Davar shehayah bichlal veyatza

Question #1: Lelameid al haklal kulo yatza — to teach about the entire category

Aside from being a major mouthful, what does the following statement mean? Davar shehayah bichlal veyatza min haklal lelameid, lo lelameid al atzmo yatza ela lelameid al haklal kulo yatza, “That which was part of a category and was specified to teach, not to teach for itself was it specified but to teach about the entire category.”

Question #2: Melachos of Shabbos

Are the 39 melachos treated like 39 different mitzvos?

Question #3: Davar shehayah bichlal veyatza

In Rabbi Yishmael’s passage, he mentions four middos (numbers 8-11) that begin with: Davar shehaya bichlal veyatza, followed by distinctions that are difficult to understand for most readers. What do these middos mean?

Introduction

Prior to the kaddish derabbanan closing the korbanos section, we enumerate the thirteen middos of Rabbi Yishmael, a listing of methods whereby the laws of the Torah shebe’al peh are derived from the Written Torah (see also Sanhedrin 86a). Without these rules of interpretation, there would be a greater chance that the laws of the Torah shebe’al peh might be forgotten, and it would also be more difficult to apply halacha to new situations and questions that develop. These are some of the advantages of the system of these thirteen rules that we were taught via mesorah from Moshe Rabbeinu at Har Sinai.

Davar shehayah bichlal veyatza

At this point, I will address my opening question: “What does the following statement mean? Davar shehayah bichlal veyatza min haklal lelameid, lo lelameid al atzmo yatza ela lelameid al haklal kulo yatza, ‘That which was part of a category and was specified to teach, not to teach for itself was it specified but to teach about the entire category?’” In other words, a case that was included in a category and is then singled out for a new teaching, it is not singled out to teach the new law only regarding itself. Rather, the new law applies to everything in its original category.

Notwithstanding the rather cumbersome title, this eighth rule of Rabbi Yishmael is actually fairly straightforward. In one place in the Torah, a group of similar mitzvos or items used for a mitzvah are listed. In a different place in the Torah, a new law is taught and only one example from the first list is mentioned. The rule teaches that the halacha applies to all cases in the first list.

The Toras Kohanim itself provides the following example to explain this rule. After teaching us concerning the various offerings brought in the Beis Hamikdash, the Torah concludes by saying: “This is the law for olah (offerings burnt on the altar in their entirety except for the hide), for mincha (grain offerings), for chatas and asham (both offerings brought as atonement for different types of sins), for miluim (offered when the Mishkan was dedicated) and for shelamim offerings (offerings from which the owner and the kohanim eat most of the meat) [Vayikra 7:37].” In a different place (Vayikra 7:20), the Torah teaches that someone who is tamei when he eats meat from the korban shelamim will receive the punishment of kareis. Thus, the Torah mentions only shelamim when it introduces this new law. Because of rule #8, we understand that the punishment of kareis applies to a person who is tamei and eats from any of the other korbanos included in the listing of Vayikra 7:37, but not if he eats something else (see also Yevamos 7a; Kerisus 2b). An example of something excluded from the new law is kodashei bedek habayis, something declared to be property of the Beis Hamikdash, which is sold and its received value is used to pay for repairs and upkeep of the Beis Hamikdash grounds. Although it is prohibited min haTorah to eat from an item that was declared property of the Beis Hamikdash, someone who eats it when he is tamei is not culpable of kareis.

There are numerous applications of this rule in all sorts of types of laws. For example, the halacha that we are not required to eat matzah after the first night of Pesach is derived via this rule (Pesachim 120a). Also, the requirement to bring nesachim (wine offerings) alongside korbanos olah and shelamim, but not alongside asham and chatas, is derived by an application of this rule (Sifrei, Bamidbar 15:3). The fact that the lo saaseh prohibiting making parts of grain korbanos into chometz applies to all stages of the korban’s production is similarly derived from an application of this rule (Menachos 55b).

Here is another example: The Torah states in several places that we are not to perform any melacha on Shabbos. As we derive from several sources, the definition of a melacha is one of the 39 categories of work that were performed in the construction of the Mishkan. Yet, the Torah specifically states independently, lo seva’aru eish bechol moshevoseichem beyom haShabbos, “Do not kindle fire anywhere that you reside on the Shabbos day” (Shemos 35:3). Kindling fire is one of the 39 melachos; therefore, it is included under the general prohibition not to do melacha on Shabbos. If so, why does the Torah need to mention it separately as its own prohibition? This is to teach us that this melacha, on its own, is treated with all the stringencies of melacha. But this answer only begs the question; what is being added to the prohibition of violating Shabbos by having hav’arah, kindling, mentioned specifically?

The halachic conclusion is that this pasuk teaches that hav’arah should be treated as if it was one of the 613 mitzvos and not simply as a category of melachos Shabbos. But since hav’arah is one of the many other melachos that are all included under the heading of melacha, applying rule #8 teaches that each of the 39 melachos is treated as if it is an independent mitzvah of the 613.

What difference does this make? A vast difference. Someone who performs melacha on Shabbos negligently is obligated to offer a korban chatas as atonement for his sin.

Unfortunately, we do not have a Beis Hamikdash today, but when the Beis Hamikdash is iy”H rebuilt, very soon, he will be required to bring a korban chatas. This law is true regarding negligent violation of almost any prohibition for which violating it intentionally brings the punishment of kareis. Whoever violates negligently a potential kareis prohibition must offer a korban chatas.

However, someone who violates the same prohibition many times because he was unaware that what he was doing was against the Torah does not require repeated korbanos chatas, but only one korban chatas.

Now, what is the law concerning someone who violated negligently several different melachos on Shabbos? Since the Torah states, lo seva’aru eish bechol moshevoseichem beyom haShabbos, we derive that all 39 melachos are treated as if they are separate Torah prohibitions. The ramification of this ruling is that someone who violated negligently several different melachos will be obligated to bring a korban chatas for each melacha that he has violated (Shabbos 70a)! We have now explained the second of our opening questions:Are the 39 melachos treated as 39 different mitzvos?

Principles 9-11

At this point, I will explain the next three principles together, since doing so will make it easier. In each of these cases, the interpretation of how the principle is applied depends on how the law that was part of a category and was specified outside that category is different from the laws with which we are already familiar from the category.

Principle #9: Davar shehaya bichlal veyatza lit’on to’an echad shehu che’inyano, yatza lehakeil velo lechachmir. The new case is not noticeably different from an already known case, yet rules that would make this case completely similar to the already known case are omitted.

When nothing new is mentioned, but some halachos are simply omitted, we derive only lenient rulings.

Principle #10: Davar shehaya bichlal veyatza lit’on to’an acheir shelo che’inyano, yatza lehakeil ulehachmir.

The halachic difference in the new case appears to be the opposite of what we would have expected based on the already known case. When the new case includes a ruling that contradicts what we knew previously, we derive both strict and lenient rulings.

Principle #11: Davar shehaya bichlal veyatza bedavar heh’chodosh, iy atah yochol lehachziro lichlalo ad she’yachazeerena hakosuv lichlalo befeirush.

The new case introduces a completely new innovation that was unheard of in any previous application. We do not apply rulings from the original category unless and until the Torah tells us that the new case is still part of that category.

I will now demonstrate applications of each of these three rules:

Principle #9 applied:

All types of tzara’as are divided into two general categories: musgar, a tumah that is temporary, and muchlat, a tumah that remains until the symptoms of tzara’as disappear or the tamei item is destroyed. Usually, musgar can be tamei for up to two weeks (actually thirteen days, because the seventh day of the first week is also the first day of the second week), after which, if no new symptoms develop, the person or garment undergoes immersion in a mikveh or spring and becomes completely tahor at the next nightfall. (In the case of a house, it undergoes a different procedure.) A muchlat could remain tamei forever, and the procedure for becoming tahor after being muchlat is far more expensive, more complicated and is considerably longer to perform than becoming tahor after being musgar. In the case of nega’im on clothing and houses, the status of muchlat will eventually require burning the clothing or razing the house.

For most types of nega’im on a person, there are three symptoms that can make a metzora muchlat:

(1) The tzara’as spreads.

(2) Two dark or other non-white hairs within the nega turn white.

(3) There is a healthy-looking area of skin with a certain minimal size inside of the white nega.

The Torah presents the case of nega’im on healthy skin and its rules and then teaches of nega’im on injured skin, which seem to be the same as the laws of regular nega’im, except:

(A) Whereas regarding other nega’im, the Torah refers to two consecutive weeks of when someone can potentially be a musgar, regarding a nega on injured skin it mentions only being musgar for one week.

(B) There is no mention of healthy skin inside the nega being a sign of muchlat.

Now we can understand how the 9^th Principle applies: “Something that became an exception with a detail that fits its general topic teaches lenience but not strictness.” No striking new rules were taught regarding the nega’im on injured skin; simply some details that apply to other nega’im are missing. Therefore, no strict rules that apply to other nega’im apply here unless the Torah specifically mentions them, but lenient rules do apply. As a result of the 9^th Principle, a nega on injured skin will never require a second week of musgar;if the signs of the nega are unchanged after seven days, the nega is ruled tahor and requires only immersion. Similarly, healthy-looking skin within a white nega on injured skin is not a sign that it is tamei.

Principle #10 applied:

This is where a case seems to be part of a general rule, but a halachic detail is dissimilar from the laws that apply to the cases of the general rule. In this situation, the new case may have some laws that are stricter and others that are more lenient than the previous known general rule.

As an example, the Toras Kohanim picks another case from the laws of tzara’as. A blond hair has no halachic significance to a regular nega or to any other rules of tzara’as on the body. Yet the Torah gave it much significance regarding a nega on the scalp or face. As mentioned above, a nega that develops two white hairs renders the afflicted person muchlat. Later, when discussing tzara’as found on the scalp or face, the Torah teaches that a blond hair is a sign of tumah (Vayikra 13:30). This example is virtually the opposite from the general rule of negaim on the body, in which white hair, not blond hair, renders it tamei. The Toras Kohanim explains that the 10^th principle of Rabbi Yishmael teaches that this case has both lenient and stringent ramifications: a white hair on the scalp or face does not make him muchlat, but a blond hair does.

Principle #11 applied

Something that is part of a general rule but that has a novel detail is no longer considered part of the original category until the Torah explicitly returns it to that category. What does this mean and how is it different from the previous principle (Ra’avad; Halichos Olam; Shlah)? Principle #11 discusses a case which has laws completely dissimilar from the typical experience with these laws.

Here is an example: Every korban, including the asham, must have its blood received into a vessel. However, the law of the korban asham of a metzora includes a ruling that is very different from any other korban. Some of theblood of the korban asham of the metzora is caught by a kohein in his right hand! This striking difference implies that we should not derive any halachos concerning this asham from the laws of other korbanos asham unless the Torah teaches us to do so (see also Zevachim 49a; Sifrei, Bamidbar 6:20, end of piska 37; Malbim #134).

Another example: When teaching what parts of a korban shelamim sheep are burnt on the mizbei’ach, the Torah (Vayikra 3:9) adds the alyah, a fat tail unique to Mid-Eastern sheep. (You won’t find it on American sheep – they have scrawny tails.) Once this detail has been taught regarding this variety of korban shelamim, the Torah needs to teach that the other laws of shelamim are identical, whether it is a sheep, cattle or a goat.

A third example of this rule is that the shelamim offering of the nazir has a special law that its right forearm is cooked before the rest of the korban is offered (Bamidbar 6:19). Once this distinction has been made, we would not apply the other laws of shelamim to this korban until we have a halachic source to do so (Pesikta Zutrasa, Vayikra 3:10).

Conclusion

When the Gemara tells us that the teachings of the rabbonim are dearer to Hashem than the laws of the Torah, it certainly includes the vast halachic literature devoted to understanding the thirteen middos. The Gemara expresses this notion by saying that what is derived from a drasha is more cherished even than the Written Torah (Yevamos 2b; 3a; see also Ritva and Aruch Laneir, Makkos 13a; Maharam Lublin, Bava Kamma 17b). To quote Rav Chaggai in the name of Rav Shmuel bar Nachman: “Torah refers to that which is taught in the Oral Torah and that which is taught in the Written Torah, yet we do not know which is more cherished. When the pasuk states, ‘according to these words I sealed the treaty with you and with Yisrael’ (Yirmiyahu 33:25), this teaches us that the Oral Torah is more dear” (Yerushalmi, Peah 2:4).

In Parshas Naso, the Torah requires the banishing of a metzora from the camp. Chazal understand this to mean that he is not permitted to be within any city that was walled from the time of Yehoshua (Keilim 1:7).

Question #1: Red

“I was told that some nega’im are red or pink. What color are they really, since pink is about the color of our usual Caucasian skin?”

Question #2: White

“I saw someone who had a discoloration on his arm that was white as snow. Is it possible that he could be a metzora, even though we do not yet have the Beis Hamikdash?”

Question #3: Green or Blue?

“Does the word yarok mean green, yellow or blue?”

Introduction:

Contrary to many Biblical translations, tzaraas is not leprosy. The symptoms described by the Torah do not fit Hansen’s disease, which is another term for the condition more commonly called leprosy (see Rav Hirsch’s Commentary, Vayikra 13:59). Tzaraas is a miraculous occurrence that strikes members of the Jewish people as a punishment, but more so, as a Divine admonition to improve our behavior. The root of the word nega means to be “touched” – in this instance, to be touched by Hashem and reminded of the need to improve and do teshuvah. It occurred when the Jewish people in Eretz Yisroel were on a high spiritual level. That it does not occur today is because we are not on the spiritual level to receive these kinds of direct messages from Hashem (Sefer Hachinuch, Mitzvah 169), just as we no longer experience prophecy or obvious miracles for the same reason. (However, see Tiferes Yisrael, Mar’ei Kohein introduction to Nega’im, #39). This may very well be the reason why only someone Jewish is susceptible to tzaraas, and cloth or houses are susceptible to tzaraas only when owned by someone Jewish.

All instances of tzaraas require that a kohein declare them tamei, and to become tahor afterwards also requires the declaration of a kohein. In other words, the symptoms do not make the person, cloth or house tamei — it is the declaration of the kohein that does.

Tzaraas blemishes must be a minimum size to be tamei, but I will not be focusing on these requirements, nor on others, such as that the entire blemish must be visible, the details of what lighting is used to view a nega, and how and when these nega’im are metamei everything in the same room as they are.

We should also note that there is no difference between a man and a woman regarding the laws of tzaraas: both can become tamei any time after they are born. For simplicity’s sake, I will refer to the person with nega symptoms in the masculine.

Difference between musgar and muchlat

To begin with, we need an overview of the basic rules of tzaraas. All types of tzaraas, whether they affect people, cloth or houses, are divided into two general categories: metzora musgar, literally a “closed” metzora, and metzora muchlat, literally, “decided” or “definite” metzora. In the case of a person, a metzora musgar can be tamei for up to two weeks (actually thirteen days, because the seventh day of the first week is also the first day of the second week), after which, if no new symptoms develop, the person immerses himself in a mikveh or spring and becomes completely tahor at the next nightfall. (All immersions germane to tzaraas may be either in a mikveh, which usually consists of rainwater, or in a spring. Throughout the article, I will refer to a mikveh, but in each of these instances, it could also be a spring.) However, someone with nega symptoms that are ruled tahor must remain vigilant that his nega not grow any larger in the future or develop any other tamei symptoms. Should this happen, he will become tamei as a metzora muchlat, which means that he could remain tamei forever, if his tamei symptoms do not go away.

It is a lo saaseh of the Torah for someone to remove the symptoms of a nega, even when he has already been ruled tahor (Tosefta, Nega’im 3:1; Rambam, Hilchos Tumas Tzaraas 10:1). The Torah forbids this in parshas Ki Seitzei, where it says Hishameir benega hatzaraas, “Be careful concerning a tzaraas affliction” (Devorim 24:8).

This lo saaseh is a bit unusual since it is not worded in the more common way of a lo saaseh with the words lo or al but, rather, with the word hishameir. The Gemara teaches that a lo saaseh can also be worded either with the word hishameir or the word pen, which means “lest” (Shabbos 132b; Eiruvin 96a; Makkos 13b).

In all instances of tzaraas, the tumah generated by a metzora musgar is the same as that of a metzora muchlat. Therefore, one could  describe  a musgar as someone who is temporarily tamei, and a muchlat as someone who remains tamei until the symptoms that made him tamei disappear. The procedure for becoming tahor after being muchlat are those described in the beginning of parshas Metzora and are far more expensive, more complicated and take longer to perform than for someone becoming tahor after being musgar.

Tzaraas on a person

At this point, we need to explain the basic categories of tzaraas. There are three types of tzaraas that can affect a person:

(1) Tzaraas on healthy skin

(2) Tzaraas on injured skin

(3) Tzaraas on the scalp or beard

In the case of tzaraas on healthy skin, a nega appears, meaning that someone finds on his skin a blemish that is of a color that is very white, at least as bright as the membrane of an egg. The Mishnah (Nega’im 1:1) explains that there are four shades of white that can make someone tamei as a metzora. In order of increasing intensity, they are:

–          White as the membrane of an egg

–          White as a whitewashed wall

–          White as the cleaned, bleached wool of a newborn lamb (Shavuos 6b)

–          White as fresh clean snow

By the way, there is an unusual shade of white, called bohak by the Torah, that is not a symptom of tumah. Simply explained, although it is a bright white, a blemish this shade is completely tahor, since it is duller than the color of the membrane of an egg, and certainly than the other nega’im colors (Vayikra 13:39).

Pinks

In a few places, the Torah refers to nega’im that are reddish in color (13:19, 24, 43). The halacha is that all nega’im on people that are temei’im if they are white are also te’mei’im if they are reddish or pinkish, and that there are four shades of red, or more accurately, pink, that are tamei, just as there are four shades of white, as I mentioned above. However, the commentaries dispute exactly which four shades are temei’im, with a wide difference of opinion among them, ranging from a very light pink, to shades that are much redder (Ravad to Sifra 13:19; Kesef Mishneh, Hilchos Tumas Tzaraas 1:4; Eliyahu Rabbah and Tiferes Yisroel, Nega’im 1:2; Aruch Hashulchan He’asid 80:6-7) .

To the kohein

Contrary to popular opinion, there is no requirement that there be a Beis Hamikdash for someone to become tamei with tzaraas. In point of fact, should a kohein be knowledgeable about the laws of tzaraas and declare someone with a proper nega shade to be tamei, the person would become tamei (She’eilas Yavetz #136). However, this last scenario would be highly unlikely, since ruling someone tamei for tzaraas requires that an individual have extensive training in all the details of the laws of tzaraas, including personal experience in identifying the differences among the four white shades mentioned above (Rambam, Hilchos Tumas Tzaraas 1:3).

Musgar

Any of the types of tzaraas, whether on a person, garment, or house, must be shown to a kohein, who rules on the status of the nega (Nega’im 3:1). If he rules that the color is tahor, the person is tahor, and no further steps are necessary. If the kohein rules that the nega is musgar, then in the case of a person, he is fully tamei for seven days, counting the day that the kohein ruled on it as the first day. Anything he touches becomes tamei, and, in addition, if he enters a room or building during this week, everything in the room capable of becoming tamei will become tamei. It will require being immersed in a mikveh and will become tahor the nightfall following.

On the seventh day, the metzora must go to the same kohein for him to rule on the nega again (Tosefta, Nega’im 1:12; Rambam, Hilchos Tumas Tzaraas 9:4; 11:6). If the kohein rules that the nega is muchlat, the metzora must go outside of the city (if it is a walled city) and live by himself until the symptoms that created the ruling that it is muchlat disappear.

A person can be tamei musgar for a total of two weeks, which is actually thirteen days, as I explained above. On the thirteenth day, the metzora shows the nega to the kohein. If no symptoms have appeared to make the nega tamei, the person becomes tahor, notwithstanding that he still has the nega symptoms (see below). He immerses in a mikveh and becomes completely tahor the nightfall after his immersion.

Muchlat

What makes a metzora muchlat?

There are three symptoms that can make a metzora muchlat:

(1) His tzaraas spreads.

(2) Two dark or other non-white hairs that are within the nega turn white.

(3) There is a healthy-looking area of skin with a certain minimal size inside of the white nega.

Obviously, the first time the kohein sees the nega, he can rule muchlat only because of either the second or third symptom; ruling a nega muchlat because it spread can be only for a person who has been seen previously by the kohein.

Injuries, scalps and beards

I mentioned above that there are two other types of nega’im that can affect a person, tzaraas on injured skin and tzaraas on the scalp or beard. Each of these categories has two subcategories.

Injured skin

The Torah mentions two types of nega’im on injured skin, one in which the injury was the result of a blow and the other in which it was the result of a burn or other heat. There is no difference in halacha between these two types of nega’im. Whether someone finds a nega on an injury received through a burn or on an injury received as a result of a blow, both have almost the same rules as regular nega’im on healthy skin, with two exceptions, both of them leniencies.

(1) A nega musgar on injured skin is tamei for only one week. If, on the seventh day, the nega has not changed, the kohein rules the nega to be tahor. The metzora then immerses himself in a mikveh and becomes tahor at the next nightfall.

(2) The second lenience is that healthy skin inside the nega is not a muchlat sign. In other words, a nega on injured skin that has healthy skin inside will either be musgar or tahor, depending on the size and shape of the nega.

Scalp and beard

There are three types of nega’im that can affect the scalp or beard areas. In two of these situations — karachas, baldness on the back of the head, and gabachas, baldness on the front and top of the head — the halacha is that once someone’s hair falls out to the extent that part of the scalp is completely bald, it is treated the same as other areas of the body germane to nega’im. In other words, when someone becomes bald, that area that once had hair and now does not has the same halacha for nega’im purposes as other parts of the body. There is one exception, again a leniency. In this instance, white hairs inside the nega are not symptoms of tumah.

The other type of nega on the scalp or beard areas is called nesek, which is described at length both in the Torah and the Mishnah. Unfortunately, nowhere in Tanach or Chazal is it clarified how this is halachically different from bald areas. As a result, the rishonim dispute exactly what is the difference (see Rambam, Hilchos Tumas Tzaraas 5:8-11, 8:1; Rash, Nega’im 10:10; Ramban, Vayikra 13:30). Since the halachic conclusion is unclear, I will not discuss this issue.

Nega’im on clothing and houses

In addition to tzaraas on a person, there can be tzaraas on cloth, thread, or leather, and also on houses. In this instance, the indication of tzaraas is not a white discoloration, but adamdom, which is deep red, or yerakrak (Vayikra 13:49; 14:37). The color yarok in Tanach and Chazal can mean blue, green, gold or yellow (Tosafos, Chullin 47b s.v. Ela; Sukkah 31b s.v. Hayarok; Niddah 19b s.v. Hayarok). In a Tosefta (Nega’im 1:3), we find a dispute between tana’im what color is yerakrak that renders a garment tamei:

According to Rabbi Elazar, it is a yellow shade — the color of wax, egg yolk, or a variety of yellow gourd (dependent on varying texts to the Tosefta). According to Sumchus, it is the color of the wing of a peacock or the leaf of a palm tree, both shades of deep green. The color is the indication that the nega is musgar. Nega’im on cloth and houses can never become muchlat the first time they are seen by a kohein.

Yarok

How can so many different shades of color — blue, green, gold or yellow – all be called by the same word yarok? One answer is that the Torah’s descriptions refer to the various shades of the refracted light spectrum that is visible to humans, which range from violet to red (see Rav Hirsch, Collected Writings, Volume III, page 127). Yarok would refer to the middle of the spectrum, “techeiles” to the violet and blue-violet part, which are the shorter waves of light, and adom to the red, or longer waves. (According to this approach, the gold color here probably means a yellowish gold, rather than reddish.)

Differences between cloth and people

Aside from the differences in the color of the nega, there are several other distinctions between the laws of nega’im germane to garments and those germane to people.

In all types of nega’im, a nega that appears without any muchlat signs is musgar for the first week, and then examined by the kohein on the seventh day. A nega on cloth that appears the same after a week has passed is removed from the cloth, and the area of the cloth that became torn when the nega was excised is sewn closed. A similar halacha is true in the case of a nega on a house – the nega area and the stones on which it appears are removed to a tamei place, the area is replaced with stone and mortar and becomes musgar for a second week.

This halacha is the exact opposite from a nega on a person, in which case it is prohibited min haTorah to excise the nega, and the person continues in the state of musgar for another six days.

A person whose nega remains the same for two weeks becomes tahor. However, a garment whose nega remains the same for two weeks has the status of tamei muchlat. Another critical difference is what is done to the person or item that becomes muchlat. As explained before, a person who becomes muchlat remains tamei until the symptoms of his nega change. A garment that becomes muchlat is burnt.

There are other halachos that apply to a nega on cloth that do not apply to nega’im on people. A person whose nega is musgar is not banished from the city – this halacha is reserved for a person whose nega is muchlat. However, cloth that is tamei tzaraas must be removed from the city – even when it is only musgar. A related strict ruling that applies to a cloth nega (and does not apply to nega’im on people) is that a cloth that has tzaraas must be removed from any city – whether or not the city is walled, whereas a person who is muchlat is banished from a walled city (Keilim 1:7), but is not required to leave an unwalled city (Tosefta Nega’im, 7:14; Rambam, Hilchos Tumas Tzaraas 13:15).

Nega’im on houses

In addition to the laws of tzaraas on people and on cloth, the Torah presents the laws of nega’im on the inside of a house. Tzaraas applies only to a house built from wood, clay and earth (Nega’im 12:2) and only to a house in Eretz Yisroel. The color of the nega is, as the law of nega’im on cloth, adamdom, bright red, or yerakrak, as explained above.

There are several unique features about the laws of nega’im on houses. One is obvious: whereas the person with a nega or the owner of cloth with a nega goes to the kohein to show him the nega, in the case of a nega on a house, the kohein comes to the house to see the nega. Whereas other nega’im are always ruled on outdoors, in sunlight, nega’im on a house are ruled as the light can be seen through the windows and open doors of the house.

A nega on a house can have the status of musgar for up to three weeks, something not possible with any other nega (Nega’im 3:8, see also 13:1).

According to many authorities, nega’im on houses can render tamei even items inside the house that can never otherwise become tamei (Rambam, Hilchos Tumas Tzaraas 14:4; Rashi and Tosafos, Mo’eid Katan 8a s.v. Deha; Eliyahu Rabbah, Mishnah Acharonah and Tiferes Yisroel, Nega’im 12:5 in explanation of Rabbi Yehudah; however, cf. Bartenura who disagrees).

Conclusion

The Gemara mentions tzaraas as a punishment for many types of prohibited behavior, which all share a common thread that they are antisocial activities. In other words, they all violate both mitzvos bein adam lamakom and bein adam lachaveiro. To quote the Rambam, “Tzaraas is a generic term comprising many things that are not comparable to one another… These changes that the Torah collectively calls tzaraas are not within what normally happens in the world. They are miraculous things that happen to the Jews to warn them away from loshon hora. Someone who speaks loshon hora — the walls of his house change color. If he changes his actions, the house becomes tahor. If he persists in his evil actions, his house will be destroyed, and then the leather items in his house that he sits and lies upon change color. If he changes his actions, they become tahor. If he persists in his evil actions until they are burnt, then the clothes that he wears change color. If he changes his actions, they become tahor. If he persists in his evil actions, until they are burnt, then his skin changes color, and he himself becomes a metzora. Therefore, someone who wants to develop himself spiritually should distance himself from these types of people, not to be influenced by their foolishness” (Hilchos Tumas Tzaraas 16:10).

Unfortunately, we no longer have these Divine reminders to keep us on the straight and narrow. Instead, we must try to inspire ourselves to grow in these areas.