Women and Reading Megillah

Question #1: Ba’alas Korei

May a woman be the ba’alas keri’ah of the megillah?

Question #2: Kiddush and Arba Kosos

The elderly Mr. Klein is fully alert, but, unfortunately, he has difficulty enunciating. May Mrs. Klein recite kiddush and the other brachos of the seder for him?

Foreword

Although there is a general rule exempting women from mitzvos aseih shehazeman grama, (time-bound requirements involving positive action), such as tefillin, sukkah and tzitzis, there are numerous exceptions to this rule. For example, women are required to observe mitzvos related to Shabbos and Pesach and to hear Megillas Esther on Purim, all topics that we will discuss.

Part of the miracle

In three places, the Gemara quotes an early amora, Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, who ruled that women are obligated to fulfill the mitzvos of megillah, ner Chanukah and the four kosos of seder night. Although these are all time-bound mitzvos aseih, women are obligated to observe these specific mitzvos because of a different rule, af hein hayu be’oso haneis, “they were also included in the miracle.” This rule means that, when Chazal created the mitzvos of kindling Chanukah lights, reading megillah on Purim or consuming the four cups on the first night of Pesach, they included women in the obligation, notwithstanding that they are usually exempt from mitzvos aseih shehazeman grama.

The rishonim dispute what the term af hein hayu be’oso haneis means. Is this emphasizing that they were saved by the miracle, or does it mean that they were involved in bringing about the miracle?

Rashi and the Rashbam (Pesachim 108b) explain that af hein hayu be’oso haneis means that women were involved in causing the miracle (think of Esther declaring that the Jews fast and do teshuvah, approaching Achashveirosh and setting Haman up for his execution). On the other hand, Tosafos (Megillah 4a s. v. She’af; Pesachim 108b s. v. Hayu) contends that it means that women, also, were saved by the miracle of survival, either physical or spiritual, that we celebrate in each of these observances.

Mitzvos min haTorah?

Note that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi applied his principle to three mitzvos, each of which is a requirement only miderabbanan. Is this coincidental, or is the principle of af hein hayu be’oso haneis a principle that Chazal created that does not apply min haTorah? This issue is disputed by two Ba’alei Tosafos. The first opinion cited by Tosafos contends that af hein hayu be’oso haneis is a rabbinic principle and will not create a Torah requirement (Tosafos, Megillah 4a s. v. She’af; Mordechai, Megillah #780). The disputant, Rabbeinu Yosef of Eretz Yisrael, rules that af hein hayu be’oso haneis applies even to mitzvos that are min haTorah.

Shomei’a ke’oneh

Prior to answering our opening questions, we need to understand a halachic principle called shomei’a ke’oneh, which translates, literally, as “hearing is like responding.” This principle means that when I hear someone recite a prayer, the megillah, kiddush or havdalah, it is considered as if I, myself, recited it.

I will explain this principle with an example that we utilize regularly: Except for heads of household, most of us fulfill the mitzvos of kiddush and havdalah by hearing someone else recite them. But the mitzvah is to recite kiddush and havdalah, not merely to hear them. So, how do we fulfill these mitzvos when we are only hearing them? The answer is that, because of shomei’a ke’oneh, it is deemed that we recited kiddush and havdalah ourselves.

Three conditions

For shomei’a ke’oneh to work, three conditions must be met:

(1) The individual performing the mitzvah must have in mind to be motzi the other people, meaning that he knows that he is acting on behalf of those listening.

(2) The individual performing the mitzvah must be required to observe this mitzvah. In other words, if a child (under bar or bas mitzvah) recites kiddush or havdalah on behalf of an adult, the adult does not fulfill the mitzvah, since the child is not obligated in this mitzvah min haTorah (see Brachos 20b).

(3) The listeners must have in mind that they are discharging their obligation to perform the mitzvah by hearing this recital.

Parshas Zachor

It is for this last reason that, immediately prior to Parshas Zachor, the gabbai announces that everyone should have in mind with the reading of the ba’al keri’ah to fulfill the mitzvah of remembering Amaleik’s dastardly deeds. Only the ba’al keri’ah actually reads the appropriate Torah portion. The rest of us discharge our obligation to observe this mitzvah by hearing the ba’al keri’ah, which, because of shomei’a ke’oneh, is considered as if we read it ourselves. In addition to Parshas Zachor, brachos, reading the Torah and the megillah, kiddush and havdalah, there are numerous other applications of shomei’a ke’oneh.

Not now!

We should note that, although the person being motzi others must be obligated by the Torah to fulfill the mitzvah, this does not require him to fulfill the mitzvah with this reading, by which he is being motzi others. He may recite kiddush or havdalah for someone else, even if he, himself, has already fulfilled the mitzvah, or if he intends to fulfill the mitzvah later with a different recital of kiddush or havdalah. That is why a ba’al keri’ah can read megillah many different times to be motzi other people, even though he has already fulfilled the mitzvah. This is also the reason why kiddush and havdalah are recited in shul, notwithstanding that the person reciting them plans to recite them again at home.

Ba’alas korei

At this point, I can present the halachic background behind our opening question: May a woman be the ba’alas korei or ba’alas keri’ah of the megillah?

Whether a woman may assume the role of ba’alas keri’ah is the subject of a fascinating dispute among rishonim, as we will soon see.

The Mishnah (Megillah 19b) states: Everyone is qualified to read the megillah except for a minor and someone who is not halachically responsible for his actions. The Gemara (Arachin 2b) asks: what is being added by emphasizing that “everyone” is qualified to read the megillah? The Gemara replies that women, who are usually not obligated in time-bound mitzvos, are obligated to read the megillah, to the extent that they may read the megillah to be motzi others. Rashi explains, explicitly, that this means that a woman may read the megillah to be motzi a man in his obligation. Thus, according to Rashi, a woman may be the ba’alas keri’ah of the megillah.

However, the Ba’al Halachos Gedolos (usually abbreviated as Bahag, the author of a halachic work from the era of the geonim) notes that the Tosefta, a halachic work dating back to the era of the Mishnah, disagrees. The salient part of the Tosefta (Megillah 2:4), as we have its text, reads: “All are obligated in the reading of the megillah… . Women… are exempt and cannot be motzi the public (rabbim) from their responsibility.”

Is there any way to resolve this contradiction between the Mishnah, as understood by the Gemara, and the Tosefta?

The Bahag presents an approach to explain the Mishnah and the Tosefta such that there is no conflict between the two positions. When the Mishnah implies, and the Gemara states explicitly, that a woman can be motziah (the feminine of motzi; plural motzios) someone else, it means that she can be motziah a woman, but not a man.

Why should this be true? The Bahag explains that there are two levels of mitzvah regarding the megillah:

(1) To read the megillah.

(2) To hear the megillah.

Ordinarily, a man fulfills both requirements when he hears the megillah from another man, since the person reading the megillah, who has both obligations, reads it for the purpose that the listeners fulfill all their megillah-related obligations. However, since a woman’s obligation is only to hear the megillah, but not to read it, it is not within her ability to be motzi someone who is obligated to read the megillah (Rosh, Megillah 1:4; note that Shu”t Avnei Neizer [Orach Chayim #511:4-5] and the Brisker Rav [Al Hashas, Inyanim #15] explain the Bahag’s approach slightly differently).

With this approach, the Bahag explains that the Mishnah refers to a woman reading the megillah for other women, which she can do, and the Tosefta refers to a woman reading the megillah for men, which is why it states that a woman cannot be motziah the public, which includes men.

The Tosefta according to Rashi

According to Rashi, either the text of this Tosefta is in error (as is not uncommon in our texts of the Tosefta) or it disagrees with the Mishnah as understood by the Gemara, in which case we rule according to the Mishnah and Gemara (both of these approaches are mentioned, in different places, by the Bach, Orach Chayim 689). We should point out that the texts that we have received of the Tosefta are notoriously unreliable, since copyists often made errors and, as a result, texts that were studied less frequently are often inaccurate. As an example, the rishonim who quote this Tosefta cite it with at least three significantly different texts.

Also, if, indeed, there is a dispute between the tanna who authored the Mishnah and the one who authored the Tosefta, the halacha follows the author of the Mishnah. Thus, either approach used to explain Rashi’s position is highly satisfactory.

Other rishonim?

Several authorities infer from the Rambam that he agreed with Rashi’s halachic conclusion (Magid Mishnah, Hilchos Megillah 1:2; Beis Yosef, Orach Chayim 689). The Beis Yosef and the Darkei Moshe quote other rishonim on both sides of fence: The Or Zarua rules like Rashi, whereas the Ra’avyah and the Mordechai (Megillah #779) rule like the Bahag. The Shulchan Aruch’s conclusion is unclear (Orach Chayim 689:2), whereas the Rema rules like the Bahag.

According to the Bahag’s opinion, some authorities contend that a woman hearing megillah when no male is fulfilling the mitzvah should not recite the brocha al mikra megillah, since she is not required to read the megillah, but to hear it. The Rema records that she should recite lishmo’a megillah, but others prefer that she should recite lishmo’a mikra megillah (Mishnah Berurah 689:8).

Getting a third opinion

Are there any other opinions? We actually find a few other opinions among rishonim, who present alternative ways of resolving the contradiction between the Mishnah and the Tosefta, with halachic results unlike either Rashi or the Bahag. Rabbi Moshe of Coucy (France), a ba’al Tosafos who wrote a halachic work based on the 613 mitzvos, usually called Sefer Hamitzvos Hagadol (abbreviated as Semag), agrees with the Bahag that a woman cannot be motziah a man, but disagrees with the reason why. In his opinion, just as Chazal ruled that a woman cannot fulfill the mitzvah of keri’as haTorah, because it is not kavod hatzibur for her to read for the community (Megillah 23a), she may also not read to be motzi a man in megillah (towards the beginning of Hilchos Megillah in the Semag). Tosafos (Sukkah 38a s. v. Be’emes at end) may agree with this opinion of the Semag.

With this approach, the Semag answers the contradiction between the Mishnah and the Gemara, on one hand, and the Tosefta, on the other, in a way similar to that of the Bahag. The Mishnah and Gemara teach that a woman may read the megillah for someone else; the Tosefta is ruling that she may not be the ba’alas keri’ah for a community.

There is yet a fourth approach to the issue, that of the Ba’al Ha’itur (Hilchos Megillah, page 110, column 1), but the details of his opinion are somewhat unclear (see Ran [Megillah 19b, 6b in the Rif’s pages]; Tur and Bach, Orach Chayim 689).

Three is a crowd

There is yet another opinion, contending that the Tosefta means that a woman should not read the megillah for more than one other woman (Korban Nesanel, Megillah 1:4:60, in explanation of Tosafos, Sukkah 38a s. v. Be’emes). According to this position, the Tosefta meant this when it said that a woman she should not read for the “public” (“rabbim” in the words of the Tosefta). The Mishnah Berurah quotes this approach as authoritative halacha (Shaar Hatziyun, 689:15). This opinion actually ends up with a stricter ruling, since, according to both Rashi and the Bahag, a woman may read megillah to be motziah other women, regardless as to how many there are, whereas this opinion allows her to be motziah only one other woman, not any more.

Kiddush

Does this principle of the Bahag apply to kiddush just as it applies to the reading of the megillah? Let us explore the halachic data on the subject.

The Gemara (Brachos 20b) states, unequivocally, that women are obligated in the mitzvah of reciting kiddush. Does this mean that a woman may recite kiddush to be motzi a man? Or, is this dependent on the dispute between Rashi and the Bahag?

Several early acharonim understand that the same dispute that exists between Rashi and the Bahag regarding women reading the megillah for men applies to women reciting kiddush for men (Maharshal and Bach, in their commentaries to Tur Orach Chayim 271). They conclude that a woman may recite kiddush for other women, but may not recite kiddush to be motzi a man in kiddush.

However, the Taz, who was the son-in-law of the Bach, disputes his father-in-law’s conclusion, contending that the Bahag’s opinion is limited to reading the Megillah, and does not apply to reciting kiddush. Since the Gemara concludes that women are obligated in kiddush min haTorah, it appears that they can be motzi men in kiddush. (This approach appears to be implied by the Gemara, Brachos 20b).

Kiddush according to the Semag

We noted above the opinion of the Semag that women cannot be motzios men in reading the megillah, just as they cannot be called up to read the Torah. This position should apply only to a woman reading the megillah, but not to reciting kiddush, which is usually not performed publicly, but recited at home.

Arba Kosos

At this point, let us explore one of our opening questions: The elderly Mr. Klein is fully alert, but, unfortunately, he has difficulty enunciating. May Mrs. Klein recite kiddush and the other brachos of the seder for him?

Chazal required that men and women have four kosos at the seder. It is difficult to imagine that someone can be motzi someone else in this requirement – drinking the four cups of wine it a mitzvah degufei, a mitzvah that is performed with one’s body, similar to matzoh, lulav and tefillin, which preclude one person performing the mitzvah for another. However, someone can recite the brachos that pertain to these kosos for someone else.

The Gemara states that each of the four kosos is associated with a different mitzvah of the seder, and, in fact, each of these mitzvos includes at least one brocha. We hold the kos while we recite these brachos.

1. The first kos is kiddush.

2. Over the second kos, we recite the brocha of Asher Ge’alanu, which completes the mitzvah of magid.

3. The third kos is used for birkas hamazon.

4. The fourth kos is the brocha upon the completion of Hallel.

Women are obligated in all the laws of the seder, which includes reciting the brachos associated with its four kosos. Does it say whether they can be motzios a man in these brachos? Would the Bahag’s opinion that they should not be motziah a man in megillah apply to these brachos? I did not find anyone who discusses this issue.

How do we pasken?

Having explained the understanding and ramifications of all these issues, let us present the halachic conclusions:

Most late authorities conclude that, regarding the reading of the megillah, we should follow the approach of the Bahag that women should not read megillah for men, and, also, we should follow the approach of the Semag that women should not read in public for a group of women. If no man is available who can read the megillah for her, a woman may read the megillah for herself, and she may also read the megillah for another woman.

Regarding the halachos of women being motzios men in kiddush, the later authorities do not accept the approach of the Maharshal and the Bach that the same ruling applies to kiddush. Instead, they contend that when there is a valid reason for a woman to make kiddush for her family, she should do so and be motziah the male members (Magen Avraham, 271:2 and later acharonim). Regarding the bracha of Asher Ge’alanu at the seder, my halachic conclusion is that Mrs. Klein may recite these brachos and be motziah Mr. Klein with them.

Conclusion

Why are women exempt from mitzvos aseih shehazeman grama? Most people, and certainly several commentaries, assume that this is because a woman’s family responsibilities should not be subject to other mitzvos that may conflict with them. However, not everyone agrees with this idea. Some note that there already is a halachic principle of oseik bemitzvah patur min hamitzvah, someone occupied with fulfilling one mitzvah is exempt from performing a different mitzvah, until the first mitzvah is completed. Thus, it would seem superfluous for the Torah to have established yet another rule, to exempt women from mitzvos aseih shehazeman grama, because of the exact same rationale.

Other authorities contend that Hashem, Who created all of our neshamos, knows which mitzvos our particular soul needs in order to thrive, and each individual’s neshamah needs different mitzvos. Following this idea, it is obvious that kohanim need certain mitzvos, but are excluded from others; men require certain mitzvos and cannot fulfill others, and so, also, with women. Each person’s neshamah has its own Divinely created formula for what it needs.

Megillas Esther and the Hard of Hearing

Question #1: Congregation Shomei’a Kol

gragger“Our long-standing baal keri’ah for the Megillah has unfortunately become very hard-of-hearing, yet he still insists on reading the Megillah. Do we fulfill the mitzvah if he cannot hear his own reading?”

Question #2: Mrs. Senior Citizen

“At my age, I no longer hear every word of the Megillah. What should I do?”

Answer:

How clearly must one hear the Megillah to fulfill the mitzvah? Do I fulfill the mitzvah if the reader is hard of hearing? These are the first questions we will discuss. As we will see, answering them impacts on the laws of several other mitzvos.

We will start our discussion with the Mishnah (Megillah 19b), which states: Everyone is kosher to read the Megillah, except for someone who is deaf, deranged, or a minor. This seems to provide Congregation Shomei’a Kol with an answer: A deaf person may not read the Megillah.

However, further examination makes this less obvious. The Gemara, expounding upon this Mishnah, discusses a dispute (Mishnah, Berachos 15a) concerning a person who read Shema so softly that he could not hear himself. Has he fulfilled the mitzvah? The Gemara equates the law of one who reads Shema softly to the issue of listening to the Megillah read by a deaf person.

Tanna’ic opinion

The Gemara concludes with four opinions:

  1. Must hear

Rabbi Yosi contends that fulfilling the mitzvos of Shema, Birchas Hamazon, berachos, or the Megillah requires that one hear one’s voice. (As we will see shortly, this understanding of Rabbi Yosi is not universal.) One who recited any of these so softly that he did not hear himself has not performed the mitzvah. Consequently, someone whose hearing is impaired to the extent that he cannot hear himself is absolved from observing these mitzvos, since there is no way for him to perform them. Furthermore, due to the halachic principle that only one commanded to perform a particular mitzvah may be motzi (discharge) others from their responsibility, he cannot read these mitzvos for anyone else. Thus, according to Rabbi Yosi, such a person may also not recite Kiddush or be the sheliach tzibur for others.

  1. Rav Yosef’s understanding of Rabbi Yosi

The Gemara mentions an alternative interpretation of Rabbi Yosi’s position, that only Shema requires one to hear his own words, since there the Torah states Shema Yisrael.  According to this opinion, even a completely deaf person is commanded to read the Megillah and recite all berachos, and someone who recites the Megillah and berachos very softly has fulfilled the mitzvah.

  1. The better to hear you, my dear

The tanna Rabbi Yehudah agrees that one is required to recite Shema, Birchas Hamazon, berachos and the Megillah loudly enough to hear them, yet he maintains that saying them in a softer voice fulfills the mitzvah bedei’evid, after the fact. One who cannot hear is still required to observe all of these mitzvos, including Shema. The Gemara concludes that, according to Rabbi Yehudah, although it is preferable that a deaf person not be motzi others, if he did so, they have fulfilled the obligation.

  1. No need to hear

The most lenient position is that of Rabbi Meir. He maintains that there is nothing wrong, even lechatchilah, with reciting any of these passages so softly that one cannot hear what he said, and he fulfills the mitzvah. A deaf person is obligated in all of these mitzvos and can be motzi others.

The halacha

The Gemara (Berachos) concludes that the halacha follows Rabbi Yehudah.  Preferably, one should read loudly enough to hear, but if one read softly, one fulfilled the mitzvah. This conclusion implies that a deaf person is obligated in all of these mitzvos and that he may be motzi others, at least after the fact.

At this point of our discussion, it would seem that Congregation Shomei’a Kol should determine whether the baal keri’ah can still hear himself speak. If he can, he may read the Megillah for the tzibur. If he cannot hear himself speak, he should not lechatchilah be the reader, but those who hear him have performed the mitzvah bedi’eved. This is indeed the halachic conclusion of several authorities (Bach; Magen Avraham; Gra).

However, the Beis Yosef (Orach Chayim 689) notes a problem: According to his interpretation of the Rif and the Rosh, and the standard text of the Rambam, all three of these major halachic authorities rule that someone who is deaf cannot be motzi others in reading the Megillah, for all three cite the Mishnah we mentioned earlier: Everyone is kosher for reading the Megillah, except for someone who is deaf, deranged, or a minor. This conflicts with the Gemara ruling that reading without hearing fulfills the mitzvah. This conundrum is even more challenging in light of the Beis Yosef’s policy to generally rule according to these three authorities.

(The Beis Yosef notes that there are alternative readings of the Rambam’s Mishneh Torah on this topic. According to some of the readings, the question we just raised will not be difficult according to the Rambam, but only according to the Rif and the Rosh.)

Position of the Bach

For reasons beyond the scope of this article, the Bach disputes the Beis Yosef’s analysis of the Rif’s position on this matter. However, he agrees with the Beis Yosef’s understanding that the Rosh held that a deaf person cannot be motzi others in reading the Megillah. Thus, he is also faced with the Beis Yosef‘s conundrum that this ruling contradicts the conclusion of the Gemara. How one resolves this contradiction will affect several halachic issues, and will impact the questions mentioned in the beginning of our article.

I am aware of two approaches presented by the early poskim to resolve the problem. The Beis Yosef himself suggests that, because reading Megillah is a mitzvah that requires pirsumei nisa, publicizing the miracle, this quality is lacking when the Megillah is read by a deaf person. Therefore, hearing the Megillah read by a deaf person does not fulfill the mitzvah.

Incapable of hearing himself

Other authorities explain the ruling of the Rosh by drawing a distinction between a deaf person and someone who spoke very softly. They explain that someone who is absolutely deaf cannot fulfill the mitzvos of Shema, Birchas Hamazon, berachos or hearing the Megillah (Bach; Taz). But someone who read them softly fulfills the mitzvah, provided that he is capable of hearing these words were he to recite them louder.

Based on these answers, the Shulchan Aruch and the Taz conclude that someone who heard the Megillah from a deaf person did not fulfill his mitzvah. Other authorities disagree, concluding that those who heard the Megillah from a deaf person have fulfilled their obligation (Bach; Magen Avraham; Gra).

Let us now examine one of our opening questions: “Our long-standing baal keri’ah for the Megillah has, unfortunately, become very hard-of-hearing, yet he still insists on reading the Megillah. Do we fulfill the mitzvah when he reads it?”

As long as he can still hear what he reads, he can be motzi people in Megillah reading. If his hearing is so impaired that he cannot hear himself, the Shulchan Aruch rules that those who hear his Megillah reading have not fulfilled the mitzvah. Although there are authorities who are more lenient bedei’evid, they agree that lechatchilah he should not read the Megillah for others.

Must a deaf person read the Megillah?

Is a deaf person obligated to read the Megillah? (Obviously, he is incapable of hearing it from others.) Most authorities conclude that he must read the Megillah, unlike the conclusion of the Shulchan Aruch. The Mishnah Berurah notes that several rishonim rule that a deaf person is required to read the Megillah, and that this approach should be treated as the primary halachic opinion.

With this background, we can now discuss another of our opening questions:

Mrs. Senior Citizen

“At my age, I no longer hear every word of the Megillah. What should I do?”

We should note that women are obligated to hear Megillah to the same degree that men are. Many elderly people share the problem raised by Mrs. Citizen. Technically, they must hear every word of the Megillah read by someone else, or they must read it themselves. Another option is to read along with someone who knows how to read it correctly. If this person whose hearing is impaired is following this last option, he or she must be careful to read from a kosher Megillah (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 490:4, 7). However, reading from a kosher Megillah is a daunting task for people who never learned to read the Megillah in their youth.

What to do?

Here is a lucrative, and very useful, suggestion for sofrim. Halacha prohibits adding anything unnecessary to a sefer Torah. But a Megillah is kosher, even if it contains vowel signs (nikud) and/or taamei hamikra (often called trop) to instruct how to chant it correctly. (One fulfills the mitzvah even if one cannot read the taamei hamikra at all, as long as one is able to read the words.)

One should note, however, that some early authorities maintain that one should not place nikud in a Megillah, although they agree that a Megillah with added nikud is still kosher (Levush, Orach Chayim 691:5). Other authorities rule that if there is no proficient Megillah reader available, one may add nikud to a Megillah and use it for public reading (Elyah Rabbah 691:6, quoting Be’er Sheva). Thus, we have a halachic basis for this niche market.

Suggestion for an enterprising sofer

Here is a suggestion that should be acceptable according to all opinions – to prepare transparencies with nikud and trop to place directly over the Megillah. Thus, nothing has been written into the Megillah itself, accomodating the Levush’s position, yet anyone able to read Hebrew can read the Megillah with the transparency on it, enabling the hard-of-hearing to fulfill the mitzvah. If a sofer prepares standard-sized megillos, he can mass-produce the corresponding transparencies. People would be forced to purchase his megillos, since other megillos would be out of sync with his transparencies.

Conclusive hearing

In conclusion, most authorities require even completely deaf people to read the Megillah (see Biur Halacha 689:2 s.v. Cheiresh). Since they cannot hear it from someone else, they must obviously read it themselves from a kosher Megillah. We suggested that people who find this difficult can overcome the challenge by having nikud and trop written in a kosher Megillah or by using a transparency that includes them.

 

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