Question #1: Stains
On Shabbos, must I try not to stain my clothes?
Question #2: Lipstick
May I freshen my lipstick on Shabbos?
Question #3: Bleaching
Does bleaching out color violate the melacha of dyeing?
One of the 39 melachos listed in the Mishnah (Shabbos 73a) is tzovei’a, dyeing. This is derived from the fact that many of the textiles and hides used in the Mishkan required dyeing; for example, the ram skins used to cover the Mishkan were dyed red (Yerushalmi, Shabbos 7:2).
Painting metal or the walls of a house are other examples that violate the Torah prohibition of tzovei’a (Rambam, Hilchos Shabbos 9:13; Tiferes Yisroel, Kalkeles Shabbos; Minchas Chinuch).
The prohibition of tzovei’a is violated min haTorah only when the dyeing is permanent (Rambam, Hilchos Shabbos 9:13). Non-permanent dyeing does not violate the law min haTorah, but was prohibited by Chazal.
There are several ways that dyeing or coloring something could be non-permanent. It could be that the colorant you used is not fast – meaning it does not absorb sufficiently into the cloth to remain (Tosefta, Shabbos 12:6). It also could be that the material to which you applied the dye will soon decompose (Tosefta, Shabbos 12:6). Yet another possibility is that the material you are dyeing is permanent, and so is the dye when used for coloring cloth, but the colorant will not set on this particular material. The Rambam picks such an example, when he rules that one does not violate tzovei’a min haTorah by smearing makeup onto metal, since the metal will not remain colored for very long (Hilchos Shabbos 9:13). Each of these non-permanent examples of dyeing is prohibited on Shabbos, but none involves a Torah prohibition.
The halachic authorities dispute concerning the length of time that a color must lastin order to qualify as permanent. According to the Rambam (Hilchos Shabbos 9:13), a dye that will remain for a day is long enough to be considered permanent — thus, someone using a colorant that will disappear a day after use desecrates Shabbos min haTorah (Shaar Hatziyun 303:68; see also Chayei Odom who appears to agree with this ruling). However, other authorities contend that violating the melacha of tzovei’a min haTorah requires a more permanent act of coloring, defined as something that lasts for a “long time” (Tiferes Yisroel in Kalkeles Shabbos).
Staining your clothes
The Shulchan Aruch rules that, because of the melacha of tzovei’a, when eating foods like beets and cherries, you should be careful not to stain your clothes (Orach Chayim 320:20). Notwithstanding that most of us are not interested in having our clothes stained by these foods, it is still prohibited miderabbanan to do so deliberately; for example, to wipe one’s hands on clothing after eating cherries. There are halachic authorities who rule that the laws of Shabbos do not require you to be concerned about staining your clothes, because doing so is considered dirtying your clothes, not dyeing them (Darchei Moshe 320:2, quoting Agur). However, the Shulchan Aruch rules strictly, and the consensus of later authorities accepts this opinion.
We can, therefore, now address our opening question: “On Shabbos, must I try not to stain my clothes?”
The answer is that it is forbidden to wipe my hands on my clothes if my hands have something that might be considered a dye, even though, from my perspective, I am dirtying the garment.
We see from the Gemara (see below) that a particular activity can be forbidden both because of tzovei’a and because of another melacha, at the same time (Shabbos 75a). Although in our day, there is no practical halachic difference whether an activity violates one melacha or two, when the Beis Hamikdash is rebuilt, speedily and in our days, there will be different halachic practices that result.
Lipstick on Shabbos
According to some authorities, applying lipstick is prohibited, both because of tzovei’a and because of memarei’ach, the melacha involved when one smoothes or files down a surface (Nimla Tal, Tzovei’a, note 31).
At this point, we can address the second of our opening questions: “May I freshen my lipstick on Shabbos?”
The answer is that applying lipstick may potentially involve two different melachos of Shabbos, tzovei’a and memarei’ach, and that both violations may be min haTorah. There are possibilities why the violation of tzovei’a, in this instance, may be only rabbinic. One reason is because the lipstick may not remain on the lips for a full day, and the second reason, because the lips are already colored. However, notwithstanding these reasons, it is still, definitely prohibited miderabbanan as tzovei’a and is probably prohibited min haTorah as memarei’ach.
Is squeezing dyeing?
One rishon,the Ramban (Shabbos 111a), contends that squeezing liquid out of a soaked piece of cloth violates the melacha of dyeing, because the squeezing changes the current color of the cloth. (This is how his opinion is understood by the Magen Avraham,end of chapter 302, and Shu”t Avnei Neizer, Orach Chayim #159:20; however, the Lechem Mishneh [Hilchos Shabbos 9:11] understands that the Ramban agrees with the other rishonim that squeezing is prohibited because of melabein, laundering and not because of dyeing.)
Creating a dye
The rishonim dispute whether creating a dye violates dyeing. According to the Rambam, blending together ingredients that, together, create a dye is a toladah of the melacha of tzovei’a, meaning that this is a sub-category of dyeing that is prohibited min haTorah (Hilchos Shabbos 9:14). However, the Ra’avad disagrees, contending that someone who creates a vat dye, which means that he heats raw materials intending to dye cloth by submerging it in the heated liquid, violates the melacha of “cooking” when he creates the dye. According to the Ra’avad, the melacha of dyeing is not violated until the cloth is placed in the vat to absorb the dye, and creating a dye without use of heat is not a Torah violation at all. This is because tzovei’a is violated min haTorah only when the result is a finished product; since creating a dye is only a preliminary step, it does not constitute a Torah violation of the melacha.
It seems that this identical dispute is a contention between other early rishonim. The Mishnah explains that it is prohibited min haTorah to stir a pot of vat dye on Shabbos. The question is — which melacha does this act violate? Tosafos (Shabbos 18b s. v. dilma) explains that this stirring violates tzovei’a, whereas Rashi (ad loc.) implies that it violates bishul, cooking. It would appear that the Ra’avad and Rashi have a similar approach, both contending that preparing a vat dye violates cooking, but not dyeing, whereas the Rambam agrees with Tosafos that manufacturing the dye violates tzovei’a.
If a cloth or another textile already has a shade of color, but it is not dyed as deeply as you want, is it prohibited min haTorah to dye it to a deeper hue? According to most authorities, intensifying the shade of a pigment that already exists violates tzovei’a min haTorah. If the additional dyeing does not make a significant difference in the color, the violation is rabbinic, not min haTorah (Mor Uketziyah, end of 328; cf., however, see Shu”t Avnei Neizer, Orach Chayim #172, who contends that once the fabric has been dyed a certain color, adding to that color does not involve a Torah prohibition. This is a minority opinion.).
Bleaching or dyeing?
At this point, we can ask whether dyeing is defined as changing the color of an item, or adding color to an item. A difference in practical halacha between the two approaches is whether bleaching an item, which changes the color by removing pigment, violates the melacha of tzovei’a.
According to most authorities, tzovei’a means applying pigment or colorant to the surface of an item that thereby changes its color. For example, the Rambam defines a different one of the 39 melachos, melabein, to be bleaching. He seems to understand that laundering is a sub-category of melabein. The question is why bleaching is not considered the same melacha as tzovei’a, dyeing, which is also concerned with changing the color of a fiber. The answer appears to be that, whereas tzovei’a adds color to the fiber, bleach removes color from the fiber. In the Rambam’s opinion, adding color to an item constitutes tzovei’a, whereas bleaching it and removing impurities that detract from the appearance of the cloth constitute melabein.
However, a minority opinion contends that any color change, including bleaching out the color, violates tzovei’a (see Tosafos, Bava Kama 93b, s. v. ha).
“If someone whitewashes his wall or paints something white, what melacha has he performed?”
The answer is that he violated the melacha of tzovei’a,dyeing, not of melabein, even though the word melabein could be translated as “he makes something white.” This is true, even according to those who contend that bleaching does not qualify as tzovei’a. The reason is that bleaching removescolor, whereas in these cases a white color is added to the surface of the wall or other item.
The Rogatchover’s position
Rav Yosef Rosen — early 20th century rav of the Chassidishe community of Dvinsk, Latvia (for much of this period, part of the Russian empire), known colloquially as “the Rogatchover,” for his place of birth — was known for his original approaches to halachic issues. Often, these approaches produced interesting strict or lenient conclusions. In one of his essays, the Rogatchover concludes that mixing a dye into a liquid does not constitute the melacha of tzovei’a. His logic is that tzovei’a requires changing an item’s color. When mixing a dye base into a liquid, the liquid’s color is not changed. What has happened is that two colors are blending together to appear as one consistent color.
Regarding tzovei’a, the Rogatchover will permit several instances that are prohibited by other authorities. An example is if someone diluted a dye with water to create an art display. According to the Pri Megadim and the Tiferes Yisroel, this act is prohibited on Shabbos min haTorah. However, the Rogatchover will dispute their conclusion, since the color is created by mixing and not by coating an item with color.
Staining your hands
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 320:20) implies that there is no halachic problem with getting your hands or face stained while eating. The Mishnah Berurah (320:58) asks: since we prohibit women from applying makeup on Shabbos because of tzovei’a, applying color to human skin violates tzovei’a. If this is true, just as staining clothes violates tzovei’a, shouldn’t someone be required not to stain his hands and face? The Mishnah Berurah answers that since men do not usually apply makeup to their faces, it is permitted for them to eat foods that might stain their faces.
Shabbos is a day which is called “mei’ein olam haba” – a day that is a small taste of the World to Come; a day when we are given a neshamah yeseirah – a special Shabbosdik neshamah; a day when Hashem’s Shechinah resides with us. The sefarim hakedoshim discuss these ideas and how much we need to prepare ourselves, every week, in order to properly relate to Shabbos Kodesh and to receive all of the benefit and bracha that Shabbos brings us.
Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch (Shemos 20:10) notes that people mistakenly think that work is prohibited on Shabbos, in order to provide a day of rest. This is incorrect, he points out, because the Torah does not prohibit doing avodah, which connotes hard work, but melacha, which implies work with purpose and accomplishment. On Shabbos, we refrain from altering the world with our own creative acts and, instead, emphasize Hashem’s role (Shemos 20:11). We thereby acknowledge the true Builder and Creator of the world and all that it contains, and focus on our relationship with Him.