Question #1: Klal hatzarich lifrat
What is the difference between a klal ufrat and a klal shehu tzarich lifrat?
Question #2: Prat shehu tzarich lichlal
What is the difference between a prat uchlal and a prat shehu tzarich lichlal?
Question #3: Frequency
Which klal shehu tzarich lifrat is the most commonly occurring in Chumash?
Introduction
At the end of the korbanos section of our daily morning prayers, we quote a beraisa that cites the thirteen midos, hermeneutic (check your dictionary) rules of Rabbi Yishmael. These are a listing of methods whereby the laws of the Torah shebe’al peh are derived from the Written Torah. These midos were taught to Moshe Rabbeinu at Har Sinai as part of the Oral Torah. The midos are a backup system to recover the Oral Laws should, G-d forbid, any of them be forgotten.
The first six of Rabbi Yishmael’s list — kal vachomer, gezeirah shavah, binyan av, klal ufrat, prat uchlal, klal ufrat uchlal — are far more commonly used than are most of the others, and are familiar to someone who has studied a significant amount of Gemara. This article will focus on the difference between the fairly common rule of klal ufrat and the uncommon klal hatzarich lifrat, which appears only a few times in the entire Talmud. Explaining the difference between these two created much literature during the generations of the rishonim and the early acharonim. This article will attempt to be non-controversial, but to explain the differences in a clear way.
Klal ufrat refers to a klal, a generality, and a prat, a specification. The rule of klal ufrat applies when the Torah states a generality followed by a specification. The rule applied is ein bichlal ela mah shebe’prat, we derive only what the detail includes. For example, the Torah says: “A person who offers a korban from animals may bring cattle or flock” (Vayikra 1:2). “From animals” is a klal, since it implies that someone could offer any species of animal as a korban, whereas “from cattle or flock” is a prat, limiting the species that one can offer as korbanos to cattle, sheep and goats. Because the rule applied to a klal ufrat is ein bichlal ela mah shebe’prat, these three species are the only mammals that may be offered as sacrifices, even though there are many other kosher mammals, including antelope, bison, buffalo, deer, giraffe, musk ox and yak. Although these latter may be eaten, they cannot be offered as korbanos, even as voluntary donations.
Prat uchlal
Prat uchlal is the exact opposite of a klal ufrat; it involves a specific example followed by a general category. In this instance, the general category is all-inclusive and not limited to the specific example. To illustrate: The Torah teaches, “You may not see your brother’s ox or sheep wandering and hide yourself from them. You must return them to your brother…. You shall do so for his donkey, you shall do so for his garment and you shall do so for any item that your brother has lost” (Devarim 22:1 and 3). The general category “any item” follows several, specific examples – ox, sheep, donkey and garment. Because of the rule of prat uchlal, the obligation to return lost property applies to any lost item, not only to those specified in the verse.
Klal hatzarich lifrat
At this point, I need to explain my opening question, “What is the difference between a klal ufrat and a klal shehu tzarich lifrat?”
The next rule taught in the beraisa of Rabbi Yishmael is Klal shehu tzarich lifrat, prat shehu tzarich lichlal. Although the name of this rule may sound similar to klal ufrat above, this is a completely different rule and applies only in special circumstances. The word tzarich means that the klal cannot be understood without the subsequent prat. In other words, the original klal has more than one interpretation and bears widely ranging meanings and halachic applications. The correct interpretation of the klal can be achieved only by use of the prat (Rashi and Tosafos, Chullin 88b; Ra’avad, Introduction to the Sifra; Halichos Olam 4:32; Yavin Shemuah ad loc.).
It will be easiest to explain this concept with a few examples: The Torah (Vayikra 17:13) commands us that, after shechting fowl or chayos (such as deer or antelope), we are required וכסהו בעפר, vechisahu be’afar, “to cover the blood with earth.” The word “cover,” both in English and its Hebrew original root word כסה, can mean several different things. For example, let us examine the word as it is used in Parshas Vayeishev where the pasuk describes how Yehudah convinced his brothers not to murder Yosef: mah betza ki naharog es achinu vechisinu (shoresh כסה) es damo, “What do we profit if we kill our brother and ‘cover’ his blood” (Bereishis 37:26). The successful way of “covering” foul play is to obliterate the murdered man’s blood in a way that no one will ever see it again. This would mean that they would hide his blood, presumably by burying it deeply underground.
Similarly, in Parshas Vayeira (Bereishis 18:17), Hashem says, “Will I hide המכסה)) from Avraham what I am about to do” (Ra’avad to Toras Kohanim)? Yet another example is the following passage from Mishlei (11:13), Holeich rachil megaleh sod vene’eman ruach mechaseh (again with the shoresh כסה) davar, “A gossip reveals secrets, whereas someone reliable hides matters” (quoted in this context by Halichos Olam 4:32). In each of these instances, the word כסה means to “hide” in the sense of reducing visibility or making unknown. Understanding the word vechisahu this way in the context of kisui hadam would result in a mistake: that the mitzvah is to hide or obliterate the blood by pouring it down a drain or burying it upon bedrock in the bowels of the earth. One might think that the mitzvah is to make sure that Scotland Yard cannot detect that an animal was slaughtered here. Others explain that it might mean to place a board, plate or bowl on top of the blood, which also covers it.
When the word be’afar is added to the expression vechisahu, it now means to mix the blood with earth and to have the liquid of the blood absorbed by a powder or something similar (Rashi and Tosafos, Chullin 88b; Ra’avad, Sifra; Halichos Olam 4:32; Yavin Shemuah; cf. Rabbeinu Tam, Chullin op. cit.). The halacha is that any similar powder fulfills the mitzvah lechatchilah, including sawdust, sand, ashes or even gold dust (Chullin 88b), for those with expensive tastes. It is perfectly permitted to have the color of the blood, and thus its existence, completely noticeable, which would not “hide” the blood from Sherlock Holmes. Thus, the word be’afar changes the entire meaning of the word vechisahu, and the halacha that results is completely different. This is why it is called a klal shehu tzarich lifrat, meaning that the prat is necessary for the klal to be understood correctly.
Another example
The Toras Kohanim that quotes and explains the beraisa of Rabbi Yishmael provides the following example to help us understand this principle. Parshas Bo contains the following pasuk: “Sanctify for Me every firstborn, the first to descend from any womb among the Benei Yisrael, whether human or animal (Shemos 13:2). Another pasuk, states: “Every firstborn male that will be born among your cattle or your flock you shall sanctify to Hashem”(Devarim 15:19). The first pasuk attributes sanctity to “every firstborn,” which should also include every female firstborn. A literal reading of this pasuk implies that we are required to redeem a firstborn daughter just as there is such a mitzvah for the firstborn son. Additionally, the firstborn female lamb, kid, calf or donkey foal would have sanctity. Only the detail in the second pasuk teaches that this kedusha is restricted to male offspring, teaching that there is a mitzvah of pidyon haben only, but not of pidyon habas.
But what about a firstborn male born via Caeserian section? Is he not firstborn? Or, for that matter, the firstborn son who is born after an older sister? Doesn’t the pasuk in Devarim say that “Every firstborn male… you shall sanctify”? Is he not technically a “firstborn male” and he should require a pidyon haben?
The answer to this question is that the klal shehu tzarich lifrat teaches that we are not to explain either the words, “Sanctify for Me every firstborn,” or the words, “Every firstborn male,” literally, but that both klalim are to be explained according to the combined pratim of both pesukim. The result is that only a male, naturally born as his mother’s first offspring has the sanctity and laws of a bechor (Bechoros 19a).
Here is a third example of a klal shehu tzarich lifrat: In describing the punishment of the daughter of a kohein who commits adultery, the Torah teaches ba’eish tisareif, “She shall be burned in fire” (Vayikra 21:9). This is a slightly variant type of klal shehu tzarich lifrat, because the word ba’eish, “in fire,” the prat, comes before “she shall be burned,” the klal. It is still a klal shehu tzarich lifrat — the klal, tisareif, requires the prat to explain what it means.
By the way, the Torah says either ba’eish tisareif or ba’eish yisareif in five other places. Each of these instances is understood the same way halachically.
Prat shehu tzarich lichlal
Prat shehu tzarich lichlal is not a new, different rule, but another application of the rule of klal shehu tzarich lifrat. In this instance, the prat requires the klal to explain what it means. Without the klal, the prat would be misinterpreted.
In preparation of this article, I tried to find examples of prat shehu tzarich lichlal. Neither the beraisa of Rabbi Yishmael nor the Toras Kohanim that explains this beraisa provide any example; nor does the Ra’avad in his commentary. The only explicit example I found is an explanation of a case that we mentioned above, the case of bechor. Rashi (Bechoros 19a) notes that the words zachar, “male,” and peter rechem, the “first to descend from the womb,” are both pratim that, on their own, would include more cases than the halacha requires. Zachar would have included the oldest male born, even when he has an older sister or sisters. The prat, zachar, requires a klal, bechor, to explain that only when the oldest male is also the firstborn does he have kedusha.
Similarly, the prat, peter rechem, would mean the first to be born naturally, notwithstanding that he has older brothers who were born via Caeserian section. Only because we have the klal, bechor, do we know that the prat is limited to a firstborn who is born naturally. Therefore, the halachic conclusion is dependent not only on klal shehu tzarich lifrat but also on prat shehu tzarich lichlal.
Prat shehu tzarich lichlal
We now have enough information to answer the second of our opening questions: “What is the difference between prat uchlal and prat shehu tzarich lichlal?”
They are totally different methods of learning halachos. A prat uchlal widens the rule just taught to include anything that would be included in the klal, whereas a prat shehu tzarich lichlal is soemthing that would be misunderstood would it not be for both terms used by the pasuk. It allows us to zero in on what the Torah is teaching.
We can also now answer the third of our opening questions: “Which klal shehu tzarich lifrat is the most commonly occurring in Chumash?”
The answer is that the verses ba’eish tisareif or ba’eish yisareif show up six times in the Torah and are examples of klal shehu tzarich lifrat.
Be’ezras Hashem, we will continue this topic of analyzing the thirteen midos taught by Rabbi Yishmael in future weeks.
