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Within the last few months, I was sent the following e-mail shaylos complete with accompanying diagrams and photos.

Question #1:

Raphael* sent me an e-mail which included an attachment with the layout of his new apartment (see attachment entitled "map"). He wants to know whether he needs to place a mezuzah at the doorway out of the lounge marked "Sofek 1", and also whether the entrance to the kitchen requires a mezuzah. Both instances are not architecturally proper doorways, but entrances formed by walls.

*Although all questions mentioned here are authentic, names have been changed to protect each individual’s privacy.

Question #2:

Yisroel sent me photographs of his hallway to determine whether he needs to place a mezuzah at its entrance (see attachment entitled "is this a mashkof").

Answer:

In modern residences, many rooms are not entered via doors, but through entranceways. Do these entrances require a mezuzah? In order to answer, we need to explain when a doorway requires a mezuzah.

The "Ten Commandments" of Mezuzah

The laws governing when one must place a mezuzah are indeed complicated. The Rambam establishes ten rules that must be met to require a mezuzah, of which the following three issues are germane to answer the above questions.

LSD

Is there a lintel?

Are there sideposts?

Is there a door?

Lintel

According to all halachic authorities, a doorway does not require a mezuzah unless there is a mashkof, a lintel that comes down from the ceiling to form the appearance of a doorway. Let me explain.

What is a mashkof?

When building a house, one must be certain that the part of the building above a door or a window is properly supported so that the building does not tumble down on its inhabitants, something that will ruin the contractor’s reputation and potentially could hurt someone. A lintel is the architectural piece that provides this support. The lintel rests its own weight and that which it supports on sideposts.

The laws of mezuzah do not require that the sideposts or the lintel actually carry the weight of the area above the door. It is adequate if the mashkof, or lintel, merely provides an aesthetic function of giving the entrance the appearance of a doorway. However, when there is no mashkof at all, that is, nothing comes down vertically to give the appearance of a lintel, there is no requirement to install a mezuzah, even when there are two proper sideposts and even when there is a door.

In modern construction, most doorways to kitchens, living rooms, dining rooms, and dens do have a piece of wall that protrudes down from the ceiling to give the appearance of a mashkof. This is for aesthetic reasons – to provide more of a sense that this is a separate room. However, when the ceiling above the room’s entrance is a horizontal plane without anything protruding downward to form a mashkof, there is no requirement to install a mezuzah even when the entrance has all the other appurtenances of a door.

At this point, I suggest you look carefully at the other attachment, the one that Yisroel sent. Is this considered a mashkof?

What happened here is that air conditioning ducts were installed in the hallway thus giving the entrance to the hallway somewhat of an appearance of being a doorway. However, in my opinion, there is no real mashkof here since it does not come down vertically to create an entranceway. The ducts have become the ceiling of the hallway, which therefore has a lower ceiling than the larger room in front. I do not consider this a proper mashkof and therefore ruled that they do not need to place a mezuzah here.

The map that Raphael sent bears no indication whether either questionable doorway contains a mashkof. Thus, on the basis of the map alone I could not provide an answer.

Is this considered a sidepost?

Assuming the there is some form of mashkof on each questionable entranceway, our next question is whether the walls that form each of Raphael’s "sofek" qualify as sideposts.

To understand whether this is considered a sidepost for the purposes of requiring a mezuzah, I will quote a passage of the Gemara:

"Ameimar said: an entranceway formed by a corner (in Aramaic de’ikarna) requires a mezuzah. Rav Ashi said to Ameimar: ‘But it has no sidepost!’ To which Ameimar retorted, ‘these [that is, the corners of the wall] are its sideposts’" (Menachos 34a).

What is meant by "an entranceway formed by a corner"?

A Sidepost Created by the End of a Wall

The Rosh (Hilchos Mezuzah #14) explains that the case is where one entire wall of the room or house is missing, and thus the entranceway is created by the wall ending, rather than the existence of an actual door. This is exactly what we find in modern construction, where the entrances to kitchens, dining rooms, living rooms, dens, and hallways are often created without a proper entranceway, but simply by a wall. In our apartment map diagram, both entrances that Raphael labeled as "sofek" are graced with this phenomenon.

Rav Ashi rules that these rooms have no sideposts, and therefore no requirement to place a mezuzah. Ameimar disagreed, contending that the "ends" of the walls qualify as sideposts. Both scholars agree that if one side of the entrance does not have the end of a wall, but is a continuing wall, that there is no sidepost on that side. We have exactly such a phenomenon in Raphael’s sofek 1 where there is no sidepost on the left side. Does this automatically remove the requirement of mezuzah? For this we need to examine a different passage of Gemara.

"Rav Papa went to Shmuel’s house and saw a doorway that had a sidepost only on its left side on which there was a mezuzah. Rav Papa said to him: ‘Were you intending to follow Rabbi Meir’s opinion (who required a mezuzah even if there is only one sidepost)? Rabbi Meir required a mezuzah on a doorway with one sidepost only when its sidepost is on the right side, but not when there is only a sidepost on the left side.’"

Right, Left…

Thus, Rav Papa notes that when the only sidepost is on the left side, there is no requirement to place a mezuzah according to all opinions. When the solitary sidepost is on the right side (entering the room), then whether there is a requirement to install a mezuzah is dependent on a dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Sages.

Let us now return to the Gemara’s discussion:

"To what comment of Rabbi Meir are we referring? To the following teaching: A house with only one sidepost, Rabbi Meir requires it to have a mezuzah and the Sages exempt it. What is the reason of the Sages? The Torah says mezuzos, which is plural," or a minimum of two (Menachos 34a).

Do we rule like the Sages or like Rabbi Meir?

The Rambam concludes like the Sages and therefore in his opinion one needs a mezuzah only when there are two sideposts. This is how the Shulchan Aruch concludes. According to this approach, there is no requirement to place a mezuzah unless the entrance has two sideposts. This approach would exempt the doorway labeled "sofek 1" from the mitzvah of mezuzah.

However, most authorities rule that if there is a right sidepost one should place a mezuzah there, albeit without a beracha. Thus, according to most opinions, the entrance leading towards the bedroom of Raphael’s apartment would require a mezuzah (assuming that is has a mashkof) but without a beracha.

Is there a door?

In the Rambam’s opinion, a mezuzah is required only when the house or room’s entrance has a door.

In this instance, the Rambam’s position is a minority opinion, since most other Rishonim contend that the lack of a door does not absolve the requirement of a mezuzah. The accepted conclusion is to install a mezuzah in a doorway that has no door, but not to recite a beracha when doing so out of deference to the Rambam (see Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 286:15).

So now Raphael has his answer: The rooms where there is a right sidepost upon entering require a mezuzah without a beracha, provided that they have some type of mashkof. One would not recite a beracha on placing the mezuzah unless there is an actual door and also sideposts on both sides of the door.

Mezuzah Rewards

Aside from fulfilling a mitzvah commanded by Hashem, the mitzvah of mezuzah serves to remind us constantly of His presence, every time we enter and exit our houses. We touch the mezuzah whenever we enter or exit a building to remind ourselves of Hashem’s constant presence, and it is a physical and spiritual protective shield. Whenever passing it, we should remind ourselves of Hashem’s constant protection.

is this a mashkof.JPG

Question #1:

Shirley mentions to her friend:  "I do not understand why people are concerned about using only chalav Yisrael. Do they really think that someone is adding pig’s milk?"

Question #2:

Muttie inquires: "My friend quoted his rav that it is more important to keep chalav Yisrael today than it ever was before. How could this be?"

Chazal (Bechoros 6b) derive from this week’s parsha a rule that whatever derives from a non-kosher species, such as eggs or milk, is also non-kosher, and thus milk of mares, camels, llamas, donkeys or sows are all non-kosher. Still, people find chalav Yisrael a perplexing matter. We have all heard various authorities quoted as saying that today use of chalav Yisrael is only a chumrah, whereas others rule that consuming non-chalav Yisrael foods is a serious infraction of halacha. The mission of this article is to provide appreciation of the issues involved. So, let us start from the beginning of the topic by understanding the origins of this proscription and then explaining the different approaches as to why it does or does not apply today.

Before we even begin our halachic discussion, we need some biological and food production information. The definition of a mammal is an animal that nurses its young with mother’s milk. (The Modern Hebrew word for mammal is yoneik, literally, that which nurses, meaning that the young suckles mother’s milk.) Hashem, who provides for all His creatures, custom-developed a formula that provides the ideal nourishment for the young of each mammalian species. This supplies the perfect "food pyramid" balanced diet with all the proteins, carbohydrates, vitamins and minerals that a young growing foal, cub, kitten, puppy, kid, lamb, infant or calf needs to thrive and mature until it is ready for an adult diet, which in many species is when it is ready to earn its own living.

There are thousands of species of mammals, yet each species’ milk is somewhat unique. The young of kosher animals require a certain protein, called casein, in higher proportions than do the young of non-kosher animals, and therefore Hashem made kosher milk with a higher proportion of casein. Non-kosher milk, of course, also contains significant amount of protein necessary for a young growing mammal, but most of this protein is categorized as "whey protein." (When I use the term "non-kosher milk" in this article I will be referring to milk from non-kosher species.) Kosher milk also contains whey protein, but in much smaller proportion to the casein in the milk.

The Origins of Chalav Yisrael

The Mishnah (Avodah Zarah 35b, 39b) proscribes consuming milk that a gentile milked, unless a Jew supervised the milking, a prohibition called chalav akum. The Gemara notes that we are not concerned that the gentile is misrepresenting non-kosher milk as kosher — milk from non-kosher species looks different from kosher milk, and this would be easily identified. Rather, the prohibition is because the milk may have been adulterated with milk of a non-kosher species. The Gemara subsequently discusses how closely must the Jew supervise the milking, concluding that when the gentile has both kosher and non-kosher animals that could be milked, the Jew may be sitting in a place where he/she cannot observe the milking, provided that should he/she stand up he would be able to observe the milking. Since the Jew can rise to his feet at any moment, we may assume that the gentile would not risk milking his non-kosher animal and losing the Jew’s business. Therefore this milk still qualifies as kosher chalav Yisrael, meaning milk that was supervised by a Jew.

On the other hand, should the gentile have only kosher species in his herd, the Gemara implies that the Jew does not need to maintain as close supervision, but it does not define exactly how much supervision is required. Although the milking still requires the attendance of a Jew, the halachic authorities dispute the reason and purpose of the Jew’s presence. This dispute is what underlies the controversy alluded to above.

The most lenient approach

The most lenient approach to the question of chalav akum is that of the Pri Chodosh (Yoreh Deah 115:15), who understands that one needs to be concerned about chalav akum only when the non-kosher milk is less expensive than the kosher variety, or when the non-kosher milk is difficult to sell. However, when kosher milk is less expensive, he contends that one does not need to be concerned that the gentile would add more expensive, specialty non-kosher milk into regular kosher milk. The Pri Chodosh reports that he was living in Amsterdam at the time that he wrote his commentary (he subsequently relocated to Eretz Yisrael), and the vast majority of the Torah community there drank the milk sold by gentiles and did not consider it to be chalav akum. He further adds that he himself relied on this approach and drank this milk. The key point of the Pri Chodosh is that there is no requirement that a Jew actually observe the milking, nor is there even a requirement that one be absolutely certain that no non-kosher milk was added. It is sufficient that there be no incentive for the gentile to add non-kosher milk to his product, and the Mishnah and Gemara that required a Jew to supervise the milking did so only when the gentile had some motivation to adulterate the milk.

The Chasam Sofer’s approach

On the other hand, the Chasam Sofer (Shu"t Yoreh Deah #107) took tremendous umbrage at people who were lenient in the use of milk from gentiles. He maintained that Chazal required that a Jew actually supervise the milking and that, furthermore, should their reason no longer apply, the rabbinic injunction remains binding until a larger and more authoritative body declares the original sanction invalid (see Gemara Beitzah 5a). Since a more authoritative beis din never rescinded the prohibition on unsupervised gentile milk, consuming this milk constitutes a serious violation. The Chasam Sofer requires that a Jew be on hand to observe (or be able to observe) the milking, and if a Jew is not there, the produced milk is completely non-kosher because of the rabbinic injunction, even when there is no incentive for the non-Jew to adulterate the product.

Risk of Snake Bite

Chazal (Bava Basra 110a; Avodah Zarah 27b) invoke the verse uporeitz geder yishachenu nachash  to mean that someone who violates a rabbinic injunction deserves to be punished by being bitten by a snake, an indication that people should be exceedingly careful not to ignore rabbinic prohibitions (see Koheles 10:8). The Chasam Sofer writes that someone who ignores the rabbinic prohibition of chalav akum and drinks milk relying on the assumption that the gentile would not add non-kosher milk should be categorized as a poreitz geder, deserving of the punishment of yishachenu nachash.

Furthermore, the Chasam Sofer contends that even if the Pri Chodosh is correct that when kosher milk is cheaper than non-kosher milk the prohibition of chalav akum does not apply, since the Jewish people rejected this ruling of the Pri Chodosh, we are prohibited from consuming dairy products that a Jew did not supervise because of the laws of nedarim, vows. Since Jews did not use chalav akum even in places where non-kosher species are not milked, it is considered that they accepted a vow to prohibit unsupervised milk. As a result, the Chasam Sofer rules that it is prohibited min HaTorah to consume unsupervised milk, with the full stringency of a vow.

One in-between position

There is an approach in between these two positions, that of Rav Moshe Feinstein and the Chazon Ish (Yoreh Deah 41:4), who contend that in a place where non-kosher milk commands a higher price than kosher milk, it is still prohibited to use non-supervised milk. However, Rav Moshe understands that the takanah did not specifically require that a Jew attend the milking, but that one is completely certain that the milk has no non-kosher admixture. However, when one is certain that the kosher milk is unadulterated, halacha considers the milk to be "supervised" (Shu"t Igros Moshe, Yoreh Deah 1:47).

How can one be certain? The Mishnah recommended the most obvious way: have a Jew nearby who may enter at any moment. Of course, we realize that even this method is not foolproof, but it is as thorough as halacha requires.

Is there another way that one can be certain? Allow me to use my own example to explain Rav Moshe’s approach. Someone runs laboratory tests on some unsupervised milk and concludes with absolute certainty that in front of him is 100% sheep’s milk. However, no Jew supervised the milking. Is the milk kosher?

According to Rav Moshe’s analysis, this milk is certainly kosher, since we can ascertain its source.

In his earliest published teshuvah on the subject, Rav Moshe explained that when the government fines those caught adulterating cow’s milk, the fear of this consequence is sufficient proof that the milk is kosher. In later teshuvos, he is very clear that other reasons why we can assume that the milk is kosher are sufficient proof, including that normal commercial practice is that standard milk is bovine milk (Igros Moshe, Yoreh Deah 1:48, 49). One should note that the Chazon Ish also agrees with Rav Moshe’s approach.

Being Stringent

Although Rav Moshe concludes that where one can rely that the standardly available milk is kosher there is no prohibition of chalav akum, he still rules in a different teshuvah that a chinuch institution should use only chalav Yisrael products even if all the children come from homes that do not use chalav Yisrael exclusively. He contends that part of chinuch is to show children that one follows a stricter standard, even when halacha does not necessarily require one.

Contemporary Problem

There is another major reason why some poskim who in general accept the lenient approaches regarding the prohibition of chalav akum feel that one should be stringent today. This is because of the common occurrence of a veterinary problem that affects dairy cows called displaced abomasums, which is often treated in a way that may render this cow’s milk non-kosher. I will discuss this topic a different time.

At this point, we can answer Shirley’s question, which I mentioned above: "I do not understand why some people keep chalav Yisrael today. Do they really think that someone is adding pig’s milk?"

Indeed, even in the time of the Gemara, it was probably unheard of for anyone to add pig’s milk or, for that matter, for anyone to use pig’s milk, since sows are almost impossible to milk. Although most non-kosher species do not allow themselves to be milked (have you ever tried to milk a cat?), camels, donkeys, and mares can all be milked and produce a palatable product. As a matter of fact, at times there was a large (non-kosher) market for mare’s milk, because of its reputed health benefits. (See Encyclopedia Talmudis Volume 15 column 178-179.) Contemporarily, there is extensive research at Ben Gurion University about use of some antibodies found in camel’s milk for treatment of a host of autoimmune diseases. I have been asked many questions about use of this milk, which is clearly non-kosher, but is permitted in case of a life-threatening ailment. (The shaylos that result from this last case will need to be dealt with at a different time.)

To answer Shirley’s question succinctly: although we can assume that the milk on your supermarket shelf is unadulterated cow’s milk, the Chasam Sofer still rules that Chazal prohibited consuming this milk, and this prohibition is in full effect today, even when the reason for the takanah no longer applies. In addition, other rabbonim have voiced other concerns about the kashrus of unsupervised dairy cows.

Stricter than Ever?

At this point, let us examine the second question I mentioned above: "My friend quoted his rav that it is more important to keep chalav Yisrael today than it ever was before. How could this be?"

One obvious reason for this rav’s position is that he holds, as does the Chasam Sofer, that using non-chalav Yisrael incurs a Torah prohibition of violating vows. Furthermore, he may feel that since being lenient on this issue is so rampant, one must demonstrate the importance of this mitzvah. He may also be concerned about the displaced abomasums problem, and holds that this prohibits the milk min haTorah.

In Conclusion

Notwithstanding the fact that the Chazon Ish writes the reasons why unsupervised milk is permitted, he never allowed its use; and Rav Moshe similarly advocates being strict, and himself did not rely on the heter. Similarly, it is well known that Rav Eliezer Silver traveled across North America by train taking his own chalav Yisrael milk with him as he went. (I have no idea why it did not spoil en route.) In conclusion, we allow each reader to clarify with his own rav whether his or her circumstances permit relying on using non-chalav Yisrael milk.

The Tenth of Av

Question #1. “We are leaving the morning after Tisha B’Av for Eretz Yisroel to attend a family simcha. Do we have to pack a suitcase full of dirty laundry and wash it upon our arrival?”

Question #2. “I am studying a Mesechta and was told not to rush to complete the siyum during the Nine Days. May I make a fleishig siyum the night after Tisha B’Av, and assuming that I can, may I rush the learning to make the siyum at that time?

Question #3. May I recite a Shehecheyanu on the night after Tisha B’Av?

BACKGROUND TO THE SHAYLAH

The Gemara (Taanis 29a) records the following: “On the Seventh of Av, the gentiles entered the Beis Hamikdash and spent three days feasting and contaminating it. As the sun was setting on the Ninth of Av, they set the Beis Hamikdash ablaze, and it continued to burn for the entire next day.” (Shulchan Aruch notes that the Beis Hamikdash burned the entire Tenth of Av, the fire finally going out as the sun set on the Tenth.) Because of this event, Rabbi Yochanan declared that had he been alive at the time of the Churban, he would have declared the fast on the Tenth of Av, rather than the Ninth. He felt that the main mourning should be on the day that the Beis Hamikdash was actually destroyed rather than on the day that the tragedy began. The halacha does not follow Rabbi Yochanan: the main observance is on the Ninth, when the destruction began. Nevertheless, the custom is to observe the Tenth of Av as a day of mourning, as we will see.

Although Chazal did not institute two consecutive days of fasting because it is dangerous for most people to go 48 hours without eating, the Talmud Yerushalmi records that Rabbi Avin fasted for two consecutive days – the entire Ninth and the entire Tenth days of Av to commemorate the tragedy on both days. Rabbi Levi, who was not as strong, fasted only the Ninth and through the night of the Tenth, but broke his fast on the morning of the Tenth. Note that these rabbonim did not require people to fast both days. Rabbi Avin felt the loss of the Beis Hamikdash so intensely that he fasted both days to grieve its loss. Rabbi Levi also felt the intensity of the Churban, but could not fast two consecutive days because of his health. Thus, he observed the Tenth of Av as a fast day to the extent that he could, refraining from ending his Tisha B’Av fast until the following morning.

The Tur (558) mentions that although we lack the strength to extend our fast into the Tenth of Av, nonetheless it is appropriate to refrain from eating meat on the Tenth. Thus, on the Tenth we eat only what is necessary to regain our strength from the Tisha B’Av fast, but not luxury items such as meat and wine. Nevertheless, we find that even in later generations there were great tzadikim who fasted both the Ninth and the Tenth of Av. Several interesting shaylahs result from this fast:

NACHEIM ON THE TENTH

Does someone who is fasting on the Tenth of Av recite Nacheim, the special prayer added to the Shmoneh Esrei of Tisha B’Av, when he is fasting the day after Tisha B’Av? On the one hand, it is no longer Tisha B’Av, so why should someone recite Nacheim? On the other hand, one is commemorating the day that the Beis Hamikdash was destroyed by fasting on that day. The Shla Hakodesh ruled that one who is still fasting on the Tenth of Av because of the churban should recite Nacheim then (quoted by Birkei Yosef). We see from his discussion that it was not unusual in his time for people to fast two consecutive days because of the Churban!

However, someone who is marrying on the night of the Eleventh of Av and is therefore fasting on the Tenth because of Taanis chassan should not recite Nacheim – because he did not fast the night before and it is therefore not a continuous fast to commemorate the churban.

FORGOT TISHA B’AV!

Some Poskim mention another interesting shaylah. A traveler without access to a Jewish calendar arrived in a Jewish community the afternoon of Tisha B’Av and discovered that he had failed to observe any of the halachos of Tisha B’Av. Since he ate the entire day because of his mistake, what should he do now? Can he observe any of the halachos of Tisha B’Av?

Firstly, he should not eat the rest of Tisha B’Av, because every piece of food that he eats violates the fast of Tisha B’Av. He is also required to observe the other halachos of Tisha B’Av until the end of the day.

What else should he do?

The gadol who paskened the shaylah ruled that he should fast and observe the halachos of Tisha B’Av on the Tenth of Av, because Chazal would have instituted the Tenth of Av as a fast were it not too difficult for people. Therefore, someone who failed to observe the Ninth of Av should fast on the Tenth (Birkei Yosef).

FASTING ON MONDAY THE ELEVENTH

Someone asked the Maharil (Shu’t #125, quoted by the Beis Yosef, Orach Chayim 558) the following shaylah. He usually fasted on the Ninth and Tenth of Av, but in the year he asked the shaylah, Tisha B’Av was on Shabbos. Thus, Sunday, the observed Tisha B’Av that year, was really the Tenth of Av. Must he fast on the Eleventh of Av in order to fulfill his practice of fasting two days of Tisha B’Av?!

The Maharil ruled that he is not required to fast on the Eleventh of Av. The reason for fasting on the Tenth of Av is because most of the Churban occurred on this day, as we explained above. But by the Eleventh the Beis Hamikdash had already finished burning and there is no reason to fast.

However, the Maharil ruled that he should refrain from eating meat on the night of the Eleventh and begin eating meat only in the morning. This is because the meal following a fast should be solemn and not include any meat or wine. Similarly, Sefer Hassidim rules that one should not eat meat or drink wine either immediately before or immediately after a fast (quoted by Shu’t Maharshal #92).

Because of these reasons, although the halacha specifically does allow one to eat fleishig immediately after Shiva Asar b’Tamuz, Asarah B’Teiveis and Tzom Gedalyah, many people have a minhag not to eat meat these nights, or at least not to eat meat immediately after the fast since these dates all commemorate events surrounding the Churban. After Yom Kippur, many have the custom specifically to eat meat in order to celebrate the forgiving of our sins.

In conclusion, the Shulchan Aruch (558) rules one should refrain from eating meat or drinking wine the entire day of the Tenth of Av, and this is the normative practice of the Sefardim. The Rama rules that one need refrain only until midday of the Tenth, and this is standard Ashkenazic practice. (However, other Ashkenazic poskim rule that one should refrain from eating meat the entire Tenth of Av [Shu't Maharshal #92].)

SOME MEATY LENIENCIES

Some contend that on the night of the Tenth one may eat food that contains meat and that one may also recite the bensching over wine (called bensching on a kos) if he usually recites the bensching over wine (Maamar Mordechai).

It should be noted that none of the poskim we have quoted so far mention refraining from any activities on the Tenth of Av other than fasting and not eating meat. Thus, one can infer that immediately after Tisha B’Av one may bathe, launder clothes, and engage in all the other activities that we refrain from during the Nine Days. This is indeed the opinion followed by both the Shulchan Aruch and the Rama (558; 551:4). However, others extend the mourning atmosphere of the Tenth of Av to other observances and say that one should not take a haircut, launder or bathe on the Tenth (Shu’t Maharshal #92, quoted by Bach 558; see also Kenesses HaGedolah’s comment, quoted by Mishnah Berurah 558:2). The standard Ashkenazic practice is to be stringent on all the halachos of the Nine Days until midday on the Tenth (Taz). However, when Tisha B’Av falls on Thursday, one may perform all these activities in honor of Shabbos (Mishnah Berurah 558:3). Sefardim are strict not to eat meat until the end of the Tenth, but most permit cutting hair, laundering and bathing.

Notwithstanding this halachic conclusion, there are some leniencies. Some poskim contend that there is no prohibition to shower on the Tenth: the prohibition is only against doing things that are pleasurable or relaxing, such as eating meat or taking a relaxing sauna (Teshuvos Vehanhagos 2:260). Others contend that under extenuating circumstances one may rely on those opinions that permit laundering on the Tenth. Therefore, someone traveling on the morning of the Tenth for a family simcha may do his laundry before he leaves (Piskei Teshuvos 558:2).

MAY ONE SCHEDULE A WEDDING FOR THE DAY AFTER TISHA B’AV?

The Mishnah states that mishenichnas Av memaatim bisimcha, when the month of Av enters, we decrease our happiness (Taanis 26b), which includes making weddings. An additional reason cited to forbid weddings is that since Av is a time of bad mazel for Jews, one should postpone a wedding to a more auspicious date (Beis Yosef 551; Magen Avrohom 551:8). However, this does not tell us how much of Av has bad mazel that precludes making weddings – clearly the minhag is not to avoid making weddings the entire month. In most places, people conduct weddings from the Eleventh of Av. However, some Hassidim have a custom not to make weddings before Shabbos Nachamu (Shu’t Minchas Elazar 3:66).

According to some poskim, one should not make a wedding on the Tenth of Av, even after midday. However, others seem to disagree since they imply that one may schedule a wedding on the day of the Tenth of Av (see Mishnah Berurah 558:2). Others, albeit a minority, even permit making a wedding the night after Tisha B’Av under extenuating circumstances (Shu’t Ramatz #40, quoted by Maharsham in Daas Torah).

SIYUM AFTER TISHA B’AV

Although the universally accepted practice is to refrain from eating meat the night after Tisha B’Av, we are more lenient than the halacha of not eating meat during the Nine Days.

Although one may eat meat at a siyum during the Nine Days, only people who would usually attend the siyum may eat meat. Other people, who might have chosen to not attend the whole year round, may not eat meat or drink wine at the siyum (Rama and Taz 551:10). Furthermore, in order to make a siyum during the Nine Days one should not rush or slow down the learning (Eliyah Rabbah 551:26; Mishnah Berurah 551:73; Aruch Hashulchan 551:28).

None of these stringencies apply to a siyum made on motza’ei Tisha B’Av: then, one may serve meat to as many people as one chooses (Mishnah Berurah 558:2). In addition, one may deliberately arrange the learning schedule so that the siyum falls on that night (Shu’t Ramatz #41, quoted by Maharsham in Daas Torah).

SHEHECHEYANU ON THE TENTH

The poskim discuss whether one may recite the bracha of Shehecheyanu on a new fruit, garment or other possession during the Three Weeks. Reciting this bracha acknowledges that Hashem has sustained us so that we can celebrate again, lazman hazeh on this special occasion.

Most poskim conclude that one may recite Shehecheyanu on Shabbos or in a case where one will not have an opportunity to recite it later, but that otherwise one should not recite Shehecheyanu on weekdays during the Three Weeks (Magen Avraham, Eliyah Rabbah, Chayei Odom; Mishnah Berurah). The poskim dispute why we do not recite Shehecheyanu during the Three Weeks. – This dispute affects whether we recite Shehecheyanu on the Tenth of Av.

According to many opinions, we do not recite Shehecheyanu during the Three Weeks because we are in mourning. These poskim assume that one may recite Shehecheyanu on Shabbos during the Three Weeks, since there are no public signs of mourning on Shabbos (Magen Avraham 551:21). According to this approach, whether and when one recites Shehecheyanu on the Tenth of Av is dependent on when we observe mourning on this day and to what extent (Shaarei Teshuvah 558:1). According to this reasoning, Ashkenazim who do not practice mourning after midday on the Tenth of Av, could recite Shehecheyanu at this point.

However according to the Ari, we refrain from saying Shehecheyanu during the Three Weeks for a totally different reason — because it is inappropriate to recite a bracha whose words are “He has sustained us for this time” when it is a time of year when so many tragedies occurred. Therefore, according to the Ari, one should not recite Shehecheyanu during the Three Weeks even on Shabbos (Shu’t Chaim She’ol #24).

According to the reasoning of the Ari, even an Ashkenazi should not recite the bracha of Shehecheyanu the entire Tenth of Av, even after midday. Although Ashkenazim do not observe any mourning in the afternoon, the reason not to recite Shehecheyanu is because the bracha is inappropriate on a day that such tragedies happened to the Jewish people. This is certainly a reason not to recite Shehecheyanu on the Tenth of Av (Aishel Avraham of Butzatsch). Other poskim contend that one may recite Shehecheyanu on the Tenth of Av since it is a less intense day of mourning (Daas Torah). This approach assumes that the reason we do not recite Shehecheyanu during the Three Weeks is because we are observing mourning practices. According to all opinions, someone who performs a mitzvah on the Tenth of Av which requires Shehecheyanu, such as a pidyon haben or a Bris (for those who recite Shehecheyanu at a bris), should recite Shehecheyanu, just as he would during the Three Weeks.

As we mentioned above, the Talmud Yerushalmi records that Rabbi Avin fasted for two consecutive days – the entire Ninth and Tenth days of Av because the loss of the Beis Hamikdash was so intense to him that he felt the need to fast both days to grieve for its loss. One might think that Rabbi Avin lived close to the time of the destruction of the Beis Hamikdash and that it was therefore a fresh personal memory for him. But in fact, he lived over two hundred years after the destruction of the Second Beis Hamikdash and 700 years after the destruction of the First. Nevertheless, he suffered such anguish from the Churban that he could not bring himself to eat on a day that the Beis Hamikdash was still burning. I have been told that Rav Yehoshua Leib Diskin went to the kosel only twice in his lifetime, although he lived in Yerushalayim. Both times he passed out from the sheer pain he felt at seeing the manifestation of the Churban!

We too should realize that the Churbanos of long ago still have an immediate impact on our lives. We should endeavor to feel the loss of the Beis Hamikdash as our personal loss for which we mourn intensely.

The Mishnah teaches that “Mishenichnas Av mema’atim b’simchah,” “When Av enters, we decrease our happiness,” (Taanis 26b). Although the Mishnah does not clarify exactly how we demonstrate our decreased happiness, the Gemara (Yevamos 43a) includes four activities that are banned: (1) one should decrease one’s business activities, (2) one should refrain from construction and planting intended for joyous reasons (Yerushalmi Taanis, cited by Tosafos to Yevamos 43a s.v. Milisa), (3) one should not conduct weddings and (4) one should not make a festive meal to celebrate an engagement. (This is the interpretation of the Gemara as explained by the Tur Orach Chayim 551 and by the Ramban in Toras Ha’adam; cf. Rashi ad loc., who explains the Gemara differently.)

WHAT IS INCLUDED IN CONSTRUCTION AND PLANTING FOR “JOYOUS REASONS”?

The Mishnah Berurah rules that any construction not necessary for one’s dwelling, but performed for expansion, is prohibited (551:12). Similarly, an improvement to the appearance of a house such as painting, hanging new drapes, wall papering and all house decorating cannot be done during the Nine Days (Piskei Teshuvos). Gardening to enhance the appearance of the property is also forbidden. However, it is permitted to weed, water or mow the lawn during the Nine Days, since these activities are not for enhancement. It is also permitted to plant and maintain a vegetable garden during the Nine Days.

MAY I EXPAND MY HOUSE DURING THE NINE DAYS TO CREATE AN ADDITIONAL APARTMENT?

 While writing this article, I was asked the following shaylah: A family is expanding their residence to accommodate an additional apartment for a married daughter and her family. For the apartment to be ready on schedule, the contractor needs to work during the Nine Days. Is this permitted? It would seem that it is permitted to do this expansion during the Nine Days, since its purpose is to provide normal living accommodations, and not for enhancement.

MAY ONE ENHANCE A SHUL DURING THE NINE DAYS?

Renovations and enhancements for purposes of a mitzvah are permitted during the Nine Days. Therefore, it is permitted to beautify and enhance a shul, yeshivah, or mikvah building or grounds during the Nine Days (Rama 551:3). All repair work on existing structures is permitted during the Nine Days (Shulchan Aruch 551:1).

MAY ENHANCEMENT WORK BE PERFORMED BY A NON-JEW?

 There is a halachic difference between a non-Jew working as a Jew’s employee, or as a contractor who is paid for the job. One may not hire a non-Jewish employee to do work that a Jew himself may not do. However, a non-Jewish contractor may build an addition on a Jew’s property during the Nine Days (see Bach; Eliyahu Rabbah; Mishnah Berurah). One should offer the contractor some financial compensation to refrain from working on your property during the Nine Days, but one is not required to offer a significant amount of money to get him to wait until after Tisha B’Av (Mishnah Berurah).

WEAVING DURING THE NINE DAYS

 The Talmud Yerushalmi cites an early custom not to weave during the Nine Days. The reason for this custom is fascinating. The Hebrew word for “warp” (the lengthwise threads on a loom) is “shesi.” This word reminds us of the “shesiyah” stone, which is the foundation stone of the world on which the aron rested in the Beis HaMikdash. In order to remind ourselves that the Beis HaMikdash was destroyed, we refrain from weaving during the Nine Days (cited by the Tur and Shulchan Aruch 551:8).

WHAT PROHIBITIONS APPLY TO CLOTHING DURING THE NINE DAYS?

One may not wear new clothes during the Nine Days, nor may one tailor or purchase new clothes or shoes (Shulchan Aruch 551:6-7). Similarly, it is prohibited to dry clean clothes or iron them (Shulchan Aruch 551:3). We also refrain from changing tablecloths, towels, and bed linens (Shulchan Aruch 551:3). However, it is permitted to repair shoes and clothes during the Nine Days (Piskei Teshuvos 551:ftn. 157). Although the Mishnah and the Gemara (Taanis 26b and 29b) prohibit doing laundry and wearing freshly laundered clothing only from the Motza’ei Shabbos preceding Tisha B’Av, the Ashkenazic custom is to refrain from Rosh Chodesh (Rama 551:3). Because we do not wear freshly laundered clothes during the Nine Days, one should prepare before Rosh Chodesh sufficient clothing already worn since it was last laundered. Towels should also be used at least once before Rosh Chodesh in order to allow their use during the Nine Days. If one’s clothing becomes sweaty or soiled during the Nine Days, one is permitted to change into clean clothes (see Aruch HaShulchan 389:7). It is permitted to launder children’s clothes and linens until the Shabbos before Tisha B’Av (Mishnah Berurah 551:82, quoting Chayei Odom). There is a dispute among poskim until what age this applies. The Rama is lenient and implies that one may launder all children’s clothing, whereas several later poskim are stricter (see Piskei Teshuvos ftn. 232, and Chanoch Lanaar, 21:2). It is permitted to spot-clean a garment if one is concerned that the stain will set. Furthermore, it is permitted to soak a garment that is dirty without completing its laundering in order to make it easier to clean after Tisha B’Av (Piskei Teshuvos 511:18).

 WHAT DO I DO IF I AM IN A HOTEL DURING THE NINE DAYS?

 If I am forbidden to use freshly laundered bed linens during the Nine Days, what do I do if I am staying in a hotel or as a guest in someone’s home during the Nine Days? May I use the freshly laundered sheets? The poskim permit guests to use fresh bed linens, since most people are very uncomfortable using unlaundered bed linens slept on by someone else (Shu”t Minchas Yitzchak 10:44; Shu”t Tzitz Eliezer 13:61). The Minchas Yitzchak suggests dirtying the linens on the floor a little before using them. Depending on circumstances, one might also be able to bring one’s own used linens. In any instance, one should instruct the hotel not to change the linens once he has used them (until after Tisha B’Av) since the basis to be lenient no longer applies.

PLEASURE BATHING DURING THE NINE DAYS

 The Gemara does not mention any prohibition regarding bathing during the Nine Days. To quote the Ran, “Washing one’s body is permitted whether in hot water or cold – and even the entire body – for Chazal only prohibited washing on Tisha B’Av itself. However, meticulous people have the custom not to bathe the entire week.” On the other hand, the Tur, quoting Avi Ezri, writes that the widespread custom is to forbid bathing from Rosh Chodesh until after Tisha B’Av. Furthermore, he states that one who violates this custom is in violation of “al titosh toras imecha,” – do not forsake the teaching of your mother, here referring to the customs of the Jewish people. The Shulchan Aruch records two customs; one to refrain from bathing from Rosh Chodesh and the second to refrain only during the week of Tisha B’Av. The accepted Ashkenazic custom is to not bathe for pleasure during the entire Nine Days, but bathing for hygienic and health purposes is permitted. A rav should be consulted as to when and how this applies.

WHY IS OUR PRACTICE TO BE MORE STRINGENT THAN THEY WERE AT THE TIME OF THE GEMARA?

 In the times of chazal, the memories of the Beis HaMikdash were still very fresh and a shorter period of mourning was a sufficient reminder. Unfortunately, with the golus continuing for so long, we require a longer period of mourning to bring us into the frame of mind of mourning for the loss of the Beis HaMikdash.

WEARING SHABBOS CLOTHES

 One may not wear Shabbos clothes or other unusually nice clothing during the weekdays of the Nine Days. (In most places, the custom is to wear Shabbos clothes on Shabbos Chazon.) A notable exception is that the celebrants of a bris are permitted to wear Shabbos clothes, since for them the mitzvah is a bit of a Yom Tov. In some places, the accepted custom is that they do not do so when the bris falls between Shabbos Chazon and Tisha B’Av.

 WHO IS CONSIDERED A CELEBRANT REGARDING THESE HALACHOS?

 According to all opinions, the baby’s parents, the sandek, the mohel, and the woman who brings the baby to the bris (the kvaterin) may wear Shabbos clothes (Rama 551:1). Other opinions extend this heter to include the grandparents and other relatives (Shaarei Teshuvah end of 551:3; see also Piskei Teshuvos), as well as the people who are honored with placing the baby on the kisei shel Eliyahu, those who bring the baby closer to the bris (“cheika”), and the man who functions as the kvatter (Eliyah Rabbah). One should ask one’s rav for directions as to what to do. (Incidentally, this discussion is a source on which the ruling that family members attending a bris the rest of the year should wear Shabbos clothes is based!)

EATING MEAT AND DRINKING WINE

Although the Gemara prohibits eating meat and drinking wine only on the day before Tisha B’Av, the accepted Ashkenazic practice is to refrain from eating meat and drinking wine or grape juice from Rosh Chodesh. (Many Sefardim permit eating meat on Rosh Chodesh itself, while others permit this until the Motzei Shabbos before Tisha B’Av.) Early poskim rule that someone who ignores this minhag violates the prohibition of “al titosh toras imecha,” (Mordechai Taanis #639). In addition, some poskim rule that a person who eats meat or drinks wine during the Nine Days violates a Torah law, since the Jewish people have accepted this custom as a vow (Aruch HaShulchan 551:23). IF A MOURNER IS PERMITTED TO EAT MEAT, WHY IS ONE NOT PERMITTED TO EAT MEAT DURING THE NINE DAYS?

This is a very good question. Indeed, the halachos of mourning do not prohibit a mourner from eating meat or drinking wine. The reason one refrains from eating meat and drinking wine during the Nine Days is to remind one of the destruction of the Beis HaMikdash, where Hashem was served by offering korbanos of meat and wine. This reason does not apply to mourning for the loss of a close relative. An alternative reason given is that the mourning of the Nine Days is so one does not forget the loss of the Beis HaMikdash, and by forgoing meat and wine, we are more likely to remember this loss (Tur Orach Chayim 552). A mourner will not forget his loss during the week of shivah, and therefore there is no need to forbid meat as a reminder. It is permitted to eat meat at a seudas mitzvah such as on Shabbos or at a bris, pidyon haben, or siyum. People who would usually attend the seudah may join and eat meat. During the week of Tisha B’Av, only a small number of people may eat fleishig at a seudas mitzvah. For example, eating fleishig is restricted to close family members, the sandek and mohel, and an additional minyan of people. A sick person is permitted to eat meat during the Nine Days. Similarly, someone who has a digestive disorder but can tolerate poultry may eat poultry during the Nine Days. Also, a woman who is nursing or pregnant and is having difficulty obtaining enough protein in her diet may eat poultry or meat during the Nine Days. In these situations, it is preferable for her to eat poultry rather than meat, if that will satisfy her protein needs (Aruch HaShulchan 551:26). A person who eats meat because he is ill or attending a seudas mitzvah will not violate either the vow discussed above or “al titosh” because klal Yisroel accepted the minhag of not eating meat with these exceptions in mind (Aruch HaShulchan 551:26). AT WHAT TYPE OF SIYUM IS IT PERMITTED TO EAT MEAT?

 One may serve meat at a siyum where the completion of the learning coincides with the Nine Days and where one would usually serve a festive fleishig meal. One should not deliberately rush or slow down the learning in order to have a fleishig siyum during the Nine Days (Eliyah Rabbah 551:26; Mishnah Berurah 551:73; Aruch HaShulchan 551:28). However, it is permitted to deliberately schedule a seder of learning in advance so that its siyum falls during the Nine Days if this will encourage more Torah to be learned (Aruch HaShulchan 551:28). Some poskim record that they deliberately delayed siyumim that fell during the Nine Days and celebrated them after Tisha B’Av (Aruch HaShulchan 551:28). One may not eat fleishig leftovers of a seudas mitzvah during the Nine Days (Eliyah Rabbah 551:26; Mishnah Berurah 551:73). Incidentally, one sees from these sources that a bris should be celebrated with a fleishig meal, because if not, why are allowances made to eat meat at a seudas bris during the Nine Days? This proves that the seudas bris is not complete without serving fleishigs.

IS ONE PERMITTED TO USE WINE VINEGAR IN A RECIPE DURING THE NINE DAYS?

 Yes, it is permitted to use wine vinegar since it tastes totally different from wine (Rama 551:9). It is also permitted to drink beer, whiskey and other alcoholic beverages during the Nine Days (see Rama 551:11).

MAY ONE TASTE THE FOOD ON EREV SHABBOS CHAZON?

 In general, it is a mitzvah of kavod Shabbos to taste the food being cooked for Shabbos to make sure that it tastes good (Magen Avraham 250:1, quoting Kisvei Ari). On Erev Shabbos during the Nine Days, one may also taste the food. However, one should try not to swallow food containing meat ingredients (Shemiras Shabbos Kehilchasah 42:61). No bracha is recited when tasting a small amount of food, unless one swallows it (Shulchan Aruch Orach Chayim 210:2).

IS IT PERMITTED TO FEED CHILDREN MEAT ON EREV SHABBOS?

In general, it is not permitted to feed children meat during the Nine Days, including erev Shabbos. Rav Moshe Feinstein ruled that if the children are fed their Shabbos evening meal before the rest of the family has accepted Shabbos, one may feed them meat at this meal because this is their Shabbos meal (Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 4:21:4).

HOW DOES ONE MAKE HAVDALAH DURING THE NINE DAYS?

One recites Havdalah on wine or grape juice. If a young child present is old enough to make brachos but not old enough to understand that we do not eat meat during the Nine Days, that child should drink the Havdalah cup. If there is no such child available, the person reciting Havdalah should drink the wine or grape juice himself.

MAY ONE HAVE A FLEISHIG MELAVA MALKA DURING THE NINE DAYS?

Rav Moshe Feinstein ruled that one may not, since it is not a universal practice to have a fleishig melava malka (Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 4:21:4).

WHAT HAPPENS IF SOMEONE RECITES A BRACHA ON MEAT AND THEN REALIZES THAT IT IS FORBIDDEN TO EAT THE MEAT?

A person who recites a bracha on meat and then realizes that it is the Nine Days, should eat a little of the meat so that his bracha is not in vain, a bracha levatalah. Eating a tiny bit does not provide any simcha and therefore does not conflict with mourning (Sdei Chemed 5:278:5 and 5:368:4). Furthermore, the person is eating the meat only in order to avoid reciting a bracha in vain.

MAY ONE EAT FLEISHIG SOUP DURING THE NINE DAYS? Although it is a dispute among poskim whether this is prohibited, Ashkenazim are strict not to eat soup made with meat or chicken. However, it is permitted to eat food cooked in a fleishig pot that contains only pareve ingredients (Mishnah Berurah 511:63).

LITIGATION DURING THE MONTH OF AV

 The Gemara (Taanis 29b) teaches that a Jew who has litigation with a non-Jew should avoid scheduling the adjudication during Av, since this is a month in which the mazel for Jews is bad. Should one avoid litigation for the entire month, or only until after Tisha B’Av? Some poskim assume that one should avoid litigation the entire month of Av because the entire month has the same mazel (Magen Avraham). Other poskim rule, however, that the bad mazel is only until the 10th of Av, when the mourning period for Tisha B’Av ends, or until the 15th, which is considered a Yom Tov. The Chasam Sofer (commentary to Shulchan Aruch) explains that Av has two different mazelos, one before Tisha B’Av and another one afterwards. While the earlier mazel is bad for the Jews, after Tisha B’Av a new mazel begins that is good for the Jews. Thus according to these opinions, there is no problem with scheduling the litigation for shortly after Tisha B’Av.

THE REWARD FOR OBSERVING THE NINE DAYS

The Midrash (Midrash Rabbah, Shmos 15:21) teaches that Hashem will bring forth ten new creations in the era of Moshiach: 1. He will create a new light for the world. 2. He will bring forth a freshwater spring from Yerushalayim whose waters will heal all illness. 3. He will create trees that every month will produce new fruits that have curative powers. 4. All the cities of Eretz Yisroel will be rebuilt, including even Sodom and Amora. 5. Hashem will rebuild Yerushalayim with sapphire stone that will glow and thereby attract all the nations of the world to come and marvel at the beauty of the city. 6. The cow and the bear will graze together, and their young will play together. (See Yeshaya 11:7). 7. Hashem will make a covenant with all the creatures of the world and banish all weapons and warfare. (See Hoshea 2:20.) 8. There will be no more crying in the city of Yerushalayim. 9. Death will perish forever. 10. Everyone will be joyful, and there will be an end to all sighing or worry. The Kaf HaChayim (551:1) states that everyone who meticulously observes the halachos of the first ten days of Av, thereby demonstrating his personal mourning over the churban of Yerushalayim, will merit to witness these ten miracles. May we all merit to see these miracles speedily and in our days.

This week’s parsha closes by mentioning that the daughters of Tzelafchad succeeded in
finding husbands. I am certain that they had no secrets to disturb their shidduchin from
happening, but what would happen if they did? Would they have been required to “spill
the beans,” or could they have kept these dark secrets to themselves? In this article we
will discuss the ramifications of this question, specifically:
1. What one must tell and what one is not required to tell.

2. When (at what stage in the developing relationship) is one required to inform about the
issue?

3. Whom one must tell.

I was asked this question recently:

Mrs. Weiss (not her real name) called me to discuss the following sensitive matter:
“I was once treated successfully for a serious disease. My grandmother had the same
illness, yet lived in good health to a ripe old age. The doctors feel that my daughter
should be checked regularly from a fairly young age for this same disease. She is now
entering the shidduchim parsha. Must I reveal this family information to shadchanim
(matchmakers) and/or to the families of potential chassanim, and, if so, at what
point must I disclose this information? I am truly concerned that this could seriously
complicate her shidduch possibilities.”

Although this situation may be atypical, we all have medical, personal, and/or
genealogical issues that we wish to keep private. What information must we reveal while
arranging shidduchim for our children (or for ourselves)? And at what point must we
disclose it?

The prohibitions of Geneivas daas, misleading someone, and Onaah, fraud, apply equally
to shidduchin. However, there are many complicating factors involved in shidduchin, and
therefore we need to explain:

ONAAH — FRAUD

Misrepresenting a product or service in order to make a sale is a form of cheating, such
as painting an item to hide a defect. A modern instance of onaah is insider trading,
which means that someone purchases or sells a stock or commodity because he/she has
information, either positive or negative, about the stock, that is unavailable to the public.
This is dishonest because the other transacting party is unaware of this information which
affects the value of the item they are buying or selling.

In shidduchim the same rule is true: Subject to some exceptions, which I will explain
shortly, one must notify the other party of information that might concern them. Hoping

that no one takes this personally, I will refer to this type of negative information as
an “imperfection.” For example, Mrs. Weiss is inquiring whether the family medical
history is an imperfection that must be revealed.

MEKACH TA’US – INVALIDATING THE MARRIAGE

The most serious ramification of withholding required information about shidduchim,
or worse, of being deceptive, is that this can even result (in certain extreme cases) in a
halachically invalid marriage. (This indeed applies to any contracted arrangement – an
unrevealed serious imperfection brings about a mekach ta’us, because the two parties
never agreed to the arrangement as it indeed exists.)

Here are a few interesting examples:

If someone specifies that his new wife should have no vows (nedarim) and finds that she
is bound by neder to abstain from meat, wine or nice clothes, the kiddushin is annulled
(Kesubos 72b)! A husband wants that he and his wife enjoy life together, and refraining
from these activities may disturb the happiness of their marriage.

OTHER SERIOUS IMPERFECTIONS

To quote the words of the Sefer Chassidim (#507), “When arranging matches for your
children or other family members, do not hide medical issues from the other party to
which they would object enough to decline the shidduch, lest they afterward choose to
annul the marriage. You should also tell them about deficiencies in halachic observances
that are significant enough that the other party would have rejected the marriage.”

CAN’T SMELL

Another example of unrevealed information that invalidates a marriage is a woman’s
failure to notify her future husband that she has no sense of smell, since this flaw
hampers her ability to prepare tasty meals. Similarly, a profession that causes a man’s
body to have a foul odor is sufficient reason to invalidate the marriage (Kesubos 76a).

Withholding information concerning an inability to have children is certainly a mekach
ta’us. In this last situation, a physician who is aware that his patient cannot have children
is required to reveal this information to the other side, even though this violates patient
confidentiality (Shu”t Tzitz Eliezer 16:4). In the situation above, the physician was aware
that the young woman had no uterus, and therefore it was physically impossible for her
to conceive a child. He was also aware that they were hiding this information from the
prospective groom. The same would be true should the male be unable to have children,
since the assumption is that people of childbearing age marry intending to bear offspring
from the marriage.

WHAT MAY ONE HIDE?

What type of information may one withhold?
There are two categories of negative information, imperfections, that one does not need
to reveal. They are information that the other party could find out on one’s own, and
information that is not significant.

KNOWN INFORMATION

A seller is not required to disclose an imperfection in his product that the buyer could
discover on his own. Furthermore, as long as the buyer could have noticed something that
may arouse attention, there is no geneivas daas and no onaah in making the sale (Shu”t
Igros Moshe, Yoreh Deah 1:31).

For example, if someone is selling a house with a drop ceiling, he is not required to notify
the buyer that there was damage above the ceiling, since a drop ceiling in a residence
should arouse attention. Similarly, if the entire neighborhood is susceptible to flooding
basements, the seller does not need to mention that his basement has a severe water
problem. If the buyer asks directly, the seller must answer honestly.

Again, in regard to stock trading: The seller is not required to mention that in the last
recorded quarter the company reported a sharp decline in profits since this information is
readily available to the buyer.

A similar concept is true concerning shidduchim. For example, if the scandalous activities
of a family member are well known in one’s hometown, one need not tell the other party
since this information could be discovered by asking around (Shu”t Panim Meiros 1:35).
Halachically, when the other party asks neighbors for information about this potential
shidduch, the neighbors should share the requested details. This is a topic I intend to
discuss more fully in a future article.

INSIGNIFICANT INFORMATION

A second category of information that need not be revealed includes factors that are
insignificant to the buyer. One is not required to provide an in-depth list of every
shortcoming the merchandise has. Similarly, shidduchim do not require revealing
every possible medical or yichus issue. The Chofetz Chaim (Be’er Mayim Chaim #8 at
end of Hilchos Rechilus) distinguishes between a medical issue one must reveal and
a “weakness,” which one does not. Thus, someone need not reveal minor ailments that
would not disturb the average person.

Of course, it is sometimes difficult to define what constitutes a “minor ailment” and what
constitutes a serious one, and specific rabbinic guidance is usually warranted when one is
in doubt. However, I will present one or two examples of each.

Although I know rabbonim who disagree with this position, I feel that juvenile diabetes
is a malady that must be mentioned, whereas non-life threatening hay fever and similar
allergies may be ignored. On the other hand, an allergy that is so serious that it affects

one’s lifestyle and activities in a major way must be mentioned. My usual litmus test is: If
the issue is significant enough that one might want to hide it, it is usually something that
one should tell.

WHEN TO TELL?

At what point must one reveal a significant “imperfection”?

In most instances, there is no requirement to notify the other party or a shadchan of any
of these imperfections at the time a shidduch is suggested. The Sefer Chassidim, quoted
above, does not mention at what point one must notify the other party of the shortcoming.
Contemporary poskim usually contend that one should reveal this information after the
couple has met a few times; about the time the relationship is beginning to get serious,
but after the two parties have become acquainted and see their overall qualities as an
individual. This is the approach I personally advise in all such situations. There is no
requirement for the parties to tell a shadchan, and in some situations it is prohibited to do
so.

My daughter has a close friend who unfortunately has celiac. She had been told by her
rav that she should reveal this information on the third date. (Let me note that this exact
detail will vary tremendously on the dating approach used in the couple’s circles.) She
was so nervous and concerned how the guy would react, that she was unable to bring
herself to mention it then. Finally, on the fourth date, she was able to get the words out,
to which he reacted nonchalantly, “Oh, so does my brother.” This story has a very happy
ending, since her mother-in-law anyway prepares food that is appropriate.

REJECTION
However, if one knows that the other party will reject the shidduch because of this
imperfection, I would recommend forgoing this shidduch from the outset. For example,
if one knows that a particular family prides itself on a pure pedigree, don’t pursue a
shidduch with them if you know they will ultimately reject it when they discover that
your great-uncle was not observant.

At this point, we can discuss Mrs. Weiss’ shaylah asked above:

“I was once treated successfully for a serious disease. My grandmother had the same
illness, yet lived in good health to a ripe old age. The doctors feel that my daughter
should be checked regularly from a fairly young age for this same disease. She is now
entering the shidduchim parsha. Must I reveal this family information to shadchanim
and/or to the families of potential chassanim, and, if so, at what point must I disclose
this information? I am truly concerned that this could seriously complicate her shidduch
possibilities.”

Most poskim with whom I discussed this shaylah contended that one should reveal
this information to the other side after the couple has gotten to know one another
and is interested in pursuing the relationship. One rov disagreed, contending that

since the problem can be caught early and treated successfully, one need not divulge
this information at all. All opinions agree that one has absolutely no obligation to
mention this information to a shadchan or to anyone who has no personal need for this
information.

Obviously, I cannot possibly discuss the various permutations of these shaylos in an
article, but simply can present the issues. Wishing all much happiness in their marriages
and their children’s marriages!

Question #1: My company sent me out of town to meet a new client, and I forgot to have my hair cut before Shiva Asar B’Tamuz. May I have the bushier parts trimmed? Does it make a difference if I use a non-Jewish barber? May I shave?

Question #2: My son wrote me that in his yeshiva in Eretz Yisroel, the Sefardic bochurim shave during the Three Weeks. Is this permitted?

Question #3: Thank G-d, we will be celebrating the Bris of a Grandson during the Three Weeks, and I do not want to look disheveled for the Bris photos. May I shave in honor of the occasion?

Question #4: My wife says that her hair is sticking out beyond her tichel and she would like to trim it. May she?

The three-week period between Shiva Asar B’Tamuz and Tisha B’Av is observed by klal Yisroel as a time of mourning. These three weeks heralded the beginning of the tragedies that took place prior to the destruction of both Batei Hamikdash. Prior to the destruction of the First Beis Hamikdash, the daily korban tamid ceased on Shiva Asar B’Tamuz and did not resume until the Jews began constructing the Second Beis Hamikdash seventy years later (see Rambam, Hilchos Taanis 5:2). Before the destruction of the Second Beis Hamikdash, the walls of the city of Yerushalayim were breached on Shiva Asar B’Tamuz, leading to the complete devastation that followed (Gemara Taanis 28b).

To commemorate these tragic events, the minhag is to observe some mourning practices (aveilus) from the 17^th day of Tamuz until Tisha B’Av (Rama, Darchei Moshe 551:5 and Hagahos 551:2; Ben Ish Chai, Parshas Devorim #4; Knesses Hagedolah; Sdei Chemed Vol. 5, pg. 279 #14). (According to most customs, some aveilus extends into the Tenth of Av.) This three-week season is referred to by the Midrash Rabbah (Eicha 1:3) as the period of Bein Hametzarim. (It is noteworthy that neither the Mishna nor the Gemara make any mention of beginning the mourning period any earlier than Rosh Chodesh.)

WHAT ARE THE LAWS ABOUT HAVING HAIRCUTS AND SHAVING DURING THE THREE WEEKS?

The Mishnah (Taanis 26b) rules that it is prohibited to cut one’s hair from the Motza’ei Shabbos preceding Tisha B’Av until Tisha B’Av. (As a general rule, the halachos of shaving and cutting one’s hair are usually the same.) These days are referred to as shavua shechal bo Tisha B’Av, the week in which Tisha B’Av falls. Thus, when Tisha B’Av falls on Sunday, one may cut one’s hair the entire period of the Three Weeks except for Tisha B’Av itself! However, the Rama notes that the custom among Ashkenazim is that we do not cut our hair during the entire Three Weeks (Darchei Moshe 551:5 and Hagahos 551:4).

There are different customs among Sefardim as to whether they get their hair cut during the Three Weeks. The Shulchan Aruch (551:3) only prohibits that which is recorded in the Gemara, cutting hair from Motza’ei Shabbos until Tisha B’Av, and this is the prevalent practice among Sefardim today in Eretz Yisroel (Shu’t Yechaveh Daas 4:36). Others shave and get hair cuts until Rosh Chodesh, but stop after that point.

However, other Sefardic communities follow the Ashkenazic practice not to shave or get haircuts the entire period of Bein Hametzarim (Ben Ish Chai, Parshas Devorim #12). (Incidentally, the Shulchan Aruch [551:4] also permits having one’s hair cut immediately after Tisha B’Av is over, and does not require waiting until the next day.)

SEFARDIM LIVING IN AN ASHKENAZI COMMUNITY

May a Sefardi living in an Ashkenazi community be lenient despite the prevalent custom?

This issue is discussed by contemporary authorities, involving the general halachic rule that a community should follow one established practice. This principle is referred to by the Gemara as “lo sisgodedu,” do not give the appearance that different Torah communities received different versions of the Torah, G-d forbid (Yevamos 14a, as explained by Rashi). This law prohibits a Jewish community from following two conflicting customs. Thus, it seems that an Ashkenazi living in a Sefardi community or vice versa must observe the prevailing custom.

However, contemporary poskim rule that Ashkenazim living in Sefardi communities may observe Ashkenazic custom and Sefardim living in Ashenazi communities may continue to follow Sefardic practice. Therefore, Sefardic bochurim studying in an Ashkenazic yeshiva are permitted to shave until Rosh Chodesh or during the entire Three Weeks, depending on their minhag. Even though most of the students in the yeshiva follow the Ashkenazic practice of not shaving during the entire Three Weeks, it does not violate minhag hamakom for the Sefardic bochurim to shave (Shu’t Yechaveh Daas 4:36).

WHY DOES THIS NOT VIOLATE LO SISGODEDU?

Even though there is a general rule that a community should follow one halachic practice, this is true when the community has one rav or follows the guidance of one beis din. However, when there are two different batei din in a community, each beis din is free to rule as it sees fit and does not need to change its decision to avoid lo sisgodadu. Thus, the prohibition of lo sisgodadu applies only when there are two different practices in one beis din.

Similarly, when it is well-known that there are different communities, each may observe its own well-established practice. Therefore, Ashkenazim and Sefardim following different minhagim is not a violation of lo sisgodadu. As a result, Sefardic bachurim may shave during the Three Weeks even if they study in an Ashkenazi Yeshiva, since it is understood that they are following a different psak.

EXTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCES

There are several exceptions when Ashkenazim are permitted to shave or take a haircut during the Three Weeks. For example, it is permitted to trim one’s mustache if it interferes with eating (Ran; Shulchan Aruch 551:13). Some poskim rule that a person who usually shaves every day is permitted to shave during the Three Weeks in honor of Shabbos (Shu”t Chasam Sofer, Yoreh Deah #348 s.v. Ve-iy golach). Others permit someone to shave whose beard stubble makes him very uncomfortable (see Shearim Hametzuyanim B’Halacha 122:5). However, since these last two psakim are not usually accepted, one should not rely on them without receiving a psak from a rav.

Someone who is in aveilos is not permitted to shave or have his hair cut until the end of the Sheloshim (30 days), and someone in aveilos for a parent, for several months. If the aveilos ended during the Three Weeks, he is permitted to have his hair cut since he could not cut it before Shiva Asar Bi’Tamuz (Be’er Heiteiv 551:18). Most poskim permit this even during the Nine Days assuming his aveilos ended then (Bach; Taz; Mishnah Berurah 551:87; cf. however, Eliyah Rabbah).

SHAVING BECAUSE OF FINANCIAL LOSS

Rav Moshe Feinstein paskens that one may shave during the Three Weeks if one may lose one’s job or customers because one does not shave. However, if the only concern is that people will make fun of him, one is not permitted to shave. Rav Moshe Feinstein contends that since the prohibition not to shave the entire Three Weeks began as a minhag, the custom was only originally established when one will not suffer financially as a result. However, if he will only suffer embarrassment or harassment but no loss of income, he is required to remain unshaven (Shu’t Igros Moshe, Choshen Mishpat 1:93; Orach Chayim 4:102). Thus, someone who makes a business trip may shave since making a bad impression on the potential customer could cost him business. Certainly, one is not required to jeopardize his employment by avoiding shaving during the Three Weeks.

SHAVING FOR A SIMCHA

If a bris falls out during the Three Weeks, the father of the baby, the mohel, and the sandek who holds the baby during the bris are permitted to shave or take a haircut in honor of the festive occasion (Shu’t Chasam Sofer, Orach Chayim #158). According to some poskim, the kvatter, who brings the baby to the bris, and the sandek meumad (also called amida lebrochos), who holds the baby while he is being named, are also permitted to shave or take a haircut (Shearim Metzuyanim B’Halacha, Kuntrus Acharon 120:8, based on Eliyah Rabbah 551:27 and Beis Meir 551). Thus the grandfather who asked whether he may shave or cut his hair in honor of his grandson’s bris during the Three Weeks may do so if he receives the honor of being sandek. If he receives a different honor, he should ask a shaylah as to whether he may shave in honor of the occasion.

The poskim dispute whether the baalei simcha are permitted to shave even if the bris falls during the Nine Days or only if it falls before Rosh Chodesh. (The Chasam Sofer, Shu’t Noda B’Yehudah 1:28, Shaarei Tshuva, and Sdei Chemed 5:278:3 permit, whereas the Be’er Heiteiv 551:3 prohibits.)

CHOSON

Question: May someone who got married before the 17^th of Tamuz shave during his Sheva Brachos week? May someone attending a Sheva Brachos shave in honor of the occasion?

The week after a couple gets married is considered a Yom Tov for them and they should wear Yom Tov clothes and eat Yom Tov–type meals. Similarly, they are not permitted to go to work. Part of the celebration is that they should look like two celebrants. Thus, it would seem that the choson may shave during his Sheva Brachos week.

However, for the participant in the Sheva Brachos it is not a Yom Tov, so he would not be permitted to shave for the occasion.

Some poskim hold that a bar mitzvah bochur who needs a haircut may get one during the Three Weeks, as long as it is not during the week of Tisha B’Av. Others contend that it is better if he gets the haircut the day before he turns bar mitzvah and rely on the opinion that a minor may get a haircut during the Three Weeks, as I will discuss (Shearim Metzuyanim B’Halacha, Kuntrus Acharon 120:8).

UPSHEREN

Although some poskim permit scheduling an upsheren (chalakah) during the Three Weeks if the child was born during the Three Weeks, the prevalent practice is to postpone the upsheren until after Tisha B’Av (Piskei Tshuvos 551:44; Chanoch Lanaar, Chapter 21, ftn. 1).

Adults may not give children haircuts during the week of Tisha B’Av (Shulchan Aruch 551:14). There is a dispute whether a minor may get a haircut during the Three Weeks, some poskim contending that children were not included in the custom not to cut hair (Mishnah Berurah 551:82, quoting Chayei Odom), whereas others rule that one may not cut a child’s hair just as one may not cut an adult’s (Eliyah Rabbah 551:28).

There are different opinions among poskim whether a woman may have her hair cut during the Three Weeks. The Mishnah Berurah rules that a woman may not have her hair cut during the week of Tisha B’Av, but he suggests that she may be permitted to trim the hair on her temples that stick out from the tichel (Mishnah Berurah 551:79). Many poskim rule that a woman may tweeze her eyebrows and perform similar cosmetic activities (see Shu’t Igros Moshe, Yoreh Deah 2:137; Halichos Beisah, Chapter 25, footnote 70; Piskei Teshuvos 551:43).

MAY I CLIP MY FINGERNAILS DURING THE THREE WEEKS?

It is permitted to clip one’s fingernails during the Three Weeks and the Nine Days according to all opinions. It is a dispute whether one can clip nails during the week of Tisha B’Av (Magen Avraham, 551:11 permits, whereas Taz 551:13 and Eliyah Rabbah 551:7 prohibit).

FOCUS OF THE THREE WEEKS

The most important aspect of the Three Weeks is to focus on the tremendous loss we suffer because of the destruction of the Beis Hamikdash. The minhag among some Sefardic kehillos in Yerushalayim is to sit on the floor each day of the Three Weeks just after midday and to recite part of tikkun chatzos that mourns the loss of the Beis Hamikdash. To further convey this mood, Yesod V’Shoresh HaAvodah prohibits any laughing and small talk during these weeks just as a mourner does not engage in laughter or small talk (Shaar 9, Ch. 11-12).

Although we may not be holding at such a madreigah, we certainly should contemplate the tremendous loss in our spiritual lives without the Beis Hamikdash. Let us pray intently for the restoration of the Beis Hamikdash and the return of the Divine Presence to Yerushalayim, speedily in our days!

Question #1: You made a bracha on a cup of tea and sipped it, and then decided it needed more sugar. Do you need to make a bracha on the extra sugar?

Question #2: You cooked a delicious vegetable-barley soup. What bracha do you recite before eating it? Does it make any difference whether you want to eat the barley?

Question #3: I eat my potato latkes with apple sauce. How many brachos and which ones do I recite before eating them? Does it make a difference if I finish the latkes but am still eating the apple sauce?

The main theme of this week’s parsha, Balak, is mankind’s ability to recite berachos, and the opposite, and creating proper priorities in how we use this ability. This is certainly an opportune time to examine the complicated rules governing how we prioritize the brachos on what we eat.

We apply the rules governing ikar and tafeil, literally the “primary” item and the “secondary” one, numerous times throughout the day. Whether we are eating cereal, fruit and milk for breakfast, macaroni and cheese for lunch, chicken with rice for supper, or snacking on an ice cream cone, these halachos apply. It definitely behooves us to be sure we are applying the halachos correctly.

First an introduction:

The Mishnah (Berachos 44a) which discuss brachos recited before eating states, “This is the rule: Whatever is primary and is accompanied by something secondary, one recites the bracha on the primary and absolves the secondary item.” Thus, the secondary item does not receive its own bracha, but is included in the bracha of the primary item.

WHAT CONSTITUTES AN IKAR-TAFEIL SITUATION?

There are two general categories of situations included in the halachos of ikar and tafeil; (1) when the ikar is an enhancer and (2) when the two items are combined in a mixture.

(1) Enhancers: This category includes food items where the tafeil food makes the ikar food tastier. Some common examples include: Cereal with fruit and milk; eating latkes with apple sauce; stirring herbal tea with a cinnamon stick; breading fish or meat (schnitzel).

In all of these cases, one recites the bracha for the ikar; that is, the cereal, latkes, tea, or meat; and the tafeil is included – that is, the tafeil item loses its bracha.

The category of enhancers also includes cases where the ikar is too spicy or sharp to eat alone. Thus, eating a cracker or piece of bread with a very sharp food to make it edible is a case of ikar and tafeil and one recites the bracha only on the sharp food (Mishnah Berachos 44a).

We should note, however, that the tafeil item loses its bracha only when one eats it together with the ikar or afterwards. But if one eats the tafeil before one eats the ikar, one does recite a bracha on the tafeil. Thus, food eaten before schnapps to soften its “bite” requires a bracha since one is eating it before the schnapps. When this situation occurs, the poskim debate what bracha one recites on the tafeil.

(2) Mixtures: This category includes cases where one food is not specifically enhancing the other, but both foods are important. For example, someone eating macaroni and cheese, blintzes (they always contain a filling), cholent, kugel, or stew is interested in eating all the different foods that comprise the dish. The same halacha applies when eating soups, which may contain vegetables, meat, noodles, barley, or flour. In these cases, all the food items eaten are important and none of these ingredients serve only to enhance the rest. However, the food in these cases are mixtures they are considered one complete food item and therefore only recites one bracha for the entire food, although it contains items that eaten separately would require separate brachos. Thus, the concept of ikar and tafeil is very different here – it is the rule used to determine which bracha we recite on this food. In this case, the bracha of the ikar is the bracha on the entire item.

WHAT DETERMINES THE BRACHA ON A MIXTURE?

There are three rules that determine which bracha to recite on a mixture.

1. If one of the items in the mixture is clearly the most important, then that item determines the bracha (Pri Megadim, Pesicha Koleles, Hilchos Brachos s.v. HaTenai; Mishnah Berurah 212:1). For example, the bracha on chicken soup with vegetables is shehakol since the chicken is the most important flavor component in the soup. However, if it is a vegetable soup with some meat added for flavor, the bracha would be ha’adamah (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 205:2 and commentaries).

2. When there is no most important ingredient, the bracha is usually determined by the majority item in the product. Thus, the bracha on a peanut bar containing peanuts, honey, and sugar is ha’adamah since peanuts are the major ingredient, and the bracha on a tzimmes consisting of prunes and sweet potatoes depends on which item is the major ingredient.

3. However, when the mixture contains one of the five grains (wheat, barley, spelt, oats, and rye) then the bracha is usually mezonos, unless the flour or grain product is included only to hold the food together (Shulchan Aruch 204:12; 208:2,3). Because these grains are important, they are the ikar of the mixture even if they are a minority component.

However, when the flour’s purpose is only to hold the item together or to provide texture, then it is not the ikar of the food because its purpose is clearly to function is a subsidiary. (In this instance, the flour is being used to enhance the other food item, and thus it categorically becomes a tafeil.)

Therefore, the bracha on a trifle containing cakes and ice cream is mezonos even if there is more ice cream than cake, since the cake is a grain product; whereas the bracha on potato kugel that contains flour, bread crumbs, and/or matzoh meal to provide texture is ha’adamah. Since the grain product here functions only to hold the kugel together, it is tafeil and does not affect the bracha. Similarly, flour added to thicken soup is tafeil (Mishnah Berurah 212:1). When the flour provides taste or makes the product satisfying, then the flour is the ikar and the bracha is mezonos (Shulchan Aruch 204:12; 208:3).

Similarly, the bracha on vegetable-barley soup is mezonos. However, if the barley is completely dissolved, the bracha on the soup is usually ha’adamah. Similarly, if you do not want to eat the barley but a few pieces ended up in your portion anyway, the bracha is ha’adamah.

The same rules apply in the case of licorice candy whose bracha is shehakol even though it contains a significant amount of flour, since the flour is there only to give it a stiff texture. On the other hand, the bracha on kishka is mezonos, since the main ingredient is the flour.

BEFORE AND AFTER

Until now we have been discussing situations when you are eating the ikar and tafeil together. What do you do if you are eating the tafeil item either before or after you eat the ikar?

A TAFEIL EATEN BEFORE

A tafeil loses a bracha only when it is eaten together with the ikar or afterwards, but not when it is eaten before. Again, the reason for this becomes fairly clear once we think about it. A tafeil’s bracha is subsumed by the bracha on the ikar. This helps us as long as one has already recited the bracha on the ikar. However, if one has not yet recited the bracha on the ikar, how can one eat the tafeil without reciting any bracha at all since we are forbidden to benefit from the world without first reciting a bracha? Thus, it must be that we recite a bracha on the tafeil when eating it before the ikar.

However, this does not tell us whether the bracha on the tafeil is the same bracha one would usually recite on it, or whether it is automatically reduced to a shehakol. Let us say that someone is going to drink a powerful beverage or a very spicy pepper, and in order to tolerate it, he is first going to eat some bread or crackers. What bracha does he recite on the bread or cracker?

The Rama (212:1) rules that one recites a shehakol on the bread or cracker!

WHY DOES THE CRACKER LOSE ITS BRACHA?

The Rama’s ruling is based on an earlier psak of the Terumas HaDeshen, who discusses a case of someone who wants to drink wine, but can not drink the wine on an empty stomach. Therefore he eats some seeds whose bracha is usually ha’eitz before imbibing the wine. The Terumas HaDeshen rules that he recites a shehakol on the seeds since he is not getting his primary benefit from the fruit (Darchei Moshe 212:2). However, the Beis Yosef disagrees and rules that he should make ha’eitz on the seeds.

On what concept is this dispute dependent? One could explain that this dispute reflects two different ways of explaining why one does not recite a bracha on a tafeil. The Terumas HaDeshen contends that a tafeil is unimportant and therefore does not warrant a bracha, however, one cannot benefit from this world without a bracha — therefore one recites shehakol. On the other hand, the Beis Yosef holds that the bracha on the ikar counts as the bracha on the tafeil and therefore one does not need to make a bracha on it- but if the tafeil were to require a bracha, it does not lose its status or its bracha.

EATING A TAFEIL AFTER THE IKAR

What do you do if you finished eating the ikar, but you have not yet completed the tafeil. Do you recite a bracha on the tafeil since you are no longer eating the ikar, or do we say that the bracha on the ikar still suffices? For example, you finished your cereal, but there is still some milk left, or you finished the barley of the soup, but there is still more soup to eat. Do you recite a new bracha on the rest of the soup?

The halacha is that if you finished the ikar first, and a small amount of tafeil remains, one does not recite a bracha on the remaining tafeil. However, if a large amount remains, one does recite a bracha (Mishnah Berurah 168:46).

At the beginning of the article I asked the following shaylah, “You made a bracha on a cup of tea and sipped it and then decided it needed more sugar. Do you need to make a bracha on the extra sugar?”

The question here is that the sugar is tafeil to the tea, but can it be a tafeil when it was not in front of you when you made the bracha?

The halacha is that if you begin eating something and afterwards decide to eat a tafeil food alongside, the tafeil requires a bracha- but only shehakol (Mishnah Berurah 212:4). This is true only if the tafeil is an enhancer (see our category above). However, if it is a tafeil because it is a mixture, it receives its regular bracha. Thus, if after making a bracha on cereal, someone decided to add milk and fruit, he recites ha’eitz on the fruit and shehakol on the milk. On the other hand, if he knew he would add fruit and milk when he recited the bracha on the cereal, then they are tafeil to the cereal and he does not recite a bracha on them even though they were not present when he recited the bracha.

What should you do if someone brought you a cup of tea and you then decided to add sugar? Do you need to recite a bracha on the sugar?

If you usually add sugar to your tea, you do not need to recite a new bracha. However, if you do not, then you will need to recite a bracha on the sugar.

Not everything we do in life qualifies as our ikar purpose in life- often we must do things that are tafeil to the more important things in life. However, paying attention to the halachos of ikar and tafeil should encourage us to focus on our priorities in life- and not allow the tafeil things we must do become more important than they are.

By Jerry Kaufman

As reported to Rabbi Yirmiyohu Kaganoff

My sister and her family are coming for Yom Tov for the very first time, which has us all very excited! But, we need to figure out all the logistics of having everyone together for Yom Tov — where will everyone sleep, how to arrange sufficient seating space and chairs. After all, they have a very large family, and our two boys are accustomed to each having their own room.

And we want to make sure that the visiting family is comfortable. In truth, there have been some sticky situations in the past. Well, let me put it this way. We are frum, but we do not keep all the chumros that they do. This has created some uncomfortable situations in the past. What we realized is that to have an optimal relationship with them, we need to be very accommodating to their needs, which is sometimes complicated since we are not always certain what their needs are. And to complicate matters, we have discovered that they don’t trust the opinions of our rabbi. But they are really wonderful people, and in addition, mishpacha is mishpacha!

We already know that when they come we should make sure to have plenty of cholov yisroel products available and to double check what hechsherim they accept. And we know that they will not use the eruv, which our rabbi uses himself. So, I guess, to each his own. But I want to make sure that they are comfortable; we really want to have a nice Yom Tov together, and so do they.

Since they have never been here for such an extended stay, we would really like to show them the sites of town. Our city is blessed with many really nice museums, many of them extremely child friendly. Hopefully, these will help make the Yom Tov memorable for all.

But one second. My brother-in-law Muttie is a kohen, and has told me that he is very careful about checking museums before he goes. It would be really nice if I can figure out in advance which museums he can visit so that we can plan the Chol HaMoed itinerary.

But maybe we can take his under-bar-mitzvah boys to the Children’s Museum without any concern? I am going to call the rabbi. After all, he is also a kohen.

I reached Rabbi Katz on the first try. He told me that the prohibition of making a kohen tamei also applies to a kohen who is too young to be obligated in mitzvos. An adult Yisroel may not bring a child or baby who is a kohen into a place where he would become tamei meis, such as a cemetery or funeral home. He told me that some kohanim are extremely careful not to visit people in hospitals even in places where most of the patients are not Jewish – not that we are planning any hospital visits during this Yom Tov.

While on the phone, I asked Rabbi Katz if there was any problem with a kohen going to a museum. He answered me that he himself goes, but he knows of kohanim who refrain from going. I asked him what the issue was, to which he responded that he would check it out and call me back.

Rabbi Katz telephoned a day later, having spoken to the city’s av beis din, Rav Gross. The senior rabbi had explained that there is a dispute whether a kohen may enter a museum in which there are human remains inside a glass enclosed display area. He explained that whereas Jewish remains certainly convey tumah whether they are touched, carried or in the same room as a person; and sometimes even if they are in the same building, it is disputed whether gentile remains convey tumah when they are in the same room if they are not touched or carried.

Rabbi Katz explained that the tumah that spreads throughout a room or building is called tumas ohel. This does not affect non-Kohanim today, since everyone is tamei anyway, and to remove this tumah requires ashes of the parah adumah. However, a kohen must be careful not to enter the same ohel as Jewish remains.

However, whereas the remains of a non-Jew convey tumas meis if they are touched or carried, there is a dispute whether they convey tumas ohel, that is, the tumah that spreads through a room or building. The halacha is that one should try to be careful and, therefore, a kohen should not enter a building containing the remains of a non-Jew.

When a museum contains parts of human bodies, we do not usually know whether these are from Jewish bodies or not, and we may assume that since most of the world is not Jewish, that they are from non-Jews. In addition, the remains in a museum are usually inside glass displays that can be opened when necessary. Some authorities contend that this glass enclosure is halachically equivalent to having the remains in a different room; in their opinion a kohen may enter a museum (see Shu”t Maharsham #215).

Thus, Rav Gross had concluded that a kohen wanting to visit a museum where all the remains are inside display cases has a basis to be lenient because of these two reasons.

Although I was glad to discover that my kohen friends who attend museums have a basis, I realized that Muttie would probably not accept the lenient approach. I remembered a time that we were visiting them and they had taken us to a neighborhood children’s museum with many “hands-on” science exhibits perfect for children. Upon turning a corner of the museum, we discovered an area described as an “Indian Burial Ground,” complete with bones for realistic affect. Assuming that the bones were artificial, Muttie had casually asked the receptionist, “Are these bones authentic?”

The receptionist answered, “Actually, they are not. They are probably not Indian bones, but acquired elsewhere.” Upon hearing this information, Muttie bee-lined an abrupt exit from the museum. Indeed, they were not authentic Indian bones, but they were authentic human bones! Unquestionably, Muttie is concerned about human bones even when they are probably of a gentile. I was also fairly certain that Muttie would not rely on the fact that the remains are inside a glass display.

At this point, I remembered a cute little theater that runs actual Shakespeare plays. What could be wrong with Shakespeare? Until I inquired, and discovered that one of the props for Hamlet is a real skull! I had just about given up on this idea, when I mentioned it to Rabbi Katz. He commented: “Check it out. I remember once discovering that these skulls are not complete, and that there is a halacha that a damaged skull does not convey tumah throughout a building.”

Off I went, to check Hamlet’s skull. Much to my surprise, they were willing to show me the actual skull that they used, although they told me that they have no crossbones. Sure enough, I discovered that the top of the skull had been replaced with a metal plate. I am no Torah scholar, and had no idea whether this would be acceptable.

I called Rav Gross, the city’s av beis din, myself and described to him the Shakespearian skull, explaining the family situation so that he would realize that I was not hunting for a lenient opinion. He told me that there was no kohen issue. “If one removes enough of an area of a skull that a live person would not be able to survive, the partial skull remaining no longer spreads tumah unless it is touched or carried. The subsequent repair with a metal plate does not cause the skull to spread tumas ohel, although it would spread tumas ohel if the removed skullcap was in the same room.”

Since I did not envision Muttie or his sons joining the cast of Hamlet, it seemed that we would be able to take them to the Shakespeare Theater as a special activity for Chol HaMoed. I thanked Rav Gross for sharing his scholarship with me, at which point he made the following observation:

“Are you sure that this is the type of entertainment that your brother-in-law and his children would appreciate?”

Admittedly, this question had not even occurred to me. What could be risqué about Shakespeare? But then again, Muttie’s priorities in education are very different from mine. I am not sure if this is the type of Chol HaMoed outing that he would consider memorable.

So I resigned myself to try to verify if any of our museums are kosher for kohanim. I asked the local Vaad Ha’Ir if they have ever researched the museums. They told me that although it is a good idea, they have never done so, but would be very eager to follow up on whatever I discover.

I called the information desk at the children’s science museum, and explained that I have company from out of town who are unable to visit the museum if it contains any human remains. I realized that they must have thought I was absolutely bonkers! I can just imagine the conversation that transpired among the receptionists on their lunch break!

Although the information desk notified me that there were no human remains to be had anywhere in the museum, I did not get any sense that they took me seriously and decided that I would have to take a trip there to check it out myself.

I decided the best way to handle the situation was to call Muttie directly, and try to get direction from him what the parameters are.

I received quite an education from Muttie. If I can paraphrase what he told me: “A close friend of mine, who is not a kohen, often visits museums to verify whether a kohen may enter. Among the most common remains he finds are mummies, human bones, skeletons, and preserved fetuses, but occasionally he has discovered preserved human organs or entire cadavers. One museum had an empty stone casket that had been found in Eretz Yisroel with an obvious Jewish name on it. Since the supports of a grave are also sometimes tamei, we had a shaylah whether this contaminates the entire museum.

“Often displays of these items are not inside glass-enclosed areas, which increases the halachic concerns. For example, he has discovered on the shelves of museums such artifacts as Aztec musical instruments carved from the femurs of captured prisoners as well as bowls hollowed out from skulls. By the way, Muttie noted, these bowls pose a problem only if the kohen touches them or picks them up – boy, was he impressed when I told him why!

“During one visit, he noticed a display of a giant, which he assumed was a mannequin, but on closer inspection turned out to be a giant whose remains had been preserved in formaldehyde!”

Muttie’s friend feels that a kohen who would like to visit a particular museum should first have a knowledgeable non-kohen carefully research the entire museum. From first-hand experience, he can attest that one should not rely on the information desk personnel – they are often uninformed of what the museum owns. In one instance, the information desk insisted that a museum displaying ossuaries containing human bones had absolutely no human remains!

“The curators also often make mistakes. In one museum, there was a skull on display, which we asked the curator whether it was real. She told us that she knows that the museum purchased it from a supplier who sells only replicas and not real skulls or skeletons. I asked her if there was any way that one could look at a skull and tell if it was real. She responded that you can usually tell by making a very careful inspection of its teeth. To demonstrate the difference between the replica and a real skull, she opened the display to show him – and discovered, much to her surprise, that the skull was real! It turned out that the museum had purchased it at a time that the supplier sold real specimens!

“Lesson to learn: Be careful, and ask lots of probing questions.”

Muttie then told me an interesting bit of information. “When approaching a museum, one should ask if it contains any remains that fall under the NAGPRA act, the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act. This was a law passed by Congress requiring many institutions to return Native American cultural items and human remains to their respective peoples. Under one provision of this law, these institutions are required to catalog all Native American burial items and religious artifacts in their collections in order to identify the living heirs, culturally affiliated Indian tribes, and Native Hawaiian organizations of remains and artifacts.

“Someone trying to find out whether a museum contains tamei remains can easily begin his conversation with the curator or collection manager by mentioning NAGPRA. Since they are familiar with the requirements of this law, the subject of human remains and their cataloging in the museum’s collections are no longer so strange to them. One can use this as an entrée to discuss what a kohen is and what our halachic concerns are. I have found that the curators are usually very helpful; however, one must ask very specifically about each type of item, such as skeletons, skulls, bones, preserved organs, and mummies, since they are not thinking about tumah but about science.

“Furthermore, sometimes the curators themselves do not know what the museum has in storage. Here one often gets into very interesting halachic questions that one needs to discuss with a first-line posek. For example, while looking at one museum, someone discovered that a different floor of the building contained drawers filled with all sorts of human artifacts.

“By the way,” Muttie noted, “there are other things to be concerned of in museums even if one is not a kohen. Many museums contain actual idols that constitute real avodah zarah. The question arises whether one may even look at them.”

At this point, my brother-in-law educated me by pointing out that when the Torah states al tifnu el elilim, do not turn to idols (VaYikra 19:4), the prohibition includes looking at idols (Yerushalmi, Avodah Zarah 3:1; Rambam, Hilchos Avodah Zarah 2:2; Sefer HaMitzvos, Lo Saaseh #10; Chinuch #213). The Magen Avraham (307:23) explains that the Torah prohibits only gazing at an idol, but does not prohibit glancing at it. Therefore, seeing it is not prohibited, but intentionally looking at it is. Thus, one must be wary of this prohibition when visiting a museum that may include icons, statues, and images.

While I was contemplating the last fact, Muttie called me back to our original topic with the following comment: “Jerry, do you know what kind of massive undertaking this is? The reason I rarely take the family to museums is that I am always uncertain what they contain, and I know how difficult it is to really determine what they have – the curators themselves often don’t know.

“I must tell you. I am so appreciative of your putting this effort into making sure we have a nice time. But you have to work and make Yom Tov. Besides, my kids are not oriented towards museum visits — they spend most of their time in Yeshiva, and they much prefer spending time playing ball and running around in the park. I am sure your wonderful boys have nice friends and the cousins and the friends can play some ball. For my kids that will be seventh heaven – and something much more memorable.”

I must admit that it had not even occurred to me that the cousins would enjoy just playing ball together. Indeed we had an absolutely wonderful Yom Tov that the cousins will all remember for years to come! And I left to someone else to research whether the local museums are kohen-appropriate. Are you interested in working on this project on behalf of klal Yisroel?

Question #1: Donkey Rides

Have you ever ridden a donkey? Did you stop to wonder whether the donkey might be firstborn and that it might be prohibited to ride it?

Question #2: Pony Rides

May I ride a horse without checking first whether it is firstborn?

Question #3: Ask its mother!

How do I know whether my donkey is firstborn? I can’t go ask its mother!

Answer:

As a kohen, I often participate in the mitzvah of Pidyon Haben, redeeming a firstborn male child, a bechor, but I have never been asked to participate in redeeming a firstborn donkey, in Hebrew called peter chamor.

After Korach’s maligning Aaron, the Torah lists the awards Aaron and his descendants, the kohanim, receive for their service to the Jewish Nation (listed in Bamidbar 18: 8 -19). There are a total of twenty-four gifts that the Torah grants the kohanim (see Bava Kamma 110b; Rambam, Hil. Bikkurim ch. 1). One of these twenty-four grants is the mitzvah of peter chamor, redeeming the firstborn donkey, the firstborn of a non-kosher animal you shall redeem (Bamidbar 18:15). This is a grant because the kohen benefits by receiving a lamb or goat or the value of the donkey, as I will explain.

This is not the only place in the Torah that this mitzvah is mentioned. The Torah mentions the mitzvah of peter chamor in two other places also:

(1) In Parshas Bo, the pasuk says: Every firstborn donkey you shall redeem with a “seh,” and if you do not redeem it, you should break its neck. Furthermore, the firstborn of your children you shall also redeem (Shemos 13:13). I intentionally did not translate the world “seh” since it includes both sheep and goats, and I am unaware of an English word that includes both species.

(2) The Torah mentions this mitzvah again in Parshas Ki Sissa: The first issue of a donkey you shall redeem with a "seh" (Shemos 34:20). Here the Torah refers to the first issue, from which we derive that the mitzvah applies only if the donkey was born in the normal fashion. This means that a firstborn donkey delivered through caesarean section does not have the sanctity of being firstborn and that there is therefore no mitzvah to redeem it. Sorry, kohen, better luck next time, or more accurately, on the next mother donkey. — If a donkey was delivered through caesarean section, the next naturally-born fetus also does not become sanctified.

No Sanctity to a Puppy

Although the verse in Parshas Korach the firstborn of a non-kosher animal you shall redeem, implies that it includes any species of non-kosher animals, including puppies, kittens and baby elephants, since the two verses in the book of Shemos both specifically mention donkeys, the halacha is that the mitzvah applies only to one species of non-kosher animals: donkeys. Thus, although a dog might be man’s best friend, a firstborn puppy does not have the sanctity of a firstborn donkey foal. There is no mitzvah to redeem a firstborn colt, camel, or wolf (Tosefta, Bechoros 1:2). Thus we can now answer one of our above questions:

May I ride a horse without checking first whether it is firstborn? The answer is that firstborn horse foals have no sanctity. We will soon learn why the donkey is an exception.

Is a Peter Chamor Holy?

Does a firstborn donkey have kedusha?

Prior to its being redeemed, a firstborn donkey has kedusha similar to that of a korban. It is prohibited min haTorah to ride it, use it as a beast of burden, or even use its hair. The hair that falls off it must be burnt and may not be used. Someone who uses this donkey violates a prohibition approximately equivalent to eating non-kosher (Rashi, Pesachim 47a s.v. ve’hein; Rivan, Makkos 21b s.v. ve’hein; cf., however, Tosafos, Makkos 21b s.v. HaChoresh).

Until the donkey is redeemed, one may not sell it, although some poskim permit selling it for the difference between the value of the donkey and a sheep (Rosh, Bechoros 1:11; Tur and Rama, Yoreh Deah 321:8). Many poskim contend that if the donkey is sold, the money may not be used (Rambam, Hilchos Bikkurim 12:4; Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 321:8)).

What if the Peter Chamor is Never Redeemed?

If the firstborn donkey is unredeemed, it maintains its kedusha its entire life! If it dies in its unredeemed state, the carcass must be buried to make sure that no one ever uses it. We may not even burn the carcass because of concern that someone might use its ashes, which remain prohibited (Mishnah Temurah 33b-34a). The owner who failed to redeem the donkey missed the opportunity to fulfill a mitzvah. Thus we see the value of redemption.

May I Ride a Donkey — Maybe it is a Firstborn?

Have you ever ridden a donkey? Although it is not common to ride donkeys them in North America, in Eretz Yisroel this is a fairly common form of entertainment. Did you stop to wonder whether the donkey might be firstborn and one is prohibited to ride it?

One need not be concerned. Since most of the donkeys of the world are not firstborn, one need not assume that this donkey is. Truthfully, the likelihood of a donkey being holy is very slim for another reason- most donkeys are owned by non-Jews, and a non-Jew’s firstborn donkey has no sanctity.

How do we Effect Redemption?

As mentioned above, the Torah commands the owner of a firstborn male donkey to redeem him by giving a kohen a seh, a word we usually translate as lamb. However, we should be aware that the word seh in the Torah does not mean only a lamb, but also includes a kid goat, as we see from the mitzvah of korban Pesach, where the Torah mentions this explicitly (Shemos 12:5; see Mishnah Bechoros 9a). Other species of animal, such as cows and deer, are not referred to as "seh" by the Torah (Mishnah, Bechoros 12a; Rambam, Hil. Bikkurim 12:8; Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 321:1).

By the way, one does not need a lamb or kid to redeem a firstborn donkey –a mature adult is perfectly fine. Furthermore, the lamb, kid, sheep or goat that may be either male or female (Mishnah Bechoros 9a).  Lamb chops enthusiasts take note — since they also may be either young or adult, and either male or female.

Saving the Owner Money

In actuality, using a sheep or goat to redeem the donkey is merely a less expensive way of fulfilling the mitzvah Hilchos Bikkurim 12:11). There is an alternative way to fulfill the mitzvah — by redeeming the donkey with anything that is worth at least as much as the donkey (Gemara Bechoros 11a). Thus, someone who gives a cow or deer to the kohen would fulfill the mitzvah of peter chamor if they are worth at least as much as the donkey (Rashi, Bechoros 12a Tur, Yoreh Deah 321; Shach ad loc. #1. and Taz ad loc. #3).

However, if the owner redeems the donkey with a sheep or goat, he fulfills the mitzvah even if the sheep or goat is worth far less than the donkey (Bechoros 11a, Rambam, Hil. Bikkurim 12:11). Thus by giving a lamb or kid to the kohen, the owner saves money.

Some authorities contend that it is preferable to use a seh for the redemption, and that one should redeem the peter chamor with other items only if he has no sheep or goat with which to redeem it (Rambam as understood by Beis Yosef, Yoreh Deah 321 and Perishah ad loc. #6). Others, however, maintain that redeeming a peter chamor with other items is as acceptable as redeeming it with a sheep or goat (see Tur, Yoreh Deah 321; see also Divrei Chamudos, Bechoros 1:26).

By the way, the sheep or goat cannot be a tereifah, meaning an animal bearing a terminal defect, it must be alive at the time of redemption (Mishnah, Bechoros 12a) and it may not be a  non-viable premature fetus even if it is still alive (Minchas Chinuch 22:5).

A Blemished Record

On the other hand, the redeeming seh may be of either gender, it may be blemished; and it may be of any age (Mishnah, Bechoros 9a).

Giving the Kohen the Foal

What if the owner decides to give the firstborn donkey to the kohen instead?

What is the halacha if the owner decided to give the firstborn donkey to the kohen, instead of redeeming it with a sheep, goat, or other item? Some authorities rule that if the owner gives the firstborn donkey to a Kohen he has fulfilled the mitzvah (Teshuvos HaRadvaz, I:496; Birkei Yosef, Yoreh Deah 321:4; Maharit Algazi, Hil. Bechoros 8; Minchas Chinuch 22:16). According to this view, the Torah merely gives the owner the option (emphasize by italicizing the word option) of keeping the donkey by redeeming it and giving the instrument of redemption to a Kohen.

Others disagree, arguing that redemption is not merely an option but the only means of fulfilling  the mitzvah, and that one who gives the peter chamor to a kohen does not fulfill the mitzvah (Levush, Yoreh Deah 321:8; Chazon Ish, Bechoros 17:6; see also Terumas HaDeshen vol.II #235).

Conclusion:

Why was the donkey an exception? It is the only non-kosher species of animal whose firstborn carries kedusha!

The Gemara teaches that this is a reward for the donkey. When the Bnei Yisroel exited Egypt, the Egyptians gave us many gifts (see Shemos 11:2-3; 12:35-36). The Bnei Yisroel needed to somehow transport all these gifts out of Egypt and through the Desert unto Eretz Yisroel. The Jews could not simply call Allied Van Lines to ship their belongings through the Desert. Instead Donkey Lines performed this service for forty years without complaint or fanfare! In reward for the donkey providing the Bnei Yisroel with a very necessary shipping service, the Torah endowed the firstborn of this species with sanctity (Gemara Bechoros 5b). In essence, Hashem rewarded the donkey with its very own special mitzvah. Thus, this mitzvah teaches us the importance of acknowledging when someone else helps us, hakaras hatov, for we appreciate the species of donkeys because their ancestors performed kindness for us. If we are required to appreciate the help given to our ancestors thousands of years ago, how much more do we need to exhibit hakaras hatov to our parents, teachers, and spouses for all that they have helped us!

By Rabbi Yirmiyohu Kaganoff

Question #1: In most years, the parsha of Bamidbar falls on the Shabbos before Shavuos, and Parshas Naso falls the Shabbos after Shavuos. However, this year Bamidbar falls out a week earlier, and Naso is also before Shavuos. Why is this year different from the other years?

Question #2: Why are most of the "Double Parshiyos" clustered together in and around Sefer Vayikra?

Question #3: Why are the Torah’s parshiyos of such disparate length? Some parshiyos are very long — the longest being this week’s Parsha, Naso, which contains 176 pesukim. Yet at the end of the Torah we have four parshiyos that are extremely short – all of them between 30 and 52 pesukim. Why aren’t the parshiyos of similar length?

Answer:

The Gemara teaches:

Ezra decreed that the Jews should read the curses of the Tochacha in Vayikra before Shavuos and those of Devarim before Rosh Hashanah. Why? In order to end the year together with its curses! [The Gemara then comments:] We well understand why we read the Tochacha of Devarim before Rosh Hashanah because the year is ending, but why is that of Vayikra read before Shavuos. Is Shavuos the beginning of a year? Yes, Shavuos is the beginning of a new year, as the Mishnah explains that the world is judged on Shavuos for its fruit" (Megillah 31b).

However, this Gemara does not seem to explain our practice. There are two Tochachos in the Torah, one in Parshas Bechukosai, the last parsha of sefer Vayikra, and the second in Parshas Ki Savo, but neither of these parshiyos is ever read immediately before Shavuos or Rosh Hashanah. There is always at least one other Shabbos wedged between. In the case of the Tochacha of Parshas Bechukosai, Shavuos occurs usually after the next parsha, Bamidbar, but occasionally after the following parsha, Naso, as it does this year. The reading of the second Tochacha, Ki Savo is never the parsha before Rosh Hashanah. The parsha after it, Netzavim, always has the distinction of being read on the Shabbos immediately before Rosh Hashanah.

Tosafos (ad loc.) explains that the Tochacha should be read two weeks before each "New Year" to allow a buffer week between the Tochacha and the beginning of the year. Thus, Ezra’s decree was that the two Tochachos should be read early enough so that there is another reading following them before the "year" is over. The Levush (Orach Chayim 428:4) explains that without the intervening Shabbos reading as a shield, the Satan could use the Tochacha as a means of prosecuting against us on the judgment day. The intervenient Shabbos when we read a different parsha prevents the Satan from prosecuting, and as a result we can declare: End the year together with its curses!

Divide and Conquer!

We can now explain why the very end of the Torah is divided into such small parshiyos. The Tochacha of Parshas Ki Savo is located towards the end of Sefer Devarim. In order to complete our annual reading of the Torah on Simchas Torah, we want to read this Tochacha at least two weeks before Rosh Hashanah, which means that we must divide the remainder of Sefer Devarim into enough parshiyos for:

(1) A buffer parsha between the Tochacha and Rosh Hashanah.

(2) One or two Shabbosos between Rosh Hashanah and Sukkos.

(3) The Torah reading for Simchas Torah, when we complete the year’s reading, as established by Chazal (Megillah 31a).

To accommodate all this, the end of Devarim is divided into four tiny parshiyos: Netzavim, Vayeileich, Haazinu, and Vezos Haberacha:

Netzavim always becomes the "buffer parsha" read on the Shabbos before Rosh Hashanah. When we need two Shabbos readings between Rosh Hashanah and Sukkos, then Vayeileich is read as a separate parsha on Shabbos Shuva, and Haazinu is read on the Shabbos between Yom Kippur and Sukkos. When there is only one Shabbos between Rosh Hashanah and Sukkos, then Haazinu is read on that Shabbos, which is Shabbos Shuva. And Parshas Haazinu must be short enough to create a parsha after it, Vezos Haberacha, which serves as the reading for Simchas Torah.

Bamidbar is always before Shavuos

Returning back to the Gemara in Megillah, we now understand why the end of Sefer Vayikra always falls at least two Shabbosos before Shavuos. Since the Tochacha is located at the end of Vayikra, Bamidbar must always be read before Shavuos to be a buffer between the Tochacha and the "new year" of the produce of the trees, as explained by the Gemara.

We can now refer back to one of our original questions: Why are most of the "Double Parshiyos" clustered together in and around Sefer Vayikra?

The "Double Parshiyos"

There are seven potential occurrences when we read "double parshiyos", that is, two consecutive parshiyos are read on one Shabbos as if they are one long parsha. These seven are:

Vayakheil/Pekudei, the last two parshiyos of Sefer Shemos.

Tazria/Metzora, in Sefer Vayikra.

Acharei Mos/Kedoshim, in Sefer Vayikra.

Behar/Bechukosai, in Sefer Vayikra.

Chukas/Balak, in Sefer Bamidbar.

Matos/Masei, the last two parshiyos of Sefer Bamidbar.

Netzavim/Vayeileich, towards the end of Sefer Devarim.

This leads us to a series of interesting questions:

(1) Why are there no doubled parshiyos in Bereishis, nor any for almost the entire length of Sefer Shemos?

(2) Why do we cluster together four doubled parshiyos between the last week of Shemos and Sefer Vayikra?

(3) And lastly, why do we not double any parshiyos at the beginning of Sefer Bamidbar?

With a little more background, we will be able to answer all of these questions.

In this article, I will discuss the reason for the first four of these doubling of the parshiyos.

Leap and Common Years

When Hashem commanded us to create a calendar, He insisted that we use the moon to define the months, and yet keep our year consistent with the seasons, which are dependent on the sun. (The word "month" originally meant "a period of time corresponding to the moon’s cycle," which is approximately 29 1/2 days, but the use of "month" today in the western calendar is simply a convenient way to divide the year and has nothing to do with the moon’s cycle.)

This mitzvah does not allow us to create either a purely solar calendar, the basis of the common western calendar, which ignores the moon’s changing phases. Nor does it allow us to create a perfectly lunar calendar of twelve lunar months, since this lunar "year" is approximately eleven days shorter than a solar year. If we were to follow a calendar of twelve lunar months every year, our months would not fall out in the same season. Pesach would occur sometimes in the dead of winter and Sukkos in the spring. This is exactly what transpires in the Moslem calendar, which always has exactly twelve lunar months in every year. Moslem months do not fall out in the same season. For example, Ramadan this year falls in the summer, but in a few years will occur in the winter.

The Torah requires that Pesach fall in the spring, yet requires that the months correlate to the cycle of the moon. We fulfill this mitzvah by occasionally adding an extra month to the year – thereby creating 13 month years, which we call "leap years," to offset the almost 11 day difference between twelve lunar months and a solar year. These extra months keep the Yomim Tovim in their appropriate seasons.

When we add an extra month to the year, we add four and sometimes five Shabbosos to the year, yet we want each calendar year to complete the entire Torah reading on the next Simchas Torah! In order to have a reading for every possible Shabbos, we need to divide the Torah into enough parshiyos so that even the longest year has a parsha for each Shabbos. Since a Jewish leap year may contain 55 Shabbosos, Chumash is divided into a total of 54 parshiyos so that there is always a parsha to read every week. (There are 54 parshiyos, and not 55, because we do not read a consecutive Torah parsha on the Shabbos that occurs during Pesach. Although this is also true on Sukkos, remember that on Simchas Torah we read Parshas Vezos Haberacha, which is one of the 54 parshiyos, so Sukkos does not eliminate the need for a parsha that week.)

To sum up, the reason for dividing the Torah into 54 parshiyos is so that there are enough parshiyos for every Shabbos of the yearly cycle that begins and ends on Simchas Torah. In reality, the need for reading each of the 54 parshiyos on a different Shabbos occurs very rarely – only on leap years when Erev Pesach falls on Shabbos. Only that particular year has 54 Shabbosos that do not coincide with any Yom Tov dates (or more accurately, 53 Shabbosos plus Simchas Torah).

Why do we "double" Parshiyos?

Since most years require less than 54 parshiyos, how do we make sure that we complete the Torah reading for the year on Simchas Torah? The answer is that we combine parshiyos.

In almost every occurrence of a common year, we double the following parshiyos: Tazria/Metzora; Acharei Mos/Kedoshim and Behar/Bechukosai. Why these three sets of parshiyos, all of which are in Sefer Vayikra?

Just as a leap year is created by adding an extra month to Adar shortly before Pesach, the parshiyos are not doubled until the month of Nisan. Thus, we do not add these extra parshiyos until the year is clearly a common year.

At this point we can answer the second question raised above: Why do we "double up" so many parshiyos in Sefer Vayikra?

The answer is that we do not double parshiyos until it is already obvious whether it is a leap or common year, yet we need to read the parshiyos in a way that we complete this process early enough to read Bamidbar before Shavuos. The above-mentioned parshiyos are not read until the beginning of the month of Nisan. Thus, we have a small window between the beginning of Nissan and the end of Sefer Vayikra in which we try to complete all the double parshiyos necessary.

Why did I write above "in almost every occurrence of a common year, we double these parshiyos"? Because there is one instance in which the parshiyos of Behar and Bechukosai are combined in Chutz La’aretz, but they are read on separate weeks in Eretz Yisrael. This occurs in a common year when the eighth day of Pesach, observed only outside Eretz Yisrael, falls on a Shabbos. The communities of the exile read a Yom Tov reading, whereas in Eretz Yisrael communities read Parshas Shemini, the next reading in order. In this instance, the communities of Eretz Yisrael must separate Behar from Bechukosai to avoid the Tochacha from being read the week before Shavuos.

Vayakheil/Pekudei

Almost, but not all common years, also combine together the last two parshiyos in Sefer Shemos, Vayakheil/Pekudei. There is one instance of a common year when this does not happen. When Rosh Hashanah and Shemini Atzeres fall on Thursday in a common year that has 355 days, a fairly rare occurence [and one of the instances of a common year when Erev Pesach falls on Shabbos], there is an extra Shabbos between Sukkos and the next Rosh Hashanah, and in this year Vayakheil and Pekudei are read on separate weeks even though it is a common year.

I still have not explained the answer to our first question: Why this year does Bamidbar fall out two weeks before Shavuos, rather than the week immediately before Shavuos.

The Longest Year

The answer is that whenever a leap year falls out with Rosh Hashanah on a Thursday, as it does this year, that year has an extra Shabbos. In this instance, the leap year added five shabbosos to the year. The result of having no double parshiyos in these years between Simchas Torah and Rosh Hashanah is that both Bamidbar and Naso fall before Shavuos.}

Conclusion

We now understand what the printers and calendar makers have known all along: Why and when certain parshiyos are doubled and when not. All this is to guarantee that we have a chance to revisit every part of the Torah in the course of the year, and to celebrate our annual siyum haTorah on Simchas Torah!