Traveling for Pesach

This week’s article is somewhat different from what I usually send. It is a combination of:

An interview that I responded to for a recent issue of Mishpacha in their Advice Line column and various questions I have answered via e-mail. Obviously, the answers are much briefer than the style I write for an article, and usually are not explained.

Advice question asked from Rabbi Yirmiyohu Kaganoff

Question:

We are a young married couple with one child living in Eretz Yisrael. Both of our parents live in the States but about a 3-4 hour drive apart.  As Pesach approaches and we made our plans to visit them it became clear that only one set of parents was willing to pay towards our tickets to visit, and that they would pay half the airfare.  After taking this into account, we decided that we still wanted to visit and would pay the other half ourselves.  However, when deciding where to be over Yom Tov we are undecided how to divide our time for Yom Tov. Please help.

Rabbi Yirmiyohu Kaganoff: There are no obvious halachic guidelines for such an issue; it falls into the category of the “fifth shulchan aruch.” I’m therefore offering you my personal thoughts and judgment. One family is paying for half of your tickets; the other side is not contributing. It does seem fair that you should spend some more time with the side that is putting up money. However there are several mitigating factors that must be kept in mind:

Firstly, I’m assuming that the side that isn’t paying is not doing so because they are stingy but rather because they simply don’t have the resources. This brings up an important question: Should a family be penalized for not having the financial wherewithal that another family has been blessed with?

Secondly, if one side has more resources than the other side, it’s probable that they come to visit in Eretz Yisrael on occasion, while the financially-strapped family probably comes rarely, if at all. This means that if you don’t go visit them, you may never see them.

All these factors point to the fact that you need to sit down and have an open, honest conversation about the issue and reach a decision together. Although such discussions are not easy, realize that the making of a strong marriage comes through discussing sticky situations and working out issues.

Try to depersonalize the discussion and really focus on the points that the other person is making. Sometimes, it’s helpful for you each to “plead” the other side. Let the spouse whose parents are paying enumerate why the Yom Tov should be split evenly and let the one whose parents aren’t able to chip in list the reasons why one should more time visiting the parents who are paying. Keep speaking until you reach a decision that you’re both comfortable with. I wish you much hatzlacha.

At this point, we are quoting some select e-mail shaylos I have received pursuant to Pesach

Pesach Cleaning

Sent: Monday, March 08, 2010 10:36 PM
To: Rabbi Kaganoff
Subject: URGENT – cleaning toys, pens, etc for pesach!
Importance: High

Question: I just organised the toys today, without wiping any of them down. I did not see any crumbs, and even if there were, they certainly would not be edible. But I understand that we are supposed to actually wash in bleach anything that has a chance of ending up on our table during Pesach.

Please explain. I don’t want to waste precious time and energy on shtuyot – i don’t have that luxury this year – limited time, energy and finances.

Answer: I do not know the source of this misinformation. It sounds like what you are doing is 100% fine. My wife follows the same approach, with my approval.

Bedikas Chometz

Question from someone else:

We are renting out our apartment for pesach and the couple only needs one out of four bedrooms. Are we required to do bedikas chometz in the three remaining rooms?

Answer: If you want to avoid doing bedika in the other rooms, you can "close them off" by putting signs on the doors that they are sold/rented to the gentile and therefore not checked for chometz. Ask the rav who is doing your mechiras chometz to sell your chometz in these rooms on the 13th of Nisan.

Yom Tov Sheini in Israel Shaylah

Dear Rabbi Kaganoff

We have been in eretz yisrael for four years, and still keep two days. Essentially, it is still clear to us that we will go back to the USA and raise our family there. But we have no location picked out, no timetable when we intend to return there, and aside from a few things in my parents and in- laws house, we really have nothing in the USA.

Inertia is powerful, and who knows how long we will really be here. I cannot see that working out financially, or practically, but if the economy in the USA really collapsed, then I definitely would stay.

If I want to shop for a psak, I know what different poskim will tell me, and I could easily ask from the posek who will give me the answer I want. Am I mechuyav to go through the sugya, and make my own conclusion? Do you think we ought to keep two days this Pesach?

Thanks a ton!

Answer:

The Chazon Ish (Yoreh Deah 150:1) explains that in a situation like this, one follows one’s rebbe (which he defines there), and if one has no rebbe, one can be meikil by a derabbanan.

Another Yom Tov Sheini in Israel Shaylah

Question: My mother and sister are not religious and will be coming to us for all of Pesach from the U.S. How should I handle their second day Yom Tov?

Answer: Don’t plan on any family activities that require them to do work, but don’t say anything to them about their doing work. In other terms, don’t cause them to do melacha, since most poskim hold that they are required to keep the second day Yom Tov.

Question: What should I do about a second day seder for them? (They would have no interest in it on their own and find it a burden.)

Answer: Do nothing. You are not required to make a seder for them, and I do not see anything gained by attempting them to keep/attend a seder.

Question: My elderly father, who is not observant, will be having surgery during Pesach, and I will therefore be visiting them. This has therefore generated many questions:

1. Can I do laundry on chol hamoed for my parents (who will be at the time unable to do it for themselves)?

Answer: Do all their laundry before Yom Tov, and see that they have everything that they need for the entire Yom Tov. If they are short items, they should be purchased- preferably before Yom Tov, but if necessary they can be purchased on Chol Hamoed.

2. What can I purchase on chol hamoed? Can I buy something that could wait until after Pesach, but my parents would prefer to have it sooner?

Answer: If they will use it on Chol hamoed or Yom Tov, you may but it on CHol Hamoed if there is no time to purchase it earlier, or you were unable to purchase it earlier.

3. I read your article about not doing melacha on the 2nd day of yom tov while in chutz l’aretz.  If my mother would like a second seder, or to light candles for the second night of yom tov, am I allowed to do it for her? My mom lights shabbos candles, but not yom tov candles, but since it is yom tov for her, can I be motzi her? [the questioner lives in Eretz Yisrael and her parents in chutz la’aretz.]

Answer: You cannot be a shaliach for her to perform these mitzvos because you are not required to observe them.

Question: What about my making kiddush on the second night/day for them? 

Answer: Also not.

4. I will be bringing with me my nursing baby who is, as is my husband, a kohen. Since I do not know people where my parents live, it may be difficult for me to find a babysitter while I visit my dad after his surgery. May I bring my baby to the hospital?

Answer: Try to find a babysitter for him. If you cannot find a sitter, and it means not visiting your father, then bring the baby along. [I permitted this since there is a very small Jewish population in the city where her parents live. The halacha will be different in an area with a large Jewish population.]

Dental Cleaning on Chol Hamoed

Dear Rabbi Kaganoff,
Hope this finds everyone well.

Is it permissible to go to the dentist for a cleaning on chol hamoed Pesach. The dentist now only has a dental hygienist in the office on Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday. I am at work all those days and can’t leave to go to the dentist.

Answer: One should not schedule this dental cleaning for chol hamoed.

All my best regards–

Would You Like One or Two?

On the evening of the first night of Chol HaMoed in Eretz Yisroel (corresponding to the eve of the second night of Yom Tov in chutz la’aretz), I received a curious phone call:

“Rabbi,” the female voice began, “I am calling on behalf of my friend, Rivkah.” After decades of rabbinic experience, I was convinced that this was the introduction to an embarrassing question. People often prefer pretending that they are asking for someone else — hiding behind the name of “a friend.” But this time, I was wrong.

KIDDUSH OR HAVDALAH?

“Rivkah is a student at Bnos Aliyah Seminary and is uncertain whether she should keep one day of Yom Tov or two. A few weeks ago, she visited a family for Shabbos and mentioned her predicament. The man of the house graciously told her that he answers halachic inquiries, and ruled that she need keep only one day of Yom Tov. However, upon returning to Seminary, a teacher told Rivkah that she should not ask her shaylah from just anyone, but must ask one of the seminary rabbis. Rivkah did so, and was told to keep two days. Subsequently, someone told her that she should not have asked the question a second time and must follow the first ruling she received. Now, she is in a dilemma: Should she observe the second day of Yom Tov or not?

Although most people do not have a Yom Tov issue like Rivkah did, they could still stumble into a similar predicament by making a query of two different rabbonim. As I understood the shaylah, the answer to Rivkah’s query did not involve analyzing the laws of who must observe two days, but concerned whether she must follow the first opinion or the second. Although the Gemara states that one may not ask the same shaylah twice, perhaps this applies only if someone received a strict ruling that he or she is now trying to overturn. But what happens if someone first received a lenient ruling, and then received a stricter response? In our instance, the first authority told Rivkah that she need keep only one day Yom Tov, which, according to most opinions, is considered a lenient ruling, since she now may perform melacha on the second day (Minchas Shelomoh 1:19:8). (Shu’t Chacham Tzvi #167 contends, for reasons beyond the scope of this article, that keeping one day is the stricter ruling.)

In order to resolve Rivkah’s quandary, we need to discuss the following questions:

  1. May one ask again after receiving a lenient answer?
  2. If one did, and the second authority ruled strictly, whose reply is binding? Is one still bound by the first ruling, which in Rivkah’s case was lenient, or the second, stricter ruling; or perhaps she should now ask a third authority for a final decision?
  3. Was the teacher correct in directing her to ask a second shaylah after she already received a psak?

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Before focusing on Rivkah’s predicament, we must first understand the general principles of the topic:

The Gemara (Avodah Zarah 7a) teaches that someone who asked a shaylah and received a strict ruling may not subsequently ask the question from a different authority. I will refer to this principle as hanishal lechacham (“one who asked a Torah scholar”), based on the opening words of the Gemara’s statement.

Tosafos (Avodah Zarah 7a s.v. hanishal) inquires, “May one never question the rav’s decision? Let the different authorities debate the issue and perhaps the second will prove to the original authority that the original decision was incorrect.” Tosafos concludes that the Gemara prohibits only asking a second rav without notifying him that one has already asked the question. However, if one notifies the second authority that the question had already been asked, the second authority may oppose the decision, if he considers it mistaken. Can he actually overturn the first ruling? This depends, as there are three levels of error:

CLEAR MISTAKE

  1. If it is obvious to the second rav that the first rav erred, the second rav may inform the inquirer of the correct practice (Tosafos). This is true only if the first rav‘s ruling conflicts with accepted halachic practice or was based on inaccurate information (see Mishnah, Bechoros 28b). In these instances, the first opinion is totally disregarded, since it is erroneous. Judaism does not accept a doctrine of rabbinic infallibility; on the contrary, the Gemara records several instances where great halachic authorities erred in specific rulings (see Horiyos 2a). For example, Rabbi Tarfon ruled that a cow whose uterus was surgically removed is not kosher, as it will die shortly. The Mishnah records that when it was demonstrated that an animal can survive this surgery satisfactorily, Rabbi Tarfon acknowledged his error (Mishnah, Bechoros 28b).

PROVABLE ERROR

  1. If the second rav feels he can prove that the first one’s ruling was mistaken, but the ruling is not an obvious error, the second authority may not say anything directly to the inquirer. Instead, he should contact the first rav and share with him his proofs that the ruling was flawed. In the true style of intellectual honesty required of a Torah scholar, the first rav should carefully examine the second rav’s approach to see if it has merit. It is now up to the first rav to decide whether to change his ruling (Shu’t Panim Meiros #2; cf. Shach, Yoreh Deah 242:58; Choshen Mishpat 25:14:17). If he still feels that his first interpretation is correct, or, at least, not proven to be in error, he should maintain his original position. According to some opinions, he may retract his position if he no longer feels it to be correct, even though he cannot prove it wrong (Levush, Yoreh Deah 242:31; Aruch HaShulchan, Yoreh Deah 242:60).

A similar situation could result if the second rav knows that well-accepted authorities rule differently from the way the first rav did, and he suspects that the first rav would accept their position (see Rosh, Sanhedrin 4:6). In this situation, too, the second rav may simply notify the first rav of the variant opinion, and then it is up to the first rav to decide whether to rescind his original decision.

In all the cases we mentioned so far, the first rav’s ruling is retracted, either because it was clearly erroneous or because he himself withdrew it.

DISPUTE IN INTERPRETATION

III. If the second rav disagrees with the first rav’s conclusion, but cannot prove it incorrect, the second rav should say nothing to the questioner, who remains bound by the original decision. There is no halachic error here, but a diversity of outlook, and the first rav’s verdict cannot be overturned. Even if the first rav himself subsequently reconsiders his decision, most authorities contend that he cannot alter his own original ruling, since the original approach cannot be disproved (Shach, Yoreh Deah 242:58 and Choshen Mishpat 25:14:17; Shu’t Panim Meiros #2; Divrei Chamudos, Chullin 3:24). (However, note that the Levush, Yoreh Deah 242:31, and the Aruch HaShulchan, Yoreh Deah 242:60, rule that he can change his mind. They feel that the second rav should engage the first rav in debate, because this might change the first one’s mind.)

HOW LONG?

How long does the ruling remain binding?

The Rama (Yoreh Deah 242:31) rules that the rav’s decision is binding only for the specific instance just asked. However, if the same shaylah recurs, one may re-ask the shaylah from either the same or a different rav. The same rav himself, and certainly any other rav, may rule differently when the question recurs. Therefore, if someone asked whether one may perform a certain activity on Shabbos, was told that it is forbidden, and subsequently discovers that the consensus of poskim permits this activity, he may be lenient in the future. Similarly, a rav who ruled one way and subsequently discovered that most poskim dispute his conclusion may conclude differently the next time he is asked this question.

WHAT IF THE FIRST SCHOLAR WAS LENIENT?

So far, we have assumed that the first rav decided strictly. What happens if the first rav ruled leniently, and the questioner would like to ask someone else? This issue is germane to Rivkah asking her seminary rabbi about observing two days of Yom Tov after the first rabbi permitted her to keep only one day.

The answer to this question depends on why one may not ask a shaylah from a second authority. Here are two reasons given:

Reason #1: CONSIDERING IT PROHIBITED

Most Rishonim contend that when submitting a question to a rav, the inquirer accepts the rav’s decision as binding and must then consider the item either permitted or prohibited (Raavad quoted by Ran; Rosh). This concept is called shavya anafshei chaticha de’issura (considering something as prohibited). I will clarify this principle with a case that I discussed in a different article.

A man believes himself to be a kohen, even though there is insufficient evidence for his assumption. Since most Jews are yisroelim and not kohanim, his halachic status is a yisroel, and he has none of the rights of a kohen — he may not duchen, redeem a bechor or receive the first aliyah to the Torah. However, since he considers himself a kohen, he must assume the stringencies that result from that esteemed status: he may not come in contact with corpses, nor marry a woman forbidden to a kohen. Since he believes that he is a kohen, he is shavya anafshei chaticha de’issura, he must consider himself prohibited to do these things, as if he is a kohen.

The Rishonim mentioned above maintain that asking a shaylah means accepting the rav’s opinion as binding halacha; if he rules stringently, I must accept his verdict, and therefore I may not re-ask the question. (The exceptions mentioned previously, where the ruling can be retracted, are because the decision is considered an error and, therefore, not a valid decision.)

This approach rules that the principle of hanishal lechacham applies only when the first rav ruled stringently. If he ruled leniently, I am permitted to follow his ruling, but not obligated to, and therefore, I may re-ask the shaylah from a different rav (see Tosafos, Avodah Zarah 7a s.v. hanishal). Thus, Rivkah may ask her shaylah from the seminary rabbi, notwithstanding the first ruling she received. We will soon discuss whether she is obligated to keep the second day of Yom Tov, once she received this second ruling.

Reason #2: RESPECT FOR A TALMID CHACHAM

Other authorities explain that re-asking a shaylah from a second rav affronts the respect due the first rav, by implying that one is questioning his competence (cited by Ran to Avodah Zarah. See there that he also quotes an additional reason.) This rationale forbids re-asking a question, even if the first rav ruled leniently, as it is still offensive to the rav’s honor. Following this approach, Rivkah should not have asked the seminary rabbi, once she had already asked someone qualified to answer her shaylah.

In view of the second reason, Rivkah’s teacher should certainly have asked her own shaylah as to whether to instruct Rivkah to ask her shaylah again.

Do any other differences result from the dispute as to why one may not re-ask a shaylah? Indeed, they do.

A BRACHA DISPUTE

Many halachic issues are not matters of being strict versus lenient, but simply questions regarding correct procedure. For example, whether or not to recite a bracha in a certain instance, which bracha to recite, or whether to repeat a tefillah are all instances where there is no “stricter” or “more lenient” side of the question. Both sides of the question involve a stringency, and therefore, the principle of shavya anafshei chaticha de’issura is not applicable.

Those who ban re-asking a question because of shavya anafshei chaticha de’issura should therefore permit re-asking any question of this type, in order to receive a more accurate or authoritative response. On the other hand, those who ban re-asking a question because it is offensive to a scholar’s honor should prohibit it in this instance, too, since it implies a lack of competence on the part of the first rav asked.

Before resolving Rivkah’s dilemma, we need to explore one other fascinating point:

A DISPUTE BETWEEN THE TALMUDS?

When the Gemara Bavli (Avodah Zarah 7a) cites the prohibition of remaking a halachic inquiry, it refers only to cases where the first rav answered stringently, but mentions no cases where the first rav ruled leniently. This implies that the Bavli explains the reason for this prohibition like the first approach – that one has accepted the prohibition of the rav.

However, the Yerushalmi (Shabbos 19:1) quotes the following anecdote:

Rabbi Simon permitted something which Rabbi Ami subsequently prohibited. Rabbi Simon was upset; is it not said that if one sage permitted something, a second sage may not prohibit it?

This Yerushalmi appears to rule that one may not re-ask a question, even if one received a lenient ruling, which is impossible according to the first approach. Thus, the Yerushalmi appears to understand that the reason one may not re-ask a question is the talmid chacham’s honor, the second approach cited. This would imply that the two Talmuds dispute the exact question upon which our dear Rivkah and her teacher stumbled!

The Rishonim prefer to avoid saying that the two Talmuds disagree, suggesting different approaches to resolve this contradiction.

AN ALTERNATIVE READING

Tosafos (Avodah Zarah 7a s.v. hanishal) suggests reading the last statement of the Yerushalmi rhetorically, as opposed to being a support for Rabbi Simon’s position. The passage now reads:

Rabbi Simon permitted something which Rabbi Ami subsequently prohibited. Rabbi Simon was upset. The Yerushalmi now questions the validity of Rabbi Simon’s reaction:

“Does it say anywhere that if one sage permitted something, a second sage may not prohibit it?”

Following Tosafos’ approach, the Yerushalmi rules, exactly as the Bavli implies, that the prohibition to re-ask a question applies only when the first scholar decided stringently. However, when he ruled leniently, a second scholar may rule freely on the case.

On the other hand, the Rosh explains the Yerushalmi as I explained originally, that Rabbi Simon objected to Rabbi Ami’s strict ruling as halachically objectionable, after he (Rabbi Simon) had permitted the matter. The Rosh quotes this approach as definitive halacha, meaning that hanishal lechacham is prohibited because of the honor of the first rav. The Rosh appears to contend that both reasons are true, the Bavli emphasizes one reason, and the Yerushalmi the second. This approach maintains that one may, indeed, not seek out a second rav’s opinion, whether the first rav was lenient or strict.

HOW DO WE RULE?

How do we rule in this dispute?

Most halachic authorities rule that the law of hanishal lechacham applies only when the initial ruling was strict, but if it was lenient, one may, indeed, re-ask the shaylah (Shach, Yoreh Deah 242:59; Gra). However, there are some who rule, like the Rosh, that hanishal lechacham applies whether the initial ruling was strict or lenient and therefore forbid re-asking a question, even if one received a lenient ruling (Rama, Yoreh Deah 242:31). According to the first approach, there was nothing wrong with Rivkah re-asking her question.

CONCLUSION

Now that Rivkah already re-asked the question, must she keep one or two days of Yom Tov? According to those who rule that hanishal lechacham is because one has accepted the stringent opinion, once Rivkah re-asked the question she is bound to follow the second, stricter, ruling. Since most authorities rule this way, one who re-asks the question from a second authority will be obligated to follow his opinion, if he is stricter. No matter how many people one asks, one will be always obliged to follow the strictest ruling. Thus, Rivkah should celebrate two days of Yom Tov this Pesach.

The final psak Rivkah received applies only to the question she asked about Pesach. When Shavuos arrives, she may ask again whether to observe one day Yom Tov or two. May she direct her question to a particular rav, knowing what answer she wants to receive? That is a topic for a different article.

Can the Rav Make a Mistake?

clip_image002This article is somewhat more complicated than what I usually send out. Nevertheless, since questions about rabbinic infallibility are usually misunderstood and misinterpreted, I decided to send this article before Pesach.

Would You Like One Day or Two?

On the evening of the first night of Chol HaMoed in Eretz Yisroel (corresponding to the eve of the second night of Yom Tov in chutz la’aretz), I received a curious phone call:

“Rabbi,” the female voice began, “I am calling on behalf of my friend, Rivkah.” After decades of rabbinic experience, I was convinced that this was the introduction to an embarrassing question. People often prefer pretending that they are asking for someone else — hiding behind the name “of a friend.” But this time I was wrong.

KIDDUSH OR HAVDALAH?

“Rivkah is a student at Bnos Aliyah Seminary and is uncertain whether she should keep one day of Yom Tov or two. A few weeks ago she visited a family for Shabbos and mentioned her predicament. The man of the house graciously told her that he answers halachic inquiries and ruled that she need keep only one day of Yom Tov. However, upon returning to Seminary, a teacher told Rivkah that she should not ask her shaylah from anyone, but must ask one of the seminary rabbis. Rivkah did so, and was told to keep two days. Subsequently, someone told her that she should not have asked the question a second time and must follow the first ruling she received. Now she is in a dilemma: should she observe the second day of Yom Tov or not? Is she supposed to find someone reciting Kiddush or Havdalah?”

Although most people do not have a Yom Tov issue as Rivkah did, they could still stumble into a similar predicament by asking any query from two different rabbonim. As I understood the shaylah, the answer to Rivkah’s query did not involve analyzing the laws of who must observe two days, but whether she must follow the first opinion or the second. Although the Gemara states that one may not ask the same shaylah twice, perhaps this only applies if someone received a strict ruling that he or she is now trying to overturn. But what happens if someone first received a lenient ruling, and then received a stricter response? In our instance, the first authority told Rivkah that she need keep only one day Yom Tov; most opinions consider this a lenient ruling since she now may perform melacha on the second day (Minchas Shelomoh 1:19:8). (For reasons beyond the scope of this article, Shu”t Chacham Tzvi #167 contends that keeping one day is the stricter ruling.)

In order to resolve Rivkah’s quandary, we need to discuss the following questions:

1. May one ask again after receiving a lenient answer?

2. If one did, and the second authority ruled strictly, whose reply is binding? Is she still bound by the first ruling, which was lenient, or the second, stricter ruling; or perhaps she should now ask a third authority for a final decision?

3. Was the teacher correct in directing her to ask a second shaylah after she already received a psak?

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Before focusing on Rivkah’s predicament, we must first understand the general principles of the topic:

The Gemara (Avodah Zarah 7a) teaches that someone who asked a shaylah and received a strict ruling may not subsequently ask the question from a different authority. I will refer to this principle as hanishal lachacham, based on the opening words of the Gemara’s statement (“One who asked a Torah scholar”).

Tosafos (Avodah Zarah 7a s.v. hanishal) inquires, “May one never question the rav’s decision? Let the different authorities debate the issue and perhaps the second will prove to the original authority that his decision was incorrect?” Tosafos concludes that the Gemara only prohibits asking a second rav without notifying him that one has already asked the question. However, if one notifies the second authority that the question had already been asked, the second authority may oppose the decision if he considers it mistaken. Can he actually overturn the first ruling? This depends, as there are three levels of error:

CLEAR MISTAKE

I. If it is obvious to the second rav that the first rav erred, the second rav may inform the inquirer of the correct practice (Tosafos). This is true only if the first rav‘s ruling conflicts with accepted halachic practice or was based on inaccurate information (see Mishnah Bechoros 28b). In these instances, the first opinion is totally disregarded, since it is erroneous. Judaism does not accept a doctrine of rabbinic infallibility; on the contrary, the Gemara records several instances where great halachic authorities erred in specific halachic rulings (see Horiyos 2a). For example, Rabbi Tarfon ruled that a cow whose uterus was surgically removed is not kosher as it will die shortly. The Mishnah records that when it was demonstrated that an animal can survive this surgery satisfactorily, Rabbi Tarfon acknowledged his error (Mishnah Bechoros 28b).

PROVABLE ERROR

II. If the second rav feels he can prove that the first ruling was mistaken, but the ruling is not an obvious error, the second authority may not say anything directly to the inquirer. Instead, he should contact the first rav to prove that the ruling was flawed. In the true style of intellectual honesty required of a Torah scholar, the first rav should carefully examine the second rav’s approach to see if it has merit. It is now up to the first rav to decide whether to change his ruling (Shu”t Panim Meiros #2; cf. Shach, Yoreh Deah 242:58; Choshen Mishpat 25:14:17). If he still feels that his first interpretation is correct, or not proven to be in error, he should maintain his original position. According to some opinions, he may retract his position if he no longer feels it to be correct, even though he cannot prove it wrong (Levush, Yoreh Deah 242:31; Aruch HaShulchan, Yoreh Deah 242:60).

A similar situation could result if the second rav knows that well-accepted authorities rule differently from the way the first rav did, and he suspects that the first rav would accept their position (see Rosh, Sanhedrin 4:6). In this situation, too, the second rav may simply notify the first rav of the variant opinion and then it is up to the first rav to decide whether to rescind his original decision.

In all the cases we mentioned so far, the first rav’s ruling is retracted, either because it was clearly erroneous or because he himself withdrew it.

DISPUTE IN INTERPRETATION

III. If the second rav disagrees with the first rav’s conclusion, but cannot prove it incorrect, the second rav should say nothing to the questioner, who remains bound by the original decision. There is no halachic error here, but a diversity of outlook, and the first rav’s verdict cannot be overturned. Even if the first rav himself subsequently reconsiders his decision, most authorities contend that he cannot alter his own original ruling since the original approach cannot be disproved (Shach, Yoreh Deah 242:58 and Choshen Mishpat 25:14:17; Shu”t Panim Meiros #2; Divrei Chamudos, Chullin 3:24). (However, note that the Levush, Yoreh Deah 242:31, and the Aruch HaShulchan, Yoreh Deah 242:60, rule that he can change his mind. They feel that the second rav should engage the first rav in debate because this might change the first one’s mind.)

How long does the ruling remain binding?

The Rama (Yoreh Deah 242:31) rules that the rav’s decision is binding only on the specific instance just asked. However, if the same shaylah recurs, one may re-ask the shaylah from either the same or a different rav. The same rav himself, and certainly any other rav, may rule differently when the question recurs. Therefore, if someone asked whether one may perform a certain activity on Shabbos, was told that it is forbidden, and subsequently discovers that the consensus of poskim permits this activity, he may be lenient in the future. Similarly, a rav who ruled one way and subsequently discovered that most poskim dispute his conclusion, may conclude differently the next time he is asked this question.

WHAT IF THE FIRST SCHOLAR WAS LENIENT?

So far, we have assumed that the first rav decided strictly. What happens if the first rav ruled leniently, and the questioner would like to ask someone else? This issue is germane to Rivkah asking her seminary rabbi about observing two days of Yom Tov after the first rabbi permitted her to keep only one day.

The answer to this question depends on why one may not ask a shaylah from a second authority. Here are two reasons given:

Reason #1: CONSIDERING IT PROHIBITED

Most Rishonim contend that when submitting a question to a rav, the inquirer accepts the rav’s decision as binding and must then consider the item either permitted or prohibited (Raavad quoted by Ran; Rosh). This concept is called shavya anafshei chaticha di’issura, considering something as prohibited. I will clarify this principle with a case that I discussed in a different article.

A man believes himself to be a kohen, even though there was insufficient evidence for his assumption. Since most Jews are yisroelim and not kohanim, his halachic status is a yisroel, and he has none of the rights of a kohen — he may not duchen, redeem a bechor or receive the first aliyah to the Torah. However, since he considers himself a kohen, he must assume the stringencies that result from that esteemed status — he may not come in contact with corpses, nor marry a woman forbidden to a kohen. Since he believes that he is a kohen he is shavya anafshei chaticha di’issura, he must consider himself prohibited as if he is a kohen.

The Rishonim mentioned above maintain that asking a shaylah means accepting the rav’s opinion as binding halacha; if he rules stringently I must accept his verdict and therefore I may not re-ask the question. (The exceptions mentioned previously where the ruling can be retracted are because the decision is considered an error and therefore not a valid decision.)

This approach rules that the principle of hanishal lachacham applies only when the first rav ruled stringently. If he ruled leniently, I am permitted to follow his ruling, but not obligated to, and therefore I may re-ask the shaylah from a different rav (see Tosafos, Avodah Zarah 7a s.v. hanishal). Thus Rivkah may ask her shaylah from the seminary rabbi, notwithstanding the first ruling she received. We will soon discuss whether she is obligated to keep the second day of Yom Tov once she received this second ruling.

Reason #2: RESPECT FOR A TALMID CHACHAM

Other authorities explain that re-asking a shaylah from a second rav affronts the respect due the first rav by implying that one is questioning his competence (cited by Ran to Avodah Zarah. See there that he also quotes an additional reason.) This rationale forbids re-asking a question even if the first rav ruled leniently, as it is still offensive to the rav’s honor. Following this approach, Rivkah should not have asked the seminary rabbi once she already asked someone qualified to answer her shaylah.

SHOULD HER TEACHER HAVE TOLD HER TO ASK THE SHAYLAH AGAIN?

Certainly, her teacher should have asked her own shaylah whether to instruct Rivkah to ask her shaylah again.

Do any other differences result from the dispute as to why one may not re-ask a shaylah? Indeed there are.

A BRACHA DISPUTE

Many halachic issues are not matters of being strict versus lenient, but simply questions regarding correct procedure. For example, whether or not to recite a bracha in a certain instance, which bracha to recite, or whether to repeat a tefillah, are all instances where there is no “stricter” or “more lenient” side of the question. Both sides of the question involve a stringency, and therefore the principle of shavya anafshei chaticha di’issura is not applicable.

Those who ban re-asking a question because of shavya anafshei chaticha di’issura should therefore permit re-asking any question of this type in order to receive a more accurate or authoritative response. On the other hand, those who ban re-asking a question because it is offensive to a scholar’s honor should prohibit it in this instance too, since it implies a lack of competence on the part of the first rav asked.

Before resolving Rivkah’s dilemma, we need to explore one other fascinating point:

A DISPUTE BETWEEN THE TALMUDS?

When the Gemara Bavli (Avodah Zarah 7a) cites the prohibition of re-asking a halachic inquiry, it refers only to cases where the first rav answered stringently, but mentions no cases where the first rav ruled leniently. This implies that the Bavli explains the reason for this prohibition like the first approach – that one has accepted the prohibition of the rav.

However, the Yerushalmi (Shabbos 19:1) quotes the following anecdote:

Rabbi Simon permitted something, which Rabbi Ami subsequently prohibited. Rabbi Simon was upset; is it not said that if one sage permitted something, a second sage may not prohibit it?

This Yerushalmi appears to rule that one may not re-ask a question even if one received a lenient ruling, which is impossible according to the first approach. Thus, the Yerushalmi appears to understand that the reason one may not re-ask a question is the talmid chacham’s honor, the second approach cited. This would imply that the two Talmuds dispute the exact question upon which our dear Rivkah and her teacher stumbled!

The Rishonim prefer to avoid saying that the two Talmuds disagree, suggesting different approaches to resolve this contradiction.

AN ALTERNATIVE READING

Tosafos suggests reading the last statement of the Yerushalmi rhetorically, as opposed to being a support for Rabbi Simon’s position. The passage now reads:

Rabbi Simon permitted something, which Rabbi Ami subsequently prohibited. Rabbi Simon was upset. The Yerushalmi now questions the validity of Rabbi Simon’s reaction:

“Does it say anywhere that if one sage permitted something, a second sage may not prohibit it?”

Following Tosafos’ approach, the Yerushalmi rules, exactly as the Bavli implies, that the prohibition to re-ask a question applies only when the first scholar decided stringently. However, when he ruled leniently, a second scholar may rule freely on the case.

On the other hand, the Rosh explains the Yerushalmi as I explained originally, that Rabbi Simon objected to Rabbi Ami’s strict ruling as halachically objectionable after he (Rabbi Simon) had permitted the matter. The Rosh quotes this approach as definitive halacha, meaning that hanishal lichacham is prohibited because of the honor of the first rav. The Rosh appears to hold that both reasons are true, the Bavli emphasizes one reason, and the Yerushalmi the second. This approach maintains that one may indeed not seek out a second rav’s opinion (without telling him that one already asked someone), whether the first rav was lenient or strict.

How do we rule in this dispute?

Most halachic authorities rule that the law of hanishal lichacham applies only when the initial ruling was strict, but if it was lenient, one may indeed re-ask the shaylah (Shach, Yoreh Deah 242:59; Gra). According to this approach, there was nothing wrong with Rivkah re-asking her question.

However, there are some who rule, like the Rosh, that hanishal lichacham applies whether the initial ruling was strict or lenient and forbid re-asking a question even if one received a lenient ruling (Rama, Yoreh Deah 242:31).

CONCLUSION

Now that Rivkah already re-asked the question, must she keep one or two days of Yom Tov? According to those who rule that hanishal lichacham is because one has accepted the stringent opinion, once Rivkah re-asked the question she is bound to follow the second, stricter ruling. Since most authorities rule this way, one who re-asks the question from a second authority will be obligated to follow his opinion, if he is stricter. No matter how many people one asks, one will be always obliged to follow the strictest ruling. Thus, Rivkah should celebrate two days of Yom Tov.

The final psak Rivkah received only applies to the Yom Tov about which she asked. Before the next Yom Tov arrives, she may ask again whether to observe one day Yom Tov or two. May she direct her question to a particular rav, knowing what answer she wants to receive? That is a topic for a different article.