RabbiKaganoff.com

How can we pass Parshas Behar without discussing the laws of shemittah? And the fact that we read these laws annually teaches that the Torah wants us to understand the lessons of shemittah every year. Yet many chutz la’aretz residents see no need to learn these laws, assuming that they are never affected.

Well — Guess again, — Although halacha prohibits exporting shemittah produce outside Israel (Mishnah Shvi’is 6:5), much produce finds its way there. And even in chutz la’aretz we must treat fruit of Eretz Yisrael with kedushas shvi’is according to all of the laws we will now discuss.

Situation #1: WHAT A ROAST!!        

When I was a rav in America, a knowledgeable housewife cooked a delectable roast using wine whose label indicated that it had kedushas shvi’is. Although she had no idea what this term meant, her son pointed out that they needed to ask a shaylah what to do with the roast. To make a long story short, the entire roast had to be treated with kedushas shvi’is; I will soon explain what this means.

Situation #2: WHAT ARE SEFICHIN?

“I noticed a sign in shul that the fruits and vegetables in the local supermarket are from Israel and must be treated appropriately. Someone told me that the vegetables are sefichin. What does that mean?”

Situation #3: HETER MECHIRAH

Several shemittah cycles ago I was working as a mashgiach for a properly-run American hechsher. One factory that I supervised used to manufacture breading and muffin mixes. This company was extremely careful about checking its incoming ingredients: George, the receiving clerk who also managed the warehouse, kept a careful list of what products he was to allow into the plant and what kosher symbols were acceptable.

On one visit to the plant I noticed a problem due to no fault of the company. For years, the company had been purchasing Israeli produced freeze-dried carrots with a reliable hechsher. The carrots always arrived in bulk boxes with the Israeli hechsher prominently stamped in Hebrew and the word KOSHER prominently displayed in English. George, who always supervised incoming raw materials, proudly showed me through “his warehouse” and noted how he carefully marked the arrival date of each new shipment. I saw crates of the newest shipment of Israeli carrots, from the same manufacturer, and the same prominently displayed English word KOSHER on the box. However, the Hebrew stamp on the box was from a different supervisory agency, one without the same sterling reputation. The reason for the sudden change in supervisory agency was rather obvious when I noted that the Hebrew label stated very clearly “Heter Mechirah.”

First, let us discuss the basics:

LAWS OF THE LAND

In this week’s parsha, the Torah (VaYikra 25:1-7) teaches that every seventh year is shemittah; we are prohibited from working the land of Eretz Yisrael and must leave our land fallow (Avodah Zarah 15b). Just as observing the seventh day, Shabbos, demonstrates our belief in the Creator, so too, observing every seventh year as shemittah demonstrates this faith. The landowner must treat whatever grows as ownerless, allowing others to enter his field or orchard to pick and take its produce. They may take as much as their family will eat, and the landowner himself also may take this amount (see Rambam, Hil. Shemittah 4:1).

LAWS OF THE FRUIT

Although shemittah observance today is mandated only miderabbanan (see Moed Katan 2b; Chazon Ish, Shvi’is 3:8), nevertheless, most of its laws are the same as they will be when observing shemittah will again become a mitzvah min hatorah. The Torah imbues shemittah produce with special sanctity, called kedushas shvi’is, declaring vehaysa shabbas ha’aretz lachem le’ochlah, "the produce of the shemittah should be used only for food" (Vayikra 25:6). According to accepted opinion, one is not obligated to eat shemittah food – rather, the Torah grants us permission to eat it, and we must treat it accordingly (Chazon Ish, Hil. Shvi’is 14:10). There is much halachic detail involved in correct use of shemittah produce. For example:

I. One may not sell shemittah produce in a business manner (Rambam, Hil. Shemittah 6:1). Although one may pick shemittah produce for one’s personal consumption, one may not harvest it to sell commercially (Tosefta, Shvi’is 5:7).

II. One may not export shemittah produce outside Eretz Yisrael (Mishnah Shvi’is 6:5). There are some opinions that allow exporting shemittah wine and esrogim, although the rationales permitting this are beyond the scope of this article (Beis Ridbaz 5:18; Tzitz Hakodesh, Volume 1 #15:4).

III. Shemittah produce is intended for Jewish consumption; one may not give or sell kedushas shvi’is produce to a gentile, although you may allow him or her to join you for your meal (Rambam, Hil. Shemittah 5:13 and Mahari Korkos ad loc.).

IV. If one trades or sells the shemittah produce, the food or money received in exchange also has kedushas shvi’is (Sukkah 40b).

V. One may not intentionally ruin shemittah produce (Pesachim 52b).

What types of “ruining” did the Torah prohibit? One may not cook foods that are usually eaten raw, nor may one eat raw produce that is usually cooked (Yerushalmi, Shvi’is 8:2; Rambam, Hil. Shvi’is 5:3). Therefore, one may not eat raw shemittah potatoes, nor may one cook shemittah cucumbers or oranges. Contemporary authorities dispute whether one may add shemittah orange or apricot to a recipe for roast or cake. Even though the roast or cake is delicious because of the added fruit, many poskim prohibit this cooking or baking since these fruit are usually eaten raw (Shu’t  Mishpat Cohen #85). Others permit this if it is a usual way of eating these fruits (Mishpetei Aretz page 172, footnote 10).

SPOILED TURTLE

One may feed shemittah produce to animals only if it is not considered fit for human consumption. This includes varieties grown for fodder, as well as peels and seeds that people do not usually eat (Rambam, Hilchos Shemittah 5:5). During the last shemittah, a neighbor of mine, who’s pet turtle usually eats lettuce, had a problem what to feed it. Before shemittah he was trying to get it to eat grass, but the turtle preferred lettuce.

Similarly, juicing vegetables and most kinds of fruit is considered “ruining” the shemittah produce and prohibited, although one may press grapes, olives and lemons since the juice and oil of these fruits are considered improvements. Many contemporary authorities permit pressing oranges and grapefruits provided one treats the remaining pulp with kedushas shvi’is. Even these authorities prohibit juicing most other fruit, such as apples and pears (Minchas Shelomoh, Shvi’is pg. 185).

RUINING VERSUS EATING

How do we determine whether processing a food “ruins” it or not? Many poskim contend that if the processing changes the food’s preferred bracha, one may not perform it to shvi’is produce (Shu’t  Mishpat Cohen #85, based on Brachos 38a and Rambam, Hilchos Shvi’is 5:3). Since turning apples to juice reduces their bracha from ha’eitz to shehakol, this would be considered “ruining” the apples. Similarly, the fact that one recites the bracha of shehakol prior to eating a raw potato or cooked cucumbers or oranges demonstrates that treating them this way ruins the produce. According to this approach, one may not press oranges or grapefruits either, since one recites shehakol and not ha’eitz on the juice (Shu’t  Mishpat Cohen #85).

Those who permit squeezing oranges and grapefruits apply a different criterion, contending that since this is the most common use of these fruit it is permitted (Minchas Shelomoh, Shvi’is pg. 185).

One must certainly be careful not to actively destroy shemittah produce. Therefore, one who has excess shvi’is produce may not trash it. Peels that are commonly eaten, such as cucumber or apple, still have shemittah kedusha and may not simply be disposed. Instead, these peels are placed in a plastic bag which is then placed into a small bin or box called a pach shvi’is, where it remains until the food is inedible. When it decomposes to this extent, one may dispose of the shemittah produce in the regular garbage.

When eating shemittah food, one need not be concerned about the remaining bits stuck to a pot or an adult’s plate that one usually just washes off; one may wash these pots and plates without concern that one is destroying shemittah produce. However, the larger amounts left behind by children, or leftovers that people might save should not be disposed in the garbage but should be scraped into the shemittah bin.

WHY DECOMPOSE?

This leads us to a question: If indeed one may not throw shemittah produce in the garbage because it has sanctity, why may one do so after the produce decomposes? Does decomposition remove kedusha?

Indeed it does. Kedushas shvi’is means that as long as the food is still edible, one may not make it inedible or use it atypically. This is because shemittah food is meant to be eaten, even though there is no requirement to do so. However, once the shemittah food is inedible, it loses its special status, and may be disposed of as trash.

SANCTITY UNTIL SPOILAGE

This sounds very strange. Where do we find that something holy loses its special status when it becomes inedible?

Although the concept that decay eliminates sanctity seems unusual, this is only because we are unfamiliar with the mitzvos where this principle applies. Other mitzvos where this concept exists are terumah, challah, bikkurim, revai’i and maaser sheini, all cases where we do not consume the produce today because we are tamei (Rambam, Hilchos Terumos Chapter 11; Hilchos Maaser Sheini 3:11). Of these types of produce that are holy, but meant to be eaten, only shvi’is may be eaten by someone tamei. Even though someone tamei may not consume tahor terumah, challah, or maaser sheini, one also may not dispose of them or even burn them. Instead, one must place them in a secure place until they decay and only then dispose of them (Tur, Yoreh Deah 331). (We burn the special challah portion after separating it only because it has become tamei. If it did not become tamei, one may not destroy the challah portion, but must place it somewhere until it decays on its own, just as we do with unused shvi’is produce.)

A SHEMITTAH ROAST IN AMERICA

We can now explore the first question I mentioned:

1a: May one use shemittah wine to season a roast?

Although one improves the roast by adding the wine, the wine itself is ruined. Thus, some poskim prohibit using the wine in this way, whereas others permit it since this is a normal use for wine (see commentaries to Yerushalmi, Terumos 11:1).

1b: What does our American housewife do with her shemittah wine-flavored roast?

If one uses shemittah food as an ingredient, one must treat everything that absorbs its taste according to the laws of kedushas shvi’is (see Mishnah Shvi’is 7:7). Therefore, one who used shemittah potatoes in cholent or shemittah onions or bay leaves in soup must treat the entire cholent or soup according to shvi’is rules. One may not actively waste this food, nor may one feed any of it to animals until the food is spoiled to the point that people would not eat it.

Therefore, our housewife who added shemittah wine to her roast must now consider the entire roast, even the gravy and vegetables cooked with it, to have kedushas shvi’is. One serves the roast in the regular way. As mentioned above, the small scrapings left on an adult’s plate may be washed off; but the larger amounts left behind by children should not be disposed in the garbage, nor should the leftovers in the pot or on the platter.

Just as one may not dispose of the leftover kedushas shvi’is roast in the garbage, it is unclear whether one may remove these leftovers from the refrigerator in order to hasten their decay, even to place them in a shemittah bin (see Chazon Ish, Shvi’is 14:10). However, if one removed leftover roast to serve, one is not required to return the leftovers to the refrigerator. One may not trash the leftovers, but instead one may place the leftovers somewhere until they have spoiled. To avoid the malodor that this may cause, one may place them in a plastic bag until they decay and then dispose of them.

SEFICHIN

At this point, we should address the second question I mentioned:

“I noticed a sign in shul that the some fruits and vegetables in the local supermarket are from Israel and must be treated appropriately. Someone told me that the vegetables are prohibited because they are sefichin. What does that mean?”

The Torah permits the use of any produce that grew by itself without anyone working the field during shemittah. Unfortunately, even in the days of Chazal one could find Jews who deceitfully ignored shemittah laws. One practice of unscrupulous farmers was to plant grain or vegetables, marketing them as produce that grew on its own. To make certain that these farmers did not benefit from their misdeeds, Chazal forbade all grains and vegetables, even those that grew by themselves, a prohibition called sefichin, or plants that sprouted. Sefichin are treated as non-kosher food and forbidden to eat, even requiring one to kasher the equipment that cooked them!

Chazal made several exceptions to this rule, including that produce of a non-Jew’s field is not prohibited as sefichin.

In all likelihood, the growers of this produce relied on heter mechirah, a topic I dealt with extensively in a different article, but which I will touch on here. (Contact me by return e-mail if you would like to read that article.) The authorities who follow this approach permit most of the fieldwork to be performed only by gentiles. However, in contemporary practice, most Jewish landowners who rely on heter mechirah sell their land to a gentile, but then work it as their own. As a practical matter, few contemporary chareidi poskim permit heter mechirah, and, even among non-chareidi authorities, support for its use is waning, although there are still some who permit it. Thus, if the heter mechirah is considered a charade and not a valid sale, the grain and vegetables growing in a heter mechirah field are prohibited as sefichin. Most, but not all, chareidi poskim today consider vegetables grown through heter mechirah to be prohibited sefichin that are forbidden to eat, although one will find different opinions whether one must kasher equipment used to cook these vegetables.

WHY NOT FRUIT?

When Chazal prohibited sefichin, they only included in the prohibition crops that are planted annually. They did not extend the prohibition of sefichin to tree fruits and other perennial crops, such as bananas and strawberries, because there was less incentive for a cheating farmer. Although trees definitely thrive when pruned and cared for, they will produce even if left unattended for a year. Thus, the farmer has less incentive to tend his trees.

“GUARDED PRODUCE”

I mentioned above that a farmer must allow others free access to help themselves to any produce that grows on his trees and fields during shemittah. What is the halacha if a farmer treats this produce as his own and refuses entry to it during shemittah?

The Rishonim dispute whether this will make the fruit forbidden. Some contemporary poskim prohibit the use of heter mechirah tree fruit on the basis that since heter mechirah is invalid, this fruit is now considered “guarded,” and therefore forbidden. Other poskim permit the fruit because they rule that the forbidden working of an orchard or treating it as private property does not prohibit its fruit (see Shu’t Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 1:186). Thus, even if one does not consider the heter mechirah to be valid, the fruit might be permitted but must be treated with kedushas shvi’is.

What about our carrot muffins? If we remember our original story, the company had unwittingly purchased heter mechirah carrots. The hechsher required the company to return all unopened boxes of carrots to the supplier and to find an alternative source. However, by the time I discovered the problem, muffin mix using these carrots had been produced bearing the hechsher’s kashrus symbol and were already distributed. The hechsher referred the shaylah to its posek, asking whether they were required to recall the product from the stores as non-kosher, or whether it was sufficient to advertise that an error occurred and allow the customer to ask his individual rav for halachic guidance.

For someone living in Eretz Yisrael, observing shemittah properly involves assuming much halachic responsibility and education and often great commitment since shemittah-permitted produce is often many times more expensive than its alternative. Those living in chutz la’aretz should be aware of the halachos of shvi’is and identify with this demonstration that the Ribbono Shel Olam created the world in seven days, and that the seventh year is holy.

–
—
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Rabbi Kaganoff’s Divrei Torah" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to Kaganoff+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

The second of this week’s two parshios, Kedoshim, mentions the mitzvah of neta reva’ie. Hence…

The Fruits of the Fourth Year

Question #1:

Rabbi Lamdan, a local talmid chacham, asks his Rav: “I have carefully studied this week’s parsha, which contains the Torah’s only mention of the mitzvah of neta reva’ie (fruit that grows during the fourth year of a tree’s existence). Yet, I cannot find a single allusion in the Torah to the laws of neta reva’ie as recorded by the halachic authorities! What information am I missing?”

Question #2:

Tikvah, always known for her intellectual honesty, inquires: “I feel like a hypocrite. Every day I pray for Moshiach to come and our return to the land of our fathers, and yet, I know little about the agricultural mitzvos of the Torah. If I truly hope for his imminent appearance, should I not be familiarizing myself with the laws that will apply when he arrives?”

Question #3:

When the Levy family moved into their spacious Waterbury home, they planted several fruit trees and grapevines, which are now producing luscious looking pears, apples and grapes. May they begin enjoying the fruit? Must they perform any special procedures before eating them?

What do these three questions have in common?

Understanding the basic laws of neta reva’ie and their source will enable us to answer both Rabbi Lamdan’s and the Levys’ questions, and at the same time will assist Tikvah in her search for truth.

First, the basics:

This week’s parsha proclaims:

“When you arrive in the Land, and you plant any tree for its fruit, you shall restrict its fruit; what is produced the first three years is restricted from you and may not be eaten. And in the fourth year, all its fruit shall be holy for praises to Hashem. Only in the fifth year may you eat its fruit – therefore, it will increase its produce for you, for I am Hashem, your G-d” (Vayikra 19:23-25).

The fruit produced in the first three years of a tree’s life is called orlah and is forbidden. The Torah refers to planting an eitz maachal, which I translated as a tree for its fruit, rather than a fruit tree. This is because Chazal understand that the prohibition of orlah applies only to a fruit tree planted for its fruit, and not to a fruit tree planted for a non-food purpose, such as for lumber or as a hedge (Orlah 1:1). This rule may affect the Levys, as I will later explain.

Although the Torah states only that orlah may not be eaten, the Torah shebe’al peh teaches that one may not benefit from it either. For this reason, one may not dye one’s skirt with orlah pomegranate peels, heat a house with orlah nutshells, or even feed orlah fruits and peels to animals. (In a different article, I discussed how one determines the end of the three prohibited crop years.) Although the mitzvah of orlah is obviously agricultural, it nevertheless applies to trees growing outside Eretz Yisrael.

KODESH HILLULIM – HOLY FOR PRAISES

Although the fourth year’s fruit is no longer orlah, it still has a special status. When the Torah discusses this produce, it states, “And in the fourth year, all its fruit shall be holy for praises (in Hebrew, kodesh hillulim) to Hashem.” As Rabbi Lamdan correctly noted, the Torah’s entire description of the status of these fruits is these two words. What does this obscure phrase kodesh hillulim mean? What type of sanctity does the fruit manifest, and how does this result in praise?

REDEMPTION IS PRAISE

The Gemara explains that the sanctity of the neta reva’ie fruit prohibits one from eating it until it has been redeemed (Berachos 35a). This act of redemption is itself praise to Hashem (Rashba ad loc.).

However, Rabbi Lamdan is not entirely satisfied with this answer. He knows that one redeems neta reva’ie only if one cannot eat the fruit in Yerushalayim, an aspect that the verse does not mention. Furthermore, the verse says nothing about the method of redemption, which, in fact, has many detailed halachos, as we will see.

We must research further.

MILITARY EXEMPTIONS

We find another reference that might shed some light on the nature of neta reva’ie. Concerning the individuals exempted from going to war, the Torah states: “Who is the man who planted a vineyard, but he did not yet redeem it? He shall return to his house” (Devarim 20:6). Here the Torah alludes to the redeeming of a vineyard, although it mentions no details about when and how this happens (see Rashba, Berachos 35a). Although this verse does not answer any of Rabbi Lamdan’s questions, it does imply a new factor, heretofore unmentioned: that the mitzvah of neta reva’ie applies only to grapes. (In reality, the Gemara [Berachos 35a] cites a dispute whether neta reva’ie indeed applies only to grapes or to all fruits, a matter that we will soon discuss.)

Thus, our search for the sources for this mitzvah is still unresolved.

In fact, much of the law concerning neta reva’ie originates elsewhere. A mesorah, an oral tradition from Sinai, compares its sanctity to that of a different mitzvah, maaser sheni (Kiddushin 54a). There the Torah states:

“And you shall eat the maaser of your grain, your wine, and your olive oil …before Hashem your G-d, in the place where He will choose to rest His name — so that you will thereby learn always to be in awe of Hashem. However, when you will be blessed by Hashem your G-d such that you will be unable to carry [the maaser sheni] as far as the place that Hashem chose, then you may exchange it for money that you subsequently take with you when you go to the place that Hashem chose. You may then exchange the money for cattle, sheep, wine or anything else you desire, and you shall eat there before Hashem your G-d, and in this way, you and your family will celebrate” (Devarim 14:23-26).

THE LAWS OF MAASER SHENI

The Torah shebe’al peh teaches that “the place where He will choose to rest His name” refers to the city of Yerushalayim. Thus, we are to transport maaser sheni to Yerushalayim. However, if this is difficult, one may redeem the produce for coins instead, and the special sanctity of the maaser sheni transfers to the money. One adds an additional 25% to the money and brings it to Yerushalayim, where he purchases with it food to be eaten within the confines of the city. This acquisition transfers the maaser sheni sanctity from the money onto the food.

Whether one transports one’s maaser sheni produce itself to Yerushalayim or exchanges it for money, the farmer remains with a large value that may be consumed only in Yerushalayim, a city bursting with sanctity and special, holy people. The beauty of this mitzvah is that it entices the farmer to ascend to the Holy City and be part of the spiritual growth attainable only there.

One can even look at the maaser sheni as “vacation fund” money that the Torah provides. Although the farmer may not be wealthy, when he arrives in Yerushalayim, he can eat and drink like a king!

WHAT MAY ONE PURCHASE?

The Torah specifies that once in Yerushalayim, one may exchange the maaser sheni money for cattle, sheep, wine or anything else you desire, which seems both wordy and unusual. The Torah shebe’al peh interprets this to mean that one may not purchase just any food with maaser sheni money, but only those that grow either from the ground or on it. Therefore, one may use maaser sheni money to purchase fruit, vegetables, breads, pastry, meat or poultry, but not fish, which do not grow on the ground, not salt or water, which do not grow; and not mushrooms, which are fungi and also do not grow from or on the ground.

RITUAL PURITY — TAHARAH

Both the original maaser sheni and food purchased with its redemption money are holy and may be eaten only within the walls of the old Yerushalayim and only when both the food and the individual eating it are tahor, ritually pure.

O’ MY JERUSALEM

By the way, the area of today’s Old City of Jerusalem is encompassed by walls constructed by the Ottoman Turks.  The Turkish walls surround areas that probably were not part of the city at the times of Tanach and Chazal, and therefore those areas do not have the halachic sanctity of the Holy City; at the same time, without any question, large sections that do have the sanctity of the Holy City are outside these walls.

CONTEMPORARY MAASER SHENI

The fact that one must be tahor to consume maaser sheni changes the way one observes this mitzvah today, when achieving this status is virtually unattainable. Since we have no ashes of a parah adumah with which to purify ourselves of certain types of tumah, we cannot eat the produce of maaser sheni, nor the food purchased with the redeeming coins, since they have the same sanctity. Because of this problem, it is pointless to purchase food with these coins, and instead, they remain unused and are eventually destroyed. To avoid excessive loss, one may redeem large quantities of maaser sheni onto a very small value within a coin: this is the way we redeem maaser sheni today. Of course, we are missing the main spiritual gain of consuming the foods in Yerushalayim, but this is one of the many reasons for which we mourn the destruction of the Beis HaMikdash and pray daily for its restoration.

THE LAWS OF NETA REVA’IE

We now return to the laws of neta reva’ie. Although the Torah alludes only to the redemption of neta reva’ie fruits, the Torah shebe’al peh teaches us to apply the laws of maaser sheni to neta reva’ie, where the redemption services the grower unable to transport his produce to Yerushalayim. Similarly, one may eat neta reva’ie itself only in Yerushalayim when tahor. Someone who cannot transport it there may redeem it by transferring its kedusha, holiness, to coins. When doing this, he add 25% to the value, brings the money to Yerushalayim instead of the fruit, and there purchases food to eat in the Holy City. Just as redeeming maaser sheni still allows the grower to reap the spiritual benefits of his produce, so, too, redeeming reva’ie enables the grower to benefit from the Yerushalayim experience.

At this point, we can answer Rabbi Lamdan’s original inquiry. The extensive literature of the Mishnah, Gemara and halachic authorities concerning neta reva’ie assumes that the laws of neta reva’ie derive from those of maaser sheni, and that the purpose of the redemption of neta reva’ie produce is to allow someone with a bountiful reva’ie crop to benefit from the spiritual gains of his produce.

And just as we cannot make ourselves tahor today, and therefore we cannot eat the produce of maaser sheni, we can also not consume the neta reva’ie or the food purchased with its redemption coins, since they have the same sanctity. Because of this problem and to avoid the loss that would result, we may transfer the kedusha of large quantities of neta reva’ie to a coin of small value. Again, we are missing the main spiritual gain of consuming the foods in Yerushalayim, and for this, too, we mourn the destruction of the Beis HaMikdash.

REVA’IE IN WATERBURY?

Having answered Rabbi Lamdan’s questions and also having addressed Tikvah’s concern, we will now tackle the questions raised by the Levys’ trees and vines. Does someone living outside Eretz Yisrael also merit fulfilling the mitzvah of neta reva’ie on his fruit? The Rishonim debate whether this mitzvah applies in chutz la’aretz, just as the mitzvah of orlah does, or if it is treated the same as most agricultural mitzvos that are exempt in chutz la’aretz. There are three basic approaches to this issue:

1. Some authorities contend that, since neta reva’ie is an agricultural mitzvah, it does not apply outside Eretz Yisrael, which is the usual, but not absolute, rule regarding these mitzvos (see Rambam, Hilchos Maachalos Asuros 10:16).  Although orlah is an exception and applies even in chutz la’aretz because of a special halacha leMoshe miSinai, an oral tradition that Moshe received at Mount Sinai, reva’ie applies only in Eretz Yisrael, since it was not specifically included in the halacha leMoshe miSinai. Those who rule this way conclude that the Torah did not extend the spiritual benefits of these mitzvos to include produce grown outside Hashem’s palace. Therefore, the Levys’ trees are exempt from the mitzvah of neta reva’ie and all fruit produced after the orlah years are available for consumption, without any redemption procedure.

2. On the opposite side, there are authorities who contend that the halacha leMoshe miSinai that requires that we observe orlah in chutz la’aretz also requires observing the mitzvah of reva’ie; Hashem wanted us to benefit from the mitzvah of neta reva’ie, even outside the Holy Land. Therefore, the fruit that grows on the Levys’ trees and vines in Waterbury during the fourth year have the sanctity of neta reva’ie (see Rabbeinu Yonah, Berachos, Chapter 6). This is the opinion that the Shulchan Aruch follows (Yoreh Deah 294:7). (For reasons beyond the scope of this article, reva’ie applies only when we are certain that the fruit grew in the fourth year, but not when we are uncertain whether it grew in the fourth year or the fifth.)

ALL FRUIT OR ONLY GRAPES

3. There is a third opinion that contends that reva’ie applies to grapes that grow in chutz la’aretz but not to other fruits (Tosafos, Kiddushin 2b s.v. esrog and Berachos 35a s.v. ulemaan). This is based on a dispute as to whether the mitzvah of reva’ie in Eretz Yisrael applies to all fruit trees, or only to grapes (Berachos 35a). Many authorities conclude that we rule leniently regarding produce grown in chutz la’aretz and therefore absolve all fruits from neta reva’ie, except for grapes (Rama and Gra to Yoreh Deah 294:7).

Thus, according to Sefardic practice of following the Shulchan Aruch, the pears, apples and grapes of the fourth year growing in Waterbury, have the status of reva’ie and require redemption. According to the Ashkenazic practice, the grapes require redemption, but not the pears or apples.

CONCLUSION

Note that the Torah states: “And in the fourth year, all its fruit shall be holy for praises to Hashem. Only in the fifth year may you eat its fruit – therefore, it will increase its produce for you, for I am Hashem your G-d” (Vayikra 19:23- 25). We see that Hashem Himself promises that He will reward those who observe the laws of the first four years with tremendous increase in the tree’s produce in future years. May we soon see the day when we can bring our reva’ie and eat it while tahor within the rebuilt walls of Yerushalayim!

–
—
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Rabbi Kaganoff’s Divrei Torah" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to Kaganoff+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

Among the many topics covered in this week’s reading are the mitzvos of the woman who just gave birth. This provides an opportunity to discuss the basics of Birchas Hapomeil:

Question #1: An offering or a blessing?

“The Torah describes bringing a korban todah as a thanksgiving offering. How does that relate to the brocha of birchas hagomeil? Did someone recite birchas hagomeil while offering the korban?”

Question #2: Blessing at home?

“May I recite birchas hagomeil if I will not be able to get to shul for kri’as haTorah?”

Question #3: Exactly ten?

“Our minyan has exactly ten people today. May someone recite birchas hagomeil?”

Answer:

There are two mitzvos related to thanking Hashem for deliverance from perilous circumstances. In Parshas Tzav, the Torah describes an offering brought in the Mishkan, or the Beis Hamikdash, called the korban todah.

There is also a brocha, called birchas hagomeil, which is recited when someone has been saved from a dangerous situation. The Rosh (Brachos 9:3) and the Tur (Orach Chayim 219) explain that this brocha was instituted as a replacement for the korban todah that we can no longer bring, since, unfortunately, our Beis Hamikdash lies in ruin. Thus, understanding the circumstances and the laws of the korban todah and of birchas hagomeil is really one combined topic. This article will discuss some of the basic laws of birchas hagomeil.

Tehillim on Salvation

The Gemara derives many of the laws of birchas hagomeil from a chapter of Tehillim, Psalm 107. There, Dovid Hamelech describes four different types of treacherous predicaments in which a person would pray to Hashem for salvation. Several times, the Psalm repeats the following passage, Vayitzaku el Hashem batzar lahem, mimetzukoseihem yatzileim, “when they were in distress, they cried out to Hashem asking Him to deliver them from their straits.” Hashem hears the supplicants’ prayers and redeems them from calamity, whereupon they recognize Hashem’s role and sing shira to acknowledge Hashem’s deliverance. The passage reflecting this thanks, Yodu lashem chasdo venifle’osav livnei adam, “they acknowledge thanks to Hashem for His kindness and His wondrous deeds for mankind,” is recited four times in the Psalm, each time expressing the emotions of someone desiring to tell others of his appreciation. The four types of salvation mentioned in the verse are for: someone who successfully traversed a wilderness, a captive who was freed, a person who recovered from illness, and a seafarer who returned safely to land.

Based on this chapter of Tehillim, the Gemara declares, arba’ah tzerichim lehodos: yordei hayam, holchei midbaros, umi shehayah choleh venisra’pe, umi shehayah chavush beveis ha’asurim veyatza, “four people are required to recite birchas hagomeil: those who traveled by sea, those who journeyed through the desert, someone who was ill and recovered and someone who was captured and gained release” (Brachos 54b). (Several commentators provide reasons why the Gemara lists the four in a different order than does the verse, a topic that we will forgo for now.) The Tur (Orach Chayim 219) mentions an interesting method for remembering the four cases, based on words from our daily shmoneh esrei prayer: vechol hachayim yoducha selah, explaining that the word chayim has four letters, ches, yud, yud and mem, which allude to chavush, yissurim, yam and midbar, meaning captive, the sufferings of illness, sea, and desert: the four types of travail mentioned by the verse and the Gemara. (It is curiously noteworthy that when the Aruch Hashulchan [219:5] quotes this, he has the ches represent “choli,” illness [rather than chavush, captive], which means that he would explain the yud of yissurim to mean the sufferings of captivity.)

Not all troubles are created equal!

Rav Hai Gaon notes that these four calamities fall under two categories: two of them, traveling by sea and through the desert, are situations to which a person voluntarily subjected himself, whereas the other two, illness and being held captive, are involuntary (quoted by Shu’t Chasam Sofer, Orach Chayim #51). Thus, we see that one bensches gomeil after surviving any of these types of dangers, regardless of their having been within his control or not.

Some commentaries note that the Rambam cites the Gemara passage, arba’ah tzerichim lehodos, “four people are required to thank Hashem,” only in the context of birchas hagomeil and not regarding the laws of korban todah. This implies that, in his opinion, korban todah is always a voluntary offering, notwithstanding the fact that Chazal required those who were saved to recite birchas hagomeil (Sefer Hamafteiach). However, both Rashi and the Rashbam, in their respective commentaries to Vayikra 7:12, explain that the “four people” are all required to bring a korban todah upon being saved. As I noted above, the Rosh states that since, unfortunately, we cannot offer a korban todah, birchas hagomeil was substituted.

Thus we can answer the first question asked above:

“The Torah describes bringing a korban todah as a thanksgiving offering. How does that relate to the brocha of birchas hagomeil? Did someone recite birchas hagomeil while offering the korban?”

At the time of the beis hamikdash, birchas hagomeil had not yet been invented. We look much forward to its rebuilding so that we can again offer the korbanos and thereby become closer to Hashem this way. (However, note that the Chasam Sofer shares another possible way which disagrees with this interpretation of the Rosh and the Tur.)

A Minyan

When the Gemara (Brachos 54b) teaches the laws of birchas hagomeil, it records two interesting details: (1) that birchas hagomeil should be recited in the presence of a minyan and (2) that it should be recited in the presence of two talmidei chachamim.

No Minyan

Is a minyan essential for birchas hagomeil, as it is for some other brachos, such as sheva brachos? If someone cannot arrange a minyan for birchas hagomeil must he forgo the brocha?

The Tur contends that the attendance of a minyan and two talmidei chachamim is not a requirement to recite birchas hagomeil, but only the preferred way. In other words, someone who cannot easily assemble a minyan or talmidei chachamim may, nevertheless, recite birchas hagomeil. The Beis Yosef disagrees regarding the requirement of a minyan, feeling that one should not recite birchas hagomeil without a minyan present. However, he rules that if someone errantly recited birchas hagomeil without a minyan, he should not recite it again, but should try to find a minyan and recite the text of the brocha while omitting Hashem’s Name, to avoid reciting a brocha levatalah, a blessing in vain (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 219:3). The Mishnah Berurah follows an approach closer to that of the Tur, ruling that if one will be unable to assemble a minyan, he may recite birchas hagomeil without one. However, someone in a place where there is no minyan should wait up to thirty days to see if he will have the chance to bensch gomeil in the presence of a minyan. If thirty days pass without the opportunity, he should recite the birchas hagomeil without a minyan and not wait any longer.

When do we recite Birchas hagomeil?

The prevalent custom is to recite birchas hagomeil during or after kri’as haTorah (Hagahos Maimaniyos 10:6). The Orchos Chayim understands that this custom is based on convenience, because kri’as haTorah also requires a minyan (quoted by Beis Yosef, Orach Chayim 219). The Chasam Sofer presents an alternative reason for reciting birchas hagomeil during or after kri’as haTorah. He cites sources that explain that kri’as haTorah serves as a substitute for offering korbanos, and therefore reciting birchas hagomeil at the time of kri’as hatorah is a better substitute for the korban todah that we unfortunately cannot offer (Shu’t Chasam Sofer, Orach Chayim #51). He concludes nevertheless that, under special circumstances, one may recite birchas hagomeil without kri’as hatorah, which answers the question asked above: “May I recite birchas hagomeil if I will not be able to get to shul for kri’as haTorah?” The answer is that, when there is no option of hearing kri’as hatorah, one may recite birchas hagomeil without it.

Do we Count the Talmidei Chachamim?

I quoted above the Gemara that states that one should recite birchas hagomeil in the presence of a minyan and two talmidei chachamim The Gemara discusses whether this means that birchas hagomeil should be recited in the presence of a minyan plus two talmidei chachamim, a minimum of twelve people, or whether one should recite birchas hagomeil in the presence of ten people which should include two talmidei chachamim. The Rambam (Hilchos Brachos 10:8) and the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 219:3) rule that the minyan includes the talmidei chachamim, whereas the Pri Megadim rules that the requirement is a minyan plus the talmidei chachamim. Notwithstanding the Pri Megadim’s objections, the Biur Halacha concludes that one does need more than a minyan including the talmidei chachamim.

No Talmid Chacham to be found

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 219:3) then adds that someone located in a place where it is uncommon to find talmidei chachamim may recite birchas hagomeil in the presence of a minyan, even without any talmidei chachamim present.

Ten or ten plus one?

There is a dispute among the authorities whether the individual reciting the brocha is counted as part of the minyan or if we require a minyan aside from him (Raanach, quoted by Rabbi Akiva Eiger to 219:3). Most authorities rule that we can count the person reciting the brocha as one of the minyan (Mishnah Berurah 219:6). Shaar Hatziyun rallies proof to this conclusion, since it says that one should recite the brocha during kri’as haTorah, and no one says that one can do this only when there is an eleventh person attending the kri’as haTorah.

Thus, we can answer the last question that was asked above:

“Our minyan has exactly ten people today. May someone recite birchas hagomeil?”

The answer is that he may.

Conclusion

Rav Hirsch (Commentary to Tehillim 100:1) notes that the root of the word for thanks is the same as that for viduy, confession and admitting wrongdoing. All kinds of salvation should elicit in us deep feelings of gratitude for what Hashem has done for us in the past and does in the present. This is why it can be both an acknowledgement of guilt and thanks.

We often cry out to Hashem in crisis, sigh in relief when the crisis passes, but fail to thank adequately for the salvation. Our thanks to Hashem should match the intensity of our pleas. Birchas hagomeil gives us a concrete brocha to say to awaken our thanks for deliverance. And even in our daily lives, when, hopefully we do not encounter dangers that meet the criteria of saying birchas hagomeil, we should still fill our hearts with thanks, focus these thoughts during our recital of mizmor lesodah, az yashir, modim or at some other appropriate point in our prayers.

–
—
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Rabbi Kaganoff’s Divrei Torah" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to Kaganoff+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

Question #1:

Miriam recently sent me the following question:

"I have heard that one should not eat apple peels, because they are coated with a treif, waxy substance. Does it make a difference if the apples are organic? Can any kind of apple be eaten with the peel? This subject concerns me, because there is much nutritional value in the peel. Do other fruits or vegetables have the same problem?"

Question #2:

“My Israeli cousin is a big talmid chacham. He is also very aware of kashrus matters, and he practices his English by reading product labels. When we visited Israel, we brought some candy as a treat for his children. He was curious to know how there could be a hechsher on a product containing confectioner’s glaze. I had no idea what he meant. Could you perhaps enlighten me?”

Answer:

Let us direct ourselves to Miriam’s question first:

The distributors of most fresh produce sold in North America coat the produce well before it arrives at your local supermarket. Coatings extend the shelf life of fresh fruit and vegetables and often make the produce more attractive. By the way, use of coatings is not limited to fresh produce. Chocolate candies that have a hard surface are coated. Coatings may be used on pizza beneath the cheese, or in fruit pies below the filling, to keep the crust crispy. Pecans and other nuts added to ice cream are sometimes coated to keep them from absorbing the moisture of the ice cream, and sometimes the caramel in candy bars is coated to keep it separate from the chocolate.

Much investment in industrial research is devoted to the best coating to be used in a particular product and application, and therefore, exactly which ingredients are used is a very closely guarded trade secret. This creates an obvious concern, not only for Miriam, but for every kosher consumer, and the problem is not limited to apples, but to most produce. The kashrus aspects of this topic are too vast to be covered thoroughly at one time, and therefore this article will focus on one specific halachic issue, the second question raised above: Whether a product that goes by the name confectioner’s glaze, resinous glaze, or sometimes simply shellac is kosher. Shellac is often used to provide the hard coating on certain candies. It is also sprayed onto fresh produce to increase its shelf life and make it more appealing.

What is Shellac?

Most consumers associate the word shellac with a clear varnish used to protect wood furniture. Indeed, shellac was introduced several hundred years ago as a wood polish for musical instruments and furniture. Shellac is a glandular secretion of the lac insect, Kerria lacca, a native of India and Thailand, that lives and reproduces on the branches and twigs of its host tree. Millions of tiny parasitic insects (Kerria lacca) ingest tree sap and produce from it a hard resinous secretion that they use to protect their larvae. The secretion, which is called shellac, forms hard layers on these branches, which are harvested, cut or broken into small pieces, crushed and then mechanically separated. The separated, crushed resin is subsequently ground, washed and dried and then ready to be processed into its various food and industrial applications. Often shellac is dissolved in several times its volume of alcohol, applied or mixed, and then the alcohol is evaporated and recovered. (We will soon see the significance of the evaporation of the alcohol.) The word shellac is derived from the Indian word laksha and refers to the refined or processed lac resin.

Until the mid-twentieth century, shellac was not commonly used for food products, but to protect phonograph records, or as in ingredient in paints, primers, inks, floor polishes and resins for electrical applications. More recently, shellac has found applications on the coating of fruits and vegetables, food and confectionary products, and pills and vitamins. When used for food, shellac is often called confectioner’s glaze.

Shellac resin is not a single compound, but a mixture of several polar and non-polar components in a molecule. Understanding how these molecules link together to build up a shellac complex involved extensive industrial and academic research and is still not fully understood.

Is Shellac Kosher?

On an obvious level, shellac should present a kashrus concern, since it is produced by an insect. The Gemara (Bechoros 5b, 7a) teaches a principle kol hayotzei min hatamei tamei, whatever derives from a non-kosher source is not kosher, and for this reason ostrich eggs, camel’s milk, and the eggs and milk of a tereifah chicken or cow are non-kosher. So, how can shellac be kosher, if it is secreted by an insect?

Several responsa discuss the kosher status of shellac or confectioner’s glaze. In 5725/1965, Rav Moshe Feinstein was asked whether this glaze may be coated onto kosher candies (Shu’t Igros Moshe, Yoreh Deah II:24). Rav Moshe discusses four possible reasons why shellac may be kosher. But before presenting Rav Moshe’s responsum on the subject, we must cite the section of Gemara that affects two of Rav Moshe’s answers.

We are all aware that honey is kosher, notwithstanding the fact that it is manufactured by bees. In other words, the principle of kol hayotzei min hatamei tamei does not apply to honey. The Gemara (Bechoros 7b) records a dispute between an anonymous scholar called the Tanna Kamma, and Rabbi Yaakov, dealing with the reason honey is an exception to the rule and is kosher. The Tanna Kamma contends that honey is kosher because it is not produced by bees, but is modified plant nectar, unlike milk and eggs that are created by the non-kosher species. To manufacture honey, bees suck nectar from flowers and deposit it into special honey-sacs. Inside the sacs, enzymes contained within the bee’s saliva convert the nectar into honey, which the bees store for food. The nectar is never "digested" by the bee, but rather, it is transformed into honey.

At this point, we should mention that, as noted by the Pri To’ar (81:1), there is a clear physical difference between the nectar that enters the bee and the honey that exits. The Pri To’ar points out that if one were to gather and concentrate nectar, it would not taste like honey, a fact that of course did not escape the Tanna Kamma. Yet, this scholar still contends that since nectar is the main ingredient, the contribution of the bee is not sufficiently significant to render honey non-kosher. Thus, we see that the Tanna Kamma holds a principle in the rule of kol hayotzei min hatamei tamei — that the product of a non-kosher animal is non-kosher only when the product is manufactured by the animal, but not when the animal makes only moderate modifications to a kosher product.

A Dissenting Position

Rabbi Yaakov disagrees with this rationale, apparently contending that the contribution of the bee would be significant enough to present a kashrus concern, yet he permits honey for a different reason: although the universal rule prohibits extracts of non-kosher species, a special Scriptural allusion excludes honey from this proscription. When the Torah states es zeh tochalu mikol sheretz ha’of — Only this (zeh) may you eat from among the small flying creatures (Vayikra 11:21), the emphasis of the word zeh teaches that honey is kosher, despite the fact that it is a product of the bee which is itself non-kosher.

According to Rabbi Yaakov, the method by which honey is produced does not exclude it from the prohibition; it is kosher only because the Torah created a unique status. His approach is referred to as gezeiras hakasuv, a special Biblical ruling.

What’s the Difference?

Do any practical differences arise from this dispute between the Tanna Kamma and Rabbi Yaakov? The Gemara states the following: Two non-bee insects, gizin and tzirin, produce a sweet product called respectively gizin honey and tzirin honey through a process similar to what bees do. (The exact identity of these species is unclear, although there are several insects that produce varieties of honey or honeydew, all of which bear much similarity in their production to bee honey.) According to the Tanna Kamma, these honeys should be kosher just like bee honey, since they are merely processed flower nectar. Rabbi Yaakov, however, permits only bee honey, but contends that the Torah never permitted gizin honey and tzirin honey.

The Gemara explains that Rabbi Yaakov prohibits gizin honey and tzirin honey because they are never called just honey, but always by their descriptive adjective, as opposed to bee honey, which is usually called by one name: "honey." What this answer means may directly impact on the halachic status of shellac.

(1) Sweet as Shellac!?

As I mentioned above, Rav Moshe presents four different reasons why shellac may be kosher. His first approach is that, according to the Tanna Kamma, which is the way the Rambam (Hilchos Maachalos Asuros 3:3) and the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 81:9) rule, any substance that an insect processes that is similar to the processing of honey is kosher. Rav Moshe understands that the lac’s contribution to shellac can be compared to the bee’s contribution to honey. The lac ingests sap from its host tree and modifies this sap into shellac, just as insects modify nectar and make it into honey or honeydew. Therefore, the resultant glaze is kosher according to the Tanna Kamma, and therefore also according to the Rambam and the Shulchan Aruch.

Rav Moshe notes that this reasoning will not be accepted by all authorities, since many poskim rule according to Rabbi Yaakov (Rosh; Pri Chodosh, Yoreh Deah 81:28). According to their conclusion, honey is kosher because of a gezeiras hakasuv, a special derivation of the Torah permitting it, but any other insect-based product, including gizin honey and tzirin honey and shellac, should be non-kosher.

(2) Shellac is like Honey!

However, Rav Moshe suggests that even according to Rabbi Yaakov it is possible that shellac is permitted. The Gemara explains that Rabbi Yaakov prohibits gizin honey and tzirin honey because the word "honey," without any other description, refers only to bee honey, not that of gizin and tzirin. What does this distinction mean?

Among the early authorities, we find two different ways of explaining why Rabbi Yaakov holds that gizin honey and tzirin honey are non-kosher. The Levush explains that since these products are always called gizin honey and tzirin honey, they are still associated with their non-kosher source, and therefore they remain non-kosher. Since bee honey is usually referred to simply as "honey," the Torah included only this product in its heter.

The Maharshal explains the Gemara differently. In his opinion, the word zeh can permit only one product, and that is bee honey. Thus, the honey produced by gizin and tzirin is prohibited, because there is no verse that permits it.

Is there any practical halachic dispute between these two approaches? According to Rav Moshe indeed there is. He contends that, according to the Maharshal, Rabbi Yaakov understands that the Torah permitted only one substance whose origin is non-kosher, honey, and none other; and that therefore, shellac (according to Rabbi Yaakov) is not kosher. However, Rav Moshe suggests that, according to the Levush, any product that is not usually referred to by an adjective identifying its source will be kosher. Therefore, although gizin honey and tzirin honey are non-kosher, since the name shellac does not mention the non-kosher source, it should be kosher. However, the Maharshal would consider shellac non-kosher (according to Rabbi Yaakov), and therefore, we would not rely on this reason alone to permit shellac. Rav Moshe advances two other approaches to permit shellac.

(3) Kosher Derivatives from Non-Kosher Sources

Another application of the rule of kol hayotzei min hatamei tamei is that an egg produced by a chicken with a physical defect (a tereifah) is not kosher. Despite this fact, the Gemara cites a dispute whether the chick that develops from this egg is kosher. The halachic conclusion is that this chick is kosher, notwithstanding the non-kosher status both of its mother hen and its own origins, because the fertilized egg deteriorates to a point of becoming inedible prior to becoming a chick (Temurah 31a). Rav Moshe explains this Gemara to mean that kol hayotzei min hatamei tamei applies only when the non-kosher animal creates food. However, when the item created is not food, the product created by a non-kosher source is considered kosher. Thus, he concludes that since shellac is tasteless, it is not considered a food, and is permitted, even though it is yotzei min hatamei.

(4) Too Small to be Significant

Rav Moshe adds another reason to permit the shellac glaze: Since shellac is not food and it is dissolved in a few times its volume of alcohol, it is therefore bateil.

Because of these reasons, Rav Moshe concluded that shellac may be used as a glaze on candies. This position has been accepted by most major hechsherim in North America.

American vs. Israeli Hechsherim

At this point, we can address the second question I raised above: My Israeli cousin, who is a big talmid chacham, asked us how there could be a hechsher on a candy containing confectioner’s glaze. The answer is that the American hechsherim follow Rav Moshe’s ruling on the kashrus status of confectioner’s glaze.

Does this mean that the Israeli cousin is grossly unaware of the halacha?

No. To the best of my knowledge, none of the mehadrin Israeli hechsherim accepts shellac as a kosher product. They are not comfortable with any of the four reasons that form the basis of Rav Moshe’s psak.

(1) Regarding the first reason, that the secretion of shellac should not be considered a product of the lac, just as honey is not considered a product of the bee:

Aside from the factor that many opinions do not rule like the Tanna Kamma, but follow Rabbi Yaakov, they feel that the comparison between honey and shellac may not be accurate. Although the Gemara states that bees do not produce honey, it is unclear what factors define why honey remains kosher. Shellac is a complex product, and the lac definitely contributes to its production in a way that is different from the way a bee makes honey. It may be that even the Tanna Kamma would consider shellac to be non-kosher. How can we be certain that the reason that honey is permitted applies to shellac?

(2) Rav Moshe’s second reason was that, just as only bee honey (and not gizin or tzirin honey) is kosher according to (the Levush’s understanding of) Rabbi Yaakov, because the common word honey makes no reference to its non-kosher source, so, too, the word shellac makes no mention of its non-kosher source. However, there are two strong reasons why shellac should be non-kosher, like the honey produced by gizin and tzirin.

(A) The word shellac means the product of the lac insect. Thus, it does refer to the non-kosher origin.

(B) A second problem, which Rav Moshe discusses, is that Rabbi Yaakov derives that honey is kosher from a drashah that permits products of flying creatures. However, the lac does not qualify as a sheretz ha’of, a flying creature, and therefore, it is not obvious that shellac could be permitted, based on the word zeh, which refers to flying creatures.

(3) Based on the halachic conclusion that a chick developing from a tereifah chicken is kosher, Rav Moshe explains kol hayotzei min hatamei tamei applies only when the non-kosher animal creates food, and that shellac is not food. However, others understand the Gemara’s point in a different way. When an item deteriorates, such as an egg that eventually becomes a chick, it is no longer considered the result of the original non-kosher source. However, when no deterioration transpires, why should the item not be considered the product of the original source? Shellac does not deteriorate during the process of being made from tree sap.

(4) Rav Moshe’s fourth reason to permit shellac is that it is dissolved in several times its volume of alcohol before being applied, and therefore, the finished shellac is bateil. However, this approach is problematic. As I mentioned above, after the shellac is applied, the alcohol is evaporated, and the finished shellac that remains on a candy is almost pure shellac; that remaining on fruit is estimated to be about 80% shellac. This should not allow for bitul.

One could still argue that one is not trying to eat the shellac, and that it does become bateil in one’s mouth while chewing the fruit. On the other hand, the Eretz Yisrael hechsherim who follow a stricter approach contend that, since the shellac is on the surface, one can peel the fruit and remove all the shellac.

As a result of Rav Moshe’s responsum, the supervisory organizations in the United States treat shellac as kosher, and devote their research on coatings to the other possible ingredients that may be a problem. However, in Eretz Yisroel Rav Moshe’s approach was less accepted and, as a result, none of the mehadrin hechsherim treat glaze as kosher. These hechsherim monitor which coatings, if any, are used on produce sold under their supervision. Indeed, there have been instances of fruit exported from the United States to Israel that the mehadrin hechsherim in Israel barred from the produce departments under their certification. (In general, fresh produce grown outside Israel has relatively few kashrus issues, other than examining them for insects. One is not required to be concerned that chutz la’aretz fruits may be orlah, a topic we will leave for a different time. Thus, produce departments in chutz la’aretz need not be supervised. The situation is very different in Israel, where one must be concerned about many agricultural mitzvos hateluyos ba’aretz; because of these concerns, produce stores and departments carry kosher supervision.)

Thus, we see that, whereas American hechsherim accept shellac as kosher, Israeli mehadrin hechsherim do not. To quote the Gemara, nahara nahara upashtei¸ literally, each river follows its own course, or, there are different halachic customs each with valid halachic source (Chullin 18b; 57a). In English we say, there is more than one way to skin a vegetable.

Earlier in the week, I sent out articles for this coming Shabbos. Now I am including an article for your Pesach reading pleasure on the topic of sheva berachos and the seder. In a separate e-mail, I am going to send you another pesach article.

My next article will be sent out iy”H after Pesach and will be a kashrus article germane to Parshas Shmini.

Wishing you and yours a chag kosher vesomayach.

Sheva Brachos at the Seder!!

Although most people grimace at the thought of attending a wedding the week before Pesach, much less making one, scheduling a wedding that week also includes the possibility of making sheva brachos at the Seder. Certainly for those who relish long, drawn-out sheva brachos, what could be more exciting than combining sheva brachos with the Seder! And, in addition to the time-honored question whether a choson wears a kittel at the Seder, this Seder has an additional question: Over which kos does one recite the first six brachos of the sheva brachos? Although this question may seem trite, many responsa and dozens of pages of halachic dialogue discuss it. In order to explain what the commotion is about, we need to understand its halachic basis.

Ordinarily, after a sheva brachos meal we take out three cups and fill two of them with wine. The person leading the bensching holds one of the full cups, while the second cup remains on the table until bensching is completed. The second cup is then handed consecutively to six honorees who recite the first six sheva brachos. (Although many authorities oppose dividing the blessings among six different honorees, this approach is commonly followed.) The person who led bensching then recites the last of the sheva brachos, borei pri hagafen while holding the first cup. He then drinks from his cup, the wine in the two cups is mixed together (using the third cup for this purpose), and finally the wine of the second and this cups are presented to the choson and the kallah.

(This is the prevalent custom, the basis of which is recorded by Derisha [Even HaEzer 62:4] and Nishmas Odom [68:2]. Some poskim recommend that the honoree leading the bensching hold the kos to be used for the sheva brachos while reciting the prayer dvei hoseir [which is inserted before bensching at a sheva brachos meal] and then put that kos down and pick up the first kos for bensching [Taz, Even HaEzer 62:7]. I have never seen anyone follow this practice. According to a third opinion, the second kos should not be filled until after bensching is completed [Magen Avraham 147:11 and Be’er Heiteiv, Even HaEzer 62:11].)

Why do we use two different kosos? Why not use the same cup for both bensching and sheva brachos? Actually, the poskim dispute this issue, as I will explain.

The Gemara (Pesachim 102b) teaches that if (for some unusual reason) someone bensches and recites Kiddush at the same time, he should not recite both of them over the same cup. Rather, he should recite Kiddush while holding one cup of wine and bensch while holding a different one. The Gemara then queries why it is necessary to take two different cups, to which it answers: “We do not recite two kedushos over the same cup. Why not? Because we do not bundle together several mitzvos, ein osin mitzvos chavilos chavilos.” Using the same kos for both mitzvos gives the impression that we view these mitzvos as a burden, rather than treating each mitzvah with due respect by designating for it its own cup of wine. This concept of ein osin mitzvos chavilos chavilos is often simply referred to as the problem of “chavilos chavilos.”

BUT DON’T WE RECITE KIDDUSH AND HAVDALAH OVER ONE CUP?

When Yom Tov falls on a Sunday, we recite Kiddush for Yom Tov and Havdalah for Shabbos as part of the same ceremony, all while holding the same cup. Why is this not a problem of chavilos chavilos, since it “bundles together” the two mitzvos of Kiddush and Havdalah?

The Gemara (Pesachim 102b) explains that Kiddush and Havdalah are considered one mitzvah – thus, reciting them over one cup is not considered bundling mitzvos together.

I can now explain why we recite bensching and sheva brachos over separate cups. Tosafos quotes a dispute whether one recites sheva brachos on the same cup that one recites bensching or over a different cup. Rabbeinu Meshulam maintains that reciting sheva brachos and bensching over the same cup of wine is not a problem of chavilos chavilos, since we do not recite the sheva brachos without bensching. Thus, since bensching causes the recital of the sheva brachos, this is not bundling separate mitzvos together. According to Rabbeinu Meshulam, we fill one cup with wine and hand it to the person leading the bensching. When he finishes bensching, he hands that kos to the honoree who recites the first of the sheva brachos, who then hands it to the next honoree and so on until the kos returns to the person who led the bensching, so that he may hold the kos while reciting the borei pri hagafen. However, Tosafos quotes a differing opinion that contends that one should recite bensching and sheva brachos over separate cups, since they are, essentially, two separate mitzvos.

HOW DO WE PASKIN?

The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 62:9) quotes both opinions in this dispute, and mentions that the custom is to use only one cup for both bensching and sheva brachos, following Rabbeinu Meshulam. (One should note that Sefardim recite all seven of the sheva brachos only when the meal is celebrated in the hall at which the wedding took place. The reason for this practice is beyond the scope of our current discussion, but see Tosafos Sukkah 25b s.v. ein simcha and Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 62:10.) The Rama notes that the custom among Ashkenazim is to use two different cups. The Chida (Shu’t Yosef Ometz #47), who was the posek hador of his generation among the Sefardim, notes that, although at the time of the Shulchan Aruch the custom among the Edot Hamizrach (the Sefardim) was to recite the sheva brachos on the same cup as the bensching, in his day (the Chida’s) a separate cup was used for sheva brachos. Thus, the minhag had changed among the Sefardim. It is also worthwhile to note that the Chida, who lived most of his life in Eretz Yisroel, traveled extensively through Northern Africa and Europe and was very familiar with the customs of many places. (As an aside, wherever the Chida visited he researched whatever seforim, both published and in manuscript, were available and recorded his findings. He later published his discoveries in an encyclopedic work, Shem HaGedolim, which is a monumental bibliography of seforim and authors.) Other Sefardic authors of the last several hundred years record two customs, some following Rabbeinu Meshulam (like the Shulchan Aruch recorded) and others using separate cups for the two mitzvos (like the Chida) (Otzar HaPoskim 62:9:53). The predominant custom today is to use two separate kosos.

WHY IS THIS NIGHT DIFFERENT FROM ALL OTHER NIGHTS?

If, on all other nights, we use separate cups for bensching and sheva brachos, why should we entertain the thought that on this night of Pesach we should use only one cup?

The background behind this question requires an additional introduction:

Chazal instituted that every individual should drink four cups of wine at the Seder in order to commemorate the four terms used by Hashem in the Torah to prophesy the redemption from Egypt: vihotzeisi, I will take you out of Mitzrayim; vihitzalti, I will save you; viga’alti, I will redeem you; vilakachti, I will take you to me as a nation (Rashi and Rashbam, Pesachim 99b, quoting Midrash Rabbah; cf. Rashi ibid. 108a, who provides a different reason). “The Rabbis instituted four cups as a means of demonstrating that we gained freedom – each one of them should be used for a mitzvah” (Pesachim 117b). Therefore, we use the first cup for Kiddush; on the second we recite the bracha, asher ga’alanu; we recite the bensching while holding the third cup of wine, and Hallel while reciting the fourth.

When celebrating a sheva brachos at a Seder, we are faced with the following dilemma:

If we drink an extra cup of wine at the Seder for sheva brachos, it gives the impression that we are drinking five cups of wine at the Seder, when Chazal instituted that one should drink only four special cups. This is referred to as “adding to the cups,” mosif al hakosos, which is a rabbinic violation. On the other hand, if we do not add a cup, we are bundling together the mitzvah of sheva brachos with the mitzvah of bensching. Thus, the principle of ein osin mitzvos chavilos chavilos, which is the reason why we use separate cups for bensching and for sheva brachos; has now become the basis for a difficulty.

Furthermore, there is another problem, in that once one drinks the third cup of wine one is prohibited from drinking another cup until after the fourth cup has been drunk (Mishnah Pesachim 117b).

The shaylah what to do in this predicament is discussed by many prominent poskim, with the earliest published discussion on the issue going back six hundred years and responsa on the question continuing up to our time.

I am aware of at least five different approaches mentioned by poskim to resolve this issue.

(1) The Chida (Shu’t Yosef Ometz #47) quotes a very creative approach to resolve this problem, although he does not approve of it: Prior to bensching, one should fill two minimum-shiur cups. The person leading the bensching holds one of these cups, while the other is held by the honorees while they recite the sheva brachos. Following the completion of the sheva brachos, one pours the two cups into one large cup, and one of the participants drinks the large kos as the third kos. Thus, since each kos was initially separate, one used two cups for the two mitzvos and did not violate the precept of ein osin mitzvos chavilos chavilos, while at the same time one did not add an extra kos, since only one cup was drunk.

The Chida disapproves of this solution, although he does not explain why. Presumably, he contends that one violates the prohibition of adding to the kosos by using a separate cup for the sheva brachos, even if it is later poured together with the bensching cup. Thus, there is no advantage to this approach.

(2) Another approach to resolve this problem is to recite the sheva brachos on a cup that is then set aside for someone to use for the fourth kos. (The Yaavetz, quoted by Pischei Teshuvah, Even HaEzer 62:18, mentions this approach.) This opinion holds that since this kos is ultimately used for one of the four cups of the Seder, one cannot say that it is “adding to the cups.” And to avoid violating the prohibition against drinking between the third kos and the fourth, the cup is drunk as the fourth kos.

Rav Moshe Feinstein (Shu’t Igros Moshe, Even HaEzer 1:95) writes that he does not understand this opinion. Simply put, the cup of sheva brachos in this case is serving two different purposes, the sheva brachos and the fourth cup. Thus, it is directly violating the prohibition of making mitzvos into bundles (ein osin mitzvos chavilos chavilos), without the advantage of Rabbeinu Meshulam’s opinion that the sheva brachos cup and the bensching cup may overlap. Thus, one is doing mitzvos chavilos chavilos in a worse way than if he had simply used the sheva brachos kos for bensching. (Shu’t Igros Moshe suggests an approach how this opinion may have addressed this question.) Presumably because of this criticism, the later poskim abandon this suggestion.

(3) The Chida cites another approach, which is to leave everyone’s cup a bit empty, and then fill each one with the wine from the sheva brachos kos. He does not like this approach, because he says it makes the mitzvah look like a joke, although he does not explain why. Presumably, the concern is that this approach does not treat the kos of sheva brachos with proper kavod.

(4) Other solutions are suggested. Many contend that one should recite both the sheva brachos and the bensching over the same kos (Yaavetz; Chida). Their reason is that, although we usually assume that this violates ein osin mitzvos chavilos chavilos, Rabbeinu Meshulam held that reciting sheva brachos and bensching over one cup does not violate this rule. Therefore, on Seder night, when the alternative is to create a problem of adding an extra kos to the Seder, it is preferable to combine the two kosos of sheva brachos and bensching together. According to this opinion, one should recite the sheva brachos over the cup used by the person leading the bensching, and then each individual should drink from his own kos.

(5) The Rama (Darchei Moshe, Orach Chayim 473:4) cites a different resolution to this dilemma. He rules that the person leading the bensching should hold his kos while reciting the bensching, and that those reciting the sheva brachos should hold the kos of the choson while reciting these brachos. Rama does not discuss who drinks the respective kosos, but I presume that the person who led the bensching drinks the first kos and the choson drinks the second.

There is an obvious problem with this approach. Since each person holds his kos for bensching at the Seder, the kos of the choson is also a kos of bensching. Therefore, what have we gained by having the sheva brachos recited over a different kos from the bensching? There are still two mitzvos being performed over this kos – bensching and sheva brachos — and we have the problem of ein osin mitzvos chavilos chavilos. This is why several of the above-mentioned poskim reject this approach.

Evidently, this opinion contends that, although all of the assembled hold their cups during the bensching, their cups are not considered the bensching cup. Only the kos of the person who leads the bensching has the halachic status of performing this mitzvah. The other cups are in fulfillment of Chazal’s having instituted the four kosos, preferring that we use each cup for a mitzvah. Therefore, it is not osin mitzvos chavilos chavilos when one uses this cup for sheva brachos. (As noted before, in this instance the choson and kallah do not drink from that cup, but drink from their own cups.)

Those who disagree with this approach contend that, at the Seder, each person’s kos is indeed a kos of bensching. Thus, there is no advantage to reciting the sheva brachos over the choson’s kos.

There is a historical curiosity about this debate. Two very prominent early poskim, the Yaavetz and the Chida, discuss this issue and conclude (#4, above) that one should rely on Rabbeinu Meshulam when celebrating sheva brachos at the Seder, and recite the sheva brachos and bensching over the same cup. The Chida published two different responsa on this shaylah, reaching the same conclusion both times; but, in his earlier responsum, he does not mention that the Rama cites the opposite conclusion. In his later responsum, the Chida mentions that someone had criticized him for having previously written a responsum on the subject and ignoring the Rama’s comments on the subject. In his later responsum, he explains that since he had quoted Rav Yaakov Emden, who in turn quoted the Rama’s source and disagreed with it, he saw no need to point out that the Rama had quoted these comments.

It is also interesting that Rav Moshe also disagreed with the Rama, yet felt bound to follow Rama’s approach because of the Rama’s greatness, whereas both Rav Yaakov Emden (the Yaavetz) and the Chida decided not to follow Rama’s approach, but to rule that one should use one kos for both bensching and sheva brachos.

In conclusion, those privileged to celebrate a sheva brachos for a newlywed couple at their Seder could either have all the brachos recited over one kos, or have the sheva brachos recited over the kos of one of the other celebrants. In any case, the practice of mixing wine from the two kosos together should not be followed at the Seder.

–
—
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Rabbi Kaganoff’s Divrei Torah" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to Kaganoff+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

A few minutes ago, I sent you an article for your Pesach reading pleasure on the topic of sheva berachos and the seder. Here I am sending you a second Pesach article.

My next article will be sent out iy”H after Pesach and will be a kashrus article germane to Parshas Shmini.

Wishing you and yours a chag kosher vesomayach.

Making Our Days Count

A Review of the Halachos of Sefiras HaOmer

Rabbi Yirmiyohu Kaganoff

In Parshas Emor, the Torah teaches us: Hashem spoke to Moshe saying, Speak to the Children of Israel and say to them: “When you enter the land that I am giving to you and you will cut its harvesting, then you shall bring an omer-sized portion from the first of its harvest to the kohen. And he (the kohen) shall wave the omer before Hashem for your benefit, on the day after the ‘day of rest’ the kohen shall wave it… And you should count for yourselves from the day after the ‘day of rest,’ from the day you bring the omer of waving, until there will be seven complete weeks. Until the day after the seventh week, you shall count fifty days.” (Vayikra 23:9-11, 15-16). It should be noted that the words in the pasuk, mimacharas hashabbos, which we have translated as the “the day after the ‘day of rest,’” would usually be translated “the day after Shabbos.” However, the Oral Torah (Torah sheba’al peh) teaches us that the words “day of rest” here mean the first day of Pesach (Menachos 65b). Thus, the omer offering is brought on the second day of Pesach, whether or not that date falls on the day after Shabbos. We begin to count the omer from the day we bring the omer offering, until the counting of seven weeks is completed.

The Gemara recounts a fascinating story that occurred at the time of the Second Temple. There was a group of non-believing Jews, the Baytusim, who disregarded the teachings of Chazal. (Indeed, the Baytusim also disavowed belief in reward and punishment and other basic Jewish tenets [see Avos deRabbi Nassan, Chapter 5:2].) Since the Baytusim followed their own interpretation of the pasuk, they decided that the korban omer must be offered on a Sunday and not necessarily on the second day of Pesach. They plotted to have Rosh Chodesh Nisan fall on Shabbos, realizing that the second day of Pesach would then fall on Sunday. The result would be that the korban omer would be offered on Sunday, even though it was not supposed to happen that particular year.

The Baytusim were so determined to have the korban omer offered on Sunday that they hired false witnesses in an attempt to manipulate the main Beis Din to declare Rosh Chodesh Nisan on a Shabbos. Fortunately, one of the witnesses they hired did not believe in the Baytusi creed and told the Rabbonim about the plot (Rosh Hashanah 22b). Because of this event, major changes were instituted in the type of witnesses accepted by the Beis Din (Rosh Hashanah 22a).

As mentioned above, the mitzvah of counting omer begins from the day the korban omer is offered. This implies that, when there is no korban omer, there is no requirement min hatorah to count the omer (Menachos 66a). Indeed, most poskim contend that since there is, unfortunately, no Beis Hamikdash today and there are no korbanos, there is no mitzvah min hatorah to count omer (Ran, end of Pesachim; see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 489:3 and Mishnah Berurah). However, Chazal instituted our counting omer even though there is no Beis Hamikdash, in order to remember the mitzvah as it was at the time of the Beis Hamikdash (Menachos 66a).

Details About the Counting

Before counting the omer, one recites a beracha on the performance of the mitzvah. One should be careful to stand while reciting both the beracha and the counting (Rosh, end of Pesachim; Shulchan Aruch 489:1).

The Torah states: “And you should count for yourselves… seven complete weeks. Until the day after the seventh week, you shall count fifty days.” It is important to note that the Torah makes two statements: one that we should count seven weeks, and a second that we should count fifty days. Based on this observation, the Gemara derives that there are two mitzvos, one to count the days and the other to count the weeks (Menachos 66a).

Tosafos raises the following question: Why does the Torah say, “Until the day after the seventh week, you shall count fifty days,” if the mitzvah is to count for only forty-nine days? Tosafos explains that the verse should be translated: “Until the day after the seventh week, which is the fiftieth day, shall you count” (Menachos 65b s.v. Kasuv.) According to this translation, there is a mitzvah to count up until the fiftieth day, which is Shavuos, but that there is no mitzvah to count the fiftieth day itself.

As mentioned above, the Gemara rules that there is a mitzvah to count the weeks. Obviously, there is no mitzvah to count the weeks until the end of the first week, at which point there is a mitzvah to state that one week of counting has been completed. From this point on, is there a mitzvah to mention the weekly count every day, or is it sufficient to count the weeks only at the end of each week? According to the latter interpretation, one counts the weeks only seven times, once at the end of each week (Tur, quoting Yesh Omrim). However, the accepted opinion is that every day of sefirah (except for the first six days) one counts the number of days and then one calculates how that divides into weeks and days. Thus, on the eleventh day of sefirah we count, “Today is eleven days, which is one week and four days in the omer” (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 489:1). (According to the opinion of the Yesh Omrim, there is no mitzvah to count the weeks on the eleventh day. According to this opinion, the entire counting is: “Today is eleven days.”)

Some Practical Applications

Someone who counts the wrong number has not fulfilled the mitzvah. However, if he remembered immediately and corrected his error, he has fulfilled the mitzvah (Mishnah Berurah 489:32).

One should not recite the blessing without knowing the day’s exact count, even if he knows that he will hear the correct count from someone else immediately. Rather, one should first find out what the correct count is before reciting the blessing (Mishnah Berurah 489:29 and Shaar Hatziyun ad loc.).

Sefirah can be counted in any language, provided one understands what he is saying. If he does not understand what he is saying, he has not fulfilled the mitzvah, even if he counts in Hebrew (Magen Avraham).

A very common question is whether one who missed counting one day of sefirah may still recite a beracha when he counts the remaining days. Several early poskim contend that someone who missed counting one day has no mitzvah to count the remaining days, since his counting of forty-nine days is no longer complete (Tur, quoting Behag). According to this opinion, someone who missed one day may continue to count sefirah, but he is forbidden to recite a beracha, since he is no longer fulfilling a mitzvah. However, other poskim contend that missing one day does not affect the upcoming days. In their opinion, there is a mitzvah each day to count the sefirah of that day, even if one has not counted the preceding days (Tur, quoting Rav Hai Gaon). The Shulchan Aruch (489:8) treats this shaylah as an unresolved issue. Thus, he rules that someone who missed counting one day of sefirah should count the remaining days without a beracha. The count should continue, because it is possible that he is still fulfilling the mitzvah. Yet he does not recite a beracha, because if he is no longer fulfilling a mitzvah, the beracha would be a beracha levatalah (a beracha recited in vain).

In this case, and all other cases where there is a doubt as to whether one is still fulfilling the mitzvah, it is preferable to hear the beracha from someone who is definitely required to count (Mishnah Berurah ad loc.). The person reciting the beracha must have in mind to include the other person in his beracha, and the person who is not reciting the beracha must have in mind that he is being included in the beracha. If there is no one available to make the beracha for him, he should count sefirah without a beracha.

An Interesting Shaylah

There is another interesting shaylah that results from the above-mentioned dispute whether each day’s sefirah counting is dependent on still having a complete count: Does a boy who becomes bar mitzvah between Pesach and Shavuos recite a beracha on the counting of sefirah? Even if the twelve-year old was counting sefirah every night very diligently, he was not fulfilling a mitzvah, since he was still a minor. Thus, if the mitzvah of counting sefirah is dependent on a complete count, the bar mitzvah bachur may not have a complete sefirah count.

Many poskim discuss this issue, and there is no common agreement what to do (See for example, Birkei Yosef 489:20; Shaarei Teshuvah 489:20; Shu’t Maharam Shick #269; Shu’t Har Tzvi 2:76). Therefore, one should ask his rav for a ruling on this shaylah.

As we mentioned above, someone who missed one day of sefirah should continue counting, but without a beracha. However, someone who is not sure if he missed counting one day may still count with a beracha (Shulchan Aruch 489:8). Since it is not certain that his counting is incomplete, he can rely on the possibility that his counting is still complete, with the possibility that the halacha is that one can recite a beracha even if the count is incomplete. This concept is called a sefek sefeika, which means that there are two possible approaches toward permitting one to do something. In this case, as there are two possible justifications for making a beracha, he may do so.

Similarly, in any other case where it is questionable whether he fulfilled the requirement to count, or where the law is that he should count without a beracha on a particular night, the halacha is that he may continue counting the next night with a beracha (Mishnah Berurah 489:38).

If, on a given night, someone counted sefirah without reciting a beracha first, he may not recite the beracha afterwards for that day’s counting. Though he fulfilled the mitzvah of counting omer that night, he is unable to fulfill the mitzvah of making a beracha on the counting. Therefore, one should be careful not to tell someone what night of sefirah it is before one has fulfilled the mitzvah (Shulchan Aruch 489:4). The accepted practice is to respond to the question “What night is it?” by stating what was the count of the previous day.

Some Unusual Applications

What is the halacha if someone alluded to the correct number of the day’s omer count, but did so in an unusual way? For example, has someone fulfilled the mitzvah if he counted on the thirty-ninth day of the omer that today is “forty days minus one”? Is this considered a valid method of counting thirty-nine days, or must one count thirty-nine in a direct way? The halacha is that this unusual method of counting is considered counting, and he has fulfilled the mitzvah (Be’er Heiteiv 469:6).

Another shaylah about an unusual method of counting has very common application.

In Hebrew, one can allude to a number by reciting the Hebrew letter or letters that represent it. For example, one could attempt to count the eleventh day of sefirah by stating that today is yud alef b’omer, or attempt to count the thirty-third day of sefirah by counting that today is lag b’omer. Poskim dispute whether one fulfills the mitzvah if one counts this way. Whereas some poskim rule that this is a valid method of counting, other poskim rule that he has not fulfilled the mitzvah, since he did not count the number explicitly (Shaarei Teshuvah 489:6).

There is a very common shaylah that results from this dispute. On the evening of Lag Be’omer someone stated “tonight is Lag Be’omer” before he counted sefirah. Can he still recite a beracha on the counting of sefirah that night, or do we say that he has already counted for that night and cannot recite the beracha anymore? Bi’ur Halacha rules that this issue remains unresolved. Therefore, one should count in the regular way to make certain he fulfills the mitzvah, but without a beracha since there is a doubt whether he is still obligated to perform the mitzvah (Bi’ur Halacha 489:1 s.v. moneh). On subsequent nights, he would be able to resume counting with a beracha.

The Korban Omer was harvested at night, hence the mitzvah of counting Omer is at night. If the omer was not harvested at night, there is a dispute among poskim whether it could be harvested in the daytime (Tosafos, Menachos 66a). The same dispute is reflected in a different very germane shaylah: If someone forgot to count the omer at night, can he still fulfill the mitzvah if he counts in the daytime? Since the matter is disputed, he should count in the daytime, but without a beracha, since we refrain from making a beracha whenever it is uncertain whether one is performing a mitzvah (Shulchan Aruch 489:7). The accepted pesak halacha is that he may resume counting with a beracha the following evening (Mishnah Berurah 489:34).

Counting Before Nightfall

As we mentioned above, according to most poskim the mitzvah of counting the omer is only rabbinic in our era, since unfortunately, the Beis Hamikdash is no longer standing. Some poskim contend that since the counting is only miderabbanan, one is permitted to count the omer before nightfall (Rosh and other Rishonim, end of Pesachim). Thus, the practice developed in some communities to count the omer during twilight, even though it is uncertain whether it is day or night. Shulchan Aruch rules that one should preferably wait until after nightfall to count. However, someone who is davening in a shul where the people are counting before nightfall is permitted to count with them, lest he forget to count later (see Shulchan Aruch 489:2-3). In this situation, Shulchan Aruch rules that he should count together with the shul without a beracha and have in mind that if he remembers later, he will count again. If he indeed remembers to count again, then he recites a beracha and counts a second time. This ruling seems very strange. How can one count the second time with a beracha — didn’t he fulfill the mitzvah the first time he counted? Counting with a beracha should be a beracha levatalah, a beracha recited in vain!

The answer is that, when he counted the first time, he made an automatic condition that if he indeed remembers to count again later, he does not want to fulfill the mitzvah now. It is considered that he specified that he does not want to fulfill the mitzvah. However, if he forgets to count later, then the first counting he performed is valid, since his condition was not fulfilled. Thus, he will rely on the opinions that counting sefirah before nightfall is valid, and he may resume counting the following night with a beracha.

Writing the Count

Is writing out the number count of the sefirah considered counting sefirah? If someone wrote a letter before he had counted sefirah, and he dated the letter with that night’s sefirah count, may he still count sefirah with a beracha? This issue is discussed at length by poskim. The conclusion is that, although writing shows the intention of the person, it does not constitute speaking. When a mitzvah requires one to speak, such as saying Shema, reciting tefillah, or counting omer, one does not fulfill his mitzvah by writing. Thus, someone who dated a letter with the night’s sefirah count before he counted sefirah can still recite a beracha on the night’s sefirah count.

As mentioned above, the Torah associates the counting of the sefirah with the offering of the korban omer. An additional idea is conveyed by the midrash. When the Jews brought the Pesach offering in Egypt, they were eager to receive the Torah immediately. When they asked Moshe, “When do we receive the Torah?” he answered them, “On the fiftieth day.” In their enthusiasm, each of them counted every day, in eager anticipation of the exciting day on which they would receive the Torah. In commemoration of this event, we count the days from Pesach until Shavuos. (This midrash is quoted by the Ran at the end of Mesechta Pesachim.) May we all be zocheh to anticipate receiving the Torah anew on Shavuos with the same excitement and enthusiasm that our ancestors had.

–
—
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Rabbi Kaganoff’s Divrei Torah" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to Kaganoff+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

The Torah teaches that, although most melachos are forbidden on Yom Tov, cooking and most other food preparation are permitted. Nevertheless, some types of food preparation are prohibited on Yom Tov, such as catching fish, picking fruit, and squeezing juice. Why are these activities different from cooking, kneading, and the other food preparatory activities that are permitted on Yom Tov?

To understand the answer to this question correctly, we must imagine ourselves preparing a meal in the days of Chazal: Refrigeration and most modern methods of preserving food do not exist, and preparing a festive meal requires baking and cooking on the day of the occasion. Although it may seem strange to us, even shechitah and soaking and salting the meat are performed the day the meal is served. Thus, the Torah permitted any activity necessary to prepare a meal that will be served on Yom Tov. It is even permitted to skin the hide off an animal that has been shechted on Yom Tov since one cannot remove the meat properly without first removing the hide.

However, some food preparatory activities are usually performed in advance of the day one intends to serve the meal. Even in earlier days, one did not begin preparing the day’s meal by catching fish. One who planned fish for dinner would catch or purchase the fish the day before, and then leave the fish in water until it was time to prepare it. Therefore, one may not fish on Yom Tov, even if one intends to fry fish for the day’s meal.

Similarly, fruits are usually picked and squeezed when they ripen, and then the juice or oil is stored. Thus, picking and squeezing fruit is not permitted on Yom Tov, even though they are steps in the preparation of food. Even picking or squeezing a small amount of fruit is prohibited, since these activities are usually performed in quantity and stored for a longer period of time.

In a like manner, the day one prepares a meal is not the time to begin grinding the wheat into flour, and it is certainly not the time to harvest the grain or to thresh it. One would grind the grain into flour at an earlier date and then store it for subsequent use. However, someone serving fresh bread or pastry prepares the dough the day the meal is to be served. Therefore, it is permitted to mix flour and water on Yom Tov. This subject leads us to a more extensive discussion about the melacha of kneading on Yom Tov.

Kneading on Yom Tov

One of the thirty-nine melachos of Shabbos is kneading, which includes any instance of combining fine particles with a liquid until they stick together. Thus, one may not mix grains or powders with liquid to create an edible cereal on Shabbos. However, since one may knead dough on Yom Tov, all kneading is permitted on Yom Tov. Thus, one may prepare oatmeal, pudding, or baby cereals on Yom Tov the same way these foods would be prepared on a weekday. (One may not mix these foods in the usual fashion on Shabbos.)

Separating Challah

When one kneads dough on Yom Tov, the challah portion is separated (assuming that one kneaded a sufficient quantity of dough). However, one does not burn the separated challah portion on Yom Tov. Instead, one sets the portion aside to be burnt after Yom Tov (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 506:4).

If one baked before Shabbos or Yom Tov, one may not separate the challah portion on Shabbos or Yom Tov. What happens if you realize on Shabbos or Yom Tov that you forgot to separate challah? The answer to this shaylah depends on whether the dough was kneaded in Eretz Yisrael or in chutz la’aretz. If the dough was kneaded in Eretz Yisrael, then there is no solution but to leave the bread until after Shabbos or Yom Tov, and then separate the challah portion. However, if this dough was kneaded in chutz la’aretz, there is a different solution: One may eat the bread on Shabbos or Yom Tov as long as one makes sure that some of the bread remains until after Shabbos or Yom Tov. After Shabbos or Yom Tov, one separates the challah portion from the leftover bread. This separating “after the fact” is sufficient to fulfill the mitzvah of separating challah in a dough produced in chutz la’aretz (Rama 506:3). The reason for this distinction requires a bit of explanation.

Min HaTorah there is a requirement to separate challah only on dough that is made in Eretz Yisrael. (In actuality, the requirement is min hatorah only when the majority of Jews live in Eretz Yisrael.) The requirement to separate challah on dough mixed in chutz la’aretz is only out of concern that Jews living in chutz la’aretz should not forget that there is a mitzvah to separate challah. However, since the mitzvah in chutz la’aretz is only miderabbanan, Chazal allowed the leniency of separating the challah portion “after the fact” (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 322:2-3).

Grating, Grinding, and Mashing on Yom Tov

The melacha of grinding is different from the melachos previously discussed. Some foods are ground or grated as the meal is being prepared, whereas others are ground well before the meal is prepared. For example, when preparing a kugel, the potatoes are grated as the meal is being prepared; similarly, a gourmet chef might crush fresh pepper and other spices specifically for the meal. These types of grinding are permitted on Yom Tov, as I will explain. On the other hand, one does not grind wheat the day one plans to bake bread, and it is therefore prohibited to grind flour on Yom Tov.

The laws of Yom Tov divide the various items that might be ground into four categories:

1. Items that are usually ground well in advance of preparing a meal, such as flour, may not be ground at all.

2. Items that might be ground while preparing the meal, but could have been ground earlier without affecting their flavor, such as salt, may be ground on Yom Tov, but only by grinding them in a way that is different from the usual method. For example, the Mishnah states that one may grind salt on Yom Tov with a wooden pestle rather than one of stone (Beitzah 14a). Therefore, if someone discovers on Yom Tov that he has no table salt in the house, only coarse koshering salt, he may crush the salt on Yom Tov on the table, but not with a mortar and pestle, or with a salt or pepper mill.

3. Items that taste better fresh but are usable if ground before Yom Tov may be ground or chopped on Yom Tov, but only by grinding or chopping them with a slight shinui (Rama 504:1), such as by placing a napkin on the plate or mortar on which they are being ground (Mishnah Berurah 504:19). Therefore, someone accustomed to freshly crushed pepper or spices may grind them on Yom Tov slightly differently from usual, but may not use a tabletop pepper mill.

4. Items that will become useless if ground or chopped before Yom Tov may be ground or chopped on Yom Tov in the way that they would usually be ground or chopped on a weekday. Therefore, one may mash avocado and banana, chop potatoes and onions into fine pieces, and dice salad and apples on Yom Tov the way one would on a weekday (Piskei Teshuvos 504:3).

Measuring

In general, it is prohibited to measure on Yom Tov, just as it is prohibited to measure on Shabbos. Thus, one may not measure how much flour, sugar, or oil to use in a recipe (Shulchan Aruch 506:1). However, one may approximate how much flour, oil, or sugar is needed. It is permitted to use a measuring cup as long as one does not fill the cup exactly to its measuring points (Mishnah Berurah 506:3).

The Poskim dispute whether one may measure spices on Yom Tov, some permitting (even though it is prohibited to measure other items), because approximating spices may ruin the recipe if one errs (Beitzah 29a). However, Magen Avraham (504:10) contends that since most women cook without measuring spices on weekdays, but simply estimate how much they use, they may not measure spices on Yom Tov. Others contend that someone who measure spices on weekdays may measure them on Yom Tov.

Cooking that is Prohibited

One is permitted to cook and prepare food on Yom Tov only when one intends to eat that food on Yom Tov, but one may not cook for after Yom Tov or on the first day of Yom Tov for the second day. For this reason, it is important that all preparations of meals for the second night of Yom Tov wait until the first day of Yom Tov is over. Thus, there was a custom in many communities in Eastern Europe to delay the davening the second night of Yom Tov to allow sufficient time for the preparations of the night meal.

One may cook amply for the Yom Tov meal, knowing that there will certainly be leftovers that can then be served on the second day of Yom Tov. However, one may not prepare individual units of a food item, knowing that one is preparing more than can possibly be eaten on Yom Tov.

One is not permitted to cook on Yom Tov for a non-Jew, since he does not observe Yom Tov. Furthermore, Chazal forbade inviting a non-Jew for a Yom Tov meal, out of concern that one might cook special for him on Yom Tov. One may invite a non-Jew, such as domestic help, for whom you would not prepare a special dish. However, one may not cook for him on Yom Tov.

It is also forbidden to cook or do other melacha for an animal. Thus, although one is permitted to mix dry grains with liquid to create an edible cereal on Yom Tov for a person, one may not mix these items to feed a pet.

Use of Stoves and Ovens on Yom Tov

Chazal prohibited kindling a new flame on Yom Tov (Mishnah Beitzah 33a). Thus, although one may turn up an existing flame, one may not strike a match on Yom Tov (Aruch HaShulchan 502:6), nor may one light a stove or oven by using an electric igniter, since this is considered lighting with a new flame (Igros Moshe 1:115). If someone has a stove or oven that does not light with a gas pilot, it is a good idea to have a twenty-four hour candle burning over Yom Tov to facilitate lighting the stove on Yom Tov. Another advantage to igniting this candle before Yom Tov is that it enables the lighting of the Yom Tov candles on the second night of Yom Tov.

One is permitted to lower a flame in order to cook on Yom Tov. However, there are poskim who rule that one may lower a flame only when there is no option for turning up or on a different flame. According to the latter opinion, if one is cooking on a stove and one wants to lower the fire so that the food does not burn or boil out, one can do so only if there is no option for turning on another flame (Magen Avraham 514:2). However, Rav Moshe Feinstein ruled that it is permitted to lower a flame when one desires to cook with a lower flame or so that the food does not burn or boil out (Igros Moshe 1:115; 4:103).

Hashkafah of Preparing Food on Yom Tov

The Torah refers to the Yomim Tovim as moed. Just as the word ohel moed refers to the tent in the desert which served as a meeting place between Hashem and the Jewish People, so too a moed is a meeting time between Hashem and the Jewish People (Hirsch, Vayikra 23:3 and Horeb). Although on Shabbos we are to refrain from all melacha activity, on Yom Tov the Torah permitted melacha activity that enhances the celebration of the Yom Tov as a moed. Permitting the preparations of delicious, freshly prepared meals allows an even greater celebration of the festivities of the Yom Tov as we celebrate our unique relationship with Hashem.

uestion #1: A certain rav told me that he was unhappy that some kosher for Pesach apple sauce products contain vitamin C, which he claims is kitniyos. But I see some reliable Ashkenazic hechsherim containing vitamin C. Does that rav have his facts wrong?

Question #2: My sister married a Sefardi, who eats rice on Pesach. Does this mean that I will be unable to eat in their house on Pesach, even if I avoid eating the kitniyos?

Question #3: I grew up in a Sefardi home where we ate kitniyos, but have kept the practice not to eat kitniyos since I married an Ashkenazi man. We will be visiting my parents for Pesach, who now have two sets of Pesach pots, one set that they keep kitniyos free to accommodate the Ashkenazi family members. May I help my mother cook kitniyos food on Yom Tov that I may not eat?

Although the Torah’s prohibition against eating, benefiting from, and owning chometz on Pesach applies only to leavened foods made from the five grains (wheat, barley, spelt, oats, and rye), Ashkenazic Jews and many Sefardim have accepted the practice of not eating rice and other grain-like products on Pesach, even when these foods are not one of the five grains. We refer to this as the prohibition against eating kitniyos.

The poskim provide several reasons for this custom, including:

(1) Chometz grains often are mixed into the kitniyos (Tur Orach Chayim 453; see Taz 453:1 and Mishnah Berurah 453:6).

(2) One can bake kitniyos varieties into a type of bread, or cook them into cereal, that might confuse unlettered people, leading them to think that one may eat chometz on Pesach (Taz 453:1, quoting Smak).

(3) Kitniyos varieties bear a physical resemblance to the five grains (Gra ad loc.).

Contemporary Kitniyos Question

A contemporary application that is germane to large-scale food production is the question whether products grown on a medium of soybeans, corn, or other kitniyos are prohibited as kitniyos or not. Some modern poskim refer to these products as “kitniyos shenishtanu,” kitniyos that have undergone a transformation, and therefore permit their use. According to this opinion, Vitamin C, sweeteners, enzymes, thickening agents such as xanthan gum, and a variety of other modern food production aids may be used in Pesach products, even though their major source is kitniyos.

The basis for this shaylah is a dispute among early poskim whether a prohibited substance that has completely transformed remains non-kosher. The Rosh (Berachos 6:35) quotes a dispute whether musk, a fragrance and spice derived from the gland of several different animals, is kosher or not. He cites Rabbeinu Yonah as permitting musk, even if it originated as a non-kosher item, because it has become a new substance and thus becomes permitted. Rabbeinu Yonah rallied support for his thesis from the halacha that, if meat or some other prohibited substance lands in honey, it eventually metamorphosizes into honey and becomes permitted. Rosh, after quoting Rabbeinu Yonah’s opinion, concludes by saying, “I think even his proof needs to be proved,” implying that, if the source of honey was a non-kosher item, the Rosh would consider it non-kosher. Nevertheless, the Rosh in a responsum (24:6) quotes Rabbeinu Yonah approvingly. Because this teshuvah is an interesting insight in the laws of Pesach, I quote it verbatim:

“I never saw anyone who prohibited using honey on Pesach out of concern that flour may be mixed in, because this is uncommon, and, if some mixed in before Pesach, it would be permitted. Furthermore, if we began prohibiting honey because of prohibited admixtures, then we must prohibit honey all year round, since some say that they add non-kosher meat that turns to honey. However, Rabbeinu Yonah wrote that, even if they added non-kosher meat, it is permitted to consume the honey, since the meat dissolves and becomes honey — we look at what it became.”

In this responsum, we see the Rosh favorably quoting Rabbeinu Yonah’s position that prohibited substances become permitted when they metamorphosize. Rabbeinu Yonah assumed that although honey has meat added to it, halachic practice still permits it. Thus, custom demonstrates that a transformed product is no longer viewed as its original source.

Although Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 467:8) permits honey purchased from a non-Jew on Pesach, he states that it is permitted, “because we do not assume that any problems occurred,” implying that he disagrees with Rabbeinu Yonah’s reason (Gra; Chok Yaakov). The Rama there prohibits this honey, so he certainly disputes Rabbeinu Yonah’s reason. This is further borne out by a ruling elsewhere in Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 114:12) where the Rama prohibits the use of saffron in places where wine or meat is added to it, even though it appears as pure saffron.

The Magen Avraham (216:3) cites proof against Rabbeinu Yonah from the Gemara (Bechoros 6b) that says it is a chiddush that the Torah permits milk, since it is formed from animal blood. Thus we see that had the Torah never permitted milk, we would consider it prohibited blood, despite its obvious physical change. Similarly, reasons Magen Avraham, musk should remain non-kosher despite its physical change, and also honey, or any other forbidden material that underwent a transformation.

Nevertheless, some poskim, including the Taz (Orach Chayim 216:2) and Elyah Rabbah (216:4), rule like Rabbeinu Yonah. How do they respond to Magen Avraham’s proof that milk would be prohibited as blood, despite its radical change, had the Torah not expressly permitted it?

Chok Yaakov (467:16) answers Magen Avraham’s question by pointing out that the Gemara’s question is whether the substance called “milk” is always non-kosher because milk originates as blood. Rabbeinu Yonah’s point is that a non-kosher substance that has transformed to a kosher substance is now treated as kosher.

As we mentioned before, although Shulchan Aruch, Rama, and Magen Avraham reject Rabbeinu Yonah’s approach permitting transformed substances, we find other later authorities permitting them. For example, Chasam Sofer (Shu’t Yoreh Deah #117) permits oil extracted from grape seeds retrieved from non-kosher wine because he considers the oil a new product. He bases his approach on the above-quoted Chok Yaakov, who permitted honey made from non-kosher substances.

Does this mean that the Chasam Sofer followed the analysis of the Chok Yaakov and completely rejected the decisions of Shulchan Aruch, Rama, and Magen Avraham? Not necessarily! Perhaps, he contends that Shulchan Aruch, Rama, and Magen Avraham reject Rabbeinu Yonah’s approach only when it comes to permitting something prohibited by the Torah, but would rely on it when it comes to rabbinic prohibitions, like stam yeinam.

This compromise position would diverge from the Taz and Chok Yaakov, who accepted Rabbeinu Yonah’s approach completely and permitted transformed substances, even when the potential prohibition was min haTorah (as did the Rosh in his Teshuvah).

Two later substantive halachic sources also permitted foods that transformed from rabbinically prohibited substances:

1. Rav Meir Arik permits drinking a coffee-type drink made from roasted dried grape seeds that were the byproducts of prohibited wine (Shu’t Imrei Yosher 2:140).

2. The Pri Megadim (Mishbetzos Zahav 216:2) implies that he would rely on Rabbeinu Yonah’s position when we are dealing with an issur derabbanan (although in Eishel Avraham [ad loc.] he implies that such a transformed substance is bateil in a mixture, but will maintain its prohibited identity if it was not bateil). The Mishnah Berurah (216:7) quotes the dispute among the poskim as to whether a transformed, prohibited substance becomes permitted. He then concludes that one may use musk as a flavoring agent, when it is less than one part in sixty in the final product. This demonstrates that he accepts the concept of “transformed food,” nishtanu, at least in regard to a rabbinic prohibition.

Many hechsherim permit use of kitniyos shenishtanu, reasoning that since the Mishnah Berurah permitted even a prohibited substance that has changed when its bitul is questionable, he would certainly permit kitniyos that changed, as this is a case that does not qualify even as a rabbinic prohibition. Upon this basis, many responsible hechsherim permit the use of enzymes, sweeteners, xanthan gum, and citric, ascorbic and erythorbic acid made from kitniyos.

Other contemporary poskim contend that although these products are kosher lepesach bedei’evid (after the fact), one should not lechatchilah arrange a hechsher upon this basis. Thus, the rav mentioned at the beginning of the article was upset that they relied lichatchilah on this lenience, feeling that it should be applied only bedei’evid.

BITUL OF KITNIYOS

There is another reason why these products may be eaten, even if one does not want to accept that kitniyos shenishtanu is permitted, or to permit it lichatchilah. The poskim dispute whether kitniyos prohibits other food in which it became mixed. Terumas HaDeshen (#113) prohibits eating food in which kitniyos became mixed. However, accepted practice is to follow the Rama (453:1) who permits it, even if the kitniyos percentage is substantive, as long as it is less than 50% (Chok Yaakov 453:6). Thus, even if we assume that a hechsher that permits kitniyos shenishtanu is mistaken, if one added kitniyos to one’s food by mistake, one may eat the resultant product. Many authorities rule that one may eat the finished product even if the kitniyos was added for flavor and even if added intentionally, provided it was added before Pesach (Shu’t Be’er Yitzchak #11). According to this approach, a sweetener made of kitniyos will not prohibit the final product, even if we assume that kitniyos shenishtanu is prohibited. Therefore, although the rav may be unhappy with Vitamin C derived originally from a kitniyos base as an ingredient in a Pesach product, one may certainly eat the final product.

This leads us directly to our second question above:

My sister married a Sefardi, who eats rice on Pesach. Does this mean that I will be unable to eat in their house on Pesach?

Although I have read responsa from contemporary Rabbonim requiring Ashkenazim to kasher pots used to cook kitniyos, this is by no means without question. As I mentioned above, kitniyos that fell by mistake into other Pesach-dik food becomes bateil, as long as the non-kitniyos food is the majority. Based on this, many authorities contend that Ashkenazim may cook in pots previously used for kitniyos, since whatever kitniyos flavor transferred to food cooked in the pots will certainly be nullified (Shu’t Zera Emes 3:48). Others prohibit using pots that absorbed kitniyos, stating that the minhag is to not use either the kitniyos food or the pots in which such food had been cooked (Shu’t Rav Pe’alim 3:30; Shu’t Maharam Shick, Orach Chayim #241). Still others follow a compromise position, ruling that one should not use the pots within 24 hours of cooking kitniyos, but permitting use of the pots after 24 hours without kashering (Kaf HaChayim 453:27).

By the way, many Sefardim do not eat kitniyos on Pesach, and many follow an approach that prohibits some kitniyos species. For example, most North African Sefardim (Moroccan, Algerian, Tunisian, and Egyptian) do not eat any kitniyos on Pesach, following the same custom as Ashkenazim; this was also the practice of many Turkish communities (Shu’t Lev Chayim 2:33). Although Iraqi communities usually ate kitniyos on Pesach, many families in Baghdad did not eat rice, and most did not eat chickpeas (Rav Pe’alim 3:30). Similarly, the Chida reports that the Sefardim in Yerushalayim, in his day, did not eat rice.

The last question raised above is:

“I grew up in a Sefardi home where we ate kitniyos, but have kept kitniyos, since I married an Ashkenazi man. We will be with my parents for Pesach, who now have two sets of Pesach pots, one set that they keep kitniyos free to accommodate the Ashkenazi family members. May I help my mother cook kitniyos food on Yom Tov that I may not eat?”

Although it should appear that there is no halachic issue here, there is indeed a discussion among poskim whether she may help her mother cook. Shu’t Zera Emes, authored by Rav Yishmael Cohen, an eighteenth century Italian posek of a community that did observe the prohibition of kitniyos, prohibits members of his community from cooking kitniyos for Sefardim who did not observe the custom. His reasoning is very instructive.

The Rama (527:20) quotes an early Ashkenazi posek, the Mahari Weil, who ruled that a person fasting on Yom Tov, perhaps because he had a bad dream, may not cook, either for himself or for someone else. The reasoning of the Mahari Weil is that cooking is actually prohibited on Yom Tov, just like every other melacha, and the Torah permits cooking and other food preparation only because Yom Tov is meant for enjoyment. But someone who is not eating on Yom Tov is treating the day as an other worldly day and therefore may not cook either for himself or for others.

Similarly, the Zera Emes reasons that someone who has accepted not to eat kitniyos may not cook them on Yom Tov, because as far as he is concerned, one may not eat these foods on Yom Tov. Once we have established that one may cook only if one may eat, the same logic dictates that one may cook only what one may eat. According to this line of reasoning, a cook who does not eat gebrochts may not cook gebrochst for a household that does.

However, there are grounds to be lenient and allow this woman to help her mother on Yom Tov, even with the kitniyos food. The Mishnah Berurah quotes several prominent poskim who dispute with Mahari Weil’s line of reasoning, contending that not being able to eat does not prohibit one from cooking on Yom Tov. Thus, a person who is fasting may cook, and certainly someone may cook food for other people, even if she does not eat it herself.

ARE WE FRUMMER?

One question often raised about kitniyos is:

If rice was kosher for Pesach in the days of Chazal, why must we be frumer than Chazal and prohibit what they permitted?

The Mordechai (Pesachim #588) raised this excellent question. He explains that in the days of Chazal, the general public was more knowledgeable and careful, and therefore there was no concern that someone would confuse kitniyos with chometz. Nowadays, however, we cannot allow room for error, since permitting rice and other kitniyos varieties may lead someone to a serious transgression.

CONCLUSION

The continuing prohibition against eating kitniyos applies because of the rule of al titosh Toras imecha, “do not forsake the teaching of your mother” (Mishlei 1:8); that is, customs accepted by the Jewish People (see Berachos 35b). In addition to keeping commandments of the Torah and the prohibitions instituted at the times of the Mishnah and Gemara, we are also required to observe those restrictions that Jewish communities accepted (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 214:2).

The Gemara (Berachos 35b) teaches that the pasuk (Mishlei 1:8) Listen my son …to the teaching of your mother refers to the practices accepted by the Jewish People. Just as a mother has an emotional, instinctive understanding of what is best for her children, Klal Yisroel inherently understands what is best for transmitting to its future generations the spirit of our mission in this world. Therefore, when Klal Yisroel, or a community of Klal Yisroel, adopts a minhag such as kitniyos, there is an inherent understanding of the need and value for this practice that transcends the more obvious reasons for customs. This is why practices such as kitniyos remain binding on the descendants of every member of a community who accepted it, even if its original rationale seems out of date. Wishing all a chag kosher vesomayach!

–
—
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Rabbi Kaganoff’s Divrei Torah" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to Kaganoff+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

Question #1: Writing in the Air

“May I communicate with someone on Shabbos by making the motions of writing the letters?”

Question #2: Frosty Writing

“May I write my initials on a frosty window on Shabbos?”

Question #3: Asking a Gentile to Write.

Elisheva plans to attend a seminar related to the latest advances in her profession as a speech therapist. Part of the seminar will be given on Shabbos. May she ask one of the non-Jews attending the class to take notes for her?

Writing and erasing are two of the thirty-nine melachos of Shabbos that were performed in the building of the Mishkan. Each board used in constructing the Mishkan was marked so that it would be returned to its correct place when the Mishkan was reassembled (Rashi, Shabbos 73a; Gemara, Shabbos 103b). (The Talmud Yerushalmi [Shabbos 12:3] emphasizes the importance of each board being kept in the same place.) The numbers written on the boards were also sometimes erased, if a mistake was made. Thus, both writing and erasing are included among the melachos, since any important activity performed while constructing the Mishkan defines a category of work prohibited on Shabbos (Bava Kama 2a).

It is important to note that the erasing performed in the Mishkan was done specifically with the intention of rewriting. For this reason, erasing is a violation min haTorah only if one intends to rewrite or intends to effect some other direct, positive result (Rambam, Hilchos Shabbos 11:9; however, cf. Tosafos, Shabbos 73a s.v. hakosheir.)

Other writing was performed in the Mishkan when the names of the shevatim were engraved on the choshen, and also when calculating the donations and where they were used (Shu’t Avnei Nezer, Orach Chayim 199:10). Since our parsha discusses the donations and the construction of the Mishkan and also discusses the writing on Luchos, we will avail ourselves of this opportunity to discuss some of the halachos that pertain to writing and erasing.

Writing, when it is written with a permanent ink or dye on a surface that will hold the writing permanently is prohibited on Shabbos min haTorah. If the writing will not last permanently, the prohibition to write or to erase is only miderabbanan.

WHAT IS CONSIDERED PERMANENT WRITING?

Some poskim contend that writing is permanent if it will last until after Shabbos (Rambam and Magid Mishnah, Hilchos Shabbos 9:13). Others contend that it is considered permanent if it lasts the length of time people usually write notes (Rashba, Shabbos 115b, cited by Bi’ur Halacha 340:4, s.v. Bemashkin). According to both opinions, writing that disappears after a few hours is prohibited only miderabbanan.

Writing on one’s hand is prohibited min haTorah, even though it eventually disappears (Mishnah, Shabbos 104b). This is because the writing, itself, would be permanent, if it were not for the body’s warmth dissolving the ink. It is therefore treated as if it has been written permanently and then subsequently erased by body temperature.

IS IT PERMITTED TO WRITE ON A FROSTY WINDOW?

Although the Torah’s prohibition is violated only with permanent writing, Chazal prohibited temporary writing. Therefore, it is prohibited to write in spilled liquid that is lying on the table, in sand, or in the frost on a window (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 340:4 and commentaries).

IS IT PROHIBITED TO WRITE LETTERS IN THE AIR?

This is permitted, since no letters are being formed at all, even temporarily (Rama 340:4).

DISAPPEARING INK

Question: I was once told that there is no Torah violation in writing a message on Shabbos with ink that appears now, but will disappear shortly. Is this true?

As we mentioned above, there is no Torah violation in writing with ink that will disappear within a few hours. This halacha has major ramifications when dealing with the needs of a Jewish hospital. Recording data is necessary, but if disappearing ink is used until after Shabbos, the prohibition is only miderabbanan. Poskim rely on this, if a hospital cannot employ sufficient non-Jewish staff.

INVISIBLE INK

Does writing with an ink that cannot be read violate Shabbos?

Although it would seem that this is a modern shailah and a modern invention, we will be surprised to discover that this shailah is at least 1,800 years old. The Gemara tells us the following story, “Rabbi Chiyah bar Abba said ‘The people who live in the East are very clever. When they want to send a secret, they write the message with “Mei milin” (an ink that is not automatically legible). Subsequently, they pour a specially formulated ink on the paper, and presto! The message becomes legible!’” (Yerushalmi, Shabbos, Chapter 12).

The Gemara then asks, “If someone wrote this way on Shabbos, has he violated a Torah prohibition?” The Gemara concludes that pouring the ink violates a Torah prohibition on Shabbos because this makes the writing legible. Whether the first step violates Shabbos is disputed by the poskim. Shu’t Har Tzvi (Yoreh Deah 230) rules that it is prohibited min haTorah, whereas Pri Megadim (340:3 in Mishbetzos Zahav) rules that it is prohibited only miderabbanan.

This dispute has an interesting ramification. If this writing is prohibited only miderabbanan, writing that cannot be read immediately does not violate a Torah violation. Therefore, taking a photograph on film or recording information on a computer disk does not violate Shabbos min haTorah (Har Tzvi).

PHOTOGRAPHY ON CHOL HAMOED

Another difference in halacha between these poskim would be whether taking photographs is permitted on Chol HaMoed. In general, one is prohibited on Chol HaMoed from doing activities considered melacha unless they fulfill some Yom Tov or Chol HaMoed need, or they will avert financial loss. These rules notwithstanding, it would appear that according to Pri Megadim, one would be permitted to take photos on Chol HaMoed, since there is no melacha being performed. It would seem that this leniency would not exist according to Har Tzvi, and photography would be permitted on Chol HaMoed only if it somehow enhances the Yom Tov. According to both opinions, developing the photographs would not be permitted on Chol HaMoed, unless Yom Tov was thereby enhanced.

LET THEM EAT CAKE

Is it permitted on Shabbos to eat cake that has icing in the form of letters on top, since I am erasing the letters when I eat it?

Again, a seemingly very contemporary shailah goes back hundreds of years. The rishonim record a Shavuos celebration, for which cakes were decorated with the letters of the alef-beis and certain tefillos and words of bracha. In a special Shavuos ceremony, these cakes were served to the young children who were just beginning to learn Torah. The children would read the letters and the brachos, and then they would be rewarded by being served the special cake (Rokei’ach #296). The question was why eating the letters does not violate erasing on Yom Tov, since writing and erasing is prohibited on Yom Tov, just as it is on Shabbos (Mordechai, Shabbos #369).

Various reasons are suggested why this minhag does not violate the halacha. Some contend that eating is not considered an act of erasing (Taz 340:2), whereas others contend that the melacha of erasing does not apply to food (Shu’t Maharshag 2:41).

Others permit eating the cake for a more complicated reason that requires an introduction. Although eating the cake must result in the erasure of the letters, the person eating did not have intention of erasing. This is halachically categorized as a situation of a “psik reisha,” meaning that a prohibited consequence will definitely result from an act that is otherwise permitted. A psik reisha is usually prohibited; thus, in this case, although eating the cake would otherwise be permitted, its consequence, the erasing, is problematic.

Although a psik reisha is usually prohibited, when combined with other mitigating factors it is sometimes permitted. In this instance, there are several different reasons why no melacha min haTorah applies. Although the activity should still be prohibited miderabbanan, when several such mitigating factors combine, we are lenient.

The rationale behind this “heter” is that Chazal forbade certain activities to prevent one from violating, chas veshalom, a Torah law. However, when there are several different reasons why the Torah law is not violated, there is no need to prohibit this activity.

When someone eats letters, there are three different mitigating factors, each of which, on its own, removes the erasing from being a Torah violation.

First, the Torah law of erasing on Shabbos is violated only when one intends to write on the erasure, as mentioned above. Obviously, someone who eats letters cannot subsequently write on the “erasure.”

Second, Torah laws are violated only when the melacha has a positive result. In the case of erasing, a positive result would be that one can now write on the erasure, or that a mezuzah is rendered valid by the erasure. However, eating the cake does not result in any positive results from the erasure.

Third, this is not the way one usually erases. The halacha is that doing any melacha in an atypical way lessens the prohibition from a Torah violation to a Rabbinic injunction.

Therefore, since the erasing is unintentional, performed not in order to write, destructive, and an unusual way to erase, the resultant indirect erasing is permitted. This is the rationale applied by many poskim to explain the Shavuos custom cited above. According to this approach, it is permitted to eat the icing on a cake that includes lettering, without concern over whether one is changing or rendering the letters illegible in the process.

However, others rule that, although one should not eat these pieces of cake, it is permitted to serve the cake to the children and allow them to eat it themselves (Mordechai, Shabbos #369). Halachically, I need not prevent a young child from doing a prohibited activity for his own benefit (Yevamos 114a). According to this approach, only a child would be permitted to eat the letters on the cake, but not an adult (Rama 340:3).

Mishnah Berurah follows a compromise position between these two opinions, permitting someone to eat the cake while disregarding where the letters are, but suggesting that, when slicing the cake, one should cut between the letters and not through a letter. As we will explain, cutting between the letters is not considered erasing according to most opinions.

MAKING AN IMPRINT IN LIFE

Most shoes and boots have a manufacturer’s trademark or name engraved on the heel. Is it permitted to traverse snow or mud on Shabbos, knowing that I am making an imprint while I walk? Isn’t this writing on Shabbos?

The contemporary poskim discuss this shailah, and permit it for the same reasons that one was permitted to eat the lettering on the cake. For one thing, I am not intending to write; and for a second, it is not the normal way of writing letters; and for a third, most people consider the imprint in the mud or snow to be “damaging.” There is another mitigating factor here, in that the writing is temporary. Since walking is more of a necessity than eating cake, the poskim rule that one is permitted to walk on snow or mud and ignore the imprint made by the shoe or boot.

WHAT AN EXQUISITE MOUTH-WRITING YOU HAVE!

The following tshuvah shows up in early sixteenth century halachic literature. A scribe was writing exquisitely beautiful sifrei Torah, tefillin and mezuzos. Unfortunately, this scribe had lost his hand in an accident and had taught himself how to write beautiful graphics with his quill in his mouth. Certainly, the he was an incredibly talented individual, and many people were using sifrei Torah, tefillin and mezuzos written by this scribe. However, the shailah was raised as to whether these were kosher.

A great posek of the era, Rav Menachem Azaryah of Fanu (Shu’t # 38) ruled that all the sifrei Torah, tefillin and mezuzos written by this scribe were invalid. His reasoning is that halacha recognizes only items written with one’s stronger hand. For this reason, someone who places a quill in his mouth on Shabbos and writes has not violated a Torah prohibition, since this is not the way people usually write (Mishnah Shabbos 104b). (It is prohibited miderabbanan to write this way on Shabbos.) Thus, even if someone has taught himself how to write beautifully by holding the pen in his mouth, it is not considered writing by the Torah, and does not fulfill the mitzvah of “writing” sifrei Torah, tefillin and mezuzos.

Similarly, writing done by a right-handed person who writes with his left hand is not considered writing. For this reason, the Gemara rules that someone who writes with his left hand has not violated a Torah prohibition of writing on Shabbos (Shabbos 103a). (Again, this is prohibited miderabbanan.)

A WRITING COURSE

At this point, I would like to address the last of our opening questions: Elisheva plans to attend a seminar related to the latest advances in her profession as a speech therapist. Part of the seminar will be given on Shabbos. May she ask one of the non-Jews attending the class to take notes for her?

According to most poskim, this is prohibited on Shabbos or Yom Tov, since a Jew may not ask a non-Jew to do work for him that would be prohibited min haTorah for a Jew. This is because the non-Jew becomes your agent, and you are not permitted to have an agent work for you on Shabbos, even if the agent is not Jewish. Thus, it appears that Elisheva will not be able to have notes taken for her by her non-Jewish colleague.

However, according to the Minchas Yitzchak, there is a very simple solution to this problem. If Elisheva pays the non-Jew to do the work and specifies that it makes no difference whether the non-Jew performs the work on Shabbos or a weekday, then there is no halachic problem at all, even if the non-Jew did the work on Shabbos or Yom Tov. The reason is that once you pay the non-Jew, he is no longer working as your agent, because he has his own interest in doing the work. I am still not permitted to ask him to do the work specifically on Shabbos, but as long as he has the option to do the work on a different day, there is no problem if he actually does it on Shabbos (Shu’t Minchas Yitzchak 5:36).

CONCLUSION

Creating a beautiful Shabbos entails much planning and organization. The melachos of writing are a prime example of how a person must be fluent in all the halachos of Shabbos in order to understand its far reaching ramifications. Studying all the melachos of Shabbos helps us appreciate Shabbos more, and to get the maximum joy out of this special day.

Before I begin this week’s article, I just wanted to share with everyone that my Hebrew responsa, most of which is available on the website in an almost unusable format, are now being edited with the hope that they will be available in the summer in a much more useful format.

Also, for those who asked again, the link to order Buffalo Burgers is:

http://www.judaicapress.com/From-Buffalo-Burgers-to-Monetary-Mysteries.html

In honor of Parshas Tetzaveh, I present:

Since the laws of Shabbos are derived from the building of the mishkan and the manufacture of the clothing of the kohanim, I thought this to be a good week to discuss:

May one Shower on Shabbos?

By Rabbi Yirmiyohu Kaganoff

Question #1: May someone soak an infected toe in hot water on Shabbos?

Question #2: May I take a quick dip in the pool on a Shabbos when it is 105 degrees in the shade?

Question #3: Is bathing on Shabbos permitted to alleviate a minor skin condition?

Answer:

Although most people assume that one may not shower on Shabbos, there actually are some situations when one may. Factors one must take into consideration include:

I. Is one taking a bath or a shower?

II. Is the water hot or cold?

III. Does one want to ease a medical need or a degree of discomfort?

IV. How does the water heating system work?

V. Is one a Sefardi or an Ashkenazi!

The interplay of all these factors makes this a highly interesting subject.

WHY YOU SHOULD NOT TAKE A BATH!

The Gemara (Shabbos 40a) records a dispute between the early Amora’im (Talmidei Chachamim of the period of the Gemara), Rav and Shmuel, concerning bathing on Shabbos. Although both scholars agree that one may not bathe in the regular manner on Shabbos, Rav permits bathing on Shabbos, as long as one does not submerge his entire body at once, but only part at a time. Shmuel disagrees, contending that one may not wash more than half of one’s body (as explained by Magen Avraham 326:2). (Most poskim contend that one may wash on Shabbos only with water heated before Shabbos [Magen Avraham 326:6; Gra to 326:5; Aruch HaShulchan, Orach Chayim 326:2. However, Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 1:126, disagrees.])

One might ask:

Since bathing is not one of the 39 melachos that the Torah prohibited on Shabbos, why can’t one take a relaxing Shabbos bath?

HISTORY OF A TAKANAH

Although Torah law permits bathing, Chazal prohibited bathing in hot water on Shabbos, because it could lead to Shabbos desecration. The Gemara (Shabbos 40a) narrates the following historical account of the ban:

Initially, one was permitted to bathe in water that was heated before Shabbos. Then, the bathhouse owners began to heat water on Shabbos (to generate business), claiming that the water had been heated before Shabbos. In order to stop this practice, the Sages prohibited bathing in hot water on Shabbos, but permitted entering a steam bath on Shabbos. However, people who did not listen to the Sages began to take hot baths on Shabbos, claiming that they had only used the steam bath. (In those days, both activities were performed in a commercial bathhouse.) To enforce their ruling, the Sages then prohibited entering a steam bath as well, but permitted bathing in natural hot springs. When some people continued to violate the instructions of the Sages by bathing in hot water and claiming that they had used water from hot springs, the Sages then banned bathing in any hot water, even hot springs, but permitted bathing in cold water. After a while, the Sages realized that this was an unbearable hardship and rescinded the ban against bathing in hot springs, while retaining the prohibition against steam baths and bathing in hot water (Shabbos 40a).

In conclusion, we see that the Sages banned bathing on Shabbos, even in water heated before Shabbos, lest bathhouse owners and managers encourage business by heating water on Shabbos. In order to maintain this initial injunction, Chazal initially prohibited attending the steam bath and bathing in hot springs, but eventually rescinded the latter prohibition. Thus, one may not bathe or steam bathe on Shabbos, even with water heated before Shabbos. The authorities dispute whether one may enter a steam bath if one is not intending to bathe there even if one will begin perspiring while there, the Shulchan Aruch ruling leniently, whereas the Rama rules stringently (Orach Chayim 326:12).

Rav and Shmuel, whom we quoted above, interpreted the above takanah against bathing in different ways, Rav limiting the ban to washing one’s entire body at one time, because this is the usual way of bathing. However, he permits bathing in an unusual way such as by not submerging oneself completely in water and washing only part of the body at a time. Shmuel feels that since he is still bathing his entire body, this is included in the ban, although he agrees that washing less than half one’s body is permitted. The halacha follows Shmuel, and therefore one may bathe only part of one’s body in preheated hot water on Shabbos.

DEFINE BATHING

What about pouring water over yourself? Is this included within the category of bathing that is prohibited, or is it permitted (Rashi, Shabbos 147b s.v. dilihishtateif)?

The Gemara (Shabbos 39b) records a three-way dispute among Tanna’im (earlier halachic authorities of the time of the Mishnah) regarding this question. Rabbi Meir prohibited pouring either hot or cold water over oneself; Rabbi Shimon permitted both; whereas Rabbi Yehudah, the compromise opinion, permitted cold water but prohibited hot. The poskim dispute precisely what case these great Sages were debating. According to some opinions (Baal HaMaor), the Gemara is discussing someone who heated himself to a sweat in front of a fire, similar to taking a sauna, and then rinsed himself off. Only then did the Tanna’im dispute what is prohibited.

According to this approach, all three Tanna’im permit pouring cold water over oneself on Shabbos, if one did not first warm himself. In addition, all three Tanna’im permit standing in front of an open fire in order to develop a healthy sweat on Shabbos. Although Chazal prohibited entering a steam bath on Shabbos, they did not prohibit standing in front of an open flame where no steam is created. Presumably, this was not a common method of steam bathing, and therefore no concern existed that it would cause bathhouse attendants to desecrate Shabbos. The dispute among the Tanna’im is whether one may stand in front of a blaze until one develops a sweat and then rinse it off on Shabbos. According to Rabbi Meir, this rinsing violates the prohibition against bathing since one is washing off sweat. Rabbi Yehudah prohibits this rinsing if performed with hot water but permits cold, whereas Rabbi Shimon permits even a hot rinse, and certainly a cold one. According to this interpretation of the dispute, all three Tanna’im permit a cold shower on Shabbos.

However, most authorities explain the dispute among the Tanna’im somewhat differently, contending that it includes any case where someone is rinsing himself on Shabbos and is not limited to someone rinsing off sweat (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 326:1). According to this approach, Rabbi Meir prohibits rinsing in either hot or cold water; Rabbi Yehudah prohibits rinsing with hot water but permits cold; and Rabbi Shimon permits even a hot water rinse. Thus, according to Rabbi Shimon, one may take a hot shower on Shabbos, because the prohibition against bathing was limited to someone sitting in a bath; according to Rabbi Meir, even cold rinsing is included in the prohibition and certainly hot; and according to Rabbi Yehudah, one may take a cold shower, but not a hot one.

May we follow Rabbi Shimon’s opinion and shower on Shabbos in hot water?

No! Halacha follows Rabbi Yehudah’s opinion prohibiting a hot rinse, but permitting a cold one (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 326:1, 4).

Nevertheless, we should at least be permitted to take a cold shower on Shabbos! Isn’t that a great way to begin the Shabbos day! Yet we know that the custom is not to shower on Shabbos. We will soon explain the basis for this custom. But first, I must digress to discuss an exception to the ban against bathing on Shabbos.

MITZTA’EIR – ALLOWING A SUFFERER TO BATHE

Based on some insightful analysis, several prominent authorities demonstrate that someone who is suffering may bathe on Shabbos even in hot water, provided the water was heated before Shabbos (Shu’t Divrei Yosef #64; Rabbi Akiva Eiger in his comments to Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 307:5 and 326:1). This is based on the halacha that although one may not usually ask a gentile to perform prohibited work on Shabbos, one may do so under certain extenuating circumstances. For example, one may ask a gentile to do something for the sake of a person ill enough to be bedridden (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 328:17).

When the Rambam lists activities that one may ask a gentile to perform on Shabbos, he includes having him transport hot water so that a person who is suffering may bathe (Hilchos Shabbos 6:9-10). The Divrei Yosef and Rabbi Akiva Eiger raise the following question: “What can the sufferer do with the hot water, seeing that Chazal prohibited bathing in hot water on Shabbos?” Obviously, although Chazal banned bathing on Shabbos, they only prohibited pleasure and hygienic bathing but permitted bathing to alleviate suffering. Thus, someone who is suffering or has a medical condition that is alleviated by bathing may ease his or her discomfort on Shabbos with a hot bath.

TWO MODERN HOT WATER PROBLEMS

I. MODERN HOT WATER BOILERS

However, this psak halacha does not help most North Americans, since most household water heating systems operate with a boiler that automatically replaces hot water with cold as you use it. This means that when one bathes, showers, or simply turns on the hot water on Shabbos, one is heating new water. Although some authorities permit using these systems on Shabbos because they consider it to be indirect heating of the water (grama) and unintentional (eino miskavein) (Divrei David, Chapter 87), most halachic authorities do not permit turning on the hot water on Shabbos. Nevertheless, someone who is suffering and would like to take hot baths on Shabbos may consider installing a heating system that does not heat new water when operated.

(By the way, many hotels, hospitals, dormitories and similar facilities use a coil system to heat water that is even more problematic, since it heats the water that you are about to use when you turn on the faucet. This system constitutes a clear Torah violation of cooking on Shabbos.)

II. MIXING HOT AND COLD WATER

Nowadays, using the hot water generally means turning a faucet dial that draws both hot and cold water which mix in the faucet or pipe. If the hot water heats the cold water to yad soledes bo (usually assumed to be 113 degrees Fahrenheit), one has violated Shabbos by cooking the cold water. Thus, anyone taking a bath must also be certain to avoid heating cold water to this temperature on Shabbos.

At this point, we can discuss some of the questions asked above:

If someone has an infected toe, may he soak it in hot water on Shabbos?

May someone bathe on Shabbos to alleviate a minor medical condition?

Soaking an infected toe or finger can be accomplished with water from the urn or kettle and certainly may be performed on Shabbos. Bathing or showering for a medical reason may be performed as long as one does not heat any new water in the boiler, the pipes or the faucet. If the person is ill enough to be considered bedridden, one may ask a non-Jew to turn on the water for the bath or shower, and the patient would now be permitted to bathe in the water. (One should ask a shaylah whether he may turn off the water afterwards by himself [see Orchos Shabbos, Chapter 1 footnote 199].) One may certainly bathe or shower in cold water for a medical reason, even if not bedridden.

WHY DID YOU SAY ONLY FOR A MEDICAL REASON?

As mentioned above, the halacha follows the opinion of Rabbi Yehudah who permitted rinsing oneself in cold water on Shabbos. Therefore, it should be permitted to take a cold shower or bath on Shabbos. Indeed, according to the conclusion of the Gemara, there is nothing wrong with bathing in cold water on Shabbos. However, early Ashkenazic poskim record a custom not to bathe in cold water due to a variety of reasons, including that one might carry (if one bathed outdoors in an area without an eruv) or squeeze water out of one’s hair or towel (Magen Avraham 326:8). This is established Ashkenazic custom, that, except for tevilah in a mikvah, one does not bathe on Shabbos. Why should this be true if the Gemara is lenient?

THE POWER OF MINHAG

The term minhag, usually translated as custom, actually includes many different categories, some of relatively minor halachic significance, and others of major importance.

The following story (Pesachim 50b) demonstrates the power of minhag: “The people of Beishan (a town in the north of Israel) had a custom that they did not travel from Tyre to Sidon on Friday, even though it was the local market day. They asked Rabbi Yochanan whether they were still required to observe this practice, claiming that the earlier generation who established this custom was wealthier and could manage without the income from Friday’s market day, whereas they were now hard-pressed financially and unable to support their families without this additional income. Rabbi Yochanan required them to continue observing the minhag established by their parents, citing the pasuk, Shma bni musar avicha ve’al titosh toras imecha, “Listen my son to the discipline of your father and do not forsake the teaching of your mother” (Mishlei 1:8): Once a community accepted a practice, even those born after the custom was established are obligated to observe it.

Another example is the observance of two days of Yom Tov in chutz la’aretz. This is actually a minhag, although one who violates it is strictly censured. Similarly, an Ashkenazi who eats kitniyos on Pesach violates a severe prohibition, even though he is technically violating only a minhag. According to many poskim, violating a minhag of this nature incurs a Torah violation, since it is halachically equivalent to a vow (Aruch HaShulchan, Orach Chayim 453:4; 551:23).

Similarly, Ashkenazic Jews accepted a minhag to not bathe even in cold water on Shabbos because of the above-mentioned concerns. (Even following Ashkenazic practice, it is prohibited only to bathe all or most of one’s entire body, but one may wash less than half one’s body.) Sefardim never accepted this minhag, and may therefore take a lukewarm or cold bath or shower on Shabbos. They should, of course, be careful not to squeeze out hair or a towel.

WHAT ABOUT A COLD SHOWER

Even though Ashkenazim accepted the custom not to bathe in cold water on Shabbos, some poskim rule that the prohibition includes only bathing on Shabbos, but not showering. In truth, some of the reasons quoted by the Magen Avraham apply to cold showers also, since one might squeeze out one’s hair or the towel whether one is bathing or showering, whereas the other reason mentioned, that one might by mistake carry on Shabbos, applies only to someone who bathes outdoors, and applies less to someone who showers indoors.

In his teshuvah on the subject, Rav Moshe Feinstein concludes that, although some authorities might permit cold showering on Shabbos, one should not follow this leniency, since it violates accepted practice (Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 4:75). However, one who is mitzta’eir may take a cold shower, since the custom mentioned by the Magen Avraham does not apply. Furthermore, Rav Moshe permits taking a cold shower on Shabbos during a heat wave (Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 4:74:rechitzah:3).

Thus we can answer the following question also:

May someone bathe or rinse themselves on Shabbos because they are uncomfortable, such as on a Shabbos when it is 105 degrees in the shade?

Someone who is mitzta’eir from his current physical condition may take a cold bath or shower if it will alleviate his discomfort. A Sefardi is permitted to take a cold shower or bath on Shabbos under any circumstances.

Conclusion:

These halachos include three levels of halachic observance: Torah law (not to heat water on Shabbos), Rabbinic Law (not to bathe in hot water lest it cause Shabbos desecration), and minhag (not to bathe in cold water, also lest it cause Shabbos desecration). This provides us with an opportunity to observe Shabbos on many levels, expressing our appreciation for its kedusha.

–
—
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Rabbi Kaganoff’s Divrei Torah" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to Kaganoff+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.