Dishes, Detergent and Malachos

The Aseres Hadibros include the mitzvah of Shabbos, providing the opportunity to continue our discussion from parshas Pinchas.

Dishes, Detergent and Malachos

Question #1: Washing dishes

“Whenever I ask my son to help wash the dishes on Shabbos, he claims that it is prohibited. Is he pulling my leg in his attempt to avoid family responsibilities?”

Question #2: No detergent

“Is it prohibited to wash clothes on Shabbos if I do not use detergent?”

Question #3: Six in one!

Can six people consecutively launder a garment?

Three weeks ago, we began our discussion about the melacha of melabein. We learned that there is a dispute among rishonim whether this melacha should be defined as laundering or as bleaching, although in practical terms, the halachos remain the same either way, and it is prohibited min haTorah to launder or to bleach on Shabbos. We also discovered that there are numerous ways that one can violate this melacha, such as by soaking, scrubbing, wringing, or rinsing, and, according to some authorities,  even by brushing a garment. At this point, we will continue our discussion where we left off.

Washing dishes

There is no prohibition of melabein for soaking, scouring, or cleaning a hard substance such as wood or metal. This is because the grime lies on top of the material and is not absorbed inside or between the fibers. This is the reason why it is permitted to wash dishes on Shabbos, provided that one does not squeeze a cloth or something similar in the process.

One may explain the difference between fabrics, that are included in the melacha of melabein, and hard substances that are not, in the following way. All melachos involve changing an object to make it more useful for mankind. In the instance of most melachos, this involves some type of physical or chemical change to the object upon which the melacha is performed. Regarding some melachos, such as trapping, carrying and selecting, no real physical or chemical change occurs in the item, but there is a difference in utility. The undomesticated animal was useless to mankind, and trapping made it available for mankind. Prior to removing the bad part of the item, one could not eat or use this food, and selecting made it useful. In carrying, the most difficult of the melachos to explain conceptually, the item is made useful by changing its location.

By the way, if we remember the dispute between Rashi and the Rambam that I mentioned earlier, the approach of the Rambam allows an easier explanation why washing dishes is not included under the melacha. According to the Rambam, the av melacha is bleaching, or changing the color of the fiber or fabric. All laundering changes the inherent appearance of the cloth, and, in this way, the toladah, laundering, is similar to the av melacha, bleaching. However, dirt on top of a plate does not change the inherent appearance of the plate – one merely needs to scrape off the leftover food on its surface, and the plate is clean. This contrasts with laundering cloth, where the dirt is embedded in the fiber.

All or nothing?

Does one violate melabein only if one performs all of the above-prohibited activities (soaking, scrubbing, wringing, and rinsing), or even if one performs any one of them? A ramification of the second approach is that cleaning an item only a bit violates melabein, despite the fact that the garment is still dirty.

The halacha is that each of these stages constitutes infringements of melabein min haTorah, and this is true even if one does not add any detergent to the water. In other words, although one ordinarily uses detergent to launder clothes, and without detergent the clothes are usually not clean, since performing each of the above-mentioned laundering steps does clean the garment a little bit, that is sufficient to contravene the Torah law of melabein.

Six in one

Thus, theoretically six different people could each be doing a different activity to a garment or cloth, each one violating the melacha of melabein min haTorah! The first one brushes the garment, removing some of the dirt. The second one places the garment in a bucket to soak it. The third one scrubs the garment on a scouring board; the fourth squeezes water out of the garment; the fifth rinses the garment clean; and the sixth bleaches the now clean garment.

Cleaning versus cooking

Since the halacha is that each of the laundering stages constitutes a Torah violation of melabein, we are faced with an interesting contrast between the melacha of melabein and that of cooking. The halacha is that someone who began cooking food, but the food is not yet cooked to the point where it is edible, has not yet violated the melacha min haTorah, but only a rabbinic injunction. Violating the melacha min haTorah requires that the food is cooked enough to make it edible. Yet, soaking an item of clothing contravenes the prohibition of laundering, even though removing it from the water without any other cleaning process may still leave the garment too soiled to wear. Why is there a difference between laundering, which one violates even if the item is still not fully clean, and cooking, which one violates only when the item is cooked?

The answer appears to be that cooking an item to the point that it is still inedible does not benefit mankind, since no one will eat it. On the other hand, although most people do not enjoy wearing dirty clothing, it is more pleasant to wear clothes that are somewhat laundered than clothes that are completely filthy. In other words, although laundering something a little bit made the item cleaner, cooking it a little bit did not make it edible.

According to the Rambam’s approach in the dispute over the definition of melabein, the distinction between laundering and cooking is more easily understood. The av melacha, in his opinion, is bleaching, which means that the basic melacha is changing the coloring, not cleaning it. Laundering is a toladah because it changes the appearance of the cloth. Thus, each stage of melabein changes the appearance of the cloth, which is the nature of the melacha.

Wringing versus stirring

At this point, we should discuss the following interesting phenomenon. When discussing the prohibition of wringing laundry on Shabbos, the Rambam (Hilchos Shabbos 9:11) states the following: “One who wrings out a garment until he extracts the water that is absorbed inside it desecrates Shabbos for laundering, since wringing is necessary (mitzorchei) for laundering just as stirring is necessary (mitzorchei) for cooking.”

This is certainly an unusual statement. Why does the Rambam need to compare wringing water to stirring food in order to explain why it is prohibited on Shabbos? And, the Rambam uses a very interesting term to describe this relationship — the word mitzorchei, which he uses in only three contexts in his entire thirty chapters of the laws of Shabbos. Aside from using this term here to describe wringing laundry and stirring food, he uses it also in the context of meleches tofeir (Hilchos Shabbos 10:9 and Magid Mishnah, Kesef Mishneh, and Mirkeves Hamishneh ad locum; Beis Yosef, Orach Chayim 340 and Elyah Rabbah 340:14)  .

Perhaps one could say that since wringing out water looks different from other laundering acts, one might think that it is not prohibited under the heading of this melacha. However, this is probably not what was bothering the Rambam. My proof is that there are many other melacha activities that do not look like the av melacha under which they are listed. For example, weeding is prohibited min haTorah because it is an aspect of plowing, notwithstanding that weeding does not look at all like plowing. It violates plowing because weeding prepares the ground to allow growth, which is the same concept involved when plowing. Similarly, pruning trees is prohibited as a subheading of planting. Although pruning appears to be the exact opposite of planting, since it is a method of having vines and trees grow better it is included under planting. In these instances, a melacha is performed because the goals of pruning and weeding are respectively similar to planting and plowing. Thus, we see that melacha prohibitions are often categorized by their purpose.Yet, in these instances, the Rambam finds no need to compare weeding or pruning to stirring, nor does he use the word tzorchei to describe what they do.

A possible approach to explain the Rambam is that both wringing and stirring are done after the basic melacha has already been performed. If you are stirring a cooking pot, someone already placed a pot of food on a fire, thereby violating the melacha of cooking. The Rambam is pointing out that stirring a pot is a full violation of cooking on Shabbos – and that we do not mitigate liability for this act on the basis that someone else already performed the actions necessary to cook this food.

Similarly, a person can wring out clothes only when someone else already soaked them in water – which, in and of itself, constitutes laundering according to halacha. Thus, one might contend that the wringer did not violate the melacha (Nimla Tal, meleches melabein #18; meleches tofeir #26).

Separate melacha

Heretofore, we have been assuming that wringing out clothes, socheit, is a subcategory of melabein. Actually, there is a dispute among tana’im concerning this matter. Indeed, most tana’im, including the anonymous author of the Mishnah, consider squeezing to be not its own melacha but a toladah of one of the other 39 melachos listed in the seventh perek of mishnayos Shabbos. (According to most rishonim, this violates the melacha of laundering, whereas the Ramban [Shabbos 111a, as understood by the Magen Avraham end of chapter 302 and Shu”t Avnei Neizer, Orach Chayim #159:20] explains that it violates the melacha of dyeing; cf. Lechem Mishneh, Hilchos Shabbos 9:11, who understands that the Ramban agrees with the other rishonim that it is prohibited because of melabein.) However, the tanna, Rabbi Yishmael, the son of Rabbi Yochanan ben Beroka, contends that squeezing is a completely separate av melacha (Yerushalmi, Shabbos 7:2), although it is not explained in halachic sources why he feels this way. (Nimla Tal Melabein #24 suggests some possible approaches.) The Gemara notes that the Mishnah disagrees with Rabbi Yishmael, the son of Rabbi Yochanan ben Beroka, since, according to him, there are forty melachos, and the Mishnah counts only 39.

39 or 40?

But wait one moment! I thought there were 39 melachos. How can a tanna have 40 melachos?

The answer to this question lies in a passage of Gemara (Shabbos 49b) that says as follows:

What is the basis upon which it has been established that there are 39 melachos? …Rabbi Yehonasan, the son of Rabbi Elazar, told them, “This is what Rabbi Shimon, the son of Rabbi Yosi ben Lekunia, said: ‘They correspond to the thirty-nine times that the word melacha is written in the Torah!’” Rav Yosef then asked, “Is the pasuk (Bereishis 39:11, regarding Yosef), Vayavo habaysa laasos melachto, included in the count or not?” To this, Abayei replied, “Let us bring a sefer Torah and count how many times the word melacha is mentioned in the Torah.” Rav Yosef replied that Abayei had misunderstood his query. Rav Yosef knew that the word melacha shows up in the Torah a total of forty times. When the tanna’im use the word melacha to count melachos, they are counting only instances when the word melacha in the Torah actually refers to work being performed. Rav Yosef’s question was whether the count of the Shabbos melachos included the pasuk regarding Yosef (which may be using the word melacha in a borrowed sense), or whether that pasuk was not included in the count, but instead they were counting a different pasuk, the one that concludes the construction of the Mishkan, which reads, Vehamelacha hoyso dayom. In the latter pasuk, also, the word melacha does not really mean work, but means the materials assembled for the work of the Mishkan. The tanna of the Mishnah, who counts only 39 melachos, felt that one of these places should not be included in the count of the melachos regarding the laws of Shabbos. The Gemara there remains unresolved which of these two pesukim is included in that count and which not. However, it is quite clear that the tanna quoted in the Yerushalmi, Rabbi Yishmael, the son of Rabbi Yochanan ben Beroka, counted both pesukim, thus reaching a total of 40 melachos.

At this point, let us return to our opening questions:

Question #1: Washing dishes

“Whenever I ask my son to help wash the dishes on Shabbos, he claims that it is prohibited. Is he pulling my leg in his attempt to avoid family responsibilities?”

Washing dishes on Shabbos is certainly permitted, as long as one does not use an item that might involve squeezing. (Details of that question we will leave for a different time.)  It is safe to assume that your son’s motivation here is not halacha but laziness.

Question #2: No detergent

“Is it prohibited to wash clothes on Shabbos if I do not use detergent?”

As we now know, one can violate the prohibition of melabein min haTorah without use of detergent.

Question #3: Six in one!

Can six people consecutively launder a garment?

The simple answer is, “Yes.”

In conclusion

Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch (Shemos 20:10) notes that people mistakenly think that work is prohibited on Shabbos, in order for it to be a day of rest. He points out that the Torah does not prohibit doing avodah, which connotes hard work, but melacha, activities or actions which bring purpose and accomplishment. Shabbos is a day that we refrain from constructing and altering the world for our own purposes. The goal of Shabbos is to allow Hashem’s rule to be the focus of creation, by refraining from our own creative acts (Shemos 20:11).

 

Bleaching or Laundering?

Parshas Pinchas is the only parsha that mentions specifically the korbanos offered on Shabbos, thus, providing a reason to discuss the laws of Shabbos.

 

Bleaching or Laundering?

 

Question #1: Bleaching or laundering?

 

“Is the name of the melacha bleaching or laundering?”

 

Question #2: Painting white

 

“If someone whitewashes his wall or paints something white, what melacha has he performed?”

 

Question #3: Threading a thread

 

“What could possibly be wrong with moistening a thread on Shabbos?”

 

Among the 39 melachos of Shabbos listed in the Mishnah is melabein, which I will translate and define shortly. It is the second of the thirteen melachos involved in manufacturing a garment, which is referred to as sidura debeged. In order, they are: Gozeiz (shearing), melabein, menapeitz (carding or untangling), tzovei’a (dyeing), toveh (spinning thread), meisach (warping, a step in preparing to weave), oseh batei nirim (creating a heddle, a further step in preparing to weave, oreig (weaving), potzei’a (undoing a weave), kosheir (tying), matir (untying), tofeir (sewing), and korei’a (tearing).

 

Bleaching or laundering?

 

The rishonim dispute what is the definition and the proper translation of melabein. According to Rashi (Shabbos 73a), the correct translation of the melacha is laundering. The Rambam (Hilchos Shabbos 9:10) disagrees, contending that the actual definition of the av melacha is bleaching, which means removing the color from a fabric or fiber. Although the Rambam agrees that laundering on Shabbos is prohibited min haTorah, in his opinion, laundering is a toladah, or subcategory, of the melacha of melabein, not the av melacha, or primary category.

 

A question that one would ask on this ruling of the Rambam is why bleaching is not considered the same melacha as tzovei’a, dyeing, which is also concerned with changing the color of a fiber. Since melabein is bleaching, which changes the color of an item, and tzovei’a is dyeing, which changes the color of an item, why are these two separate melachos?

 

The answer appears to be that whereas tzovei’a adds color to the fiber, bleaching removes color from the fiber. In the Rambam’s opinion, a distinction is made between adding color to an item, which constitutes tzovei’a, and bleaching it, which removes the color and constitutes melabein. Laundering, which removes impurities from the cloth that detract from its appearance, is therefore a toladah of melabein.

 

An advantage to the Rambam’s approach is that melabein shares its root with lavan, which means white. (As a curiosity, the Modern Hebrew word for bleaching is malbin, derived from the same root, lavan. The word malbin is used in the Mishnah [Nega’im 4:4], although there it has a different meaning from the modern word. In the Mishnah the word means turning white. [See a similar usage in Parah 2:5.]) Since Rashi understands that the av melacha melabein means laundering, it is strange that the Mishnah did not call the melacha mechabeis, which means laundering.

 

It should be noted that there is a rishon who appears to hold that bleaching is not included under melabein at all, but is forbidden because of tzovei’a (see Tosafos, Bava Kamma 93b s.v. ha). This approach follows Rashi that melabein means laundering, but restricts laundering to actions that clean, and does not extend it to those that change the material’s color. Any activities that change an item’s color are considered tzovei’a, according to this opinion.

 

Clean or color?

 

This dispute between Rashi and the Rambam reflects different ways of understanding the concept of the melacha. According to Rashi, the focus of the melacha is the cleaning of cloth, whereas the Rambam understands its focus to be changing the cloth’s appearance. Laundering is included, according to the Rambam, because it changes the appearance of the cloth, albeit by removing dirt rather than by removing color.

 

There are halachic differences that result from this dispute, although I am unaware of any that affect us today. When the Beis Hamikdash is rebuilt, bimheira biyameinu, there will be questions regarding offering korbanos chatos that will be affected by the dispute between Rashi and the Rambam.

 

Notwithstanding their dispute, both Rashi and the Rambam agree that all forms of laundering are prohibited on Shabbos. In the modern world, most laundering is performed by dropping clothes into a washing machine, adding detergent, and turning the machine on to its appropriate cycle. However, prior to the invention of the washing machine, mankind was familiar with the different stages involved when laundering clothing. There are numerous questions germane to the details of how one launders clothing that affect the halachic application of melabein.

 

Several stages

 

There are several stages involved in laundering. First, one soaks the clothing or fiber, which loosens the grime. Then, one scrubs the clothing or fiber, which separates the loosened grime from the fibers of the material. One then wrings out the water, which removes much of the dirt. Finally, one rinses out the material, which washes away the remaining dirt residue. Thus, the standard way of laundering clothes involves four different steps: soaking, scrubbing, wringing, and rinsing. Let us now understand some other halachic ramification of these steps.

 

Soaking

 

The Gemara teaches that throwing a kerchief into water violates Shabbos min haTorah as an act of laundering (Zevachim 94b). As we will see shortly, this is prohibited not only if one soaks the cloth, but even if one only moistens it (Rashi, Shabbos 142b).

 

The rishonim disagree as to whether one violates melabein if one soaks cloth that one is not trying to clean. There is also a dispute whether soaking or moistening cloth is prohibited if one does it in a way that one is soiling the cloth, such as by mopping up a spill with a piece of cloth or a rag on Shabbos. Because of space limitations, we will need to discuss these topics at a future time.

 

Rashi (Shabbos 142b) notes that pouring a small amount of water onto cloth similarly violates laundering. For this reason, one must always be careful not to place even a small amount of water or spittle on a stain on Shabbos. This is prohibited min haTorah even if one is concerned that the stain will set and ruin the garment.

 

Moistening a thread

 

The Yerushalmi (Shabbos 7:2) rules that moistening a thread in one’s mouth on Shabbos, such as what one would do to thread a needle, violates a Torah violation of soaking the thread. It is unclear whether the Yerushalmi considers any moistening of a thread, even with water, to be laundering, or if the concern is only because one is using saliva, which has a special ability to launder, something that was well-known in the days of Chazal (Mishnah, Niddah 9:6).

 

Here is an interesting ramification of this ruling. Someone sewed a button onto their garment shortly before Shabbos. On Shabbos, he noticed that there was extra thread dangling from the button of a garment. The logical, short-term solution for this problem is to moisten the offending extra thread and wrap it around under a button. However, halachically, doing this presents a serious problem. According to the above-quoted Yerushalmi, moistening the thread in order to facilitate this winding is prohibited min haTorah!

 

Squeezing

 

One of the steps in laundering clothing is that one wrings the dirty water out of the clothing. Wringing out cloth is a kind of squeezing. This sometimes creates confusion, because, the laws of Shabbos recognize two types of squeezing, what I will call (1) extracting and (2) wringing. The first type involves extracting juice or oil from fruit, such as grapes or olives, which is prohibited on Shabbos but has nothing to do with the laws of laundering. According to most rishonim, this type of squeezing is a violation of the melacha of dosh, threshing. The melacha of dosh is violated when one breaks the natural, physical connection between two items that are dissimilar in their use, thus creating a product that can be used easily. Further discussion of this type of squeezing, extracting, is beyond the scope of this article, whose topic is laundering.

 

Wringing

 

Wringing cloth to clean it is a different type of squeezing, and this is involved only when one squeezes out something that can be laundered, such as cloth or fabric. According to all opinions, it is forbidden min haTorah to squeeze water out of cloth. The rishonim debate whether this melacha is violated when one wrings out a cloth to remove absorbed wine, beer, oil or other liquids that are not customarily used for cleaning. Rabbeinu Tam contends that squeezing these liquids out of cloth is not prohibited min haTorah unless one wants to use the liquid (in which case it would be prohibited because it is considered extracting), whereas his nephew, Rabbeinu Yitzchok (whose name is usually abbreviated to R’Y), ruled that it is prohibited min haTorah (Tosafos, Kesubos 6a s.v. Hei, and other rishonim ad locum; Sefer Hayoshor #283; Tosafos, Shabbos 111a). Because of space considerations, further discussion on this subtopic will be left for a future article.

 

Brushing a garment

 

According to many authorities, one can violate melabein even without use of water by brushing out a garment, at least under certain circumstances (Rema, Orach Chayim 302:1; Bach, Elyah Rabbah, Mishnah Berurah, Biur Halacha). For this reason, one should refrain from brushing clothes on Shabbos. The Mishnah Berurah (302:6) rules that one should be careful on Shabbos to place his clothes in places where they will not fall into dust or dirt, so that he does not come to brush the clothes.

 

At this point, we can answer the three questions that we posed at the beginning of our article:

 

Bleaching or laundering?

 

“Is the name of the melacha bleaching or laundering?”

 

Actually, it is a dispute among rishonim whether the melacha should be defined as

 

bleaching or as laundering, although for our contemporary purposes there may not be a halacha lemaaseh difference.

 

Painting white

 

“If someone whitewashes his wall or paints something white, what melacha has he performed?”

 

The answer is that he violated the melacha of tzovei’a, dyeing, not of melabein.

 

Threading a thread

 

“What could possibly be wrong with moistening a thread on Shabbos?”

 

Indeed, it might be prohibited min haTorah to do so, because it is considered that one laundered the thread.

 

We will continue our discussion of meleches melabein in three weeks.

 

The Unknown Melachos

Question #1: Carding

“If one of the melachos is carding, does that mean that one may not play cards on Shabbos?”

Question #2: Combing

“Someone told me that combing my hair on Shabbos violates the melachah of menapeitz? Is it prohibited to comb my hair on Shabbos?”

Question #3: Cloth

“Could you please explain the different melachos that involve the creation of cloth?”

Introduction:

Parshas Ki Sisa discusses the laws of Shabbos and of the yomim tovim. We are all aware that there are 39 melachos of Shabbos, and most of us are fairly familiar both with the concepts and with many of the details of such varied melachos as kosheir, tying knots, boreir, selecting, and hotza’ah, carrying. However, there are several melachos, for example, menapeitz, toveh, meisach, oseh batei nirin and potzei’a that are unfamiliar, and perhaps we could say virtually unknown, to most people. Since all of these melachos are involved in the manufacture of textiles, they all apply min haTorah on Shabbos and Yom Tov according to all opinions, which makes a wonderful incentive to study them. I will present these melachos in the order in which they appear in the list of the 39 melachos in the Mishnah in Shabbos (73a).

Menapeitz

Menapeitz is often translated as combing or carding, but neither term explains the melachah adequately. The origin of the word menapeitz means to break something in a way that it scatters (see Radak, Tehillim 2:9), as in the pasuk, ki’chli yotzeir tenapetzeim, “You will shatter them, like a vessel made by a potter.” We find the word conveying the same idea in Shoftim (7:19), venafotz hakadim asher biyadam, “They smashed the jugs that were in their hands,” and, again, in Yeshayahu (33:3), mei’romemusecha noftzu goyim, “From Your loftiness, nations have dispersed.”

The av melachah, or major category, menapeitz, is one of the stages involved in processing wool into a usable textile. The wool shorn from a sheep cannot be used immediately, because it is filthy and very tangled. Cleaning it involves the melachah of melabein, which we will not discuss in this article. Menapeitz includes untangling the wool.

While showering, many people use hair conditioner to facilitate combing the tangles and knots out of their hair. Realize how much more difficult this is for a sheep, whose hair is much curlier, and it has been quite a while since it last brushed its hair! (Wool and hair are essentially the same thing. The word “wool” is used when the hair is soft enough to be used as a textile fabric.) And yet, although the sheep does not care enough about its appearance to warrant using conditioner, combing out the tangles in the wool is absolutely necessary, if one is going to take wool of a sheep or any other animal and spin it into thread. Thus, the definition of the melachah is the separating or combing out of the strands of wool so that they they can be spun into wool (Aruch, eirech nefes; Shu”t Avnei Neizer, Orach Chayim 170:2, 8, 9).

Sheep and other animals

Although the prohibition of shatnez applies exclusively to the hair of sheep and not to the wool of other animals, such as goats, camels, llamas and rabbits (see Kil’ayim 9:1), all opinions agree that menapeitz applies to the wool of all animals that may be used for clothing.

Silk

Although silk, unlike wool, is not hair, and is processed very differently, combing it out on Shabbos, so that it can be spun, also violates the melachah of menapeitz (Rashi, Shabbos 20b s.v. Gushkera).

Sinews

The halachah requires that Sifrei Torah and tefillin be sewn by a strong, very special type of “thread” made of sinew. The processing of these sinews so that they can be used as thread is also considered an act of menapeitz (Rambam, Hilchos Shabbos 9:15).

Linen and cotton

There is a dispute among rishonim whether the melachah of menapeitz applies min haTorah to textile materials that grow from the ground (vegetable-based), such as cotton, jute, or flax, which becomes linen. Rashi and several other early authorities contend that menapeitz applies only to materials that do not grow from the ground (Rashi, Chiddushei Ran and Meiri, all in their commentaries to Shabbos 73b; Tosafos, Shabbos 74a s.v. Af al gav), whereas the Rambam (Hilchos Shabbos 9:12) and the Semag rule that menapeitz applies to all materials. The Chayei Odom rules according to the Rambam that menapeitz does apply to vegetable-based textiles.

Cottonseed

According to several rishonim, combing out cotton, which removes the seeds, violates a different melachah, dosh, threshing, because it separates the usable textile material from the seeds, which are not usable for clothing (Rashi, Shabbos 73b, Ran and Meiri ad locum). The melachah of dosh is violated when one breaks the natural, physical connection between two items that are dissimilar in their use, thus creating a product that can be used easily. For example, threshing breaks the connection between the kernels and the chaff, thus making the kernels usable, and squeezing separates the juice or oil from the fruit. The Chayei Odom concludes that someone who combs out cotton or similar textiles, thus removing the seeds and, at the same time, preparing the fibers for cloth manufacture, violates two melachos, dosh and menapeitz. (However, see Semag who does not seem to agree.)

(Cottonseed is crushed for its oil. At the time of the Gemara, cottonseed oil was used as inferior kindling oil [see Rashi, Shabbos 21a s.v. Mish’cha]. Today, it is a source of cooking oil, used, for example, in the production of potato chips.)

Menapeitz times two

According to some authorities, one can violate the melachah of menapeitz twice on the same material. Certain methods of processing wool involve combing out the material and then soaking it in a special solution, so that it will absorb dye better. This soaking causes the wool to clump again and one needs to comb it out a second time. According to the Maasei Rokei’ach, if both of these actions were performed on Shabbos, this second combing would be a second Torah violation of the melachah of menapeitz (Hilchos Shabbos 9:12).

Carding

Before we go on to the next melachah, let us examine the first two of our opening questions: “If one of the melachos is carding, does that mean that one may not play cards on Shabbos?”

Although many halachic authorities prohibit playing cards on Shabbos (see commentaries to Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 322:6), no one contends that it violates any melachos. As we now see, the melachah called menapeitz has nothing to do with playing cards. It is sometimes called carding because in Old French and Old English the word card means a brush used to disentangle fibers prior to spinning them.

Menapeitz and combing hair

“Someone told me that combing my hair on Shabbos violates the melachah of menapeitz? Is it prohibited to comb my hair on Shabbos?”

There are two questions here. The first is whether combing hair on Shabbos or Yom Tov is included under the melachah of menapeitz. The second is whether it is permitted to comb one’s hair on Shabbos or Yom Tov.

Regarding the first question, the Avnei Neizer demonstrates very conclusively that combing (human) hair is not included under the melachah of menapeitz. The question is why this is true. He proposes that the melachah of menapeitz applies only to hair or wool that is no longer attached to its living source (Shu”t Avnei Neizer, Orach Chayim #171). According to this approach, there could be a prohibition of menapeitz when combing a wig. I will simply comment that, although I have seen many authorities prohibit combing wigs on Shabbos, none of these sources prohibit it because of menapeitz.

A simpler answer is that menapeitz means to prepare fiber so that it can be used as a textile, and that is not the purpose in combing hair (Nimla Tal, menapeitz #15).

Combing hair

Having established that combing your hair does not violate menapeitz, we will now discuss whether it is permitted on Shabbos. According to the Rivash, a rishon who was the av beis din of Algiers in the fourteenth century, it is forbidden to comb your hair on Shabbos. This is because when combing, one pulls out hair, which violates a different melachah of Shabbos, that of gozeiz, which means shearing (Shu”t Harivash #394). This melachah includes any activity that disconnects something connected to a living creature, including clipping nails, shaving, shearing wool, and removing cuticles. The Rivash’s ruling is cited by Shulchan Aruch and later authorities as accepted halachah (Orach Chayim 303:27).

Cloth

At this point, let us discuss the next of our opening questions: “Could you please explain the different melachos that involve the creation of cloth?” To explain them, we need to understand what happens to fiber after it is combed out, until it becomes finished cloth.

Toveh — Spinning

Toveh is the melachah that immediately follows after menapeitz. The definition of this melachah is taking combed fiber and making it ready to be used for the manufacture of clothing. Spinning combed fiber into thread is the most common application of this melachah, and comprises the av melachah.

Taking a thread and straightening it so that one can sew with it is also included under the melachah of toveh (Shabbos 75a, as explained by Rabbeinu Chananel). Similarly, twisting threads together to make a thicker thread, called shozeir in Hebrew, is also included under the melachah of toveh (Yerushalmi as quoted by Rokei’ach). This process is sometimes colloquially called cabling or plying, although the correct term for it is simply twisting or braiding. Twisting tzitzis threads around themselves, a requirement for the mitzvah, is included under the melachah of toveh and therefore prohibited on Shabbos and Yom Tov (Kitzur Hilchos Shabbos, Chapter 22). Similarly, twisting or braiding fibers into a wick is also included under the melachah of toveh (Shaar Hatziyun 514:52).

Felt

Textile fibers are not always spun into thread. An alternative way of manufacturing fiber into a usable textile is by pressing it — which makes it into what is called felt. According to the Rambam, the melachah of toveh includes not only spinning fiber into thread, but also pressing fiber into felt (Rambam, Hilchos Shabbos 9:15; cf. Ra’avad ad locum, who explains that manufacturing felt is included under the melachah of boneh and not toveh. Both agree that making felt on Shabbos is prohibited min haTorah). Felt is used as backing to reinforce the shoulder, underarm and neck areas of garments, but one can actually manufacture garments completely out of felt. I have seen blankets, coats, hats and even tents made out of felt.

Meisach

Although many of us have little personal experience with either menapeitz or toveh, we probably have even less experience with the remaining three melachos on our list for today, meisach, oseh batei nirin and potzei’a. Weaving cloth involves several different stages, each of which is its own melachah. Once one has thread, the next stage is creating a warp. This has nothing to do with the shape of a piece of wood. The warp is the “body” of the fabric. One way to create a warp is simply to place the threads onto a loom. One now has a warp through which one can weave threads in a perpendicular direction, thus creating cloth. Placing the threads onto the loom constitutes the melachah of meisach, and weaving other threads through them is the melachah of oreig, weaving.

Here is a second way of performing the melachah of meisach: A common child’s craft involves taking cloth loops and place them onto a specially-constructed metal frame about six or eight inches square. The child then manually weaves other pieces of cloth perpendicularly over and under the loops that are already on the frame. Finally, one crochets the edges and thereby removes the ends of the loops from the metal frame.

When finished, one has created a pretty potholder. In this particular craft, several melachah activities were performed. Placing the loops onto the metal frame creates a warp, and therefore constitutes the melachah of meisach. Weaving the second series of loops through those already on the frame is oreig. It is unclear which melachah activity is performed when the item is crocheted. It might be makeh bepatish, which can be explained as completing the final stages, or boneh, building.

By the way, meisach can also be performed without having any loom at all.

Oseh batei nirin

One of the 39 melachos is oseh batei nirin, which I will not translate, but rather, explain. When weaving with a loom, one needs to have a method whereby one raises some of the warp threads while keeping the other threads depressed. This creates what is called a shed through which one inserts the woof thread, thus weaving the material. The heddle is the name of the implement used to raise and lower the warp threads, and this is done by placing the warp threads through the eyes or loops of the heddle. (There are several excellent works that have pictures to explain this process. Among them are the Artscroll, Shabbos Chapter 13, and Ma’aseh Oreg by Dayan Yisroel Gukovitzki.)

Among the halachic authorities, we find three primary opinions defining oseh batei nirin. According to some opinions, creating these loops is the melachah of oseh batei nirin (Tosafos Rid, Shabbos 73b; Gra in Shenos Eliyahu; Lechem Misheh, Hilchos Shabbos 9:16; Tiferes Yisrael, Shabbos 7:18). A different opinion contends that placing the warp threads in the loops is the melachah (Rashi, Shabbos 73a). Yet a third opinion contends that oseh batei nirin is not a stage in weaving cloth, but rather it is a type of hand-weaving process in which the final product is like a netting, mesh or basket weave. According to this approach, the melachah of oseh batei nirin has nothing to do with using a loom.

Potzei’a

The last of the five melachos that we will study in this article is potzei’a. Potzei’a is unusual in that there is no Gemara that explains what the melachah is. I have seen four different opinions among the rishonim to define the melachah.

In the Rambam’s opinion, the melachah of potzei’a constitutes undoing the weave of cloth that has already been woven, for the purpose of forming one larger piece.  There are two ways to combine smaller pieces of fabric.  The more common way is to sew together their edges. Indeed, this involves a melachah, but not potzei’a. Sewing two items together is the melachah of tofeir, sewing. Potzei’a is involved when someone does not want to sew the edges of the cloth together, but instead wants to blend the weave together. This is done by undoing the weave at the edge of each of the two pieces of fabric and then reweaving them together so that they form one new, larger piece of fabric. In the Rambam’s opinion, doing this involves two different melachah activities. Undoing the weave is the malachah of potzei’a, and then, reweaving it is the melachah of oreig, weaving. In his opinion, potzei’a is the opposite of weaving, similar to the way building and razing (soseir) or kindling (mav’ir) and extinguishing (mechabeh) are opposite melachos.

A second opinion is that of the Ra’avad, who contends that potzei’a is the removal or disconnection of newly woven fabric from the loom. He feels that removing threads from the weave is not potzei’a but is included under the melachah of korei’a, tearing. Just as tearing something sewn together is korei’a, so is removing threads from the weave (Ra’avad, Hilchos Shabbos 9:20; Shenos Eliyahu, Shabbos chapter 7).

A third opinion, that of Rashi (Shabbos 73a s.v. Hapotzei’a), is that potzei’a is thinning a thread that has been already spun but is thicker than one needs to weave. The melachah is removing some of the fiber from the thread. One would violate this melachah min haTorah if one thins the thread to facilitate using it for weaving.

In conclusion

Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch (Shemos 20:10) notes that people mistakenly think that work is prohibited on Shabbos, in order for it to be a day of rest. He points out that the Torah does not prohibit doing avodah, which connotes hard work, but melachah, activities or actions which bring purpose and accomplishment. Shabbos is a day that we refrain from constructing and altering the world for our own purposes. The goal of Shabbos is to allow Hashem’s rule to be the focus of creation, by refraining from our own creative acts (Shemos 20:11).

 

Various Kindling Kwestions

Question #1: Electric lights for Shabbos

“Unfortunately, I need to have a medical procedure performed which will require me to spend Shabbos in the hospital. Because of safety concerns, they will not allow me to kindle candles. Do I fulfill the mitzvah of kindling Shabbos lights if I light electric lights?”

Question #2: Rekindle for Shabbos?

“If lights are already burning Friday afternoon shortly before Shabbos, is there a mitzvah to extinguish and rekindle them for the sake of fulfilling the mitzvah of kindling Shabbos lights?”

Question #3: Unbelieving kindler

“My mother, who unfortunately does not believe in Judaism, kindles Shabbos candles every Friday evening, because ‘that is what Jews do.’ Do I fulfill the mitzvah when she lights?”

Answer:

All three of the above questions involve laws that result from understanding the rabbinic mitzvah to kindle lights before Shabbos. Several reasons are cited for this mitzvah:

Any place treated with pomp and ceremony is always suitably illuminated. Certainly, the area where the Shabbos is celebrated, which commemorates the fact that Hashem created the world, should have plenty of light.

People will not enjoy the Shabbos meal if they eat in the dark. Therefore, the Sages required that the place where one intends to eat the Shabbos repast be properly illuminated.

Some provide a different and highly practical reason to require illumination on Shabbos. We do not want anyone to hurt himself by stumbling over or bumping into something on Shabbos.

Difference in halachah

There is a difference in halachah among these different opinions. According to the first two opinions, the main halachic concern is that the place where one eats should be lit. According to the last opinion, one must be careful to illuminate all places in the house that a person may pass through on Shabbos, so that he does not hurt himself by bumping into or stumbling over something.

Chazal were concerned that one not remain in the dark on Shabbos. Did they simply require everyone to be certain that his house is illuminated, or did they establish a requirement to kindle a lamp? The Rishonim dispute this question, some holding that Chazal were satisfied that one make certain that he have adequate lighting for Shabbos, whereas others contend that we are required to kindle a light specifically for this purpose.

What difference does it make?

Several halachic differences result from the above-mentioned dispute:

Rekinding lights – keep those candles burning!

  1. If lights are already burning Friday afternoon shortly before Shabbos, is there a mitzvah to extinguish and rekindle them for the sake of fulfilling the mitzvah of kindling Shabbos lights? If the mitzvah is to make sure that there is illumination, then I am not required to rekindle lights, but may simply leave the lights burning on into Shabbos. However, if there is a special mitzvah requiring me to kindle the lights, then I must extinguish the burning lights and rekindle them!

The Rishonim dispute whether one is required to extinguish the lights and rekindle them or not. Those who contend that one may leave the candles burning maintain that it is sufficient if there is adequate illumination for Shabbos, and one has no responsibility to extinguish the light and rekindle it. Other Rishonim, however, maintain that Chazal required kindling lights especially for Shabbos. Thus, leaving lights kindled is insufficient, if I did not light them especially for Shabbos.[i] We rule according to the second approach.

Later authorities rule that we satisfy the requirement to kindle a special light in honor of Shabbos by kindling just one light. Thus, if there are many lights kindled around the house, one is not required to extinguish all of them and rekindle them all for the sake of Shabbos. It is sufficient to kindle one light for this purpose and leave the other lights burning.[ii] Similarly, if your house is situated in a way that street lighting illuminates your hallway, you are not required to leave lights on to provide additional illumination.

Reciting a brocha

  1. Does one recite a brocha on the mitzvah of kindling Shabbos lights?

A second dispute that results from our original inquiry (whether the mitzvah is to kindle lights or to have illumination) is whether one recites a brocha when kindling the Shabbos lights. According to those opinions that the mitzvah is simply to see that the house is illuminated, one would not recite a brocha when kindling Shabbos lights, even if he needs to kindle lamps before Shabbos. This is because, in their opinion, there is no special mitzvah to kindle lights.[iii] However, the conclusion of the poskim is that there is a mitzvah to kindle Shabbos lights, and that even if one has lights kindled already, one should extinguish and rekindle them.[iv]

Having a gentile light for me

  1. A third result of this dispute is whether I can fulfill the mitzvah by having a non-Jew kindle Shabbos lights for me. What happens if I am unable to kindle the Shabbos lights myself? May I ask a non-Jew to kindle them for me? If the mitzvah is to kindle the lights, then I have not fulfilled a mitzvah this way, since a non-Jew cannot be my agent to fulfill a mitzvah. On the other hand, if the mitzvah is for the house to be illuminated, having a gentile kindle lights for me fulfills the mitzvah, since the house is now illuminated.

Since we follow the second approach, I may not have a non-Jew light for me.

Electric lights?

In our modern houses, the candles or oil lamps provide very little lighting, and our main illumination is provided by the electric lights. In most houses, one does not even notice when the candles go out, so overshadowed are they by the electricity. May we fulfill the mitzvah with electric lights?

Indeed, most authorities contend that one fulfills the mitzvah of kindling Shabbos lights with electric lights (Shu”t Beis Yitzchok 1:120; Eidus Leyisrael, page 122). There are authorities who disagree, because they feel that the mitzvah requires kindling with a wick and a fuel source that is in front of you, both requirements that preclude using electric lights to fulfill the mitzvah (Shu”t Maharshag 2:107).

The consensus of most authorities is that, in an extenuating circumstance, one may fulfill the mitzvah with electric lights (Shu”t Yechaveh Daas 5:24; Shu”t Kochavei Yitzchak 1:2). Therefore, someone who is hospitalized for Shabbos may recite a brocha on electric lights, since hospitals usually forbid lighting an open flame.

Electricity and then candles

Since we are, anyway, primarily using electric lighting to fulfill the mitzvah, it is therefore a good idea that, immediately prior to kindling the Shabbos lights, one turn off the electric lights in the dining room and then rekindle them for the purpose of Shabbos, then kindle the Shabbos candles or lamps, and then recite the brocha, having in mind that the brocha includes both the candles and the electric lighting. (This is following Ashkenazi practice. Sefardim, who recite the brocha first and then kindle the lights, can recite the brocha, and then turn on the electric lights and light the Shabbos candles.)

Lady of the house

Although long-established custom is that the lady of the house kindles the Shabbos lights (see Mishnah Shabbos 31b), in actuality, each person is responsible for fulfilling the mitzvah (Rambam, Hilchos Shabbos 5:1). This does not mean that everyone should start kindling his own lights. It means that when the lady of the house kindles the Shabbos lights, she does so as the agent of the entire household. Should there be no lady of the house who can perform the mitzvah, a different member of the household should kindle the lights.

Preparing the lights

Although the lady of the house is the one who actually kindles the lights, her husband should assume the responsibility of preparing the lights for her to kindle. This approach, mentioned in the Zohar, is also implied by the wording of the Mishnah (Tosafos Rabbi Akiva Eiger, Shabbos 2:6).

Unbelieving kindler

At this point, we are in a position to begin analyzing the third of our opening questions:

“My mother, who unfortunately does not believe in Judaism, kindles Shabbos lights every Friday evening, because ‘that is what Jews do.’ Do I fulfill the mitzvah when she lights?” Let us understand the basis for the question.

Someone who does not observe all the mitzvos of Judaism certainly can and should be encouraged to observe whatever mitzvos they are willing and able to. The question here is that we are told that her mother “does not believe in Judaism,” which I presume means that she has actively rejected the assumption that Hashem has commanded that we observe His mitzvos. A great late authority, the Sho’eil Umeishiv (2:1:51; 2:3:91) discusses whether someone who does not believe that Hashem commanded to observe mitzvos fulfills them, since this person rejects that there are commandments. The Sho’eil Umeishiv concludes that, indeed, someone who does not accept the basis of mitzvos does not fulfill them. He bases this principle on the statement of the Rambam (Hilchos Melachim 8:11) that a gentile who observes mitzvos is considered a righteous gentile and is rewarded with olam haba, provided that he believes that Hashem told Moshe Rabbeinu that the descendants of Noach are commanded to observe the mitzvos that apply to them.

According to the Sho’eil Umeishiv, someone who does not believe in Torah but kindles Friday night lights only because it is a Jewish practice, but without any belief that one is commanded to do so, does not fulfill any mitzvah. If this is so, then their kindling cannot function as an agent for someone else. This would mean that the daughter, who is observant, should also kindle Shabbos lights, and that she should recite a brocha when she does so, since she is the one fulfilling the mitzvah.

If she feels that this will offend her mother, she can turn on the dining room electric lights, which, as we noted above, fulfills the mitzvah. Based on what we have explained above, she could even recite a brocha on the electric lights.

In conclusion

Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch (Shemos 20:10) notes that people mistakenly think that work is prohibited on Shabbos in order that it be a day of rest. He points out that the Torah does not prohibit doing avodah, which connotes hard work, but melachah, which implies activity with purpose and accomplishment. Shabbos is a day that we refrain from constructing and altering the world for our own purposes. The goal of Shabbos is to allow Hashem’s rule to be the focus of creation, by refraining from our own creative acts (Shemos 20:11).

The Gemara (Shabbos 23b) teaches that someone who kindles Shabbos lights regularly will merit having sons who are Torah scholars. Let us hope and pray that in the merit of observing these halachos correctly, we will have children and grandchildren who light up the world with their Torah!

 

[i] Tosafos, Shabbos 25b s.v. Chovah

[ii] See Ketzos HaShulchan 74:1

[iii] See Tosafos, Shabbos 25b s.v. Chovah

[iv] Tosafos, Shabbos 25b s.v. Chovah; Rambam 5:1; see Mordechai, Shabbos #294

The Melachah of Setting Fires

Aside from our parsha teaching of the very first Shabbos, the brocha upon fire is recited motza’ei Shabbos because we then regain its use. This definitely provides reason to discuss:

The Melachah of Setting Fires

candleQuestion #1: Why the pasuk?

“Why does the written Torah mention specifically that we may not kindle a flame on Shabbos?”

Question #2: Out of order

“Why does the Mishnah mention that extinguishing, mechabeh, is a melachah, before it mentions that kindling, mav’ir, is a melachah? One must kindle a fire before one extinguishes it!”

Question #3: Bothered by a blech

“Why must we use a blech on Shabbos?”

Answer:

All three of the above questions involve laws that result from the Torah’s prohibition against kindling fires on Shabbos; lo seva’aru eish bechol moshevoseichem beyom hashabbos, “Do not kindle fire in all your places of residence on Shabbos” (Shemos 35:3). The Torah prohibition includes not only kindling a flame, but adding fuel or stoking a fire, so that it burns better. Similarly, adjusting the wick of a burning lamp on Shabbos so that it produces clearer light also violates the Torah’s prohibition.

Hav’arah is counted by the Mishnah as one of the 39 melachos. This melachah was performed during the construction of the Mishkan when they built fires under the pots used to create the vat dyes required for the curtains and the vestments of the kohanim (Rashi, Shabbos 73a s.v. mechabeh).

Why a special pasuk?

There is a question here: Why does the written Torah mention, specifically, that we may not kindle a flame on Shabbos? Other melachos are not singled out with a special mitzvah in the written Torah.

The Gemara (Shabbos 70a) records a dispute between tanna’im why the written Torah especially mentions the melachah of hav’arah. Rabbi Yosi rules hav’arah lelav yatzas, meaning that hav’arah is singled out to mitigate it. Whereas the other melachah prohibitions of Shabbos are capital offenses, hav’arah is a somewhat lesser Torah transgression, only a regular lo saaseh. (Certainly, we should treat it with full seriousness, even according to Rabbi Yosi. The difference in practical halachah is that, according to Rabbi Yosi, one who violated hav’arah negligently does not bring a korban chatas as atonement, whereas someone who transgressed negligently one of the other melachos does.)

Rabbi Nosson disagrees with Rabbi Yosi, contending that kindling is considered a regular melachah of Shabbos like all the others, but that hav’arah lechaleik yatzas, hav’arah is singled out to teach that the 39 melachos of Shabbos are considered 39 different prohibitions. This means that someone who violated more than one melachah on a single Shabbos is punished as if he had violated several prohibitions of the Torah. He might be required to offer more than one chatas offering.

The accepted halachah follows Rabbi Nosson, that kindling is considered a regular melachah of Shabbos.

Injunctions because of hav’arah

Although we are all aware that it is prohibited to kindle or to increase a flame on Shabbos, we may not realize that many of the regulations that we observe on Shabbos were established by Chazal out of concern that someone not violate the prohibition of hav’arah. For example, the reason that we use a blech to warm food on Shabbos or to keep it warm is because Chazal prohibited using an open fire for these purposes. This would involve two different rabbinic prohibitions, that of chazarah, returning food to a fire on Shabbos, and shehiyah, leaving food to cook or keep warm from before Shabbos on an open flame. Chazal prohibited shehiyah because of concern that someone might mistakenly stoke coals. According to some authorities, the prohibition of chazarah was also so that someone warming his food on Shabbos not err and inadvertently stoke the coals of the flame. Similarly, Chazal prohibited hatmanah, wrapping or insulating hot food before Shabbos in a way that increases the heat on Shabbos. All of these are prohibited because of concerns that one may mistakenly stoke a flame on Shabbos (Shabbos 34b; Tosafos, Shabbos 36b s.v. lo).

Chazal also prohibited reading or doing other activities involving detailed work by the light of an open flame on Shabbos, because of concern that one will adjust the flame (Rashi, Mishnah Shabbos 11a). For this reason, on Shabbos, one may not use an oil lamp to assist choosing between two items of clothing that look similar (Shabbos 12a), or use it to check tzitzis (Magen Avraham 275:1).

Permitted

Chazal permitted using oil lamps on Shabbos when they were not concerned that someone might errantly adjust the light. For example, they permitted two people to read the same text together by oil lamp, reasoning that each would pay attention that his partner not inadvertently adjust the flame (Shabbos 12b). Similarly, even in situations when it is prohibited to use a lamp for meticulous work, one may appoint a shomer to make sure that one does not adjust the flame by mistake. This shomer must be someone who is not currently doing any meticulous work – otherwise, we are concerned that he, himself, may forget his job as shomer.

Chazal also permitted students studying under the direction of their rebbe to study and read in their usual fashion. The reason is that since they know that their rebbe is supervising them, they keep in mind to be careful (Shabbos 12b). The rebbe himself is permitted to glance at the seforim to tell the students where to start, although he is not permitted to continue reading the material. For a similar reason, when the Seder night falls on Shabbos, one may read the hagadah by lamplight. The halachic assumption is that most people are fairly familiar with the hagadah and use the printed book just to make sure that they don’t inadvertently skip parts (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 275:9). This is considered similar to the halachah that the rebbe of cheder students is permitted to glance at the seforim to tell the students where to start.

There are a few other instances in which Chazal permitted reading on Shabbos using the illumination of an open oil lamp: One may read the Mishnah of the second chapter of Shabbos, Bameh Madlikin, which describes these concerns. Since the chapter itself emphasizes these laws, it serves as a reminder to be careful (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 275:7). Similarly, accepted practice was to allow people to read from a machzor on Yom Kippur by lamplight, since the fear of Yom Kippur will remind a person not to errantly adjust the lamp (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 275:8).

Candlelight

Is reading by the light of a candle the same as reading by the light of an oil lamp? Are we less concerned that someone will attempt to adjust a candle to provide better light?

Indeed, we find a dispute among early authorities whether one may read by candlelight on Shabbos, some contending that it is unlikely that someone would mistakenly adjust this lighting (Hagahos Ashri, Shabbos 1:27; Beis Yosef, Shulchan Aruch and commentaries, Orach Chayim 275; Taz, Orach Chayim 278). The prevalent custom is to be lenient (see Biur Halachah 275:1 s.v. le’or). Therefore, we may certainly be lenient regarding electric lights, although there are individuals who follow a stringent position even in this regard. Those who follow this stricter approach assign someone to be the shomer of the Beis Medrash – his job is to not learn and to be responsible that no one inadvertently try to adjust the lights.

What is burning?

We find a very interesting dispute between acharonim concerning what is the definition of the melachah of mav’ir: is it the increase of the fire or is it the consumption of fuel? Some contend that the melachah is the creation or increase of the fire or flame (Graz, Orach Chayim 495 in Kuntros Acharon), whereas others dispute this analysis and define the melachah as the consumption of fuel that transpires when a flame burns (Shu”t Avnei Neizer, Orach Chayim 238:8). Although this dispute seems like a theoretical and almost philosophic debate, there seems to be a difference in halachah that is contingent on this dispute. Does heating metal to a glow involve the melachah of hav’arah? If hav’arah is defined as the consumption of fuel, then the heating of metal, which does not create any noticeable destruction of fuel, should not violate hav’arah. On the other hand, if hav’arah is defined as the increase of a flame, then heating metal should violate hav’arah.

This could perhaps explain a dispute between the Rambam and the Raavad (Hilchos Shabbos 12:1) whether heating metal is prohibited because it is considered hav’arah or because it is included under the melachah of bishul, cooking, but it is not considered hav’arah.

This dispute could then affect what melachah is involved when turning on an incandescent light. According to those who consider heating metal to be bishul, then this would violate bishul, whereas according to those who categorize heating metal as hav’arah, then turning on an incandescent light is included under the melachah of hav’arah. There are a few practical differences that result from this dispute, but, unfortunately, explaining this will take us far afield from our topic. (This is without getting involved in the separate dispute as to whether use of electricity violates the melachos of either boneh [constructing] or makeh bepatish [completing an item].)

Out of order

At this point, let us explain the second of our opening questions:

“Why did the Mishnah mention that extinguishing, mechabeh, is a melachah before it mentions that kindling, mav’ir, is a melachah?” When the Mishnah lists the 39 melachos, it mentions extinguishing before it mentions kindling. Is this not counter-logical, since it is difficult to extinguish a fire unless someone has previously kindled it?

Among the various standard commentaries, I found two approaches to answer this question . The Meiri explains that when preparing a vat dye, you sometimes need to lower the flame so that the dye does not burn and then you need to increase the size of the fire afterwards. Lowering such a flame on Shabbos would violate extinguishing, and increasing the heat of the fire afterwards is included under the Torah’s prohibition of mav’ir. Since the preparation of dye in the construction of the Mishkan involved extinguishing before kindling, the Mishnah mentions the two melachos in this order. (An alternative answer is mentioned by the Tiferes Yisroel in his Kalkeles Shabbos introduction to Mesechta Shabbos, Meleches Mav’ir #37).

In conclusion

Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch (Shemos 20:10) notes that people mistakenly think that work is prohibited on Shabbos in order that it should be a day of rest. He points out that the Torah does not prohibit doing avodah, which connotes hard work, but melachah, which implies purpose and accomplishment. Shabbos is a day that we refrain from constructing and altering the world for our own purposes. The goal of Shabbos is to allow Hashem’s rule to be the focus of creation, by refraining from our own creative acts (Shemos 20:11).

 

What If I Goofed and Said Tikanta Shabbos by Mistake?‎

Since this coming Shabbos is also Rosh Chodesh, this question may become very germane.

What If I Goofed and Said Tikanta Shabbos by Mistake?

By Rabbi Yirmiyohu Kaganoff

Question: In the middle of davening Musaf on Shabbos Rosh Chodesh, I realized that I was reciting the Musaf for a regular Shabbos rather than the special Musaf for Shabbos Rosh Chodesh. What should I have done?

Answer:

This Shabbos is also Rosh Chodesh, requiring the recital of a special text for the middle bracha of Musaf. This special Musaf includes elements of the usual Shabbos Musaf, the usual Rosh Chodesh Musaf, and a special introductory passage. This passage, beginning with the words Atah Yatzarta, actually bears closer resemblance to the introductory part of the Yom Tov Musaf than it does to Musaf of either Shabbos or Rosh Chodesh. The rest of the middle bracha of Musaf combines elements of both Shabbos Musaf and Rosh Chodesh Musaf.

I once edited an article in which the author quoted several anthologies, each of which ruled that someone who realizes he is saying Tikanta Shabbos on Shabbos Rosh Chodesh should immediately stop where he is, and go to the beginning of Atah Yatzarta, and recite the entire bracha. However, I believe that this ruling is in error. I will explain shortly why I believe that this answer is erroneous.  But first…

I attempted to trace the sources quoted in the article to see if perhaps I was missing some logic or information that I would clarify in the course of my research.

What I did discover was that each source was simply quoting a previous one, and that they all traced to one obscure 19th century work, which did not explain at all the reason for the ruling. Classic group-think.

I will now explain why I believe this ruling is in error, and what one should do. My major concern is that the approach that these works advocate results in repeating many parts of the shemoneh esrei, and that this repetition constitutes a forbidden interruption in the tefillah. Furthermore, to the best of my knowledge, there is no essential requirement to recite this middle bracha of the shemoneh esrei precisely in order. Obviously, one should maintain the order as is, but there is ample evidence from major halachic authorities that, in general, mistakenly rearranging the order of a bracha is not calamitous (see, for example, Rosh, Taanis 1:1; Shu”t Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 4:18 and 4:70:14). Thus, when left with the choice of rearranging the order of a bracha to avoid repetition, or repeating parts of the bracha and ignoring what was already said, one should follow the first approach.

Subsequently, I realized that the position I have followed, is indeed that of Rav Moshe Feinstein. However, it appears that, in general, there are other halachic authorities who feel that the text of a brocha should indeed be kept intact even when repetition will result (see, for example, Mateh Efrayim 582:10; Mishnah Berurah 582:16; Biur Halacha 127:2 s.v. Aval).

Notwithstanding the disputing opinion, I still think that the approach I am suggesting is correct, but I recognize that others may disagree with me. Therefore, I am going to present my approach, as confusing as it may appear.

Based on my opinion, it appears that someone who discovers that he/she began reciting Tikanta Shabbos rather than Atah Yatzarta should mention only those parts of the bracha that he/she has as yet not recited, but not repeat any theme or part of the bracha that one has already said. Although fulfilling this may be confusing to someone unfamiliar with the bracha, this should provide us with a valid reason to pay more attention to the details of this bracha and understand its different parts.

In order to explain how one does this correctly, brachos of Atah Yatzarta and Tikanta Shabbos into their constituent parts, so that we can identify which parts we should not repeat. We can divide these brachos into the following seven sections (the sections for a regular Shabbos have been numbered in a way that parallels the list for Shabbos Rosh Chodesh:

 

Shabbos Rosh Chodesh Regular Shabbos
1. The introduction – from the words Atah Yatzarta until and including the words shenishtalcha (some recite the text hashelucha) bemikdashecha.

 

1. The introduction – from the words Tikanta Shabbos until and including the word kara’ui.
2. The prayer for our return – beginning with the words Yehi Ratzon – until (and including) the word kehilchasam. 2. The prayer for our return – beginning with the words Yehi Ratzon – until (and including) the word kehilchasam.
3. The sentence that introduces the mention of the pesukim of the Musaf Ve’es Musafei Yom HaShabbos Hazeh veyom Rosh Hachodesh… until (and including) the word ka’amur. 3. The sentence that introduces the mention of the pesukim of the Musaf Ve’es Musaf Yom HaShabbos Hazeh… until (and including) the word ka’amur.

 

4. Mention of the pesukim of the korban Musaf of Shabbos. 4. Mention of the pesukim of the korban Musaf of Shabbos.
5. Mention of the pasuk of the korban Musaf of Rosh Chodesh and the passage Uminchasam… until (and including) the word kehilchasam.
6. The paragraph Yismechu Vemalchusecha that concludes with the words zeicher lemaasei vereishis. 6. The paragraph Yismechu Vemalchusecha that concludes with the words zeicher lemaasei vereishis.
7. The closing of the brachaElokeinu Veilokei Avoseinu. 7. The closing of the brachaElokeinu Veilokei Avoseinu.

 

We should note that the closings of these middle brachos of Musaf shemoneh esrei are very different. On Shabbos Rosh Chodesh we recite a version that is almost identical to what we recite on a weekday Rosh Chodesh, but we insert three passages to include Shabbos.

Parts 2, 4 and 6 of the two brachos are identical, whether it is Shabbos or Shabbos Rosh Chodesh. Therefore, one should not repeat these sections if one has said them already.

Part 1 on Shabbos Rosh Chodesh, Atah Yatzarta, is very different from what we usually recite on a regular Shabbos. Therefore, someone still in the middle of this bracha should recite this passage again.

If someone missed part 5, mention of the pesukim of Rosh Chodesh, and is still in the middle of this bracha, he/she should recite it and introduce it with the section 3 above, which introduces the korbanos of the Musaf. However, if he/she already recited the pesukim of Shabbos korban Musaf (#4) above, he should omit the reference to Shabbos in this piece and only mention Rosh Chodesh. In the latter case, one should change the plural Musafei to a singular Musaf since he/she now is only mentioning the Rosh Chodesh Musaf.

Having explained the rules governing these halachos, I will now present the conclusions in a hopefully clearer way, depending on when you discover your mistake:

  1. If you were still reciting the beginning of Tikanta Shabbos, and had not yet reached Yehi Ratzon:

Return to Atah Yatzarta and recite it in order without any changes.

  1. If you had already begun the Yehi Ratzon, but are before Ve’es Musaf Yom HaShabbos Hazeh:

Complete the Yehi Ratzon until Ve’es Musaf; then recite Atah Yatzarta until the words Yehi Ratzon, then resume from the words Ve’es Musafei Yom HaShabbos Hazeh Veyom Rosh Hachodesh from the Shabbos Rosh Chodesh Musaf and continue through the rest of the tefillah.

  1. If you had just begun Ve’es Musaf Yom HaShabbos Hazeh:

Add the words Ve’es Musaf Yom Rosh Hachodesh Hazeh, and then continue in the Shabbos Rosh Chodesh Musaf until Yismechu Vemalchusecha. Immediately prior to saying Yismechu Vemalchusecha insert the words from Atah Yatzarta until the words shenishtalcha bemikdashecha. Then return to Yismechu Vemalchusecha and recite the rest of the tefillah in order.

  1. If you are already in the middle of Ve’es Musaf Yom HaShabbos Hazeh:

Recite Uveyom Hashabbas… until Veniskah. Then insert the words from Atah Yatzarta until the words shenishtalcha bemikdashecha. Then return to the words Ve’es Musaf but say the following: Ve’es Musaf Yom Rosh Hachodesh Hazeh until the word ka’amur. Then say Uverashei Chadsheichem in the Shabbos Rosh Chodesh section and continue in order.

  1. If you are in the middle of Yismechu Vemalchusecha, complete it until Zeicher lemaasei vereishis, and then insert the words from Atah Yatzarta until the words shenishtalcha bemikdashecha. Then return to the words Ve’es Musaf but say the following: Ve’es Musaf Yom Rosh Hachodesh Hazeh until the word ka’amur. Then say Uverashei Chadsheichem in the Shabbos Rosh Chodesh section. Then go to Elokeinu Veilokei Avoseinu (after Yismechu Vemalchusecha) and finish the end of the bracha and the davening.
  2. If you are already in the middle of the closing part of the bracha (Elokeinu Veilokei Avoseinu) complete the clause that you are saying, and then insert the words from Atah Yatzarta until the words shenishtalcha bemikdashecha. Then return to the words Ve’es Musaf but say Ve’es Musaf Yom Rosh Hachodesh Hazeh until the word ka’amur. Then say Uverashei Chadsheichem in the Shabbos Rosh Chodesh section. Then return to chadeish aleinu beyom hashabbos hazeh es hachodesh hazeh and finish the end of the bracha in the Shabbos Rosh Chodesh section.

If you completed the entire bracha of Tikanta Shabbos, but mentioned in the middle of the bracha some reference to the korban Musaf of Rosh Chodesh, you have fulfilled the requirements of this prayer and you should continue Retzei (see Mishnah Berurah 423:6). If you completed the bracha of Tikanta Shabbos but did not yet begin Retzeih, you should say “vena’aseh lefanecha korban Rosh Chodesh hazeh” – “and we shall do before You this Rosh Chodesh offering” and then continue with Retzei (ibid.).

Conclusion

Although all this may sound very confusing, if we spend a few seconds familiarizing ourselves with the divisions of this bracha that I have made, we will easily realize why the halachos are as I have outlined, and will be ready to make the necessary adjustments should we find that we have erred. This readiness has of course a tremendous value on its own: It familiarizes us with the shemoneh esrei, something we always should do, but, unfortunately, often do not pay sufficient attention.

Understanding how much concern Chazal placed in the relatively minor aspects of davening should make us even more aware of the fact that davening is our attempt at building a relationship with Hashem. As the Kuzari notes, every day should have three high points — the three times that we daven. Certainly, one should do whatever one can to make sure to pay attention to the meaning of the words of one’s Tefillah. We should gain our strength and inspiration for the rest of the day from these three prayers. Let us hope that Hashem will accept our tefillos together with those of Klal Yisrael!

 

Do Clothes Make the Man?

Since this parsha discusses the special clothes worn by the kohanim, and all the melachos of Shabbos are derived from the building of the mishkan, what other week could be more appropriate to discuss the laws of wearing clothing on Shabbos?

Do Clothes Make the Man?

Question #1: The clown of town

clown“To entertain a chosson and kallah at their Shabbos sheva brachos, I want to dress in a clown suit, which includes wearing multiple hats, one atop the other. May I walk this way through an area that has no eruv?”

Question #2: Belts and braces

“May I wear a belt on Shabbos when I am already holding my pants up with suspenders?”

Question #3: Lehoniach muffler

“May I wear my talis as a scarf when I am outside an eruv?”

Question #4: Gallant garteling

“May I wear my gartel to shul on Shabbos the way I usually do?”

Introduction:

As we are aware, one of the 39 melachos of Shabbos is hotza’ah, which is transporting or, as we usually call it, carrying items through a reshus harabim, an unwalled public thoroughfare or marketplace. This melachah also prohibits moving items from a reshus harabim into a reshus hayachid, an enclosed area, or from a reshus hayachid into a reshus harabim. In other articles, I discussed how an eruv permits carrying. (These articles can be read or downloaded from RabbiKaganoff. Com under the titles An Eruv Primer and Carrying in Public and the Use of an Eruv.) This article will discuss the issues of wearing clothing and similar items on Shabbos, in a place that does not have an acceptable eruv.

Violating the melachah of carrying is not necessarily through one’s carrying the item in his hand. Walking through or into a public area with a needle pinned to one’s garment or a handkerchief in one’s pocket breaks the Torah’s proscription. It is also prohibited to have chewing gum or candy in one’s mouth while walking through a reshus harabim or between a reshus harabim and a reshus hayachid.

Although wearing clothing or jewelry is permitted, one may wear them only in a way that they are usually worn. In addition, at times Chazal prohibited wearing certain items to guarantee that a person would not mistakenly carry on Shabbos.

Permitted to carry

One may wear something that qualifies as a garment and is being worn in a normal way, even if you, yourself, do not usually wear it (Chayei Odom 56:4). For example, a rich man may wear something that he would not usually wear, because he considers it demeaning (Chayei Odom 56:4). Similarly, someone may wear earmuffs or an extra pair of socks or other garment, even when he usually does not. This is permitted even on a hot day and when the intention is to bring the extra garment for someone else (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 301:36).

Example: Some teenagers got involved in a very non-Shabbosdik water fight, with some of the contestants now completely drenched. Yitzie, who lives nearby, may make several trips home, each time donning several layers of clothing and a few pairs of socks, in order to supply his friends with dry clothing, even though there is no eruv.

The garment district

Wearing a handkerchief around one’s neck is permitted, since it can be used this way either to provide warmth or to absorb perspiration (Mishnah Berurah 301:133, quoting Chayei Odom).

In an early ruling that sends shivers up my spine, the Rema (Orach Chayim 301:23) permits wearing Jewish “yellow circles” on Shabbos, the forerunner of the Nazi’s “Jewish stars,” even if they are not sewn fully onto the garment.

Not normal

As I mentioned above, one may wear a garment outside an eruv only in a style that is considered “usual.” However, one may not wear a garment in an atypical manner. For example, the Gemara (Shabbos 58a; 147a) teaches that wearing a talis wrapped around one’s neck like a scarf in a reshus harabim is a Torah violation, since it is not the way this garment is meant to be worn. For the same reason, the Mishnah Berurah 301:133 prohibits wrapping a handkerchief around one’s leg and walking this way in a reshus harabim. (However, see Shu’t Levushei Mordechai #133.)

Only a garment

One may not “wear” something that is not a garment, such as a box (Chayei Odom 56:4), even if it is cut out to allow you to slide your head inside.

We do not all hang together

Sometimes two “wearings” may appear to be similar, but halachah treats them in completely different ways. For example, although a woman’s wearing a necklace is an appropriate mode of dress, hanging a key on a string that one wears around one’s neck is prohibited. This is true, even if the string is tied to the key in a way that it would fall off her neck without the key. Wearing a necklace around one’s neck is an accepted way to wear jewelry. A key on a string is neither jewelry nor a garment, and therefore, it is prohibited to use this as a method of transporting a key on Shabbos.

Lo yilbash

The Torah’s mitzvah prohibiting a man from wearing a woman’s clothes and vice versa has an interesting ramification germane to the laws of carrying on Shabbos. This mitzvah applies not only to clothing, but also to ornaments and jewelry – meaning, for example, that a man is forbidden to wear jewelry that would ordinarily be worn only by a woman.

The Shabbos ramification of this question is that someone wearing ornaments inappropriate for his or her gender on Shabbos in an area without an eruv desecrates Shabbos by transporting the ornaments (Chayei Odom 56:4). Since this is not an acceptable way to wear them, it is halachically equivalent to carrying them in a reshus harabim. For this reason, a woman may not wear a talis in a reshus harabim (Chayei Odom 56:4). Perhaps this is something we should draw to the attention of the “women of the wall.”

Finding tefillin

There is an interesting ramification of this law. Suppose that someone discovers several pairs of tefillin on Shabbos, outside of an eruv, in a place where they could become ruined or treated with disrespect. Does the kedushah of the tefillin supersede the violation of carrying on Shabbos? If it does not, what can one do to save the tefillin?

The halachah is that one may not do anything that would desecrate Shabbos to save the tefillin. Nevertheless, although it is usually forbidden to wear tefillin on Shabbos, they are still considered ornaments that men wear. And, since the halachah is that there is sufficient room on one’s head and arm to wear two pairs of tefillin simultaneously, it is permitted to wear two pairs of tefillin. Therefore, a man who finds these tefillin can put on two pairs at a time, two pairs of tefillin shel yad on his arm, and two pairs of tefillin shel rosh on his head, bring the tefillin to a secure place, and then return for more (Eruvin 95). (We should note that some authorities permit wearing two pairs at a time only when they are fairly small.) However, since women do not wear tefillin, they are not considered an ornament for them, and they may not wear even one (Chayei Odom 56:4).

Tafeil parts of a garment

When wearing a garment, one does not need to remove a part of the garment that is not being used at the moment, even when this can be done easily. For example, the Biur Halachah (s.v. Shedarko) permits walking through a reshus harabim while wearing a garment that has pockets, provided that they are empty. Although we are all familiar with this law (I am unaware of anyone who wears pocket-less shirts and slacks on Shabbos), we should stop and ask why it is true. After all, pockets provide no warmth or any other clothing-related benefit – why are they considered clothing, rather than small “backpacks” that happen to be attached to clothing?

The answer is that when wearing a garment in a way that it is usually worn, one need not be concerned about the tafeil, or secondary, parts of the garment. Halachah views the tafeil parts as having no consequence – any significance they have is lost to the garment. For the same reason, one does not need to remove the hood of a garment, even when it is attached by a zipper or buttons and can be easily removed (see Biur Halachah). Similarly, one may drape a coat over one’s shoulders, even though he is not “wearing” the sleeves (Shemiras Shabbos Kehilchasah). The pockets, hood and sleeves are all considered parts of the garment, even when they are not being used.

Tafeil parts of a garment also include such items as stray threads on a garment, whether partially attached or not. Since no one saves them, they are rendered insignificant.

Embellishments

Another type of tafeil part of a garment is something that enhances it aesthetically, such as decorations. For example, one may wear bells that have been woven onto one’s clothing as ornaments (Mishnah, Shabbos 66b, as understood by the Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 301:23).

Not tafeil

To sum up: something is considered part of a garment when it is either (1) insignificant on its own (2) it decorates the garment or (3) it is functionally part of the garment. However, there are items connected to the garment that are certainly not tafeil. Even sewing something onto one’s clothes permits carrying it only when it is an item that is usually worn on that garment (Rema, Orach Chayim 301:23). For example, shirts often have spare buttons attached to them to be used as replacements, should the originals get lost. Some authorities rule that these extra buttons are significant, because the intent is to save them, in case they are ever needed. At the same time, their attachment to the garment does not service the garment or the wearer, since they are not doing anything functional for the shirt, nor are they decorative. Therefore, some authorities require that one remove these buttons from the garment before wearing it in a reshus harabim. On the other hand, other authorities contend that these extra buttons are not considered important and that one does not need to remove them (Shu’t Rivevos Efrayim, 4:87).

Hanging your jacket

Should the cloth loop used for hanging one’s jacket become torn, this often creates a problem in wearing this garment outside of an eruv. Allow me to explain. As long as the loop is not torn, it is tafeil to the jacket, since it has a functional purpose — to hang the jacket on a hook. The halachic problem is when one side of the loop tears, yet the loop remains attached to the garment. This loop is still considered important, since one intends to sew it back into place, so that it can again be used. Yet, the loop is no longer functional, and it serves no aesthetic purpose. Thus, the loop is no longer included in any of the three categories whereby it could be tafeil to the jacket. As a result, wearing the jacket in an area without an eruv will be a problem, since the loop is now being carried (Chayei Odom).

Should the loop tear in a way that it cannot be resewn into the garment, one may wear the garment outside an eruv, since, in this situation, the remnants of the loop have no significance, and they are therefore tafeil to the garment. It is also permitted if one does not intend to use the loop, but to throw it away and use something else to replace it.

Not decorative

We learned above that one may wear a decorative item that lies upon or attaches to a garment. However, this is permitted only when the attached item is indeed decorative. One may not wear a pin in one’s clothes, unless it is either decorative or it is being used in a functional way, such as being used instead of a button (Chayei Odom 56:2). As I mentioned above, it is therefore forbidden to go outside an eruv with a house key attached to one’s clothes with a safety pin, since this does not enhance the garments aesthetically. I will soon discuss other possible options of what one may do.

Two belts

I mentioned earlier that one may wear two or more of the same garment, even though one usually does not. There is a dispute among authorities whether this is true regarding wearing two belts. Based on different ways of understanding a passage of Gemara (Shabbos 59b), the rishonim disagree as to whether one may wear two belts, one on top of the other. The dispute is whether it is considered normative for someone to wear two belts in this way. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 301:36) concludes that this is permitted, whereas the Rema prohibits it; the latter is the accepted practice of Ashkenazim. This is prohibited, even when the two belts are not placed one directly on top of the other, but one is placed somewhat higher than the other, as long as they are both holding tight the same garment (Minchas Shabbos 84:20).

Nevertheless, the Magen Avraham concludes that where the two belts are accomplishing different things, such as, where one is attached to a garment above and therefore functions more like suspenders than a belt, that it is permitted. Similarly, the Pri Megadim (Mishbetzos Zahav 301:25) permits two belts, one on top of the other, when there is a practical reason to wear them this way, such as the inside belt is not aesthetic but is functional, and the outer belt is attractive; or when the two belts are worn so that they lift up one’s garments to prevent them from getting dirty (Mishnah Berurah 301:134).

Gartels

Rav Moshe Feinstein forbids wearing a gartel in the street on Shabbos on top of one’s shirt or slacks, if one is already wearing a belt, since this is considered to be wearing two belts, one on top of the other. It is, similarly, forbidden to wear the gartel over a tie, since this is not a normal way of keeping a tie in place (Shu’t Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 2:76). It is permitted to wear the gartel on top of one’s jacket, so that it functions as a type of a belt holding the jacket in place.

Wearing two hats

May one wear two hats? Some early authorities prohibit wearing two hats on Shabbos, unless the hats are of a type that people occasionally wear one atop the other (Machatzis Hashekel 301:49). Similarly, we find those who forbid wearing two yarmulkas, one atop the other (Minchas Shabbos 84:19). So, although people say that “they wear two hats,” they should be careful how they do it on Shabbos.

A rain cover

May one wear a raincover on one’s hat on Shabbos? Many authorities prohibit this, since it is not to protect your body, but your hat (see Chayei Odom 56:4). Thus, it does not serve a clothing purpose, and it is also not an ornament. Some authorities draw a distinction between raincovers used by men to cover their hats, which they prohibit, and the rainbonnets worn by women, which, although they are also used to protect sheitelach, also protect the wearer. They rally evidence that this is so, since they are also used by single women, which demonstrates that its primary purpose is to protect the wearer, not the hat or sheitel (Kitzur Hilchos Shabbos).

Shabbos keys

Is there any permitted way to transport keys through a public area on Shabbos?

The basic question here is that the key is not a garment and one is permitted, on Shabbos, to wear only a garment or an ornament. Many authorities permit making the key into a proper ornament, but, to do this, it must be made of silver and have the appearance of something that one would wear as jewelry (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 301:11 and Mishnah Berurah 42; Chayei Odom 56:3. It should be noted that although the Shulchan Aruch cites the lenient opinion in this dispute, he rules that this last suggestion is prohibited.) The other option is to make the key a functional part of a garment, such as by using it as the prong of the belt, which is the part that one inserts into the holes when buckling (Mishnah Berurah 301:45; Shu’t Minchas Yitzchok 4:33).

Walking stick

One of the more difficult problems to resolve is that of an older person, who usually walks outdoors with a cane or walking stick, but can walk without it. The halachah is that someone who cannot walk at all unassisted may use a cane (Chayei Odom). However, if one can walk without the stick, even only at home, the Kitzur Shulchan Aruch (84:5) prohibits him from using a cane on Shabbos in an area without an eruv.

Conclusion

The Navi Yirmiyohu (17:19-27) was concerned about carrying on Shabbos; it is a melachah like any other, yet people mistakenly think that it is not important. Indeed, we would not usually define transporting something as changing something functionally, which is what most melachos accomplish.

Rav Hirsch (Shemos 35:2) explains that whereas other melachos demonstrate man’s mastery over the physical world, carrying demonstrates his mastery over the social sphere. The actions that show the responsibility of the individual to the community and vice versa are often acts of hotza’ah. Thus, the prohibition to carry on Shabbos is to demonstrate man’s subordination to Hashem regarding his role and position in his social and national life.

 

Wanted Dead or Alive

In honor of Parashas Terumah and the Construction of the Mishkan…

Wanted Dead or Alive

bug trapQuestion #1: Getting Rid of those Bugs!

“May I trap or kill mosquitoes, bees, or wasps on Shabbos?”

Question #2: Hanging from the Lowest Tree

“I forgot to hang flypaper before Shabbos. May I do it on Shabbos?”

Question #3: A Charming Shabbos

“May a snake charmer work on Shabbos?”

Answer: Catching or dispatching

We have all been in the following uncomfortable situation. Some time during Shabbos, a mosquito appears in our vicinity, seeking to earn its living. Although we realize that this creature requires its sustenance, we are not eager that we, our children, or our guests should become mosquito fodder, even just as a minor donation. Are we permitted to trap or kill the mosquito? Trapping living things, tzad, was an action necessary for acquiring some of the materials used to build the Mishkan, and is one of the 39 melachos, categories of prohibited activity on Shabbos (Mishnah Shabbos 73a and Rashi ad loc.). Killing living things also violates the melachos of Shabbos, but space constraints will require that we leave this discussion for a different time. We will use this opportunity to discuss many pertinent principles of Shabbos and some details of the melachah of tzad.

Shabbos nomenclature

When discussing what one may or may not do on Shabbos, the Mishnah and Gemara use three terms: (1) chayov, punishable, when a particular act constitutes melachah, meaning that it desecrates Shabbos by violating a Torah law; (2) patur, exempt, meaning it does not violate a Torah law, and (3) mutar, permitted, when an act may be performed on Shabbos. We will discuss the middle term, patur, which states that a particular act does not violate Torah law, since this usually indicates something prohibited due to rabbinic sanction. Even though the word patur usually implies an act prohibited by rabbinic law, sometimes the Sages permitted it. But what makes performing a forbidden activity patur?

Meleches machsheves

The Gemara (Chagigah 10b; Bava Kama 26b; Kerisus 19b) teaches that the Torah prohibited only something that can be categorized as meleches machsheves, which can perhaps be translated as premeditated melachah. An obvious example of meleches machsheves would be trapping an animal to obtain its hide or meat. Similarly, someone who digs a hole to plant the base of a tree violates the meleches machsheves of choreish, ploughing, and one who picks a fruit performs a meleches machsheves of kotzeir, harvesting.

Meleches machsheves is often explained by what it is not. Following that approach, I will provide three categories of labor that are exempt from being defined as desecrating Shabbos min hatorah, because they do not qualify as meleches machsheves, at least according to some opinions.

Mekalkeil

In general, an act constitutes meleches machsheves only when its direct result is beneficial. This means that an action that is inherently destructive does not violate Shabbos min hatorah, even when one needs the result. For example, digging a hole in the ground, which one does not need, in order to obtain earth is defined as a destructive activity and prohibited only miderabbanan. The dug hole itself is a negative development, which renders the burrowing an act of mekalkeil, not prohibited min hatorah, but only because of rabbinic injunction. However, digging a hole to plant or to create a posthole results in a positive benefit and is indeed prohibited min hatorah, since one wants the hole in the ground.

Bemino nitzad

Here is a second example of meleches machsheves that is particular to the melachah that we are discussing, tzad. The tanna’im (Shabbos107b) dispute whether it is prohibited min hatorah to ensnare a creature that mankind does not typically use, such as a scorpion or a flea, which is called ein bemino nitzad, literally, a species that is not trapped. The halachic conclusion follows the lenient opinion, ruling that tzad applies min hatorah only to a species that is bemino nitzad, commonly trapped, so that mankind can benefit from it. For example, a species that is eaten, from whose body a medicine is extracted, or whose hide is used as leather qualifies as bemino nitzad. The halachic authorities discuss whether trapping an animal for scientific research or so that one can have it as a pet makes the animal into bemino nitzad (Rambam, Hilchos Shabbos 10:21; Chazon Ish, Orach Chayim 50:4 at end).

However, a species that is caught only because it is an annoyance has the status of ein bemino nitzad.

Why is this true? The purpose of trapping is to harness a living creature, so that mankind can use it. Thus, tzad is a type of acquisition (see Shu’t Avnei Neizer, Orach Chayim 189:7; however, see Biur Halachah, 316:2 s.v. Oh Choleh, who might disagree with this analysis.) However, trapping creatures that mankind does not generally use, such as scorpions or fleas, is not an act of acquiring these creatures, but of distancing them from victims that they may harm. Therefore, most opinions conclude that trapping a species that is ein bemino nitzad does not violate the melachah of tzad, and is prohibited only because of rabbinic injunction. Thus, since flies are ein bemino nitzad, catching them would not violate a Torah prohibition. Hanging flypaper on Shabbos would still involve a rabbinic prohibition, and it is similarly prohibited to set up a mousetrap on Shabbos (Magen Avraham 316:9; see Piskei Tosafos, Shabbos 17b #62).

By the way, many authorities consider mice to be bemino nitzad, since there are places in the world where their hide is used (Chayei Odom 30:7). There is also a dispute whether a non-kosher species that is harvested as food for non-Jewish consumption is considered bemino nitzad (Ritva, Shabbos 106b; Nimla Tal, Meleches Tzad #37).

Melachah she’einah tzerichah legufah

Many authorities rule that another category of activity is not prohibited min hatorah, because it is not considered meleches machsheves. There is a dispute among tanna’im whether a melachah she’einah tzerichah legufah, literally, an act not needed for its purpose, is prohibited min hatorah or only miderabbanan. Whereas Rabbi Yehudah contends that melachah she’einah tzerichah legufah is prohibited min hatorah, according to Rabbi Shimon, these acts are prohibited only by virtue of rabbinic injunction. Let me explain.

What is a melachah she’einah tzerichah legufah? Among the rishonim, we find differing opinions how to define and even how to translate this term, and there are many instances where a dispute in halachah results. Since this complicated question is a bit tangential to our topic, I am going to present only one approach. According to Tosafos (Shabbos 94a s.v. Rabbi Shimon) and the Rivash (Shu’t Harivash #394), Rabbi Shimon contends that the 39 melachos are prohibited min hatorah only when performed for a goal or purpose similar to the reason why this melachah was done when constructing the Mishkan. Performing a melachah to accomplish a purpose other than that for which this melachah was performed in the Mishkan qualifies as a melachah she’einah tzerichah legufah. This means that it is prohibited only miderabbanan, according to Rabbi Shimon and those who rule like him.

Here is an explanatory example: Removing an item that has a bad odor from a reshus hayachid, an enclosed area, into a reshus harabim, an open area meant for public use, is a classic case of melachah she’einah tzerichah legufah. Although moving something from a reshus hayachid into a reshus harabim constitutes the melachah of carrying, moving the foul-smelling item from a house to a reshus harabim does not constitute a melachah min hatorah, according to Rabbi Shimon, because the purpose of the carrying when building the Mishkan was to move the item being carried to a new location. However, when removing a foul-smelling item, there is no significance attached to the place to which the item is moved; one’s only goal is to distance it from its current location. The public area does not constitute the goal of one’s act, but, rather, a convenient place to dump unwanted material. For this reason, Rabbi Shimon contends that this act was not prohibited by the Torah, but only by the Sages. On the other hand, Rabbi Yehudah considers melachah she’einah tzerichah legufah to fulfill the definition of meleches machsheves and therefore prohibited min hatorah.

Although most rishonim conclude that the halachah follows Rabbi Shimon that melachah she’einah tzerichah legufah is prohibited only because of rabbinic injunction, the Rambam and others rule, according to Rabbi Yehudah, that melachah she’einah tzerichah legufah is prohibited min hatorah.

When exempt is permitted

There is a passage of Gemara that reflects both on our opening question and on a different aspect of the melachah of tzad. “Shmuel said: Whenever the Mishnah states that something is patur when performed on Shabbos, the activity is prohibited [because of a rabbinic injunction], with the exception of the following three instances, where patur means that the activity is permitted. The first case is catching a deer, the second is catching a snake and the third is lancing a boil” (Shabbos 3a; 107a, as explained by Tosafos, Shabbos 3a s.v. Bar). Shmuel proves from Mishnayos that, in these three instances, the acts are permitted (Shabbos 107a). The first two of these cases educate us to understand what constitutes the melachah of trapping. (The case of lancing a boil involves a different topic that we will leave for a future article.)

What are the first two cases presented by Shmuel? The first situation is when a deer entered a building and someone sat in the doorway of the building, thereby preventing the deer’s escape. When that person sat down, he trapped the deer and therefore performed the melachah of tzad. This is true, even if he was not involved in coaxing the deer into the building. The Mishnah (Shabbos 106b) then states that if a second person sits alongside the first in a way that the deer’s escape is still blocked, even when the first person gets up, the second person has not desecrated Shabbos. This is because the second person did not trap the deer but merely guaranteed that a captured animal remain in captivity. Although the Mishnah says that the second person is patur, Shmuel explains that one may lechatchilah sit down alongside the first person, even if one’s intention is to keep the deer trapped when the first person gets up. This explains a different aspect of tzad — the melachah is making the animal available for human use; once it is already trapped, there is no further violation in maintaining it under human control.

The second case is based on two different mishnayos. One Mishnah (Shabbos 107a) permits catching a scorpion so that it doesn’t bite, and another states that catching a snake to prevent it from biting does not violate Shabbos min hatorah, whereas catching it for medicinal use does (Eduyos 2:5). Tosafos proves that both Mishnayos that permit tzad to protect someone are discussing creatures whose bite is painful, but not life-threatening, pikuach nefesh (Tosafos, Shabbos 3a s.v. Bar). Were the Mishnah discussing a creature whose bite is life-threatening, it would be obvious that one may kill it, because of the general rule that actions necessary to protect life supersede Shabbos and almost all other mitzvos.

Shmuel ruled that although catching non-dangerous creatures is ordinarily prohibited on Shabbos, since this involves only a rabbinic injunction, the Sages permitted it under extenuating circumstances.

Why is this considered only a rabbinic injunction? We have already presented two possible reasons. The first is because of the principle of melachah she’einah tzerichah legufah, since one has no interest in capturing a snake or a scorpion (Tosafos op. cit.). The second reason is that one is not catching these species to make them available for human use, which is an essential component of the melachah of tzad (Avnei Neizer, Orach Chayim 189:7; see Biur Halachah, 316:2 s.v. Oh Choleh).

Mosquitoes versus snakes

Although we have discovered that one may catch snakes and scorpions that are not life-threatening, this does not tell us whether one may trap mosquitoes, bees or wasps. Although the sting or bite of these species is indeed painful, it is not usually as painful as a snake or scorpion bite. Thus, it might be that Chazal did not permit catching mosquitoes, bees or wasps.

Based on the following passage of Gemara, we can presumably prove the correct answer to this question:

“Someone who trapped a flea on Shabbos — Rabbi Eliezer rules that he is liable for desecrating Shabbos min hatorah, whereas Rabbi Yehoshua rules that his desecration of Shabbos violates only a rabbinic ordinance” (Shabbos 107b). The Gemara explains that this dispute is dependent on an issue that we discussed earlier — Does one desecrate Shabbos min hatorah if he traps a species that is not usually trapped? Rabbi Eliezer rules that he does, whereas Rabbi Yehoshua rules that he does not. Thus, it appears from this Gemara that although Shmuel proved that it is permitted to trap a scorpion, even of the non-deadly variety, one cannot trap a flea, which only causes discomfort.

Three types of varments

We can, therefore, divide the different types of unpleasant biters and stingers into three categories:

  1. Those that are potentially life-threatening to people. In this instance, if there is even the slightest possibility of danger, one may kill or catch them on Shabbos.
  2. Those whose bite is very painful, but does not present any life-threatening danger. These may be trapped on Shabbos, provided that one’s intent is to save people from harm (Rambam, Hilchos Shabbos 10:25). However, it is forbidden to trap if one intends to use the insect, reptile or arachnid. (Modern biology categorizes spiders and scorpions as arachnids, because they have eight legs, are carnivorous and are wingless. If we want to categorize insects and arachnids together, we should use the word arthropods, but that still excludes snakes and other reptiles. So, for most of this article, I have simply used the word creatures. My apologies to the scientists reading this.)
  3. Those whose bite will be unpleasant, but not highly painful. In this instance, there is a dispute among the rishonim. Tosafos and the Rosh (ad loc.) quote from an earlier baal Tosafos, named Rav Poras, that if one sees that an insect may bite him, he is permitted to catch the insect so that he can remove it. When the insect is not so close to him, he may brush the insect off, but he may not trap it.

Not all authorities accepted Rabbi Poras’s approach. The Mordechai (#402) quotes Rav Yehudah Gaon that he noticed that the “elder rabbis” did not trap fleas, even when the fleas were on their skin. The Beis Yosef, however, contends that even Rav Yehudah Gaon accepts the ruling of Rabbi Poras, but that he himself practiced this as a personal chumrah, not as the required halachah that he would rule for others. There are other rishonim, however, who disagree with Rabbi Poras and prohibit trapping mosquitoes, even when they are on someone’s skin, since they are only a discomfort and not dangerous (Meiri, Shabbos 107b).

Consensus

The consensus of halachic authorities follows Rabbi Poras, although there is a dispute among them whether it is permitted to catch the insect only when it is actually biting (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 316:9; Bach) or whether one may remove the insects even when they are in close proximity (Taz 316:8; Magen Avraham 316:18; Elyah Rabbah). The Mishnah Berurah (316:37) concludes that when one can brush off the insect, he should not rely on the heter of trapping it, but he implies that one may trap the insect if brushing it off will not suffice.

Answers

At this point, let us take a fresh look at some of our original questions:

“May I trap mosquitoes, bees, or wasps on Shabbos?”

The answer is that if the insect is about to attack someone, one may trap it. One may also trap it if its sting or bite is very painful, and certainly if it is potentially dangerous.

“May a snake charmer work on Shabbos?” If one is not intending to use the snake, it is permitted. This is all the more so if the snake is dangerous.

In conclusion

Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch (Shemos 20:10) notes that people mistakenly think that work is prohibited on Shabbos to ensure that Shabbos is a day of rest. He points out that the Torah does not prohibit doing avodah, which connotes hard work, but melachah, which implies purpose and accomplishment. We certainly see this idea borne out by the ideas of meleches machsheves, which denote the purpose of the action, and have no correlation at all to the amount of energy expended. The goal of Shabbos is to allow Hashem’s rule to be the focus of creation by our refraining from our own creative acts (Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch Commentary to Shemos 20:11).

 

Eating before Kiddush

kiddush cupQuestion #1: Reuven calls me: I have not been well, and I need to eat something shortly after awaking. On weekdays, I daven shortly after I wake up and then eat immediately afterwards, but there is no available minyan for me to attend early Shabbos morning. What should I do?

Question #2: Ahuva asks: It is difficult for me to wait for Kiddush until my husband returns from shul. May I eat something before he arrives home?

Question #3: Someone told me that a woman may not eat in the morning before she davens, but I remember being taught in Beis Yaakov that we may eat once we say the morning berachos. Is my memory faulty?

Answer:

When we recite Kiddush on Friday evening, we fulfill the Torah’s mitzvah of Zachor es yom hashabbos lekadsho, Remember the day of Shabbos to sanctify it.

There is another Kiddush, introduced by our Sages, which is simply reciting borei pri hagafen and drinking wine prior to the Shabbos day meal. This article will discuss under what circumstances one may eat before reciting the daytime Kiddush.

First, we need to categorize that there are two related subjects here:

May one eat before reciting Kiddush?

May one eat before davening in the morning?

May one eat before reciting Kiddush, either at night or day?

May one eat or drink prior to reciting the Torah-required evening Kiddush? Although the Tanna, Rabbi Yosi, holds that someone eating a meal when Shabbos begins is not required to interrupt, but may complete his meal and then recite Kiddush afterwards, the Gemara concludes that we do not follow this approach. Once Shabbos arrives, it is forbidden to eat or drink anything until one recites or hears Kiddush (Pesachim 100a). The poskim conclude that one may not even drink water before Kiddush (Shulchan Aruch Orach Chayim 271:4).

What is the halacha regarding eating or drinking before daytime Kiddush? This matter is disputed by the two great pillars of halacha, the Rambam and the Raavad. The Rambam  (Hilchos Shabbos, 29:10) declares that one may not taste anything before reciting the daytime Kiddush, whereas the Raavad contends that this prohibition applies only to the evening Kiddush, but not to the morning Kiddush.

What is the underlying issue of this difference of opinion? At first glance, it would seem that the Rambam and the Raavad are disputing the following question: When our Sages required Kiddush in the daytime, did they provide it with all the rules of evening Kiddush? After all, there is a general halachic principle Kol detikun rabbanan ke’ein de’oraysa tikun, whatever the Sages instituted, they did so following the pattern of the Torah’s mitzvos. (For brevity’s sake, I will henceforth refer to this concept simply as Kol detikun rabbanan.) Kol detikun rabbanan would indicate that just as one may not eat or drink before evening Kiddush, similarly one may not eat or drink before morning Kiddush. It would seem that the Rambam is contending that Kol detikun rabbanan applies to daytime Kiddush, whereas the Raavad disputes this, for a reason that we will soon explain.

However, a careful reading of the Rambam demonstrates that this analysis is somewhat oversimplified, since the Rambam, himself, does not fully apply the concept Kol detikun rabbanan to daytime Kiddush. Whereas he introduces Chapter 29 of Hilchos Shabbos by stating: “It is a positive mitzvah of the Torah to sanctify Shabbos with words,” when he begins discussing the daytime Kiddush, he says, “It is a mitzvah to recite a beracha over wine on Shabbos morning before one eats the second meal of Shabbos, and this is called Kiddusha Rabbah.” Evidently, the daytime Kiddush is not a second mitzvah of Kiddush, but simply announces that the daytime meal is in honor of Shabbos. (The early commentaries note that the term Kiddusha Rabbah [literally, the great Kiddush] for the daytime Kiddush, whose origin is in the Gemara itself [Pesachim 106a], is intentionally overstated.) We could say that the evening Kiddush is a sanctification of Shabbos, whereas the daytime Kiddush is a proclamation about the coming meal.

Reciting Kiddush over Bread

Now that we understand that evening Kiddush and daytime Kiddush serve different functions, we can explain why there are other halachic differences between them. For example, one may recite evening Kiddush over the challah-bread that one is using for the meal, but one may not use the bread of the day meal as a substitute for the daytime Kiddush. After all, if daytime Kiddush is to proclaim that the coming meal is in Shabbos’ honor, this proclamation must precede the meal and be somewhat extraordinary.

So now we need to ask: If daytime Kiddush serves a different function than evening Kiddush, why does the Rambam prohibit eating before daytime Kiddush? The answer is that he understands that some laws of Kiddush still apply in the daytime. The dispute between the Rambam and the Raavad is the degree to which daytime Kiddush is compared to evening Kiddush.

The Halacha

The accepted halacha follows the Rambam: that one may not eat before daytime Kiddush (Shulchan Aruch Orach Chayim 289:1), although as we will soon see, the Raavad’s opinion is not completely ignored by later authorities. They often factor the Raavad’s opinion when other mitigating circumstances exist, a halachic concept called tziruf. For example, the Elyah Rabbah (286:9) rules that a weak person who has davened Shacharis and has no beverage available for Kiddush may rely on the Raavad together with another opinion who contends that there is no obligation to make Kiddush until one has completed davening musaf.

May one drink water before Kiddush?

In regard to the evening Kiddush, the halacha is that one may not drink anything, even water, after Shabbos begins and before reciting Kiddush. Does the same law apply to morning Kiddush? The Tur cites a dispute whether one may drink water before davening on Shabbos morning, since one has as yet not recited or heard Kiddush. He quotes the Avi HaEzri as prohibiting this, whereas the Tur’s own father, the Rosh, permitted drinking water before Kiddush, and he, himself, drank before Shabbos morning davening. The Rosh reasoned that drinking before Kiddush is prohibited only once the time for reciting Kiddush has arrived, which is not until one has davened. Prior to davening, one is prohibited from eating, and, therefore, it is too early for the Shabbos meal, and too early for Kiddush. As we will soon see, one may drink tea or coffee before davening on weekdays, and the Rosh permits this also on Shabbos morning.

May one eat before morning davening?

At this point, we can discuss the first question raised by Reuven above: I have not been well, and I need to eat something shortly after awaking. On weekdays, I daven shortly after I wake up and then eat immediately afterwards, but there is no available minyan for me to attend early Shabbos morning. What should I do?

Reuven’s question involves an issue that we have not yet discussed: May one eat before davening in the morning?

The Gemara states: “What do we derive from the verse, You may not eat over blood? That you may not eat (in the morning) before you have prayed for your ‘blood’… The verse states, in reference to someone who eats and drinks prior to praying: You have thrown me behind your body (Melachim 1 14:9). Do not read your body (in Hebrew gavecha), but your arrogance (gai’echa). The Holy One said: After this person has indulged in his own pride (by eating or drinking), only then does he accept upon himself the dominion of heaven (Berachos 10b)!?”

The halacha that results from this Gemara is codified by all authorities. To quote the Rambam: “It is prohibited to taste anything or to perform work from halachic daybreak until one has prayed shacharis” (Hilchos Tefillah 6:4).

Would you like tea or coffee?

Although all poskim prohibit eating and drinking before morning davening, we find early authorities who permit drinking water before davening, since this is not considered an act of conceit (Rosh quoting the Avi HaEzri; the Beis Yosef cites authorities who disagree, but rules like the Avi HaEzri). Most later authorities permit drinking tea or coffee, contending that this is also considered like drinking water, but the poskim dispute whether one may add sugar to the beverage. The Mishnah Berurah and others prohibit this, whereas the Aruch Hashulchan and most later authorities permit it. They are disputing whether adding sugar to the beverage promotes it to a forbidden beverage, or whether it is still considered water that one may imbibe before davening.

Hunger

The Rambam rules that someone who is hungry or thirsty should eat or drink before he davens, so that he can daven properly (Hilchos Tefillah 5:2).

Similarly, some authorities contend that,for medical reasons, one may eat or drink before davening. They explain that the Gemara prohibited only eating or drinking that demonstrates arrogance, whereas medical reasons, by definition, do not express arrogance (Beis Yosef, quoting Mahari Abohav). This approach is accepted as normative halacha by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 89:3).

I will be hungry!

What is the halacha if someone is, as yet, not hungry, but he knows that he will be so hungry by the end of davening that it will distract him from davening properly. Is he permitted to eat before davening, so that the hunger does not distract him? This question impacts directly on Reuven’s question.

The answer to this question appears to lie in the following Talmudic discussion:

Rav Avya was weak and, as a result, did not attend Rav Yosef’s lecture that transpired prior to musaf. The next day, when Rav Avya arrived in the Yeshiva, Abayei saw Rav Avya and was concerned that Rav Yosef may have taken offense at Rav Avya’s absence. Therefore, Abayei asked Rav Avya why he had failed to attend the previous day’s lecture. After which the following conversation transpired:

Abayei: Why did the master (addressing Rav Avya) not attend the lecture?

Rav Avya: I was not feeling well and was unable to attend.

Abayei: Why did you not eat something first and then come?

Rav Avya: Does the master (now referring to Abayei) not hold like Rav Huna who prohibits eating before davening musaf?

Abayei: You should have davened musaf privately, eaten something and then come to shul (Berachos 28b).

We see from Abayei’s retort, that someone who is weak should daven first and then eat, even if this means that he davens without a minyan. Based on this passage, several noted authorities rule that someone who will not be able to wait until after davening, and cannot find an early minyan with which to daven, should daven privately (beyechidus), eat and then attend shul in order to hear the Torah and fulfill the mitzvos of answering Kaddish and Kedusha (Beer Heiteiv 89:11; Biur Halacha 289; Daas Torah 289 quoting Zechor Le’Avraham; Shu”t Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 2:28 at end of teshuvah). Thus, it seems that we can positively answer Reuven’s question: If he cannot wait to eat until davening is over, he should daven be’yechidus, make Kiddush and eat something, and then come to shul to answer Borchu, Kedusha, Kaddish and hear kerias Hatorah.

May a woman eat before Kiddush?

At this point, we have enough information to discuss Ahuva’s question: It is difficult for me to wait for Kiddush until my husband returns from shul. May I eat before he arrives home?

Of course, Ahuva may recite Kiddush herself and eat something before her husband returns home. To fulfill the mitzvah, she needs to eat something that fulfills the halacha of Kiddush bimkom seudah¸ a topic we will have to leave for a different time. However, Ahuva either does not want to recite Kiddush, or does not want to eat something to accompany the Kiddush. Is there a halachic solution to permit her to eat or drink before Kiddush?

There are some authorities who suggest approaches to permit Ahuva to eat or drink before Kiddush. Here is one approach:

Although most authorities obligate a woman to recite the daytime Kiddush and prohibit her from eating before she recites Kiddush (Tosafos Shabbos 286:4, 289:3; Pri Megadim, Mishbetzos Zahav 289:1; Mishnah Berurah 289:6), this is not a universally held position. One early authority (Maharam Halavah, Pesachim 106, quoting Rashba) contends that women are absolved of the requirement to recite daytime Kiddush, for the following reason:

Since the daytime Kiddush is not an extension of the mitzvah of evening Kiddush, but is to demonstrate that the meal is in honor of Shabbos, this requirement does not devolve upon women. Although this approach is not halachically accepted, some authorities allow a woman to rely on this opinion, under extenuating circumstances, to eat before reciting morning Kiddush (Shu”t Minchas Yitzchak 4:28:3).

When does a married woman become obligated to make Kiddush?

Rav Moshe Feinstein presents a different reason to permit a married woman to eat before Kiddush. He reasons that since a married woman is required to eat the Shabbos meal with her husband, she does not become responsible to make Kiddush until it is time for the two of them to eat the Shabbos meal together, meaning after davening (Shu”t Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 4:101\2). However, the Shemiras Shabbos Kehilchasah (Chapter 52, note 46) quotes Rav Shelomoh Zalman Auerbach as disputing Rav Moshe’s conclusion that a married woman has no obligation to make Kiddush before the Shabbos meal. Firstly, he is unconvinced that she is halachically required to eat her meal with her husband, and, even if she is, that this duty permits her to eat before Kiddush.

If we do not follow the lenient approaches mentioned, when does a woman become obligated to recite Kiddush and, therefore, at what point may she no longer drink tea, coffee, and water? The Acharonim debate this issue, but understanding their positions requires an understanding of a different topic.

What must a woman pray?

All authorities require a woman to daven daily, but there is a dispute whether she is required to recite the full shemoneh esrei (I will call this the “Ramban’s opinion”), or whether she fulfills her requirement by reciting a simple prayer, such as the morning beracha that closes with the words Gomel chasadim tovim le’amo Yisrael. (I will refer to this as the “Magen Avraham’s opinion.”) Allow me to explain.

When may she eat?

According to the Ramban’s opinion that a woman is required to recite the full shemoneh esrei, she may not eat in the morning without first davening (see the previous discussion), whereas according to the Magen Avraham’s opinion that she fulfills her requirement once she has recited a simple prayer or morning berachos, she may eat once she recited these tefilos.

Some authorities rule that a woman becomes obligated to hear Kiddush as soon as she recites berachos, since she has now fulfilled her requirement to daven and she may therefore begin eating. According to this opinion, once she recited berachos on Shabbos morning, she may not eat or drink without first making Kiddush (Tosafos Shabbos 286:4, 289:3). This approach contends that before she recites morning berachos, she may drink water, tea or coffee, but after she recites morning berachos, she may not even drink these beverages without first reciting Kiddush.

There is another view, that contends that a woman can follow the same approach that men follow, and may drink water, tea or coffee even after she recited berachos before she has davened (Pri Megadim, Eishel Avraham 289:4 as understood by Halichos Beisah page 204).

At this point we can address the third question I raised above:

“Someone told me that a woman may not eat in the morning before she davens, but I remember being taught in Beis Yaakov that we may eat once we say the morning berachos. Is my memory faulty?”

Many authorities contend that although a woman should daven shemoneh esrei every morning, she may rely on the opinion of the Magen Avraham in regard to eating, and may eat at home after reciting morning berachos. In many institutions, this approach was preferred, since it accomplishes that the tefillah the girls recite is a much better prayer, and they learn how to daven properly.

Conclusion

According to Rav Hirsch, observing Shabbos and declaring its holiness means recognizing that the arrival of Shabbos signifies that man’s activity has attained its goal. Now, it is time to recognize Hashem’s creation and devote ourselves to developing our spirituality. When we recite Kiddush, we should internalize this message.

 

Of Umbrellas and Eruvs

umbrellasQuestion #1: Umbrellas and Eruvs

“Why can’t I use an umbrella on Yom Tov or on Shabbos within an eruv? Is it a mitzvah to get wet?”

Question #2: My Shabbos Nap

“May I shade an area for my Shabbos nap by throwing a blanket on top of some lawn chairs?”

Question #3: Cocktail Torah

“May I place a cocktail umbrella on top of a drink on Shabbos?”

Answer: The original sunscreen

The umbrella, or parasol, was invented in the eighteenth century and came into use very quickly as a simple and practical way to be protected from the rain and the harshest rays of the sun. Shortly after its invention, we already find discussion among great halachic authorities whether this “new apparatus” could be used on Yom Tov or Shabbos in a location where carrying is permitted. Before analyzing their positions, we need to discuss the laws regarding the construction of an ohel on Shabbos and Yom Tov.

Building and roofing

One of the 39 melachos, categories of work that the Torah forbids on Shabbos, is boneh, constructing (Mishnah Shabbos 73a). A subheading, or toldah, of boneh is making an ohel kavua, which translates literally as creating a permanent roof or shelter (Rambam, Hilchos Shabbos 10:13). Constructing an ohel arai, a “temporary” roof, on Shabbos or Yom Tov, was not forbidden by the Torah, but was prohibited by Chazal, our early Sages. Now we need to define:

  1. What is considered a permanent ohel that is prohibited min hatorah?
  2. How do we define a temporary ohel, so that we know what is prohibited because of a rabbinic injunction?
  3. What type of covering, if any, is permitted?

What is an ohel kavua?

Based on how the Rif (Shabbos, beginning of Chapter 20), the earliest of the great halachic codifiers, presented the topic, most respected authorities understand him to rule in the following way: Virtually anything that covers an empty area at least a tefach (about three to four inches) long, a tefach wide and a tefach high is halachically considered a permanent ohel. This “roof” does not need to be connected to the ground in any way. According to this approach, assembling such a covering is a violation of Torah law, even if the ohel is intended to exist for only a short period of time. The defining line between a permanent ohel and a “temporary” one (ohel arai), which was not prohibited by the Torah but only by the Sages, is that an ohel kavua has a “roof” that is one tefach squared, whereas an ohel arai’s “roof” is narrower than a tefach.

If the ohel is not flat on top, but peaked, yet it widens to a tefach squared within three tefachim of its peak, it is also an ohel kavua that is prohibited, min hatorah, to assemble on Shabbos. Only if it is very narrow on top and does not widen at all, or only widens at a lower point, does it qualify as an ohel arai, whose construction is prohibited only because of rabbinic injunction.

Thus, according to this opinion, throwing a blanket over a few lawn chairs so that you can crawl underneath to play or relax violates a Torah prohibition. Even those who hold that this does not violate a Torah law agree that it is prohibited because of a rabbinic injunction.

We can already answer one of the questions asked above: “May I shade an area for my Shabbos nap by throwing a blanket on top of some lawn chairs?”

According to all opinions, this is prohibited. Some opinions hold that this is prohibited min hatorah.

What is permitted?

When is it permitted to make a temporary ohel?

According to this opinion, there are two situations in which a temporary cover, roof or tent may be assembled on Shabbos or Yom Tov.

  1. When the area being covered is less than a tefach in height (see Shu’t Noda Biyehudah. Orach Chayim 2:30, s.v. Vehinei; Nimla Tal, Boneh, 15). Covering an area this low is not considered creating a “roof.”
  2. When the ohel is very narrow — less than a tefach wide — and it is attached to something to make it easier to open and close (see Shabbos 138a). Since the area being covered is less than a tefach wide, it is not considered an ohel area min hatorah. We mentioned above that covering such an area is usually still prohibited, because of a rabbinic injunction. However, when there is some form of hinge to make its opening and closing easier, or any other indication that the ohel is meant to be opened and closed frequently, Chazal permitted its use on Shabbos or Yom Tov.

In addition, if a temporary ohel exists from before Shabbos or Yom Tov, it is permitted to open and close it. It is also permitted to make the ohel wider (Eruvin 102a).

A differing approach

Not all authorities accept this approach that assembly of any “roof” over an area of a tefach squared is an ohel kavua prohibited min hatorah. Others rule that anything temporary is prohibited only because of a rabbinic injunction (Mishnah Berurah 315:34). This latter approach contends that any temporary ohel that is hinged, or has some other indication that it is meant to be opened and closed regularly, may be opened and closed on Shabbos, even when it covers an area a tefach squared. Thus, some authorities rule that one may open and close the hood of a baby carriage on Shabbos, since it is clearly meant to be closed temporarily, and it is hinged to facilitate its opening and closing (Chazon Ish, Orach Chayim 52:6). Other authorities are less lenient, requiring that opening the hood on Shabbos is permitted only when it was open the width of a tefach before Shabbos (Magen Avraham 315:4; Shu’t Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 4:105:3; Ketzos Hashulchan 120:4).

London, 1782

One of the first internationally distinguished authorities to discuss whether one may use an umbrella on Yom Tov or Shabbos is the Noda Biyehudah, Rav Yechezkel Landau, renowned posek hador and Chief Rabbi of Prague (Shu’t Orach Chayim, 2:30). Sometime in late 1782, as the American Revolution was beginning to wind to a close, Rav Leib Hakohen, a talmid chacham in London, sent a missive to the Noda Biyehudah. Their correspondence was not about how the redcoats and their Hessian mercenaries were getting by in the western hemisphere, but about important halachic matters. Rav Hakohen wrote that he felt that one may not use an umbrella on Shabbos, but that he had sent the question to a different, unnamed posek who permitted it. Rav Hakohen was still not comfortable with the lenient approach and, therefore, wrote to the Noda Biyehudah, presenting the two reasons why the first rav had ruled leniently. (Based on his level of scholarship, we may assume that the first rav was not from the American colonies.)

The first reason to permit use of umbrellas on Shabbos and Yom Tov was this posek’s opinion that an ohel must cover a specific, defined area, and an item which is constantly being moved from place to place, such as an umbrella, does not qualify as an ohel. The permitting rabbi substantiated this position on the basis of his understanding of Rashi (Shabbos 138b s.v. ela) that an item meant only to cover a person does not qualify as an ohel for the purposes of the laws of Shabbos. This is based on the following:

The Gemara rules that a type of felt hat called a siyana may not be worn on Shabbos if its brim is a tefach wide. Rashi explains that the Gemara’s conclusion that a wide-brimmed siyana may not be worn on Shabbos is because of concern that it will be blown off, and when the wearer retrieves it he may come to carry it in a public area, thus desecrating Shabbos.

The posek questioned why Rashi did not prohibit wearing a siyana on Shabbos because of making an ohel arai on Shabbos, since the brim is a tefach wide. The posek answered that since a hat is meant only to shelter a person who moves, this does not qualify as an ohel, which he defines as something that shelters a location. He rallied further evidence substantiating the truth of this principle by noting that, regarding the laws of tumas ohel, the Mishnah mentions several items, a bird in flight, fluttering cloth, or a ship that is sailing, that are not considered an ohel because they are in motion (Ohalos 8:4).

The second reason to permit the umbrella was based on the fact that it is hinged, to ease opening and closing. The permitting rabbi held that any temporary covering cannot possibly involve a Torah prohibition — the issue with an umbrella is only whether opening and carrying it violates the rabbinic injunction of an ohel arai. Since an umbrella is hinged, he felt that there are two valid reasons to permit using an umbrella on Yom Tov and on Shabbos within an eruv, although he admitted that some of the evidence for his position might be refutable.

However, Rav Hakohen felt that the reasons to be lenient were not sufficient and therefore referred the question to the Noda Biyehudah.

First response: Prague, 1783

On the eighteenth of Shevat, 5543 (1783), the Noda Biyehudah responded to Rav Hakohen, disputing both reasons of the permitting rabbi. He pointed out that careful analysis of the sources would reach the opposite conclusion. The Noda Biyehudah explained that there are many other ways to understand what Rashi wrote, such that they do not prove that something covering only a person is not an ohel. Furthermore, most authorities disagree with Rashi and, indeed, understand that wearing a siyana is prohibited on Shabbos because of the laws of ohel.

The Noda Biyehudah reports that several years previously, when the umbrella was first introduced to Prague, he taught publicly that it is strictly forbidden to use it on Shabbos, and that the prohibition might be min hatorah. He bases his approach on the Rif’s opinion that it is forbidden, min hatorah, to create any ohel that covers an area that is a tefach squared, which will certainly forbid the use of an umbrella. The Noda Biyehudah mentions that the majority of the people of Prague do not use umbrellas on Shabbos, in accordance with his ruling. He contends that, notwithstanding the fact that other rishonim (Rosh, Shabbos 20:2) clearly dispute the Rif’s definition of ohel, the Rif’s opinion should not be disregarded. Furthermore, in this instance, the Rambam (Hilchos Shabbos 22:29) may agree with him. Thus, we have two of the three great halachic codifiers (the Rosh being the third) ruling that a roof or awning constructed for very short term use may be prohibited min hatorah, if it is more than a tefach squared. This description seems to fit an umbrella very accurately. The Noda Biyehudah concludes that, indeed, the Rosh may be the only early authority that disputes this conclusion of the Rif, and that even the Rosh would prohibit use of an umbrella on Shabbos, albeit only because of the rabbinic injunction on an ohel arai. Many other authorities accept the Noda Biyehudah’s analysis of the topic (Aruch Hashulchan, Orach Chayim 301:113; 315:12; Shu’t Sho’el Umeishiv 3:2:42).

Nineteenth century Bratislava

On the other hand, the Chasam Sofer (Shu’t Orach Chayim #72) saw the responsum of the Noda Biyehudah and took issue with his analysis of the topic. In an undated halachic essay, the Chasam Sofer, posek hador of his generation and rav of Pressburg, concludes that although he does not recommend using an umbrella on Shabbos, he is not convinced that it is prohibited, and feels that if it is, it should be only because of rabbinic injunction, and not because it violates Torah law.

The Chasam Sofer first contends that no authorities hold that any type of temporary construction is prohibited min hatorah. Thus, he disputes those who interpret that the Rif and the Rambam hold that a temporary cover may be prohibited min hatorah. Second, the Chasam Sofer contends that something movable cannot be prohibited because of boneh, since all construction in the mishkan, which is the source of the melachos of Shabbos, was not movable. Third, there is no Torah concept of ohel unless the covering has walls that reach the ground. To sustain the last position, he notes that the Rif, himself, implies that this is a defining factor of an ohel kavua.

The Chasam Sofer contends that once he has established that an umbrella cannot possibly be an ohel according to Torah law, opening or carrying it on Shabbos is not even prohibited because of rabbinic injunction, because of its hinges, which are meant to facilitate its use. The Chasam Sofer thus concludes that although he does not advise using an umbrella on Shabbos, there is no technical violation in using it. He permits asking a gentile to open an umbrella on Shabbos for one to use, implying that he sees no problem at all with carrying it afterwards (obviously within the confines of an eruv). Several prominent halachic authorities follow this approach and permit use of an umbrella on Shabbos (Beis Meir, Orach Chayim 315; Daas Torah 301:40).

A lawn umbrella

We should note that the arguments raised by the Chasam Sofer as to why an umbrella is not an ohel may not apply to a lawn umbrella. This apparatus is meant for use in a backyard or garden, to provide shade against the sun. It is often left in its open position for months on end, or even indefinitely. Several prominent authorities contend that any ohel meant to remain open for more than a week is considered permanent, which would make it a Torah prohibition to open it (Pri Megadim, Mishbetzos Zahav 315:8; Eishel Avraham 315:1; Tiferes Yisroel, Kilkeles Shabbos 34:2).

In addition, since a lawn umbrella is not moved from one location to another, another of the Chasam Sofer’s reasons to permit a regular umbrella does not apply. Although one of the Chasam Sofer’s reasons, that an ohel is prohibited only when its “walls” reach the ground, applies to a lawn umbrella, it is difficult to rely only on this justification to permit opening a lawn umbrella on Shabbos. Therefore, there is strong reason to prohibit opening a lawn umbrella, even by a gentile, even according to the Chasam Sofer.

The position of the Chazon Ish

A third approach to the question of whether an umbrella may be used on Shabbos and Yom Tov is presented by the Chazon Ish (Orach Chayim 52:6). Although he concludes that it is prohibited to use an umbrella on Shabbos, his ruling is based on completely different considerations. He rejects the Noda Biyehudah’s position, contending that since umbrellas are meant for temporary use and are hinged for this purpose, opening them on Shabbos is not considered creating an ohel, just as opening and closing a door on Shabbos is not prohibited as an act of construction, since both are meant to be opened and closed frequently. The Chazon Ish rejects the position that any rishonim disagree with this definition of ohel. As I mentioned above, upon this basis, the Chazon Ish permits opening and closing the hood of a baby carriage on Shabbos. However, as I noted above, most authorities do not understand the Rif’s position as the Chazon Ish does, and consequently rule that one should leave the hood open at least a tefach before Shabbos.

Notwithstanding that the Chazon Ish rejects the Noda Biyehudah’s approach to the topic, he prohibits using an umbrella on Shabbos for two other, completely different reasons. First, he suggests that opening an umbrella might be prohibited because of tikun maneh, a general prohibition of completing items, which is a subcategory of the melachah of makeh bepatish. He then rules that opening an umbrella is forbidden as a takanas chachamim established by the Torah leadership of the recent generations to reinforce the sanctity of Shabbos.

Umbrellic conclusion

As I noted above, most authorities contend that there are rishonim who prohibit min hatorah creating a temporary ohel on Shabbos, if it is a tefach wide. It is indeed widespread custom to prohibit carrying an umbrella on Yom Tov or Shabbos, either because we are concerned about the prohibition of ohel, or, perhaps, because of the reasons advocated by the Chazon Ish.

A cocktail umbrella

At this point, I would like to discuss the last of our opening questions: “May I place a cocktail umbrella on a drink on Shabbos?”

A cocktail umbrella is a tiny umbrella used to decorate a glass. Since it does not resemble an ohel in any way, opening it on Shabbos is permitted.

Conclusion

Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch (Shemos 20:10) notes that people mistakenly think that work is prohibited on Shabbos in order to provide a day of rest. This is incorrect, he points out, because the Torah does not prohibit doing avodah, which connotes hard work, but melachah, which implies purpose and accomplishment. On Shabbos, we refrain from constructing and altering the world for our own purposes. The goal of Shabbos is to emphasize Hashem’s dominion as the focus of creation by refraining from our own creative acts (Shemos 20:11). By refraining from building for one day a week, we acknowledge the true Builder of the world and all that it contains.