Well, not quite thin air, because plants, like the rest of us, require nutrients and water to grow. Although the word “aeroponics” does not show up in either of the dictionaries I use for handy reference, and is totally ignored by my spellchecker, it is actually common enough that it should be appearing in any current dictionary of the English language. I admit that I had no idea what the word meant when Yehudah asked me the following shaylah:

“To overcome the many problems that may be involved in purchasing products during shmittah, we want to purchase a large aeroponics kit and grow our own vegetables. Will this present us with any halachic problems in terms of either the laws of shmittah, or the laws of kilayim?”

And so I began my education about this subject. This is what I discovered:

Aeroponics is a method of growing vegetables or herbs without soil by spraying the plant roots with water and nutrients (as opposed to hydroponics where the roots are submerged in a nutrient solution). Although it can be done on a commercial scale, the company Yehudah contacted sells aeroponic kits for growing herbs and vegetables in the comfort of one’s home. Each kit includes the seeds and nutrients required for specific types of plants, a complete self-contained open-top growing tank that includes its own light fixtures, and instructions on how to make it all work. Just add water and electricity to run the pump and lights.

The company advises growing lettuce, herbs, tomatoes, peppers, or strawberries each in its own tank since they have quite different needs. Even so, it is possible that one might plant different varieties or species that are halachically kilayim close enough together to involve a shaylah of kilayim.

WHAT IS KILAYIM?

It is important to clarify a common misconception. The prohibition of kilayim is not the creation of a new species; it is the mere appearance that one is mingling two species together. This is why hauling loads with two species of animal, grafting different tree species together, mixing wool and linen in a garment, or planting grains in a vineyard, are all Torah violations of kilayim although these acts do not affect the genetic make-up of the species.

Yehudah’s question involves two halachic topics:

I. Kilayim

Could his desktop garden possibly violate the mitzvah of kilei zera’im, which prohibits planting two species together or near one another? Violating this prohibition requires three basic conditions, all of which Yehudah met:

A. The prohibition applies to herbaceous, as opposed to woody plants, meaning that it does not apply to trees and shrubs, but it does apply to vegetables and many herbs. Thus, one may plant seeds of different trees together, yet one is forbidden to plant a mix of vegetable seeds (Rambam, Hilchos Kilayim 1:6).

B. The prohibition of kilei zera’im applies only to edible crops (Rambam, Hilchos Kilayim 1:4). Thus, one may plant seeds of different ornamental flowers and grasses within close proximity.

C. It applies only in Eretz Yisroel (Gemara Kiddushin 39a), and is min haTorah according to most halachic authorities even today (implied by Rambam, Hilchos Kilayim 1:1). (However, note that Rashi [Shabbos 84a] contends that kilei zera’im is prohibited only midirabbanan, and Tosafos [Yevamos 81a s.v. mai] contends it is only rabbinic in our era because most of the Jewish people do not currently live in Eretz Yisroel.) Therefore, someone in Chutz La’Aretz may plant his backyard garden with a wide variety of herbs and vegetables without any concern for how close they are, whereas in Eretz Yisroel, someone planting a garden patch must be very careful to keep the different species separate (Rambam, Hilchos Kilayim 1:3). I will discuss later how far apart one must plant two species to avoid violating this prohibition (see Chazon Ish, Hil. Kilayim 6:1).

II. Shmittah

One may not plant in Eretz Yisroel during shmittah. Does planting this indoor garden in Eretz Yisroel violate the laws of shmittah?

Yehuda’s question requires analyzing the following subjects:

Do these mitzvos apply when planting indoors?

Would they apply when planting outdoors in a pot or planter that is disconnected from the ground?

Do they apply when one is not planting in soil?

INDOORS

Two Talmudic passages discuss whether agricultural mitzvos apply indoors. One occurs in Eruvin (93a), which prohibits planting grain in a vineyard planted underneath a roof that extends from a house. This passage implies that agricultural mitzvos apply within physical structures.

On the other hand, Talmud Yerushalmi (Orlah 1:2) discusses whether three agricultural mitzvos, orlah (the prohibition to use fruit produced in the first three years of a tree’s life), maaser (tithing produce), and shmittah, apply to indoor plants. The Yerushalmi rules that whereas orlah applies, there is no requirement to separate maaser on produce grown indoors. The Yerushalmi questions whether shmittah applies to indoor produce, but does not clearly conclude whether it applies or not.

WHY IS ORLAH DIFFERENT FROM MAASER?

The Yerushalmi notes that when the Torah instructs us to separate maaser, it states: You shall tithe all the produce of your planting, that which your field produces each year (Devarim 14:22). Since the Torah only requires maaser on produce of a field, there is no requirement to separate maaser from what grows indoors, since, by definition, a field is outside. Therefore, one need not separate maaser min haTorah when planting inside a structure even if one is planting directly in the soil floor of the structure. (The Rishonim dispute whether there is a rabbinic requirement to separate terumos and maasros when planting in the ground within a building, see Rambam and Raavad, Hilchos Maasros 1:10.)

However, when the Torah describes the mitzvah of orlah, it introduces the subject by stating When you will enter the Land (VaYikra 19:23). A tree planted indoors is definitely in the Land of Israel, and thus is included within the parameters of this mitzvah, even if it is not considered a field.

SHMITTAH INDOORS

Do the laws of shmittah apply to produce grown indoors? Does shmittah apply only to a field, or to anything planted in the Land of Israel?

The Yerushalmi notes that when the Torah discusses the mitzvah of shmittah, it uses both terms, land (VaYikra 25:2) and field (VaYikra 25:4). It is unclear how the Yerushalmi concludes and the poskim dispute whether the mitzvah of shmittah applies indoors in Eretz Yisroel. Ridbaz (Hilchos Shvi’is end of Chapter 1), Chazon Ish, Shvi’is 22, and Pnei Moshe all rule that it does; Pe’as HaShulchan (20:52) rules that it does not. Most later authorities conclude that one should not plant indoors during shmittah, at least not in the soil. I will discuss shortly whether one may plant during shmittah indoors hydroponically or with a covered floor.

INDOOR KILAYIM

May one plant different species next to one another indoors? Does the prohibition of kilayim apply to produce planted under a roof?

Based on the Talmud Yerushalmi we quoted above, we should be able to establish the following rule:

Where the Torah commands that a mitzvah applies to the land, it applies whether the planting is indoors or outdoors, whereas when the Torah commands that a mitzvah applies to a field¸ it does not apply indoors. As noted above, an indoor area can never be called a field.

How does the Torah describe the mitzvah of kilei zera’im? The Torah states “you shall not plant kilayim in your field” (VaYikra 19:19), implying that the mitzvah does not apply indoors. Thus, we should conclude that there should be not prohibition min haTorah in planting herbs or vegetables proximately if they are indoors. (Nevertheless, both the Yeshuos Molko [Hil. Kilayim 1:1] and the Chazon Ish rule that kilei zera’im does apply indoors and apparently disagree with the above analysis. I will take this into consideration later.) However, it is probably prohibited midirabbanan according to the Rambam’s opinion that the Sages required tithing produce grown indoors.

BUT…

At this point, the discerning reader will note a seeming discrepancy based on the Talmudic passage that I cited earlier. The Gemara rules that one may not plant grain in a roofed vineyard, implying that kilayim does apply indoors. This seemingly conflicts with my conclusion that one may plant different herbs or vegetables proximately indoors without violating the prohibition of kilayim.

THE SOLUTION: GRAPES VERSUS VEGETABLES

The answer is that there is a major halachic difference between the two cases: Planting grain in a roofed vineyard violates kilei hakerem, planting other crops in a vineyard. Although both kilei hakerem and kilei zera’im are called kilayim, kilei hakerem is a separate mitzvah and is derived from a different pasuk than kilei zera’im, planting herbaceous species together. The Torah commands us about kilei hakerem by stating: “You shall not plant your vineyard with kilayim (Devorim 22:9), using the word vineyard, not field. Whereas a field cannot be indoors, the Gemara teaches that a vineyard could be.

At this point, we have resolved the first of our questions asked above:

“Do these mitzvos apply when planting in a covered area?”

The answer is that planting kilayim species should seemingly not apply, although some prominent authorities disagree. Shmittah does apply according to most poskim.

FLOWERPOTS

We now progress to our next question:

Do agricultural mitzvos apply to plants growing in closed pots and planters in Eretz Yisroel that are separated from the ground and yet exposed to the elements?

The Mishnah (Shabbos 95a) teaches that someone who plants in a flowerpot that has a hole in its bottom, called an atzitz nakuv, violates Shabbos as if he planted in the earth itself. However, planting in a flowerpot that is fully closed underneath, called an atzitz she’aino nakuv, is forbidden only because of rabbinic injunction and does not involve a Torah-prohibited violation of Shabbos. The same categories usually apply to other agricultural mitzvos: plants in a pot with a hole in the bottom are equivalent to being in the ground itself; those whose bottom is completely sealed are included in agricultural mitzvos by rabbinic injunction.

Therefore, one must separate terumah and maaser from produce grown in pots or planters, whether or not the containers are completely closed underneath, and one would violate kilayim if one planted two species together.

(There are some exceptions to this rule. According to the Rambam [Hilchos Maaser Sheni 10:8] and Shulchan Aruch [Yoreh Deah 294:26], orlah applies min haTorah to a tree planted in a closed flowerpot. The reason for this phenomenon is that a tree root will, with time, perforate the bottom of its pot, and therefore it is already considered to have a hole and be part of the ground below. There are also poskim who contend that shmittah does not apply at all, even midirabbanan, to items planted in a planter or flowerpot whose bottom is completely closed.)

SHMITTAH IN A HOTHOUSE

What happens if you plant in a covered area in a pot that is completely closed underneath? May one be lenient since the pot is both indoors and is also an atzitz she’aino nakuv, which is not considered connected to the earth min haTorah? This question leads us directly to the following question that Israeli farmers asked about sixty years ago: May one plant in a hothouse during shmittah in a closed bottom vessel? As I mentioned above, although some authorities permit planting in the soil indoors during shmittah, the consensus is to be more stringent. However, many poskim permit planting in pots in a hothouse if its floor is covered with a thick material, such as heavy plastic or metal (see Chazon Ish, Shvi’is 26:4; Mishpatei Aretz pg.239; however, cf. Shu”t Shevet HaLevi who prohibits this).

AEROPONICS AND SHMITTAH

Based on the above discussion, we may conclude that most authorities contend that there is no shmittah violation to plant aeroponically provided that the bottoms of the tanks are metal or plastic.

We still need to explore whether desktop planting may violate the laws of kilei zera’im?

I concluded above that there is probably only a rabbinic prohibition of kilei zera’im on indoor planting, but that some prominent authorities prohibit it min haTorah. Can we offer a solution for Yehudah’s plans? To answer this we need to address another issue.

KEEP YOUR DISTANCE

As I mentioned in the beginning of this article, kilayim occurs when different species are mingled together. If there is enough distance between the plants, there will clearly be no mingling.

How far apart must I plant herbs or vegetables to avoid violating kilayim? The poskim dispute this issue, and there are complications involving how and what one is planting. I will however, go directly to the conclusion that affects our case.

Since the desktop garden involves only herbs and vegetables and only a single plant or a few plants of each species, the halacha requires only a relatively small distance between species. The poskim dispute whether one is required to plant at least three tefachim apart [about ten inches] (Rashi, Shabbos 85a) or it is sufficient for the plants to be only 1½ tefachim apart [about five inches] (Rambam, Hil. Kilayim 4:9; Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 297:5). Min haTorah one is required to plant only one tefach apart, the additional space requirement is rabbinic (see Rambam, Hil. Kilayim 3:10). Furthermore, since the tanks are completely closed underneath, they have the halachic status of atzitz she’aino nakuv, a closed pot or planter, which are considered part of the ground only because of rabbinic injunction, but not min haTorah. We can therefore conclude that as long as the seeds are placed more than a tefach apart we avoid any Torah prohibition. As far as the possible rabbinic prohibition if the plants are only a bit more that one tefach apart, we could additionally rely on the likelihood that kilei zera’im does not apply indoors in an aino nakuv planter.

Having completed the halachic research, we corresponded with the company that produces the desktop planting kits, asking them how far apart are the holes in which one “plants” the seeds, and how many different herbs and vegetables can be planted in a single tank.

The company replied that the kit usually has seven holes, each four inches apart center to center. When planting peppers and tomatoes, which grow larger than the greens or herbs, the company recommends plugging four of the holes and using only three, which are far enough apart to avoid any kilayim issue according to our conclusion. However, when planting herbs and greens, the distance between the holes is just about the distance that might present a halachic problem. I therefore advised Yehudah to plant in alternative holes even when planting herbs.

Having concluded that there is no problem from either shmittah or kilayim with growing one’s vegetables aeroponically, we now face a different shaylah: Does one recite borei pri ha’adamah before consuming vegetables grown in thin air, or does one recite shehakol? But the discussion of that shaylah will need to wait for a future article.

SHMITTAH, KILAYIM AND SHABBOS BREISHIS

Both the laws of shmittah and those of kilayim have sources in Shabbos Breishis; shmittah because it is the seventh year, and thus is the land’s observance of Shabbos, and kilayim because it represents our responsibility to keep species consistent with the way Hashem created them (see Gemara, Sanhedrin 56b; Yerushalmi, Kelayim 1:7).

Parshas Bo mentions the mitzvah of pidyon haben, redeeming the bechor, the first-born boy. The mitzvah is performed optimally when the baby turns a month old, by giving a cohen five sela’im, equal to about 96 grams, of silver (Chazon Ish).

The dollar value of the five sela’im varies, depending on the market price of silver. Some people have the custom of giving the cohen six coins, in case the coins are defective and do not contain enough silver.

WHO IS REQUIRED TO REDEEM THE BECHOR?

The obligation rests on the father of a boy who is the first-born of his mother and was born through natural delivery. If the father is a cohen or a levi, or if the mother is the daughter of a cohen or a levi, there is no mitzvah of pidyon haben. Since pidyon haben is dependent on the boy being the first-born of his mother, her pedigree is taken into consideration concerning whether there is a requirement to redeem her son (Bechoros 47a).

If a boy is born from a non-Jewish father and a bas levi, there is also no mitzvah of pidyon haben since his mother is the daughter of a levi. However, if a boy is born from a non-Jewish father and a bas cohen, there is a mitzvah. Since the daughter of the cohen has violated her kedusha by being with a gentile, she loses her status as a bas cohen. Because of this relationship, she loses her rights as the daughter of a cohen – for example, she may no longer eat terumah even when we can reestablish tehorah.

Similarly, the son of a yisroel who marries a bas cohen who had previously been with a gentile is required to be redeemed.

Incidentally, there are poskim who rule that the grandson of a non-Jewish father and a bas levi is also excluded from pidyon haben. This means that the son of a non-Jewish father and a bas levi does not have a mitzvah to redeem his son. Since this man does not have a Jewish father, he is considered to be a levi pasul who is not obligated to perform pidyon haben on the basis of his mother being a bas levi. (Note that Shu’t Maharam Shick, Yoreh Deah  #299 rejects this ruling.)

WHAT HAPPENS IF A COHEN MARRIED A DIVORCEE?

If a cohen married a divorcee or any other woman prohibited to him, the children born are challalim, which means that they have become defiled from kehuna. The daughters may not marry cohanim, and the first-born son born to this cohen from this woman needs to be redeemed just like any yisroel. Furthermore, his son’s son will also require pidyon haben like any other yisroel.

WHAT IS THE HALACHA OF A BECHOR BORN THROUGH CAESARIAN SECTION?

There is no mitzvah of pidyon haben if the boy was delivered through caesarian section. His younger brother is also not considered a first-born even if he is born through natural delivery. Similarly, a boy born after a miscarriage is not a bechor for purposes of the mitzvah of pidyon haben (Bechoros 46a). This last halacha depends on how far advanced was the terminated pregnancy, a topic that we will leave for a different time.

WHAT HAPPENS IF NO ONE REDEEMS THE BECHOR?

If the father cannot or does not redeem the bechor, other people can redeem him but are not required to do so. However, if no one redeemed the bechor as a child, then he is required to redeem himself when he becomes an adult (Kiddushin 29a).

Many men who are not from an observant background did not have a pidyon haben. At a pidyon haben that I once performed (I am a cohen), the grandfather of the newly redeemed baby came over to me, saying, “You know, I am also a first-born and a baal tshuva. I can’t imagine anyone ever made a pidyon haben for me.” And so two pidyonim were performed on the same day, one for the grandson and one for the grandfather!

WHAT IS THE PROCEDURE?

As opposed to other mitzvos such as bris mila and a wedding where the mitzvah is performed first and then the festive meal is eaten, pidyon haben is performed during the meal in order to call attention to the mitzvah.

The procedure is as follows: after the assembled have made hamotzi and taken their seats, the father brings the bechor to the cohen, who is seated at a place of honor. The custom is to bring the bechor on a large silver platter. Many have the custom of placing sugar cubes, cloves of garlic, and jewelry on the platter. The father declares to the cohen that the baby is a first-born child, a male that must be redeemed.

The cohen then responds with the famous and enigmatic question: “Mai Ba-is Tefay?” Which do you prefer? Would you rather have your child or the five sela’im of pidyon?

The father responds that he would prefer his son, and that he is prepared to redeem his son. He then recites the bracha on the mitzvah and the bracha of shehechiyanu, and places the coins into the cohen’s right hand. The cohen waves the coins over the head of the bechor while blessing him. Then the cohen recites the Birkas Cohanim and other words of blessing on the head of the bechor. The procedure is completed by the cohen reciting a bracha on a cup of wine and drinking it.

WHAT DOES IT MEAN WHEN THE COHEN SAYS “MAI BA-IS TEFAY?” — DOES THE FATHER REALLY HAVE A CHOICE?

The wording of the cohen’s question, “Which do you prefer?” — implying that the father has a choice — i­­s extremely strange. Halachically, there is no choice or option. The father has a mitzvah to fulfill, which he is required to observe. So why does the cohen suggest to the father that he has a choice?

The text of our pidyon haben ceremony goes back 1,000 years, and since that time probably tens of thousands of interpretations have been suggested for this question. Think of your own answer to this question, and you’ll have something to share with others the next time you attend a pidyon haben!

WHY DO SOME PEOPLE PLACE GARLIC CLOVES AND SUGAR CUBES ON THE PLATTER THAT HOLDS THE BABY?

There are many customs that have developed around the mitzvah of pidyon haben. Some people place pieces of garlic, sugar cubes, or candies alongside the bechor when he is brought in for the pidyon. Among the many reasons I have heard for this custom: The sugar cubes show that the mitzvos are sweet, and garlic is a symbol and segula for fertility.

WHEN IS THE PIDYON PERFORMED? WHY IS THE MINHAG TO PERFORM PIDYON HABEN IN THE AFTERNOON?

The Torah says that the mitzvah is to redeem the bechor when he turns a month old.

How does one determine that a child is a month old? Although one is accustomed to thinking of a Jewish month as being either 29 or 30 days long, these are actually calculations of the calendar which deal only with complete days. There is a dispute in halacha as to how one determines that the bechor is a month old.

One opinion follows the day-count method and rules that the pidyon haben should take place on the 31^st day after the boy was born, counting his day of birth as day one (Magen Avraham 339:8).

However, others rule that a month for pidyon haben is determined by the astronomical method, meaning the same amount of time that transpires from one new moon to the next. Since the time that transpires from one new moon to the next is 29 days, 12 hours and 793/1080 of an hour (usually called 793 chalakim), the time for pidyon haben begins when the bechor is exactly 29 days, 12 hours and 793 chalakim old (Shach 305:12).

The common practice is not to perform a pidyon haben until both opinions have been fulfilled.

Usually, by the morning of the 31^st day, the bechor is 29 days, 12 hours and 793 chalakim old. However, if the bechor was born shortly before sunset on a long summer day, daybreak on the morning of the 31^st day is less than 29 days, 12 hours and 793 chalakim since his birth. In this situation, one should wait to perform the pidyon until he is 29 days, 12 hours and 793 chalakim after birth (Pischei Tshuva 305:17). For this reason, it is a common custom to schedule a pidyon haben on the afternoon of the 31^st day, which is always an appropriate time according to both opinions.

When the earliest time to perform the pidyon is on an erev Shabbos or erev Yom Tov, the pidyon should be scheduled in the morning (Mishna Berura 249:13). In the rare case that it is not yet 29 days, 12 hours and 793 chalakim after birth, one should calculate when the 29 days, 12 hours and 793 chalakim after birth falls out and schedule the pidyon then.

When the 31^st falls on Shabbos or Yom Tov, the pidyon should be scheduled for Motzei Shabbos or Motzei Yom Tov (Shu”t Noda Biyehuda Tenina, Yoreh Deah #187).

WHAT DOES ONE DO IF THE THIRTY-FIRST DAY FALLS OUT ON A FAST DAY?

There are two practices mentioned by the poskim. One approach is to perform the pidyon during the fast day so as not to delay the opportunity to observe the mitzvah, and conduct the festive meal at night after the fast is over. The other approach is to delay the pidyon until the night after the fast, and then perform the pidyon during the meal as it usually is done (Shach, Yoreh Deah 305:12).

CAN ONE PERFORM THE MITZVAH OF PIDYON HABEN BY GIVING THE COHEN A CHECK OR A BOND?

One does not fulfill the mitzvah of pidyon haben if one gives the cohen an IOU note or a bond. The yisroel must give the cohen something that has inherent value such as merchandise. A check is an order of payment instructing the bank to release funds, but itself has no inherent value. Therefore a check is not equal to cash and is not valid for pidyon haben.

It should be noted that according to many prominent gedolei poskim, our paper money or coins should not be used for pidyon haben because they also do not have inherent value. (Shu”t Chasam Sofer, Yoreh Deah #134; Aruch Hashulchan (305:18) and Shu”t Oneg Yom Tov YD # 102 all rule not to use our money for pidyon haben.)

Usually the pidyon haben is performed with silver coins, although at one pidyon haben I performed the father handed me 96 grams of silver. When coins are used, they are often supplied by the cohen, in which case he sells them to the father before the pidyon. It is halachically acceptable for the father to pay for the coins by check when he buys them from the cohen, and then give those coins to the cohen for the pidyon.

CAN ONE FULFILL THE MITZVAH BY BUYING THE COHEN A PRESENT?

Yes, as long as the present is worth at least the value of five sela’im (96 grams of silver). However, the prevalent custom is to give the cohen silver coins as mentioned above.

MAY THE COHEN RETURN THE MONEY TO THE FATHER OF THE BECHOR?

The cohen may return the money. However, this should not be his regular practice since it might cause a loss of revenue to other cohanim because yisraelim may stop using them for pidyon haben (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 305:8). There are some poskim who contend that today the money should be returned since the cohen cannot prove that he is a cohen (Shu”t Yaavetz #155). However, the accepted practice is that the cohen does not return the money (Pischei Tshuva 305:12, quoting Chasam Sofer).

ONCE THE FATHER ASKED A COHEN TO BE THE COHEN AT HIS SON’S PIDYON HABEN, MAY HE SUBSEQUENTLY CHANGE HIS MIND AND USE A DIFFERENT COHEN?

Once the father has asked one cohen to “officiate” at the pidyon haben, he should not ask another cohen. However, if he does give the redemption money to a different cohen, the pidyon is valid (Rama 305:4).

MAY THE FATHER OF THE BECHOR DIVIDE THE MONEY FOR PIDYON HABEN BETWEEN TWO OR MORE COHANIM?

It is preferable not to do this, but if he did so, the pidyon is valid (Pischei Tshuva 305:10, quoting Chasam Sofer).

A RATIONALE FOR THE MITZVAH

It behooves us to consider the reason for the mitzvah of pidyon haben. Following the smiting of the first-born in Egypt, all first-born boys had a certain kedusha, which should have entitled them to a role of service in the Beis Hamikdash.

However, because the bechorim were involved in worshipping the Eigel Hazahav, the Golden Calf, they lost their unique status and could no longer perform any special role in the Beis Hamikdash. Therefore, the bechor must undergo a redemption ceremony to make amends – which is to pay the cohen as a means of  “redeeming” his former kedusha.

Ron Goldstein, who is seeking to find his way into observant Judaism, is having a casual conversation with Yosel Schwartz, an Orthodox accountant who often invites him over often for Shabbos. As usual, Ron is peppering Yosel with questions:

“Recently, I began praying daily, and I have even begun to attend synagogue occasionally. I have many questions regarding both the prayers and the practices I see there.”

Of course, Yosel is more than happy to answer Ron’s questions.

“I would really appreciate it if you could provide me with background to some of the prayers. I see that there is a lot of structure and that various sections of the prayer are very dissimilar from one another. Some parts are consecutive blessings, others include extensive Biblical passages; some are praises, others are straightforward supplications. I have been told that the two most important parts of the morning and evening prayers are the Shma and the Shemoneh Esrei, and I have been reciting these parts for a few months now. But at this point I would like to understand some more about some of the other parts of our prayer. Could you help me?”

“Certainly; where would you like to start?”

“I am really curious to know more about the Psalms we read towards the beginning of the prayers. Psalms are really inspiring. But I also know that the Book of Psalms is fairly large. Why do we always recite the same ones every day; why not just read consecutive passages each day as an introduction to the prayer? This would familiarize people with the whole beautiful book.”

It is interesting that Ron noticed the beauty of the Psalms David Hamelech bequeathed to the Jewish people. Indeed, it seems that David Hamelech was aware of the tremendous responsibility Hashem placed upon him to provide a link between Man and Hashem. This is evidenced in the following verse: “For an eternal covenant He placed in me” (Shmuel II 23:5). Although most commentaries explaing that this verse refers to the eternity of his royal dynasty, which will soon return with Moshiach, it certainly also alludes to David’s unique role as the Psalmist of mankind.

Tehillim Each and Every Day, makes Certain we do not Stray

Yosel points out to Ron that the Psalms have indeed been organized into daily readings that enable one to complete them every week or month. Ron sounds interested in making this a regular practice, certainly a laudatory observance. Yosel points out that the purpose in reciting parts of Tehillim during davening is not to create familiarity with the entire book, but something else altogether. In Yosel’s own words:

“To answer your question, I need to provide you with some background to this part of the prayer, which is called Pesukei Dezimra, Verses of Song. Two Talmudic references provide the earliest basis for this part of our daily prayer.  One source teaches that reciting Psalm 145 every day guarantees one a share in olam haba, the World to Come (Berachos 4b).” (Yosel is aware that an alternate reading [girsa] of this Gemaraattributes the reward to someone who recites this psalm three times every day. This is why we recite Ashrei, which includes this Chapter of Tehillim, three times a day, twice in Shacharis and once during Mincha.Yosel did not want to sidetrack the conversation with this information.)

Hashem Provides for All, even those without Wherewithal.

“What is unique about this Psalm that its recital merits such a special reward?” Ron inquired.

“The Gemara explains that this Psalm includes the verse beginning with the words Posayach es yodecha, which praises G-d who opens His hands to provide for all creatures. One must make sure to recite this verse with much focus (Tur, Orach Chayim 51), as we thereby internalize the fact that Hashem supervises over all his creatures and provides all their needs.

“In addition, the alphabetical acrostic of this Psalm demonstrates that King David intended that it be easily memorized and utilized by all of mankind (Rav Hirsch, Tehillim 25:1).

“The verses of this chapter that follow Posayach es yodecha also include many basic tenets of Judaism. They note that Hashem’s deeds are also justified; and that He is close to all who seek him truthfully, fulfills their desires, and protects them. It is critical to recite these passages with full focus on their significance. One who recites the verse Posayach es yodecha without thinking about its meaning is required to read it again, since he has missed the message of the passage. Some authorities conclude that if he completed the Psalm, he should repeat from the words Posayach es yodecha to the end of the Psalm (Mishnah Berurah 51:16).”

Begin the Day with G-d’s Praise, so that we Merit the Sun’s Rays

Ron replied: “This is really a nice, meaningful passage, and it certainly sets the tone for devotion and interacting with G-d, which is one of the beauties of Judaism. However, according to my references, this is only one Psalm among several others that we read.”

Yosel continues his explanation: “True. In another Talmudic passage, the great scholar, Rabbi Yosi, mentions his yearning to receive the special reward granted to those who recite the Pesukei Dezimra daily (Shabbos 118b). Also, reciting these praises with the proper awareness guarantees that our subsequent prayer will be accepted (Abudraham).

“The early authorites dispute how many Psalms Rabbi Yosi included in his Pesukei Dezimra. While Rashi mentions only Psalm 148 and Psalm 150 (presumably in addition to 145), the Rambam includes all of the last six Psalms of Tehillim as the kernel of Pesukei Dezimra. Accepted halachah follows the Rambam (Tur, Orach Chayim 51), and therefore we recite all six Psalms, but in extenuating circumstances we follow Rashi’s opinion. For example, someone with insufficient time to recite the entire Pesukei Dezimra with the tremendous focus it deserves and still be ready to begin the Shemoneh Esrei together with the congregation may omit the three extra Psalms that the Rambam includes and rely on Rashi’s opinion. We actually rule that one may delete even more sections of Pesukei Dezimra to enable one to begin the Shemoneh Esrei together with the congregation.”

Together we shall Pray, and then look Forward to a Wonderful Day!

“Why is it so important to begin the prayer together with everyone else?”

“Unfortunately but realistically, we sometimes do not focus when we recite our prayers. In reality, prayers recited without proper thought should accomplish nothing and may even be harmful. Imagine someone who has the opportunity for an audience with a human king and arrives late, out of breath, and distracted. If his conversation is unfocused, he will probably be thrown into a dungeon for his disrespect! How much more so when talking to the King of kings!

“When our prayers fall short of what they should be, we deserve to have them rejected. There is one consolation, however. When a community prays together, G-d always accepts their prayers (Gemara Berachos 8a).”

Concentrate on Ashrei, and we will Focus while we Pray

“I now understand why Ashrei is an important prayer,” said Ron, “But I see in my Siddur that besides Psalm 145, that the Ashrei prayer also includes three other verses from Psalms, two before Psalm 145 and one after.”

“I see you’ve been paying a lot of attention to the prayers.”

“The Siddur I use notes the Biblical source of every prayer, so it does not really involve a lot of paying attention. Praying the way you are describing does require a lot of concentration. But I am eager to try. After all, for many years G-d meant little in my life – now that I understand how important He is to me, I am trying to pray daily with meaning. I truly enjoy these six Psalms because each one emphasizes a different aspect of G-d’s magnamity. But could you explain why we begin with the verse Ashrei, which is ‘borrowed’ from elsewhere in the book?”

“The Halachah recommends spending some time in quiet meditation prior to praying (Berachos 30b). This makes it easier to focus on the essence of prayer and what we are trying to accomplish.The source cited for this law is the verse Ashrei, usually translated as ‘Happy is he who dwells in Your house; he will continually be able to praise You.’ I would note that Rabbi Hirsch, a great Nineteenth Century scholar, explains the word Ashrei a bit differently. According to his explanation, the verse means: ‘He who dwells in Your house is constantly striving forward in his life; providing his life with more meaning.’ Either interpretation emphasizes the importance of not racing into our prayer, but spending time meditating over the smallness of man and the greatness of G-d before we approach Him with our daily requests.

Pesukei Dezimra Every Day and one’s Concerns will go away.

“My own experience is that involving oneself in Pesukei Dezimra not only helps one daven the entire tefilah on a completely different level, but also rouses one’s sense of bitachon. In David Hamelech’s own words “The G-d of Yisroel told me… the righteous will rule over man, he will prevail through his fear of Hashem” (Shmuel II 23:3).

“In modern Hebrew, bitachon means security or defense; and bituach means insurance. Both of these uses cloud the issue:

Yisrael Betach BaHashem, the Jewish people can trust only in Hashem. Only through arousing our sense of Hashem’s power and providence can we possibly find any comfort. In the words of the Chovos HaLevavos, ‘He who does not trust in Hashem, places his trust in something else.’”

“I certainly identify with this, perhaps more so, since I am so familiar with the way people live ‘out there.’ I find these Psalms extremely powerful.”

Baruch She’amar – A Song of Desire

Ron is ready with his next question: “I notice that while the Pesukei Dezimra contains only Biblical quotes, my Siddur notes no Biblical quotes in the introductory passage.”

“Because these passages are so important and comprise their own special mitzvah of praising G-d, we introduce and conclude with special blessings, just as we recite blessings before and after eating, and before performing mitzvos. The introductory prayer, which begins with the words Baruch She’amar, begins by blessing G-d ‘who said and made,’ a quality unique to Hashem. He both says and performs, whereas all else in the world either orders or acts (Avudraham). Baruch She’amar includes hints to all of Creation by alluding to the Ten Statements with which Hashem made the world. To quote the Tur (Orach Chayim 51): ‘One must recite Baruch She’amar with song and sweetness because it is a beautiful and desirous song.’

The concluding blessing of Pesukei Dezimra begins with the word Yishtabach. In order to avoid any interruption between these berachos, one may not interrupt from the time one recites Baruch She’amar until the end of davening (Shulchan Aruch 51:4). The Medrash reports that when the verse speaks of someone ‘who is afraid because he has sinned’ it refers to a person who spoke during Pesukei Dezimra.”

Singing David’s Song will keep us from Steering Wrong

Ron notes that while Baruch She’amar states that we use the songs of David, Your servant, to praise Hashem, not all the verses in Pesukei Dezimra come from Psalms.

“Although a few passages in Pesukei Dezimra are from other authors, the vast majority were written by King David. Even the two sections taken from Divrei Hayamim (Chronicles) are actually quotes of King David that appear in those books.

“Among the notable exceptions is the very end of Pesukei Dezimra where we recite Az Yashir, the Song that the Jewish people sang after miraculously crossing the Red Sea. This epic is considered the song of praise of the Jewish people and therefore merits its special place in the daily Pesukei Dezimra. It is singled out as such a special praise, that halacha requires one to sing  it daily as if one personally  experienced this miraculous manifestation of G-d’s presence.

“Notwithstanding all its wondrous virtues, there is still somehalachic controversy whether it should be recited as part of Pesukei Dezimra or not.”

“How so?”

“The Rambam, perhaps the greatest scholar of the last thousand years, mentions the recital of Az Yashir after Yishtabach, not before. Apparently, since King David did not author Az Yashir, the Rambam feels that it should not be included between the two blessings; only passages that are authored by King David should be included. I am personally unaware of any community that currently follows this practice.”

Hodu – Before Baruch She’amar or After?

Ron is ready with his next question: “I have noticed that some congregations begin Pesukei Dezimra with Baruch She’amar, while others begin with a different passage. What is the rationale behind these two different approaches?”

“King David taught this song to be sung on the day that Aron, which held the Ten Commandments, was brought to the City of David, in the city of Jerusalem (Divrei Hayamim I 16). Later they were sung to accompany the daily offerings in the Mishkan, the Tabernacle, until the Beis Hamikdash was built (Seder Olam, Chapter 14). Thus, they are praises that are directly associated with the offerings of the Jewish people and at the same time they are beautiful praises that reflect on the early history of the Jewish nation.

The question is whether we should recite them as part of the regular Pesukei Dezimra, albeit it placing them closer to the part of the prayer when we discuss the offerings, or whether they are said as a sequel to korbanos and prior to Pesukei Dezimra. Ashkenazic practice follows the first approach and Sefardic the latter – two old customs, both cited by early authoritative sources (Tur).”

Pesukei Dezimra: Fulfilling Hashem’s Only Desire

“Could you sum up in a few words what we have learned today?”

“Rather than my words, I will cite a great early scholar, the Ramban: ‘All that Hashem desires from this world are that man should thank Him for creating him, focus on His praise when he prays, and that the community pray together with concentration: Mankind should gather together and thank the Lord who created them, broadcasting: We are your creations!’” (Ramban, Shemos 13:16).

To this Ron replied : “You just mentioned that the community should recite the praises together. In my visits to different synagogues, I have noticed that in the Sefardic community the entire congregation recites these prayers in unison. In many other synagogues, someone begins and ends each passage aloud so that everyone can read from the same place. It seems from your description that this is the proper way one should recite these prayers.

“However, in some shuls that I frequent the prayers seem far more chaotic. Although these shuls are, thank G-d, very crowded and well attended, people arrive at different times and each person starts praying by himself. No one leads the services until after Pesukei Dezimra is complete, and they are certainly not said in unison. I must admit that I do not find this part of the services very attractive. It certainly does not fit the beautiful description you just gave me.”

Yosel shifted uncomfortably, realizing that Ron is absolutely correct. “It is embarrassing to admit that we are not doing what we should be,” he began. “Your criticism is extremely well founded. Would you be willing to come with me and speak to the Rabbi of our congregation about the problem? I admit that the problem has bothered me for a while, but I have not had the gumption to do anything about it. Perhaps you can help me?”

Ron realized that he had turned the tables. He had come as an outsider sharing something that bothered him. He had expected to receive an answer that he would not foresee; similar to Yosel’s other brilliant answers. He did not expect to be the person Yosel would appeal to for help in what appeared to be some type of crusade. But Yosel’s face indicated that he was sincere in his request. Not knowing the rabbi, Ron was uncertain what to expect, but at the meeting hefound the rabbi more than accomodating.

“I have wanted to introduce this in the shul for a long time,” the rabbi said after listening to their complaint. “The old minhag in all communities always included someone leading the services from the very beginning of Berachos. Why and when this practice changed is not for our discussion now, but I would like your help in changing the practice in our shul.”

In Conclusion, the Congregation’s Resolution

Ron became a very active member of the shul, although his attire initially looked fairly dissimilar from most other members.His input as an “outsider” was happily accepted. And as Ron morphed into Reuvein and learned how to use the Hebrew Siddur fluently, his unflagging enthusiasm for Pesukei Dezimra spurred major change not only in himself and in his good friend Yosel, but also to Congregation Bnei Torah. Ultimately, his enthusiasm and initiative spiritually permeated the entire world.

In our parsha, the midwives tell Pharaoh that the Jewish women handle their own childbirths without any assistance. Such women would have no need to go to the hospital on Shabbos. However, the rest of us need to know what to do about Shabbos emergencies.

I once received the following communication:

“As an active member of Hatzalah, but not speaking on behalf of any specific Hatzalah organization, I suggest that you cover a topic that would benefit many frum communities, especially those where, Boruch Hashem, new branches of Hatzalah have recently been established, such as Passaic-Clifton, Elizabeth, Baltimore, Waterbury, and overseas. In many instances of our responding to Shabbos emergencies, we discover that the patient, family, and bystanders do not know the basic halachos of pikuach nefesh; thus, they do not understand why we do certain things, such as using our radios or driving to and from an emergency. Although occasionally different branches follow different protocols (such as whether we drive back from a call) depending on different piskei halacha that each branch received, the basic rules are the same, and the differences in psak halacha among the different branches rarely affect what the patient does.

“Another phenomenon that I see is simply baffling. People call Hatzalah on Shabbos, with no intention of allowing us to transport the patient to a hospital if we deem it necessary. They tell us, ‘We can’t go to the hospital; it’s Shabbos.’ Guess what? You called us and it’s Shabbos for us too. People need to be taught that if Chas V’Shalom they need to call Hatzalah on Shabbos (or any other day), they MUST listen to our advice.

“We are trained to recognize problems that are not obvious to the untrained individual. If we say the patient needs to be transported to the hospital on Shabbos, please don’t argue with us!

“My understanding of the halacha is that it is the responsibility of the Rabbonim of a community to educate people what to do on Shabbos if someone is endangered. It seems that there is no better vehicle to accomplish this than your articles in Yated Neeman!

“Thanking you in advance,”

The Hatzalah volunteer who addressed this letter requested that we withhold his name, and we are honoring his request.

Although I have never been involved in Hatzalah’s holy work, I would like to introduce my comments with the following tragic story: Yuddie, a hard working, mid-fifties, proud Jew, was feeling unwell on a Shabbos afternoon. His concerned children called the local ambulance service, who felt he should go to the hospital immediately. Yuddie refused to go on Shabbos. To bring the story to its abrupt end, Yuddie died a few hours later from cardiac arrest.

This is only part of the tragedy. Imagine what probably happened when Yuddie arrived for final judgment in the court of the Olam HaEmes. Certainly the Satan charged him with manslaughter for bringing about his own demise by violating the halachos of pikuach nefesh. Maybe the Beis Din shel Maalah had rachmonus to mitigate his crime and judge him as a shogeg, someone negligent in his violation because he was unaware of the halachos. Certainly, Yuddie will receive some punishment for his serious breach of halacha since he should have learned the halacha.

To make sure such tragedies don’t reoccur, we will review the basics of these halachos.

The Gemara (Yerushalmi, Yoma 8:5) teaches: “Someone who was asked a shaylah (whether to desecrate Shabbos in the case of a life-threatening emergency) is disgraced and the one who asks is guilty of bloodshed.” We understand the second part of this statement that someone busying himself with asking whether he can save someone’s life is wasting precious minutes that literally may be the difference between life and death, but why is the rav who was asked the shaylah considered disgraced?

The answer is because he is responsible to teach these halachos publicly so that people should always know these laws thoroughly. If people are asking what to do it indicates that the rav has not adequately taught these halachos, which is negligence on his part (Korban HaEidah ad loc.).

By the way, this rule obviously applies equally on weekdays! If someone is uncertain whether a particular situation is life threatening or not, he/she is required to immediately seek proper medical attention. Delaying might be shedding blood!

Let us quote the words of Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 328:2): “It is a mitzvah to desecrate Shabbos for a dangerous illness. He who does so swiftly is praised; the person who goes to ask what to do is a shedder of blood!” and again: “Whoever is swift in desecrating Shabbos in a matter that involves danger is praised!! (Shulchan Aruch Orach Chayim 328:13)

IS THIS AN EMERGENCY?

But what if I do not know whether this is a life threatening emergency? Am I required to be a doctor to know what is and what is not? After all, only a life-threatening emergency supersedes Shabbos!

No, there is no halacha requirement to be a physician. However, this is the rule that one should follow:

“One must desecrate Shabbos even if there is only a slight possibility that the situation is dangerous. One does not need a professional opinion or an expert physician. Whenever one is uncertain whether the situation is dangerous, he is required to desecrate Shabbos (Shu’t Tashbeitz 1:54).”

Thus, Yuddie’s children were absolutely correct in calling the emergency service and certainly could have driven him to the hospital themselves, even if it would have turned out to have been nothing but indigestion from too much cholent. Certainly, I have only praise for the Hatzalah volunteers who drive on Shabbos to attend emergencies.

The source for this halacha is the following statement: “An uncertainty whether the situation is life-threatening supersedes Shabbos. Not only if it is an uncertainty whether the situation is immediately dangerous, but even if there is no danger now and the situation may create a danger for the future (Gemara Yoma 84b).” The last clause teaches that we supersede Shabbos for someone when inferior care received now may affect his future health, such as a person suffering from an apnea condition which, left untreated, may eventually cause permanent heart damage. The same applies to kidney conditions or diabetes.

In short, the Torah demands that when you are uncertain whether a situation is dangerous or not, be mechaleil Shabbos first to get proper medical care, and ask questions later.

Years ago, I was visiting a physician friend of mine when a well respected member of the frum community, who lived quite a distance from the house, arrived on Shabbos afternoon to determine whether his child’s illness was life-threatening. They had just walked with the child forty minutes to have a frum physician evaluate whether the situation warranted chillul Shabbos! To this day I am astonished at how little this yeshiva-educated man knew about pikuach nefesh. When uncertain whether a situation is life threatening or not, assume that it is until someone knowledgeable informs you that it is not.

WHAT IS CONSIDERED MEDICALLY KNOWLEDGEABLE?

The halachic definition of a physician for these purposes certainly includes a trained Hatzalah emergency medical technician. I can prove this from an anecdote concerning Rav Yaakov Kaminetzky, zt”l. Rav Yaakov’s first rabbinic position was in a small Lithuanian village that had no physician. Thus, living there violated the psak of the Rambam (Hilchos Dayos 4:23) that a talmid chacham may live only in a town that has a physician. Rav Yaakov needed a solution to accept this position and move into the community. He resolved the problem by reading through medical books until he felt he met the halachic requirements of being a local doctor (Reb Yaakov, page 106). Thus we see that someone who knows enough to treat commonplace medical problems is halachically qualified as a physician.

One can conclude that a Hatzalah volunteer has sufficient training to be considered halachically a physician for the emergencies with which he deals. Therefore, someone who disobeys the instructions of a Hatzalah volunteer to desecrate Shabbos is a shofeich domim!

WHO SHOULD DRIVE? A WOMAN OR A MAN?

If one needs to call Hatzalah, drive a patient to the hospital, or perform some other act of chillul Shabbos in a life-threatening emergency, is it better to have a woman perform the activity or a man?

The most important rule throughout all of the laws of pikuach nefesh is that the situation should be taken care of as swiftly and responsibly as possible. Therefore whoever can remedy the situation best and quickest should drive (Mishna Berurah 328:34). However, the person driving must ensure that no one is endangered. Do not drive at night without lights in an attempt to mitigate the amount of chillul Shabbos, and do not drive recklessly. Unfortunately, I know of people who in their diligence to limit chillul Shabbos endangered others in the process. For those who would like a fuller education in this subject, I recommend Shmiras Shabbos Ke’hilchasa 40:50-73.

Assuming that either a man or a woman can take care of the emergency equally well, and the person making decisions is level-headed to choose without wasting any time at all, it is preferable for a man to be mechaleil Shabbos for a life threatening emergency than for a woman (Shulchan Aruch Orach Chayim 328:12).

WHY THE MAN?

Chazal were concerned that if a woman was mechaleles Shabbos to take care of a life threatening emergency, she might erringly think that she was asked to desecrate Shabbos because her violating Shabbos (in non-pikuach nefesh circumstances) is not such a severe violation. As a result, they were concerned that she may become lackadaisical in her attitude towards Shabbos (Rambam, Hilchos Shabbos 2:3). This is simply not true; a woman and a man have the same level of responsibility to observe Shabbos and the same halachos. However, since many unlettered people feel that women are less responsible to observe mitzvos than men are, Chazal emphasized that it is the importance of saving lives that supersedes Shabbos and not the unimportance of her chillul Shabbos. We therefore have a man supersede Shabbos so that the woman does not think she was chosen to be the mechaleil Shabbos.

WHO SHOULD DRIVE? A JEW OR A NON-JEW?

Again, the first rule is who will handle the emergency in the most expeditious way. Assuming that either a Jew or a non-Jew is available, the Poskim dispute which is preferable, some contending that one should specifically have an observant Jew do the melacha whereas others maintain that one should specifically have a gentile perform the activity since he is not required to observe Shabbos. Since these two approaches are diametrically opposite, I will present the sources for this dispute:

The Gemara states:

“We do not have gentiles perform these matters (being mechaleil Shabbos to save lives) only gedolei Yisroel” (Gemara Yoma 84b). This Gemara presents us with two different issues that we need to discuss:

1. What does the Gemara mean when it states: “We do not have gentiles perform these matters?”

2. What does it mean when it states: “only gedolei Yisroel?”

I will address these two halacha questions one at a time:

What does it mean that we do not have gentiles perform life-saving measures on Shabbos?”

Tosafos (Yoma 84b) explains that even if a non-Jew is readily available, one should deliberately have a Jew desecrate Shabbos because Chazal understood that someone who feels accountable to observe Hashem’s commandments executes those mitzvos more diligently.

The Rosh (Yoma 8:14) presents a different reason why we prefer a Jew perform the melacha — because of concern that people seeing that a gentile was instructed to perform the activity may erringly think that pikuach nefesh is less valuable than Shabbos and in the future may jeopardize someone’s life when a gentile is not available. Alternatively, they may erringly think that one must first try to find a gentile rather than doing whatever is most expeditious. Either mistake may jeopardize someone’s life. To avoid these errors, we deliberately have a Jew perform the activity on Shabbos so that people realize that a life threatening emergency always supersedes Shabbos.

An interesting dispute results from these differing interpretations. According to Tosafos, even on a weekday one should have an observant Jew perform the life-saving measures (assuming that this does not slow or impede the quality of care) since he performs the work with the added sense that he is performing a mitzvah. However according to the Rosh, this preference for a Jew is only on Shabbos and not on a weekday when no one will assume that there was a reason one chose a gentile. As mentioned above, this entire dispute is only in a case where no time or care is lost in making the decision whom to send.

Thus far we have explained two approaches that understand the Gemara’s statement, “We do not have gentiles perform these matters” literally, that we prefer that a Jew be mechaleil Shabbos to a non-Jew. However, the Ohr Zarua (Hilchos Erev Shabbos #38) suggests an alternative approach – the Gemara means that we do not look for a non-Jew to perform these activities when we already have a Jew available. However, if both a Jew and a gentile are available, one should ask the gentile. Although the Ohr Zarua disagrees with this approach, the Mordechai (Shabbos #467) quotes the Ravyah who indeed rules that we should not have a Jew perform melacha when a non-Jew is available to do it as swiftly. The Rama (328:12) records that the Ashkenazic custom follows the Ravyah not to desecrate Shabbos when a gentile is available who will perform the work as swiftly as a Jew would.

The Taz (328:5) takes very strong exception to this ruling of the Rama and contends that one may not ask a gentile to do the work when an observant Jew is available. Thus we face a dispute between major halachic arbiters which of these two approaches to follow: to prefer using a gentile, or to prefer using a Jew. As mentioned above, this dispute is only assuming that either one can perform the work equally efficiently and that no delay results.

It is significant to note that the Mishna Berurah is inconsistent which of these two approaches to follow. In Chapter 328:37 he implies that he follows the Taz’s opinion, whereas in Chapter 278:2 he rules like the Rama, that one should use a gentile when all else is equal. Therefore, this is an unclear halacha. If you are faced with the shaylah, do whatever is expedient without thinking which is better. You may want to ask your rav for his opinion in order to be prepared for emergencies.

WHO SHOULD DRIVE? A NOTED TALMID CHACHAM OR A LAYMAN?

I quoted above the Gemara that states that we should have specifically gedolei Yisroel perform the chillul Shabbos necessary to save lives. What does the Gemara mean when it declares that only gedolei Yisroel should perform the melacha? The Rishonim debate this question, presenting two alternate explanations:

1. Some understand that the Gemara means Jewish adults (Tashbeitz 1:54; Beis Yosef 328 rules that this is the opinion of most Rishonim and poskim).

2. Others explain the term to mean the greatest of the Jewish people, i.e., people we usually call Gedolei Yisroel (Rambam, Peirush Hamishnayos, Shabbos end of Chapter 18, and Hilchos Shabbos 2:3).

According to the latter opinion, if a godol biYisrael is in a place where there is a life-threatening emergency, he should be the one to drive the ambulance to the hospital rather than someone else (assuming he knows how to safely and that this will not delay matters) in order to convey to people that what is being done is not because chillul Shabbos is unimportant, but because of the overriding importance of pikuach nefesh! The first opinion contends that it does not make any halachic difference whether a talmid chacham drives the ambulance or any other observant male adult.

The Mishna Berurah (328:34) quotes the Rambam’s opinion: If there are several people together when a pikuach nefesh matter presents itself, if any one of the people involved can attend to the danger with equal efficiency, the greatest talmid chacham among them should rush to be mechaleil Shabbos himself!

A corollary of this halachic point is that a person should not seek to avoid doing melacha on Shabbos when it is necessary and have someone else perform the melacha instead. Quite the contrary, it is meritorious to be the one who performs the melacha. The Tashbeitz’s words are, “The first one who has the opportunity to perform the mitzvah should do so, and receive the reward for saving a Jewish life.” I would like to stress that this is true even if it is subsequently discovered that the person was not seriously ill. Since the person who desecrated Shabbos did so according to the Torah’s guidelines, he is rewarded as if he saved a Jewish life!

WHAT IF THE SITUATION IS NOT LIFE THREATENING?

If a medical authority, such as a Hatzalah volunteer, tells you that the situation is not life-threatening, a Jew may not perform any activity that involves violating a Torah prohibition, although depending on circumstances, rabbinic takanos may often be set aside.

It is beyond the scope of this article to detail what one may do under these circumstances, but I will supply two rules of thumb that one should usually follow under these circumstances:

1. If the person is ill (even not seriously) or uncomfortable, one may ask a gentile to do whatever is necessary (Shulchan Aruch Orach Chayim 307:5).

2. If the patient and his family do not include any talmidei chachamim, and the Hatzalah volunteer tells you that based on his experience of asking shaylos from Rabbonim, you should be able to do something yourself, you may rely on this information until one has the opportunity to ask a shaylah what to do.

May we always merit that to perform mitzvos in good health and in the way that Hashem wants us to.

Question #1: “Rabbi,” asked Mr. Greenberg, “My neighbor, Mrs. Friedman is having an operation. Is it appropriate for me to visit her?”

Question #2: Does Dr. Strauss fulfill the mitzvah of bikur cholim when he makes his hospital rounds?

Question #3: “My sister-in-law is hospitalized for a few days for a minor procedure. I should really visit her, but I just can’t find the time. Is it halachically sufficient for me to call her?”

Parshas VaYeira opens with Hashem visiting Avraham Avinu three days after his Bris Milah. Rashi points out that Hashem was performing bikur cholim, visiting and providing care for the ill. In the same way, by taking care of the ill, we fulfill the mitzvah of emulating Hashem’s ways, in addition to the special mitzvah of bikur cholim (Gemara Sotah 14a). Thus physicians, nurses, or other medical professionals should have in mind before every visit or appointment, that they are performing two mitzvos, one of emulating Hashem, and the other of bikur cholim. Since we rule that mitzvos tzrichos kavvanah, to fulfill a mitzvah requires being cognizant of that fact, any medical professional gains much merit by realizing this every day.

Every community should have an organization devoted to the needs of the sick, and it is a tremendous merit to be involved in organizing and participating in such a wonderful chesed project (Ahavas Chesed 3:3).

The Kli Yakar (Bamidbar 16:29) offers an additional reason for fulfilling bikur cholim - to benefit the visitor — because he thereby appreciates the importance of doing teshuvah. And this provides extra merit for the sick person since he caused someone else to do teshuvah, even if it was unintentional.

The Gemara (Nedarim 40a) reports that when one of Rabbi Akiva’s disciples was ill, no one came to check his welfare. Then Rabbi Akiva entered his dwelling, cleaned it and sprinkled water on the floor (to prevent dust from rising), and the student exclaimed, “Rabbi Akiva, you have brought me back to life!” After this experience, Rabbi Akiva taught that someone who visits the ill is considered as if he saved someone’s life!

WHY “BIKUR” CHOLIM?

What does the “Bikur cholim” mean?

It is worth noting that although “bikur” means “visit” in modern Hebrew, the original meaning of “bikur” is not “visit” but “checking.” In other words, the actual mitzvah of bikur cholim is to check which of the sick person’s needs have not been attended to (Toras HaAdam).

There are two main aspects of this mitzvah:

I. Taking care of the physical and emotional needs of ill people.

II. Praying for their recovery (Toras HaAdam, based on Gemara Nedarim 40a).

I. TAKING CARE OF PHYSICAL NEEDS

In addition to raising the sick person’s spirits by showing one’s concern for him or her, the visitor should also ensure that his/her physical, financial, and medical needs are properly cared for, as well as other logistical concerns that may be troubling him/her. Often, well meaning people make the effort to visit the sick, but fail to fulfill the mitzvah of bikur cholim properly because they fail to take care of the choleh’s needs (Gesher HaChayim).

Always cheer up the choleh (Gesher HaChayim). If you know that you cannot cheer him up, you should not visit him.

Your visit must benefit the choleh. In most circumstances, a visit should be short and not tire out or be uncomfortable for the ill person. Sometimes the sick person wants to rest, but feels obligated to converse with a visitor (Aruch HaShulchan 335:4). Unfortunately, in such cases, visitors think they are performing a mitzvah, while they are actually doing the opposite. It is important to remember that the entire focus of bikur cholim is on the sick person’s needs and not on the visitor’s desire to feel noble or important. I remember my mother a”h having such guests during one of her hospital stays; although she kept hinting that she wanted to rest, they didn’t catch on and stayed put. They thought they were performing a kind deed, while in reality they were harming a sick person who desperately needed to rest.

OVERNIGHT CARE

One of the greatest acts of chesed is to stay overnight with a choleh (Aruch HaShulchan 335:3; Shu’t Tzitz Eliezer, Volume 5, Ramat Rachel, #4). A similar act of bikur cholim and true chesed is to stay overnight with a hospitalized child to enable parents to get some proper sleep and keep their family’s life in order.

A person can fulfill the mitzvah of bikur cholim even a hundred times a day (Nedarim 39b). If one frequently pops one’s head into one’s sick child’s bedroom to see how the child is doing, or periodically drops in to visit a shut-in, one fulfills a separate mitzvah each time so long as it does not become burdensome to the choleh. Similarly, a nurse fulfills the mitzvah of bikur cholim each time she checks on a patient, and – therefore she should have intent to do this for the sake of fulfilling the mitzvah. (This applies even if she is paid, because the proscription against being paid to do a mitzvah applies only to the mitzvah’s minimum requirement. Once one does more than this minimum, one can be paid for the extra time one spends. The same certainly applies to someone paid to stay overnight with a sick patient.)

IS THERE AN OPTIMUM TIME OF DAY TO VISIT?

The Gemara states that one should not visit a sick person during the first quarter of the day, since one usually looks healthier in the morning and the visitor may not be motivated to pray on his behalf. One should also not visit a sick person at the end of the day when he looks much sicker and one might give up hope. Therefore, one should visit an ill person during the middle part of the day (see Gemara Nedarim 40a, and Ahavas Chesed 3:3). Rambam offers a different reason for this halacha, explaining that at other times of the day, visitors might interfere with the attendants and medical personnel who are taking care of the choleh (Hilchos Aveil 14:5).

(Why does the Rambam give a different reason than the Gemara? The Kesef Mishneh suggests that the Rambam had a different text of this Gemara.) Thus, the ideal time for visiting an ill person is in the middle of the day, unless he is receiving medical treatment at that time.

Despite the above, the custom is to visit the ill person regardless of the time of the day. Why is this so? The Aruch HaShulchan (Yoreh Deah 335:8) explains that the Gemara’s visiting times are advisory rather than obligatory. The Gemara is saying that one should visit the ill person at the time most beneficial for his/her care, which is usually the afternoon, either because this does not interfere with medical care or because it is the best time to detect the patient’s medical status. However, this is only advice and can be tempered by other practical concerns.

WHAT IF THE ILL PERSON IS RECEIVING SUBSTANDARD CARE?

In this instance, one should try to upgrade the choleh’s care without agitating him in the process (Gesher HaChayim).

WHOM TO VISIT FIRST

Usually, it is a greater mitzvah to visit a poor choleh than a wealthy one. This is because there is often no one else to care for the poor person’s needs (Sefer Chassidim #361). Additionally, he may need more help because of his lack of finances, and he is more likely to be in financial distress because of his inability to work (Ahavas Chesed 3:3).

If two people need the same amount of care and one of them is a talmid chacham, the talmid chacham should be attended to first (Sefer Chassidim #361). If the talmid chacham is being attended to adequately and the other person is not, one should first take care of the other person (Sefer Chassidim #361).

CROSS-GENDER VISITING

Should a man pay a hospital visit to a female non-relative, or vice versa?

The halacha states that a man may attend to another man who is suffering from intestinal disorder, but not to a woman suffering from such a problem, whereas a woman may attend to either a man or a woman suffering from intestinal disorder (Mesechta Sofrim Chapter 12). This implies that one may attend to the needs of the opposite gender in all other medical situations (Shach, Yoreh Deah 335:9; Birkei Yosef 335:4; Aruch HaShulchan 335:11 and Shu’t Zakan Aharon 2:76).

However, some halachic authorities distinguish between attending to a sick person’s needs and visiting, contending that although a woman may usually provide a man’s nursing needs and vice versa, there is no requirement for a woman to visit an ill man (Shu’t Tzitz Eliezer, Volume 5, Ramat Rachel, and Zichron Meir pg. 71 ftn 24 quoting Shu’t Vayaan Avrohom, Yoreh Deah #25 and others). Other authorities contend that when one can assume that the woman’s medical needs are provided, a man should not visit her because of tzniyus concerns (Shu’t Chelkas Yaakov 3:38:3; Shu’t Tzitz Eliezer, Volume 5, Ramat Rachel, #16). Instead, he should inquire about her welfare and pray for her. I suggest asking your Rav for direction in these situations.

According to a famous story of Rav Aryeh Levin, when he was once concerned that a certain widow who had been told not to fast on Yom Kippur would disobey orders, he personally visited her on Yom Kippur and boiled her water for a cup of tea to ensure that she drank. In this way, he fulfilled the mitzvah of bikur cholim on Yom Kippur in a unique way (A Tzadik in Our Time).

II. PRAYING FOR THE ILL

The Beis Yosef (Yoreh Deah 335) writes, “It is a great mitzvah to visit the ill since this causes the visitor to pray on the sick person’s behalf which revitalizes him. Furthermore, since the visitor sees the ill person, the visitor checks to see what the ill person needs.” We see that Beis Yosef considers praying for the ill an even greater part of the mitzvah than attending to his needs, since he first mentions praying and then refers to attending to the other needs as “furthermore.”

Someone who visits a sick person without praying for his recovery fails to fulfill all the requirements of the mitzvah (Toras HaAdam; Rama 335:4). Therefore, physicians, nurses, and aides who perform bikur cholim daily should accustom themselves to pray for their sick patients in order to fulfill the complete mitzvah of bikur cholim. A simple method of accomplishing this is to discreetly recite a quick prayer (such as “Hashem, please heal this person among the other ill Jewish people [b’soch she’ar cholei yisrael]”) as one leaves the person’s room. (A doctor in his office can recite the same quick prayer.)

MUST ONE PRAY FOR A SICK PERSON BY NAME?

When praying in a sick person’s presence, one need not mention his name and one may recite the prayer in any language. The Gemara explains that this is because the Shechinah, the Divine presence, rests above the choleh’s head (Gemara Shabbos 12b). However, when the ill person is not present, one should pray specifically in Hebrew and should mention the person’s name (Toras HaAdam; Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 335:5). If one cannot pray in Hebrew, one may do so in English or any other language except Aramaic (see Taz 335:4).

[Incidentally, since the Shechinah is in the choleh’s presence, visitors should act in a dignified manner (Gemara Shabbos 12b; Shl”a). This includes both their behavior and their mode of dress.]

Why must one pray in Hebrew when the ill person is not present? Rashi explains that in such a case, when one prays for an individual, angels have to transport the prayer to the Divine presence (the Shechinah) – these angels transport only prayers recited in Hebrew and not those recited in Aramaic (Rashi to Shabbos 12b s.v. d’shechinah).[b2] However, when praying in the presence of the sick person one may pray in any language since the Shechinah is nearby and the prayer does not require the angels to transport it on high (Gemara Shabbos 12b).

MAY ONE PRAY IN ENGLISH FOR THE ILL?

This explains the difference between Hebrew and Aramaic. What about other languages? Do the angels “transport” prayer recited in a different language?

To answer this question, we must first explore a different issue: Why do angels not transport Aramaic prayers?

The halachic authorities dispute why the angels do not convey prayers recited in Aramaic. Some contend that angels communicate only in Hebrew and, furthermore, only convey a prayer that they understand (Tosafos, Shabbos 12b s.v. She’ayn). According to this approach, the angels convey only Hebrew prayers. However, other authorities contend that the angels do not convey Aramaic prayers because they view it as corrupted Hebrew and not as a real language (Rosh, Berachos 2:2). Similarly, the angels will not convey a prayer recited in slang or in a different undignified way. According to the latter opinion, the angels will convey a prayer recited in any proper language and one may pray in English for an ill person even if he is not present.

The Shulchan Aruch quotes both opinions, but considers the first opinion as the primary approach (Orach Chayim 101:4). However, in Yoreh Deah 335:5, the Shulchan Aruch omits the second opinion completely. The commentaries on the Shulchan Aruch raise this point, and conclude that the Shulchan Aruch felt that praying for an ill person is such a serious matter that one should certainly follow the more stringent approach and pray only in Hebrew when the choleh is not present (Taz, Yoreh Deah 335:4). Therefore, one should not pray for an individual sick person’s needs in any language other than Hebrew. If one is unable to pray in Hebrew however, one may rely on the second opinion and pray in any language other than Aramaic.

DOES ONE FULFILL BIKUR CHOLIM OVER THE TELEPHONE?

To answer this question, let us review the reasons for this mitzvah and see if a telephone call fulfills them. One reason one visits the ill is to see if they have any unfulfilled needs. Although one might discover this over the phone, one cannot ascertain everything without seeing them. The second reason one visits the ill is to motivate the visitor to pray on their behalf. Again, although one may be motivated by a phone call, it is rarely as effective as a visit. Furthermore, although a phone call can cheer up the choleh and make him feel important, a personal visit accomplishes this far more effectively. Therefore, most aspects of this mitzvah require a personal visit. However, in cases where one cannot actually visit the choleh, for example, when a visit is uncomfortable for the patient, or unwanted, one should call (Shu’t Igros Moshe, Yoreh Deah 1:223; Shu’t Chelkas Yaakov 2:128). Some authorities contend that it is better for a man to call a hospitalized or bed-ridden woman who is not a relative since it is difficult for an ill person to maintain the appropriate level of tzniyus (Chelkas Yaakov 3:38:3).

ALWAYS PRAY FOR GOOD HEALTH

A healthy person should daven for continuing good health, because it is far easier to pray that one remain healthy than to pray for a cure after one is already ill. This is because a healthy person remains well so long as no bad judgment is brought against him in the heavenly tribunal, whereas an ill person needs zechuyos to recover. This latter instance is not good for two reasons — first, the choleh may not have sufficient zechuyos, and second, even if he does, he will lose some of his zechuyos in order to get well.

Before taking medicine or undergoing other medical treatment one should recite a short prayer: “May it be Your will, Hashem my G-d, that this treatment will heal, for You are a true Healer” (Magen Avraham 230:6; Mishnah Berurah 230:6, based on Gemara Berachos 60a).

People who fulfill the mitzvah of bikur cholim are promised tremendous reward in Olam Haba, in addition to many rewards in this world (Gemara Shabbos 127a). Someone who fulfills the mitzvah of bikur cholim properly is considered as if he saved people’s lives and is rewarded by being spared any severe punishment (Gemara Nedarim 40a).

Are there halachic or hashkafic concerns about purchasing life insurance or annuities? Should this practice be encouraged or discouraged from a Torah perspective?

Poskim who discuss this shaylah raise the following considerations:

1. “Al yiftach adam piv l’satan.” One should not say something that might cause evil to occur. Is buying life insurance included under this concern?
2. Bitachon. Does the purchase of life insurance demonstrate a lack of trust that Hashem will provide for one’s needs?
3. Zechuyos. Does a person jeopardize himself by buying insurance since his family will no longer be totally dependent on his support?
4. Ribbis. Does life insurance or an annuity involve prohibitions of charging interest?

In this article, we will discuss what the poskim have written about the above issues.

DO NOT GIVE THE SATAN AN OPPORTUNITY

The concept of “Al yiftach adam piv l’satan” literally translates as, “A person should not open his mouth for Satan.” This means that one should be careful not to say something that might provide Satan with ammunition to attack him in the Heavenly tribunal. (For further discussion on this point, see Derech Hashem by Rav Moshe Chayim Luzzatto, Part II, Section 6. An English translation is available.)

The Gemara provides the following example of this principle. A person should not say, “I sinned a lot, but Hashem has not punished me” (Gemara Berachos 19a). This admission that one is guilty and deserves punishment gives the Satan a chance to prosecute one in the Heavenly tribunal. (This statement is very different from viduy, one of the steps of Tshuvah, which accomplishes atonement and cannot be used by the Satan.)

Some poskim investigate whether acquiring life insurance provides the Satan with an opportunity to mount a prosecution, since it becomes payable upon someone’s demise? (Kochavei Yitzchak 1:22)

Opposing this supposition are Talmudic sources that discuss posthumous arrangements, implying that there is nothing wrong with making such plans. For example, the Gemara discusses whether someone who prepares four-cornered shrouds (tachrichim) for himself is required to put tzitzis on them (Menachos 41a).

The previous case is quoted to resolve the following shaylah. A man is lying on his deathbed Erev Shabbos afternoon and there is concern that if he dies before Shabbos, his corpse will begin to decompose before it can be buried. Is it permitted to dig a grave while the person is still alive, so that he can be buried before Shabbos if he dies? Most poskim rule that this is permitted (Beis Yosef, Bach and Gr”a to Yoreh Deah 339; Mishneh L’Melech, Hilchos Aveil 4:4).

A disputing opinion prohibits digging the grave until the person dies, out of concern that the sick person might hear that they have dug his grave and become emotionally distressed (Shu”t Rivash #114 as explained by Bach, Yoreh Deah 339).

However, none of the Gedolei HaPoskim who discuss this shaylah is concerned about al yiftach piv l’satan. Some explicitly state that it is perfectly acceptable for a healthy person to dig his own grave and prepare his own shrouds. The Rivash expressively approves the practice of purchasing adjacent burial plots for a couple.

Thus we see that it is not considered al yiftach piv l’satan when a healthy person makes funeral arrangements for himself, because even though he is mentioning a potential evil, he is not mentioning his sins and giving the Satan any reason to prosecute him. Therefore, purchasing life insurance is also not a violation of al yiftach piv l’satan (Shu”t Yechaveh Daas 3:85).

However, two places where the Gemara mentions Al yiftach adam piv l’satan are not resolved with this approach: In Kesubos 8b, the Gemara states that a person should not say “many will drink the cup of mourning” for this because of al yiftach adam piv l’satan, and similarly, the Gemara in Berachos 60a states that upon entering the bathhouse (which involved a moderate amount of safety concerns), one should not say “if something goes wrong, my death should atone for my sins” because of al yiftach adam piv l’satan. Thus, it appears that since the poskim do not refer to these concerns either in reference to making one’s shrouds, opening a grave, preparing a gravestone, or purchasing life insurance, that the concern is only that one should not express the possibility of one’s passing, which fits the words of the Chazal. Thus, in conclusion, although one may purchase life insurance, one should be careful not to mention specifically the possibility of death of the purchaser.

BITACHON

A Jew is obligated to believe that although he makes efforts to earn his livelihood, Hashem provides his parnasah.

Is it prohibited to purchase life insurance because such an act implies lack of confidence that Hashem will provide for his family?

To answer this question, we must first examine the halachic relationship between parnasah and bitachon.

IS THERE A DISPUTE IN THE MISHNAH?

The Mishnah quotes two ostensibly dissenting opinions: “Rabbi Meir said, ‘A person should teach his son a livelihood that is easy (to learn) and free of potential sin. (At the same time, he should) pray to He who is the source of all wealth and property. (Always realize that) there is no profession that does not have its vicissitudes. Poverty and wealth are dependent on his merit.’” We see that Rabbi Meir advocates teaching one’s child a livelihood, while simultaneously acknowledging that livelihood comes from Hashem and not from our efforts (Kiddushin 82a).

On the other hand, the very same mishnah quotes Rabbi Nehora’i as saying,

“I abandon all means of livelihood and teach my son only Torah.”

Thus, we appear to have a dispute between two Tannayim as to whether one should take time from teaching one’s son Torah in order to provide him with vocational training. However, this analysis cannot be accurate for the following reason:

The Gemara (Eruvin 13b) teaches that Rabbi Meir was a substitute name for Rabbi Nehora’i because his teaching of Torah produced so much light. (Meir means “He who gives light.”) How could Rabbi Nehora’i disagree with himself?

RESOLVING THE DISPUTE

One answer to this problem is that Rabbi Nehora’i’s statement that he would teach his son nothing but Torah was personal – Rabbi Nehora’i himself had no worldly concerns because he placed complete trust in Hashem. Someone at this level should indeed not teach his son any worldly occupation. However, most people do not have this level of trust and must provide their son with a livelihood while emphasizing that parnasah is from Hashem (Sefer HaMikneh, Kiddushin 82a). (See Kochavei Ohr of Rav Yisrael Salanter, Chapter 11, for a description of the difference between these two types of people.)

Rav Moshe Feinstein presents an alternative answer to the contradictory statements of Rabbi Meir. The two statements are discussing different stages of life, one before the son must begin supporting his family, and the other when he has to support his family. Rabbi Nehora’i’s statement that “I teach my son only Torah” applies before the son needs parnasah. Until then, he should only learn Torah. The other statement refers to a son who has to earn a living. At that point, his father should teach him a livelihood that involves few halacha difficulties and is easy to learn, while at the same time teaching him that his vocation is only hishtadlus and that parnasah comes only from Hashem (Shu”t Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 2:111).

There is a halachic difference between the two approaches. According to the first approach, someone with total trust that Hashem will provide for him even if he makes no hishtadlus should not make any efforts to make parnasah and rely totally on Hashem. According to Rav Moshe’s approach, even a person with total trust in Hashem is required to have a livelihood. Rav Moshe brings evidence from several sources that it is inappropriate to rely on miracles for one’s parnasah. Furthermore, he considers having no livelihood as equivalent to relying on miracles.

On the other hand, Rav Vozner rules like the first approach that a pure baal bitachon is permitted to rely totally on Hashem for parnasah (Shu”t Shevet HaLevi 4:1:2). However, he agrees that this only applies only to rare individuals. There are stories about Gedolim such as Rav Yosef Chayim Sonnenfeld who made no normal hishtadlus to achieve his parnasah. These Gedolim too must have held like Rav Vozner. According to Rav Moshe’s approach, one may not deliberately adopt such a lifestyle.

Both Rav Moshe and Rav Vozner rule that regular people are required to have some type of parnasah, and that it is not a lack of bitachon to do so. Unless he is a great tzaddik, no one should assume that he has sufficient zechuyos to expect Hashem to provide his parnasah with no hishtadlus on his part. (Receiving a kollel stipend is also a method of hishtadlus.)

PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE

Is there a difference between working for one’s daily needs, and working to save money for future expenses? Is it a shortcoming in bitachon to save for the future?

The poskim bring evidence from Tosafos (Kiddushin 41a s.v. Asur #II) that it is not a shortcoming in halacha to make arrangements that take care of one’s future. The Gemara there rules that although a father has the halachic ability to marry off his daughter while she is a minor, he is prohibited to do so out of concern that when she grows up she may not like her husband. In Tosafos’ time however, underage daughters were married off in ostensible violation of this halacha. Why were they lenient?

Tosafos explains that in his turbulent times (the Baalei Tosafos lived during the period of the Crusades), a man who had sufficient means to provide his daughter with a dowry and thereby provide her with a husband, he was too marry her off immediately. If he delayed, he risked losing his money and could have become unable to marry her off. Tosafos does not contend that a person should have bitachon that he will be able to marry her off later.

Similarly, someone who has the means to purchase life insurance, an annuity, or other items that will make his life or the lives of his dependents more secure, should purchase them (Shu”t Yechaveh Daas 3:85; Shu”t Kochavei Yitzchak 1:22, both quoting several other poskim). Bitachon does not require someone to ignore future needs. Bitachon does require someone to realize that everything that happens is under Hashem’s supervision and control.

WHAT WILL I EAT TOMORROW?

But doesn’t this psak violate the statement that “Someone who has (today’s) bread in his basket, and asks, ‘What will I eat tomorrow?’ lacks faith” (Gemara Sotah 48b). Doesn’t this mean that someone who plans for tomorrow’s livelihood lacks bitachon?

The answer is no. This Gemara is discussing people’s emotions. Everyone must believe that Hashem provides for him and that whatever happens in under His control. Therefore the Gemara in Sotah objects to someone asking, “What will I eat tomorrow?” and ignoring Hashem’s supervision. However, this does not mean that making practical plans for the future is a violation of bitachon.

Another problematic Gemara is the following:

“Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai’s disciples asked him, ‘why did the Manna not fall for the Bnei Yisroel once a year (for the entire year)?’ He answered them, ‘I will give you a parable. A human king once provided his son with support on an annual basis. The son visited his father once a year to receive his allowance. Wanting to see his son more often, the father altered the system and began providing his son with support on a daily basis. Thereafter, his son visited his father every day. Similarly, the head of a large household worried that no Manna would fall on the morrow; thus he would pray daily for sustenance” (Gemara Yoma 76a). Doesn’t this Gemara imply that it is better for one’s parnasah to arrive one day at a time than to plan for the future?

Poskim give two answers to this question that are dependent on the dispute between Rav Vozner and Rav Moshe mentioned earlier. According to Rav Vozner, this Gemara reflects the ideal. A great tzaddik should indeed receive his parnasah one day at a time. However, most people are not at this madreiga and may plan for the future. According to Rav Moshe’s approach, the Gemara means that a person should mentally acknowledge every day that Hashem provides for all his needs. However, he is permitted and required to make hishtadlus, which includes planning for future needs. It should be noted that all the poskim that I have seen discussing this issue rule that purchasing life insurance qualifies as normal hishtadlus.

In this context, it is worthwhile to quote a midrash that demonstrates the obligation to make hishtadlus. Quoting the posuk, “L’ma’an Yevorechecha Hashem Elokecha b’chol maasecha asher taaseh,” “So that Hashem Your G-d will bless you in all your deeds that you will perform” (Devorim 14:29), the Midrash points out that the last two words of the posuk, “asher taaseh,” “that you will perform” are seemingly superfluous, because theTorah already stated, “b’chol maasecha,” “in all your deeds.” What is added with the words, “that you will perform?”

In answer to this question the Midrash explains, “The Torah states, ‘Keep the mitzvos.’ I might think that he should do nothing and expect his parnasah to come? Therefore the Torah repeats, ‘that you will perform.’ If you work you will receive blessing, and if you do not work you will not receive blessing,” (Midrash Shocher Tov). This Midrash proves that one has a responsibility to earn parnasah (cited by Shu”t Yechaveh Daas 3:85).

3. Loss of zechus

I have heard people give yet another reason why someone should not purchase life insurance. What happens if a husband does not have the personal zechuyos or mazel for longevity, while his wife and children do have the zechuyos or mazal to live financially secure lives? In a case like this, the husband would live a long productive life as their provider. By purchasing life insurance which guarantees their sustenance b’derech hateva even without his presence, he jeopardizes his life, since his dependents now have a source of financial support should something happen to him.

I saw this concern mentioned in one sefer (Shu”t Kochavei Yitzchak 1:22). In response to this argument, the author, Rav Yitzchok Sternhell, quoted the exact opposite approach in the name of the Shinaver Rav (Rav Yechezkel Shraga Halberstam, author of Divrei Yechezkel), who was one of the greatest poskim of his day in Galicia. The Shinaver contended that buying life insurance is a segulah for longevity. He argues that since the mazal of the people who own insurance companies is to become wealthy, their mazal will prevent them from losing money by having to pay out life insurance policies. Thus by purchasing a policy, one is actually rallying mazal to one’s side and not jeopardizing one’s life.

Another counter-argument runs as follows. If loss of zechus is a concern, there is a valid reason to refrain from accumulating any wealth. The wife and children of a man who ekes out a daily existence are far more dependent on him for their daily bread than the wife and children of a wealthy man; since he will leave them with a substantive inheritance should something happen to him. Thus, one could argue that accumulating wealth is not in one’s best interest.

I have never seen anyone refrain from accumulating wealth because of this concern, and have never seen any posek or sefer suggest this as a reason to avoid affluence. Therefore, I conclude that this is not a factor in the question of purchasing life insurance.

Rav Meir Shapiro, the founder of the Yeshivas Chachmei Lublin, had a very large life insurance policy even though he unfortunately had no children. His reason for this was that fundraising for the yeshiva was completely on his shoulders and he was concerned that in the event of his premature death, the yeshiva would be forced to close. We see that he was not concerned with the possibility that his zechuyos in raising money for the yeshiva would grant him longevity and felt that purchasing insurance was the correct course.

Ribbis issues. The acquisition of a typical life insurance policy should not involve any prohibition of Ribbis since it a risk venture, not an investment or loan. However, some annuities are structured so that they are loans according to halacha and might potentially involved questions of Ribbis. Someone who purchases an annuity should check this question with a Rav. Problematic cases can easily be alleviated with the use of a heter iska, which converts the loan to a form of investment.

In conclusion, this author is aware of about ten written teshuvos about the purchase of life insurance or annuities, from Poskim representing Litvishe, Chassidishe and Sefardic approaches. All ten of these teshuvos permit purchasing life insurance, and some encourage the practice strongly.

Of course, there are many other issues that come up in terms of bitachon, such as what profession or livelihood one pursues, whether to change careers or jobs that might jeopardize how much time one has to learn Torah, and how much time one should devote towards training for parnasah. These questions should be discussed with one’s Rav.

May we all be blessed with long years and good health.

“I know that I only eat from certain hechsherim. However, my sister-in-law, who is a very frum person, was told by her Rav that she can use a certain hechsher that I was told not to use. Don’t all the rabbonim follow the same Shulchan Aruch?”

“I have been told that it isn’t possible that there could be such a high percentage of glatt kosher to accommodate everyone purchasing it, and that the term is used incorrectly. Is this true?”

“Is there such a thing as non-glatt kosher veal?”

These are common questions, and indeed, explaining the distinctions between different kashrus standards could fill volumes. This article will be devoted exclusively to issues of kosher meat. By the time we finish this reading this article hopefully the answers to the above questions will be clarified.

THE BASICS OF KOSHER MEAT

There are several mitzvos involved in the preparation of kosher meat and poultry. Only certain species may be eaten, and these must be slaughtered in the halachically-approved way, shechitah. Even then, the animal or bird may still have defects that render it non-kosher. Finally, there are non-kosher parts that must be removed, specifically the gid hanasheh (the sciatic nerve), non-kosher fats called “cheilev,” and the non-kosher blood. After all these have been removed, the meat is finally ready to be prepared for the Jewish table.

In other articles, I discussed some of the contemporary issues concerning kosher animal, bird, and fish species. This article will discuss some halachic issues that occur after the shechitah.

THE BEDIKAH

Immediately following the slaughtering, the shochet (ritual slaughterer; plural, shochtim) checks visually to verify that he performed the shechitah correctly. This is a vitally important step – if this inspection is not performed, the animal or bird cannot be eaten.

Next, the animal or bird must be examined to ensure that it is not a treifah. Although in common usage the word “treif” means anything non-kosher for any reason whatsoever, technically the word refers to an animal with a physical defect that renders it non-kosher. The word treif literally means “torn,” and indeed the most common cause of a treifah is tearing or damage to the internal organs.

Organs where treifos are infrequent do not require inspection. In these instances, one may rely on the principle of “rov”- since the overwhelming majority is kosher, one need not check for treifos. However, an organ that has a high percentage of treifos must be checked to ensure that it is kosher. Thus, established halachic practice of over 1000 years is to check an animal’s lungs because of their high rate of treifos.

How high a percentage of treifos is needed to require examination? A dispute over this issue developed in the early nineteenth century between two great poskim, Rav Efrayim Zalman Margolies, the Rav of Brody (Shu”t Beis Efrayim, Yoreh Deah #6) and Rav Yaakov, the Rav of Karlin (Shu”t Mishkenos Yaakov, Yoreh Deah #16 & 17). The Beis Efrayim contended that it is not necessary to check for a treifah if we do not find that Chazal and early poskim required it, whereas the Mishkenos Yaakov contended that if a certain treifah occurs in ten per cent of animals one is required to check every animal for this treifah. (The halachic source for this figure of ten per cent is beyond the scope of this article.)

Reliable hechsherim tend to follow the Mishkenos Yaakov’s ruling and check for treifos that appear frequently. Thus, it is standard to check the stomachs and intestines of chickens and the lungs of turkeys for irregularities, and reliable hechsherim usually check the second stomach of cattle (the reticulum, called the beis hakosos in Hebrew) for damage that results from swallowed nails.

Geography can sometimes be a factor. For example, treifos are not found commonly in the lungs of chickens raised in North America, and therefore the hechsherim there do not check the lungs. On the other hand, it is far more common to find these problems in chickens raised in Israel. Thus, many poskim require chicken lungs in Israel to be checked for treifos. (I have heard different theories why there is a greater rate of treifos in the lungs of Israeli chickens, including that the heat and desert climate damage the lungs or that there are exposure to certain viruses, but the truth is that no one really knows.)

GLATT KOSHER

Before explaining the concept called glatt kosher, we must first discuss adhesions, a type of lesion that develops on the lungs of animals. An animal or bird with a tear in its lung is not kosher and this is one of the many types of treifah.

The Gemara rules that an animal with an adhesion (sircha) on its lung is also non-kosher (Chullin 46b), because this demonstrates that the lung once had a tear that was subsequently covered by the adhesion (Rashi ad loc.). A second reason given is that the adhesion would have eventually torn off and damaged the lung (Tosafos). Even though the animal was slaughtered before the adhesion tore off, the animal is considered non-kosher since it ultimately would have died as a result of the adhesion.

If the adhesion is between two adjacent sections of the lung, the animal is kosher, because the lung protects the adhesion from tearing.

Did the Gemara prohibit all adhesions or only ones that are difficult to remove? Is there a concern that even a thin adhesion might be covering a tear in the lung or will ultimately cause the lung to tear?

This halacha question is disputed by the Rishonim. The Rosh (Chullin 3:14), who was the foremost posek in Germany (Ashkenaz) in the Thirteenth Century, ruled that any sircha that is removed easily without damaging the lung is kosher. These easy-to-remove adhesions are called “ririn.” Based on his ruling, the custom amongst Ashkenazic Jewry was that a shochet who found a sircha on a lung would attempt to remove the sircha. If it could be removed without damaging the lung, the shochet declared the animal kosher. If the lung was completely clear of any adhesions, even ririn, the animal was declared “Glatt Kosher.” “Glatt” means “smooth” in Yiddish – in other words, the lung was smooth and had no adhesions at all.

The Rashba (Shu”t #304), who was the foremost posek in Spain (Sfarad) at the time, disagreed with Rosh, declaring that it is forbidden to remove adhesions, and that an animal with any adhesion is non-kosher even if the adhesion can be easily removed. He also declared that any shochet who removes sirchos in order to declare the animal kosher should be removed from his position if he has been warned to cease this practice and continues to do so.

(It is an interesting historical note that when the Rosh fled the persecutions in Germany for Spain, he became a houseguest of the Rashba in Barcelona. Eventually, the community of Toledo engaged the Rosh as its rav upon the recommendation of the Rashba.)

Shulchan Aruch follows the ruling of Rashba and declares that a shochet who removes sirchos is considered to have fed treif meat to Jews (Yoreh Deah 39:10). The Rama, however, points out that the custom in Ashkenaz was to permit meat from animals with easy-to-remove sirchos. The Rama explains that although the basis for the practice is tenuous, one should not rebuke those who are lenient. Clearly, the Rama himself is not advocating being lenient in this matter and preferred that people be strict. Furthermore, the Rama is only lenient when one knows that the bodek, the person checking the lung, is a G-d-fearing person who will be careful to remove the sircha gently (Yoreh Deah 39:13). Moreover even among Ashkenazic poskim, many were hesitant to be lenient.

Because of all this, the Gr”a ruled that one should not use non-glatt meat, that is meat from animals that have thin adhesions on the lungs.

Since Sefardim follow the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch over the Rama, they are not permitted to use non-glatt meat. Ashkenazim are permitted to follow the Rama and use non-glatt kosher meat, although it is preferable to be strict.

There is an additional reason to be strict. Based on a pasuk in Yechezkel (4:14), the Gemara concludes that a meticulous person does not eat meat that had a shaylah, even if it was paskened to be permitted (Chullin 44b). Because of this Gemara, hechsherim that cater to Bnei Torah attempt to certify only products that have no shaylos whatsoever. These hechsherim are usually referred to as “Mehadrin,” although it is important to note that there is no universal mehadrin standard. I have found hechsherim that refer to themselves as “mehadrin” or as “heimishe” that are indeed excellent, but I have also found hechsherim purporting to be “mehadrin” or “heimishe” whose standards are at best mediocre.

It should be noted that the lenience of removing adhesions from the lungs applies only to mature beef cattle. On birds and other animals, any lung that has a problematic adhesion would automatically be non-kosher. Thus, any poultry, veal and lamb that is kosher is by definition glatt kosher, and using the word “glatt” is superfluous. However, since consumers often assume that “glatt” means a higher standard of kosher, it is not uncommon to find these items advertised as “glatt kosher.” I have even seen dairy or pareve products sold as “glatt kosher,” which is a totally meaningless usage of the expression.

DIFFERENT DEFINITIONS OF GLATT

The Beis Dovid, a commonly used halacha work on the laws of shechitah, contends that adhesions that can be removed easily are not only considered kosher, but even qualify as glatt kosher (Section 2 pg. 72, #8:5, quoting Shu”t Daas HaZevach). Many hechsherim follow this opinion and consider such meat to be glatt kosher. However, other poskim dispute his conclusions and feel that this meat should not be used by Sefardim who are halachically required to use only glatt meat. Those who are strict in this shaylah often refer to their hechsher as “Glatt Beis Yosef.” However, this term (Glatt Beis Yosef) also has no precise definition. An experienced shochet/rav hamachshir once told me that it probably only means that in the opinion of the hechsher, the Beis Yosef himself would prefer eating this meat than some other kosher meat on the market.

Thus, two hechsherim may be called “glatt” and may not be using the same definition of the word.

KOSHER VEAL

As mentioned above, the heter of non-Glatt meat only exists in reference to mature beef cattle, but that lambs, kids, and young calves that have any sircha should be treated as non-kosher (see Rama Yoreh Deah 39:13). The logic behind this is that if a young calf already exhibits some signs of an adhesion, it is probably a kashrus problem and the animal should be considered treif. Thus, we would conclude from this that all veal should be either glatt or treif.

However, at this point the modern meat industry has created a new problem by attempting to convince the consumer that quality veal should be very light-colored, almost white. Since meat is naturally red and not white, this is accomplished by raising calves in drastically unnatural circumstances such as not feeding them a normal diet, not providing them with any iron in their diet, and not allowing them to exercise. This approach decreases the hemoglobin in the blood which gives the meat its red color. The result is that “white veal” or the misnomer “nature calves” often have a notorious high rate of treifos in the lungs as a result of the conditions in which they were raised. (It is known in the industry that if the grower improves the ventilation and sanitary conditions of his pens, the rate of kosher product increases.) For this reason, non-scrupulous meatpackers have plenty of temptation to bend the rules that define the kashrus of veal. (One shochet recently told me that he once shechted 114 “nature calves” that had been raised in non-sanitary conditions and had only one kosher!)

I was once scheduled to visit a veal shechitah to see whether it met the standards for the Vaad HaKashrus I headed at the time. Before visiting the plant, I called the rav giving the hechsher to find out his standard for accepting kosher veal. When I asked him if he “takes sirchos” on veal, he replied, “Of course we do, otherwise we would never have enough marked kosher!”

What an astonishing reply! At least he saved me a long trip. Yet, there are hechsherim that allow purchase of “kosher” veal from shechitos like this!

(I have heard very complicated halachic reasons to permit this standard. Suffice it to say that I consider the reasons unacceptable.)

REMOVING BLOOD

As mentioned above, before meat is ready for the pot, it must have several items removed. The non-kosher blood is removed from the meat either by broiling or through soaking and salting. Liver must be kashered by broiling. Except for certain extenuating circumstances, when kashering meat by salting it must be soaked for a half-hour and salted for an hour, with the salt covering all sides of the meat thoroughly. I have personally witnessed meat kashered inadequately in commercial facilities, usually because the workers are not given enough time or proper facilities to do the job correctly. However, any responsible hechsher will make certain that this does not happen.

In earlier times meat and liver were always kashered at home. Today, most housewives assume that the meat they purchase is already kashered. Thus, they often do not know how to kasher meat themselves, although concerned Jewish homemakers would do well to learn how to kasher meat and liver properly.

SEVENTY-TWO HOURS

Over a thousand years ago, the Gaonim established a new requirement in the processing of kosher meat. They ruled that if the meat was not soaked within seventy-two hours of its slaughter, the blood could no longer be removed by the soaking and salting method but only by broiling. Thus, it is paramount to kasher meat, or at least to soak it, within a few days of the shechitah. Many poskim are lenient to permit meat if it was soaked within the seventy-two hours, but different hechsherim have very different definitions as to what is considered properly “soaked.” In general, a mehadrin hechsher will not permit meat to be used unless it has been kashered within seventy-two hours of the shechitah, whereas a non-mehadrin hechsher will permit it. Similarly, a mehadrin hechsher will not allow the use of meat that has been frozen before it was kashered, whereas non-mehadrin hechsherim will allow the kashering of meat that was frozen for more than seventy-two hours.

TRABERING

The Torah prohibited certain fats, called cheilev, which are predominantly attached to the stomachs and the kidneys in the hindquarter. These non-kosher fats and the gid hanasheh are cut out of the meat in a process called “trabering.” This Yiddish word’s origin derives from the Aramaic word for non-kosher fat, tarba, and thus means, removing non-kosher fat. (The Hebrew word for the process is “nikur,” excising.)

Removing the gid hanasheh and forbidden fats from the hindquarters is an extremely arduous process that requires much skill and patience. Since most of the forbidden fats and the entire gid hanasheh and all its tributaries are in the hindquarters, the custom in many places is to use only meat from the forequarters, thus considerably simplifying the trabering process.

OTHER DIFFERENCES BETWEEN HECHSHERIM

There are also subtle distinctions between hechsherim, which might cause one Rav to approve a shechitah and make another Rav uncomfortable. When is a shechitah line considered operating too quickly for the shochtim and bodkim to do their jobs properly? When is a plant considered understaffed? Are the tags that identify the meat as kosher kept under proper supervision? Are the shochtim yirei shamayim (G-d fearing)?

Thus, it could indeed happen that one rav considers a shechitah acceptable and another rav feels that it is not. The differences may be based on the interpretation of halacha, or they may result from a rav’s inclination as to how a plant should be run.

Based on the above information we can better understand many aspects of the preparation of kosher meat and why it is important to use only meat that has a proper hechsher. We can also gain a greater appreciation as to how hard rabbonim and shochtim work to maintain a high kashrus standard.

We should always hope and pray that the food we eat fulfills all the halachos that the Torah commands us.

Today, I will be meeting someone who is extremely concerned and knowledgeable about halacha, yet doesn’t even keep a kosher home. Neither has he ever observed Shabbos. On the other hand, he is meticulous to observe every detail of Choshen Mishpat.

Who is this individual?

Allow me to introduce you to John Adams who is a practicing Noahide, or, as he prefers to call himself, an Adamite.

Adams asserts that he descends from the two famous presidents, a claim that I have never verified and have no reason to question. Raised in New England and a graduate of Harvard Law School, John rejected the tenets of the major Western religions but retained a very strong sense of G-d’s presence and the difference between right and wrong. Study and introspection led him to believe that G-d probably had detailed instructions for mankind, and sincere questioning led him to discover that of the Western religions, only Judaism does not claim a monopoly on heaven. A non-Jew who observes the Seven Laws taught to Noah and believes that G-d commanded them at Har Sinai has an excellent place reserved for him in olam haba.

John began the practice of these laws. John is quick to point out that, with only one exception, these laws were all commanded originally to Adam. Since John is proud of his family name and lineage, he likes calling himself an Adamite.

What are the basics of Noahide practice?

We all know that a gentile is required to observe seven mitzvos, six of them prohibitions, to avoid: idolatry, incest, murder, blasphemy, theft, and eiver min hachai (which we will soon discuss), and the seventh, the mitzvah of having dinim, whose nature is controversial. The Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah #416) and others note that these seven mitzvos are actually categories, and a non-Jew is really required to observe several dozen mitzvos.

Kosher, Noah style

I asked John if eating meat presents any religious problems for him.

“Well, you know that Noah was prohibited from eating meat or an organ that was severed before the animal died, a prohibition you call eiver min hachai,” said John, obviously proud that he could pronounce the expression correctly. “So sometimes I come across meat that I may not eat. The following question once came up: Moslem slaughter, called halal, involves killing the animal in a way that many of its internal organs are technically severed from the animal before it is dead. Because of this, we are very careful where we purchase our organ meats.”

May a Noahide Eat Out?

“This problem went even further,” John continued. “Could we eat in a restaurant where forbidden meats may have contaminated their equipment?”

I admit that I had never thought of this question before. Must a gentile be concerned that a restaurant’s equipment absorbed eiver min hachai? Does a Noahide needs to “kasher” a treif restaurant before he can eat there? Oy, the difficulty of being a goy!

“How did you resolve this dilemma?” I timidly asked.

“Well, for a short time our family stopped eating out,” he replied. “You could say that we ate only treif at home. My wife found the situation intolerable – no MacDonald’s or Wendy’s? Although I know that observant Jews do not understand why this is such a serious predicament, but please bear in mind that we made a conscious decision not to become Jewish. One of our reasons was that we enjoy eating out wherever we can.

“So I decided to ask some rabbis I know, but even then the end of the road was not clearly in sight.”

“Why was that?”

“I had difficulty finding a rabbi who could answer the question. From what I understand, a rabbi’s ordination teaches him the basics necessary to answer questions that apply to kosher kitchens. But I don’t have a kosher house – we observe Adamite laws. As one rabbi told me, ‘I don’t know if Noahides need to be concerned about what was previously cooked in their pots.’”

“How did you resolve the predicament?”

How treif is treif?

“Eventually, we found a rabbi who contended that we need not be concerned about how pots and grills were previously used. He explained that we could assume that they had not been used for eiver min hachai in the past 24 hours, which certainly sounds like a viable assumption, and that therefore using them would only involve the possibility of a rabbinic prohibition, and that we gentiles are not required to observe rabbinic restrictions. The last part makes a lot of sense, since there is nothing in the Seven Laws about listening to the rabbis, although I agree that they are smart and sincere people. [Note: I am not certain who it was that John asked. According to Shu”t Chasam Sofer, Yoreh Deah #19 (at end), there would be no heter to use pots that once absorbed eiver min hachai. There are poskim who disagree with Chasam Sofer (see Darchei Teshuvah 62:5), but many of these hold that there is no prohibition altogether with a gentile using pots absorbed with eiver min hachai.]

“The result is that we now go out to eat frequently, which makes my wife very happy. It was a good decision for our marital bliss, what you call shalom bayis. Although I understand that this is another idea we are not required to observe, it is good, common sense.”

Milah in the Adams Family

When John’s son was born, he raised an interesting shaylah. To quote him: “Circumcision as a religious practice originates with G-d’s covenant with Abraham, the first Jew. But my covenant with G-d predates Abraham and does not include circumcision. However, even though there was no religious reason for my son to be circumcised, my wife and I thought it was a good idea for health reasons. On the other hand, I know that many authorities forbid a gentile, which I technically am, from observing any commandments that he is not specifically commanded (see Rambam, Hilchos Melachim 10:9).”

John is a very gregarious type, and loves to explain things fully. “We actually had two concerns about whether we could circ John Jr. The second one was that many authorities contend that the seventh mitzvah of instating ‘Laws,’ which you call ‘Dinim,’ includes a prohibition against injuring someone (Ramban, Genesis, oops, I mean Bereishis 34:13). According to this opinion, someone who hits someone during a street fight may lose his world to come for violating one of our seven tenets. I have come too far to risk losing my share in the world to come, so I try very hard not to violate any of the laws. I called some rabbis I know to ask whether there was any problem with circumcising my son for health reasons. The rabbi I asked felt that since we are doing this for medical reasons, it is similar to donating blood or undergoing surgery. The upshot was that we did what no self-respecting Jew should ever do: We had a pediatrician circumcise John Jr. on the third day after his birth, to emphasize that we were not performing any mitzvah.”

No Bris

Proud to show off his Hebrew, John finished by saying: “So we had a milah, but no bris. We also decided to skip the bagels and lox. Instead, my wife and I decided it was more appropriate to celebrate with shrimp cocktails, even though primordial Adam didn’t eat shrimp. All types of meat were only permitted to Noah after the Deluge, which you call the mabul. I believe that some authorities rule that Adam was permitted road kill and was only prohibited from slaughtering, while others understand he had to be strictly vegetarian. My wife and I discussed whether to go vegetarian to keep up the Adams tradition, but decided that if meat was ‘kosher’ enough for Noah, it is kosher enough for us. We decided we weren’t keeping any stringent practices even if they become stylish.”

Earning a Living

“Have you experienced any other serious dilemmas due to your being an ‘Adamite?’”

“Oh, yes. I almost had to change my career.”

I found this very curious. As John Adams seemed like an honest individual, it seemed unlikely that he had made his living by stealing or any similar dishonest activity.

Non-Jews are forbidden to perform abortions, which might affect how a Noahide gynecologist earns a living, but John is a lawyer, not a doctor. Even if John used to worship idols or had the bad habit of blaspheming, how would that affect his career?

May a Gentile Practice Law?

John’s research into Noahide law led him to the very interesting conclusion that his job as an assistant district attorney was halachically problematic. Here is what led him to this conclusion.

One of the mitzvos, or probably more accurately, categories of mitzvos, in which a Noahide is commanded in the mitzvah of dinim, literally, laws. The authorities dispute the exact definition and nature of this mitzvah. It definitely includes a requirement that gentile societies establish courts and prosecute those who violate the Noahide laws (Tosefta, Avodah Zarah 9:4; Rambam, Hilchos Melachim 9:14). Some authorities contend that the mitzvah of dinim prohibits injuring or abusing others or damaging their property (Ramban, Breishis 34:13).

However, this dispute leads to another issue that was more germane to John’s case. There is a major dispute among halachic authorities whether Noahides are governed by the Torah’s rules of property laws, which we refer to as Choshen Mishpat (Shu”t Rama #10), or whether the Torah left it to non-Jews to formulate their own property and other civil laws. If the former is true, a non-Jew may not sue in a civil court that uses any system of law other than the Torah. Instead, he must litigate in a beis din or in a court of non-Jewish judges who follow halachic guidelines. Following this approach, if a gentile accepts money based on civil litigation, he is considered as stealing, just as a Jew is. This approach is accepted by many early poskim (e.g., Tumim 110:3). Some authorities extend this mitzvah further, contending that the mitzvos governing proper functioning of courts and civil laws apply to Noahides (Minchas Chinuch #414; 415). Following this approach, enforcing a criminal code that does not follow the Torah rules violates the mitzvah of dinim.

As John discovered, some authorities extend this idea quite far. For example, one of the mitzvos of the Torah prohibits a beis din from convicting or punishing someone based on circumstantial evidence (Rambam, Sefer HaMitzvos, Lo Saaseh #290; Sefer HaChinuch #82). If the same applies to the laws of dinim, a gentile court has no right to use circumstantial evidence (Minchas Chinuch #82, #409). Thus, John was faced with an interesting predicament. According to these opinions, a gentile who prosecutes because of circumstantial evidence might violate the Seven Mitzvos of Noah even if the accused party appears to be guilty. It is understood that according to these opinions, one may not prosecute for the violation of a crime that the Torah does not consider to be criminal, or to sue for damages for a claim that has no halachic basis.

Napoleonic Code and Halacha

On the other hand, other authorities contend that non-Jews are not obligated to observe the laws of Choshen Mishpat; but instead the Torah requires them to create their own legal rules and procedures (HaEmek Shaylah #2:3; Chazon Ish, Bava Kamma 10:1). These authorities rule that gentiles perform a mitzvah when creating a legal system for themselves such as the Napoleonic Code, English Common Law, or any other commercial code. Following this approach, a non-Jew may use secular courts to resolve his litigation and even fulfills a mitzvah by doing so. Thus, John could certainly continue his work as a D.A. and that it would be a mitzvah for him to do so.

It is interesting to note that following the stricter ruling in this case also creates a leniency. According to those who rule that a gentile is not required to observe the laws of Choshen Mishpat, a gentile may not study these laws, since the Torah prohibits a gentile from studying Torah (see Tosafos, Bava Kamma 38a s.v. karu; cf., however, that the Meiri, Sanhedrin 59a, rules that a gentile who decides to observe a certain mitzvah may study the laws of that mitzvah in order to fulfill it correctly.) However, according to those who contend that the mitzvos of dinim follow the laws of Choshen Mishpat, a gentile is required to study these laws in order to observe his mitzvos properly (Shu”t Rama #10)).

John’s Dilemma

The rabbis with whom John consulted felt that a gentile could work as a district attorney. However, John had difficulty with this approach. He found it difficult to imagine that G-d would allow man to make such basic decisions and felt it more likely that mankind was expected to observe the Torah’s civil code. He therefore gravitated to the opinion of those who held that gentiles are required to observe the laws of Choshen Mishpat. As a result, he felt that he should no longer work in the D.A.’s office, since his job is to prosecute based on laws and a criminal justice system that the Torah does not accept.

“What did you do?”

“I decided to ‘switch sides’ and become a defense attorney, which has a practical advantage because I make a lot more money.”

“How do you handle a case where you know that your client is guilty?”

“Firstly, is he guilty according to halachah? Did he perform a crime? Is there halachically acceptable evidence? If there is no halachically acceptable evidence, he is not required to plead guilty. Furthermore, since none of my clients are Noahides or observant Jews, they can’t make it to heaven anyway, so let them enjoy themselves here. Even if my client is guilty, the punishment determined by the court is not halachically acceptable. It is very unclear whether jail terms are halachically acceptable punishment for gentiles. Philosophically, I was always opposed to jail time. I think that there are better ways to teach someone to right their ways than by incarceration, which is a big expense for society.”

Interesting Noahide Laws

“Have you come across any other curious issues?”

“Here is a really unusual question I once raised,” John responded. “Am I permitted to vote in the elections for a local judge? According to some authorities, the Torah’s prohibition against appointing a judge who is halachically incompetent applies equally to gentiles (Minchas Chinuch #414). Thus, one may not appoint a judge to the bench who does not know the appropriate Torah laws, which precludes all the candidates. When I vote for one of those candidates, I am actively choosing a candidate who is halachically unqualified to judge. I therefore decided that although there are authorities who rule this is permitted, and that therefore it is permitted to vote, I wanted to be consistent in my position. As a result, I vote religiously, but not for judgeships.

Becoming Jewish

“John, did you ever consider becoming Jewish?”

“First of all, I know that the rabbis will discourage me from becoming Jewish, particularly since I don’t really want to. I know exactly what I am required to keep and I keep that properly. I have no interest in being restricted where and what I eat, and I have no interest in observing Shabbos, which, at present, I may not observe anyway, and that is fine with me (Gemara Sanhedrin 58b). I am very willing to be a ‘Shabbos goy’— and I understand well what the Jews need — but it is rare that I find myself in this role. Remember, I do not live anywhere near a Jewish community.

Although I have never learned how to read Hebrew – why bother, I am not supposed to study Torah anyway – I ask enough questions from enough rabbis to find out all I need to know.

In Conclusion

Although it seems strange for a non-Jew to ask a rav a shaylah, this should actually be commonplace. Indeed, many non-Jews are concerned about their future place in Olam Haba and, had the nations not been deceived by spurious religions, many thousands more would observe the mitzvos that they are commanded. When we meet sincere non-Jews, we should direct them correctly in their quest for truth. Gentiles who observe these mitzvos because Hashem commanded them through Moshe Rabbeinu are called “Chassidei Umos HaOlam” and merit a place in Olam Haba.