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This week’s parsha teaches the prohibition against having one witness testify against someone, which is a violation of loshon hora.

What constitutes talebearing?

Question #1: Talebearing — Rechilus

“What is the legal definition of rechilus?”

Question #2: Loshon hora

“May I listen to someone say inappropriate things about a second person, in order to calm the speaker down?”

Question #3: Motzi shem ra

“I found out that a smear campaign is being planned against someone I know. Whom may I tell about it?”

Introduction

In parshas Kedoshim, the Torah teaches lo seileich rachil be’amecha (Vayikra 19:16), which Rashi and most authorities translate as:“You shall not go as a talebearer among your people.” Rashi explains that the three-letter root of the word rachil, the letters reish, kof, lamid,is related to the root reish, gimel, lamid, which is the root of the word meaning “spy,” since the kof and the gimel sounds are created by the same parts of the mouth. They are both palatals, meaning that both are pronounced by pressing the back of the tongue against the soft part of the palate. Thus, the pasuk means someone who seeks gossip. This mitzvah is counted as one of the 365 lo sa’aseh prohibitions of the Torah. We will soon clarify what is included in this prohibition.

Broader definitions

Several other prohibitions are also included under the general heading of lo seileich rachil be’amecha. According to many authorities, this also includes the lo sa’aseh not to say loshon hora. According to the Gemara and other rishonim, this lo sa’aseh also applies to a judge who does not treat the two parties before him in an equal way, but acts harshly to one and softly to the other. The latter prohibition is derived from a different translation of the word rachil, explaining that its root is related to the word rach, soft.

Let us examine the passage of Gemara (Kesubos 46a) that derives both of these prohibitions from this pasuk: “Which source teaches that spreading falsehood about someone else violates a lo sa’aseh of the Torah? Rabbi Elazar says ‘lo seileich rachil,’ whereas Rabbi Nosson says that he violates a different pasuk, in parshas Ki Seitzei (Devorim 23:10) ‘and you should guard yourself from any evil matter.’ Why did Rabbi Nosson not use Rabbi Elazar’s verse? Because he considers this verse (lo seileich rachil) to teach us a lo sa’aseh that applies only to beis din – that they should not be soft to one of the two litigants and harsh to the other. Rashi explains that this is derived in the following way: lo seileich rachil means, ‘you shall not be soft to me’ when you dealt more harshly with the other litigant. This latter law is mentioned by both the Semag (Lo Sa’aseh 9) and the Sefer Hachinuch (Mitzvah #236).

Hurting feelings, Betraying a secret

There are other prohibitions that are included under the heading of lo seileich rachil. According to the Sefer Hachinuch, the mitzvah of lo seileich rachil also includes saying something that might hurt someone’s feelings.

The prohibition of lo seileich rachil be’amecha also includes revealing information that someone wants kept confidential (Semag). This ruling is codified by later halachic authorities on the topic (Orach Meisharim 8:2). If the information is negative, the teller also violates speaking loshon hora.

Ask your Rabbi

Rav Naftali Amsterdam, one of the primary disciples of Rav Yisroel Salanter, was famous for saying that he found it quite astonishing that people spend so much time and money to effect a heter mei’ah rabbonim, a program which releases someone from a prohibition that has the status of only a cherem established by Rabbeinu Gershom, and yet they freely violate a prohibition to speak loshon hora or to spread gossip, both of which involve violations of Torah laws, without asking any rabbonim what they are permitted to say (retold in Torah Lada’as, Volume V, page 56).

What is talebearing?

At this point, we are ready to discuss our first question: “What is the legal definition of rechilus?”

Thanks to the Chofetz Chayim’s efforts, the laws of loshon hora are much better known and more carefully observed today than they were in earlier days. Nevertheless, there is still much confusion regarding what is considered spreading gossip, and therefore prohibited, and what is not.

To begin our elucidation of the mitzvah, let us quote the words of the Rambam (Hilchos Dei’os 7:1-2) on the topic:

“Someone who tells tales about his fellow violates the proscription of lo seileich rachil be’amecha, ‘You shall not go as a talebearer among your people.’Even though the violator of this prohibition does not receive lashes for this, it is a major sin and has caused much loss of life among the people of Israel. For this reason, the continuation of the pasuk reads, lo sa’amod al dam rei’echa Do not stand aside, ignoring the blood of another.’ Go see what happened to Do’eig the Edomite.

“Who is a talebearer? Someone who carries stories and goes from one person to another, saying, ‘This is what so-and-so said; I heard such-and-such about someone.’ Even if what he says is true, he destroys the world.

“There is a greater sin than this, which is included in this lo sa’aseh, and that is loshon hora, which means that he tells over embarrassing things about his fellow, notwithstanding that it is the truth.”

It is quite clear from the Rambam that, whereas loshon hora is saying over something that is embarrassing about someone else, the prohibition of lo seileich rachil be’amecha is violated even if the story is not embarrassing. Does this mean that the Torah has prohibited saying nice things about your fellowman?

We can prove from later comments of the Rambam that he cannot possibly mean this, since he writes as follows: “Someone who talks about another person’s qualities in front of that person’s enemies is engaging in avak loshon hora (literally, the ‘dust’ of loshon hora, meaning a rabbinic violation of this prohibition) since it causes them to begin to talk disparagingly about him. In this context, Shelomoh said, Mevoreich rei’eihu bekol gadol baboker hashkeim, kelalah teichasheiv lo, ‘He who blesses his neighbor in a loud voice early in the morning, is considered that he cursed him (Mishlei 27, 14), because a result of the good that he (the talker) did caused him (his neighbor) harm” (Hilchos Dei’os 7:4).

Obviously, there is nothing wrong with talking about another person’s qualities, if it is not in front of that person’s enemies or will not cause him any harm. So, what then is the Torah prohibition of lo seileich rachil be’amecha?

Two excellent works on the topic of the laws of loshon hora discuss this question and reach the same conclusion. The Orach Meisharim (8:2 in biurim), authored by Rav Menachem Troish, who was the rav of Salzburg, a village in the Austrian Alps, in the late nineteenth century, and the Nesiv Chayim (Hilchos Rechilus 1:1), authored by Rav Moshe Kaufman, a contemporary author in Bnei Braq, both explain that the prohibition of lo seileich rachil be’amecha applies when the information will ultimately cause harm to the person about whom it is said or when it will lead to some type of machlokes. The person who recounts the “tale” intends to spread gossip, to harm someone, or to create machlokes. This is prohibited even when the person who did the act is not embarrassed by what he did or said; the gossiper is in violation since his goal is to create harm, he violates lo seileich rachil be’amecha.

For example, if the decision of a beis din was not unanimous, the ruling should not be recorded as a split decision, since this may easily create ill feeling between the losing party and those dayanim who sided against him (see Sanhedrin 30a). Instead, you simply write the halachic conclusion. Furthermore, the dayan who disagreed is prohibited from telling this to others (Sanhedrin 31a) since this may cause that those who lost will be upset or angry at the other dayanim.

Another example is when Reuven said something non-complimentary to Shimon about Levi, and Shimon tells Levi what was said. Since this certainly leads to ill feeling among people, it violates lo seileich rachil be’amecha.

Among the types of harm that are included under lo seileich rachil be’amecha is to inform a person that someone helped his enemy. The person who did the act may be unaware that this individual is an enemy of the person he helped, but the rochil is aware of this and wants to spread the machlokes.

Let us for a moment review the story of Do’eig to understand this prohibition better. David he sought refuge in Nov, a city of kohanim, in his flight from Shaul. The residents of Nov were unaware that David was a wanted man, and they provided him with food and a sword. Do’eig told Shaul that the city of Nov had provided for David. Although Shaul was told that the people of Nov were completely unaware that Shaul was pursuing David, Shaul ordered the entire city wiped out.

The Mishnah (Sanhedrin 10:2) mentions Do’eig as one of the individuals who forfeited his right to olam haba.

Lo sa’amod

At this point, we can discuss the third of our opening questions: “I found out that a smear campaign is being planned against someone I know. Whom may I tell about it?”

When talker (T) plans something that may harm V (the victim), listener (L) is required to tell victim (V), so that V can protect himself. This is an example of lo sa’amod al dam rei’echa and is true even if the threat is not life-threatening, but concerns only V’s reputation or his finances. The Torah teaches that there are instances in which telling over what you know is not only permitted, but required.

However, if L (listener) knows that the T (talker) is halachically correct — “person V” is not a victim but actually did harm the talker, and talker is justified to respond — lo sa’amod al dam rei’echa does not apply. In this latter situation, it is prohibited for L to tell over T’s plans, and, if L does so, he violateslo seileich rachil (Be’eir Mayim Chayim, Hilchos Rechilus 1:3).

More on lo seileich rachil, which includes loshon hora

To continue the quotation of the Rambam (Hilchos Dei’os 7:3): “Chazal said, ‘Three sins are punished in this world and deprive a person of the next world — idolatry, adultery, and murder — and loshon hora is equivalent to all three of them. Furthermore, Chazal (Arachin 15b) said that speaking loshon hora is tantamount to denying that there is a G-d, as the pasuk says, Asher amru lil’shoneinu nagbir sefaseinu itanu mi adon lanu, ‘Those who say: “We will make our tongue powerful! Our lips are ours! Who is lord over us?”’ Tehillim 12:5). In addition, Chazal said, ‘Loshon hora kills three people: The one who said it, the one who believes it, and the person about whom it is said. And the one who is hurt most is he who believed it.’”

To quote the Gemara (Arachin 15a), “Rav Elazar ben Parta said, ‘Come and see how serious is the power of loshon hora. How do we see this? From the meraglim, where we see that someone saying loshon hora only about wood and stones could cause such a calamity — how much worse is someone who says loshon hora about another person!’” The Mishnah (Arachin 15a) states that the decree on our forefathers in the desert was sealed because of the loshon hora that they reported.

Continuing the Rambam (Hilchos Dei’os 7:2, 4, 5): “The person who says loshon hora sits around, saying, ‘So-and-so did this,’ ‘His parents were no better and did this,’ ‘I heard these stories about him,’ and repeats embarrassing things. About this, the pasuk says, yachreis Hashem kol sifsei chalokus loshon medaberes gedolos,‘Hashem will cut off all smooth-talking lips, the tongue that talks boastfully’ (Tehillim 12:4).

“There are things that are prohibited as avak loshon hora the ‘dust’ of loshon hora. For example, ‘Who would have believed that so-and-so would end up where he is now,’ or someone who says, ‘Don’t talk about so-and-so, I don’t want to tell you what he did,’ or anything similar. Someone who talks about another person’s qualities in front of that person’s enemies is engaging in avak loshon hora, since it causes them to begin to talk disparagingly about him. In this context, Shelomoh said, Mevoreich rei’eihu bekol gadol baboker hashkeim, kelalah teichasheiv lo, ‘Someone who praises another loudly from early in the morning, is considered a curse to him’ (Mishlei, 27:14), because a result of the good that he did caused him harmbad. Similarly, someone who says loshon hora as a joke or with levity, as if he is not speaking out of hatred, is also engaging in avak loshon hora. This is what Shelomoh intended when he said, in his wisdom, kemislah’lei’ah hayoreh zikim chitzim vamaves, kein ish rimah es rei’eihu ve’amar halo mesacheik ani, ‘Just as a person who exhausts himself by throwing burning wood, arrows and death, so is someone who tricks his fellow, saying, “I was only joking” (Mishlei, 26:18-19). A similar prohibition is violated by someone who says loshon hora, pretending that he does not realize that what he said is negative.

“Something qualifies as loshon hora whether it is said in front of the aggrieved party or not. Furthermore, something that is not inherently negative about the person, but, if spread, will cause him harm either to his body or to his financial situation, it is loshon hora.” An example of the latter might be that a potential investor may decide not to assist someone who is a good risk to start a business because, based on the information he has received, the investor is led to believe that the business will not succeed.

Calming someone down

At this point, let us discuss the second of our opening questions: “May I listen to someone say inappropriate things about a second person, in order to calm the speaker down?”

Accepting loshon hora violates the lo sa’aseh of lo sisa sheima shav, “Do not listen to a purposeless rumor” (Shemos 23:1). However, the Sefer Hasidim rules that if someone comes to you very upset and angry, and you realize that by hearing him out you may be able to calm him down so that he does not tell anyone else, it is a mitzvah to listen to him and then convince him that the person he is upset about really cares about him. Either way, you are not to believe the story, and you are not to share it with others, because of concern that they will share it with the person about whom it is said and it will create a machlokes (Sefer Hasidim #64).

Conclusion

The Talmud Yerushalmi (Peah 1:1) relates the following: In the days of the evil king Achav, the Jews were victorious in their wars, notwithstanding that both idol worship and murder were, unfortunately, prevalent. The Gemara attributes this to the fact that they were extremely meticulous about avoiding loshon hora, as can be demonstrated from the fact that Ovadyah was a member of Achav’s household at the very same time that he was sustaining a hundred prophets who were hiding from Achav (Melachim I 18:13). Obviously, Ovadyah could not hide this information without many people knowing about it, yet Achav never found out. On the other hand, in the days of Shaul, when they were meticulous about refraining from idol worship, they lost the battle with the Pelishtim, because there was loshon hora among the Jews.

It has been said that one time, a yeshivah bochur came to the Chofetz Chayim, complaining that many times he had given long sermons in different communities, and he had as yet not noticed that he had achieved any success in drawing these people closer to the level of observance of mitzvos for which he was striving. The Chofetz Chayim answered that he disagrees with the bchur’s attitude. The midrash states that for every moment that someone keeps his mouth closed and is careful not to say anything that is prohibited, he merits a heavenly light in the next world that no angel or any other creature can even imagine what it accomplishes. This, noted the Chofetz Chayim, is the reward for being quiet for a few seconds, and perhaps even less. How much reward have you gained for yourself and for the people who are listening to you that for all the hours you have spoken, they have not said anything inappropriate? Do you have any idea how much reward you have brought to them and to yourself? (This story is quoted in the biography of the Chofetz Chayimchayav upoalo, Volume I, page 77).




Mezuzah on a Rental

Question #1: Tenancy

“We rented a new apartment but did not put up mezuzos immediately, assuming that we had thirty days to do so. Someone told me that Rav Moshe held that we should put up mezuzos immediately. Is that true?”

Question #2: Temporary Dwelling

“When we went to visit our children in Ramat Beit Shemesh for two weeks, they had borrowed for us a brand-new apartment that the owners themselves had as yet not used. I was surprised to see mezuzos on the doors already. My son-in-law explained that he put up mezuzos in the entire apartment so that we could use it. Was he required to do so? I thought that one is not required to have mezuzos unless one lives somewhere for at least a month.”

Question #3: Mezuzah in a Rehab

“My mother unfortunately fell and broke her femur and will be staying for an extensive period of time in a rehabilitation hospital. Are we required to make sure that there is a kosher mezuzah on the door of her room?”

Basic information:

The Torah requires that a mezuzah be placed on the doorposts of “your” house, beisecha. What is the definition of beisecha? Does the mitzvah apply even when I live in a house that I do not own? Does it apply to a property I own, even if I do not live there? These questions are addressed by the Gemara and its major early commentaries.

The Gemara (Pesachim 4a; Bava Metzia 101b; Avodah Zarah 21a) teaches that the obligation to put up a mezuzah devolves upon the person living in a house and not upon a non-resident owner. Thus, a Jew who rents his home from a gentile is obligated to have mezuzos on the doors (Rambam, Hilchos Mezuzah 5:11; Beis Yosef, end of Yoreh Deah 286; however, cf. Hagahos Maimonis 5:7 who quotes a disputing opinion), whereas a Jewish landlord who owns residential properties that he rents out is not obligated to place mezuzos on them.

When one Jew rents his house or apartment to a second Jew, the requirement to place a mezuzah rests with the tenant.

The Gemara’s statement

There is another Talmudic passage that expands upon the previously-quoted rulings:

“One who lives in an inn in Eretz Yisrael, or one who rents a house in chutz la’aretz is exempt from the mitzvah of mezuzah for thirty days. [If he rents] for longer, he is required to put up a mezuzah. However, one who rents a house in Eretz Yisrael must put up a mezuzah immediately, because this assists in the settling of Eretz Yisrael” (Menachos 44a).

This passage of Gemara mentions three halachos:

1. Someone who lives in an inn, hotel, or other temporary residence is, in general, not obligated to put up a mezuzah. The Gemara states that someone who dwells in an inn in Eretz Yisrael for thirty days becomes obligated in mezuzah.

2. Someone who rents a house or apartment for thirty days or more must put up a mezuzah.

3. However, someone who rents or borrows a house or apartment in Eretz Yisrael must put up a mezuzah immediately.

More details

In order to answer our opening questions, we will need to clarify each of these halachos in more detail. I am first going to explain the rules governing a tenant in chutz la’aretz, who is required to put up a mezuzah when he lives thirty days in a rented or borrowed residence.

I mentioned above that the Torah requires placing a mezuzah on beisecha, your house. One may ask: If a rented residence qualifies as “your” house, then a tenant should be obligated to place a mezuzah there immediately, and if a rented residence does not qualify as “your” house, then the tenant should not be obligated in the mitzvah, even if he lives there longer.

What difference does thirty days make?

As we can imagine, we are not the first to raise this question. Tosafos (Menachos 44a s.v. Talis) does and, to answer it, presents two very different approaches:

I. The person dwelling in a residence is the one who requires the shemirah that the mezuzah provides. For this reason, the mezuzah is the tenant’s responsibility. However, someone living in a dwelling for less than thirty days is not yet considered to be a resident.

This answer contends that installing a mezuzah on a rented dwelling in which one lives for thirty days is min haTorah.

II. The second approach understands that min haTorah a tenant is never required to have a mezuzah on his door, since the word beisecha, your house, implies that the owner of a residence (who also dwells there) is required to install a mezuzah. A tenant is required to have a mezuzah as a takkanas chachamim instituted by the Sages, because the house appears to be his.

Several later authorities conclude that the second approach, that a tenant’s obligation to put up a mezuzah is only miderabbanan, is the approach that we follow in practical halachah (Shu”t Rabbi Akiva Eiger, 1:66; Shu”t Avnei Nezer, Yoreh Deah, #380).

What if I borrow?

The halachic authorities rule that just as someone who rents a residence for thirty days is obligated to have a mezuzah, so, too, someone who borrows a residence for thirty days or more, without paying any rent, is obligated to have a mezuzah (Rabbeinu Manoach, quoted by Beis Yosef, Yoreh Deah, end of 286).

Is the requirement for a mezuzah immediate?

At this point, I want to address our opening question:

“We rented a new apartment but did not put up mezuzos immediately, figuring that we had thirty days to do so. Someone told me that Rav Moshe held that we should put up mezuzos immediately. Is that true?”

The question here is: When someone knows that he will be living in a house or apartment for more than thirty days, is he exempt from mezuzah until the thirtieth day, or since he will be living there for thirty days obligate him immediately?

This matter is disputed. Some authorities contend that the requirement to install a mezuzah is immediate when you intend to rent or borrow the residence for thirty days (Derech Hachayim; Shu”t Harei Besamim 2:219, quoted by Shu”t Minchas Yitzchak 2:82). This approach is implied by Rashi (Menachos 44a), who writes that a tenant is not obligated in mezuzah for thirty days because he might back out of the rental, implying that, when he is committed to renting it for thirty days, he is required to put up a mezuzah immediately.

Some derive support for this position from the halachah that someone who moves into a community is not obligated in local taxes until he lives there for thirty days. However, should he demonstrate his intention to live in the community for thirty days or more, he becomes obligated to pay taxes immediately. Thus, someone’s intention to live somewhere for thirty days may determine permanent dwelling status.

However, other authorities contend that a tenant’s obligation to put up a mezuzah is because it looks as if he is living there permanently, and this does not happen until he is actually there for thirty days. They maintain that even someone who signed a multi-year lease is not obligated to put up a mezuzah until he lives in the rental home for thirty days (Nachalas Zvi to Yoreh Deah 286:22; Pischei Teshuvah, Yoreh Deah 286:18).

Although some later authorities prefer that a long-term tenant put up the mezuzah immediately, in deference to the Derech Hachayim’s position (Shu”t Igros Moshe, Yoreh Deah 1:179), common practice is to follow the second approach, that of the Nachalas Zvi, that one is not obligated to put up the mezuzah immediately.

When should I actually put it up?

Assuming that a tenant is not required to put up a mezuzah until thirty days have passed, may one put up the mezuzah earlier and already recite a brocha, or should one wait until the thirtieth day? The question is: since the Nachalas Zvi rules that a tenant is not obligated to put up a mezuzah until he is living there for thirty days, perhaps one cannot recite a brocha upon installing the mezuzah until one is obligated to do so?

We find a dispute in this matter. The Nachalas Zvi and the Halachos Ketanos (quoted by Birkei Yosef, Yoreh Deah 286:7) conclude that although it may be a bigger mitzvah to wait until the thirtieth day, so that one performs the mitzvah at a time that one is required to do so, one may put up the mezuzah any time during the thirty-day period with a brocha. Others rule that one should not recite a brocha until the thirtieth day (Toras Chesed, quoted by Birkei Yosef, Yoreh Deah 286:7; and others quoted by Chovas Hadar, page 29, ftn. 8).

Thus, we have three approaches as to what to do:

1. Put up the mezuzah immediately.

2. Put up the mezuzah any time during the thirty days.

3. Put up the mezuzah specifically on the thirtieth day.

I advise each individual to ask his own posek which approach to follow.

Temporary dwelling in Eretz Yisrael

At this point, let us discuss the third point made by the Gemara I quoted above – that someone who rents or borrows a house or apartment in Eretz Yisrael must put up a mezuzah immediately.

How does putting up a mezuzah assist the settling of Eretz Yisrael?

To explain this idea, we need to cite a different law. The halachah is that, when vacating a residence, one is usually required to leave the mezuzos in place. To quote the Gemara, “when a Jew rents a house to a fellow Jew, the tenant is responsible to affix the mezuzos. However, when the tenant vacates, he may not remove them. On the other hand, a Jew who rents a residence from a gentile removes the mezuzos when he leaves” (Bava Metzia 102a).

Based on this halachah, Rashi (Menachos 44a) explains why Chazal required someone renting in Eretz Yisrael to put up a mezuzah immediately. Since the tenant may not take the mezuzos with him, he will be reticent to move. And even if he does move, since the mezuzos are left behind, a different Jew will be eager to rent it, since he spares himself the expense of purchasing mezuzos. Either way, the dwelling will remain with a Jewish resident, which accomplishes that “this assists in the settling of Eretz Yisrael.”

Borrowing in Eretz Yisrael

At this point, we will the second of our opening questions:

“When we went to visit our children in Ramat Beit Shemesh for two weeks, they had borrowed for us a brand-new apartment that the owners themselves had not as yet used. I was surprised to see mezuzos on the doors already. My son-in-law explained that he put up mezuzos in the entire apartment so that we could use it. Was he required to do so? I thought that one is not required to have mezuzos unless one lives somewhere for at least a month.”

As I mentioned above, the Gemara rules that someone who rents a house in Eretz Yisrael must put up a mezuzah immediately, because this assists in the settling of Eretz Yisrael. And, since borrowing a house is the same as renting it (Rema, Yoreh Deah 286:22), someone who borrows someone’s house even for just one night is required to install mezuzos on the entire house.

The “inn” thing

As I mentioned above, someone who lives in an inn, hotel, or other temporary residence is, in general, not obligated to put up a mezuzah. Since it is generally assumed that an inn is not a place in which one lives permanently, it is not considered a “dwelling” (Shach, Yoreh Deah 286:28). Rashi (Menachos 32b s.v. Hayu) implies that someone living temporarily in a residence that is clearly not intended to be permanent is not required to have a mezuzah, even if he owns the “residence.”

Thus, someone staying in a hotel in Eretz Yisrael is not required to have a mezuzah, and one is certainly not required to ascertain if the mezuzos on one’s hotel room door are kosher.

Inn chutz la’aretz

However, the Gemara states that someone who dwells in an inn in Eretz Yisrael for thirty days becomes obligated in mezuzah. What about a chutz la’aretz resident who lives permanently in an inn – is he obligated to put up a mezuzah?

Most authorities explain that someone who lives permanently in an inn in chutz la’aretz is not obligated to put up a mezuzah, because this is not considered having a house (see Chovas Hadar, page 31, ftn. 16). Only in Eretz Yisrael did Chazal require putting up a mezuzah when living permanently in a place usually meant for temporary dwelling. (Perhaps this explains why so many people in Eretz Yisrael live permanently in temporary housing, such as caravans and caravillas.)

However, the Aruch Hashulchan (Yoreh Deah 286:48) implies that living in an inn in chutz la’aretz for thirty days requires installing a mezuzah, and I believe that this is the more common practice.

A hut?

Later authorities discuss whether someone who lives in a hut or similar accommodation for longer than thirty days must put up a mezuzah. The Sedei Chemed concludes that if someone moves into a hut, bungalow or similar accommodation for more than thirty days, he is obligated in mezuzah, whereas someone living in a hut as a refugee is not obligated to put up a mezuzah (Volume 4 page 245). Others rule that one should put up a mezuzah without a brocha, even if he is a refugee (Chazon Nachum, quoted by Birkei Yosef, Yoreh Deah 286:9)

A mobile home?

The Minchas Yitzchak (2: 82) discusses whether someone who lives permanently in a mobile home is required to put up a mezuzah, concluding that he is required to do so, although the Minchas Yitzchak is uncertain whether he should recite a brocha.

A boarding house

The Aruch Hashulchan (Yoreh Deah 286:46) rules that, although someone staying temporarily in an inn is exempt from the mitzvah of mezuzah, this is true only when the room or the inn is not a part of someone’s house. However, a Jewish person who takes in boarders into his house is required to have mezuzos on all the doors. This is not a requirement because of the tenants, but because of the owner – this is considered a residential use of his own property that requires him to have a mezuzah, just as all other rooms in his house must have one.

A similar situation would exist if someone has gentile help living in his house or if he rents out rooms in his house to gentiles. Even though a gentile has no obligation to put up a mezuzah, since this is a room in your house, you are required to put up a mezuzah.

A guest house

Chovas Hador (page 20, ftn. 1) explains that this obligation exists only when the guest rooms are in your house. However, if you have a separate structure that you use as a guesthouse, the owner has no responsibility to place mezuzos there.

Similarly, if hired help lives in a separate building that is on your property, and you do not use that property for your own domestic needs, you have no requirement to put a mezuzah on the help’s residence (Chovas Hador page 20, ftn. 1).

A rehab center

At this point, we should discuss the third of our opening questions:

“My mother unfortunately fell and broke her femur and will be staying for an extensive period of time in a rehabilitation hospital. Are we required to make sure that there is a kosher mezuzah on the door of her room?”

This question is discussed by one of the great nineteenth-century halachic authorities, the Avnei Nezer. He concludes that someone hospitalized for an extensive period of time is not required to place a mezuzah on a hospital room for two reasons:

Even according to those who contend that a long-term tenant is obligated min haTorah to put up a mezuzah, this is true only when he rents a specific room, apartment or house. A patient in a hospital or rehab program is entitled to a bed somewhere in the facility, and the hospital may move him to a different room without his agreement. Thus, he has no ownership that requires having a mezuzah on the door.

In addition, if a tenant’s obligation to put up a mezuzah is a rabbinic requirement, it is because use of the property is similar to that of an owner. Staying in a hospital is never viewed as ownership of your room. Therefore, the Avnei Nezer concludes that a patient in a hospital has no requirement to have a mezuzah on the door. (See also Shu”t Chayim Sha’al #22, who reaches the same conclusion.)

Mezuzah rewards

Aside from fulfilling a mitzvah commanded by Hashem, the mitzvah of mezuzah serves to remind us constantly of His presence, every time we enter and exit our houses. In addition, the Gemara teaches that someone who is meticulous in his observance of the laws of mezuzah will merit acquiring a nice home (Shabbos 23b). Thus, observing this mitzvah not only protects one’s family against calamity, but also rewards one with a beautiful domicile. May we all merit being careful always in our observance of the laws of mezuzah and the other mitzvos, and reaping all the rewards, both material and spiritual, for doing so!




Must I Immerse a Candy Dish?

Both parshiyos Balak (read this week in Eretz Yisrael) and Chukas (read in chutz la’aretz) discuss relationships with non-Jews, and therefore are appropriate parshiyos to discuss the mitzvah of tevilas keilim.

Question: A Sweet Saga

Avraham Sweet, the proprietor of Candy Andy, wants to know.

“I have a gift business in which I sell glass candy bowls filled with candies, fruits, and nuts. Must I toivel these dishes before I fill them?”

Introduction:

In Parshas Matos, the Torah teaches: Regarding the gold and the silver; the copper, the iron, the tin and the lead: any item that was used in fire needs to be placed in fire to become kosher, yet it must also be purified in mikveh water. In addition, that which was not used in fire must pass through water” (Bamidbar 31:22-23). From these verses we derive the mitzvah of tevilas keilim — The mitzvah to immerse metal implements in a mikveh or spring prior to using them for food. The Gemara (Avodah Zarah 75b) notes that this immersion is required even if the vessel has never been used. In other words, this mitzvah is unrelated to the requirement of koshering equipment that was used for non-kosher food or to the laws related to purifying implements that became tamei.

The Gemara (Avodah Zarah 75b) further states that in addition to metal items intended for food use, we are also required to immerse glass dishes, because both metal and glass share a similarity – they are repairable by melting and reconstructing, or, as we would say, they are recyclable. This renders them different from vessels made of stone, bone, wood or earthenware, all of which cannot be repaired this way.

What types of dishes must be immersed?

The Gemara cites a highly instructive dialogue about the mitzvah of immersing vessels:

“Rav Nachman said in the name of Rabbah bar Avuha: ‘One can derive from the verse that one must immerse even brand new items, because used vessels that were purged in fire are as kosher as those that are brand-new, and yet they require immersion.’

Rav Sheishes then asked him: ‘If it is true that the mitzvah of immersing vessels is not because of kashrus concerns, maybe one is required to immerse even clothing shears?’

Rav Nachman responded: ‘The Torah only mentions vessels that are used for meals (klei seudah)’“ [Avodah Zarah 75b].

Rav Sheishes suggested that if immersing utensils has nothing to do with kosherizing utensils used for non-kosher, perhaps this mitzvah applies to all paraphernalia — even cameras, cellphones and clothing shears!

To this, Rav Nachman retorted that since the Torah mentions only implements used for a meal, the mitzvah of tevilas keilim applies only to utensils used for preparing and consuming food, not those intended for other purposes.

Klei seudah – appliances used for meals

Rav Nachman did not require that all food preparation utensils be immersed, only klei seudah, items used for meals. Soon, we will see how this detail affects many of the halachos of tevilas keilim. But, what exactly are considered klei seudah, and how is this different from simply saying that all food preparation utensils must be immersed?

Klei sechorah — “merchandise”

The halachic authorities note that a storekeeper is not required to immerse vessels he has for sale, since for him they are not utensils with which he intends to prepare food or eat. Later authorities coin a term “klei sechorah,” utensils used as merchandise, ruling that these items do not require immersion until they are purchased by the end user (see Taz, Yoreh Deah 120:10). Furthermore, several halachic authorities contend that not only is the storekeeper not required to immerse the utensils prior to sale, if he immerses them, it is not valid, since there is, as yet, no requirement to immerse them (Shu”t Minchas Yitzchak 8:70). This is based on a comment of the Rama implying that tevilah performed before the obligation to immerse a utensil exists, such as while it is still owned by the non-Jew, does not fulfill the mitzvah, but must be repeated after the utensil becomes the property of a Jew (Rama 9). Thus, reciting a beracha on this too-early tevilah would be a beracha levatalah.

Based on this discussion, we can now address one of our above-mentioned questions:

“I have a gift business in which I sell candy bowls filled with candies, fruits, and nuts. Must I toivel these dishes before I fill them?”

This question is a modification of a situation in which I was once involved. We received a glass candy bowl as a gift from someone with a note that the proprietor had already toiveled the bowl. I called the owner of the business to inform him that, in my opinion, not only is he not required to toivel the dish, but I suspect that the tevilah does not help. My reasoning is that, although the proprietor fills the bowls with nuts and candies, from his perspective this is merchandise that he is selling. The dish therefore qualifies as klei sechorah that one need not immerse, and immersing them does not fulfill the mitzvah. As a result, not only is the proprietor not obligated to immerse the dishes, but doing so fulfills no mitzvah, and it is a beracha levatalah for him to recite a beracha on this tevilah. Including a note that the dish was toiveled is detrimental, since the recipient will assume that he has no requirement to toivel this dish, when the end-user is required to immerse it. For these reasons, I felt it incumbent on myself to bring this to the attention of the owner of the business.

The proprietor was very appreciative. He told me that, in truth, it was a big hassle for him to toivel the dishes, but he had been assuming that halacha required him to do so before he could fill them.

Shortly after writing these words, I received the following shaylah:

“I want to ask you whether one must toivel an item that is being given away as a present. When I studied the topic, I concluded that, even if I purchase a utensil that requires tevilah, but I am planning on giving it to someone, it does not have a chiyuv tevilah until it reaches the recipient’s hands. Only then does it become kli seudah. This would also apply, for example, if someone gave a shalach manos bowl filled with candy, etc; the utensil wouldn’t require tevilah until the person receives it. What do you think?”

To which I answered:

“It seems to me that since one is purchasing the item for someone’s personal use, and not to sell, that it should have a chiyuv tevilah at this point. Only items meant to be merchandise are absolved from tevilah.”

I received the following response:

“Who says that the recipient is going to use the utensil at his table? Indeed, I had the very same shaylah tonight. My wife took a small receptacle that was holding a plant, filled it with nuts and dried fruit, and brought it to someone as a present. Who said that the recipient will use it afterwards for food? Maybe it will be a candle holder, a decorative piece, etc. It doesn’t become kli seudah until she decides what she will use it for.”

The point the correspondent is making is that it may indeed be that this item will never be a food utensil, and therefore never be required to be immersed. Only the end user determines whether the item is indeed a food utensil, and therefore until he decides what to do with it, there is no requirement to immerse it.

Conclusion

According to Rav Hirsch, metal vessels, which require mankind’s mining, extracting and processing, represent man’s mastery over the earth and its materials. Whereas vessels made of earthenware or wood only involve man shaping the world’s materials to fit his needs, the manufacture of metal demonstrates man’s creative abilities to utilize natural mineral resources to fashion matter into a usable form. Consuming food, on the other hand, serves man’s most basic physical nature. Use of metal food vessels then represents the intellectual aspect of man serving his physical self, which, in a sense, is the opposite of why we were created, which is to use our physical self to assist our intellect to do Hashem’s will. Specifically in this instance, the Torah requires that the items hereby produced be immersed in a mikveh before we use them to endow them with increased kedusha before they are put to food use. This demonstrates that although one may use one’s intellect for physical purposes, when doing so one must first sanctify the item to focus on the spiritual.




Cutting Corners

Question #1: Idolatrous shavers

What does my style of haircut have to do with idolatry?

Question #2: Women shaving

Are women included in the prohibition of shaving?

Question #3: Tweezing my beard

May I tweeze out my facial hairs?

Question #4: Am I square-headed?

Where are my head’s corners? My head is round!

Introduction

In two places in the Torah, the mitzvos not to shave the “corners” or “edges” of one’s head and beard are discussed. In parshas Kedoshim, the Torah states, “Lo sakifu pe’as roshechem velo sashchis eis pe’as zekanecha, “Do not round the corners of your head, and do not destroy the corners of your beard” (Vayikra 19:27). We should note that the first part of the posuk states sakifu and roshechem, both plural, whereas the latter part of the posuk states tashchis and zekanecha, which are both singular and masculine. This observation will be significant in our forthcoming discussion.

The other place where the Torah discusses the prohibition not to shave is in parshas Emor,where the Torah states, “They should not shave the corners of their beard” (Vayikra 21:5). Just reading these two pesukim already raises questions: What does the Torah mean in referring to the “corners” of your head and beard. I, like most people, have an oval-shaped head that has no straight lines or corners! My barber tells me that my beard is roundish also, so, pray tell, where are the corners of my beard?

Even should we explain the posuk to mean “edges” rather than “corners,” it is still unclear. Where are the “edges” of my head, or those of my beard? We will return to these questions shortly.

Shaving and avodah zarah

The Rambam discusses these laws in a place that we might find somewhat unusual — at the end of Hilchos Avodah Zarah, the laws of idol worship. As he explains himself: “It is prohibited to shave the edges of the head, as the idol worshippers and their priests used to do.” Clearly, he understands that this prohibition is linked to the general laws prohibiting idol worship, notwithstanding that these laws apply only to Jews and not to non-Jews, whose responsibility not to worship idols is the same as that of a Jew.

Similarly, when the Rambam introduces the lo saaseh not to shave, he states as follows: “The approach of the priests of idolatry was to shave their beards. Therefore, the Torah forbade shaving the beard.” It is also interesting to note that, although I translated the Rambam as “shaving,” he actually here uses the word hashchasah, which, as in the translation of the posuk in parshas Kedoshim above, means “destroying” the beard.

Both of these statements of the Rambam are unusual. Although he often quotes reasons for mitzvos before concluding the laws of that mitzvah, he rarely introduces a mitzvah with an explanation of the reason for the mitzvah. Here, he obviously felt that there was a reason to do so, which provoked other rishonim to take issue with him, as we will soon see. It is fascinating to note that today there are idolatrous practices that involve shaving the sides of the head in a way somewhat reminiscent of the Rambam’s description. It is also interesting to note that the Yiddish word for a priest, “galach,” is derived from the word giluach, shaving.

Women and hair corners

The two mitzvos, “rounding” the head and “destroying” the edges of the beard, apply only to men and not to women, but where does the Torah teach this? The question is even stronger, since neither of these mitzvos is timebound, and they are both mitzvos lo saaseh, prohibitions of the Torah. The general rule is that women are exempt only from time-bound positive mitzvos (mitzvos aseih) and not from mitzvos lo saaseh, nor from mitzvos that are not time-bound!

To answer this last question, let us quote the Mishnah, which states, “Men are obligated and women are exempt from positive time-bound mitzvos (mitzvas aseih shehazeman grama). Men and women are equally obligated to observe positive mitzvos that are not timebound (mitzvas aseih shelo hazeman grama). Men and women are equally obligated to observe all prohibitions (lo saaseh), except for “Don’t round (bal takif),” “Don’t destroy (bal tashchis),” and “Don’t become tamei to the dead (bal tetamei lameisim)” (Kiddushin 29a).

Thus, we are taught that there are three mitzvos lo saaseh that are discriminatory – they apply only to men, but not to women. In other words, male kohanim may not become tamei to a human corpse, but women who are wives or daughters of a kohein (called kohanos in numerous places) may become tamei. Male Jews are prohibited from “rounding out” the “edges” of their heads, but women are exempt from any prohibition of “rounding out” the “edges” of their heads. And male Jews are prohibited from “destroying” the “edges” of their beards, whereas women are exempt from any prohibition of “destroying” the “edges” of their unwanted facial hairs.

We do not yet know why these mitzvos should be exceptions and not apply to women. The Gemara asks (Kiddushin 35b), “What is the hermeneutic basis for these rulings?” In other words, how do we see in the Written Torah that this is true, based on the thirteen midos of Rabbi Yishmael.

I will note that the Gemara is not questioning why these three mitzvos are exceptions. This we know via our mesorah, the Torah she’be’al peh. The Gemara’s question is how are these laws derived from the Torah shebiksav (see Rambam, Introduction to Commentary on the Mishnah).

The relevant passage of Gemara explains that the law that a kohein may not become tamei through contact with the dead applies only to men and not to women is clearly implied in the posuk (in parshas Emor), where it states: “Speak to the kohanim who are the sons of Aharon,” implying that the prohibition applies only to the male descendants of Aharon, but not to his female progeny. However, from where in the verse would we know that the two prohibitions of rounding the head and destroying the beard apply only to men? The Gemara first explains how we know that the prohibition against destroying the beard applies only to men. The proof for this returns us to the observation we made above: When the Torah states, Lo sakifu pe’as roshechem velo tashchis eis pe’as zekanecha, “Do not round the corners of your head, and do not destroy the corners of your beard,” the beginning of the posuk is plural, whereas the latter part is masculine singular. This change and emphasis implies that lo tashchis eis pe’as zekanecha, which translates, “You (male, singular) are not to destroy the corners of your beard” applies only to men. (This is not the only approach mentioned in the Gemara, but it is the clearest.) The Gemara also demonstrates the hermeneutic source why the lo saaseh of Lo sakifu pe’as roshechem,“Do not round the corners of your head,” also applies only to men, but not to women.

Tweezing my beard

At this point, let us examine one of our opening questions: “May I tweeze out my facial hairs?” We have already learned that a woman is permitted to do this, but we do not know what the halacha is regarding a man. In this context, we should study the Mishnah in Makkos (20a), in which the tanna kamma rules that the prohibition is violated min haTorah only by shaving with a razor, whereas Rabbi Eliezer prohibits min haTorah using either a malkeit or a rehitni. What are these two instruments? According to many rishonim, a malkeit is a pair of tweezers, and the word’s root lelakeit indeed can be translated as “to tweeze” (Bartenura, Makkos 3:5; however, cf. Rashi, Shabbos 97a). Rehitni is understood by most rishonim to mean a plane or similar implement, which has a single blade as sharp as a razor, but is meant for purposes other than shaving (Rashi, Shabbos 48b, 58b, 97a; Rambam Commentary and Bartenura, Makkos 3:5). Notwithstanding that the rishonim differ regarding the correct identification of malkeit and rehitni, they appear to agree regarding the halachic issues that result.

At the beginning of this article, we noted that there are two pesukim banning shaving, one in parshas Kedoshim, which prohibits “destroying” your beard, and the other in parshas Emor, which prohibits shaving. The Gemara (Makkos 21a) explains the tanna kamma to mean that the two pesukim, together, mean that the lo saaseh applies only when someone uses an implement that is both a normal way of shaving and destroys. Although both tweezers and planes will “destroy” the beard, the Gemara explains that neither is commonly used to shave, and, therefore, they are excluded from this prohibition, at least min haTorah. Rabbi Eliezer contends that although they are not the most common shaving instruments, it is still called shaving when they are used and, therefore, it is forbidden min haTorah to shave with them (Rivan ad loc.). Although Rabbi Eliezer disagrees with the tanna kamma, since the majority opinion rules that these two instruments are permitted, this is the halachic conclusion.

The Gemara then makes a distinction between scissors, on the one hand, and tweezers and planes on the other, explaining that even Rabbi Eliezer rules that this prohibition of the Torah does not include cutting the beard with scissors, since this does not “destroy” your beard. Since Rabbi Eliezer rules that scissors do not violate the prohibition of shaving the beard, certainly the tanna kamma agrees. Therefore, this lo saaseh is not violated when cutting beard hairs with tweezers, planes or scissors. We should note that many authorities, nevertheless, prohibit shaving using these items, for a variety of different reasons, which we will explain in a future article.=

One blade

Even when using scissors or a beard trimmer, one must be extremely careful not to shave the beard only with the lower blade of the scissors, since this is halachically the same as cutting with a razor and prohibited min haTorah (Rema, Yoreh Deah 181:10). In other words, scissors’ action is not a razor only because the cutting uses both blades. Should one blade of the scissors be used by itself, it is functioning as a razor – the upper blade may be hanging on for the ride, but the lower blade is shaving as a razor does.

Similarly, it is prohibited min haTorah to shave using a flintstone (which was apparently common at one time in history), since this is equivalent to shaving with a razor (Shu’t Noda Biyehudah, Yoreh Deah 2:81).

Powders and Creams

Several halachic authorities rule that, just as a scissors may be used to shave the beard, so can depilatory powders and creams be used to remove the beard (Shu’t Noda Biyehudah, Yoreh Deah 2:81; Shu’t Shemesh Tzedakah Yoreh Deah #61; Birkei Yosef, to Yoreh Deah 181:10; Tiferes Yisroel, Makkos 3:5 #34). They caution against using a knife or other sharp implement to scrape off the powder or cream, since this may result in using a razor-type instrument to remove the hair, if the powder or cream did not yet separate the hair from the face. Instead, they recommend using an implement made of wood or a smooth piece of bone to wipe off the powder or cream.

We will continue this topic in a future article.




The Halachos of Book, Wine, and Restaurant Reviews

The entire story of Yosef being sold to Egypt was a result of a “critical review…”

Photo by EmZed from FreeImages

Someone once sent me the following email with the following series of shaylos:

Dear Rabbi Kaganoff,

1. Is a person allowed to write balanced reviews of books? This question concerns hashkafah-type works, halachic works, self-help books, as well as novels.

Obviously, there are many halachic ramifications, including lashon hora, etc. I would specifically like to know if one is allowed to review unfavorably a work that the reviewer finds seriously lacking.

2. May one write reviews of other products, such as wine or restaurants?

3. If a person asks my opinion of a book, a wine, or a restaurant, may I answer truthfully, even if my personal negative opinion may result in the person choosing another product?

With much thanks in advance, Aaron Bernstein

Before I answer Aaron’s question, I must first present the halachos of lashon hora that apply here.

Saying something true that may damage someone’s professional or business reputation, or causes him financial harm, constitutes lashon hora, even when nothing negative is intended.[1] Thus, random schmoozing about the quality of different workmen’s skills, the halachic prowess of different talmidei chachomim, or the quality of education provided by a certain school constitutes lashon hora.

However, when I need certain information, I may ask people who might know. For example, if I need to have some home repairs performed, I may “ask around” what experience other people have had with various professionals. I should tell them why I need to know, and they should tell me only what is relevant to my needs.

Examples:

1. Gilah hired a home-improvement contractor who was skilled and efficient, but inexperienced in certain plumbing work. Ahuva asks Gilah whether the contractor was good. Gilah should reply that he was skilled and efficient, but does Ahuva intend to include any plumbing? If the reply is negative, Gilah should say nothing, since Ahuva understands that if she changes her mind and decides to include plumbing, she should discuss it with Gilah first. If the reply is that there is plumbing to be done, Gilah should tell her that the contractor’s work was excellent and efficient, but that he seemed somewhat inexperienced in plumbing. Gilah should suggest that, perhaps, by now he has the experience, and Ahuva also has the option to ask him to subcontract the plumbing.

2. Yaakov moves to a new neighborhood and asks Michael who the local poskim are. Michael can mention one, some, or all of the local available poskim, but should not mention any disqualifying factors about them, such as, Rabbi X is curt, Rabbi Y is very machmir, or Rabbi Z’s shiurim are unclear. Michael may ask Yaakov what qualities he is looking for in a rav and then make recommendations, based on Yaakov’s answer.

What if I know that the mechanic is dishonest?

Yitzchok and Esther just moved to my neighborhood and mention to me that they are planning to bring their car, which is making an unusual noise, to Gonif’s Service Station. I have found the proprietor of Gonif’s to be very dishonest. May I say something to Yitzchok and Esther?

The halacha is that not only may I say something to them, but I am obligated to do so.[2] This is because I am responsible to make sure that Yitzchok and Esther are not hurt financially by the crooked repair shop. This is included in the mitzvah of lo saamod al dam rei’echa, do not stand by idly while your friend becomes injured.[3]

However, exactly how I impart this information to Yitzchok and Esther depends on the circumstances.

Why is this so?

In any situation where I must protect someone from harm, whether it is a potentially harmful shidduch, damaging chinuch or a bad business deal, there are five rules that govern what I may say:

1. Is it bad?

Be certain that what may transpire (if I do not intercede) is, indeed, bad. Often, one assumes that something is worse than it really is. Later in this article, I will describe a case that appears bad, while halachically it is not considered so. In the case at hand, I am responsible to see that Yitzchok and Esther are not deceived by the repair shop. By warning them, I have fulfilled the first rule.

2. No exaggerating

Do not exaggerate, describing the situation as worse than it is. In this case, even if I need to describe Gonif’s dishonesty (which I can probably avoid, as we will explain later), I should describe only what I personally know, and I must be careful not to embellish or include hearsay.

3. Appropriate motivation

One’s motivation must be to protect the innocent person from harm, not to bring retribution on the person responsible for causing the harm. In our case, this means that my goal is to protect Yitzchok and Esther from harm, not to “get back” at Gonif’s. The reason for this condition is that one violates the prohibition of saying lashon hora if one has evil intent, even in a case when one may otherwise transmit the information.[4]

4. No other choice

Can I accomplish what I need to without saying lashon hora? The answer to this question depends on the situation. What do I need to accomplish? In the case of the crooked repair shop, my goal is that Yitzchok and Esther not be victimized by the shop. I can accomplish this in several different ways, some of which do not require tarnishing the repair shop’s reputation. For example, if Yitzchok and Esther will heed my advice to take their car to “Careful and Honest Repairs” instead, I have no need to tell them that Gonif’s is a dishonest shop. In this instance, I have accomplished my purpose, without mentioning the dishonest acts I have witnessed.

5. Too damaging

Will the result of my sharing the negative information be more harmful to the perpetrator than what he should suffer according to halacha? For example, I know that Reuven’s professional work is sometimes substandard, and I discover that Shimon, who is known to back out on deals he has committed to, contracted Reuven to do work. Although under other circumstances I would not only be permitted, but even required, to notify someone of Reuven’s lack of professional skill, in this situation, I may not notify Shimon, because he may back out on Reuven in a way that contravenes halacha.

When is something not really bad?

In condition #1 above, I mentioned that there are situations that someone considers bad, but which are not considered bad, according to halacha. The background behind this shaylah will impact directly on our original shaylah about reviewing books, wines, and restaurants.

What is an example of this situation?

Chani sees Miriam, who is new in the neighborhood, about to enter a grocery store that Chani knows is expensive. May Chani tell Miriam that groceries in this store might cost more than at the competition? The Chafetz Chayim rules that one may not reveal this information.[5]

Why is it not permitted to save Miriam from overpaying?

The Chafetz Chayim rules that overpaying slightly for an item is not considered a “bad thing,” provided the storekeeper is within the halachic range of what he may charge. (A full explanation of how much the storekeeper may charge is beyond the focus of this article.)

Why is being overcharged not considered being harmed?

Since the storekeeper who charges higher prices is not doing anything halachically wrong, one may not hurt his livelihood by encouraging someone to purchase elsewhere. And if one does, this is lashon hora, which includes hurting someone’s livelihood.

Thus, there is a major difference between a dishonest repair shop and one that is more expensive. It is a mitzvah to steer someone away from a dishonest store, but it is forbidden to steer him away from a Jewish store that charges more, when the store is halachically permitted to do so.

What happens if someone moves to town and asks me where he can find kosher groceries?

You should tell him which local groceries sell kosher products that have the hechsherim he wants. You do not need to supply a complete list of the stores in the neighborhood, but it is permissible to mention only the stores that are less expensive. However, you may not tell him which stores are more expensive.

If someone knows that a third party plans to purchase an item from a store that tends to be expensive, do not say anything. Even though the purchaser could save money by buying elsewhere, the storekeeper is losing from your actions. One should not get involved in saving one person’s money at someone else’s expense.[6] However, if the proprietor of the store is not an observant Jew or not Jewish, you may tell the purchaser that there is a less expensive place to make his purchase.

On the other hand, if the storekeeper is doing something that is halachically prohibited, such as selling defective or misrepresented products, you should warn a person intending to make a purchase there.

Book reviews

With this background, we can now discuss Aaron Bernstein’s first shaylah: “Is a person allowed to write balanced reviews of books?”

What does the review accomplish?

This depends on the type of book being reviewed. Let us begin with one category: Jewish novels.

Why do secular sources review books?

So that people can decide whether they will enjoy the book, and whether they should spend the money to purchase it.

May I do this? What “harm” am I protecting someone from by telling him to avoid purchasing this book? On the other hand, by warning people away from the book, I am hurting the livelihood of those who have invested time and money, intending that this book will provide them parnasah.

This is parallel to the case where one Jewish storeowner, in his desire to make a living, charges a bit more than his competitors. The halacha there is that I may not tell someone to avoid his store, since I am harming the storekeeper. Similarly, I may not tell people to save money by avoiding the purchase of a book. One may, however, publish a review that describes the positive aspects of a book.

Of course, this means that the most standard book reviews and other reviews common in secular circles contravene halachic guidelines. One may include a book review column only if it merely informs people of new publications, but does not provide negative critical review.

However, if a work contains flaws in hashkafah, one is required to refute the author’s mistakes.

Similarly, if a halacha work is flawed, one should write a review to clarify that the work contains errors.

Example:

Many years ago, I was asked by a well-known Jewish publication to review a particular halachic work. When I read the work, I felt it sorely lacking in certain areas — particularly hashkafah, and that it could easily be used as a resource for someone who would then behave in a questionable or non-halachic fashion. I pointed out these concerns of mine in the review, because, in this situation, it was very important to avoid serious halachic mishaps.

If the work reflects an approach to halacha different from one’s own, then it depends: if the halacha quoted is reliable, one may draw the reader’s attention to the fact that it reflects a different halachic approach.

Now we can look at the second question:

“2. May one write reviews of other products, such as wine or restaurants?”

We already know the answer to this question. If the purpose of the review is to discourage people from buying a product or eating in a restaurant, one may not write the review. But one may publish a review that contains the positive aspects of the product.

What if someone asks me my opinion of a certain wine or restaurant?

If you have a poor opinion of the wine, restaurant or book, you should inquire, “What are you looking for?” Then, when the questioner clarifies what he wants, direct him to the product that most satisfies his needs and interests. If the wine or restaurant in question may not be what he wants, explain to him what aspects would meet his needs, and what might not. This is permitted, because they have come to you to ask for information about the item. However, one may not simply put this information in the media for everyone, including readers who have no need of, or interest in, the information.

For example, you do not have a positive opinion of a restaurant. Why? You think the service is poor. Would that be a factor to this person? If you are not certain, but you think there are other redeeming reasons why this person may want to eat there anyway, say it in a way that does not reflect too negatively upon the restaurant, such as, “Once, when I was there, the service was a bit slow. But I don’t dine there very often.”

One of the rabbonim to whom I sent this article for his opinion wrote me the following: “I don’t agree with what you wrote about restaurants. If one has a criticism that doesn’t necessarily make it an undesirable place for the one asking, I think that it is better to just say that ‘I don’t go there too often.’ The person won’t suffer by trying, and he will decide if he is happy with it.”

Could there be a frum kosher wine review?

Possibly, but only if its readership was limited to people who are shopping for wines and looking for advice.

Consumer Reports

According to halacha, may one publish a magazine like Consumer Reports?

Although the editors of this magazine have not sought my opinion, I think that they may publish the results of their research, if it is read only by people interested in purchasing these items and not by a general audience.

In conclusion, we see that the halachic approach to this entire issue is very different from that of contemporary society. We must remember that we examine our behavior through the prism of halacha and not from that of society.


[1] Rambam, Hilchos Dei’os 7:5

[2] Chofetz Chayim, Hilchos Rechilus 9:1

[3] See Be’er Mayim Chayim ad loc.

[4] See Be’er Mayim Chayim, Hilchos Rechilus 9:3

[5] Be’er Mayim Chayim, Hilchos Rechilus, 9:27

[6] See Be’er Mayim Chayim, Hilchos Rechilus 9:27 and commentaries




Using Hashem’s Name

The posuk in parshas Vayeishev (Bereishis 39:3) says that Yosef’s master, Potifar, recognized that Hashem was with Yosef. Rashi, quoting the Bereishis Rabbah, explains that this means that Yosef frequently referred to Hashem, thus introducing our topic for this week.

Question #1: Nasty Neighbor

Mrs. Goodhearted asks: “I have a disturbed neighbor who often spews out abusive invective. I am concerned that her cursing may bring evil things upon me. What should I do?”

Question #2: A Friend in Vain

Mr. Closefriend inquires: “A close friend of mine often makes comments like ‘for G-d’s sake,’ which I know are things that we should avoid saying. I wanted my friend to be one of the witnesses at my wedding, but an acquaintance mentioned that my friend may not be a kosher witness because he uses G-d’s name in vain. Is this really true?”

Introduction

Although both words “swear” and “curse” are often used to mean “speaking vulgar language,” for this entire article, I will not be using these words in this sense, but “swear” in the sense of “taking an oath,” and “curse” to mean “expressing desire that misfortune befall someone.”

Ten prohibitions

The Rambam counts a total of thirteen different mitzvos, ten mitzvos Lo Sa’aseh and three mitzvos Aseh, which are included within the context of our discussion. The ten Lo Sa’aseh prohibitions are:

  1. Not to break an oath or commitment that one has made. The Torah’s commandment concerning this law is located at the beginning of parshas Matos. It is counted and discussed in the Rambam’s Sefer Hamitzvos as Lo Sa’aseh #157 and in the Sefer Hachinuch as Mitzvah #407.
  2. Not to swear falsely (Sefer Hamitzvos, Lo Sa’aseh #61; Sefer Hachinuch, Mitzvah #227). This is derived from the words, lo sishav’u bishmi lashaker, “you shall not swear falsely in My Name,” which appear in parshas Kedoshim.
  3. Not to deny, with an oath, that one owes money. This mitzvah is also located in parshas Kedoshim and is derived from the words lo seshakru ish ba’amiso, “do not lie to your fellowman,” which Chazal interpret as a prohibition against swearing a false oath denying that one owes money (Bava Kama 105b; Sefer Hamitzvos, Lo Sa’aseh #249; Sefer Hachinuch, Mitzvah #226).
  4. Not to swear an oath that has no purpose (Sefer Hamitzvos, Lo Sa’aseh #62; Sefer Hachinuch, Mitzvah #30). This mitzvah is derived from the words of the Aseres Hadibros: You shall not take the Name of Hashem, your G-d, in vain.
  5. Not to cause someone to swear in the name of an idol (Sefer Hamitzvos, Lo Sa’aseh #14; Sefer Hachinuch, Mitzvah #86). This mitzvah is derived from the words, vesheim elohim acheirim… lo yishama al picha, “You should not cause the names of other gods to be used in an oath” in parshas Mishpatim (23:13; see Sanhedrin 63b).
  6. Not to curse Hashem (Sefer Hamitzvos, Lo Sa’aseh #60; Sefer Hachinuch, Mitzvah #70).
  7. Not to curse one’s parents (Sefer Hamitzvos, Lo Sa’aseh #318).
  8. Not to curse the king of the Jewish people or the head of the Sanhedrin, who is called the Nasi (Rambam, Hilchos Sanhedrin 26:1; Sefer Hamitzvos 316; Sefer Hachinuch, Mitzvah #71). This mitzvah is derived from the words, venasi be’amecha lo sa’or in parshas Mishpatim.
  9. Not to curse a dayan, a judge presiding over a beis din proceeding (Sefer Hamitzvos, Lo Sa’aseh #315; Sefer Hachinuch, Mitzvah #69; Rambam, Hilchos Sanhedrin 26:1). This mitzvah is derived from the words, Elohim lo sekaleil in parshas Mishpatim.
  10. Not to curse any Jew (Rambam, Hilchos Sanhedrin 26:1; Sefer Hamitzvos 317; Sefer Hachinuch, Mitzvah #231). This mitzvah is also derived from a verse in parshas Kedoshim, since it is included under the Torah prohibition do not curse someone deaf. As the Sefer Hachinuch explains the mitzvah, “do not curse any Jewish man or woman, even one who cannot hear the curse.”

Four in one

We should note that the above-mentioned mitzvos are not mutually exclusive, and one could violate several of them at the same time. For example, the son of the Nasi of the Sanhedrin who curses his father violates four different Lo Sa’aseh prohibitions: for cursing (1) a Jew, (2) his father, (3) a dayan, (4) the head of the Sanhedrin (Sefer Hachinuch, Mitzvah #231).

As we will see shortly, violating most of these prohibitions is punishable by 39 malkus, lashes (Temurah 3b). This is highly surprising, since usually violating a Torah mitzvah through speech does not lead to this sentence (Temurah 3a). However, these laws are exceptions to the usual rule, which demonstrates the severity of these prohibitions.

Three positive mitzvos

In addition to the ten Lo Sa’aseh mitzvos that this topic covers, there are also three positive mitzvos involved:

1. A mitzvah to fulfill something that one has accepted to do, located at the beginning of parshas Matos (Sefer Hamitzvos, Mitzvas Aseh #94; Sefer Hachinuch, Mitzvah # 406).

2. Fearing Hashem, which includes treating His Name with respect (see Temurah 4a).

3. The Rambam counts a positive mitzvah of taking an oath (Sefer Hamitzvos #7).

What does a curse accomplish?

At this point, I would like to explain a very important and often misunderstood concept. When someone curses an innocent person, the curse causes no harm. To quote Rav Moshe Feinstein, “when someone curses his fellowman, the prohibition is not because it causes harm to the other person. First of all, Heaven will ignore a curse that was performed in violation of the Torah. Second of all, a curse without basis does not bring harm.” Rav Moshe refers to the verse in Mishlei (26:2): an unjustified curse affects only the one who uttered it. a curse of this nature causes no harm.”

Furthermore, even the curses and evil intended by sorcerers (kishuf) do not affect Jews, since we are directly connected to Hashem, and therefore not affected by kishuf (Ramban, Bamidbar 24:23).

Rav Moshe concludes that although a curse of this nature does no harm to its intended target, the one who cursed a fellow Jew is punished because he embarrassed someone, and because he acted with disdain for Hashem’s Holy Name.

Based on this, Rav Moshe explains that there is a difference in halacha between cursing someone else and cursing oneself. When the Gemara (Shavuos 35a) states that cursing oneself is prohibited min HaTorah, Rav Moshe explains that, in this instance, the sinful act of cursing will bring upon himself punishment and harm (Shu”t Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 3:78).

Based on Rav Moshe’s analysis of the mitzvah, we can now understand several other halachos of cursing. Cursing a child old enough to understand what was said is liable to the same level of punishment as cursing an adult. This is because it is prohibited to hurt a child’s feelings, just as it is forbidden to insult an adult. However, cursing a dead person is exemptfrom the punishment of malkus (Toras Kohanim on Parshas Kedoshim; Rambam, Hilchos Sanhedrin 26:1-2). This is because the dead feel no pain when someone curses them.

In one situation, cursing a dead person is indeed punished — cursing one’s parents after their demise is a fully culpable crime (Sanhedrin 85b, quoted by Kesef Mishneh, Hilchos Sanhedrin 26:2).

Cursing without using Hashem’s Name

Cursing a person without using G-d’s Name does not incur the punishment of malkus. However, the beis din has the halachic right and responsibility to punish the offender in a way that they feel is appropriate (Rambam, Hilchos Sanhedrin 26:5).

Having seen Rav Moshe’s explanation of the mitzvah, we can now explain why someone who curses without using Hashem’s name is not liable. The most severe violation, which incurs the punishment of malkus, is violated only if one committed both aspects of the sin – he demonstrated total disregard both for G-d and for man, by desecrating G-d’s Name and by offending someone. However, one who cursed without desecrating Hashem’s Name is spared from receiving corporeal chastisement, because his infringement was not of the highest level.  This is similar to cursing a dead person, as explained above.  Although Hashem’s Name has been desecrated, no living person is offended; hence, there is no malkus.

At this point, we can address our first question above. Mrs. Goodhearted asks: “I have a disturbed neighbor who often spews out abusive invective. I am concerned that her cursing may bring evil things upon me. What should I do?”

I would advise her to avoid her neighbor when she can, but for a different reason. Mrs. Goodhearted is concerned that she will be damaged by the neighbor’s curses – but according to Rav Moshe, there is no cause for concern. However, if her neighbor is sane enough to be responsible for her actions, the neighbor will be punished for cursing and for hurting people’s feelings. Mrs. Goodhearted should try to avoid giving her neighbor an opportunity to sin.

Cursing in English

Does cursing using G-d’s Name in a language other than Hebrew violate this prohibition? The Rambam rules that cursing someone using a vernacular Name of G-d is also prohibited min haTorah and is chayov malkus (Hilchos Sanhedrin 26:3; see also Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 27:1).

What type of oath?

Having discussed the prohibitions against cursing one’s fellow Jew, let us now discuss the prohibitions against swearing in vain. What type of oath did the Torah prohibit taking?

In general, the Torah prohibits taking any type of oath, even when the oath is true, because it is an oath that has no purpose (Temurah 3b). For example, someone who swears truthfully that he did not eat anything today violates the Lo Sa’aseh, You shall not take Hashem’s Name in vain, since this oath accomplishes nothing.

Someone who swears an oath that is false, such as one who falsely swears that he did not eat breakfast that day, violates both the proscription for swearing a false oath and also for swearing a vain oath, since it serves no purpose.

Two exceptions

There are two instances when the Torah permits someone to swear a truthful oath (Temurah 3b). This is derived from the fact that the Torah says in two different places (Devarim 6:13; 10:20), uvishmo tishavei’a. We will see shortly that the halachic authorities dispute whether the words uvishmo tishavei’a should be translated as “in His Name you shall swear” or as “in His Name you may swear.”

Encouraging mitzvah observance

What are the two exceptional instances in which the Torah permits swearing?

(1) The first is when someone swears an oath as an incentive to support his efforts at growth and self-improvement. One may take an oath to encourage himself to perform a mitzvah that he might otherwise not perform (Temurah 3b). For example, one may swear to donate to tzedakah or to say a chapter of Tehillim every day.

Bear in mind that in general, although permitted, it is not a good idea to create oaths or vows upon oneself (see Nedarim 22a). Someone who takes an oath or a vow is now bound to observe it, and failure to do so is a grievous sin. Therefore, although reciting such an oath (that has a purpose) does not violate the Torah’s prohibition against taking Hashem’s Name in vain, it is usually recommended not to do so.

A better approach is to accept the new practice bli neder, which means that one is hoping and planning on it, but without the obligation and inherent problem of making it an obligation on the level of a shavua or a neder, a vow.

When required in litigation

(2) The second situation in which the Torah permits swearing an oath is within the framework of halachic litigation. There are instances in which the psak halacha, the final ruling of a beis din, requires a litigant to take an oath in order to avoid paying or to receive payment. When the beis din rules that one is required to take an oath, the Gemara (Temurah 3b) concludes that the person swearing does not violate the Torah’s prohibition against swearing unnecessarily.

Permitted or a mitzvah?

It is important to note that in this last situation, the authorities dispute whether the halacha is that one may take an oath, but there is no mitzvah to do so, and we would discourage the oath, or whether, in this situation, it is a mitzvah to swear an oath. The Rambam (Hilchos Shavuos 11:1 and Sefer Hamitzvos, Positive Mitzvah #7) contends that someone who swears because of a din Torah fulfills a positive mitzvah of the Torah, uvishmo tishavei’a, “in His Name you shall swear.” Others contend that this verse means simply “in His Name you may swear,” but that there is never a mitzvah of taking an oath (Ramban, Sefer Hamitzvos, Positive Mitzvah #7). Still others contend that even though the verse says, “in His Name you may swear,” this does not mean it is permitted to swear, but that one who swears is not punished for taking an oath (Shu”t Chasam Sofer, Choshen Mishpat #90). However, this last authority contends that one should avoid taking an oath even under these circumstances, and thereby explains why the custom is to pay large fees or fines rather than swear an oath that is fully truthful.

Testimony without oaths

It is worthwhile to note that testimony in halacha does not require one to swear an oath. This can be juxtaposed to the secular legal system, in which one must take an oath or pledge; otherwise, one’s testimony cannot be considered perjury. This is not true in halacha. A Jew’s word is sacrosanct, and any time he testifies or makes a claim in court, whether as a litigant, a witness or an attorney, he is halachically bound to tell only the truth. It is therefore a serious infraction of the Torah for someone to file a legal brief that includes false statements. In addition, filing these statements may involve many other violations, including loshon hora, rechilus, motzi shem ra, machlokes and arka’os.

Oath without G-d

Does swearing an oath without mentioning Hashem’s Name qualify as an oath? This question is discussed extensively by the rishonim, who conclude that someone who commits himself to doing (or refraining from doing) something, using terminology that implies an oath, is now bound to observe the pledge, whether or not he mentioned Hashem’s Name (Rambam, Hilchos Shavuos 2:4; Rashba, Shavuos 36a; Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 137:1). Nevertheless, according to most authorities, swearing an oath that mentions Hashem’s Name is a more serious Torah violation (Rambam, Hilchos Shavuos 2:4).

Taking Hashem’s Name in vain

It is also prohibited min haTorah to use Hashem’s Name unnecessarily, even when one is not taking an oath. This is prohibited as a mitzvas Aseh, since it violates the words of the Torah, es Hashem Elokecha tira, “You shall fear Hashem your G-d” (Devarim 6:13). Thus, it is prohibited min haTorah for someone to say as an expletive, “For G-d’s sake,” “Oh, my G-d in Heaven” or similar exclamations.

In this context, the following halachic question is raised:

“Is there anything wrong with saying: ‘Just as G-d is True, so this is true!’ Does halacha consider this to be an oath?”

This question is discussed almost five hundred years ago by the Radbaz (Shu”t #17), who writes that these types of declarations are serious infractions of the Torah and are considered blasphemous. Anyone who makes such statements should be severely reprimanded and punished, so that he realizes how sinful this is and will take it upon himself to do teshuvah on his crime. The Radbaz states that it is very wrong to compare the existence and truth of anything else to Hashem’s existence and truth. Furthermore, someone who makes such a declaration about a falsehood denies the Creator and forfeits his share in the World to Come.

A friend in vain

At this point, we have enough information to examine Mr. Closefriend’s question posed above:

“A close friend of mine often makes comments like ‘for G-d’s sake,’ which I know are things we should avoid saying. I wanted my friend to be one of the witnesses at my wedding, but an acquaintance mentioned that my friend may not be a kosher witness, because he uses G-d’s name in vain. Is this really true?”

Although Mr. Closefriend should convince his close friend that this irreverent referring to Hashem and His holy Name is prohibited, this use does not qualify as making an oath in vain, but as a violation of the mitzvas Aseh of fearing Hashem (Temurah 4a). As such, there is a difference in halacha:

Two categories of people are disqualified as witnesses because they are sinners.

One is someone who has demonstrated that he will compromise halacha for monetary benefit (Rambam, Hilchos Edus 10:4).

The other category is someone who violates a sin so severe that, during the time of the Sanhedrin, he could be punished with malkus (Rambam, Hilchos Edus 10:1-3; Sefer Hamitzvos, Lo Sa’aseh 286; Sefer Hachinuch, Mitzvah 75). Therefore, someone who curses people using G-d’s Name or one who swears is not a valid witness at a wedding ceremony. However, although it is highly sinful to violate mitzvos Aseh, one who violates them is not invalidated as a witness.

Conclusion

In addition to the above-mentioned reasons why one should be careful how and when one uses Hashem’s Name, the Sefer Hachinuch (Mitzvah 231) mentions other reasons not to curse people. Cursing creates conflict, something we certainly want to avoid.  Furthermore, we want to learn to develop our self-control.




The Paw, the Jaw and the Maw

When Yaakov sent Eisav all those animals, he did not include instructions that the kosher ones required giving certain parts to a kohein. So, we need to fill in the rest of the picture.

Question #1: Four leg or foreleg?

Why does the kohein receive the femur, if, in any instance, we are accustomed not to eat the hindquarters?

Question #2: Tongue in cheek!

Can the kohanim really corner the market on kosher tongue?

Question #3: The jaw and the maw!

How many of a cow’s stomachs does a kohein receive?

Introduction:

There are a total of 24 different gifts that the Torah requires be given to the kohein (Chullin 132b). Many of these, such as bikkurim and the meat and hides from various korbanos, are applicable only when we have the Beis Hamikdash. Others, such as terumah, pertain only to produce that grows in Eretz Yisroel, or, because of a rabbinic requirement, on lands near Eretz Yisroel, such as Egypt and Jordan. On the other hand, other mitzvos, such as pidyon haben, challah, petter chamor (the redemption of a firstborn donkey) and the firstborn kosher animal, are relevant everywhere and at all times. Although challah is applicable everywhere today, since a kohein may eat challah only when he is tahor, prevalent practice is that it is burnt or allowed to spoil, rather than given to a kohein. Therefore, in the contemporary world, the kohein does not end up benefiting from this mitzvah.

Among the gifts the kohein receives are three parts of every slaughtered animal. (As we shall see later, whether this mitzvah applies only in Eretz Yisroel or also in chutz la’aretz is the subject of a dispute between Tanna’im.) The pasuk states: “And this shall be the allocation to which the kohanim are entitled of the people, from those who slaughter animals, whether species of cattle or of flock: they must give the kohein the zero’a (the arm), the lecha’ya’yim (the cheeks or jaws) and the keivah (the fourth of an animal’s stomachs, called the abomasum)” [Devorim 18:3]. We will discuss shortly exactly what parts are included in “the arm, the cheeks and the abomasum.”

Of the people

The pasuk leads us to several questions that we will address. Why does it emphasize that the kohanim receive these gifts because they “are of the people”? It would be highly unusual for the animals themselves to give these portions to the kohein, or for anyone other than “people” to do so!

I will answer this question shortly, but will first present a different, but related, issue. Does the mitzvah of giving away the zero’a, lecha’ya’yim and keivah apply to a kohein’s own animal? In other words, must a kohein give the zero’a, lecha’ya’yim and keivah to another kohein?

The Tosefta (Peah 2:13) states that not only may a kohein keep the zero’a, lecha’ya’yim and keivah for himself, but a Levi, also, may keep them for himself. The Gemara (Chullin 131a) cites that the great amora,Rav, was uncertain as to whether the Levi is obligated to give zero’a, lecha’ya’yim and keivah or not.

Why does the Tosefta exempt a Levi from giving zero’a, lecha’ya’yim and keivah?

In true Jewish style, we are going to answer this question with a question: Why does it emphasize that the kohanim receive these because they “are of the people”?

The answer is that the word the Torah uses for “of the people”, העם, am, implies “the common people,” not the top echelons of the Jewish people, who are always called Bnei Yisroel.The pasuk implies that the mitzvah to give zero’a, lecha’ya’yim and keivah applies only to the “commoners.” A Levi may contend that he is not part of the “ordinary” people, but of special stock. Thus, the word עם, in this pasuk, should probably not be translated as “the people,” but the “common people.”

By the people

Who is obligated to perform this mitzvah?

The pasuk states that the mitzvah is observed by “those who slaughter animals,” implying that it is the shocheit who is obligated to perform the mitzvah. But, is it not the owner of the animal who is obligated to give away part of his animal to a kohein, and not the person he hired to shecht it for him?

The Gemara rules that the obligation of the mitzvah falls on the shocheit, even when someone else owns the animal (Chullin 132a). On the other hand, the owner of the animal, not the shocheit, has the right to choose which kohein or kohanim receive the zero’a, lecha’ya’yim and keivah (Tosefta, Peah 2:13; Rema, Yoreh Deah 61:28). In other words, whereas the owner may decide which kohein receives the matanos, the shocheit is the one who actually presents them. He asks the owner to which kohein he should give them (Taz, Yoreh Deah 61:29 and Pri Megadim ad loc.).

If the owner of the animal has a grandson who is a kohein, he may instruct the shocheit to give the zero’a, lecha’ya’yim and keivah to his grandson.

For the people

What if there is no kohein nearby when I shecht the animal? This question was a more acute problem in the era before refrigeration, particularly in hot climates where meat will spoil if it is not consumed immediately after slaughter (unless salted heavily). The Tosefta explains that if no kohein is available, the Yisroel should evaluate what the zero’a, lecha’ya’yim and keivah of this animal are worth and keep them for himself, and then compensate a kohein, when he locates one, the value of the three pieces of meat (Chullin 9:7).

Share the wealth!

Although the Torah mentions giving three different parts of the animal, the act is counted as only one mitzvah — by the Rambam as mitzvas aseih #143 and by the Sefer Hachinuch as mitzvah #506. Notwithstanding that giving the three parts constitutes one mitzvah, they may be given to more than one kohein, as the Gemara states: Rav Chisda says, “The zero’a to one, the lecha’ya’yim to two and the keivah to one,” which means that the zero’a, lecha’ya’yim and keivah are divided to be given to a total of four different kohanim.

The Gemara then challenges Rav Chisda: “Is this really true? Did not Rav Yitzchak bar Yosef teach that, in Eretz Yisroel, the practice is to divide the zero’a into its two component bones,” giving each one (with its attached meat) to a different kohein! Thus, the custom in Eretz Yisroel was to divide the zero’a between two different kohanim, unlike Rav Chisda’s ruling.

The Gemara answers that when giving the zero’a from a bull, each bone and the meat on that bone may be given to a different kohein – thus, you are splitting the zero’a between two kohanim. Rav Chisda was discussing a sheep, goat or calf, which are much smaller, where splitting the zero’a between two kohanim would provide each kohein with a portion too small to be a meaningful gift (Chullin 132b; Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 61:9). Thus, when donating matanos of a bull, they can be given to five different kohanim, and when donating those of a smaller animal, they can be given to four kohanim.

Dividing the matanos

The Rambam permits giving all three matanos to the same kohein (Hilchos Bikkurim 9:17). Although, in general, the Gemara discourages giving all of one’s matanos to the same kohein, preferring that one “spread the wealth” among the kohanim, this applies only when all of one’s matnos kehunah are provided to the same individual. However, giving the zero’a, lecha’ya’yim and keivah to one kohein, while giving terumah to a different kohein, is certainly not a problem, even should one always give the zero’a, lecha’ya’yim and keivah to the same kohein (Pri Chadash, Yoreh Deah 61:15), and certainly not a concern if done on an occasional basis.

Fowl play!

Does this mitzvah apply to fowl?

The Mishnah (Chullin 11:1) indicates that it does not. The wording of the Mishnah is that “the mitzvah of zero’a, lecha’ya’yim and keivah has a stringency over the mitzvah of reishis hageiz, in that zero’a, lecha’ya’yim and keivah apply to cattle and flock… whereas reishis hageiz applies only to sheep.” This is implied by the pasuk when it rules that the mitzvah applies to “species of cattle or of flock.” In other words, when shechting a bird, there is no mitzvah to give away part of it, and all a kohein can do is “cry fowl!”

What’s gnu?

The inference of the Gemara (Chullin 132a, 135a; see also, Rashi, Devorim 18:3) and the conclusion of the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 61:17) is that the mitzvah of zero’a, lecha’ya’yim and keivah does not apply to chayos, including, for example, deer, giraffe, pronghorn and wildebeest. Again, this is implied by the pasuk, when it states that the mitzvah applies to species of cattle or of flock. So, now you know that the next time you shecht a giraffe, you can keep and pickle that long tongue for yourself!

Barbecued and with mustard!

The kohein is supposed to eat these parts as would a wealthy man. The Gemara suggests that he “barbecue them and eat them with mustard” (Bechoros 27a). These are not requirements, but suggestions: they should be eaten in a royal, honorable manner.

One or two?

Why is the word zero’a, foreleg, in the Torah singular and lecha’ya’yim plural? Obviously, since an animal has only one keivah, this word must be singular – but an animal has two forelegs and four jaw bones, an upper one and a lower one on each side. So why does the Torah teach that the kohein receives zero’a (singular) and lecha’ya’yim (plural)?

The answer is that the kohein receives only one of the two forelegs, and the conclusion is that he receives the right foreleg, which corresponds to the human right arm (Tosefta, Chullin 9:12; Chullin 134b). We will discuss shortly how much of this foreleg he receives. But the kohein receives both jaws, right and left, and everything included, as we will soon see.

Four leg or foreleg?

At this point, let us examine our opening question: “Why does the kohein receive the femur, if, in any instance, we are accustomed not to eat the hindquarters?”

Our questioner has erred, not realizing that although animals have four legs, they are not equivalent. The femur is the extension of the hind leg, corresponding to the human thigh bone. Just as we have no femur in our anterior appendages, which we refer to as our hands and arms, neither do animals. Thus, the answer to this question is that the zero’a is a foreleg and not in the hindquarters, and, in fact, has no femur.

An arm and a leg?

How much of the animal’s foreleg does the kohein get? The Mishnah (Chullin 134b) teaches that it includes from the “joint of the arkuvah until the palm of the foreleg.” From the Mishnah’s description, we know that one border is a joint; but which joint? If you look at the foreleg of an animal, you will notice that it has several joints. Cattle have no fingers, but, from the ground up, the bones of an animal’s joint can be described as the phalanges (corresponding to the human fingers), the metacarpus (the hand), the carpus (the wrist), the radius and ulna (which together form the lower arm), the humerus (the upper arm) and the shoulder blade. The bones at the very bottom have no meat (“muscle” and “meat” are two ways of referring to the same thing) attached to them; as we go up the leg, the meat increases, both in quality and quantity.

What is the joint of the arkuvah?

The Gemara (Chullin 76a, 122b) uses an expression arkuvah hanimkeres im harosh, which literally means “the joint sold with the head.” This market term meant that parts of the animal that contain little in the way of edible meat were sold together. Just as the head contains little muscle, the bones beyond this joint contain little meat and were sold “together with the head.”

The early authorities dispute what is included in this gift to the kohein; in other words, what is meant by the Mishnah’s words: From the joint of the arkuvah until the palm of the foreleg. There are three basic opinions:

1. According to the Rambam, the kohein receives the metacarpus and the radius/ulna bones and the meat attached to them. Unless you are a veterinarian or a butcher, you are not familiar with these as cuts of meat. Even in large cattle, there is no meat to speak of on the metacarpus, and little meat on the radius/ulna; what is there is usually thrown into the butcher’s ground beef pile.

2. According to the Shulchan Aruch, the two parts are the humerus and the radius/ulna. The metacarpus is considered beyond the palm of the foreleg, and the the perek shel arkuvah is the shoulder blade. The muscle on the humerus does include some quality meat that is considered shoulder roast or shoulder steak – not as good as ribeye or brisket, but certainly quality meat cuts.

Both opinions we have quoted above contend that the zero’a includes two bones and the meat on those bones, and the Tosefta (Chullin 9:3) adds also the joint above the bone.

3. According to the disciples of the Vilna Gaon, he held that the mitzvah included only one bone and the meat on that bone.

The halacha is that the kohein receives the bone, plus the meat attached to it.

JAWS!

The pasuk said “jaws” plural, which could mean two jaw bones, or all four. This is the subject of an ancient dispute among halachic authorities, since the Targum Yonasan explains that the kohein receives both the upper and lower jaw, an approach to which the Vilna Gaon concurs, maintaining that this is the correct girsa in the Sifrei (Shoftim #165). Those who rule this way, which include the Gra and the Aruch Hashulchan (Yoreh Deah 61:12), conclude that the kohein receives both sides of the upper jaw in addition to the lower jaw. This approach means that the kohein receives all of the “cheek meats” of the animal.

However, most poskim (Rashi, Chullin 134b, s.v. haperek shel lechi; Pri Chadash, Yoreh Deah 61:5; Yad Efrayim to Yoreh Deah 61:3) rule that the kohein receives only the lower jaw, and this is the girsa that we have in the Sifrei. According to this approach, the kohein receives only the meat attached to the lower jaw, but not what is attached to the upper jaw.

Jawed down

How much is included with the lecha’ya’yim? The Mishnah states that it includes from “the joint of the jaw until the pikah of the throat” (Chullin 134b). The “pikah” is the top of the trachea (see Pri Chadash, Yoreh Deah 61:5). The lecha’ya’yim includes, therefore, the tongue, some meat, hide, bone, hair, and, on sheep, a small amount of wool (Chullin 134b).

Since the lower jaw includes the tongue (Rashi; Rav), this means that, indeed, where these mitzvos are observed, the kohanim have a virtual monopoly on the tongues.

Why did I write “in places where these mitzvos are observed?” The answer is that there is a dispute among tanna’im whether this mitzvah applies in chutz la’aretz, notwithstanding that it is not one of the mitzvos ha’teluyos ba’aretz, a mitzvah dependent on the land. There is a major discussion among halachic authorities how we rule in this dispute.

The maw?

What is the keivah? Several of the chumashim I have seen translate the word as “maw,” but this translation is neither professional nor accurate, since the word maw simply means a stomach, mouth or other opening. (The origin of the word maw is a “bag” or other receptacle, and it later came to mean “mouth” or “stomach,” since these are “bag” functions of the body — areas that receive food.) To translate keivah as maw is, therefore, inaccurate, because the word “maw” does not refer to a specific stomach or compartment of the stomach, and, if it did, it would refer to the first stomach of cattle, the rumen or paunch. The keivah, however, is the fourth, and last, stomach.

Can’t stomach it!

At this point, we can examine the last of our opening questions: How many of a cow’s stomachs does a kohein get?

All kosher beheimos are ruminants, and all of them have several stomachs, or more technically accurate, a four-chambered stomach. The four parts are called the rumen, reticulum, obasum, and the abomasum. As I mentioned above, the keivah is the abomasum. Although today the keivah has limited value, in earlier days, it was the natural source of the enzyme called rennet, which is used to curd milk into cheese. How kosher rennet, which is halachically meat, may be used to curd milk into kosher cheese is beyond today’s topic, but rennet can be used, and, in earlier times, had much commercial value.

There are several questions germane to this mitzvah that we have not yet discussed; we will leave them for a future article.

Conclusion

Why does the Torah give the kohein these three, unusual parts of the animal?

The Gemara (Chullin 134b), quoted by Rashi (Devorim 18:3), explains that these three remind us of Pinchas’s courageous and zealous act, when he sanctified Hashem’s Name during the Midyan debacle – he grabbed his spear with his hand, he prayed with his mouth (Tehillim 106:30), and he plunged his weapon into the stomach of the dishonorable woman Kozbi, who brought Zimri to sin (see Bamidbar 25:8). Thus, every kohein is rewarded in Pinchas’s merit, or, more accurately, all the Bnei Yisroel are constantly reminded of what Pinchas did to save the Jewish people.




Do I Have to Tell the Truth?‎

Question #1: The Truth

May I take credit for something that I did not do myself?

Question #2: The Whole Truth

Must I make a full disclosure when it may cause a negative outcome?

Question #3: Nothing but the Truth!

Is it permitted to “add” to the truth?

Introduction:

A person must maintain total integrity in all his dealings – after all, we are commanded to act as Hashem does in all our deeds, and Hashem’s seal is truth (Shabbos 55a). Furthermore, someone meticulously honest and truthful will merit receiving the presence of the Shechinah.

Conversely, the Gemara (Sanhedrin 103a) teaches that habitual liars will not merit to receive the Shechinah’s presence. This is derived from the pasuk, Dover shekarim lo yikon leneged einai, “He who speaks lies will not be established in My sight” (Tehillim 101:7). A person who gains nothing from his lies and simply has no regard for telling the truth is included in the “kat shakranim” (pack of liars) who will not merit to meet Hashem (Shaarei Teshuvah 3:181, 186). This category also includes people who fail to keep their word (Shaarei Teshuvah 3:183).

Truth is so important that the Gemara teaches, Hafoch bineveilasa velo seifoch bemilei, “Turn over a carcass and do not turn over your words” (Pesachim 113a). This means that it is preferable to do unpleasant, malodorous work rather than talk deceitfully.

Therefore, the Torah warns, Midevar sheker tirchak, “Keep distant from a false matter” (Shemos 23:7). Nowhere else does the Torah command that we must “keep distant” from an activity (Sefer Hachinuch #74), which emphasizes how far we must keep from falsehood (Mesilas Yesharim, Chapter 11). Even taking credit for something that one did not do is considered a falsehood (Shaarei Teshuvah 3:184).

Truth in education

Regarding chinuch, we are taught, “Do not promise something to a child without giving it to him, because this teaches him to lie” (Sukkah 46b).

In addition to the halachic requirement of being meticulously honest, there is also a tangible benefit in being known as someone who always tells the truth. As the Gemara notes: “Someone who lies is not believed even when he tells the truth” (Sanhedrin 89b).

The whole truth

Despite the importance of telling the truth, there are situations where the Torah allows one to be imprecise because of a greater good. It is of paramount importance not to hurt people’s feelings, harm their reputation, embarrass them or create machlokes (Bava Metzia 23b with Rif and Tosafos). When placed in a situation in which full disclosure will cause one of these negative outcomes, one should avoid fabricating a story, but should omit the harmful information (see Chofetz Chayim, Hilchos Rechilus 1:8). However, if machlokes may result if one answers truthfully, one must modify the truth, rather than create ill feeling.

Why?

Why is it permitted to alter the facts in order to avoid hurting someone’s feelings?

In general, the Torah does not accept that the end justifies the means. Thus, one is generally not permitted to do something halachically wrong in order to accomplish a positive result. However, altering the truth to avoid machlokes or to save someone from hurt is an exception to this rule.

Even in these situations, changing the truth should be a last resort. When the situation can be resolved without resorting to untruth, one must do so. Furthermore, it is preferable to give a truthful answer that omits the harmful information, rather than modify the truth (see Chofetz Chayim, Hilchos Rechilus 1:8). However, when there is no choice other than modifying the truth, one is required to do so.

When should the truth be modified?

There are five categories of cases when modifying the truth is permitted. They are:

1. Shalom

One is required to avoid dispute or ill feeling even if it requires distorting the truth. This also includes situations where telling the truth will result in loshon hara. Therefore, if someone is asked, “What did so-and-so say about me?” and the true answer to this question will result in loshon hara or ill feeling, one may not give a complete answer. As mentioned above, it is preferable to answer in a way that is not an outright untruth, such as telling part of the story that has no negative ramifications. If there is no choice, one should resort to fabrication rather than telling the truth that includes loshon hara or creates machlokes (Chofetz Chayim, Hilchos Rechilus 1:8).

It should be noted that when there is no way to avoid modifying the truth for the sake of shalom, it is not only permitted but obligatory in order to avoid machlokes or hurting someone’s feelings (Rif, Bava Metzia 23b).

Here is an example: Reuven refused to lend Shimon money, because he felt that Shimon was a credit risk.Shimon discovered that Reuven loaned money to someone else, whereupon Shimon asked Reuven why his (Shimon’s) request was turned down. To avoid hurting Shimon’s feelings or creating machlokes, Reuven may tell him that, at the time, he had no money available to lend. As mentioned above, this approach should be used only as a last resort. It is preferable for Reuven to change the subject or respond to the answer in a different, inoffensive way that is not a fabrication.

For the same reason (to avoid hurting a person’s feelings), it is permitted to praise a person’s performance to make him feel good, even if the performance was actually mediocre (Kesubos 17a). Similarly, one should tell the purchaser of a new garment that it looks great, even if he thinks the opposite.

What is the halacha when a woman who values your judgment asks you how her new dress looks? If the dress does not look nice, and the situation can be modified (such as, the dress can be tailored or exchanged), you should give the appropriate advice. However, if there is no option to do anything with the dress, you should remark that it looks nice. After all, there are certainly some people who will think it looks nice on her.

2. Modesty

It is advisable to act humbly and to answer questions modestly. For example, a Torah scholar who is asked how much he knows of Shas (the entire Talmud) is permitted to say that he is familiar with a few mesechtos, even when he knows the entire Shas thoroughly (Rashi, Bava Metzia 23b). This statement is permitted, even though it is technically not true. It should be noted that modifying the truth in this situation is not required (Rif, Bava Metzia 23b). For example, Sefer Hassidim (#1061) states that it is preferable not to say a lie in order to be modest, but instead to change the subject.

Likewise, one should be careful not to boast or advertise the chesed that one performs. A person who is asked about his chesed activities should downplay his role and understate his involvement.

If a posek (halachic authority) is asked whether he is qualified to pasken a certain shaylah, he should answer truthfully, but not boastfully. He can say something like, “There are people who ask me shaylos,” or “Rav so-and-so told me that I may pasken,” which, if said in a humble tone of voice, is informative and not boastful. In this situation, underplaying his knowledge is counterproductive, since the person who has a shaylah will not feel comfortable that he can ask (Tosafos, Bava Metzia 23b s.v. bemesechta).

A person heavily involved in chesed projects is permitted to describe his full role, in order to encourage other people to be involved in chesed.

Someone who observes a halachic stringency must try to keep it a secret. One is even permitted to give a false reason for his behavior, rather than explain that he observes a chumrah (see Brachos 53b). For example, while attending a simcha where one’s chumrah is not observed, he should hide the fact that he is not eating. If someone notices that he is not eating, he may say that he already attended another simcha and ate there. He may say this, even if he did not attend a simcha that night and ate at home, since his statement is true (he has attended other smachos previously). This is better than saying that one’s stomach is upset (when it is not), which is an outright untruth. However, if he feels that the only excuse he can use is that he has an upset stomach, he may say so, even if he is feeling fine.

It should be noted that, in such cases as well, modifying the truth to act modestly is not required, but merely permitted (Rif to Bava Metzia 23b; Sefer Hassidim #1061).

3. To save embarrassment

If necessary, one may modify the truth to save from an embarrassing situation or to protect privacy. Therefore, if someone asks me a question that infringes on my privacy, I may give him an untrue answer, if there is no other way to avoid the situation without being offensive (Bava Metzia 23b). It is usually better to give an untrue answer than to point out that the question was inappropriate, which might embarrass the person asking the question. Similarly, if asked about someone’s personal habits, I may modify my answer, if the truth reveals private information that the person does not want divulged (Maharal, Bava Metzia 23b).

It is permitted to modify the truth to save someone from embarrassment, even if it is myself that I am saving and I also created the uncomfortable situation. For the same reason, if asked a question on a Gemara to which I do not know the answer but should, I may reply that I have not learned that Gemara recently, even if I have (see Rambam, Hilchos Aveidah 14:13and Lechem Mishneh).

Although it is permitted to modify the truth to save oneself from embarrassment, it is not preferred behavior (Orach Meisharim). Of course, the best thing is to know the Gemara adequately enough to answer the question (Kiddushin 30a).

It is forbidden to be untruthful if it causes financial harm. For example, it is prohibited to deny having damaged someone’s property — even if the goal is to avoid embarrassment — if this may exempt him from compensating the owner. Similarly, it is prohibited to tell the boss that one is late to work because of a fictitious traffic tie-up.

Similarly, one may not deceive someone about a shidduch by providing misinformation that might affect the other party.

Truth in litigation

There is no heter, whatsoever, to mislead a Beis Din, even if I know that the other side is misrepresenting the facts. I may set the record straight and say that information is being fabricated.

Money received through a din Torah because of misrepresentation is considered stolen. Furthermore, a lawyer or to’en rabbani (rabbinic legal adviser) who suggests withholding relevant information in order to win a case violates several serious prohibitions.

4. Protecting someone

One may modify the truth to protect a person from harm or to prevent him from sinning. Again, the halachic principle is that, in this instance, the ends (avoiding sin) justify the means (altering the facts).

A few examples will clarify what we mean. An unsavory or untrustworthy person asks you where you were a guest last Shabbos, because he wants to invite himself to the same host. Since the results may be detrimental, you may tell the untrustworthy person that you ate at home, even if this is not true. Early poskim describe the following situation: “Someone who is asked how he was received as a guest may lie, to protect the host from becoming inundated with more guests than he can afford” (Rashi, Bava Metzia 24a).

Similarly, if I am asked by someone who is a poor credit risk where he can borrow money, I may tell him that I don’t know, rather than putting potential lenders in an uncomfortable position or placing them at risk.

It is permitted to modify the truth to prevent someone from sinning. In this context, there is a halacha that many people find surprising. Someone thinks that what he is doing is permitted, but you know that it is forbidden. You know that the perpetrator will not accept your halachic opinion, unless you quote it in the name of a well-known posek. It is permitted (but not required) to quote the psak in the name of a well-known posek, even if you have no basis to say that he said this, so that the person accepts the halacha and, therefore, does not sin (Shabbos 115a).

The Gemara records several instances of this ruling (Eruvin 51a; Pesachim 27a; see Magen Avraham,Chapter 156). Here is one example: In pre-refrigeration days, vegetables cut up before Yom Kippur would spoil before the fast ended. Rav Yehudah noticed that the vegetables were being cut up on Yom Kippur in a way that violated the halacha, but was uncertain whether he would be obeyed if he told them to stop. To put an end to the practice, he told the perpetrators that he had received a letter from Rabbi Yochanan prohibiting it.

Under the category of protecting people from undesirable situations, the Gemara tells us a very interesting story about the great tzaddik, Iyov. When he heard about a widow who wanted to remarry but was not receiving any shidduch suggestions, Iyov would invent a family relationship with the woman, in order to improve her shidduch prospects (Bava Basra 16a).

If I am asked questions that will lead in an undesirable direction, it is permitted to modify the truth in order to politely cut off the questioning. The Gemara tells us the following story: Alexander the Great once met the Talmudic scholars of the Negev and asked them several philosophic questions. When he asked them whether light was created first or darkness, they responded that this question cannot be answered. The Gemara points out that it states clearly that darkness existed before light(Bereishis 1:2-3). Nevertheless, the scholars refrained from answering Alexander, to forestall his asking other questions that might lead to blasphemy (Tamid 32a). Therefore, when you suspect someone may turn the conversation into a topic that you do not wish to discuss, you may change the subject or say that you do not know the answer to the question.

5. Exaggeration

It is permitted to exaggerate, even though the literal meaning of one’s words is inaccurate. So long as one’s intent is clear, this is neither deceptive nor dishonest, but simply idiomatic. Therefore, it is permitted to say that something has happened “millions of times,” since everyone understands that this is an exaggeration. Similarly, it is permitted to call a fellow Jew “my brother,” since all Jews are related and, furthermore, we are all brothers in mitzvos. It is also permitted to call a student “my son,” since the pasuk refers to our students this way (Shabbos 31a).

Some contemporary poskim justify the widespread practice of printing wedding invitations knowing that the time on the invitation is earlier than the simcha will take place. Since this is intended to give people a sense of when the simcha will actually transpire, it does not violate the mitzvah of being truthful.

There are a few other instances where one is permitted to say something, even though the literal meaning of one’s words is not exactly true. Following a halachic discussion with his disciples, Rabbi Akiva said that the halacha accorded with the opinion of one of his students, although it was obvious that the halacha was otherwise. Stating that the halacha was like this student meant that the student’s reasoning was very solid, and the compliment would encourage the students to study with more enthusiasm (Eruvin 13a).

An opposite pedagogic usage is found in a different passage of Gemara (Moed Katan 16a). Bar Kappara, one of Rebbe’s disciples, once said something disrespectful about Rebbe. Realizing that he had a halachic responsibility to reprimand Bar Kappara, the next time Bar Kappara came to visit Rebbe, Rebbe told him eini makircha mei’olam, “I have never met you.” Bar Kappara understood that Rebbe meant that he did not want to have anything to do with Bar Kappara. Bar Kappara repented and Rebbe befriended him once again.

However, how could Rebbe make an untruthful statement? Because Bar Kappara understood Rebbe’s intent, this was not regarded as an untruth. Furthermore, Rebbe’s words, eini makircha mei’olam, could also mean “I do not truly know who you are,” words that are actually very truthful — does one human being ever really know another? (Orach Meisharim 9:ftn 2) Incidentally, we see that even a statement like this, which was fully understood, should preferably be expressed in a way that has a truthful meaning, as well.

From the foregoing, it is apparent that the halachos of telling the truth are far more complex than most people realize. Those who tell the truth will receive the presence of the Shechinah. Many special blessings are bestowed on someone who is meticulous about telling only the truth, as required by halacha.

The Gemara tells about the community of Kishuta where everyone was very careful never to lie. In reward for this, none of them ever died prematurely (Sanhedrin 97a).

Conclusion

Rav Yaakov Kamenetski was once asked why he lived so long. (Several Gemara discussions imply that it is proper to try to answer this question accurately.) After contemplating the question for a while, Rav Yaakov reluctantly answered, “Probably in the merit of the fact that I have never told a lie.”

Why is telling the truth a merit for longevity?

As mentioned earlier, someone who is meticulously honest and truthful will merit receiving the Shechinah’s presence (Orach Meisharim 9:ftn 3). The pasuk in Mishlei (16:15) teaches, be’or pnei Melech chayim, “Those who are in the light of the King will live.” Furthermore, Hashem’s brachos rest on those who imitate His ways, and His essence is truth (Sefer Hachinuch #74). Therefore, those who live with meticulous honesty are rewarded with long, productive lives. May we all merit this reward!




The Words of the Prophets

Question #1: Just This Once

“Obviously, I never met either the Chofeitz Chayim or Rav Aryeh Levin, but there is a great tzadik in our neighborhood, a big talmid chacham and a mekubal, who is never involved in what is going on. Today, he came to me, quietly, and told me that Hashem appeared to him in a vision and instructed him to tell me that this coming Shabbos, but only this Shabbos, I am supposed to drive him somewhere in my car. Am I supposed to listen to him?”

Question #2: Untruthful Prophets?

The brocha we recite prior to reading the haftarah states ve’rotzeh be’divreihem ha’ne’emarim be’emes, that Hashem “desired the words of the prophets that are said in truth.” This brocha requires explanation: Of course, Hashem desires the words of the prophets – He was the One Who sent them the message in the first place! What does this brocha mean?

Answer:

To answer the above questions thoroughly and correctly, we need to study the entire halachic issue of prophets, beginning from the Chumash, through the Gemara, rishonim and poskim. Even if we do not happen to have a neighbor in shul who meets all the requirements of a navi, we should know these laws:

(1) From a perspective of mitzvas Talmud Torah.

(2) So that we can observe them properly when we again have the opportunity.

(3) So that we can understand the verses that are germane.

(4) A proper understanding of the thirteen ikarei emunah of the Rambam is contingent on comprehending these laws.

How prophetable?

We will start with the Torah’s discussion in parshas Shoftim about the topic:

 “You shall be wholehearted with Hashem, your G-d… A prophet from among you, from your brothers, like me (Moshe), will Hashem, your G-d, establish for you. You shall listen to him…. Then, Hashem said to me… ‘I will establish for you a prophet from among your brothers, like you, and I will put My words in his mouth – everything that I will command him. Whoever will not listen to My words that the prophet will speak in My name – I will exact punishment from him. However, any prophet who will have the audacity to speak in My name that which I did not command him to say, or any prophet who will speak in the name of foreign gods – that prophet shall surely be put to death.’ And should you ask in your heart, ‘How am I to know which statement was not said by Hashem?’ (The answer is): That which the prophet says in the name of Hashem (that it will miraculously happen) and the matter does not transpire, this is, for certain, something that Hashem never said. This prophet has violated the Torah intentionally: Do not be afraid of him.” (Devorim 18: 13, 15, 18-22).

We see in these pesukim the following laws:

A.    If a prophet demonstrates that he is, indeed, a prophet that Hashem sent, we are required to obey whatever he tells us that Hashem commanded. Based on the pesukim and some relevant passages of Gemara and halachic midrash, the Rambam (Sefer Hamitzvos) explains as follows: “Mitzvah #172 is that we were commanded to listen to every prophet and to obey what he commands, even if it contradicts a mitzvah… as long as it is temporary, not a permanent change either to add or subtract… The words of the Sifrei are ‘to him shall you listen’; even if he tells you to violate temporarily one of the mitzvos that are written in the Torah, listen to him.”

B.     Someone who does not follow the commandment of the prophet – Hashem will exact punishment from him. Chazal tell us that the punishment is quite severe.

C.     If the prophet claims to speak in Hashem’s Name and he had received no such commandment – such a “prophet” should be executed.

D.    Someone who meets all the requirements of a true prophet, but relates a prophetic vision in the name of an idol or other foreign god (anything that qualifies as avodah zarah) — this “prophet” should also be executed.

In the Rambam’s opinion, there is also another place in the Torah where this mitzvah is discussed. At the end of parshas Va’eschanan, the Torah writes, “Lo senasu es Hashem Elokeichem, do not test Hashem your G-d” (Devorim 6:16), which the Rambam explains to mean: Do not test the promises or warnings that Hashem sent to us via His prophets, by casting doubt on the veracity of a prophet after he has proven his authenticity. This mitzvah is similarly quoted by the Sefer Hachinuch, who calls this mitzvah (#424 in his count): “Not to test a true prophet more than necessary.”

This leads us to the following question: What are we to do when someone seems to have the right qualifications for a prophet, and he tells us that he received a prophetic vision? The prohibition just described is only after he has demonstrated adequately that he is, indeed, a navi. How does he prove that he is an authentic navi?

Who is prophetable?

First, we need to establish that there are pre-requisite qualifications that must be met by a navi. The Gemara (Nedarim 38a) states: “Hashem places his presence only on someone who is physically powerful, wealthy, wise and humble.” The Gemara proceeds to prove that we know these factors from the fact that Moshe Rabbeinu was physically strong enough to assemble the Mishkan on his own, and that he was extremely wealthy from the trimmings of precious stone that he collected when he chiseled out the second luchos.

The Rambam adds a few other qualities that a prophet must always exhibit: “Among the most basic concepts of religion is to know that Hashem communicates with people. Prophecy happens only to a very wise talmid chacham who is in total control of his personality traits, whose yetzer hora never controls him – rather, he is in control of his yetzer hora, always. He must also be someone with tremendous and correct understanding. Someone filled with all these qualities, who is physically complete and healthy, when he begins studying the deeper aspects of Torah and is drawn into these great topics, develops great understanding, becomes sanctified and continues to grow spiritually, separates himself from the ways of common people who follow the darkness of the time, and instead, he is constantly growing and spurring himself onward. He teaches himself to control his thoughts so as not to think of things that have no value. Rather, his thoughts should always be engaged with the ‘Throne of Hashem’, in his attempts to understand holy and pure ideas.… When the spirit of Hashem rests upon him, his soul becomes mixed with that of the angels… and he becomes a new person who understands that he is no longer the same as he was before, but that he has become elevated beyond the level of other talmidei chachamim” (Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah 7:1).

Net prophets

When the prophet reveals his first prophecy, the posuk that we quoted above teaches: “How am I to know which word was not said by Hashem?” (The answer is): “That which the prophet says in the name of Hashem (that it will miraculously happen) and the matter does not transpire, this is for certain something that Hashem never said.”

This posuk teaches that, in addition to having all the requisite personal qualities, a navi must foretell the future in the Name of Hashem in order to qualify as a navi. There is a dispute between Rav Sa’adiyah Gaon and the Rambam what type of “prophecy” must be demonstrated to prove that he is a prophet. According to Rav Sa’adiyah, the prophet must perform something that is supernatural, such as Moshe did when he turned water into blood, or the stick into a snake. This is because the navi, functioning as a messenger of Hashem, would have been provided by Him with a sign that only Hashem could accomplish, such as preventing water from running downhill, or stopping a heavenly body in its course (Emunos Udei’os 3:4). (This is also the opinion of the Abarbanel in parshas Shoftim.)

On the other hand, the Rambam (Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah 10:2) disagrees, stating:

“Any prophet who arises and says that Hashem sent him does not need to produce a sign on the level of what Moshe Rabbeinu did, or Eliyahu or Elisha, which was completely supernatural. It is sufficient that he prophesy, saying that something will happen in the future, and his words come true.… Therefore, when a man appropriate to being a navi comes… we do not tell him, ‘Let us see you split the sea, or bring the dead back to life, or anything similar, in order that we can believe you’. Rather, we tell him: ‘If you are indeed a prophet, foretell something that will happen.’ When he foretells, we then wait to see if it happens. If it does not happen, even if something small of his prophecy does not happen, we know for certain that he is a false prophet. If his words are entirely fulfilled, you should consider him to be truthful. We then proceed to check him several times; if each time his words are exactly fulfilled, we consider him a true prophet.”

According to some acharonim (Arba’ah Turei Aven), we test him three times, just as Moshe Rabbeinu was given three signs. If he meets all the requirements of a navi and foretells the future, perfectly and accurately, three times, we are required to follow what he tells us to do, and, when we do so, we accomplish the mitzvah of the Torah.

If he predicts that something will happen and it does not, we know that he is a false prophet. In any of these cases where we are not permitted to obey his words, the Sanhedrin would subject him to capital punishment as a false prophet.

Prophets on prophets

There is another way that a navi can be verified as such, without his producing a miracle or foretelling the future. If someone we already know to be a prophet testifies that an individual who meets the personal requirements of a prophet is indeed a navi, the second individual should be accepted immediately as a prophet (Rambam, Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah 10:5). The proof for this is that Yehoshua became accepted as a prophet on Moshe Rabbeinu’s say-so, without producing any miracles or foretelling the future. (The miracles he performed were done later, after he already had been accepted as a navi.)

Gross prophet

What is the halacha if someone who clearly does not meet the personal requirements that we have described tells us that Hashem spoke to him. Let us even assume that he foretells the future successfully, or that he performs miracles. What is the halacha?

The halacha is that he is considered a false prophet. When the batei din had the ability to carry out capital punishment, he would be executed by them. Since our batei din do not have this ability today, we can excommunicate him or banish him, to mitigate the harm he causes. This was done many times in our past, when we were confronted by false prophets. In other words, it is non-prophetable to have him among the Jewish people.

Highly prophetable

The halacha is that once he proved he is a prophet, we are required to obey him, even if he tells us to do something that is counter to a mitzvah or is usually prohibited. The two exceptions are if he tells us that he is changing something of the Torah permanently, or if tells us to violate the prohibition of avodah zarah. In either of these two situations, the Torah tells us that he is a false prophet, even if his tests were true.

Is this a prophetable venture?

At this point, we can analyze our opening question: “Obviously, I never met either the Chofeitz Chayim or Rav Aryeh Levin, but there is a great tzadik in our neighborhood, a big talmid chacham and a mekubal, who is never involved in what is going on. Today, he came to me, quietly, and told me that Hashem appeared to him in a vision and instructed him to tell me that this coming Shabbos, but only this Shabbos, I am supposed to drive him somewhere in my car. Am I supposed to listen to him?”

Let us assume that this talmid chacham/mekubal meets all the requirements that the halacha requires, as quoted above. He now needs to meet the next challenge: According to Rav Sa’adiyah and the Abarbanel, he must perform a miracle that defies nature as we know it. According to the Rambam, he must successfully predict future events several times, without a single detail varying from his description and without any incorrect prediction. If his prophecy is inaccurate even in a slight detail, he is subject to the death penalty, if Sanhedrin can carry out this ruling. Since we have no Sanhedrin today, he would be ruled as a rosho, notwithstanding his other fine qualities.

Personally, I would think that he is probably suffering from some mental illness, and I would recommend that he have a full psychiatric evaluation. I do not think that he is evil; I think that he is ill.

Prophetable brochos

At this point, let us examine our second opening question: The brocha we recite prior to reading the haftarah states that Hashem “desired the words of the prophets that are said in truth.” This brocha requires explanation: Of course, Hashem desires the words of the prophets – He was the One Who sent them the message in the first place! What does this brocha mean?

We can answer this question by realizing the following: With the exception of Moshe Rabbeinu, Hashem communicated to the prophets in a vision, not in words. The prophet, himself, put the ideas he had seen, heard and understood into his own words. It is for this reason that the Midrash teaches that ein shenei nevi’im misnabe’im besignon echad, it will never happen that two prophets recite the exact same words of prophecy (Pesikta and Midrash Seichel Tov, Parshas Va’eira 9:14). Each prophet still maintains some of his own personality and upbringing that will reflect itself in the way he describes what he saw. Yet, the final words, which are the words of the prophet, “their words,” are still “said in truth” – meaning that notwithstanding the personal imprint of the prophet on what he said, the words all convey Hashem’s absolute intent.

Conclusion

In the Sefer Hachinuch, mitzvah #424 is: “Not to test a true prophet too much.” He explains that, if we test the navi after he has adequately proved his veracity, those jealous of him or pained by his success may use excessive testing as an excuse not to listen to his commandments. In other words, they will deny his authenticity unjustifiably, by claiming that he has as yet not been tested sufficiently. Thus, we see that even something so obvious as the ability of a great tzadik to foretell the future can be denied by people, when they don’t want to accept the truth!




The Talis Exchange and Other Lost Stories

Chazal teach us that in the merit of Avraham saying to the king of Sodom that he would not accept even a thread from him, his descendants received the mitzvah of tzitzis.

Question #1: THE TALIS EXCHANGE

Dovid asked me the following shaylah: “I put down my talis in shul and, upon returning, discovered that it had been replaced with a similar-looking talis. I left the talis undisturbed, and hung up a sign noting the exchange. Unfortunately, no one responded, and, indeed, the owner may not even realize that he has my talis. Should I take his talis home? May I use it, or must I purchase a new one and leave his until he claims it, which may never happen?”

Question #2: THE LAUNDRY EXCHANGE

A laundry returned the correct quantity of items that had been brought originally; however, the customer, Reuvein, later realized that one sheet was not his. A different customer, Shimon, picked up his laundry and was missing some items; however the laundry insisted that it had returned whatever was brought. Shimon subsequently discovered that Reuvein had one of Shimon’s missing sheets and he clearly identified his missing sheet. Reuvein claimed that the sheet was a replacement for his sheet that was lost and that he is therefore not required to return it. Must he return the sheet?

Question #3: THE WEDDING EXCHANGE

Someone went to a wedding wearing one coat and mistakenly returned home with a different one. May he use this coat and assume that the other party is agreeable to the exchange? Does this depend on which coat is more valuable?

Question #4: AN UMBRELLA ON THE SUBWAY

On the subway you see a frum, unfamiliar person rush off the car, forgetting her umbrella. May you keep or use the umbrella, knowing that the owner will soon realize her loss?

SHO’EL SHELO MIDAAS

The concern in all these situations is that one is using someone else’s property without permission. This is called sho’el shelo midaas, borrowing without the owner’s knowledge, which is usually halachically equivalent to stealing(Bava Metzia 41a; 43b)! In general, one may not use an item until one receives permission from the owner.

CAN’T I JUST ACCEPT THE TRADE OF THE TWO ITEMS?

Since the loser is wearing my talis, why can’t I simply assume that we have traded taleisim; I’ll keep his talis and allow him to keep mine? (Although the correct Hebrew plural is taliyos or talisos, I will use the colloquial taleisim.)

Although Dovid may grant permission to the other person to use his talis,can he assume that he has permission to use the other person’s talis? Let us examine a relevant discussion:

EXCHANGED ITEMS AT THE TAILOR

Someone whose clothes were replaced with someone else’s at a tailor may use what he received until his garment is returned. However, if the exchange transpired at a shiva house or a simcha, he may not use the garment he received but must hold it until the owner claims his property. What is the difference between the two cases? Rav answered: “I was sitting with my uncle, and he explained to me, ‘Sometimes people tell the tailor to sell the item for them’” (Bava Basra 46a).

We see from this case that if I exchanged a coat with someone else at a simcha or at a shiva, I may not wear the coat,since I am “borrowing” it without permission. The fact that the other person is using my garment, knowingly or unknowingly, does not permit me to use his. I may have to purchase a replacement, even though a perfectly nice garment is sitting unused in my closet, since the garment is not mine.

However, if the exchange happened in a tailor shop, I may use the replacement.

WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A TAILOR AND A WEDDING?

Why is the tailor shop different? The Gemara presents a rather cryptic answer to this question: “Sometimes people tell the tailor to sell the item for them.” What does this mean?

The early poskim explain that when the exchange transpired in a repair shop, one may assume that the following situation occurred:

Someone brought a garment to the tailor, asking him to sell it for him. The tailor erred and sold your garment instead and then paid the money received (minus his sales commission) to the original owner of that garment. When you came to claim your garment, the tailor realized his error, and also realized that he must compensate you for your item, since he probably has no way to retrieve it. However, he had no cash available,so he gave you a replacement instead – the garment that he was supposed to sell (Tur and Sma, Choshen Mishpat 136:1). Since the tailor already paid the original owner for his garment, he now owns it and he is fully authorized to give it to you as a replacement for your lost garment. This case is referred to as nischalfu keilim beveis ha’uman (items that were exchanged in a craftsman’s shop).

The next passage in the Gemara’s discussion is now almost self-explanatory:

Rav Chiya the son of Rav Nachman explained that the ruling of nischalfu keilim beveis ha’uman applies only if the repairman himself gave you the different garment, but not if his wife or children gave them to you.

Obviously, if the tailor’s wife or child gave you the wrong garment, you cannot assume that this was because of the tailor’s earlier error. It is more likely that they simply mistakenly gave you the wrong garment, which needs to be returned.

Similarly, the following concluding passage of this discussion is clear.

Rav Chiya the son of Rav Nachman continued: The halacha of nischalfu keilim beveis ha’uman applies only if the repairman told you, “Here is a garment.” However if he said “Here is your garment,” we assume that he erred, since he is not giving you your garment.

If the tailor had sold your garment in error and is now sheepishly providing you with a replacement, he would not tell you, here is your garment. Therefore, if he says here is your garment, we assume he must have mistakenly given you the wrong garment, and you must return it.

We see clearly that the ruling of nischalfu keilim beveis ha’uman applies only when I can assume that a tailor or other repairman inadvertently sold or disposed of my item and can legitimately offer me the replacement. Otherwise the situation is comparable to the case of garments exchanged at a simcha, where one may not use the received garment without permission.

At this point we can analyze Question #2.

A laundry returned to Reuvein the same number of items he had brought originally; however, one sheet is not his. Shimon claims to be missing some items, which the laundry denies. Shimon proves that the sheet is his, yet Reuvein claims that the laundry gave it to him as a replacement for what they lost and that he is therefore not required to return it. Must he return the sheet?

Answer: Shimon did not give the sheet to the laundry to sell. Therefore, the laundry gave Shimon’s sheet to Reuven without authorization and he must return it to its rightful owner, even if Reuven has no other way of being compensated for his loss (Terumas Hadeshen #319; one of the interesting and surprising aspects of this shaylah is that this actual case was asked over 600 years ago!!).

The reason for this is obvious: Laundries do not usually act as agents to sell people’s clothing, and in any case, Shimon clearly denies ever making any such arrangement.

SO, WHAT IS THE STATUS OF THE TALIS?

Let us return to our original question. Someone took Dovid’s talis and left behind a similar-looking one. The owner has not responded to any of his notices, and Dovid suspects that he does not even realize that an exchange transpired.

Based on the above discussion, it would seem that Dovid has no choice but to consider purchasing a new talis. However, there is another Gemara discussion that affects our case, so don’t run to the store just yet. Let us examine the following passage:

Shmuel said, “Someone who finds tefillin in the street should estimate their worth and may wear them himself” (Bava Metzia 29b). If the finder has no need for a pair of tefillin, he may sell them and put the money aside for the owner. The Rosh (Bava Metzia 2:16) rules that the finder may even use the money in the interim.

Shmuel’s statement presents some obvious questions:

His ruling seems to contradict the principle that borrowing an item without permission is tantamount to theft. Why can the finder wear (or sell) these tefillin? As we are all aware, one of the Torah’s mitzvos is to return a lost object to its owner (Devorim 22:1-3; Shemos 23:4). How does the Gemara permit the tefillin finder to wear them and not return them to the owner? And even if we correctly assume that “estimating their worth” means that he is responsible to return the value of the tefillin to its owner if and when he locates him, why is this case different from the normal obligation of returning the actual lost item itself to its owner? Obviously, there must be something about tefillin that permits the finder to keep them and simply repay their estimated value.

Some poskim contend that this ruling applies only to a mitzvah object, where the owner wants someone else to use his tefillin rather than have them sit unused (Shach 267:16, in explanation of the Rambam, Hilchos Gezeilah 13:14). However, most authorities imply that this ruling also applies to non-mitzvah items, in cases where the owner is satisfied with simply receiving back their value (see Tur and Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 267:21). The basis for this second opinion is the continuation of the Gemara’s discussion:

TEFILLIN VERSUS SEFORIM

The Gemara asks why someone finding tefillin may wear them, since this ruling appears to contradict a statement that someone who found books may not use them, but must hold them for the owner. Why are tefillin different from seforim? The Gemara answers that a person wants to receive back his own books, whereas he can always purchase new tefillin. This implies that people have no strong attachment to any specific pair of tefillin, whereas they have tremendous interest in seforim that are difficult to replace. From this one could infer that there is a difference between finding an item that the owner does not mind replacing and finding an item that he does not want to replace, and this would seem to have ramifications for someone who finds a talis, an umbrella, or some other easy to replace item.

Although this seems to be the obvious point of this Gemara, elsewhere the Gemara seems to rule otherwise. If someone found coins placed in a deliberate fashion, the finder may not spend this money and replace it with other coins, but must hold these very coins and return them to their owner (Bava Metzia 29b). Obviously, the owner is not concerned about receiving back these specific coins, and would be very satisfied with receiving replacement money. Why is it not sufficient to simply return coins of the same value? We see that returning replacement value is not satisfactory, even when the owner does not care.

The answer is that in the case of lost tefillin, two factors must be met before one may use them. In addition to the point mentioned above, another consideration is that someone who finds tefillin must occasionally air them out and ensure that they are kept dry (Rosh, Bava Metzia 2:18). (When a person wears tefillin daily, he automatically airs them out at the same time, which benefits them.) Thus, the owner of the tefillin actually benefits more if the finder sets aside money, since the tefillin will become ruined if no one takes proper care of them. This is qualitatively different from finding lost coins, which require no care other than storing them in a secure place.

We can therefore derive the following principles:

If taking care of a lost item requires some effort, and the owner does not care whether he receives back the original item, the finder may estimate the value of the lost item and plan to repay the owner this amount. Otherwise, the finder should hold the lost item and await the owner’s return.

Having established the rule, let us see which cases fit the rule and which do not. Clothing does not usually fit this rule, since people are interested in receiving back the same garment. A person is comfortable with his own clothes, and often purchasing something to one’s taste is not a simple matter. Therefore, someone finding a lost garment may not sell it and hold the money for the owner.

ARE UMBRELLAS AND TALEISIM LIKE TEFILLIN?

On the other hand, the average person does not develop a personal attachment to his umbrella and is perfectly satisfied to have a usable replacement umbrella. Similarly, a man is usually not that concerned about his specific talis and is satisfied with a replacement. In addition, both of these items are comparable to tefillin and not to coins, since if they are never used they become musty. (Normal use of an umbrella airs it out.) Therefore, someone who locates a lost umbrella may use it after estimating its value.

We are now prepared to answer Question #1 and also Question #4. I will answer Question #4 first: On the subway you see a frum but unfamiliar person rush off the car, forgetting her umbrella. May you keep or use the umbrella, knowing that the owner will soon realize her loss?

Clearly, she will despair of recovering her umbrella as soon as she realizes her loss (yi’ush), and if pick it up after she realizes that she left it on the subway, you are not responsible to return it or its value. Nevertheless, in this subway scenario, you will be picking up the umbrella before she realizes her loss.  In that case,  the umbrella is still the property of the person who lost it and someone picking it up is responsible to return it.

However, a person is usually not concerned about owning a specific umbrella, but is satisfied with money to purchase a replacement. (Indeed, if the umbrella that was lost appears to be a designer umbrella, the halacha will be different.) Therefore, even though the owner still owned the umbrella when you found it, you may claim the umbrella as your own, and simply make a mental note how much it is worth. Should you ever meet its owner and she proves that the umbrella was hers, you must compensate her.

And now our analysis of our opening question, The Talis Exchange

Dovid had put down his talis in shul, and it was replaced by a similar-looking talis. His attempts to alert the owner were unsuccessful, and, indeed, the owner may not even notice the exchange. May Dovid use the other talis or must he purchase a new one?

I believe that most men do not feel attached to their particular taleisim, and this case is therefore comparable to the tefillin case of the Gemara. Assuming this to be true, someone who finds a lost talis may estimate its value and then either wear it or sell it. Either way, he should record the value of the talis and intend to return it to the owner, should the owner ever return for it. When I first published this article, I received several responses disagreeing with me, contending that most people are more possessive of their taleisim than I felt.

PECULIARITIES

The careful reader may have noted that our discussion is heading to an unusual conclusion.Although the Gemara’s rules that the owner is less concerned about retrieving his tefillin than retrieving his seforim, today the opposite is generally true – an owner is usually not concerned about receiving backthe same sefer since one can usually purchase it again in a bookstore. (However, the Gemara’s halacha would remain true if he had written notes in the sefer, or it is a special edition that the owner would not be able to readily replace.)

On the other hand, many people own hand-picked tefillin and want their specific pair back (Minchas Elazar 4:9; see Pischei Choshen, Aveidah 6:ftn23). They may have purchased tefillin whose parshi’os were written by a specific sofer who no longer writes, or made by a specific batim macher who has a long waiting list. After analyzing the principles of the above-mentioned Gemara, the Minchas Elazar decides that the original owner gets his tefillin back. Thus, although the principles of the Gemara are infinite, the specific cases that match them change with society.

Returning lost items is a beautiful and important mitzvah. As we now see, the details of observing this mitzvah are often very complicated – and can vary from item to item.