It’s for the Birds, Part I

Question #1: Bird Determination

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I know that birds are very determined to get to their destinations, but how do we determine whether they are kosher?

Question #2: Noach’s Kosher Aviary

How did Noach know which species of bird and animal are kosher? The Torah was not given until Moshe Rabbeinu, fifteen generations later!

Question #3: The Chicken or the Egg?

Which comes first, the chicken or the egg? In other words, may I eat a bird relying that the egg it lays has a kosher shell shape?

Question #4: Mom and Pop Shop

Can a non-kosher species of bird and a kosher species of bird produce viable offspring together?

Foreword:

Noach was commanded to bring more kosher than non-kosher animals into the teivah, as the Torah states: “From each of the kosher animals you shall take seven, male and female, and from the non-kosher animals two, male and female. Also, from the birds of the heavens you shall take seven, male and female” (Bereishis 7:2-3). But how did Noach know which species are kosher? Rashi (Bereishis 7:2) explains that this demonstrates that Noach studied the Torah. Presumably, he became an expert on the list of kosher birds in Parshas Shemini and Parshas Re’eih.

However, this presents us with a curious problem. Noach could have easily observed which mammals have split hooves, and he could also figure out which species chew their cud. (Although it is not perfectly accurate, I am going to substitute the word mammal, rather than animal, for the Torah’s beheimah and chayah in order to avoid confusion that occurs in English – since birds, fish, reptiles and insects are all types of animal, although none of them qualify as either beheimah or chayah, which are subcategories of what we call “mammals.”)

Although the Torah describes the exact indicating signs, simanim, that render fish and animals kosher (“indicia” in proper English), regarding birds the Torah simply inventories the non-kosher varieties (Vayikra 11:13-19; Devarim 14:11-19). Most of these appear to be non-kosher species, but in four instances, the Torah states lemino or lemineihu, meaning that these include categories of non-kosher birds. In addition, Chazal’s analysis of the case of nesher concludes that this is also a category of birds. So how did Noach know to identify the non-kosher species? The rishonim (Radak, Bereishis 7:2; Ramban, Bereishis 6:20) explain that when Noach was commanded concerning how many of each species to bring into the teivah, he was also told how to identify which are kosher.

Noach’s Kosher Aviary

We now have the answer to one of our opening questions: “How did Noach know which species of bird and animal are kosher? The Torah was not given until Moshe Rabbeinu, fifteen generations later!”

According to the Ramban and others, Hashem taught Noach the Torah, including a comprehensive listing of all kosher birds and animals, so that he could accomplish what he was commanded.

Simanim of kosher birds

At this point, we need to understand several aspects of the indicia of kosher birds. As opposed to kosher mammals, fish and grasshoppers, where the Torah provides rules indicating which are kosher, regarding birds the Torah lists the non-kosher ones, implying that all other birds are kosher. The Gemara analyzes the Torah’s two lists, concluding that 24 varieties and categories of bird are non-kosher (Chullin 61b). Someone who verifies all 24 non-kosher varieties may shecht and eat any other bird species he discovers. The Gemara states that a hunter who recognizes all the varieties of non-kosher bird may shecht and eat any other species of bird he discovers and may teach other people which species are kosher (Chullin 63b). By process of elimination, our hunter knows that all other birds are kosher. The same passage of Gemara notes that there are countless kosher species of birds (Chullin 63b).

Size of teivah

Of course, we now have a question: If there are thousands of varieties of kosher bird, each of which had fourteen representatives in the teivah, how could the teivah have been big enough for all of them!

I note that, even without this birdie calculation, the Ramban already points out that the teivah was not possibly big enough to accommodate all its passengers and their food requirements. He observes that even ten teivos of the size that Noach constructed would be vastly insufficient to hold the necessary cargo. It could only exist and survive by a miracle. The Ramban then explains why Noach was required to build the teivah to its insufficient dimensions.

Bird determination

At this point, let us address our opening question: “I know that birds are very determined to get to their destinations, but how do we determine whether they are kosher?”

Chazal observed that there are four simanim of kosher birds (Mishnah Chullin 59a). However, there is a qualitative difference between the identifying characteristics of birds and those that the Torah uses to identify kosher fish and mammals. Any mammal that has fully split hooves and chews its cud is kosher, and any that does not have both of these indicia is not. There are no exceptions; the simanim of the Torah are absolute. Similarly, any fish that has fins and the proper scales (see Ramban, Vayikra 11:9; Rema, Yoreh Deah 83:1) is kosher, and any that does not have these simanim is not kosher. Again, there are no exceptions.

However, when discussing indicia that a bird is kosher, the Mishnah teaches that there are four simanim. Any bird that has all four kosher simanim is kosher. Any bird that has none of the four kosher simanim is not kosher. However, many birds have some of the simanim, but not others, and are still kosher. Yet there are other birds that have some simanim and are not kosher. In other words, a bird that has some of the simanim, but not all, might be kosher and might not be. This means that the simanim can be used sometimes to ascertain whether a bird is kosher, but are not a litmus test. Although the halachically expert hunter mentioned in the Gemara could figure out by process of elimination whether a species is kosher, the only practical way for us to know whether a bird with some simanim and not others is kosher is through mesorah.

For example, the peres and the ozniah, two of the 24 non-kosher varieties, each possesses only one of the kosher simanim and lacks the other three. The oreiv, usually identified as the raven (see Tosafos, Chullin 62a s.v. Mipnei who discusses whether this is accurate) and the zarzur each has two kosher simanim and lack the remaining two, and the remaining 19 types of non-kosher birds each has three of the simanim and lacks only one. (This follows the approach of most interpretations of this passage of Gemara.) But there are other birds that have one, two or three of the simanim and are kosher.

What are the indicia that a bird is kosher? In other words, what are the simanim that if we can identify that a bird has all of them it is definitely kosher? For practical reasons, I am not listing and explaining them in the order of the Mishnah, but according to function. The Mishnah (Chullin 59a) lists four simanim, which include three anatomical features, one external and two internal, and one behavioral.

The external feature, called etzba yeseirah, means that it possesses an “extra claw,” or, according to other opinions, “a larger claw.” The rishonim disagree what exactly this means, some understanding that this claw points in the opposite direction from the other claws of the bird; others explain that this claw protrudes at a higher point on the leg than do the other claws. A third approach understands that the claw protrudes outward farther than the others.

Crop and gizzard

The two internal features of a kosher bird are that it has a crop, and a gizzard that can be peeled manually. To the uninitiated, this sounds fairly strange, particularly, since most of us have never dissected the digestive system of a bird and certainly have never had the opportunity to compare the digestive systems of various types of bird. Let me explain, very briefly:

The crop is an expandable storage pouch for undigested food. It is commonly found among birds that eat seeds and grains for sustenance.

The gizzard is more commonly known to us by its Yiddish name, pupek, whose hard muscle grinds the seeds that a bird eats so that they can then be properly digested.

Don’t chew your food before you swallow it!

Hashem gave these features to small birds who stick to a vegan diet. These allow them to enter fields and meadows and quickly gobble up a large quantity of seed without chewing or digesting them. Then they can disappear to their hiding places before they become somebody’s lunch. Those of us who do not have crops and gizzards would get severe indigestion if we gobbled up our food this way, which is why your mother told you to chew your food slowly and carefully before you swallow it.

Doreis

The behavioral feature is that kosher birds are never doreis. The rishonim debate exactly what this is, but it is a feature that exhibits cruelty in the way the bird seizes and devours prey. The Gemara (Chullin 62b) implies that a bird is non-kosher even if it is doreis very rarely, making it difficult to identify a bird as a non-doreis. It is also important to note that although all birds that are doreis are non-kosher, the inverse is not true — there are varieties of fowl that are not doreis, yet are not kosher.

This leads us to a conundrum raised by Tosafos (Chullin 61a, s.v. Kol Of). Whereas the simanim for kosher mammals and fish are taught by the Torah, the simanim for kosher birds are observations of the Mishnah. But that assumes that Chazal checked carefully every kosher species of bird in the world and determined that not one of them is doreis. How did that happen?

Tosafos rules out the explanation that this was an oral tradition communicated to Moshe Rabbeinu at Har Sinai (halacha leMoshe miSinai) because, if that were true, the Torah need not have mentioned all 24 varieties of non-kosher bird in order to identify all non-kosher varieties. Instead, it could have succinctly taught that all birds that are doreis are non-kosher and then provide the very small list of birds that, despite the fact that they are not doreis, are still not kosher.

Tosafos focuses on who was the only person in world history to have seen and interacted with every species, and that is Noach, who spent months in very close quarters providing the needs of all the terrestrial species of the world. Noach, who knew which birds are kosher and which are not (as explained above), observed that none of the kosher varieties were doreis. Thus, the siman that a doreis is not kosher is an oral tradition dating back to Noach (Chullin 61a, s.v. Kol Of).

The Mishnah records an alternative method of verifying whether a bird is doreis: Rabbi Elazar ben Rabbi Tzadok rules that any bird that splits its talons, two before and two behind, when it grips a rope, is doreis and therefore not kosher (Chullin 59a, as explained there by the Gemara 65a). The halachic authorities quote this statement as definitive.

For the continuation of this article, click here.

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Mezuzah Mystery

Question: The Pantry Predicament

Several frum families have recently moved to an apartment complex where the residences are virtually identical. Each apartment has a small pantry off the kitchen, and we need to know whether its door requires a mezuzah, and if so, where to place it. Each family has asked this question from its posek and collectively there have been four completely different answers.

  1. Sarah was told that she should place a mezuzah on the righthand side of the door as one enters the pantry from the kitchen.
  2. Rivkah was told to place the mezuzah on the opposite side – on the righthand side as one leaves the pantry to reenter the kitchen.
  3. Rachel was told that she does not need a mezuzah at all.
  4. Leah was told to place two mezuzos, one on each side.

How can there be four different opinions how to place the mezuzah? Furthermore, since we know that one always places the mezuzah on the righthand side entering the room (Yoma 11b), why were Rivkah and Leah told to put mezuzos on the left side?

The “Ten Commandments” of Mezuzah

The laws governing where one places a mezuzah are indeed complicated. The Rambam (Hilchos Mezuzah6:1) codifies ten necessary requirements that must be fulfilled for a house or room to be obligated to have a mezuzah. The first of his ten rules is that the room must have a minimum area of four amos by four amos (which is about fifty square feet). In the Rambam’s opinion, it is not necessary that each side be at least four amos wide – if the room or building’s area is at least sixteen square amos one must place a mezuzah on its entrance. Thus, according to the Rambam’s opinion, a room that is three amos wide but six amos long requires a mezuzah.

However, the Rosh and others disagree, contending that a room three amos wide and six amos long does not require a mezuzah since it does not have four amos in each dimension. In other words, he contends that a normal living area must be at least four amos per side.

Although the authorities accept the Rambam’s position as primary halachic opinion, and therefore one is required to place a mezuzah at the doorway to a room that is sixteen square amos even if it is narrower than four amos (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 286:13), we do not recite a beracha when placing only this mezuzah. Instead, one should recite a beracha prior to placing a mezuzah on a different doorway that all authorities require a mezuzah, and after installing that mezuzah, put up a mezuzah on the door of the room that is narrower than four amos (Shach). (This is the general rule that is applied to any case when there is a safek whether one must install a mezuzah. One does not recite a beracha, but it is optimal to place this mezuzah immediately after putting a mezuzah on another doorway that requires a beracha, thereby including the safek situation with the beracha.)

The Gemara (Sukkah 3a) says that a house smaller than four amos squared is considered too small to qualify for what the Torah calls a house, which affects many laws, including that it does not require a mezuzah (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 286:13). A house this small is not large enough for human habitation.

However, there are several important discussion points:

What if the “house” is not meant for general habitation, but is intended for a specific use, for which it is indeed suited, notwithstanding that it is smaller than four amos squared? There are authorities who contend that an area smaller than four amos squared that is suitable for its intended purpose requires a mezuzah. According to those who accept this latter idea, since a pantry is suitable for human use even when it is smaller than fifty square feet, this pantry area requires a mezuzah (Chamudei Daniel, quoted by Pischei Teshuvah). This explains why Sarah was told that she should place a mezuzah on the righthand side entering the pantry. The rav she asked follows the approach of the Chamudei Daniel (see Chovas Hadar of Rav Yaakov Blau, page 38, who cites several other authorities who accept this approach).

Are You Coming or Going?

At this point, I want to explain the answer Rivkah received, which was that one should place a mezuzah on the right entranceway reentering the kitchen from the pantry. Many authorities do not accept the approach of the Chamudei Daniel, contending that since Chazal ruled that a house smaller than four amos squared does not require a mezuzah, this is an inviolate rule, without exception. However, some authorities maintain that although a room this small never requires a mezuzah in its own right, when it connects to a larger room that requires a mezuzah, the doorway between them requires a mezuzah as an entrance to the larger room (Rabbi Akiva Eiger). They contend that if we were to remove the pantry, the doorway to the pantry would still serve as an entrance to the kitchen, and as such it requires a mezuzah. In this case, the mezuzah should be placed on the righthand side entering the kitchen and not entering the pantry.

No Mezuzah Need Apply

At this point, we will explore a third approach to the above question. Rachel’s rav ruled that her pantry doorway requires no mezuzah on either side. This is because he agrees that there is no requirement to place a mezuzah entering the pantry notwithstanding that it is suitable to its purpose, since it is smaller than four amos squared. He also holds that there is no requirement to place a mezuzah entering the kitchen. Whereas Rabbi Akiva Eiger contends that we remove the pantry from the picture and still require a mezuzah because the doorway between the two rooms qualifies as a door entering the kitchen, this third approach understands that the doorway must be viewed exclusively as the entrance to the pantry and not to the kitchen. If the pantry is too small to necessitate a mezuzah, then this doorway does not require a mezuzah at all (Da’as Kedoshim 286:13).

Double Duty

What remains is to explain the answer that Leah received that one must place a mezuzah on both sides. This rabbi appears to be concerned that perhaps the Chamudei Daniel is correct that one must install a mezuzah on the right side entering the pantry, and perhaps Rabbi Akiva Eiger is correct that one must install a mezuzah on the right side entering the kitchen. Although many authorities object to this approach of having mezuzos on both sides (Shu”t Maharam Shik, Yoreh Deah 287), there are authorities who see no problem with having mezuzos on both sides when it is uncertain which side should have the mezuzah (see Shu”t Binyan Tzion 1:100). I would like to note that most authorities object to placing mezuzos on both sides of an entranceway.

Mezuzah Rewards

We touch the mezuzah whenever we enter or exit a building to remind ourselves of Hashem’s presence, which is a physical and spiritual protective shield. Whenever passing a mezuzah, we should remind ourselves of Hashem’s constant protection.

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Squirrels in Kashrus

Most of us are very surprised to discover that a passage of Gemara (Avodah Zarah 68b-69a) discusses the taste of squirrels (see Rashi ad loc.). The quality of their taste is relevant to halacha notwithstanding that squirrels are non-kosher rodents, a category that includes mice, beavers and rats. In the Aramaic dialect of the Gemara, squirrels are called achbara dedabra, literally, achbarim of the field, as opposed to achbara demasa, achbarim of the city, which refers to mice, which are also usually called just achbar (singular; the additional aleph at the end of the word achbara is simply the Aramaic version of the Hebrew word). As the Gemara notes, whereas mice are not favored as cuisine, non-Jewish royal families considered squirrels a delicacy. Even in the United States, two presidents, William Henry Harrison and James Garfield, are known to have favored squirrel stew as White House fare. (Don’t blame this commonality for their short times as president; Harrison died of pneumonia and Garfield was assassinated. Neither died of stomach poisoning!)

When the Torah lists the eight creeping creatures (sheratzim) whose remains generate tumah that contaminates food, people and vessels, one of the eight listed is the achbar (Vayikra 11:29). This factor will actually become significant to our discussion, since the eight sheratzim generate tumah when a very small piece, the size of an adasha, a lentil, is extant.

Rodents are mammals, and the Torah’s definition of kosher animals includes only those that chew their cud and have split hooves, both features that evade all rodents. Thus, all rodents are non-kosher. So, our reader will ask: What halachic difference does it make whether squirrels, mice or beavers are delicacies for the non-Jewish palate or not? Whether they are cooked by Jews or non-Jews they are prohibited min haTorah, so the concept that they might be oleh al shulchan melachim (could be served at a king’s table), and may therefore be included in the prohibition of bishul akum,should be irrelevant; they are very non-kosher!

Understanding properly the passage of Gemara discussing squirrel meat requires a lengthy introduction. When a non-kosher substance mixes into kosher food, and the non-kosher food is removed or can no longer be identified, the food is usually permitted when the kosher food is sixty times the quantity of the non-kosher. Although it is forbidden to eat non-kosher, when the ratio of the non-kosher is so small that it cannot be tasted, the offending substance is nullified, bateil. Chazal arrived at the figure of sixty to one by noting that most prohibited foods will not be tasted when their percentage is this small. However, if the non-kosher food can still be tasted, such as, it possesses a strong flavor, the mixture will still be prohibited, notwithstanding that there is sixty times more kosher than non-kosher.

The same is true when the non-kosher substance is still identifiable in a different way, such as by its consistency. In this instance, the finished product is permitted only if the identifiable non-kosher substance is removed, such as by filtering it out. Similarly, some authorities prohibit consuming a substance that contains a tiny component of non-kosher food coloring. Although it cannot be tasted, it is still noticeable by the color of the product (Pri Megadim, Mishbetzos Zahav 100:1; Minchas Kohen, Sefer Hata’aroves 3:3, quoted by Darkei Teshuvah 102:30; cf. Pri Chadash, Yoreh Deah 102:5; Minchas Yaakov, 74:5; Gra Yoreh Deah 102:6 and Chasam Sofer, quoted by Darkei Teshuvah, who disagree).

Nosein ta’am lifgam

At times, the residual flavor that a food provides is nosein ta’am lifgam, which means that the taste is unappetizing. The tanna’im dispute whether the unappetizingflavor of a non-kosher item into a kosher food renders the food non-kosher. Rabbi Meir contends that nosein ta’am lifgam is prohibited — all residual flavor is prohibited, whether or not it is tasty. Rabbi Shimon disagrees, contending that nosein ta’am lifgam is permitted — the Torah prohibited the appetizing flavor of non-kosher substances, but not an unappetizing non-kosher flavor (Avodah Zarah 67b).

There are many reasons why a food might be nosein ta’am lifgam. One is because the non-kosher food or its residue is mildly spoiled. Another possibility is that people do not enjoy the flavor of that component in this particular food.

We should note that something is considered nosein ta’am lifgam even if it is only mildly distasteful. If most people prefer to eat this mixture without the taste added by the minor ingredient, that flavor qualifies as nosein ta’am lifgam.

The Mishnah (Avodah Zarah 65b) rules that nosein ta’am lifgam is permitted. This is also the conclusion of the Gemara in numerous places (Avodah Zarah 36a, 38b, 39b, 65b, 67b) and that of the halachic authorities (Rambam, Hilchos Ma’achalos Asuros 17:2; Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 103:5; 122:6). Therefore, although eating a food that includes a pleasant taste or residue of non-kosher is prohibited, when the non-kosher is not identifiable in the finished product and does not provide an appetizing flavor, the food is permitted.

Also note that it is never permitted to create a situation of bitul. Bitul is always a concept that exists after the fact – after the prohibited item became mixed in. It is forbidden to intentionally add a non-kosher ingredient to a food, even when it will be bateil in the final product. This rule is called ein mevatlin issur lechatchilah, literally, one cannot create, up front, a situation of bitul.

Rav’s achbar

This lengthy introduction has provided sufficient background to discuss the topic that I promised we would in my opening sentences to this article. The Gemara (Avodah Zarah 68b) tells us the following story: The students of Rav Sheishes’ yeshiva had heard of an incident in which an achbar had fallen into a vat of beer and that the great amora, Rav, had prohibited consumption of the entire vat, even after the achbar was removed. Although absorption of taste usually requires that the two products be heated together, which presumably did not happen to this vat of beer, there are other ways that taste can be transferred from one food to another. One example of this is kavush ki’mevushal, which literally translates as “marinating is like cooking.” A food item that sits in a liquid for 24 consecutive hours causes the flavor of the food and liquid to blend together; if one of them is non-kosher its flavor will prohibit the rest. Unless we are dealing with a salty or pungent food, the rule of kavush ki’mevushal applies only when the two sit together for at least 24 hours. If an ambient non-kosher ingredient lands in a kosher liquid and is removed before 24 hours have passed, the liquid remains kosher after the identifiable parts of the non-kosher matter are removed (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 104:1).

Let us return to our passage of Gemara: An achbar fell into a vat of beer; Rav prohibited the consumption of the entire vat. Why did Rav prohibit the beer? If the taste of marinated mice does not improve beer, this is nosein ta’am lifgam and the beer is permitted!

The students of Rav Sheishes, who had heard about Rav’s ruling, could think of only one option – that Rav accepts the opinion of Rabbi Meir prohibiting nosein ta’am lifgam. This would render the beer forbidden if the achbar was large enough to provide taste into the beer – in other words, there was less than sixty times beer in the vat, relative to the achbar.

The Gemara is not satisfied that Rav followed the stringent ruling of Rabbi Meir, presumably because of the multiplicity of places in which the Mishnah and the Gemara rule that nosein ta’am lifgam is permitted. To resolve Rav’s ruling, the Gemara presents three other approaches to explain why Rav prohibited the beer.

Repulsive foods

Rav Sheishes, the rosh yeshiva to whom the question was referred, contended that there is an exception to the general rule that nosein ta’am lifgam is permitted. In his opinion, a prohibited item that initially has a good taste and now renders a bad taste into another food is permitted because of nosein ta’am lifgam. But this applies only to a prohibited item that originally had a good taste. However, when the Torah forbids something that people find repulsive, the prohibition remains, even if it is nosein ta’am lifgam in a mixture. The logic for this position is that, in these instances, the Torah prohibited an item even though people loathe eating it. Therefore, the Torah was prohibiting even the ill taste of these items.

According to this approach, nosein ta’am lifgam is limited to foods that taste good but do not add benefit to the food in which they are mixed; nosein ta’am lifgam never applies to items that people do not usually consume as food. Since most people do not appreciate the fine taste of mice meat, this is always nosein ta’am lifgam, yet the Torah forbade it notwithstanding. Therefore, in Rav Sheishes’ opinion, a nosein ta’am lifgam of mice remains prohibited, and beer, or any other food or beverage, is forbidden when it contains a flavor from a repulsive, prohibited substance.

Squirrel

A second approach to explain Rav’s ruling is presented by Rav Shimi of Nahardea, who explains that the achbar that fell into the vat of beer was not an achbara demasa, a city achbar, also known as a mouse. It was an achbara dedabra, a squirrel, which non-Jewish royalty considered to be a delicacy. Squirrels are never considered nosein ta’am lifgam. The beer for which this squirrel gave its last moments of total devotion acquired a fine taste because of the squirrel meat. This is a case in which the non-kosher provides a positive flavor to the mixture, and the beer is prohibited for consumption min haTorah. If these are the facts with which Rav was dealing, it is obvious why he forbade the beer.

Beer is different

The final approach the Gemara provides is that of Rava, who is uncertain what Rav held, but suggests that although nosein ta’am lifgam is permitted, marinated mouse improves beer. Tosafos suggests that the mouse improves the fermentation of the beer – but not because of any “mousy” taste profile. The improved fermentation is a positive taste provided by a non-kosher substance, thereby explaining why Rav forbade the beer.

Note that although these are four very different approaches to explaining why Rav ruled stringently, the reasons provided are not mutually exclusive. The halachic authorities conclude that we accept the reason of Rav Shimi of Nahardea that squirrel meat is considered tasty and provides a good flavor into other food (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 104:1). They also consider it a possibility that Rava’s approach is correct — mice might enhance the fermentation of beer.

The halachic authorities infer that the conclusion of the Gemara rejects Rav Sheishes’ approach and, therefore, the principle of nosein ta’am lifgam applies even to something that people find repulsive (Toras Habayis, Bayis 4, end of Sha’ar 1, page 20a; Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 104:3; Gra, Yoreh Deah 104:2).

To review: the halachic conclusion drawn from this passage of Gemara is that there are two ways that we can explain Rav’s ruling:

(1) The achbar that fell into the beer vat was a squirrel, which provides a good taste into the beer (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 104:1). This vat could be marketed as a specialty beer product, but only to a non-Jewish market since it is non-kosher.

(2) Rav’s case was indeed a mouse, not a squirrel, but marinated mouse provides a special positive quality to the fermentation of beer that is not nosein ta’am lifgam.

Both approaches accept that a mouse that fell into oil or wine would not prohibit the product, even if it was more than one part per sixty. This is because it is nosein ta’am lifgam (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 104:2).

Mice in vinegar

Having provided four possible solutions for Rav’s ruling, the Gemara then inquires as to whether an achbar that falls into vinegar provides a good taste or not. According to Tosafos (Avodah Zarah 69a s. v. Eibaya),the Gemara was asking the following: We are aware that pungent foods have the ability to improve tastes that are otherwise nosein ta’am lifgam. (See Mishnah, Avodah Zarah 35b, that chiltis, an exceedingly pungent food, that issliced with a non-kosher knife becomes prohibited, notwithstanding that we usually assume that residual flavors in equipment is already spoiled and nosein ta’am lifgam; see Tosafos, Avodah Zarah 67b; 69a.) This author notes that when examining the formulae used for natural or artificial flavoring, it is common to find components that are inherently very distasteful but, as an ingredient, contribute to a delicious flavor.

The Gemara questions whether vinegar, a very pungent substance, has the ability to turn the nosein ta’am lifgam of mouse meat into a positive flavor.

Shredded mice

The Gemara proceeds to discuss another shaylah. What is the halacha if a mouse was shredded and the shredded pieces fell into a liquid. As we will see, although the Gemara mentions the case when mice shreds fell into vinegar, the halacha will be the same whether they fell into vinegar or any other liquid; it also make no difference whether they were submerged in the liquid for 24 hours or not.

Understanding this discussion also requires an introduction: The Beis Hamikdash contained chambers wherein met the Sanhedrin, the halachic supreme court that was composed of the 71 greatest Torah scholars of the generation. When the Sanhedrin existed, there was a high level of enforcement of the mitzvos of the Torah. In this era, someone eating a Torah-prohibited substance was punishable by malkus. This would happen only when the sinner received a warning that the local beis din might discipline him for his iniquity. At least two eyewitnesses needed to testify that the perpetrator received the warning, acknowledged that he understood it and nevertheless immediately consumed the forbidden food. Only under these circumstances would the beis din punish him. Moreover, the sinner was guilty only if he ate a minimum size of the prohibited food, usually a kezayis, an olive-sized piece.

The rishonim (to Me’ilah 16b) dispute whether the minimum size to receive malkus for violating the prohibition of eating prohibited sheratzim is a kezayis or a smaller size, referred to as a ka’adasha, the size of a lentil bean. Rashi and the Rashba understand that one is chayov malkus for consuming even the smaller size, whereas Tosafos explains that the punishment is meted out only for someone consuming the size equivalent to a kezayis.

In today’s world, we unfortunately do not have the Sanhedrin meeting in the Beis Hamikdash and, consequently, these sins are not prosecuted. Nevertheless, there are halachos that result because the chiyuv malkus for eating a sheretz is even when consuming only a ka’adasha.

The passage of Gemara (Avodah Zarah 69a) prohibits consuming vinegar that contains shredded mouse meat. There are two different reasons why this mixture is prohibited.

1. The shredded pieces of mouse are discernible in the liquid. The only way to permit this liquid is by first filtering out all pieces. This is true regardless of what type of liquid it is, regardless as to whether the non-kosher food tastes good or not, and regardless as to how long the non-kosher food remained in the liquid. The prohibition here is because the non-kosher is discernible in the mixture and therefore not bateil.

2. There is another concern here. Since pieces as small as a ka’adasha of a non-kosher sheretz, of which mice are one of the eight types, can make one culpable for malkus, there is no bitul when pieces this small may still be in the mixture. This would be true even when the kosher food in which it became mixed has its own lumpy parts, such as a stew, cholent or porridge. Chazal prohibited consuming this food because of the possible presence of a piece large enough to be a punishable offense (see Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 104:1). This contrasts with the earlier case of the passage of Gemara in which an achbar fell into beer, but was removed, and therefore the question was only about the taste left in the beer by the achbar.

We should always hope and pray that the food we eat fulfills all the halachos that the Torah commands us.

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Shaving and Haircuts during the Three Weeks

Question #1: Bushy presenter

“My company sent me out of town to meet a new client, and I forgot to have my hair cut before Shiva Asar BeTamuz. May I have the bushier parts trimmed? Does it make a difference if I use a non-Jewish barber? May I shave?”

Question #2: Mixed shavers

“My son wrote me that, in his yeshiva in Eretz Yisroel, the Sefardic bochurim shave during the Three Weeks. Is this permitted?”

Question #3: Celebrating a bris!!

“Thank G-d, we will be celebrating the bris of a grandson during the Three Weeks, and I do not want to look disheveled for the bris photos. May I shave in honor of the occasion?”

Question #4: Tichel tattling

“My hair is sticking out beyond my tichel. May I trim it?”

The three-week period between Shiva Asar BeTamuz and Tisha B’Av is observed by klal Yisroel as a time of mourning. These three weeks heralded the beginning of the tragedies that took place prior to the destruction of both Batei Hamikdash. Prior to the destruction of the First Beis Hamikdash, the daily korban tamid ceased on Shiva Asar BeTamuz and did not resume until the Jews began constructing the Second Beis Hamikdash seventy years later (see Rambam, Hilchos Taanis 5:2). Before the destruction of the Second Beis Hamikdash, the walls of the city of Yerushalayim were breached on Shiva Asar BeTamuz, leading to the complete devastation that followed (Taanis 28b).

To commemorate these tragic events, the custom is to observe some mourning practices (aveilus) from the 17th day of Tamuz until Tisha B’Av (Rama, Darchei Moshe, Orach Chayim 551:5 and Hagahos 551:2; Ben Ish Chai, Parshas Devorim #4; Knesses Hagedolah; Sdei Chemed Vol. 5, pg. 279 #14). This three-week season is referred to by the Midrash Rabbah (Eicha 1:3) as the period of Bein Hametzarim. (It is noteworthy that neither the Mishnah nor the Gemara makes any mention of beginning the mourning period any earlier than Rosh Chodesh.)

WHAT ARE THE LAWS ABOUT HAVING HAIRCUTS AND SHAVING DURING THE THREE WEEKS?

The Mishnah (Taanis 26b) rules that it is prohibited to cut one’s hair from the Motza’ei Shabbos preceding Tisha B’Av until Tisha B’Av. These days are referred to as shavua shechal bo Tisha B’Av, the week in which Tisha B’Av falls. This year, when Tisha B’Av falls on Sunday, there is no shavua shechal bo Tisha B’Av. However, the Rama notes that the custom among Ashkenazim is that we do not cut our hair during the entire Three Weeks (Darchei Moshe, Orach Chayim 551:5 and Hagahos 551:4). As a general rule, the halachos of shaving and cutting one’s hair are the same.

There are different customs among Sefardim as to whether they get their hair cut during the Three Weeks. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 551:3) prohibits only that which is recorded in the Gemara, cutting hair from Motza’ei Shabbos until Tisha B’Av, and this is the prevalent practice among Sefardim today in Eretz Yisroel (Shu’t Yechaveh Daas 4:36), which means that there is no prohibition this year. Others shave and get haircuts until Rosh Chodesh, but stop after that point.

However, other Sefardic communities follow the Ashkenazic practice not to shave or get haircuts the entire period of Bein Hametzarim (Ben Ish Chai, Parshas Devorim #12). (Incidentally, the Shulchan Aruch [Orach Chayim 551:4] permits having one’s hair cut immediately after Tisha B’Av is over even when Tisha B’Av does not fall on Sunday, and does not require waiting until the next day.)

SEFARDIM LIVING IN AN ASHKENAZI COMMUNITY

May a Sefardi living in an Ashkenazi community be lenient, despite the prevalent custom?

This issue is discussed by contemporary authorities, involving the general halachic rule that a community should follow one established practice. This principle is referred to by the Gemara as “lo sisgodedu,” do not give the appearance that different Torah communities received different versions of the Torah, G-d forbid (Yevamos 14a, as explained by Rashi). This law prohibits a Jewish community from following two conflicting customs. Thus, it would seem that an Ashkenazi living in a Sefardic community or vice versa must observe the prevailing custom.

However, contemporary poskim rule that Ashkenazim living in Sefardic communities may observe Ashkenazic custom, and Sefardim living in Ashenazic communities may continue to follow Sefardic practice. Therefore, Sefardic bochurim studying in an Ashkenazic yeshiva are permitted to shave until Rosh Chodesh or during the entire Three Weeks, depending on their minhag. Even though most of the students in the yeshiva follow the Ashkenazic practice of not shaving during the entire Three Weeks, it does not violate minhag hamakom for the Sefardic bochurim to shave (Shu’t Yechaveh Daas 4:36).

WHY DOES THIS NOT VIOLATE LO SISGODEDU?

Even though there is a general rule that a community should follow one halachic practice, this is true when the community has one rav or follows the guidance of one beis din. However, when there are two different batei din in a community, each beis din is free to rule as it sees fit and does not need to change its decision to avoid lo sisgodedu. Thus, the prohibition of lo sisgodedu applies only when there are two different practices in one beis din.

Similarly, when it is well-known that there are different communities, each may observe its own well-established practice, even if they are in the same location. Therefore, Ashkenazim and Sefardim following different minhagim is not a violation of lo sisgodedu. As a result, Sefardic bachurim may shave during the Three Weeks, even if they study in an Ashkenazic yeshiva, since it is understood that they are following a different psak.

EXTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCES

There are several situations in which Ashkenazim are permitted to shave or take a haircut during the Three Weeks. For example, it is permitted to trim one’s mustache, if it interferes with eating (Ran; Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 551:13). Some poskim rule that a person who usually shaves every day is permitted to shave during the Three Weeks in honor of Shabbos (Shu’t Chasam Sofer, Yoreh Deah #348 s.v. Ve’i golach). Others permit a person to shave if his beard stubble makes him very uncomfortable (see Shearim Ha’metzuyanim Behalachah 122:5). However, since these last two psakim are not usually accepted, one should not rely on them without receiving a psak from a rav.

Someone who is in aveilos is not permitted to shave or have his hair cut until the end of the Sheloshim (30 days), and someone in aveilos for a parent, for several months. If the aveilos ended during the Three Weeks, he is permitted to have his hair cut, since he could not cut it before Shiva Asar BeTamuz (Be’er Heiteiv 551:18). Most poskim permit this even during the Nine Days, assuming his aveilos ended then (Bach; Taz; Mishnah Berurah 551:87; cf. however, Elyah Rabbah).

SHAVING BECAUSE OF FINANCIAL LOSS

Rav Moshe Feinstein rules that one may shave during the Three Weeks if he may lose his job or customers because he does not shave. However, if the only concern is that people will make fun of him, he is not permitted to shave. Rav Moshe Feinstein contends that since the prohibition not to shave the entire Three Weeks began as a minhag, the custom was originally established only when one would not suffer financially as a result. However, if he would suffer only embarrassment or harassment, but no loss of income, he is required to remain unshaven (Shu’t Igros Moshe, Choshen Mishpat 1:93; Orach Chayim 4:102). Thus, someone who makes a business trip may shave, since making a bad impression on the potential customer could cost him business. Certainly, one is not required to jeopardize his employment by avoiding shaving during the Three Weeks.

SHAVING FOR A SIMCHA

If a bris occurs during the Three Weeks, the father of the baby, the mohel, and the sandek who holds the baby during the bris are permitted to shave or take a haircut in honor of the festive occasion (Shu’t Chasam Sofer, Orach Chayim #158). According to some poskim, the kvatter, who brings the baby to the bris, and the sandek meumad (also called amida lebrochos), who holds the baby while he is being named, are also permitted to shave or take a haircut (Shearim Ha’metzuyanim Behalachah, Kuntrus Acharon 120:8, based on Elyah Rabbah 551:27 and Beis Meir, Orach Chayim 551). Thus, the grandfather who asked whether he may shave or cut his hair in honor of his grandson’s bris during the Three Weeks may do so, if he receives the honor of being sandek. If he receives a different honor, he should ask a shaylah as to whether he may shave in honor of the occasion.

The poskim dispute whether the baalei simcha are permitted to shave even if the bris occurs during the Nine Days or only if it occurs before Rosh Chodesh. (The Chasam Sofer, Shu’t Noda Biyehudah 1:28, Shaarei Teshuvah, and Sdei Chemed 5:278:3 permit, whereas the Be’er Heiteiv 551:3 prohibits.)

CHOSON

Question: May someone who got married before the 17th of Tamuz shave during his Sheva Brachos week? May someone attending a Sheva Brachos shave in honor of the occasion?

The week after a couple gets married is considered a Yom Tov for them, and they should wear Yom Tov clothing and eat festivemeals. Similarly, they are not permitted to go to work. Part of the celebration is that they should look like two celebrants. Thus, it would seem that the choson may shave during his Sheva Brachos week.

However, for the participant in the Sheva Brachos it is not a Yom Tov, so he would not be permitted to shave for the occasion.

Some poskim hold that a bar mitzvah bochur who needs a haircut may get one during the Three Weeks, as long as it is not during the week of Tisha B’Av. Others contend that it is better if he gets the haircut the day before he turns bar mitzvah and rely on the opinion that a minor may get a haircut during the Three Weeks, as I will discuss shortly (Shearim Ha’metzuyanim Behalachah, Kuntrus Acharon 120:8).

UPSHEREN

Although some poskim permit scheduling an upsheren (chalakah) during the Three Weeks if the child was born during the Three Weeks, the prevalent practice is to postpone the upsheren until after Tisha B’Av (Piskei Teshuvos 551:44; Chanoch Lana’ar, Chapter 21, ftn. 1).

Adults may not give children haircuts during the week of Tisha B’Av (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 551:14). There is a dispute whether a minor may get a haircut during the Three Weeks, some poskim contending that children were not included in the custom not to cut hair (Mishnah Berurah 551:82, quoting Chayei Odom), whereas others rule that one may not cut a child’s hair, just as one may not cut an adult’s (Elyah Rabbah 551:28).

There are different opinions among the poskim whether a woman may have her hair cut during the Three Weeks. The Mishnah Berurah rules that a woman may not have her hair cut during the week of Tisha B’Av, but he suggests that she may be permitted to trim the hair on her temples that sticks out from the tichel (Mishnah Berurah 551:79). Many poskim rule that a woman may tweeze her eyebrows and perform similar cosmetic activities, even during the week of Tisha B’Av (Halichos Beisah, Chapter 25, footnote 70; Piskei Teshuvos 551:43; however, see Shu’t Igros Moshe, Yoreh Deah 2:137, who appears to be more stringent).

MAY I CLIP MY FINGERNAILS DURING THE THREE WEEKS?

It is permitted to clip one’s fingernails during the Three Weeks and the Nine Days according to all opinions. There is a dispute whether one may clip one’s nails during the week of Tisha B’Av (Magen Avraham, 551:11 permits, whereas Taz 551:13 and Elyah Rabbah 551:7 prohibit).

CONCLUSION

The prophet Yeshaya declared: “Exult with Yerushalayim and rejoice over her, all those who love her. Rejoice with her rejoicing all those who mourned over her,” (Yeshaya 66:10). “From here we see,” says the Gemara, “that whoever mourns over Yerushalayim will merit to see her happiness, and whoever does not mourn over Yerushalayim will not merit to see her happiness” (Taanis 30b).

May we all merit to experience the happiness of Yerushalayim very soon!

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May I Attend a Wedding During the Three Weeks?

Question:

I live in a predominantly Ashkenazic community where the “Three Weeks” are observed with no music, and certainly no celebrations or weddings. A Sefardic family in the neighborhood has scheduled a wedding during the Three Weeks.

(A) May they do so? Should we stop them from breaking the community’s custom?

(B) May an Ashkenazi attend the wedding? May he/sheremain while music is playing orjoin the dancing?

Answer:

Before answering these questions, we must first understand the halachic and historical background to the observances of the period between the Seventeenth of Tamuz and Tisha B’Av, whichthe Midrash refers to as the period of Bein HaMetzarim, between the troubles (Midrash Rabbah, Eicha 1:3).

WHAT DID THE MISHNAH FORBID?

It is noteworthy that neither the Mishnah nor the Gemara requires any commemoration of mourning during the month of Tamuz. The earliest source to mention a mourning period, the Mishnah, requires mourning only from the beginning of the month of Av since “Mishenichnas Av mema’atim b’simcha,” “Once Av enters, we decrease our happiness” (Taanis 26b). This includes the Nine Days that begin on Rosh Chodesh Av and continuethrough Tisha B’Av. The Mishnah makesno mention of any observances before Rosh Chodesh.

Although the Mishnah does not clarify what practices are forbidden during the Nine Days, simply stating that “we decrease our happiness,”the Gemara (Yevamos 43a)lists several activities that are consequently forbidden, including refraining from conducting weddings (see the Ramban in Toras HaAdam, page 244 of the Mosad Rav Kook edition). However, this proscription against weddings during the time leading up to Tisha B’Av prohibits them only during the Nine Days.

WHO FORBADE MARRYING DURING THE THREE WEEKS?

If neither the Mishnah nor the Gemara prohibited marrying before Rosh Chodesh Av, why do we observe mourning from the Seventeenth of Av?

The Rama (Darchei Moshe 551:5 and Hagahos 551:2) notes that accepted Ashkenazic practice forbids marriage from the Seventeenth of Tamuz onwards. Since the Tur (Fourteenth Century) mentions no such custom, it seems that Ashkenazim adopted the custom some time after the Tur’s era, extending the proscription against weddings for the entire three weeks. Thus, whereas mourning during the “The Nine Days” is already mentioned by the Mishnah and has the status of a rabbinic injunction (takanas chachamim), the Three Weeks developed only about 1300 years later and is therefore categorized as minhag, custom. (Of course, we must observe minhagim of this nature; but we often find that they do not apply under extenuating circumstances.)

Why did custom extend the takanas chachamim and prohibit these activities on these additional days? After all, if our Sages felt that nine days of commemoration of the Churban is sufficient, why should minhag extend it to an entire three weeks?

I once heard an explanation that since earlier generations were much more cognizant of the loss of the Churban, a few days were a sufficient memorial for them. Today, however, we require a greater reminder to reinforce our consciousness of the Churban.

SEFARDIC PRACTICE

Although the Rama, a primary Ashkenazic source, mentions the three-week mourning period, the Shulchan Aruch, the main Sefardic source, makes no mention of extending mourning before Rosh Chodesh. It appears that in his day and place there was still no observance of “Three Weeks”but only of “Nine Days.” However, other Sefardic authorities mention that this practice spread to their communities (Keneses HaGedolah, Hagahos Tur end of 551; Ben Ish Chai, Parshas Devarim #4; Kaf HaChayim 551:33, 101), and by the Nineteenth Century, it appears that most Sefardic communities observed the entire Three Weeks period, certainly to the extent of prohibiting weddings. For example, the Ben Ish Chai assumed that weddings are not performed the entire Three Weeks, as did the Sedei Chemed.

CRIMEAN CUSTOM

Although most of us associate Crimea with the war by that name, one of the many waged between the Moslem Ottoman Turks and Orthodox Christian Czarist Russia, there was actually a thriving Jewish community there for hundreds of years. The Sedei Chemed records that when he became Rav of the Crimea (then a Sefardic community) he was requested to perform a wedding at the end of Tamuz. At first, he refusedto do so, stating that this violates accepted custom. He then researched the community records and discovered several instances when weddings were conducted at the end of Tamuz. Concluding that the custom not to marry before Rosh Chodesh had never reached the Crimea, he permitted the wedding and performed the ceremony himself (Vol. 5, pg. 279 #14).

THE CUSTOMS OF BAGHDAD

Apparently, some of these practices varied within the very same community. For example, the Ben Ish Chai, who was the Rav of Baghdad in the nineteenth century, records that Sefardim do not marry during the entire three-week period, although Rav Ovadyah Yosef quotes from Rav Solomon Chugi Avodi, the Chief Rabbi of Baghdad in the 1940’s, that in his day they conducted weddings there until Rosh Chodesh. Of course, this is strange: once it became Baghdadi custom to ban weddings for the entire Three Weeks, how could one subsequently permit them? Rav Ovadyah suggests that indeed the Ben Ish Chai, a very holy person, was more involved with his halachic and kabbalistic studies than in noting the community practices.

Rav Ovadyah contends that many Sefardic communities permit weddings until Rosh Chodesh Av, and that this was the accepted practice among Sefardim in Eretz Yisrael. Furthermore, he maintains that Sefardim from communities in the exile that prohibited weddings during the entire Three Weeks may follow the more lenient practice upon moving to Eretz Yisrael. This follows the general approach that upon relocating permanently one follows the accepted practices, including even the leniencies, of one’s new domicile (Shu”t Yabia Omer 6: Orach Chayim #43). He further notes that upon becoming the Chief Rabbi of Tel Aviv in 5729 (1969), he discovered that the Chief Rabbinate there had banned weddings for the entire Three Weeks period. He instructed the administrators that they could henceforth schedule weddings for members of the Sefardic community from the Seventeenth of Tamuz until the end of the month, in accordance with the accepted practice among Sefardic communities in Israel. Of course, Ashkenazic practice, both in Tel Aviv and everywhere else, remained to prohibit marriages during the entire three-week period.

SOMEONE NEVER MARRIED BEFORE

Although the Gemara prohibits marrying during the first nine days of Av, there is halachic discussion whether this injunction applies even to someone who does not yet have a son and a daughter, and has therefore not yet fulfilled the mitzvah of peru urvu, be fruitful and multiply. Indeed, many prominent authorities permit such a man to marry during this period.

WHERE DO WE SEE SUCH A DISTINCTION?

When drought strikes a community, its leadership should declare a series of fasts and other mourning customs as a spur to teshuvah (Taanis 10a-12b). Included in these enactments is to not perform weddings during this period. However, this rule does not extend to those who have not yet fulfilled the mitzvah of peru urvu. The regulations do not apply, if as a result, people will not perform a mitzvah.

The Beis Yosef (Orach Chayim 551) asks why this exception is mentioned only regarding marrying during a drought, but not in the context of marrying during the Nine Days. He suggests three possible explanations why even someone who has not yet fulfilled peru urvu should not marry during the Nine Days:

1. There are two reasons why people do not marry during the Nine Days:

(A) It is a mourning period.

(B) It is not a good omen to marry during the season that tragic events befell the Jewish people.

Because people want to marry during a time of good omen, they refrain from marrying during the Nine Days even where it is halachically permitted, such as when one has not yet fulfilled peru urvu.

2. The Nine Days, as a period of public bereavement, are more stringent than a period of drought, which is a period of teshuvah rather than mourning. Therefore, weddings are not conducted during the Nine Days, even if this results in people postponing the mitzvah of peru urvu.

3. Since the prohibition against marriage caused by a drought may extend for a long time, we do not want people to postpone their weddings that long. But it is not unreasonable to postponeweddings for nine days, the limit enacted by Chazal.

There is a halachic difference among these reasons. If the basis is only that it is not a good omen, then someone who is not concerned may schedule a wedding during these days.

The Shevus Yaakov (2:35) discusses whether someone who has not yet fulfilled peru urvu may marry during the Three Weeks, even according to Ashkenazic custom. He conjectures that this wedding be permitted based on the fact that a mourner who has not yet fulfilled mitzvas peru urvu may marry even during his thirty days of sheloshim. However, he concludes that the wedding must be postponed until after Tisha B’Av, ruling that a public mourning season is stricter than an individual’s private mourning.

One can rally sources from earlier authorities both in favor of and in opposition to the Shevus Yaakov’s conclusion. The Shulchan Aruch does not mention whether someone who has not yet fulfilled peru urvu may marry during the Nine Days, implying that such a person may not. On the other hand, the Rama (551:2) rules that, in general, the prohibitions of the Three Weeks and the Nine Days do not apply to someone who is fulfilling a mitzvah. Upon the basis of this Rama, the Chayei Adam (133:11) rules that someone who has not fulfilled peru urvu may indeed marry even during the Nine Days, although he notes that the custom is not to. The Kaf HaChayim (551:33, 101) cites this Chayei Adam, but disagrees with him, quoting other authorities who conclude that even someone who has not yet fulfilled peru urvu should not marry during the Nine Days. It is interesting that the Kaf HaChayim concludes that a childless Ashkenazi has more basis to be lenient and marry than a childless Sefardi, since the Rama permits one to override restrictions of the Bein HaMetzarim period in order to fulfill a mitzvah, whereas the Beis Yosef concludes otherwise!

Other Sefardic authorities rule that someone who has not yet fulfilled peru urvu may marry even during the Nine Days and certainly during the Three Weeks (Shu”t Yabia Omer). (It is noteworthy that some authorities permit music and dancing at a sheva berachos celebrated during the Three Weeks because of the same rationale: that performing a mitzvah supersedes the mourning of the season [see Kaf HaChayim 551:40].)

Nevertheless, established practice in our locales is not to marry during the entire Three Weeks period, even for someone who has not yet fulfilled the mitzvah of peru urvu. Does this mean that a Sefardi who follows the practice of marrying before Rosh Chodesh (or those who permit marriage for someone who has not fulfilled peru urvu) may not marry if he lives in a predominantly Ashkenazi community?

We can now refer back to our original question:

I live in a predominantly Ashkenazic community wherethe “Three Weeks” are observed with no music, and certainly no celebrations or weddings. A Sefardic family in the neighborhood has scheduled a wedding during the Three Weeks. May they do so? Should we stop them from breaking the community’s custom?

This takes us into a different area of halacha – must the entire community observe the same practice?

LO SISGODADU – DO NOT FORM DISPARATE GROUPS

Generally, a community is required to observe one practice so that it does not appear that Hashem’s chosen people are following two different versions of the Torah, G-d forbid (Yevamos 13b). Because of this law, the Rama requires that an entire community observes the mourning of the sefirah period during the same dates (Darchei Moshe 493:3). It would appear that this same prohibition applies during the Three Weeks. This would result in prohibiting someone who has a different halachic custom from marrying during the Three Weeks, even if he has not yet fulfilled peru urvu, if this practice conflicts with the prevailing custom.

However, several prominent authorities note that a community that has only one beis din or one rav must universally follow the same interpretation of halacha. Where there are many kehillos in a city, each with its own custom or halachic authority, each community may follow its own accepted practice or authority (Yevamos 14a). For this reason, there is no requirement that everyone in a large city follow the same custom for sefirah, unless it has been accepted that the community has one standard practice (Shu”t Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 1:159).

Based on the same logic, it is usually accepted that Ashkenazim and Sefardim following different approaches is not a violation of lo sisgodadu. As a result, Rav Ovadyah Yosef permits Sefardic bachurim studying in an Ashkenazi Yeshiva to shave during the Three Weeks, since it is understood that they are following a different custom (Shu”t Yechaveh Daas 4:36). For the final ruling in your community, I defer to your local rav.

ATTENDING THE WEDDING

We may now address Question (B) that I asked at the beginning of this article: May an Ashkenazi attend the wedding of someone whose halachic authority permitted it? Assuming that one may attend, may one listen to music or dance at such a wedding, since music and dancing are generally prohibited during the Three Weeks (Magen Avraham 551:10; Elyah Rabbah 551:6)?

Authorities discuss whether one may attend and dance at a wedding during the period that one observes sefirah. Rav Moshe Feinstein and others permit attending such a wedding, including listening to music and dancing (Shu”t Igros Moshe 1:159). However, Rav Moshe rules that, when going to a wedding on a day that one keeps sefirah, he should not shave unless his unkempt appearance will disturb the simcha (Shu”t Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 2:95). So perhaps we can compare his ruling to a similar situation during the Three Weeks. On the other hand, since there is a distinction between the intensity of the mourning of the Three Weeks and that of sefirah, I suggest that anyone faced with this question ask his own shaylah.

FOCUS OF THE THREE WEEKS

The most important aspect of the Three Weeks is to focus on the tremendous loss we suffer because of the destruction of the Beis Hamikdash. In many kehillos, there is a minhag to sit on the floor each day of the Three Weeks just after midday and to recite part of Tikkun Chatzos that mourns the loss of the Beis Hamikdash. The Yesod VeShoresh HaAvodah even prohibits any laughing and small talk during these weeks, just as a mourner does not engage in laughter or small talk (Shaar 9, Ch. 11-12).

Although we may not be holding on such a madreigah, we should certainly contemplate the tremendous loss in our spiritual lives because we live without the Beis Hamikdash. Let us pray intensely for the restoration of the Beis Hamikdash and the return of the Divine Presence to Yerushalayim, speedily in our days!

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The Rosh Hayeshiva, Rav Ruderman

In commemoration of my Rosh Yeshiva’s yahrzeit, which is this Thursday, the 14th of Tamuz:

For clarity, I included the Rosh Yeshiva’s family name in the title, but, because of the way I always call him and because of my relationship with him, I will refer to him throughout this article simply as “the Rosh Yeshiva.” I cannot bring myself to refer to him any other way.

As a very American high school graduate, raised in a frum, New York family, I arrived in Ner Yisrael planning to stay one year in full-time yeshiva. My life was all planned out. I already had a scholarship to a good college in New York City and was the winner of a New York State Regents Scholarship, which would provide me with extra money while attending college. I planned to combine my daily college attendance with some yeshiva education while I achieved my B.A. degree, probably with a major in psychology, and then I intended to pursue my professional career, either to attend graduate school to become a psychologist or, more likely, to attend a top law school and become an attorney.

I had accepted my high school menahel’s suggestion to spend a year in yeshiva full-time before starting college. He suggested that I attend Ner Yisrael for a year, which did not pose any conflict with my long-term plans, either for myself or for my father, because of the yeshiva’s reputation for not being opposed to “college.”

Having arranged that my slot in college and the scholarship wait for a year, I arrived in Ner Yisrael. After one year in yeshiva, I decided to stay for another year and extended my slot in college and my scholarship for another year. After two years, I was told that my New York State’s Regents Scholarship would not be renewed anymore. I decided to spend another year in yeshiva, and then another. Now, decades later, I presume that there is still a place for me in the college I was supposed to attend but never did. Instead, extensive reading supplied my secular education, whereas learning, teaching and spreading Torah to Klal Yisrael became my life’s aspiration and commitment. Clearly, my vision for what I wanted to do with my life changed very significantly, albeit highly gradually.

How did this happen? Certainly not overnight. As a high school senior, I remember questioning the study of Bava Basra, a mesechta whose halachic issues discuss whether it is my financial responsibility to provide a neighbor privacy in his yard and whether using a field for three years enforces claiming ownership of the property. Obviously, these reasons would not establish a legal claim in today’s world, so why devote time to arcane, non-practical matters? Shouldn’t we be studying only practical topics like Shabbos or Berachos? This was the perspective of a senior from a frum background in a quality yeshiva high school. Yet, somehow the yeshiva changed my entire life’s priorities without my ever feeling that I was threatened. To understand how the yeshiva accomplished this, we need to understand the greatness of who the Rosh Yeshiva was.

That the Rosh Yeshiva was one of the greatest talmidei chachamim of his era is an undisputed fact, but provides little understanding of his brilliance as an educator. That he had absorbed the wellsprings of the Slabodka approach to mussar and personal development from its original proponent and builder, Rav Nosson Tzvi Finkel, the Alter of Slabodka, is also true, but does not convey to us anything of meaning. Nor does the fact that his head stored the collected knowledge of tens of thousands of seforim explain the success of the yeshiva he founded. And noting his regal comportment does not clarify our perception of his pedagogic genius. Instead, I will attempt to show how I, as one young talmid, was influenced on a daily basis, without my noticing that it was happening. Others will have different stories but, the results were usually parallel. Parallel, but not identical, because the Rosh Yeshiva developed our latent, individual abilities far greater than I have seen by any master of the literature of contemporary educational theory.

Furthermore, the cultural difference between the Rosh Yeshiva and us American boys should have been overwhelming. The Rosh Yeshiva was the age of our grandfathers (the few of us who had grandfathers), he spoke only Yiddish (which none of us did), had grown up in the poverty of eastern Europe and had been raised from the cradle in a culture in which Torah study was the highest, and perhaps only, goal. We were all baseball playing, typically spoiled, middle-class American kids, interested in eventually developing a comfortable, professional lifestyle. Of course, the most important part of the daily newspaper was the sports section. How did the Rosh Yeshiva bridge this gap to be such a successful educator and role model!

Let me mention some specific observations and anecdotes about the Rosh Yeshiva’s method of teaching and the yeshiva he built. The Rosh Yeshiva, who had a serious case of phlebitis, was medically required to go for walks to the extent that he could. As talmidim, we would often take the Rosh Yeshiva for walks. (I note that this was done, officially, during the time that, according to the usual yeshiva schedule, we should be in the Beis Medrash studying with our chavrusos.) If you did not prepare questions to ask the Rosh Yeshiva, he would ask you where you were up to in the Gemara, and ask you questions that demonstrated your level of absorption of the material. These were usually inquiries that did not have obvious answers. He would ask you what you thought the correct approach was.

It was not until many years later that I realized the humor of the scenario. The Rosh Yeshiva knew thousands of seforim by heart. There was nowhere in Torah that we would have any information that he did not know. Yet, rather than bamboozle us with his chiddushim, his novel approaches, or his massive Torah knowledge, as many roshei yeshiva would do, he asked us, as if he did not know the answer to the question. Was it possible that we might think of an answer that he had not seen or thought of? Highly unlikely. His goal was to build confidence in us to think independently and seek answers to Torah questions from within ourselves.

Over the years, I have been able to write many articles and full-length works on Torah topics. Many have asked me, where did I learn to think so independently? Initially my answer was incredulous. Is there any other way to learn Torah? This is the way I was taught how to analyze Torah sources. And then I realized that in Ner Yisrael we received an education that included how to use our own best resources – that blessed brain that G-d gave us – and lots of sweat – to plumb the original Torah material until we were satisfied with the approach at which we arrived. And that approach would remain with us as the truth of Torah until such time as we realized that we may not have understood the sources correctly. At that moment, our need for absolute intellectual honesty would teach us to review and potentially revise our understanding.

I will include a few anecdotes that I witnessed during the Yom Kippur and Sukkos season of holidays. I note that these stories indicate very different aspects of the Rosh Yeshiva’s greatness: His skill at molding people to serve Hashem and how to be a mentsch, not by force of personality, but by example.

The machzor

There is a famous story, which I personally witnessed, about the Rebbitzen’s machzor. One Rosh Hashanah musaf, we saw that the Rosh Yeshiva had davened his quiet shemoneh esrei near the doorway of the Beis Medrash, instead of at his usual place in the center of the front of the Beis Medrash. Why had he davened there?

The Rebbitzen was homebound in those days (her health had been failing; she predeceased the Rosh Yeshiva by several years). When the Rosh Yeshiva was about to begin the musaf shemoneh esrei, he realized that when he had left home (after making Kiddush before the shofar blowing), he had mistakenly taken the Rebbitzen’s machzor with him. Realizing that the Rebbitzen would want to use her familiar machzor, the Rosh Yeshiva immediately walked home (not an easy walk for him at his age) to make sure that the Rebbitzen had her machzor, and then returned to yeshiva to join the davening of the quiet shemoneh esrei in progress. This became his uppermost concern prior to the musaf shemoneh esrei of Rosh Hashanah, a prayer that he told us annually was of utmost importance. A lesson in respect for one’s wife that you never forget.

Prior to a Yom Tov, the wife of one of the prominent chavrei hakollel had given birth to twins, and they had one other child, about three years old, at the time. Because of the timing, no extended family was available to help out at the house. This yungerman understood that his responsibility for Yom Tov was to help his wife at home and not to attend davening in shul. Apparently, at the time that kerias haTorah would occur, things at home were quiet, and he came to the Beis Medrash, three-year-old in tow, because, after all, he could daven at home, but he could not hear kerias haTorah at home. Immediately, the Rosh Yeshiva called him over and sent him home. Your mitzvah for this Yom Tov is to take care of your wife and children, not to hear kerias haTorah or come to the Beis Medrash. A lesson in family responsibility that you never forget.

On the longer winter Friday nights, I would often visit the Rosh Yeshiva and his rebbitzen at their house on the yeshiva campus. The conversations were always about what life was like in Eastern Europe, in the town of Slabodka and similar matters. The rebbitzen participated in the conversations very freely, and the Rosh Yeshiva was very forthcoming with information, stories, insights and observations. It was completely natural and informal. I had no sense in the slightest that I was wasting his time or preoccupying him with matters when he would rather be studying Torah. He was too great for that. This is a lesson that I have thought about, although I admit to falling far short of his abilities in this area also.

One insight of mine is that the Rosh Yeshiva would answer any question that I asked him about any matter – with one major exception. When I asked him about the greatness of the Alter of Slabodka and his abilities to create so many gedolei Yisrael from his disciples, the Rosh Yeshiva would not answer. All he would do was allude to the incredible greatness of who the Alter was. Anything more than that was sacred territory on which the Rosh Yeshiva would not tread.

Perhaps I should follow his lead and refrain from discussing the greatness of the Rosh Yeshiva. But I feel this would deprive future generations of an appreciation of who he was, and, perhaps by some extension, a sense of the greatness of his rebbe, the Alter.

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The Saga of the Frying Pan

Parshas Chukas is the first time the Jewish People found themselves with lots of treif keilim.

Photo by Zedcor Wholly Owned on Freeimages.com

Question #1: It Fries through the Air

When the frying oil is all absorbed, is the food considered cooked directly by fire?

Question #2: With the Greatest of Grease

How do you kasher a commercial deep fryer?

Question #3: The Daring Young Pan

Can a frying pan present a daring challenge?

Question #4: On the Frying Trapeze

How do you kasher a frying trapeze? (I also have not yet figured out what that is.)

Kashering

The Torah teaches the halachic process whereby we kasher a utensil, when it commands, kol davar asher yavo vo’eish ta’aviru vo’eish, “Any item that entered fire, shall be passed through fire” (Bamidbar 31:23), thereby implying that kashering a utensil that became non-kosher through direct contact with a flame requires burning the appliance in a flame — no other process will sufficiently kasher this utensil.

The Mishnah (Avodah Zarah 75b) teaches that, upon purchasing used kitchen equipment from a gentile, one kashers the equipment via one of the following procedures:

1) That which is used to broil or roast food directly in fire must be kashered directly in fire, a process called libun. As examples of this rule, the Mishnah chooses a barbecue spit and a grate used for roasting. Since these utensils absorbed non-kosher ta’am directly through fire, they must be kashered by burning them in fire.

2) That which is usually used for cooking in a liquid medium must be kashered in boiling water, which is called hag’alah. Bear in mind that it must be fully clean and rust-free before it is kashered.

Kebol’o kach polto

This Mishnah teaches a rule called kebol’o kach polto, the same way a vessel absorbed non-kosher substance is the way one uses to kasher it. If a utensil; absorbed the food directly through fire, hag’alah, i.e., placing the utensil in a pot of boiling water, will not remove the residue of prohibited substance sufficiently to kasher it.However, if a prohibited or chometz-dik food was cooked in a pot, it can be kashered by hag’alah, which boils out what was absorbed.

Libun versus hag’alah

Hag’alah will remove sufficiently what was absorbed by cooking (Taz, Yoreh Deah 121:7; see Pri Megadim, Orach Chayim 452:4 in Mishbetzos Zahav). Most late authorities understand that the dissimilarity between libun and hag’alah is because the two methods of kashering operate in different ways. Libun removes the non-kosher residue by burning it in situ, similar to the way we destroy the last remnants of our chometz before Pesach. The spit or grill may be used for your kosher barbecue, because the residual flavor from the non-kosher meat has now been completely consumed. (Note, however, that there are rishonim who appear to understand this topic differently.)

On the other hand, hag’alah, boiling, kashers by removing the residue. The word hag’alah means to expel. In the book of Iyov, it says, “Their houses are safe, without fear, and no punishment from G-d is upon them. Their bulls impregnate their cows ve’lo yag’il — without miscarrying” (Iyov 21:9-10). The Hebrew word yag’il, which I have translated as miscarrying,has the same root, gimel, ayin, lamed as the word hag’alah. Rashi (ad loc.) explains that this root means to expel, and he rallies proof from the Mishnah’s use of the word hag’alah to mean to expel or extract the non-kosher residue by use of boiling water. By the way, the same root can also bear the meaning disgust, something that you want to “expel from yourself.” All of these words — miscarry, expel, extract and disgust — carry the same basic concept.  Thus, whatever taste of non-kosher food remains in the pot is dissolved and nullified in the water by the hag’alah (Shach, Yoreh Deah 121:17, quoting Re’ah; see also Pri Megadim, Orach Chayim 452:4 in Mishbetzos Zahav; Shu”t Igros Moshe, Yoreh Deah 1:60).

Therefore, libun could be used on an item requiring hag’alah, since it will satisfactorily burn up any residue. However, a utensil that requires libun cannot be kashered with hag’alah, since this does not remove sufficiently whatever was absorbed when the non-kosher food was broiled.

It fries through the air

At this point, we have “absorbed” enough background to discuss our opening question: When the frying oil is all absorbed, is the food considered cooked directly by fire?

When frying food, the food is cooked using a liquid medium, the oil. However, it is fairly common that, in the course of frying, the oil is used up and the food is fried without any visible liquid medium. At this point, do we view the absorption of the food into the pan to be direct, without a medium? Or do we contend that, since there is much oil absorbed both into the food and into the pan, it is still considered that the food was cooked via a liquid medium?

If we consider this to be direct absorption, the halachic conclusion is that kashering a frying pan requires libun. On the other hand, if we consider the absorption to be through the liquid medium of the oil, we can argue that a frying pan requires only hag’alah.

This issue is the subject of a dispute between two well-known rishonim who knew one another very well, the Rashba and the Rosh. (For a period of time, when the Rosh was a refugee from Germany who had fled to Spain, he lived as a guest in the home of the Rashba in Barcelona.) The Rashba (Toras Habayis, Bayis 4, Sha’ar 4) contends that a frying pan requires libun to kasher it, whereas the Rosh disagrees, arguing that it is sufficient to kasher a frying pan with hag’alah (Rosh, Pesachim 2:7; Shu”t Harosh 14:1).

With the greatest of grease

How do you kasher a commercial deep fryer?

By the way, it can be inferred from the way the Rashba expresses himself that he agrees with the Rosh that it is permitted to kasher a deep fryer with hag’alah, even it was used with treif oil. However, we will note another opinion shortly.

How do we rule?

This is where we are faced with a true conundrum. Without explaining his reasoning, the Shulchan Aruch states overtly that it depends on why we are kashering the pan. If we are kashering it because it was used for non-kosher, the Shulchan Aruch requires that we kasher it with libun (Yoreh Deah 121:4). However, if we are kashering it to make it Pesach-dik, he requires only hag’alah (Orach Chayim 451:11).

Although there are instances in which the Shulchan Aruch changed his mind, this is not one of those instances, since he writes himself that the law is different in the two cases (Yoreh Deah 121:4). So, what is the difference?

To explain the decision of the Shulchan Aruch, we find three approaches among the early acharonim.

First approach — contradictory Mishnayos!

The most common approach is based on a passage of Gemara toward the end of mesechta Avodah Zarah. A Mishnah in Zevachim seems to dispute one of the principles that I explained above. The Torah teaches that there is a mitzvah to eat the meat of korbanos, but that there is a time limit within which they may be eaten. After the korban’s time limit has passed, the leftover meat is called nosar, literally, leftover, and must be burnt. Eating it after this time violates a serious prohibition of the Torah.

What happens to the equipment used to cook the korban? The absorbed flavor remaining in the equipment becomes nosar and the equipment must be kashered. This means, essentially, that equipment used to cook or roast kodoshim must constantly be kashered.

How does one kasher the equipment? One would think that we would apply the same rules presented by the above-mentioned Mishnah in Avodah Zarah, i.e., that which is used directly on the fire requires libun, and that which is used for cooking in a liquid medium requires only hag’alah. However, the Mishnah in Zevachim states that a grill used to barbecue a korban requires only hag’alah (Zevachim 97a). This seems to say that there is a one-size-fits-all approach to kashering – and that hag’alah can be used to kasher anything, even that which absorbed the food directly via fire. This approach does not fit the rule of kebol’o kach polto.

As you can imagine, we are not the first ones to raise this question. The Gemara (Avodah Zarah 76a) does, and provides several answers. The conclusion of the Gemara is that, when the prohibited substance was permitted at the time of absorption (as in the case of meat of a korban, which is not yet nosar), a concept that the Gemara calls heteira bala, hag’alah is sufficient to kasher it. The opposite of heteira bala is issura bala, which means that the food was prohibited at the time that the absorption took place. The Mishnah in Avodah Zarah discussing used equipment purchased from a gentile is teaching the laws regarding issura bala.

Heteira bala

Why does heteira bala create a basis to be more lenient?

Some explain this phenomenon as follows: When a prohibited substance is absorbed through a medium, such as by cooking in water, hag’alah, boiling out the non-kosher vessel, will remove all of the prohibited substance. However, when the substance absorbed directly by fire, boiling it will not remove all of the prohibited substance. Nevertheless, it does remove most of the substance. When the vessel was used to cook a non-kosher substance, non-kosher flavor absorbed into the vessel and must be fully removed. But when the absorbed substance was kosher at the time that it was absorbed, the small amount of flavor that remains after the hag’alah was never declared by the Torah to be prohibited.

Kashering from fleishig

The Gemara mentions the concept of heteira bala relative to the absorption of permitted kodoshim, which will later become prohibited nosar. It is obvious that if one has equipment that absorbed fleishig residues and one wants to make it pareve, this is a case of heteira bala and will require only hag’alah. Following the logic I explained above, this means that although the Torah prohibited cooking and eating meat and milk together, it never prohibited cooking or eating with milk the small amount of meat flavor that remains after hag’alah was performed on a spit or grill.

Here is another example that I have been asked on several occasions:

In a food service operation, pareve baking trays were mistakenly used to bake chicken or meat. One might think that kashering these trays would require libun, since the absorption was direct from the meat into the tray, without any liquid medium. However, because of the principle of heteira bala, only hag’alah is required. Again, the logic here is that the meat flavor remaining in the trays after hag’alah is not sufficient to be included in the Torah’s prohibition of basar bechalav.

Is chometz considered heteira bala?

Since chometz is permitted to be eaten anytime but Pesach, it would seem that chometz should be considered heteira bala. This would mean that kashering chometz equipment for Pesach use would never require more than hag’alah. However, we find that there is a dispute among halachic authorities whether chometz is considered heteira bala or issura bala. Those who follow the stringent approach rule that, at the time of its use, chometz is what absorbed into the walls of the pot, and chometz may not be used on Pesach. The concept of heteira bala is applicable, in their opinion, to kodoshim products since, at the time that the grillwas used, the kodoshim products were not nosar; the small remnant that is left after the hag’alah cannot be called nosar. Chometz, on the other hand, was called chometz even before it was absorbed.

Whether chometz is considered heteira bala or issura bala is very germane in practical halacha. If it is considered heteira bala, then hag’alah will suffice to kasher all items for Pesach, and one is never required to kasher items with libun to make them Pesach–dik.

How do we rule?

Both the Shulchan Aruch and the Rema (Orach Chayim 451:4) conclude that chometz is considered issura bala. Therefore, one cannot kasher a grill used for chometz through hag’alah, only with libun. However, in a case of major financial loss (hefsed merubeh), one may rely on the opinion that chometz is heteira bala (Mishnah Berurah 451:32, citing Elya Rabbah and Gra).

Now let me return to our question: Why did the Shulchan Aruch rule that kashering a treif frying pan requires libun, whereas kashering a chometz-dik frying pan requires only hag’alah? Remember that we cited a dispute between the Rashba and the Rosh whether kashering a frying pan (from prohibited substances) requires libun or merely hag’alah. In addition, we have rishonim who contend that kashering from chometz never requires more than hag’alah. Thus, we have two different reasons to rule that, germane to Pesach, hag’alah suffices to kasher a frying pan, and only one reason if we are kashering it from prohibited food. Therefore, this explains why the Shulchan Aruch follows a more lenient approach regarding Pesach than he does regarding prohibited substance (see Beis Yosef, Levush, Taz and Shach to Yoreh Deah).

A second approach – from the frying pan into the fire

Based on a ruling found in the responsa of Rav Menachem Azaryah (usually abbreviated to “the Rama”) of Fanu (Shu”t Rama miFanu #96), the following approach is suggested: When cooking in a pot, water is typically used. Thus, the absorption into the pot took place via a medium that is itself kosher, and this might be the reason why hag’alah suffices to remove the prohibited substance from the pot. Since the non-kosher absorbed into the pot via a kosher medium, it does not get into the pot’s walls as deeply as it does when there is no kosher medium, which is the case when broiling or roasting, or, for that matter, frying using treif oil. When non-kosher meat is barbecued on a grill, the non-kosher absorbs directly into the rack or spit without any medium. That is why kashering to remove the prohibited food requires libun.

Similarly, when frying treif products, animal fat was presumably used at times as the medium for frying. In this situation, the medium used was itself non-kosher, and that is why the Shulchan Aruch ruled that we require libun when kashering treif pans. On the other hand, when chometz was fried, such as when someone made French toast, the oil is not chometz. Thus, the chometz always absorbed into the pan via a non-chometz medium, which is why hag’alah is satisfactory for kashering a chometz-dik frying pan(Notes of Rabbi Akiva Eiger to Yoreh Deah; Notes of the Chasam Sofer to Orach Chayim; Shu”t Chasam Sofer, Yoreh Deah #111; Machatzis Hashekel, Orach Chayim; Aruch Hashulchan, Yoreh Deah 121:11).

There are practical halachic differences regarding which approach we follow. According to the second approach, if we are certain that vegetable oil was always used when frying non-kosher meat, there would be no requirement to kasher with libun; hag’alah would suffice. This distinction would not exist according to the first approach.

There is another possible difference in practical halacha in the other direction. I mentioned above that, according to the Rashba, kashering a treif deep fryer may be done with hag’alah. However, it would seem that the Rama of Fanu would require libun, since the oil that was used was presumably some type of non-kosher, melted animal fat.

A third approach

Before I explain the third approach, I need to provide another introduction. A vessel that was used primarily with liquid, but on occasion was used without any liquid but — does it require libun to kasher it, because of the absorption that happened during the times that it was used without liquid, or may we be lenient to kasher it with hag’alah, since that is how it was used most of the time. This subject is disputed by the rishonim, Rabbeinu Tam, the Ra’avad (both on Avodah Zarah 76a) and others contend that this item must be kashered through libun, whereas the Ramban (op. cit.) rules that hag’alah is sufficient. This latter approach is called rov tashmisho, meaning that an item need be kashered only according to its primary use. (Because of space constraints, I will have to defer the explanation of this dispute to another time.)

Some acharonim explain the Shulchan Aruch’s reason for drawing a distinction between kashering a frying pan from chometz for Pesach, where he required only hag’alah, and kashering a treif frying pan, where he required libun, is because a kosher frying pan is used for many purposes, sometimes with water, sometimes with oil, and only upon rare occasion does all the oil burn off. Therefore, since rov tashmisho is with a liquid medium, hag’alah is sufficient. However, a frying pan that is used for treif is probably used most of the time for frying with melted animal fat, and most of the time the oil burns off. Therefore, the concept of rov tashmisho requires that the pan be kashered through libun (explanation of the Rama of Fanu presented by Pri Megadim, Orach Chayim 451:16 in Mishbetzos Zahav).

Conclusion

This article has provided a small introduction to some of the ideas of kashering. We now have a bit of understanding concerning a complicated halachic issue, with all sorts of ramifications. We can now get a sense of how much one’s rav or posek must keep in mind every time he answers one of our inquiries. Certainly, this is a time to appreciate his scholarship and his making himself available to us when we need him.

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Advice Line #2

Question:

My husband keeps shooting himself in the leg at every job he gets. He comes in late, leaves exactly on time no matter how hectic things are in the office, and generally seems lazy when it comes to his jobs. Then he’s surprised when he’s the first to get laid off. He was recently fired from yet another job. Is there any way I can motivate him to change, or point out what’s going on, without destroying his fragile ego?

Rabbi Yirmiyohu Kaganoff:

Anything you try to do to change your husband will just lead to more frustration and cause shalom bayis difficulties. He undoubtedly knows the problem, but a person will only change if and when he wants to. Your nudging him will not motivate him. You are probably doing a reasonable amount of nudging without even realizing it and we can assume it’s taking its toll.

The one thing you can do is try to build your husband up with positive motivation and compliments. Help him feel better about himself. Find excuses to compliment him in a sincere way, specifically on the rare occasion when he shows initiative.

Although when he is unemployed one cannot compliment him for his bringing home income, I often find it surprising that women expect their husbands to compliment them for preparing supper, but a woman does not find it necessary to thank her husband for going to work. One cannot emphasize more how much it does for a man’s ego to be complimented for earning a living and going to work, particularly when it is a struggle for him to do so.

Question:

I’m almost twenty-one years old but have not yet started dating since I have an older sister who is still in shidduchim. My parents want me to start dating already, but I don’t want to. My sister also says I shouldn’t wait for her, but I disagree. I can’t picture myself as a kalla, getting married before her. I don’t want that to happen! And once I start dating it may happen. What should I do?

Rabbi Yirmiyohu Kaganoff:

I believe you should start dating. The bottom line is that, while it’s wonderful to care for your sister’s feelings, it is not easy for a girl to find a shidduch in today’s world, and there’s no need to make it any more difficult for yourself.

The harsh reality is that your sister is not yet married, but that’s no reason to prevent you from getting married. This is particularly the case when no one else in your family seems to mind; in fact, they are encouraging you to date. It’s misplaced to worry so much about your sister’s feelings that you put your own future in jeopardy.

However, I must point out that if you are very resistant to the idea of dating, it may make the process quite difficult. If you find that you continue to struggle with feelings of ambivalence and guilt, it would be best to seek out a rebbetzin, therapist, or life coach who can help you work through these feeling.

May you and your sister both find your zivugim b’karov.

Question:

I work in a large marketing company where nearly all the employees are frum. The staff meets once a week to discuss ideas and proposals. Once a month, that meeting includes the CEO, and all ideas are finalized. Numerous times, my immediate supervisor has presented my ideas as her own. This is very detrimental to me because the possibility of a promotion is to a certain extent based on the proposal of original ideas. Her stealing my ideas is hampering my growth in the company. It’s difficult for me to say anything to my supervisor because I will be risking her wrath, and she is the darling of the CEO precisely because he thinks she is very creative. When I once broached the subject, she said I was imagining things and that the ideas were really hers. What can I do?

R’ Yirmiyohu Kaganoff:

The specific situation you are presenting is a bit unusual, because it is uncommon for a frum person who is psychologically healthy to say an outright lie to a listener who knows he is lying. Thus, there is either a major misunderstanding, something difficult to explain when this has happened repeatedly, or, more likely, one of the two parties suffers from a psychological handicap. Since we do not know which party is having this difficulty, it is hard for me to advise you.

Assuming, however, that you are indeed the party being wronged here, and you’ve repeatedly discerned this type of unhealthy behavior in your immediate superior, you have an obligation to report this to the “big boss.” The reason here is simple: Halacha requires us to protect someone else’s money, and having either an unstable or dishonest employee could cause your boss long-term financial harm.

You should make a discreet appointment with the big boss and explain only what you have observed, without any added interpretation or exaggeration. It is a good idea to review the relevant parts of Sefer Chofetz Chaim before the meeting and think through carefully exactly what you may say and how you will say it. Make it clear to the big boss that you are only meeting because of concern for his interests. Indeed, it is strictly prohibited to talk to him because you are angry at your immediate supervisor and want to get even.

Question:

My mother-in-law and I have an excellent, warm relationship. However, there is one area of conflict, which, although it doesn’t damage the quality of our relationship, causes her anxiety and me irritation. The issue is chasunah attendance. My mother-in-law’s father is one of many siblings, and they are currently marrying off their grandchildren. I see no need to kill my precious nights – work time (I work at home), housework, and much needed sleep – to attend a stranger’s chasunah just because they are my mother-in-law’s uncle’s grandchild. To satisfy my mother-in-law’s feelings, and to show that I’m not rebelling against her family’s norms (as she claims I am), I go 2-3 times a year to a chassunah when it works out for me. When I do attend, I don’t know most people there, and don’t feel my presence appreciated enough for me to have killed a night. My mother-in-law feels that my attitude is wrong. She says if I would go to the chasunahs I would develop a relationship with her cousins and my second cousins, and they wouldn’t be strangers. I feel that I don’t have the emotional resources to have a relationship with so many people, to the extent that I’d attend their simchos. My mother-in-law agreed that I present this issue to you. Please advise.

Rabbi Yirmiyohu Kaganoff:

You seem to be asking whether you are obligated to acquiesce to your mother-in-law’s request. In response, I’d like to start by briefly reviewing the halachos of kibud av va’em. You do have an obligation of kibud av v’em towards your husband’s parents, although not on the same level as your obligation towards your own parents or your husband.

However, the mitzvah includes only two components – kibud and moreh. Kibud encompasses ensuring that your in-laws have their physical needs met. This involves providing them with food if needed, bringing them a drink if requested, taking care of their medical needs if relevant, and so on. Moreh requires you to show them respect by not contradicting them, not sitting in their set places, etc.

In the situation you describe, I don’t see how either kibud or moreh comes into play. One can claim that since your mother-in-law is insisting so strongly on this, there’s an element of moreh. However, that is only a result of her feeling so strongly that she insists on it, to the extent that your refusal is rude. Her position, even under these circumstances, is by no means obvious.

If you are like most frum women today, between caring for a large household, supplementing the family income, and taking care of all your other responsibilities, you are juggling the equivalent of two full-time jobs. It seems unfair for your mother-in-law to pile even more on your already overburdened shoulders. Women today are already far too stressed, and need to spend more, not less, time with their families. Encroaching on that time for the sake of fairly distant relatives is not a wise move.

I don’t know where you live. If you live in a city where it’s acceptable to merely show up, say mazel tov, and leave, and if your mother-in-law would be happy with that arrangement, perhaps you could do that on occasion. But I wouldn’t advocate any more than that.

Question:

I’m a sheitel macher, and recently opened up my own business. There’s a problem I keep running into – relatives and good friends often assume that I will either do their sheitels entirely for free, or give them a steep discount. In addition, they often expect priority, and that I should do their sheitels before others that came earlier. I’m trying hard to establish myself, and my prices are already on the low end. Every discount impacts my parnassah. And when I push one job before another, it can hurt my reputation with the woman who now has to wait longer. I’ve tried to explain all this, but from the cool responses I’ve received, I realize that friends and relatives perceive me as mercenary and callous. What can I do?

Rabbi Yirmiyohu Kaganoff:

As a rav, I’m going to approach this question from a halachic perspective, and leave the emotional issues involved to the other respondents.

It looks like your family members are unaware of the difficult predicament in which they are putting you. Their approach to utilizing your services is misguided. Just as we are told in hilchos tzedakah that relatives take precedence over someone not related, so, too, assuming that the quality of work is identical, we should bring our business to a relative before someone else. This is not for our personal benefit so that we can get a price break; it’s so we can perform the highest level of tzedaka – that of helping someone become self-sufficient.

It seems like your friends and relatives are acting in self-interest, not halachic interest. They are probably not aware that their actions can sabotage your nascent business. You’re trying to be responsible, build a client base, and earn a good reputation; giving their sheitels priority over those that came in earlier jeopardizes all that. In addition, as you may know, businesses that fail usually do so early. This is a critical period for you and cutting into your profits at this time is not wise.

I’m not saying that it’s wrong to give a break to a friend or a relative – but that’s a gesture you can only offer once you’ve established yourself and are on secure financial footing. Your primary responsibility is to your immediate family, and supporting them has to be your first objective. Iy”H, once you are well-established you can certainly offer your family and friends discounts, but it will be because you can afford to and wish to, not because you feel pressured to do so.

Until then, it may help to discuss the issue with your local rav. Assuming that he also feels that giving discounts is incorrect at this time, you can then tell your friends and relatives that you were given a psak not to give discounts until your business is established. This will hopefully deflect the negative feedback you’ve been receiving and will perhaps prompt your relatives and friends to examine their actions through the eye of halacha.

Question:

We are a young married couple with one child and living in Eretz Yisrael. Both of our parents live in the States but about a 3-4 hour drive apart. As Pesach approaches and we made our plans to visit the US, it became clear that only one set of parents was willing to pay towards our tickets to come home. After taking this into account, we decided that we still wanted to go and would pay the other half ourselves. However, when deciding where to be over Yom Tov we are expected to split it evenly, although we feel that we should only be going to the family that paid for us to come, or at least spend most of the time with them. Please help.

Rabbi Yirmiyohu Kaganoff:

There are no obvious halachic guidelines for such an issue; it falls into the category of the “fifth Shulchan Aruch.” I’m therefore offering you my personal thoughts and judgment. One family is paying for half of your tickets; the other side is not contributing. It does seem fair that you should spend some more time with the side that is putting up money. However, there are mitigating factors that must be kept in mind:

Firstly, I’m assuming that the side that isn’t paying is not doing so because they are stingy but rather because they simply don’t have the resources. This brings up an important question: Should a family be penalized for not having the financial wherewithal that another family has been blessed with?

Secondly, if one side has more resources than the other side, it’s probable that they come to visit in Eretz Yisrael on occasion, while the financially-strapped family probably comes rarely, if at all. This means that if you don’t go visit them, you may never see them.

These factors indicate that you and your spouse need to sit down and have an open, honest conversation about the issue and reach a decision together. Although such discussions are not easy, realize that the making of a strong marriage comes through discussing sticky situations and working out issues.

Try to depersonalize the discussion and really focus on the points that the other person is making. Sometimes, it’s helpful for each of you to “plead” the other side. Let the spouse whose parents are paying enumerate why the Yom Tov should be split, and let the one whose parents aren’t able to chip in list the reasons the lion’s share should be spent by the parents who are paying. Doing this will help you get out of your own headspace and see another perspective. Keep speaking until you reach a decision that you’re both comfortable with. I wish you much hatzlacha.

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Kusim or Shomronim?

There is a bit of a sad association between the Shomronim and Parshas Shelach; both relate to our losing rights to Eretz Yisrael.

Question #1: Kusim or Shomronim?

What is the difference between the Kusim and the Shomronim?

Question #2: Kussite? Shomronite?

What language do they speak? Do they have their own language as do the seventy original nations?

Question #3: Kusi religion?

Are they Moslem? What religion do they practice?

Question #4: Kusi Chaveir???

Can there be a Kusi chaveir? This sounds like an oxymoronic term.

Question #5: When is a Kusi not a Kusi?

Is the word Kusi authentic?

Foreword:

The Gemara is filled with references to a people called the Kusim, yet most people are either confused or unaware of their existence, their history and that they still exist as a minority population in Eretz Yisrael. And then I find many people who confuse them with the Kara’im (in English, called the Karaites), to whom the Kusim have no relationship, history or common culture. Since this is a halachic column, I will be emphasizing the halachic aspects of the Kusim and discuss their history and sociology only to the extent necessary to make the halacha clear, and I will leave discussion about the Kara’im for a different time.

Introduction:

When the northern tribes, Malchus Yisrael, were led away in exile by Ashur, the Assyrian empire, several nations from other places were moved into their lands to replace them. Sancheirev, the king of Ashur, did not want to leave Eretz Yisrael vacant; firstly, this could eventually make a valuable country uninhabitable, and it was certainly not good for the Assyrians who needed the area as a buffer zone against their traditional enemy, Egypt. The Midrash Tanchuma (Vayeishev II) adds another reason: Sancheirev did not want to lose the valuable taxes he would receive from the produce of the land if it was properly and profitably farmed.

These transplanted people are called the Kusim or the Shomronim, the Samaritans. Among the different places that they came from was the town of Kusah (see Melachim II 17:24-41). In addition to the several locations, stated in Melachim, from which Sancheirev resettled them, the Midrash cites many other places whence they came. In all likelihood, each of these places had its own language or dialect, and attempts to communicate among themselves must have been similar to the Tower of Bavel. They may have created a polyglot language of their own, but, eventually, as we see from the book of Ezra (Chapter 4), they used Aramaic, the lingua franca of the era, to communicate with others. With time, Aramaic became their only language until, hundreds of years later, it was replaced by Arabic, which was the spoken language of the Middle East. (For a brief time, Greek was used more commonly than Aramaic, but local populations continued to speak Aramaic among themselves, as evidenced by the Assyrian, Kurdish, Georgian, Circassian and other longstanding Middle Eastern populations that still speak Aramaic dialects as their native tongue. [Both Georgian and Circassian are derived from Aramaic. Most linguists also consider Arabic to originally have been a dialect of Aramaic.])

From early times, the Kusim were joined by other peoples and religions, and even by some less committed Jews. At one time even some kohanim joined them (Kiddushin 75b; Tosefta, Demai 3:3), and they initially were meticulous about not contaminating themselves by coming in contact with tumas meis (Niddah 57a).

Thus, with time, the Kusim became a people descended from a mix of various nations, languages and cultures, all of whom assimilated to become a small population.

Shomronim

Whereas the name Kusim derived from their town of origin, the term Shomronim is derived from the place to where they moved. Shomron was the capital city and regional area of the former northern Jewish kingdom, just as today the area between the Judean Mountains and Migdal Ha’eimek in modern Israel is called the Shomron. As the Midrash notes, Chazal use both terms, Kusim and Shomronim, although they use the term Kusim more commonly (Pirkei Derabbi Eliezer, Chapter 37). This community is today usually called the Shomronim (“Samaritans” in English).

As the sefer Melachim describes, after these nations had been settled into their new homeland in Eretz Yisrael, Hashem sent lions to attack them. The Kusim appealed to the Assyrian monarch to send someone to instruct them how to serve the local deity so that the animal attacks would end. Sancheirev accommodated them, and the pasuk describes how they began to observe some of the mitzvos of the Torah, but still continued to worship their idols, thus creating their own religion.

The Kusim never accepted most of the Torah she’be’al peh, nor did they accept the sanctity or educational value of Nevi’im and Kesuvim. Although they claimed to accept the laws as stated in the written Torah, in practice, they followed a potpourri, observing some mitzvos, ignoring others and including practices from their previous idolatrous ways.

Assyria was eventually conquered by the Babylonian Empire, and, as taught at the end of the Book of Daniel, the Persian Empire overran the Babylonian Empire. Ezra describes how Koresh, the Persian Emperor, gave permission and encouragement to the Jews to return to Eretz Yisrael, to build the second Beis Hamikdash and to create a Jewish community in Eretz Yisrael. Zerubavel, a descendant of malchus beis David, was appointed the governor of Eretz Yisrael. Upon their arrival in Eretz Yisrael, the small returning Jewish community were assisted by the prophets Chaggai, Zechariah and Malachi in locating the venue of the mizbei’ach;  they began offering korbanos even before they had built the Beis Hamikdash. The kohein gadol was Yehoshua ben Yehotzadok, whose father was a brother of Ezra.

When the Jews arrived in Yerushalayim, the Kusim approached the Jews, attempting to infiltrate the renascent Jewish community. The Kusim were rebuffed because the Jews distrusted them (Arachin 5b). We see how well placed this distrust was: the Kusim sent a missive to Koresh charging the Jews with insurrection, a complete canard. Unfortunately though, the charge resounded within the royal household, and the emperor ordered an immediate halt to the construction of the Beis Hamikdash. Throughout the rest of Koresh’s reign and that of Achashveirosh, construction of the Beis Hamikdash was stopped. Eventually, the Persian emperor Daryavesh (Darius) allowed the construction of the Beis Hamikdash to continue (Ezra 4:24) and ignored the further attempts of the Kusim to block it.

Nevertheless, the Kusim and their allies continued to harass the Jewish community. As Nechemiah writes, “We were performing the construction, while half our number was holding their spears (on constant defense against attack) from daybreak until the stars appeared” (Nechemiah 4, 15). Shortly afterward, the Kusim staged a major attack on the Jewish community and also attempted to assassinate Nechemiah (Nechemiah 6:2; Pirkei derabbi Eliezer, Chapter 38).

During the period of the second Beis Hamikdash, relationships with the Kusim deteriorated further. The Kusim saw the Jews as an enemy and devoted much effort to undermining the Jewish community and its practices (Mishnah Rosh Hashanah 22b; Beitzah 4b). When Alexander the Great marched through the holy land, the Kusim tried to convince him to destroy the Beis Hamikdash (Yoma 69a; Megillas Ta’anis). As we know from the Gemara, when he saw Shimon Hatzadik leading the procession of Jews to greet him, Alexander dismounted and bowed to Shimon Hatzadik (Yoma 69a). Thus, another of the Kusim’s nefarious plots was foiled.

Eventually, the Kusim gave up on trying to control Yerushalayim. At this point, they decided to replace Har Hamoriah (also known as Har Habayis) as the focal point of their religion, with Har Gerizim. As they apparently frequently did, when they changed their minds about a particular practice, they modified their version of the Torah to reflect their changed perception (Sanhedrin 90b; Shu”t Melamed Leho’il 3:79). Thus, all references and allusions in the Torah to Har Habayis were changed to Har Gerizim.

Apparently, at a later time, the Kusim abandoned their idols, but even then, they did not fully observe mitzvos (Rambam, Peirush Hamishnah, Berachos 8:8). At the time of the Mishnah and Gemara, they were keeping some mitzvos, such as shechitah (Chullin 3a), baking matzoh and separating ma’asros (Berachos 47b; Gittin 25), more or less correctly, but not other mitzvos. They had no concern about lifnei iveir, the prohibition of causing someone else to violate what Hashem has commanded him. Chazal derive from the pasuk lifnei iveir lo sitein michshol, the prohibition of misleading someone or causing them to sin. The Kusim limited the meaning of the pasuk to literally placing a stumbling block in front of a blind person.

The Kusim had little concern about observing Shabbos properly (Eruvin 31b), purity laws (Niddah 69a; Tosefta, Demai 3:3), properly observing the laws of gittin and kiddushin (Kiddushin 75; Yerushalmi, Gittin 1:4) or of being honest about financial matters. They were also notorious for not being knowledgeable or careful about the laws of yichus (Kiddushin 75a-76a) and rejected basic tenets of the Torah (Sanhedrin 90b). Because of their callousness in the important area of yichus, there are opinions in the Gemara that, according to halacha, a male Kusi and a female Kusis are forbidden to marry one another, because of the possibility that one is a mamzeir and the other is halachically a kosher Jew (Kiddushin 75a-76a; Tosafos s.v. Verabbi).

On the other hand, the Gemara notes that at times they observed practices that halacha does not require, such as separating challah on products made from rice flour (Pesachim 51a).

The early tanna’im dispute whether (1) there was a point in history at which the Kusim accepted mitzvos properly and became authentic Jewish converts, an opinion called Kusim geirei emes; or (2) Kusim geirei arayos, the Kusim converted only because of the lions and never accepted the mitzvos, as the halacha requires (Yerushalmi, Gittin 1:4).

According to the first opinion, since the Kusim observe certain mitzvos, such as shechitah and matzoh, properly, there was a time in history when it was permitted to eat Kusi shechitah and to fulfill the mitzvah of matzoh at the seder with what the Kusim baked. To quote a beraisa, “It is permitted to eat the matzoh of a Kusi and one can fulfill with it the responsibility of eating matzoh seder night, whereas Rabbi Eliezer prohibits it because they are not expert at the details required to observe mitzvos correctly. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says that the mitzvos that Kusim do observe, they are much more careful in observing than Jews are” (Kiddushin 76a; see also Berachos 47b).

Kusi chaveir

In several places, Chazal also note a phenomenon of a Kusi chaveir, which meant a Kusi who was very meticulous to observe the details of their practices (Berachos 47b; Gittin 10b; Niddah 33b). As opposed to other Kusim, a Kusi chaveir could be relied upon to faithfully keep what Kusim contended that they kept.

The opinion that Kusim geirei arayos maintains that meat or matzoh of Kusim is produced by non-Jews. Since meat shechted by non-Jews is not kosher, the meat of Kusim is non-kosher, and, since the matzoh produced by non-Jews may not be used at the seder, the matzoh they baked is not acceptable for seder use, although it could, in theory, be eaten during the rest of Pesach, if one is certain that proper standards were maintained throughout the production.

One of the surprising aspects of Kusi mitzvah observance is that, apparently, in this era, Kusim performed shechitah correctly, notwithstanding that the details of its laws are mesorah from Moshe Rabbeinu at Har Sinai, and that, otherwise, the Kusim rejected any aspect of the Oral Torah. In other words, the Kusim were completely inconsistent. Yet, the Gemara (Chullin 3a; 5b; 6a) reports of amora’im who ate from the shechitah of Kusim. Nevertheless, with time, the opposition to treating the Kusim as kosher Jews strengthened and it became accepted to treat the Kusim as non-Jews.

In the time of the later Tannaim, Kusim were discovered to maintain an idol of a dove atop Har Gerizim (Chullin 6a), to which they dedicated their performance of bris milah (Avodah Zarah 27a). For this reason, the Mishnah (Berachos 51b, see especially Rambam Commentary) rules that one does not recite amen when hearing the conclusion of a Kusi’s brocha unless you heard him recite the entire brocha. This is out of concern that he might have been blessing his deity on Har Gerizim.

Eventually, the Kusim created their own religion, which bears some minor resemblance to a literal observance of the Written Torah. They follow their own version of the eastern calendar and they have their own “kohein gadol” with their own version of his garments. It is a popular tourist experience to visit the Kusim — or as they are commonly called today, the Shomronim — on their day of erev Pesach to watch them “offering” their version of korban Pesach. One does not need to look hard to realize that they no longer practice shechitah according to the method that they did at the time of the Gemara. Their “shechitah” appears much closer to the Moslem method of halal slaughter than it does to what halacha requires.

As an experienced student will readily note, the attempts by the Tzedukim, Samaritans, Kara’im, Conservatives and others at ignoring Chazal and the mesorah from Moshe Rabbeinu of the Oral Torah have resulted in completely different observances, non-identifiable with one another. Some of this was actually the subject of the doctoral dissertation of Rabbi Dr. Bernard Revel.

At one point, the organized Jewish community, both in Eretz Yisrael and in Bavel, realized that there was no choice but to excommunicate the Kusim and declare them as personae non gratae to the Jewish people. They were to be treated as non-Jews. Their bread was to be considered completely non-kosher “like pork.” Even conversions of Kusim to the Jewish people were banned, out of concern that they were already mamzeirim because of their approach to yichus and related laws. This ban was accepted even by the Persian royal household (Yalkut Shimoni, Melachim II 234; see also Chullin 6a).

The Samaritan community today has two withering branches, one on Har Gerizim, right next to the yishuv Har Beracha, and the other in Holon. They speak Arabic, but identify with the Jewish presence in Israel. Most are law-abiding Israeli citizens, and they even operate food companies bearing mehadrin hechsherim. In recent decades, they have suffered from a high rate of assimilation of their descendants (becoming secular Israeli Arabs) and a shortage of potential wives for their young men. Prior to the Ukrainian War, they were actively recruiting rural Ukrainian women to join their ranks as converts to their religion and wives for their men. Many of the more established Kusim complained about the lack of sincerity and consistency of the neophyte converts. The young men responded that they had no other choices for mates. Of course, the result was an even greater ethnic and polyglot mix, with Ukrainian and Arabic intermingled.

When is a Kusi not a Kusi?

At this point, we should discuss the last of our opening questions: When is a Kusi not a Kusi? First, some background.

As we are painfully aware, the invention of the printing press in Europe was instrumental in creating several new professions. One of them was the censor, a government official authorized to use his discretion to decide what was in the interests of the ruler to publish and what was not. The censor deleted and changed text at whim, depending on whether he felt the intended text might be perceived as showing the rulers, their religion or anything similar in a poor light. Of course, there was little interest in preserving the accuracy of the text, nor were the censors necessarily well versed in the language or the material that they were censoring. For this reason, many censors used a very broad wand to eliminate words that they considered offensive. Many words that were not intended in any negative way were often deleted, and at times replaced by others that the censors considered to be “pareve.”

The term “Kusim” had no negative connotations for the censors or their employers. They considered the Kusim to be another wayward group, similar to the Roma, the Jews and the Moslems. Thus, to change a word to “Kusi” was a convenient way for the censors to wave their wand. For this reason, there are many instances in which censors changed the words akum (idol worshipper), goy (non-Jew), or min (non-believer), a word often reserved in the Gemara for the early Christians, to Kusi. In all of these instances, one must realize that the text has nothing to do with Kusim (see, for example, Gittin 10b; Avodah Zarah 15b, Niddah 50b), but probably means either “non-Jews” or “heretics,” depending on context.

Conclusion

The story of the Kusim is very different from the various challenges and alternative mistaken expressions of Judaism that we have encountered over the millennia, such as the Tzedukim, the Mis’yavnim, the Kara’im, Reform and Conservative Judaism, the haskalah and secular Zionism. All of these were attempts by Jews to redefine Judaism to their liking. They were attempts to exchange the covenant that Hashem provided with something that could be accommodated to someone’s personal modus vivendi.

In the case of the Kusim, we are dealing with a group who were not originally Jewish and may never have become Jewish. Although many Jews apparently intermarried with them, the culture was completely non-Jewish. Yet, even at the time when there was a possibility that the Kusim were wayward Jews, our Torah leadership realized that this was a group from which to distance ourselves, not only from their philosophy, but even from themselves personally, a highly unusual step, perhaps without any precedent.

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Advice Line

I am sharing responses to people who asked me for advice.

Question:

We are a young couple living in E”Y. Over the past few years my younger brother has been learning here and we’ve gotten to know him quite well. Now he’s back in Lakewood and my mother is pursuing shidduchim for him. She told me she thinks he’s the catch of the century. She’s only looking for the best, smartest, most serious girl, and has narrowed her list to very specific seminaries and standards. The problem is that my husband and I know my brother pretty well by now, and he’s not a very serious learner. He’s a lovely boy, a great uncle to my kids, and a fun person to have around, but he definitely does not keep to his sedarim and would much rather sit on my couch and shmooze than go to the beis medrash. Should I tell my mother what I know about my brother? I can’t imagine that she’d believe me. Is there anything else I can do?

Rabbi Yirmiyohu Kaganoff answered:

It seems from your description that your brother would not be servicing Klal Yisrael or himself well by being a long-term, full-time learner. He should ideally be directing his kochos towards harbatzos Torah. You mention his love of children. He’d very possibly shine in chinuch (and I mean chinuch in the broad sense of harbatzos Torah, be it teaching, kiruv, or rabbanus) but he’s being forced into a mold that isn’t a good fit.

The burning question is who can direct this bachur and help him make these crucial life decisions? To address this, I’d need to know more about your family dynamics. Are his future plans heavily influenced by your parents? If they understand fully who he is, will they be able to direct him properly?

Your mother seems to view the world in a very black and white way (I don’t know if this is coming from a great appreciation of learning or from the pressure to have her son in a frum “Ivy League” environment). How would she react if your brother would choose to be a third-grade rebbe or an out-of-town high school teacher (possibly the way he can serve Hashem best)?

It also sounds like your mother is not easily influenced. Does she not take direction from anyone or will she just have a hard time listening to you because you’re her child and she doesn’t take you seriously? You haven’t mentioned your father. Where does he stand in this situation?

The last element to consider is the girls being redt to your brother. Today, a girl often feels that she can only be a good, frum girl if she marries a boy who is a full-time learner, with either she or her parents supporting him. The Torah is actually that, while a woman should enable and assist her husband and children to learn and should keep the atmosphere in the home Torahdik, she should not be supporting the family. That is the husband’s halachic responsibility.

These beliefs, in my opinion, are contributing to both the shidduch crisis and to shalom bayis issues. The bottom line is that there are far fewer boys capable of long-term learning than there are girls who want to marry them, and this mismatch causes shidduch problems. The desire to marry only a person in full-time learning, or to have a son like that, sometimes stems not from a place of idealism, but from gaavah. A girl should want a boy who is serious about his Yiddishkeit, but that doesn’t mean that he needs to be rosh yeshiva material.

Because the shidduch market is what it is, your mother may find the type of girl she wants for your brother, despite his true colors. If the girl’s family does proper research, they will no doubt find out the truth. However, the girl may still choose to marry him.

If he does date a girl who thinks he is what he is not, it’s not your responsibility to open her eyes. It’s her family’s job to research the aspects that are important to them. If the couple does get married and the girl is disappointed, she won’t be alone. Many girls are disappointed in the Torah level of their husband; at least this girl will be getting a solid ben Torah, and hopefully they will build a Torah true home together, whatever your brother chooses to do.

It’s hard for me to give a final response, because I don’t have sufficient information. The answer is dependent upon a few subtle points which you haven’t included. I do think you should try to clue your mother in to your brother’s true nature. It would be good for him if your mother knows where his strengths do and don’t lie; she can then direct him in the right way both in shidduchim and in life.

This may best be accomplished by speaking with your father, who perhaps can hear the truth more easily. You know your parents best, and will know what approach will be most likely to yield results.

Question:

I have a friend to whom I feel very close but who does not live nearby. From our phone conversations I get the sense that her husband has very unrealistic expectations of her. For example, a few days after she gave birth, she was serving hot breakfast to her father-in-law. Her husband leaves the house at 6:30 a.m. and comes home close to midnight, leaving her to take care of a houseful of small children, errands, shopping, cooking, cleaning — totally on her own. Now he wants her to take a job since money is tight. On hectic Friday afternoons he expects her to serve him lunch.

I don’t want to, chas v’shalom, interfere in her shalom bayis or threaten her marriage. However, I see that she has a submissive personality and does not assert herself. When she was serving breakfast days after giving birth, it wasn’t because her husband demanded it, but because she knew that he expected it; she didn’t think of saying no. When she was cooking and cleaning on Erev Shabbos with 102-degree fever, kids jumping all over, and husband nowhere in sight, it wasn’t because he was trying to be evil, but rather because she didn’t tell him that she needed help or that he should buy takeout. Should I encourage her to say no more often and assert herself? Should I point out that husbands should be helping more? Or should I just empathize and provide a listening ear?

Rabbi Yirmiyohu Kaganoff answered: This is a difficult question to answer since there are several core elements we do not know.

First, is the man clueless how to relate to his wife and as a result acts in a way that is grossly inconsiderate, or is he malicious, or is he something in between? Some men are completely unaware of how to deal with marriage and a wife. Often, when someone enlightens them, they are willing, and sometimes even happy, to work on change. On the other hand, some men have tendencies towards emotional abuse, and will never see themselves as being in the wrong.

The second important factor is how does your friend feel about this? Are her stories of what’s going on in her home a cry for help, or simply a description of what’s going on during the course of the day? Is she at a breaking point, or basically managing? Last, what would be the price of involvement? If you open up her eyes and help her realize the unjustness of the situation she is in, you will be opening a Pandora’s box that may be best left closed. Bringing her to realize how insensitive her husband is can jeopardize a marriage that, while not joyous, may be quite bearable and far preferable to divorce (which can certainly happen if she becomes unhappy enough).

I once heard from a gadol of the previous generation that if a couple is not arguing, even if we don’t think their marriage is good, we should not get involved. The exception, as I see it, is if abuse is taking place, since in most cases of abuse, there is no arguing taking place. This situation, however, is very gray. While it sounds very much like abuse, without more details, it’s hard to say that’s what is going on here.

Rather than bring the difficulty of the situation to her attention, I’d recommend that you find a way to have someone speak to the husband. Find someone he respects — a rebbi figure, a rav, a family member — and appraise them of what is going on; see if they can carefully speak to him about the way a man is meant to treat his wife.

If he insists that he does nothing wrong and whatever is wrong is her fault, or if he gets angry at the interference and takes it out on his wife, then you would have a clear sign that you are dealing with an abusive personality. However, if he is as you describe him – clueless but not evil — it’s very possible that opening his eyes can help rehabilitate this marriage. In the latter situation, the possibility exists that he will willingly go to therapy. This is even more likely if he has Asperger’s, or as the professionals prefer to call it today, is “on the spectrum,” which may be a possibility here.

In addition, as her friend, you should give her whatever support you can, be it a listening ear or any physical help you can offer. If you feel that the situation is worsening, or if you think that there are already elements of emotional abuse, then you should definitely seek the advice of a rav as to how to proceed.

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