the contact lenses into solution only when they are still moist, out of concern that wetting them after they are dry is considered repairing them. In point of fact, everyone who has these lenses keeps them moist at all times, exactly for this reason.

I have heard rabbonim paskin a compromise position between these two above-mentioned positions, contending that there is no problem with soaking the lenses, since this does not clean them, but when removing the lenses from the solution one should not rub them, since this might be considered scrubbing the lenses.

Conclusion

The Torah commanded us concerning the halachos of Shabbos by giving us the basic categories that are prohibited. Our poskim analyze the rules the Torah gives us and then compare these rules to new circumstances that appear. The greatness of the Torah is that even though the world is constantly changing and developing, the words of Torah are timeless and can be applied to all of these new situations.

Using a Thermos on Shabbos

Since most of the laws of Shabbos are derived from the construction of the Mishkan, it is an appropriate week to discuss:

Question #1: Using a Thermos

“May I pour hot water from an urn or a kettle that is on the blech into a thermos on Shabbos?”

Question #2: Wrapping a Thermos

“May I wrap a thermos bottle, containing hot water, with towels on Shabbos to keep the water hot?”

Introduction:

Explaining the background behind both of these questions involves an in-depth analysis of the rabbinic injunctions instituted by our Sages to safeguard the Shabbos. The laws of Shabbos include many Torah prohibitions, such as not to cook or stir a fire, and also many rabbinic prohibitions to guarantee that people not violate Torah laws. We will begin our explanation of this topic with an extensive glossary, but bear in mind that this is a brief overview of these concepts and not to be used for practical halacha.

Shehiyah – leaving food on the fire

Chazal prohibited shehiyah, which is leaving food on a fire or in an oven when Shabbos begins, because of concern that someone might mistakenly stir the coals. However, they permitted leaving food this way when one fulfills any one of the following three requirements:

1. Covering the fire

One may leave food cooking or warming as Shabbos begins, if he covers the fire in a way that lessens its heat and also reminds one not to stir the fire on Shabbos (see Shabbos 36b with Rashi and Ran). The most common method used today to accomplish this is to place a blech on top of the stove. It is preferable that the blech also cover the dials, to avoid inadvertently adjusting the flame (Shu”t Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 1:93).

2. Adding raw meat

A second method to permit cooking or warming food when Shabbos begins is to place raw meat into the pot immediately before Shabbos (Shabbos 18b). By doing so, one knows that the food will certainly not be ready to eat for the Friday night meal, and it will be ready for the Shabbos day meal, so there is no need to be concerned about turning up the fire (Rashi ad locum).

Several late poskim are reluctant to rely on this heter today, for reasons beyond the scope of this article (Chazon Ish, Orach Chayim 37:22; Teshuvos Ivra in Kisvei Hagaon Rav Yosef Eliyahu Henkin, Volume 2, page 19).

3. Cooked before Shabbos

A third approach is to have the food cooked before Shabbos begins. According to Ashkenazic practice, one may leave the food even on an open fire, as long as it is considered edible when Shabbos begins. Sefardim follow a more stringent approach, allowing this heter only if the food is fully cooked and only for heating water and similar foods that do not improve by remaining longer on the fire. To prepare chamin shel Shabbat, what Ashkenazim call cholent, a Sefardi must rely on one of the other two heterim mentioned above, whereas an Ashkenazi may leave his food even on an open flame, if it is edible when Shabbos begins.

Chazarah – warming food on Shabbos

A second prohibition that Chazal instituted is called chazarah, which includes placing food, even if fully cooked, on a heat source on Shabbos to warm it up. The details of this prohibition are complicated, but for our purposes we will mention that it is permitted to return a pot or food to the fire on Shabbos, even if the food is fully cooked, only in two general ways:

A. The food is still hot, one removed it from the blech intending to return it to remain hot or warm, provided he kept his hand on the handle of  the pot the entire time that it was off the fire. Many Sefardim are lenient, maintaining that one does not need to observe the last two requirements, provided the pot of food was not placed on the ground; Ashkenazim can be lenient about returning the food to the fire, if someone mistakenly forgot these two requirements. Concerning how hot the food must be, Sefardim are stricter than Ashkenazim, contending that the food must be too hot to hold directly in one’s hand in order to permit returning. Ashkenazim rule that one may return the food as long as it is still warm enough to eat.

B. Under certain circumstances, Chazal permitted warming dry food on Shabbos in a way that is different from the way one normally cooks food. For example: One may place a fully-baked kugel on top of a pot that is on the fire.

Hatmanah – insulating

A third prohibition that Chazal instituted, one very relevant to our topic, is called hatmanah, wrapping or insulating food to keep it hot. This includes two different sets of rules – one for someone who wraps the food before Shabbos and one for someone who wants to wrap his food on Shabbos.

Before Shabbos

Chazal prohibited hatmanah before Shabbos in a way that increases the heat, such as with hot ash, fertilizer, or the remaining crushed-out pulp of olives or sesame seeds. These materials are called davar hamosif hevel, items that increase heat. This is prohibited because of a concern that someone might mistakenly stir coals on Shabbos (Shabbos 34b). However, it is permitted to insulate foods before Shabbos with materials that do not increase heat, called davar she’eino mosif hevel, such as clothing, blankets, towels, or sawdust. (In the case of sawdust, one may also have to deal with the laws of muktzah, but that is not today’s subject.)

Partial hatmanah before Shabbos

The Rishonim dispute what constitutes hatmanah. Does leaving food on a fire to continue warming when Shabbos arrives constitute hatmanah? Although this does not fulfill our usual definition of insulating, it warms the food on Shabbos by maintaining physical contact with a source of heat. According to many Rishonim, placing food so that it touches the fire is included in the prohibition of hatmanah (Ba’al Hamaor and Ran, beginning of Shabbos, Chapter 3). In their opinion, if one heats food on a wood fire and intends to leave the food that way into Shabbos, one must place the food atop a tripod or other device that raises it above the burning wood and coals. Placing the pot of food on the tripod avoids the prohibition of hatmanah (but may still involve the prohibition of shehiyah), since the food is no longer touching any heat source. Failing to distance the food from direct contact to the source of heat violates the prohibition of hatmanah, and the food may not be eaten on Shabbos.

According to other Rishonim, hatmanah is prohibited only when the pot of food is covered completely or mostly (see Tosafos, Shabbos 36b s.v. Lo; Sefer Hayashar, Cheilek Hachiddushim Chapter 235). The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 253:1) follows the first opinion that one may not have food lying directly on a flame or hot coals when Shabbos begins. Thus, Sefardim, who follow the Shulchan Aruch’s decisions, may not leave food for Shabbos touching the heat directly, even if it is otherwise exposed to the air. The Rema permits partial hatmanah on Shabbos, allowing placing a pot into warm coals before Shabbos, as long as the lid is not covered by the coals.

Thus, people on a camping trip over Shabbos who choose to keep their Friday night dinner warm by leaving it on their campfire need to know if they are Ashkenazim or Sefardim. If they are Ashkenazim, they may leave their food on the fire when Shabbos starts, as long as it is already cooked to the extent that it is edible. If they are Sefardim, they must have the food elevated above the fire when Shabbos begins, and, in addition, they can do this only with food that is fully cooked and does not improve when it stews longer.

Lid is not covered

If one is an Ashkenazi, how much of the pot may be covered without violating the laws of hatmanah? The Shulchan Aruch Harav (Kuntrus Acharon 257:3) contends that as long as the pot lid remains uncovered, one may cover all the sides of the pot. He permits placing a bottle into a pot of hot water before Shabbos, provided that the cover of the bottle is above the water level.

The Pri Megadim (Mishbetzos Zahav, Orach Chayim 259:3) discusses whether it is sufficient that the top of the pot be exposed, or whether a larger area of the pot must be exposed. Based on a ruling of the Taz (Orach Chayim 258:1), the Pri Megadim contends that one must leave most of the pot exposed to avoid violating hatmanah. (We should note that the Taz in Orach Chayim 253:14 appears to hold like the Shulchan Aruch Harav.)

This dispute would affect to what extent one may drape towels over an urn either before or on Shabbos. According to the Pri Megadim, one may do this only if the sides of the urn are predominantly exposed. According to the Shulchan Aruch Harav, it is sufficient if the sides are partially exposed.

Shabbos sleeve

I once saw a woman prepare her electric hot water urn by draping a cloth sleeve made especially for the urn and embroidered with the words “Lichvod Shabbos.” I asked her why she did that and she said, “It keeps it hotter.” When I told her she can’t use it because of hatmanah, she was incredulous, and responded, “but it says ‘lichvod Shabbos!’” I have no idea who produced this sleeve, but there was no hechsher embossed on it. Unfortunately, the label on the cloth does not permit its use.

By the way, there is a simple solution for this problem. If some space is left between the side of the urn and the towels or sleeve, this is not considered hatmanah and is permitted (Chayei Odom, Hilchos Shabbos 2:5). One may place a board or other item on top of the urn that is wider that the urn and drape the towel over the item. In this instance, one may leave the towel there all of Shabbos, and one may even place the towel there on Shabbos itself. Since the towel is not resting flush against the urn, this is not included in the prohibition of hatmanah.

On Shabbos

On Shabbos itself, Chazal prohibited covering the food, even with something that does not increase heat (Shabbos 34a). Therefore, one may not take a cholent pot or kettle and wrap it in towels on Shabbos to keep it hot. The reason for this prohibition is concern that someone insulating his food will discover that it is colder than he wants and will mistakenly heat it (Shabbos 34a).

Kli rishon and sheini

The next part of our glossary involves explaining the terms kli rishon, kli sheini and yad soledes bo.

A kli rishon is a pot, pan or other vessel containing food that was heated on top of a stove, inside an oven or any other way directly from a source of heat. A kli sheini is the platter or bowl into which food was poured from a kli rishon.

Here is a halachic example of the distinction between kli rishon and kli sheini. The Mishnah (Shabbos 42a) teaches that if a pan or pot of food was removed from the fire on Shabbos, one may not add spices into that pot, because this constitutes bishul. However, one may add spices to a platter which contains the food after it has been poured out of the original pot or pan. The second case is a kli sheini, meaning that the platter itself was never on the fire.

Why is there a halachic difference between a kli rishon and a kli sheini? Tosafos (Shabbos 40b s.v. Ushma) explains that when the vessel itself is on the fire or inside the oven, the heat of the food is sustained by the hot walls of the vessel, and that is why bishul occurs. However, when the container itself was never directly warmed, the walls of the vessel diminish the heat of the food placed therein. As a result, the food will not cook from the heat of the kli sheini walls. In other words, cooking requires not only sufficient heat, but also that the walls of the pot or vessel maintain that heat. Therefore, cooking occurs in a kli rishon even after it was removed from the fire, but, under most circumstances, not in a kli sheini.

Yad soledes bo

Whenever halacha discusses that something is hot, it means that it is at least yad soledes bo, a term meaning that it is hot enough that a person pulls his hand back instinctively when he touches it. There is much dispute among the halachic authorities as to how we measure this in degrees, which is a subtopic that we will leave for a different time.

Using a thermos

Now that we have completed our very extensive introduction, we can address the questions that began this article:

“May I pour hot water from an urn or a kettle that is on the blech into a thermos on Shabbos?”

“May I wrap a thermos bottle, containing hot water, with towels on Shabbos to keep the water hot?”

The Gemara (Shabbos 51a) quotes a Tosefta (see Shabbos 4:12) that provides the prologue to our question: “Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says that they prohibited (insulating on Shabbos) only if the food is in the pot in which it was originally heated up, but if it was moved to a different pot, one may insulate it on Shabbos.” The Gemara explains that the prohibition to insulate food on Shabbos is out of concern that someone might increase the heat by stirring coals (see Shabbos 34a). Rashi explains that the reason Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel permitted wrapping up the pot of food in this case is because the person is actively trying to cool off the water by pouring it into a cooler vessel. However a thermos bottle that is being used to keep things hot may be different.

On the other hand, the Rambam (Hilchos Shabbos 4:5) cites this law as follows: “If you moved the cooked food or the hot water from one vessel to another, one is permitted to insulate the second vessel on Shabbos, provided one uses material that does not increase heat… because they forbade insulating food on Shabbos only in a kli rishon, in which the food was originally cooked, but once it was moved from that vessel, it is permitted.” Clearly, the Rambam understands that there was no decree prohibiting hatmanah in a kli sheini on Shabbos with devorim she’einam mosifim hevel. Following this logic, it would appear that one may pour hot water into a thermos bottle on Shabbos, even though one’s intent is to keep the water hot,since a thermos is only a kli sheini. Thus, whether one may pour hot water into a thermos on Shabbos may depend on this dispute between Rashi and the Rambam.

In general, halachic authorities rule according to the Rambam when he disputes with Rashi, both lechumrah and lekulah. The Birkei Yosef (Choshen Mishpat 25:31) explains the reason is because Rashi wrote his comments to explain the text of the Gemara, and it is possible that he might have reconsidered had he issued a final ruling.  Indeed, in this instance, several major authorities appear to rule according to the Rambam (Ran; Tur; Taz, Orach Chayim 257:5; see also Magen Avraham 252:13).

Notwithstanding the opinions of these authorities, Rav Moshe Feinstein writes that it is preferable to be machmir like Rashi (Shu”t Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 1:95). Rav Moshe concludes, however, that, even according to Rashi, it is permitted to pour water into a thermos bottle on Shabbos, because of a different reason. The closing of a thermos bottle is not an act of hatmanah, but an act of closing the bottle. However, according to Rashi, it is certainly forbidden to wrap the thermos bottle with towels to keep it hot. According to Rambam, this should be permitted, because there is no hatmanah in a kli sheini.

In conclusion

Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch (Shemos 20:10) notes that people mistakenly think that work is prohibited on Shabbos in order that it be a day of rest. He points out that the Torah does not prohibit doing avodah, which connotes hard work, but melacha, which implies purpose and accomplishment. Shabbos is a day on which we refrain from altering the world for our own purposes, and the goal of Shabbos is to allow Hashem’s rule to be the focus of creation, by refraining from our own creative acts (Shemos 20:11).

The Gemara teaches that the rabbinic laws are dearer to Hashem than the Torah laws. In this context, we can explain the vast halachic literature devoted to understanding these prohibitions, created by Chazal to protect the Jewish people from major sins. Seeing how much attention the poskim apply to understanding the laws of Shabbos thoroughly should encourage us to make sure we know these laws well, in all their details.

No Leg to Stand On

Question #1: Placing my feet

“If the wheel of a stroller falls off on Shabbos, may I slide it back?”

Question #2: A benched bench

“If one leg fell off a bench, may I place the bench on top of another so that people can sit on it on Shabbos?”

Question #3: Pulling my leg

While in shul the first day of Sukkos, I noticed that one of the legs of the shulchan on which the sefer Torah is read was loose and fell off. I then noticed that the gabbai used his foot to push the leg underneath the shulchan to keep it balanced, apparently something he has been doing fairly frequently. As I will explain, I was concerned that the entire shulchan and the leg might be muktzah because of a special decree of Chazal. But first we need an introduction.

Answer

The manufacture of the mishkan and the vestments of the kohanim, discussed in parshas Tetzaveh, provides the source for the 39 melachos, categories of prohibited activities, of Shabbos. One of the activities prohibited min haTorah on Shabbos is repairing an appliance in a permanent, professional way. The early authorities dispute under which melacha heading this activity is included, some considering it to be a type of boneh, constructing, whereas others incorporate it under makeh bepatish, the melachah involved when completing construction of an item. According to both opinions, repairing an appliance in a permanent, professional way is prohibited min haTorah.

Since repairing an appliance in a permanent way is prohibited d’Oraisa, Chazal prohibited other activities that might lead one to violate the Torah law. Here is an example: In the days of Chazal, a kirah was a type of low, earthenware stovetop that rested on short legs that kept it balanced on the ground. A fire was constructed either inside the kirah or beneath it in a small trough dug into the ground. The Gemara (Shabbos 138b) teaches that if the legs of the kirah became detached, the entire stovetop is muktzah, out of concern that one might forget and insert the legs in a permanent way, an act that is prohibited min haTorah.

At this point, we can already understand the question that was raised above regarding the shulchan with a broken leg. Just as the stovetop is muktzah because of its missing leg, perhaps the same is true regarding the shul’s shulchan. Answering this question will require that we delve into this and other related passages of Gemara, and then study what the early commentators write about this topic – so let us roll up our sleeves. As in all our articles, it is not our purpose to render a final halachic decision – that is the role for an individual’s rav or posek. Our goal is to elucidate the topics in order to enable our readers to be able to ask an intelligent shaylah and understand the answer well.

Rav versus the beraisa

Let us begin by examining the Gemara more carefully (Shabbos 138b):

Rami, the son of Yechezkel, asked Rav Huna to review for him three rulings that Rav Huna had heard directly from the great amora Rav, whose name refers to his role as the teacher of all of Klal Yisroel. One of these rulings was: A beraisa (an ancient teaching dating from the era of the tanna’im that was not included in the Mishnah) ruled that a kirah of which two legs became detached is muktzah and may not be used on Shabbos, whereas if only one leg slipped out of place, the kirah may still be used. According to our text of the Gemara, Rav disagreed with the beraisa, contending that if even one leg slipped out of place, the stovetop cannot be moved because of concern that one might reinsert the leg on Shabbos in a permanent way. This text does not reveal why the beraisa contended that one may move a kirah if it is missing only one leg but not if it is missing two.

Among the early rishonim, we find three ways to explain this passage of Gemara:

According to the Ran, the dispute between the beraisa and Rav relates to whether we need to be concerned that someone might insert the leg in a permanent way when only one leg is missing (Ran’s commentary on Rif ad loc.). Presumably, when two legs are missing, the stovetop is difficult to use, and, therefore, the beraisa was concerned that someone might mistakenly insert the two legs in a permanent way, thus desecrating Shabbos. However, when only one leg is missing, since one can use the stovetop by balancing it on its remaining legs, Chazal did not ban using it. Rav disagreed, concerned that even one missing leg might cause someone to repair it in a way that desecrates Shabbos.

A second approach to understanding the beraisa is that of the Aruch, who holds that the beraisa itself was not concerned that someone might repair the stovetop in a way that desecrates Shabbos. The beraisa held that a stovetop missing two legs is muktzah for a completely different reason: It is considered useless with two missing legs, and a useless item is muktzah on Shabbos. Rav is concerned that someone might forget and repair the stovetop in a permanent way, and this concern exists even if only one leg is missing (quoted in the margin of the Gemara in the glosses added by Rav Yeshaya Pik).

A third approach is that of Rashi, who apparently had in front of him a text of the Gemara that varies from what is printed in our editions. His text omits three words that we have in our Gemara, including the words that Rav disagreed with the beraisa. According to his version, there is no dispute in the Gemara and no one prohibits using a stovetop that is missing only one leg. The beraisa ruled that one may not use a stovetop missing two legs, and Rav explained the reason: We are concerned that someone may insert the legs in a permanent way (see Maharshal and Maharam, Shabbos 138b).

According to Rashi, a stovetop missing one leg is not a cause for concern that someone may repair it on Shabbos and, therefore, Chazal did not rule it to be muktzah. Following this approach, there should similarly be no problem with the shulchan that I found to be missing a leg. However, based on the text that we have in our Gemara, all other halachic authorities conclude that if even one leg is missing, the stovetop is muktzah. This ruling is codified by the Rif, Rambam (Hilchos Shabbos 26:6), Rosh, Tur and Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 308:16). Thus, it would seem that our shulchan may indeed be muktzah. We will return to this dispute among the rishonim shortly.

A benched bench

Based on the above quoted passage of Gemara, we find that an early authority, the Terumas Hadeshen, prohibited using on Shabbos a bench missing one of its legs – even by resting the bench on top of another bench or chair. This is because of concern that one might forget and repair the bench (Terumas Hadeshen 1:71). And, according to late authorities, the rulings that we have seen applied to stovetops and benches apply to other tools and furniture with similar issues. For example, although it is permitted to use a hammer on Shabbos to open a coconut, if the head of the hammer fell off before Shabbos, the entire hammer is now muktzah and thus forbidden even for what would otherwise be a permitted purpose. This is because of a concern that someone may re-attach the head in a permanent way, which would desecrate Shabbos (Ketzos Hashulchan 109, Badei Hashulchan #10, at end).

To sum up: We see that Chazal were concerned about someone using a broken appliance because he might forget and, without thinking, repair it in a way that is prohibited min haTorah. To avoid this problem, they prohibited moving the appliance.

We can now explain the concern that I had about the shul’s shulchan. Since the shulchan had a leg that fell off, is the shulchan now muktzah?

Complicating the question

Circumstances complicated the question that I had raised regarding the loose shulchan leg. I discovered the problem on the first day of Sukkos, which means that the coming days are chol hamoed, Shemini Atzeres and Simchas Torah. Since repairing the shulchan in a professional manner is prohibited on chol hamoed, the repair would have to be postponed until after Yom Tov. However, on Simchas Torah the shulchan will be moved in order to accommodate the dancing. How are we going to do this if the shulchan is muktzah?

Conflicting passage

Although the above-quoted discussion would lead us to conclude that a damaged appliance that might accidentally be repaired is muktzah, other rulings of Chazal indicate that this is not always the case. A different passage of Gemara quotes a beraisa that one may remove the door of a cabinet, footlocker or bookcase on Shabbos, but one may not reaffix the door afterward, because of concern that one might hang it in a permanent way, which would desecrate Shabbos min haTorah (Shabbos 122b). However, there is no mention that these appliances or their doors may not be moved because of concern that someone will reaffix the door in a permanent way. In other words, although the Gemara prohibits reaffixing the door, it permits use of the cabinet, footlocker and bookcase and of their doors. Thus, although a broken kirah is muktzah, these appliances are not, despite the fact that we are concerned that someone might reaffix their doors in a permanent way. What is the difference between the two cases?

Similarly, we find a passage in Gemara Eiruvin (102b) that demonstrates the same point. There the Gemara records that if a hinge of the door of a cabinet, footlocker or bookcase is slipping out of place, one may push it back into place, but if it has completely slipped out of place one may not put it back, because of a concern that someone will mistakenly repair it in a permanent way, which, as we noted above, is prohibited min haTorah. Again here, although the Gemara prohibits reaffixing the hinge, the appliance itself does not become muktzah. Thus, we see again that the appliance may be moved as long as no one attempts to reaffix the door or the hinge. This contrasts with the cases of the stovetop leg where the Gemara ruled that the entire stove becomes muktzah.

Stoves versus footlockers

How is a stove different from a footlocker?

One might explain the difference between the case of the stove and that of the footlocker as being that it is difficult to use the stove at all without its leg, whereas the cabinet, footlocker or bookcase can be used without its door or hinge operating properly. We can explain this phenomenon as meaning that when someone has an appliance that is functional, he is less likely to forget and repair it on Shabbos. Although Chazal prohibited reaffixing the hinge or door in a temporary fashion, they saw no reason to prohibit using the appliance. On the other hand, since the stove could be used only with difficulty, Chazal prohibited its use altogether, concerned that even using the appliance might cause someone to repair it in a permanent way. Based on this analysis, we can understand why the Terumas Hadeshen banned the use of the bench, since, as it is now, it cannot be used without being repaired.

Return to the shulchan

According to this analysis, it would appear that the shulchan missing a leg should not be muktzah, since the shulchan can be used while missing a leg, notwithstanding the fact that it will obviously be somewhat wobbly. Thus, we can assume that Chazal would not have been concerned that someone might mistakenly repair it in a permanent way.

In addition to the reasoning we have just presented, there are several other reasons why this shulchan should probably not be muktzah. The first reason is based on the fact that the shulchan has already been used without having its leg repaired. This approach is based on the following ruling of the Rema. When he quotes the Terumas Hadeshen’s case (of the bench missing a leg) as definitive halachah, the Rema adds, however, that if the bench had been used before Shabbos by placing one end on top of another bench, one may use the bench and move it on Shabbos. Thus we see that when the appliance has already been used in its compromised status before Shabbos, we are not concerned that someone may mistakenly repair it on Shabbos. Since the shulchan was apparently being used with the broken leg propped up, one could argue that the Gemara’s concern does not apply.

Major repair

I believe that there is yet another reason why we do not need to be concerned about the damaged shulchan leg. The Taz (Orach Chayim 308:14) explains that, notwithstanding that a kirah whose leg or legs have fallen out may not be used, this is not true if the entire leg of the stovetop was lost, or the leg broke in the middle, rather than having fallen out. The reasoning here is as follows. Reaffixing a leg into an appliance in a permanent way is something that can be done relatively easily. This is why Chazal were concerned that someone might repair this item without realizing that it is prohibited to do so on Shabbos. However, repairing a leg that has broken is more complicated. We are confident that someone who considers making this repair will remember that it is Shabbos before he attempts it. The same is true if the leg is missing completely, since this requires fashioning a whole new leg that is the right size, appearance, and strength. Since this is a more complicated repair, we are not concerned that someone will forget it is Shabbos and do it. The Mishnah Berurah (308:69) rules in accordance with this Taz¸ that in these two situations one may use the stovetop.

In our case of the shul’s shulchan leg, it appears that reinserting it is a complicated task requiring specialized skills and would require the skills of a repairman. If that is so, it would seem that we could be lenient to assume that Chazal did not make the broken shulchan muktzah unless someone could easily make the repair on his own.

Why are we moving it?

Until now, we have not discussed whether the reason that one wants to move the broken shulchan, bench or stovetop affects whether one may move them. In point of fact, some authorities maintain that the prohibition of moving the broken stovetop is only when one wants to use it. Chazal prohibited not only using the stovetop but also moving it. However, there are late authorities who contend that it is permitted to move a kirah whose leg fell out if one is not interested in using the kirah, but its location is needed for another item or because it is in the way of something one needs to do (Ketzos Hashulchan 109:10 in Badei Hashulchan, at end; see also Tehillah Ledavid 308:22). They rally proofs to show that when Chazal prohibited moving a broken stovetop, the prohibition was only when one wants to use it, but that one may move it if one needs its place. In halachic terminology, it is prohibited to move the broken kirah or bench letzorech gufah (literally, for its own sake), but it may be moved letzorech mekomah (literally, for the purpose of its place). Thus, if the broken stovetop was being moved in order to make room for the Simchas Torah dancing, these authorities would permit moving it.

We should note that this question may be dependent on a dispute we quoted at the very beginning of our article between the Aruch and the Ran, whether a kirah with two detached legs is muktzah because one may come to repair it, or because it is no longer functional. If the reason not to move it is because of concern someone will repair it, it stands to reason that this concern exists only when one wants to use it. However, when one moves it to get it out of the way, why should moving it cause someone to mistakenly repair it? On the other hand, if it is muktzah because it is useless, then it makes no difference why one chooses to move it – it is prohibited to do so because the item is muktzah (Tehillah Ledavid 308:22).

In conclusion

Although I initially thought that the shulchan with a broken leg presented a serious problem, my personal conclusion was that the shulchan could be used and moved as is. I am very glad to have noticed the shaylah, because it provided me with the opportunity to research the question thoroughly and to provide our readers with the extensive background that this question entailed. Again, I note that if our readers are faced with a similar, actual question, they should pose it to their own rav or posek.

Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch (Shemos 20:10) notes that people mistakenly think that work is prohibited on Shabbos in order to provide a day of rest. This is incorrect, he points out, because the Torah does not prohibit doing avodah, which connotes hard work, but melachah, which implies purpose and accomplishment. On Shabbos, we refrain from constructing and altering the world for our own purposes. The goal of Shabbos is to emphasize Hashem’s rule as the focus of creation by refraining from our own creative acts (Shemos 20:11). By refraining from building for one day a week, we acknowledge the true Builder of the world and all that it contains.

 

 

Carrying Him Home

According to some commentaries, the source for some of the laws regarding the prohibition of carrying on Shabbos is in this week’s parsha. This certainly provides an excellent reason to discuss:

Carrying Him Home

Question #1: My son

“We were returning home in an area without an eruv, when my two-year old decided that he was walking no farther. Is there a halachically acceptable way for me to carry him home?”

Question #2: Public safety

“There is something dangerous lying in the street. May we remove it on Shabbos before anyone gets hurt?”

Question #3: Tefillin

“While taking a Shabbos stroll through the woods outside my town, I discovered some pairs of tefillin lying on the ground! Presumably, these were taken by thieves who broke into a shul, but subsequently abandoned them. Is there any way that I can bring these tefillin back to town?”

Answer:

All of the above questions involve carrying something on Shabbos in a place where there is no eruv. Our topic will be whether there is a halachic basis to permit carrying under these circumstances. As always, the purpose of this article is not to render decisions for our readers, but to introduce background and have the reader refer any related questions to his or her rav or posek. But first, some basic background.

What is “carrying”?

As we know, one of the 39 melachos of Shabbos is hotza’ah, which is violated by transporting an item from a reshus harabim, a public thoroughfare or open marketplace, into a reshus hayachid, an enclosed area, or, vice versa, by transporting from a reshus hayachid to a reshus harabim. The melacha also includes carrying or otherwise transporting items four amos (about seven feet) or more within a reshus harabim (Shabbos 96b; Tosafos, Shabbos 2a s.v. pashat). With reference to the laws of Shabbos, the terms reshus hayachid and reshus harabim are not determined by ownership, but by the extent to which the area is enclosed and how it is used. An area could be either publicly-owned or ownerless and still qualify as a reshus hayachid; an area owned by an individual might still qualify as a reshus harabim.

Akirah and hanacha

Violating this melacha min haTorah is defined by three steps.

(1) The first step is called akirah, literally, uprooting, which means removing the item from a place where it is at rest. The item must be at rest before the melacha is performed. “At rest” does not have to mean that it is on the ground – it could be resting on an item or piece of furniture, and, sometimes could even be “resting” in someone’s hand. Removing it from its “place of rest” qualifies as an akirah.

(2) The second step is the actual movement of the item, as described above.

(3) The final step is called hanacha, placing, which means that when the melacha activity is completed, the item is again “at rest.”

Let me use the first Mishnah of Maseches Shabbos for examples that explain these rules: One person, whom we will call “the outsider,” is standing in a reshus harabim, picks up an item that is located in the reshus harabim and passes it to someone in a reshus hayachid, “the insider.” If the outsider places the item into the hand of the insider, then the outsider has violated Shabbos – he (1) performed the akirah, (2) transported the item from a reshus harabim into a reshus hayachid and (3) performed the hanacha. Placing the item into the insider’s hand is considered hanacha, since the item is now “at rest,” and, when it reaches its resting point, it is in the reshus hayachid.

However, if the outsider merely extends his hand containing the item into the reshus hayachid, and the insider takes the item from the outsider’s hand, neither of them has performed a Torah violation of Shabbos. Although the outsider performed akirah and moved the item into the reshus hayachid (thereby performing steps 1 and 2), he did not complete the hanacha (step 3). Since the item was still in the suspended hand of the outsider, who himself was standing in a different area, it is not considered to be at rest in a reshus hayachid.

In this situation, the Mishnah explains that neither the outsider nor the insider has violated a melacha min haTorah. Nevertheless, both have violated rabbinic prohibitions, because Chazal prohibited performing akirah without hanacha and also prohibited performing hanacha without akirah. In addition, Chazal prohibited carrying something in the reshus harabim without either akirah or hanacha, and transporting something from a reshus hayachid to a reshus harabim, or vice versa, without akirah or hanacha.

Akirah and hanacha both within a reshus harabim

Similarly, the Torah’s prohibition to carry something or otherwise transport it four amos or more within a reshus harabim is only when there is both an akirah and a hanacha. If one transports it more than four amos, but did not perform both an akirah and a hanacha, the prohibition is only miderabbanan. Thus, if someone picks up an item in a reshus harabim, carries it four amos, but did not stop, and a different person removes it from his hand, neither of them has desecrated Shabbos min haTorah, although both violated rabbinic prohibitions for performing part of the melacha act.

What is a hanacha?

Here is another example of a case where no hanacha was performed. Someone picks up a bundle in a reshus harabim, places it on his shoulder, and walks with it more than four amos. At this point, he stops to adjust the bundle. The Gemara (Shabbos 5b) teaches that this is not considered a hanacha, and therefore the person has not desecrated Shabbos min haTorah.

However, if the person carrying the bundle stopped to rest, it is considered hanacha. (We will explain shortly what we mean that he “stopped to rest.”) Therefore, if he performed an akirah, carried a bundle more than four amos in a reshus harabim and then stopped to rest, he has performed a melacha, whereas if he stopped simply to rearrange his bundle and then continued on his way, he did not yet perform a melacha.

Less than four amos

In addition to the requirements of akirah and hanacha, one violates the melacha of carrying within a reshus harabim only when one transports the item at least four amos. Carrying an item less than four amos, called pachos mei’arba amos, in a reshus harabim does not violate Torah law. Whether this is prohibited by the Sages is the subject of a dispute among tana’im. According to the Rambam, it is permitted even miderabbanan to move an item less than four amos in a reshus harabim, whereas according to the Raavad, this is prohibited miderabbanan, except in extenuating situations.

A lenient hanacha

Until now, both akirah and hanacha have been sources of stringency, meaning that they have created a Torah prohibition, and without both of them, one does not violate the melacha of carrying min haTorah. However, there is actually a leniency that can be created by performing a hanacha. Here is the case: Someone transported an item less than four amos through a reshus harabim and then performed a hanacha, thereby completing this act of carrying. He then performs a new akirah and carries the item an additional short distance, but again less than four amos. Although, as we will soon see, it is prohibited to do this on Shabbos, there is no violation min haTorah; each time he carried the item, it was for less than four amos, since the two acts were separated by a hanacha.

Pachos pachos

What is the halacha regarding the following scenario: Reuven notices an item in a reshus harabim that he would like to move to a different location, more than four amos from where it currently is. He knows that it is prohibited min haTorah for him to pick it up, move it there, and put it down in its new location, since this constitutes akirah, moving it more than four amos, and hanacha. Instead, Reuven decides to do the following: he will pick up the item, move it less than four amos and put it down. Although he did both an akirah and a hanacha, since he moved the item less than four amos, this does not constitute a Torah violation, and, according to many rishonim, it is permitted lechatchilah. However, moving the item less than four amos does not accomplish what Reuven wants. In order to get the item to where he would like it to be, Reuven performs this process again – that is, he picks it up, moves it less than four amos, and puts it down again. This type of carrying is called pachos pachos mei’arba amos, meaning that although each time he carries the item he transports it less than four amos, he carries it this way more than one time. Reuven would like to repeat this process until he gets the item where he wants it. Is this permitted?

Indeed, Reuven’s plan will avoid desecrating a Torah prohibition of Shabbos, since he has successfully avoided performing melacha. However, Chazal prohibited someone from transporting an item this way out of concern that he may err, even once, and carry the item four amos or more and then perform the hanacha, thereby violating Shabbos min haTorah (Shabbos 153b).

However, the Gemara mentions that, under certain extraordinary circumstances, someone is permitted to transport an item in this manner. For example, someone walking through a reshus harabim discovers a pair of tefillin! He is concerned that, should he leave the tefillin where they are, they will be desecrated. The Gemara rules that, should the finder have no other option, he may transport the tefillin to a secure place via pachos pachos (Eruvin 97b). In other words, in order to avoid the desecration of the tefillin, Chazal relaxed the prohibition of carrying pachos pachos.

Babies and thorns

Similarly, the Gemara discusses this in the context of a baby who is outside of an eruv, and permits use of the heter of pachos pachos to transport him to an appropriate place.

In yet another example, the Gemara permits removing a thorn from a reshus harabim so that no one gets hurt (Shabbos 42a). Again, in an extenuating situation, Chazal permitted one to carry this way, even though it is usually not permitted.

At this point, we can address a different one of our above questions: “There is something dangerous lying in the street. May we remove it before anyone gets hurt?”

The answer is that one may remove it by carrying it less than four amos, stopping, and then repeating, as described above.

Must he sit down?

As I explained above, transporting something pachos pachos can be accomplished only when there is a proper hanacha to divide the two carrying acts into two separate halachic activities. What constitutes a proper hanacha in this instance?

There is a dispute between rishonim whether, in this instance, the person transporting the tefillin must sit down, or whether it is sufficient that he stop to rest while remaining standing.  Rashi (Avodah Zarah 70a) rules that it is sufficient for someone to stop to rest within four amos of his last stop. He does not explain how long he must rest for it to be considered a hanacha.

There are those who disagree with Rashi, contending that stopping to rest qualifies as a hanacha only when one truly wants to rest. However, when one’s goal is not to rest, but simply to avoid desecrating Shabbos, stopping of this nature while still standing does not constitute hanacha. According to this opinion, to avoid the prohibition of carrying on Shabbos, the tefillin transporter must actually sit down to qualify as having performed hanacha (Rabbeinu Yerucham, quoted by Beis Yosef, Orach Chayim 266 and 349, as explained by Magen Avraham 266:9).

How do we rule?

There is a dispute among early acharonim whether we follow Rashi or Rabbeinu Yerucham in this matter, but the majority follow Rashi’s approach that stopping to rest is adequate as a hanacha, even in this situation (Darchei Moshe, Orach Chayim 266:1; Magen Avraham 266:9; cf. Taz, Orach Chayim 266:4 who rules like Rabbeinu Yerucham).

Found tefillin

At this point, we can address one of our opening questions: “While taking a Shabbos stroll through the woods outside my town, I discovered some pairs of tefillin lying on the ground! Presumably, these were taken by thieves who broke into a shul, but subsequently abandoned them. Is there any way that I can bring these tefillin back to town?”

In this context, the Gemara rules that if one cannot safely remain with the tefillin until Shabbos ends, one may bring them back via the method of pachos pachos, meaning that one carries the tefillin for less than four amos, stops to rest, and then continues. According to Rabbeinu Yerucham, one should actually sit down when one stops to rest, whereas according to Rashi, this is unnecessary.

Karmelis

Until this point, we have been discussing the halachic rules that exist min haTorah, and we have dealt with areas that are either reshus harabim or reshus hayachid. However, there are many areas that do not qualify as either reshus harabim or reshus hayachid. A reshus harabim must be meant for public use or thoroughfare (Shabbos 6a) and must also meet other specific requirements, which I discussed in a different article. Any area that does not meet the Torah’s definition of a reshus harabim, and yet is not enclosed, is called a karmelis. Min haTorah, one may carry inside, into and from a karmelis. However, Chazal ruled that a karmelis must be treated with the stringencies of both a reshus hayachid and a reshus harabim. This means that it is forbidden to carry inside, into, or from any area that is not completely enclosed. This is the way we are familiar with observing Shabbos – one does not carry in any unenclosed area.

Nevertheless, the Gemara rules that there are exceptional situations when Chazal permitted one to carry in a karmelis. The Gemara mentions explicitly that should one find a thorn in a karmelis that might hurt someone, one can simply pick it up and remove it, since the prohibition of carrying within and out of a karmelis is only miderabbanan.

Pachos pachos in a karmelis

Is it permitted to carry pachos pachos in a karmelis? In other words, since carrying in a karmelis is, itself, prohibited only miderabbanan, and carrying pachos pachos in a reshus harabim is prohibited only miderabbanan, if we combine both of these aspects in one case, is it permitted to carry?

This question is discussed neither in the Gemara nor by most of the rishonim. Although there are several attempts to demonstrate proof one way or the other from the Gemara and the early authorities, none of the proofs is conclusive. There is a dispute among the later authorities, many contending that pachos pachos is prohibited in a karmelis (Tashbeitz 2:281; Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 349:5; Gra), whereas others feel that there should be no halachic problem at all with carrying pachos pachos in a karmelis (Even Ha’ozer and Maamar Mordechai, Orach Chayim 349; Shu”t Avodas Hagershuni #104). Common practice is to prohibit carrying pachos pachos in a karmelis, following the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch.

Conclusion

Let us now examine our opening question: “We were returning home in an area without an eruv when my two-year old decided that he was walking no farther. Is there a halachically acceptable way for me to carry him home?”

According to what we have now learned, even if the area in question qualifies as a reshus harabim, if one were to pick up the child, carry him less than four amos, and then stop, this would be permitted under the circumstances. Assuming that there are two people to carry the child, there is even a better solution, one that space-constraints does not allow us to explain fully, and that is to have the two people hand the child from one to the other and back without either walking four amos at any given time. There is also another reason to be lenient in the case of a child old enough to walk, in that carrying him in a reshus harabim is not prohibited min haTorah, because of a principle called chai nosei es atzmo, which we will have to leave for a future article.

Difference of carrying

The melacha of hotza’ah, carrying, is qualitatively different from the other 38 melachos. Every other melacha results in some type of change, either physical or chemical, to the item on which the melacha is performed. In the case of carrying, the only thing being changed is the item’s location. Furthermore, the rules governing what is permitted min haTorah and what violates Torah law seem strange and arbitrary. Yet, we understand that these rules are part of our Torah shebe’al peh, and we have to study to learn how to apply them. The Navi Yirmiyohu (17:19-27) was concerned about carrying on Shabbos; it is a melacha like any other, yet people mistakenly think that it is not important. Indeed, we would not usually define transporting something as changing it functionally, which is what most melachos accomplish. Yet, this does not make the melacha of hotza’ah any less important than any other melacha.

Rav Hirsch (Shemos 35:2) explains that whereas other melachos demonstrate man’s mastery over the physical world, carrying demonstrates his mastery over the social sphere. The actions that show the responsibility of the individual to the community and vice versa are often acts of hotza’ah. Thus, the prohibition to carry on Shabbos is to demonstrate man’s subordination to Hashem, in regard to his role and position in his social and national life.

 

Do I say Yaaleh Veyavo, Retzei or both?

Since Rosh Chodesh falls on motza’ei Shabbos, I thought it appropriate to discuss:

Do I say Yaaleh Veyavo, Retzei or both?

Question #1: Is it Shabbos versus Rosh Chodesh?

“When Rosh Chodesh begins on motza’ei Shabbos, do I say Yaaleh Veyavo in bensching at seudah shelishis?”

Question #2: Why is this night of Chanukah different from all other nights?

“Chanukah begins this motza’ei Shabbos. If I finish seudah shelishis after nightfall, do I include Al Hanissim in bensching?”

Introduction

When we recite birchas hamazon on Shabbos, Yom Tov, Chol Hamoed, Rosh Chodesh, Chanukah and Purim, we include special prayers to commemorate the holiday: on Shabbos, a passage beginning with the word Retzei; on Yom Tov, Chol Hamoed and Rosh Chodesh, the opening words are Yaaleh Veyavo; and on Chanukah and Purim, Al Hanissim.

In a different article, I discussed whether one recites these additions when one’s meal was divided between a holiday and a weekday – i.e., one ate part of his meal on the holiday and part before or after; or when the change of date transpired between the eating of the meal and the bensching. Does one recite the special addition to commemorate the holiday when this happens, or does one omit it? We discovered that there are several opinions as to what to do. These are the earliest opinions that I found:

  1. When one bensches

The Rosh rules that one recites the version of birchas hamazon appropriate to when one bensches, regardless as to when one ate the meal. In his opinion, one who finished seudah shelishis after nightfall does not recite Retzei. Similarly, one whose Purim seudah ends after Purim does not recite Al Hanissim. The Rosh also holds that someone who completed a meal before Rosh Chodesh and bensches after it is dark should recite Yaaleh Veyavo.

  1. The beginning of the meal

The Maharam, as understood by the Bach and the Aruch Hashulchan, maintains that the text of the bensching is established according to what was correct when the meal began. Therefore, one who finished seudah shelishis after nightfall recites Retzei, since his meal began on Shabbos. (There is an exception – if he did something to declare that Shabbos is over, such as reciting havdalah, davening maariv, or even simply answering borchu, he does not recite Retzei any more, as it is therefore inconsistent to mention Shabbos in bensching.)

  1. All of the above

The Maharam, as understood by the Taz, contends that one adds the special prayer if either the meal began on the holiday or one is bensching on the holiday. Thus, one who finished seudah shelishis after nightfall recites Retzei, and someone who completed a meal before Rosh Chodesh and bensches after it is dark should recite Yaaleh Veyavo.

The halachic conclusion

The halachic consensus regarding someone who began his meal on Shabbos or Purim and continued it into the night is that one recites Retzei or Al Hanissim, following the position of the Maharam and not the Rosh.

Conflicting prayers

The topic of our current article adds a new aspect to this question – what to do when Rosh Chodesh or Chanukah begins on motza’ei Shabbos, and seudah shelishis started on Shabbos and was completed on Rosh Chodesh or on Chanukah. According to the Rosh, one should recite Yaaleh Veyavo or Al Hanissim, whether or not one ate on Rosh Chodesh or on Chanukah. However, the consensus of halachic opinion is that the Maharam’s opinion is accepted, in this topic, over that of the Rosh. According to those who understand that the Maharam ruled that one should always recite the text of birchas hamazon appropriate to the beginning of the meal, one should recite Retzei. Yet, many authorities follow the second interpretation of the Maharam mentioned above, that one adds the special prayer if either the meal began on the holiday or one is bensching on the holiday. What complicates our question is that there may be a requirement to recite both Retzei and either Yaaleh Veyavo or Al Hanissim, yet mentioning both in the same bensching might be contradictory in this instance, since the holiday begins after Shabbos ends. As we will soon see, whether or not this is a problem is, itself, debated by the authorities.

The earliest authority that I found who discusses this predicament is the Bach (end of Orach Chayim, 188). Regarding what to recite when seudah shelishis continues into Rosh Chodesh, he concludes that one should say Retzei and not Yaaleh Veyavo, because the beginning of a meal determines the exact text of its birchas hamazon. As I mentioned above, this is precisely the way the Bach understands the Maharam’s position – that the proper bensching is always determined by the beginning of the meal. Since the halacha follows the Maharam’s position, the Bach comfortably rules according to his understanding of the Maharam, that one recites Retzei and not Yaaleh Veyavo.

The Magen Avraham (188:18; 419:1) analyzes the issue differently from the way the Bach does. First, he considers the possibility that one can recite both Retzei and Yaaleh Veyavo. This is based on his understanding of the Maharam’s position that ending a meal on Rosh Chodesh or a different festival is reason to recite the holiday additions, even if the meal started on a weekday. However, the Magen Avraham concludes that one cannot recite both Retzei and Yaaleh Veyavo in this instance, because this is an inherent contradiction: If it is already Rosh Chodesh, it is no longer Shabbos, and if it is still Shabbos, it is not yet Rosh Chodesh. Since this is now a conundrum, the Magen Avraham concludes that one should follow the Rosh’s opinion, that one recites whatever is appropriate to be said at this moment, which means to recite only Yaaleh Veyavo. Magen Avraham contends that this practice is followed only when one ate bread on Rosh Chodesh. If he did not eat bread on Rosh Chodesh, then he should say only Retzei, following the Maharam’s opinion that the special prayers are determined by the beginning of the meal.

Chanukah on motza’ei Shabbos

The Magen Avraham also rules that there is a difference in halachah between Rosh Chodesh and Chanukah. When Chanukah begins on motza’ei Shabbos and seudah shelishis extended into the beginning of Chanukah, he rules that one should recite only Retzei and not Al Hanissim, even if he ate bread on Chanukah.

Why is Chanukah different from all other nights?

The Magen Avraham explains that, whereas when reciting Yaaleh Veyavo on a weekday Rosh Chodesh bensching is required, reciting Al Hanissim in bensching of a weekday Chanukah is technically not required, but optional. Therefore, when his meal began on Shabbos (which was as yet not Chanukah) and he is, therefore, required to recite Retzei, even if he continued the meal into Chanukah and ate bread then, the optional addition of Al Hanissim does not cancel the requirement to recite Retzei.

More opinions

Thus far, we have seen two opinions concerning what to do for the bensching of a seudah shelishis that extended into Rosh Chodesh that begins on motza’ei Shabbos:

(1) The Bach, that one should recite Retzei and not Yaaleh Veyavo.

(2) The Magen Avraham, that if he ate bread on motza’ei Shabbos he should recite Yaaleh Veyavo, but otherwise he should recite Retzei.

A third position is that, once it is Rosh Chodesh, one should recite Yaaleh Veyavo and not Retzei (Maharash of Lublin, quoted by Shelah and Taz 188:7). The Maharash maintains that since at the time he bensches it is Rosh Chodesh, the requirement to recite Yaaleh Veyavo is primary and preempts the requirement to recite Retzei, which he considers to be secondary, since it is no longer Shabbos.

Why not both?

The Taz (188:7) disagrees with all the above-mentioned positions, challenging the assumption that one cannot recite both Retzei and Yaaleh Veyavo. He concludes that since Yaaleh Veyavo is recited after Retzei there is no contradiction, since Rosh Chodesh begins after Shabbos ends. Therefore, one who ate on Shabbos and is bensching on Rosh Chodesh should recite both additions.

To sum up, someone whose meal began on Shabbos and is bensching on Rosh Chodesh, should:

  • recite Yaaleh Veyavo, according to both the opinion of the Rosh and that of the Maharash,.
  • recite Retzei, according to the opinion shared by the Bach and the Aruch Hashulchan.
  • recite both Retzei and Yaaleh Veyavo, according to the conclusion of the Taz,.

According to the ruling of the Magen Avraham, if he ate bread after Rosh Chodesh arrived, he should recite Yaaleh Veyavo. If he did not, he should recite Retzei.

Rabbi, what should I do?

The Mishnah Berurah (188:33), when recording what to do, implies that one should follow the position of the Magen Avraham. He then mentions the Taz as an alternative approach – that one should say both Retzei and Yaaleh Veyavo. This is consistent with the Mishnah Berurah’s general approach of following the Magen Avraham, except when the latter’s position is opposed by most later authorities.

The Aruch Hashulchan, on the other hand, concludes neither as the Magen Avraham nor the Taz, but that what one recites is always determined by the beginning of the meal. Therefore, in this situation, he rules to recite Retzei and omit Yaaleh Veyavo, regardless of whether one ate on Rosh Chodesh.

Since there are many conflicting positions as to which additions to recite when Rosh Chodesh begins on motza’ei Shabbos, many people avoid eating bread after nightfall. They eat all the bread that they intend to eat towards the beginning of the meal, and upon completing the seudah, recite bensching including Retzei and omitting Yaaleh Veyavo. This approach follows the majority of halachic authorities (Bach, Magen Avraham, Aruch Hashulchan, Mishnah Berurah [according to his primary approach]), although it runs counter to the opinions of the Maharash and the Taz. Those who want to avoid any question recite birchas hamazon before the arrival of Rosh Chodesh.

Conclusion

In our daily lives, our hearts should be full with thanks to Hashem for all He does for us. Birchas hamazon provides a regular opportunity to elicit deep feelings of gratitude for what Hashem has done in the past and does in the present. All the more so should we should acknowledge Hashem’s help on special holidays.

 

 

Dishes, Detergent and Malachos

The Aseres Hadibros include the mitzvah of Shabbos, providing the opportunity to continue our discussion from parshas Pinchas.

Dishes, Detergent and Malachos

Question #1: Washing dishes

“Whenever I ask my son to help wash the dishes on Shabbos, he claims that it is prohibited. Is he pulling my leg in his attempt to avoid family responsibilities?”

Question #2: No detergent

“Is it prohibited to wash clothes on Shabbos if I do not use detergent?”

Question #3: Six in one!

Can six people consecutively launder a garment?

Three weeks ago, we began our discussion about the melacha of melabein. We learned that there is a dispute among rishonim whether this melacha should be defined as laundering or as bleaching, although in practical terms, the halachos remain the same either way, and it is prohibited min haTorah to launder or to bleach on Shabbos. We also discovered that there are numerous ways that one can violate this melacha, such as by soaking, scrubbing, wringing, or rinsing, and, according to some authorities,  even by brushing a garment. At this point, we will continue our discussion where we left off.

Washing dishes

There is no prohibition of melabein for soaking, scouring, or cleaning a hard substance such as wood or metal. This is because the grime lies on top of the material and is not absorbed inside or between the fibers. This is the reason why it is permitted to wash dishes on Shabbos, provided that one does not squeeze a cloth or something similar in the process.

One may explain the difference between fabrics, that are included in the melacha of melabein, and hard substances that are not, in the following way. All melachos involve changing an object to make it more useful for mankind. In the instance of most melachos, this involves some type of physical or chemical change to the object upon which the melacha is performed. Regarding some melachos, such as trapping, carrying and selecting, no real physical or chemical change occurs in the item, but there is a difference in utility. The undomesticated animal was useless to mankind, and trapping made it available for mankind. Prior to removing the bad part of the item, one could not eat or use this food, and selecting made it useful. In carrying, the most difficult of the melachos to explain conceptually, the item is made useful by changing its location.

By the way, if we remember the dispute between Rashi and the Rambam that I mentioned earlier, the approach of the Rambam allows an easier explanation why washing dishes is not included under the melacha. According to the Rambam, the av melacha is bleaching, or changing the color of the fiber or fabric. All laundering changes the inherent appearance of the cloth, and, in this way, the toladah, laundering, is similar to the av melacha, bleaching. However, dirt on top of a plate does not change the inherent appearance of the plate – one merely needs to scrape off the leftover food on its surface, and the plate is clean. This contrasts with laundering cloth, where the dirt is embedded in the fiber.

All or nothing?

Does one violate melabein only if one performs all of the above-prohibited activities (soaking, scrubbing, wringing, and rinsing), or even if one performs any one of them? A ramification of the second approach is that cleaning an item only a bit violates melabein, despite the fact that the garment is still dirty.

The halacha is that each of these stages constitutes infringements of melabein min haTorah, and this is true even if one does not add any detergent to the water. In other words, although one ordinarily uses detergent to launder clothes, and without detergent the clothes are usually not clean, since performing each of the above-mentioned laundering steps does clean the garment a little bit, that is sufficient to contravene the Torah law of melabein.

Six in one

Thus, theoretically six different people could each be doing a different activity to a garment or cloth, each one violating the melacha of melabein min haTorah! The first one brushes the garment, removing some of the dirt. The second one places the garment in a bucket to soak it. The third one scrubs the garment on a scouring board; the fourth squeezes water out of the garment; the fifth rinses the garment clean; and the sixth bleaches the now clean garment.

Cleaning versus cooking

Since the halacha is that each of the laundering stages constitutes a Torah violation of melabein, we are faced with an interesting contrast between the melacha of melabein and that of cooking. The halacha is that someone who began cooking food, but the food is not yet cooked to the point where it is edible, has not yet violated the melacha min haTorah, but only a rabbinic injunction. Violating the melacha min haTorah requires that the food is cooked enough to make it edible. Yet, soaking an item of clothing contravenes the prohibition of laundering, even though removing it from the water without any other cleaning process may still leave the garment too soiled to wear. Why is there a difference between laundering, which one violates even if the item is still not fully clean, and cooking, which one violates only when the item is cooked?

The answer appears to be that cooking an item to the point that it is still inedible does not benefit mankind, since no one will eat it. On the other hand, although most people do not enjoy wearing dirty clothing, it is more pleasant to wear clothes that are somewhat laundered than clothes that are completely filthy. In other words, although laundering something a little bit made the item cleaner, cooking it a little bit did not make it edible.

According to the Rambam’s approach in the dispute over the definition of melabein, the distinction between laundering and cooking is more easily understood. The av melacha, in his opinion, is bleaching, which means that the basic melacha is changing the coloring, not cleaning it. Laundering is a toladah because it changes the appearance of the cloth. Thus, each stage of melabein changes the appearance of the cloth, which is the nature of the melacha.

Wringing versus stirring

At this point, we should discuss the following interesting phenomenon. When discussing the prohibition of wringing laundry on Shabbos, the Rambam (Hilchos Shabbos 9:11) states the following: “One who wrings out a garment until he extracts the water that is absorbed inside it desecrates Shabbos for laundering, since wringing is necessary (mitzorchei) for laundering just as stirring is necessary (mitzorchei) for cooking.”

This is certainly an unusual statement. Why does the Rambam need to compare wringing water to stirring food in order to explain why it is prohibited on Shabbos? And, the Rambam uses a very interesting term to describe this relationship — the word mitzorchei, which he uses in only three contexts in his entire thirty chapters of the laws of Shabbos. Aside from using this term here to describe wringing laundry and stirring food, he uses it also in the context of meleches tofeir (Hilchos Shabbos 10:9 and Magid Mishnah, Kesef Mishneh, and Mirkeves Hamishneh ad locum; Beis Yosef, Orach Chayim 340 and Elyah Rabbah 340:14)  .

Perhaps one could say that since wringing out water looks different from other laundering acts, one might think that it is not prohibited under the heading of this melacha. However, this is probably not what was bothering the Rambam. My proof is that there are many other melacha activities that do not look like the av melacha under which they are listed. For example, weeding is prohibited min haTorah because it is an aspect of plowing, notwithstanding that weeding does not look at all like plowing. It violates plowing because weeding prepares the ground to allow growth, which is the same concept involved when plowing. Similarly, pruning trees is prohibited as a subheading of planting. Although pruning appears to be the exact opposite of planting, since it is a method of having vines and trees grow better it is included under planting. In these instances, a melacha is performed because the goals of pruning and weeding are respectively similar to planting and plowing. Thus, we see that melacha prohibitions are often categorized by their purpose.Yet, in these instances, the Rambam finds no need to compare weeding or pruning to stirring, nor does he use the word tzorchei to describe what they do.

A possible approach to explain the Rambam is that both wringing and stirring are done after the basic melacha has already been performed. If you are stirring a cooking pot, someone already placed a pot of food on a fire, thereby violating the melacha of cooking. The Rambam is pointing out that stirring a pot is a full violation of cooking on Shabbos – and that we do not mitigate liability for this act on the basis that someone else already performed the actions necessary to cook this food.

Similarly, a person can wring out clothes only when someone else already soaked them in water – which, in and of itself, constitutes laundering according to halacha. Thus, one might contend that the wringer did not violate the melacha (Nimla Tal, meleches melabein #18; meleches tofeir #26).

Separate melacha

Heretofore, we have been assuming that wringing out clothes, socheit, is a subcategory of melabein. Actually, there is a dispute among tana’im concerning this matter. Indeed, most tana’im, including the anonymous author of the Mishnah, consider squeezing to be not its own melacha but a toladah of one of the other 39 melachos listed in the seventh perek of mishnayos Shabbos. (According to most rishonim, this violates the melacha of laundering, whereas the Ramban [Shabbos 111a, as understood by the Magen Avraham end of chapter 302 and Shu”t Avnei Neizer, Orach Chayim #159:20] explains that it violates the melacha of dyeing; cf. Lechem Mishneh, Hilchos Shabbos 9:11, who understands that the Ramban agrees with the other rishonim that it is prohibited because of melabein.) However, the tanna, Rabbi Yishmael, the son of Rabbi Yochanan ben Beroka, contends that squeezing is a completely separate av melacha (Yerushalmi, Shabbos 7:2), although it is not explained in halachic sources why he feels this way. (Nimla Tal Melabein #24 suggests some possible approaches.) The Gemara notes that the Mishnah disagrees with Rabbi Yishmael, the son of Rabbi Yochanan ben Beroka, since, according to him, there are forty melachos, and the Mishnah counts only 39.

39 or 40?

But wait one moment! I thought there were 39 melachos. How can a tanna have 40 melachos?

The answer to this question lies in a passage of Gemara (Shabbos 49b) that says as follows:

What is the basis upon which it has been established that there are 39 melachos? …Rabbi Yehonasan, the son of Rabbi Elazar, told them, “This is what Rabbi Shimon, the son of Rabbi Yosi ben Lekunia, said: ‘They correspond to the thirty-nine times that the word melacha is written in the Torah!’” Rav Yosef then asked, “Is the pasuk (Bereishis 39:11, regarding Yosef), Vayavo habaysa laasos melachto, included in the count or not?” To this, Abayei replied, “Let us bring a sefer Torah and count how many times the word melacha is mentioned in the Torah.” Rav Yosef replied that Abayei had misunderstood his query. Rav Yosef knew that the word melacha shows up in the Torah a total of forty times. When the tanna’im use the word melacha to count melachos, they are counting only instances when the word melacha in the Torah actually refers to work being performed. Rav Yosef’s question was whether the count of the Shabbos melachos included the pasuk regarding Yosef (which may be using the word melacha in a borrowed sense), or whether that pasuk was not included in the count, but instead they were counting a different pasuk, the one that concludes the construction of the Mishkan, which reads, Vehamelacha hoyso dayom. In the latter pasuk, also, the word melacha does not really mean work, but means the materials assembled for the work of the Mishkan. The tanna of the Mishnah, who counts only 39 melachos, felt that one of these places should not be included in the count of the melachos regarding the laws of Shabbos. The Gemara there remains unresolved which of these two pesukim is included in that count and which not. However, it is quite clear that the tanna quoted in the Yerushalmi, Rabbi Yishmael, the son of Rabbi Yochanan ben Beroka, counted both pesukim, thus reaching a total of 40 melachos.

At this point, let us return to our opening questions:

Question #1: Washing dishes

“Whenever I ask my son to help wash the dishes on Shabbos, he claims that it is prohibited. Is he pulling my leg in his attempt to avoid family responsibilities?”

Washing dishes on Shabbos is certainly permitted, as long as one does not use an item that might involve squeezing. (Details of that question we will leave for a different time.)  It is safe to assume that your son’s motivation here is not halacha but laziness.

Question #2: No detergent

“Is it prohibited to wash clothes on Shabbos if I do not use detergent?”

As we now know, one can violate the prohibition of melabein min haTorah without use of detergent.

Question #3: Six in one!

Can six people consecutively launder a garment?

The simple answer is, “Yes.”

In conclusion

Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch (Shemos 20:10) notes that people mistakenly think that work is prohibited on Shabbos, in order for it to be a day of rest. He points out that the Torah does not prohibit doing avodah, which connotes hard work, but melacha, activities or actions which bring purpose and accomplishment. Shabbos is a day that we refrain from constructing and altering the world for our own purposes. The goal of Shabbos is to allow Hashem’s rule to be the focus of creation, by refraining from our own creative acts (Shemos 20:11).

 

Bleaching or Laundering?

Parshas Pinchas is the only parsha that mentions specifically the korbanos offered on Shabbos, thus, providing a reason to discuss the laws of Shabbos.

 

Bleaching or Laundering?

 

Question #1: Bleaching or laundering?

 

“Is the name of the melacha bleaching or laundering?”

 

Question #2: Painting white

 

“If someone whitewashes his wall or paints something white, what melacha has he performed?”

 

Question #3: Threading a thread

 

“What could possibly be wrong with moistening a thread on Shabbos?”

 

Among the 39 melachos of Shabbos listed in the Mishnah is melabein, which I will translate and define shortly. It is the second of the thirteen melachos involved in manufacturing a garment, which is referred to as sidura debeged. In order, they are: Gozeiz (shearing), melabein, menapeitz (carding or untangling), tzovei’a (dyeing), toveh (spinning thread), meisach (warping, a step in preparing to weave), oseh batei nirim (creating a heddle, a further step in preparing to weave, oreig (weaving), potzei’a (undoing a weave), kosheir (tying), matir (untying), tofeir (sewing), and korei’a (tearing).

 

Bleaching or laundering?

 

The rishonim dispute what is the definition and the proper translation of melabein. According to Rashi (Shabbos 73a), the correct translation of the melacha is laundering. The Rambam (Hilchos Shabbos 9:10) disagrees, contending that the actual definition of the av melacha is bleaching, which means removing the color from a fabric or fiber. Although the Rambam agrees that laundering on Shabbos is prohibited min haTorah, in his opinion, laundering is a toladah, or subcategory, of the melacha of melabein, not the av melacha, or primary category.

 

A question that one would ask on this ruling of the Rambam is why bleaching is not considered the same melacha as tzovei’a, dyeing, which is also concerned with changing the color of a fiber. Since melabein is bleaching, which changes the color of an item, and tzovei’a is dyeing, which changes the color of an item, why are these two separate melachos?

 

The answer appears to be that whereas tzovei’a adds color to the fiber, bleaching removes color from the fiber. In the Rambam’s opinion, a distinction is made between adding color to an item, which constitutes tzovei’a, and bleaching it, which removes the color and constitutes melabein. Laundering, which removes impurities from the cloth that detract from its appearance, is therefore a toladah of melabein.

 

An advantage to the Rambam’s approach is that melabein shares its root with lavan, which means white. (As a curiosity, the Modern Hebrew word for bleaching is malbin, derived from the same root, lavan. The word malbin is used in the Mishnah [Nega’im 4:4], although there it has a different meaning from the modern word. In the Mishnah the word means turning white. [See a similar usage in Parah 2:5.]) Since Rashi understands that the av melacha melabein means laundering, it is strange that the Mishnah did not call the melacha mechabeis, which means laundering.

 

It should be noted that there is a rishon who appears to hold that bleaching is not included under melabein at all, but is forbidden because of tzovei’a (see Tosafos, Bava Kamma 93b s.v. ha). This approach follows Rashi that melabein means laundering, but restricts laundering to actions that clean, and does not extend it to those that change the material’s color. Any activities that change an item’s color are considered tzovei’a, according to this opinion.

 

Clean or color?

 

This dispute between Rashi and the Rambam reflects different ways of understanding the concept of the melacha. According to Rashi, the focus of the melacha is the cleaning of cloth, whereas the Rambam understands its focus to be changing the cloth’s appearance. Laundering is included, according to the Rambam, because it changes the appearance of the cloth, albeit by removing dirt rather than by removing color.

 

There are halachic differences that result from this dispute, although I am unaware of any that affect us today. When the Beis Hamikdash is rebuilt, bimheira biyameinu, there will be questions regarding offering korbanos chatos that will be affected by the dispute between Rashi and the Rambam.

 

Notwithstanding their dispute, both Rashi and the Rambam agree that all forms of laundering are prohibited on Shabbos. In the modern world, most laundering is performed by dropping clothes into a washing machine, adding detergent, and turning the machine on to its appropriate cycle. However, prior to the invention of the washing machine, mankind was familiar with the different stages involved when laundering clothing. There are numerous questions germane to the details of how one launders clothing that affect the halachic application of melabein.

 

Several stages

 

There are several stages involved in laundering. First, one soaks the clothing or fiber, which loosens the grime. Then, one scrubs the clothing or fiber, which separates the loosened grime from the fibers of the material. One then wrings out the water, which removes much of the dirt. Finally, one rinses out the material, which washes away the remaining dirt residue. Thus, the standard way of laundering clothes involves four different steps: soaking, scrubbing, wringing, and rinsing. Let us now understand some other halachic ramification of these steps.

 

Soaking

 

The Gemara teaches that throwing a kerchief into water violates Shabbos min haTorah as an act of laundering (Zevachim 94b). As we will see shortly, this is prohibited not only if one soaks the cloth, but even if one only moistens it (Rashi, Shabbos 142b).

 

The rishonim disagree as to whether one violates melabein if one soaks cloth that one is not trying to clean. There is also a dispute whether soaking or moistening cloth is prohibited if one does it in a way that one is soiling the cloth, such as by mopping up a spill with a piece of cloth or a rag on Shabbos. Because of space limitations, we will need to discuss these topics at a future time.

 

Rashi (Shabbos 142b) notes that pouring a small amount of water onto cloth similarly violates laundering. For this reason, one must always be careful not to place even a small amount of water or spittle on a stain on Shabbos. This is prohibited min haTorah even if one is concerned that the stain will set and ruin the garment.

 

Moistening a thread

 

The Yerushalmi (Shabbos 7:2) rules that moistening a thread in one’s mouth on Shabbos, such as what one would do to thread a needle, violates a Torah violation of soaking the thread. It is unclear whether the Yerushalmi considers any moistening of a thread, even with water, to be laundering, or if the concern is only because one is using saliva, which has a special ability to launder, something that was well-known in the days of Chazal (Mishnah, Niddah 9:6).

 

Here is an interesting ramification of this ruling. Someone sewed a button onto their garment shortly before Shabbos. On Shabbos, he noticed that there was extra thread dangling from the button of a garment. The logical, short-term solution for this problem is to moisten the offending extra thread and wrap it around under a button. However, halachically, doing this presents a serious problem. According to the above-quoted Yerushalmi, moistening the thread in order to facilitate this winding is prohibited min haTorah!

 

Squeezing

 

One of the steps in laundering clothing is that one wrings the dirty water out of the clothing. Wringing out cloth is a kind of squeezing. This sometimes creates confusion, because, the laws of Shabbos recognize two types of squeezing, what I will call (1) extracting and (2) wringing. The first type involves extracting juice or oil from fruit, such as grapes or olives, which is prohibited on Shabbos but has nothing to do with the laws of laundering. According to most rishonim, this type of squeezing is a violation of the melacha of dosh, threshing. The melacha of dosh is violated when one breaks the natural, physical connection between two items that are dissimilar in their use, thus creating a product that can be used easily. Further discussion of this type of squeezing, extracting, is beyond the scope of this article, whose topic is laundering.

 

Wringing

 

Wringing cloth to clean it is a different type of squeezing, and this is involved only when one squeezes out something that can be laundered, such as cloth or fabric. According to all opinions, it is forbidden min haTorah to squeeze water out of cloth. The rishonim debate whether this melacha is violated when one wrings out a cloth to remove absorbed wine, beer, oil or other liquids that are not customarily used for cleaning. Rabbeinu Tam contends that squeezing these liquids out of cloth is not prohibited min haTorah unless one wants to use the liquid (in which case it would be prohibited because it is considered extracting), whereas his nephew, Rabbeinu Yitzchok (whose name is usually abbreviated to R’Y), ruled that it is prohibited min haTorah (Tosafos, Kesubos 6a s.v. Hei, and other rishonim ad locum; Sefer Hayoshor #283; Tosafos, Shabbos 111a). Because of space considerations, further discussion on this subtopic will be left for a future article.

 

Brushing a garment

 

According to many authorities, one can violate melabein even without use of water by brushing out a garment, at least under certain circumstances (Rema, Orach Chayim 302:1; Bach, Elyah Rabbah, Mishnah Berurah, Biur Halacha). For this reason, one should refrain from brushing clothes on Shabbos. The Mishnah Berurah (302:6) rules that one should be careful on Shabbos to place his clothes in places where they will not fall into dust or dirt, so that he does not come to brush the clothes.

 

At this point, we can answer the three questions that we posed at the beginning of our article:

 

Bleaching or laundering?

 

“Is the name of the melacha bleaching or laundering?”

 

Actually, it is a dispute among rishonim whether the melacha should be defined as

 

bleaching or as laundering, although for our contemporary purposes there may not be a halacha lemaaseh difference.

 

Painting white

 

“If someone whitewashes his wall or paints something white, what melacha has he performed?”

 

The answer is that he violated the melacha of tzovei’a, dyeing, not of melabein.

 

Threading a thread

 

“What could possibly be wrong with moistening a thread on Shabbos?”

 

Indeed, it might be prohibited min haTorah to do so, because it is considered that one laundered the thread.

 

We will continue our discussion of meleches melabein in three weeks.

 

Various Kindling Kwestions

Question #1: Electric lights for Shabbos

“Unfortunately, I need to have a medical procedure performed which will require me to spend Shabbos in the hospital. Because of safety concerns, they will not allow me to kindle candles. Do I fulfill the mitzvah of kindling Shabbos lights if I light electric lights?”

Question #2: Rekindle for Shabbos?

“If lights are already burning Friday afternoon shortly before Shabbos, is there a mitzvah to extinguish and rekindle them for the sake of fulfilling the mitzvah of kindling Shabbos lights?”

Question #3: Unbelieving kindler

“My mother, who unfortunately does not believe in Judaism, kindles Shabbos candles every Friday evening, because ‘that is what Jews do.’ Do I fulfill the mitzvah when she lights?”

Answer:

All three of the above questions involve laws that result from understanding the rabbinic mitzvah to kindle lights before Shabbos. Several reasons are cited for this mitzvah:

Any place treated with pomp and ceremony is always suitably illuminated. Certainly, the area where the Shabbos is celebrated, which commemorates the fact that Hashem created the world, should have plenty of light.

People will not enjoy the Shabbos meal if they eat in the dark. Therefore, the Sages required that the place where one intends to eat the Shabbos repast be properly illuminated.

Some provide a different and highly practical reason to require illumination on Shabbos. We do not want anyone to hurt himself by stumbling over or bumping into something on Shabbos.

Difference in halachah

There is a difference in halachah among these different opinions. According to the first two opinions, the main halachic concern is that the place where one eats should be lit. According to the last opinion, one must be careful to illuminate all places in the house that a person may pass through on Shabbos, so that he does not hurt himself by bumping into or stumbling over something.

Chazal were concerned that one not remain in the dark on Shabbos. Did they simply require everyone to be certain that his house is illuminated, or did they establish a requirement to kindle a lamp? The Rishonim dispute this question, some holding that Chazal were satisfied that one make certain that he have adequate lighting for Shabbos, whereas others contend that we are required to kindle a light specifically for this purpose.

What difference does it make?

Several halachic differences result from the above-mentioned dispute:

Rekinding lights – keep those candles burning!

  1. If lights are already burning Friday afternoon shortly before Shabbos, is there a mitzvah to extinguish and rekindle them for the sake of fulfilling the mitzvah of kindling Shabbos lights? If the mitzvah is to make sure that there is illumination, then I am not required to rekindle lights, but may simply leave the lights burning on into Shabbos. However, if there is a special mitzvah requiring me to kindle the lights, then I must extinguish the burning lights and rekindle them!

The Rishonim dispute whether one is required to extinguish the lights and rekindle them or not. Those who contend that one may leave the candles burning maintain that it is sufficient if there is adequate illumination for Shabbos, and one has no responsibility to extinguish the light and rekindle it. Other Rishonim, however, maintain that Chazal required kindling lights especially for Shabbos. Thus, leaving lights kindled is insufficient, if I did not light them especially for Shabbos.[i] We rule according to the second approach.

Later authorities rule that we satisfy the requirement to kindle a special light in honor of Shabbos by kindling just one light. Thus, if there are many lights kindled around the house, one is not required to extinguish all of them and rekindle them all for the sake of Shabbos. It is sufficient to kindle one light for this purpose and leave the other lights burning.[ii] Similarly, if your house is situated in a way that street lighting illuminates your hallway, you are not required to leave lights on to provide additional illumination.

Reciting a brocha

  1. Does one recite a brocha on the mitzvah of kindling Shabbos lights?

A second dispute that results from our original inquiry (whether the mitzvah is to kindle lights or to have illumination) is whether one recites a brocha when kindling the Shabbos lights. According to those opinions that the mitzvah is simply to see that the house is illuminated, one would not recite a brocha when kindling Shabbos lights, even if he needs to kindle lamps before Shabbos. This is because, in their opinion, there is no special mitzvah to kindle lights.[iii] However, the conclusion of the poskim is that there is a mitzvah to kindle Shabbos lights, and that even if one has lights kindled already, one should extinguish and rekindle them.[iv]

Having a gentile light for me

  1. A third result of this dispute is whether I can fulfill the mitzvah by having a non-Jew kindle Shabbos lights for me. What happens if I am unable to kindle the Shabbos lights myself? May I ask a non-Jew to kindle them for me? If the mitzvah is to kindle the lights, then I have not fulfilled a mitzvah this way, since a non-Jew cannot be my agent to fulfill a mitzvah. On the other hand, if the mitzvah is for the house to be illuminated, having a gentile kindle lights for me fulfills the mitzvah, since the house is now illuminated.

Since we follow the second approach, I may not have a non-Jew light for me.

Electric lights?

In our modern houses, the candles or oil lamps provide very little lighting, and our main illumination is provided by the electric lights. In most houses, one does not even notice when the candles go out, so overshadowed are they by the electricity. May we fulfill the mitzvah with electric lights?

Indeed, most authorities contend that one fulfills the mitzvah of kindling Shabbos lights with electric lights (Shu”t Beis Yitzchok 1:120; Eidus Leyisrael, page 122). There are authorities who disagree, because they feel that the mitzvah requires kindling with a wick and a fuel source that is in front of you, both requirements that preclude using electric lights to fulfill the mitzvah (Shu”t Maharshag 2:107).

The consensus of most authorities is that, in an extenuating circumstance, one may fulfill the mitzvah with electric lights (Shu”t Yechaveh Daas 5:24; Shu”t Kochavei Yitzchak 1:2). Therefore, someone who is hospitalized for Shabbos may recite a brocha on electric lights, since hospitals usually forbid lighting an open flame.

Electricity and then candles

Since we are, anyway, primarily using electric lighting to fulfill the mitzvah, it is therefore a good idea that, immediately prior to kindling the Shabbos lights, one turn off the electric lights in the dining room and then rekindle them for the purpose of Shabbos, then kindle the Shabbos candles or lamps, and then recite the brocha, having in mind that the brocha includes both the candles and the electric lighting. (This is following Ashkenazi practice. Sefardim, who recite the brocha first and then kindle the lights, can recite the brocha, and then turn on the electric lights and light the Shabbos candles.)

Lady of the house

Although long-established custom is that the lady of the house kindles the Shabbos lights (see Mishnah Shabbos 31b), in actuality, each person is responsible for fulfilling the mitzvah (Rambam, Hilchos Shabbos 5:1). This does not mean that everyone should start kindling his own lights. It means that when the lady of the house kindles the Shabbos lights, she does so as the agent of the entire household. Should there be no lady of the house who can perform the mitzvah, a different member of the household should kindle the lights.

Preparing the lights

Although the lady of the house is the one who actually kindles the lights, her husband should assume the responsibility of preparing the lights for her to kindle. This approach, mentioned in the Zohar, is also implied by the wording of the Mishnah (Tosafos Rabbi Akiva Eiger, Shabbos 2:6).

Unbelieving kindler

At this point, we are in a position to begin analyzing the third of our opening questions:

“My mother, who unfortunately does not believe in Judaism, kindles Shabbos lights every Friday evening, because ‘that is what Jews do.’ Do I fulfill the mitzvah when she lights?” Let us understand the basis for the question.

Someone who does not observe all the mitzvos of Judaism certainly can and should be encouraged to observe whatever mitzvos they are willing and able to. The question here is that we are told that her mother “does not believe in Judaism,” which I presume means that she has actively rejected the assumption that Hashem has commanded that we observe His mitzvos. A great late authority, the Sho’eil Umeishiv (2:1:51; 2:3:91) discusses whether someone who does not believe that Hashem commanded to observe mitzvos fulfills them, since this person rejects that there are commandments. The Sho’eil Umeishiv concludes that, indeed, someone who does not accept the basis of mitzvos does not fulfill them. He bases this principle on the statement of the Rambam (Hilchos Melachim 8:11) that a gentile who observes mitzvos is considered a righteous gentile and is rewarded with olam haba, provided that he believes that Hashem told Moshe Rabbeinu that the descendants of Noach are commanded to observe the mitzvos that apply to them.

According to the Sho’eil Umeishiv, someone who does not believe in Torah but kindles Friday night lights only because it is a Jewish practice, but without any belief that one is commanded to do so, does not fulfill any mitzvah. If this is so, then their kindling cannot function as an agent for someone else. This would mean that the daughter, who is observant, should also kindle Shabbos lights, and that she should recite a brocha when she does so, since she is the one fulfilling the mitzvah.

If she feels that this will offend her mother, she can turn on the dining room electric lights, which, as we noted above, fulfills the mitzvah. Based on what we have explained above, she could even recite a brocha on the electric lights.

In conclusion

Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch (Shemos 20:10) notes that people mistakenly think that work is prohibited on Shabbos in order that it be a day of rest. He points out that the Torah does not prohibit doing avodah, which connotes hard work, but melachah, which implies activity with purpose and accomplishment. Shabbos is a day that we refrain from constructing and altering the world for our own purposes. The goal of Shabbos is to allow Hashem’s rule to be the focus of creation, by refraining from our own creative acts (Shemos 20:11).

The Gemara (Shabbos 23b) teaches that someone who kindles Shabbos lights regularly will merit having sons who are Torah scholars. Let us hope and pray that in the merit of observing these halachos correctly, we will have children and grandchildren who light up the world with their Torah!

 

[i] Tosafos, Shabbos 25b s.v. Chovah

[ii] See Ketzos HaShulchan 74:1

[iii] See Tosafos, Shabbos 25b s.v. Chovah

[iv] Tosafos, Shabbos 25b s.v. Chovah; Rambam 5:1; see Mordechai, Shabbos #294

The Melachah of Setting Fires

Aside from our parsha teaching of the very first Shabbos, the brocha upon fire is recited motza’ei Shabbos because we then regain its use. This definitely provides reason to discuss:

The Melachah of Setting Fires

candleQuestion #1: Why the pasuk?

“Why does the written Torah mention specifically that we may not kindle a flame on Shabbos?”

Question #2: Out of order

“Why does the Mishnah mention that extinguishing, mechabeh, is a melachah, before it mentions that kindling, mav’ir, is a melachah? One must kindle a fire before one extinguishes it!”

Question #3: Bothered by a blech

“Why must we use a blech on Shabbos?”

Answer:

All three of the above questions involve laws that result from the Torah’s prohibition against kindling fires on Shabbos; lo seva’aru eish bechol moshevoseichem beyom hashabbos, “Do not kindle fire in all your places of residence on Shabbos” (Shemos 35:3). The Torah prohibition includes not only kindling a flame, but adding fuel or stoking a fire, so that it burns better. Similarly, adjusting the wick of a burning lamp on Shabbos so that it produces clearer light also violates the Torah’s prohibition.

Hav’arah is counted by the Mishnah as one of the 39 melachos. This melachah was performed during the construction of the Mishkan when they built fires under the pots used to create the vat dyes required for the curtains and the vestments of the kohanim (Rashi, Shabbos 73a s.v. mechabeh).

Why a special pasuk?

There is a question here: Why does the written Torah mention, specifically, that we may not kindle a flame on Shabbos? Other melachos are not singled out with a special mitzvah in the written Torah.

The Gemara (Shabbos 70a) records a dispute between tanna’im why the written Torah especially mentions the melachah of hav’arah. Rabbi Yosi rules hav’arah lelav yatzas, meaning that hav’arah is singled out to mitigate it. Whereas the other melachah prohibitions of Shabbos are capital offenses, hav’arah is a somewhat lesser Torah transgression, only a regular lo saaseh. (Certainly, we should treat it with full seriousness, even according to Rabbi Yosi. The difference in practical halachah is that, according to Rabbi Yosi, one who violated hav’arah negligently does not bring a korban chatas as atonement, whereas someone who transgressed negligently one of the other melachos does.)

Rabbi Nosson disagrees with Rabbi Yosi, contending that kindling is considered a regular melachah of Shabbos like all the others, but that hav’arah lechaleik yatzas, hav’arah is singled out to teach that the 39 melachos of Shabbos are considered 39 different prohibitions. This means that someone who violated more than one melachah on a single Shabbos is punished as if he had violated several prohibitions of the Torah. He might be required to offer more than one chatas offering.

The accepted halachah follows Rabbi Nosson, that kindling is considered a regular melachah of Shabbos.

Injunctions because of hav’arah

Although we are all aware that it is prohibited to kindle or to increase a flame on Shabbos, we may not realize that many of the regulations that we observe on Shabbos were established by Chazal out of concern that someone not violate the prohibition of hav’arah. For example, the reason that we use a blech to warm food on Shabbos or to keep it warm is because Chazal prohibited using an open fire for these purposes. This would involve two different rabbinic prohibitions, that of chazarah, returning food to a fire on Shabbos, and shehiyah, leaving food to cook or keep warm from before Shabbos on an open flame. Chazal prohibited shehiyah because of concern that someone might mistakenly stoke coals. According to some authorities, the prohibition of chazarah was also so that someone warming his food on Shabbos not err and inadvertently stoke the coals of the flame. Similarly, Chazal prohibited hatmanah, wrapping or insulating hot food before Shabbos in a way that increases the heat on Shabbos. All of these are prohibited because of concerns that one may mistakenly stoke a flame on Shabbos (Shabbos 34b; Tosafos, Shabbos 36b s.v. lo).

Chazal also prohibited reading or doing other activities involving detailed work by the light of an open flame on Shabbos, because of concern that one will adjust the flame (Rashi, Mishnah Shabbos 11a). For this reason, on Shabbos, one may not use an oil lamp to assist choosing between two items of clothing that look similar (Shabbos 12a), or use it to check tzitzis (Magen Avraham 275:1).

Permitted

Chazal permitted using oil lamps on Shabbos when they were not concerned that someone might errantly adjust the light. For example, they permitted two people to read the same text together by oil lamp, reasoning that each would pay attention that his partner not inadvertently adjust the flame (Shabbos 12b). Similarly, even in situations when it is prohibited to use a lamp for meticulous work, one may appoint a shomer to make sure that one does not adjust the flame by mistake. This shomer must be someone who is not currently doing any meticulous work – otherwise, we are concerned that he, himself, may forget his job as shomer.

Chazal also permitted students studying under the direction of their rebbe to study and read in their usual fashion. The reason is that since they know that their rebbe is supervising them, they keep in mind to be careful (Shabbos 12b). The rebbe himself is permitted to glance at the seforim to tell the students where to start, although he is not permitted to continue reading the material. For a similar reason, when the Seder night falls on Shabbos, one may read the hagadah by lamplight. The halachic assumption is that most people are fairly familiar with the hagadah and use the printed book just to make sure that they don’t inadvertently skip parts (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 275:9). This is considered similar to the halachah that the rebbe of cheder students is permitted to glance at the seforim to tell the students where to start.

There are a few other instances in which Chazal permitted reading on Shabbos using the illumination of an open oil lamp: One may read the Mishnah of the second chapter of Shabbos, Bameh Madlikin, which describes these concerns. Since the chapter itself emphasizes these laws, it serves as a reminder to be careful (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 275:7). Similarly, accepted practice was to allow people to read from a machzor on Yom Kippur by lamplight, since the fear of Yom Kippur will remind a person not to errantly adjust the lamp (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 275:8).

Candlelight

Is reading by the light of a candle the same as reading by the light of an oil lamp? Are we less concerned that someone will attempt to adjust a candle to provide better light?

Indeed, we find a dispute among early authorities whether one may read by candlelight on Shabbos, some contending that it is unlikely that someone would mistakenly adjust this lighting (Hagahos Ashri, Shabbos 1:27; Beis Yosef, Shulchan Aruch and commentaries, Orach Chayim 275; Taz, Orach Chayim 278). The prevalent custom is to be lenient (see Biur Halachah 275:1 s.v. le’or). Therefore, we may certainly be lenient regarding electric lights, although there are individuals who follow a stringent position even in this regard. Those who follow this stricter approach assign someone to be the shomer of the Beis Medrash – his job is to not learn and to be responsible that no one inadvertently try to adjust the lights.

What is burning?

We find a very interesting dispute between acharonim concerning what is the definition of the melachah of mav’ir: is it the increase of the fire or is it the consumption of fuel? Some contend that the melachah is the creation or increase of the fire or flame (Graz, Orach Chayim 495 in Kuntros Acharon), whereas others dispute this analysis and define the melachah as the consumption of fuel that transpires when a flame burns (Shu”t Avnei Neizer, Orach Chayim 238:8). Although this dispute seems like a theoretical and almost philosophic debate, there seems to be a difference in halachah that is contingent on this dispute. Does heating metal to a glow involve the melachah of hav’arah? If hav’arah is defined as the consumption of fuel, then the heating of metal, which does not create any noticeable destruction of fuel, should not violate hav’arah. On the other hand, if hav’arah is defined as the increase of a flame, then heating metal should violate hav’arah.

This could perhaps explain a dispute between the Rambam and the Raavad (Hilchos Shabbos 12:1) whether heating metal is prohibited because it is considered hav’arah or because it is included under the melachah of bishul, cooking, but it is not considered hav’arah.

This dispute could then affect what melachah is involved when turning on an incandescent light. According to those who consider heating metal to be bishul, then this would violate bishul, whereas according to those who categorize heating metal as hav’arah, then turning on an incandescent light is included under the melachah of hav’arah. There are a few practical differences that result from this dispute, but, unfortunately, explaining this will take us far afield from our topic. (This is without getting involved in the separate dispute as to whether use of electricity violates the melachos of either boneh [constructing] or makeh bepatish [completing an item].)

Out of order

At this point, let us explain the second of our opening questions:

“Why did the Mishnah mention that extinguishing, mechabeh, is a melachah before it mentions that kindling, mav’ir, is a melachah?” When the Mishnah lists the 39 melachos, it mentions extinguishing before it mentions kindling. Is this not counter-logical, since it is difficult to extinguish a fire unless someone has previously kindled it?

Among the various standard commentaries, I found two approaches to answer this question . The Meiri explains that when preparing a vat dye, you sometimes need to lower the flame so that the dye does not burn and then you need to increase the size of the fire afterwards. Lowering such a flame on Shabbos would violate extinguishing, and increasing the heat of the fire afterwards is included under the Torah’s prohibition of mav’ir. Since the preparation of dye in the construction of the Mishkan involved extinguishing before kindling, the Mishnah mentions the two melachos in this order. (An alternative answer is mentioned by the Tiferes Yisroel in his Kalkeles Shabbos introduction to Mesechta Shabbos, Meleches Mav’ir #37).

In conclusion

Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch (Shemos 20:10) notes that people mistakenly think that work is prohibited on Shabbos in order that it should be a day of rest. He points out that the Torah does not prohibit doing avodah, which connotes hard work, but melachah, which implies purpose and accomplishment. Shabbos is a day that we refrain from constructing and altering the world for our own purposes. The goal of Shabbos is to allow Hashem’s rule to be the focus of creation, by refraining from our own creative acts (Shemos 20:11).

 

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