Curious Kiddush Shaylos

The Torah commands us to declare the sanctity of Shabbos, a mitzvah we fulfill when we recite Kiddush before beginning the meal. Notwithstanding that this mitzvah appears very clear cut, it sometimes involves interesting shaylos.

We recite Kiddush before the seudah at night and also Shabbos morning. The Torah mitzvah of Kiddush is fulfilled at night and has two brachos, one is on the wine and the other is the special Kiddush bracha. The daytime Kiddush was instituted by Chazal to demonstrate the specialness of Shabbos meals – therefore, we drink a cup of wine immediately before the meals begin. (The pesukim that we recite before this Kiddush are a later minhag, presumably to emphasize that we are reciting Kiddush.)

One is forbidden to eat or drink before reciting Kiddush. The poskim dispute whether an ill or weak person who eats before davening should make Kiddush before doing so. There is also a dispute whether a woman makes Kiddush before eating breakfast on Shabbos morning, or whether she does not need to make Kiddush until she eats later with her husband.

Someone who failed to recite the full Kiddush at night, for whatever reason, must recite it before or during one of the Shabbos day meals (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 271:8). We will discuss later an interesting application of this rule.

You can fulfill the mitzvah of Kiddush either by reciting it yourself or hearing it from someone who is reciting it. When the head of household recites Kiddush, he does so for everyone at the table. Everyone is yotzei Kiddush, he by reciting it and, everyone else, by hearing it. This is referred to as the baal habayis being “motzi” the others in their mitzvah.

Several requirements must be met in order to fulfill the mitzvah through hearing someone else’s Kiddush. One of the requirements is that the person reciting Kiddush must be obligated in the mitzvah. For this reason, only an adult can be motzi other adults.

When I was twelve years old, I once spent Shabbos with my widowed grandmother, a”h. She wanted me, as the “man” of the house, to recite Kiddush, and I was happy to oblige. Years later, it occurred to me that my recital did not fulfill her obligation to fulfill the mitzvah of Kiddush, since I was under bar mitzvah at the time.

HEARING KIDDUSH

The people fulfilling the mitzvah must hear the Kiddush. Therefore, if the baal habayis mumbles inaudibly, they do not fulfill the mitzvah. Trying to solve this problem can sometimes create shalom bayis issues or hurt someone’s feelings. A rav’s direction may be very helpful.

Someone once asked me the following shaylah. His father-in-law recited Kiddush in a very garbled manner. Even if his father-in-law, indeed, recited a full Kiddush, he (the son-in-law) did not hear enough to be yotzei. How could he fulfill the mitzvah of Kiddush without hurting anyone’s feelings?

I proposed two possible suggestions. One was to find some practical excuse why he (the son-in-law) should recite his own Kiddush after his father-in-law (such as, this is his personal custom). Alternatively, if this is not a practical solution, he and his wife could discreetly make Kiddush in their own room, beforehand. (Of course, this solution will not help when their children get older.) Later in this article, we will discuss whether one can recite Kiddush in one room and eat in another.

KEEP THEM IN MIND

It is necessary that the person making Kiddush intend to be motzi those who want to fulfill the mitzvah, and they must have intent to fulfill the mitzvah with his recital. This leads us to a curious situation that once happened to me.

The hosts where we were eating honored me to recite Kiddush first – or so I thought. I assumed that I was reciting Kiddush for myself, and that the baal habayis would then recite Kiddush for his family. However, upon completing my Kiddush, it became clear that the family had assumed that I had made Kiddush for them, as well. But since this was not my intention, they were not yotzei.

It turned out that the head of household was embarrassed to recite Kiddush in my presence. Under the unusual circumstances, I may well have ended up reciting Kiddush twice, one right after the other, because the family still needed someone to be motzi them in Kiddush. Thus, if the baal habayis was still reluctant to recite Kiddush, I could have recited it a second time for them, because of the concept “Yatza motzi,” “someone who has already fulfilled the mitzvah may recite Kiddush, another time, for someone who has not yet fulfilled it.”

HOW CAN I RECITE KIDDUSH WHEN I HAVE ALREADY PERFORMED THE MITZVAH?

One may recite a birkas hamitzvah (a bracha on a mitzvah) on behalf of another person (presuming that we are both obligated to fulfill this mitzvah), even if one is not presently fulfilling this mitzvah, because of the principle “kol Yisroel areivim zeh lazeh,” “all Jews are responsible for one another,” (Rosh Hashanah 29a). This concept of “areivus” means that, since I am responsible to help another Jew observe mitzvos, his responsibility to fulfill a particular mitzvah is also my mitzvah. Since I am responsible to see that my fellow Jew makes Kiddush, I can recite the Kiddush bracha on his behalf. For this same reason, I may blow shofar in a shul and recite the brachos for other people, even if I fulfilled the mitzvah of shofar earlier.

MAKING KIDDUSH WHEN I WILL FULFILL THE MITZVAH LATER

I was once asked the following shaylah. Mr. Hirsch was hospitalized, and his wife was unable to make Kiddush for her family. Mr. Goldberg, one of the Hirsch’s neighbors, asked whether he could make Kiddush for the Hirsch family on his way home from shul, and then go home and make Kiddush for his own family. I told him that this was perfectly acceptable. However, if he was not planning to eat anything at the Hirsch residence, he should not drink the Kiddush wine but, instead, ask one of the Hirsch adults to drink most of a revi’is (about one-and-a-half ounces) from the cup (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 273:4; 271:13). I will explain, shortly, why Mr. Goldberg should not drink from the Hirsch goblet.

This seems strange. How can Mr. Goldberg recite “borei pri hagafen” and not drink any wine?

THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE DIFFERENT TYPES OF BRACHOS

The answer to this question needs an introduction. It is true that one cannot recite a bracha on food or fragrance (birkas ha’ne’henin) for someone else’s benefit, unless he is anyway making that bracha for himself. This is because the other person is not fulfilling any obligatory mitzvah by reciting these brachos. He needs to recite a bracha because he is gaining benefit, not because he is obligated to perform a mitzvah. Therefore, the rule of areivus does not apply in this case. Because the other person has no obligation to recite a bracha, someone else does not share in his mitzvah and cannot make the bracha on his behalf.

However, the bracha on Kiddush wine is different, because it is considered part of the obligatory mitzvah of Kiddush (Rosh Hashanah 29a). Therefore, Mr. Goldberg can make borei pri hagafen for the Hirsches, even though he is not drinking any wine. (It should be noted that it is disputed whether this halacha is true for the daytime Kiddush.)

AN INTERESTING APPLICATION

Sometimes one has guests for a Shabbos daytime meal who have not yet fulfilled the mitzvah of Kiddush this Shabbos. (A common application is when a guest is not yet observant.) This provides one with an opportunity to perform the additional mitzvah (in addition to exposing one’s guests to Shabbos) of Kiddush. As explained above, the normal daytime Kiddush is not a replacement for the night Kiddush. Therefore, reciting the daytime Kiddush will not help our not-yet-observant lunch guests fulfill the mitzvah of Kiddush this Shabbos. How can one alleviate the situation?

Since Kiddush can be recited the entire Shabbos day, one should recite both brachos of the Friday night Kiddush before the daytime meal, on behalf of his guests. Although he has already fulfilled the mitzvah, he can still be motzi his guests. However, in order to do so, he must explain to them that hearing Kiddush is a mitzvah, and that they should listen to him with the intent to fulfill the mitzvah. (It is always a good idea to do this, so that one’s guests know to fulfill the mitzvah.)

WHY COULDN’T MR. GOLDBERG DRINK THE CUP OF WINE?

Before answering this question, we need to explain the concept of Ein Kiddush ela bimkom seudah, “Kiddush must be recited in the place that one will be eating a meal” (Pesachim 101a).

The Gemara relates the following story. One Friday evening, Rabba made Kiddush. Although his disciple Abaye was present, Abaye planned to eat his Shabbos meal in his own lodgings. Rabba urged Abaye to “taste something” before he left, voicing concern that the light in Abaye’s lodging might extinguish before his arrival, making it impossible to make Kiddush there. (I presume that Abaye was unable to locate his wine in the dark.) Rabba pointed out that Abaye would not be yotzei with the Kiddush he just heard unless he ate something at Rabba’s house because of Ein Kiddush ela bimakom seudah (Pesachim 101a).

This halacha is derived from the pasuk, Vekarasa laShabbos oneg (Yeshayahu 58:13), which Chazal midrashically interpret to mean, “In the place where you declare the Kiddush of Shabbos, you should also celebrate your Shabbos meal” (Rashbam and Tosafos ad loc.). From this we derive that one must eat a meal in the place that one recites Kiddush.

WHAT IS CONSIDERED THE SAME PLACE?

The Gemara rules that someone fulfills the mitzvah of Kiddush if he recited (or heard) Kiddush in one part of a large room and ate in a different part of the room, since the entire room is considered the same place. Some poskim contend that one should not move to a different part of the house between making Kiddush and eating, unless he knew at the time of Kiddush that he might do this (Magen Avraham 273:1; Mishnah Berurah 273:3). Even this should be done only under extenuating circumstances (see Biur Halacha 273:1). However, if one recited Kiddush in one building and then went to a different building without eating, one certainly did not fulfill the mitzvah of Kiddush and must recite (or hear) it again. This is why Mr. Goldberg could not drink the Hirsch’s wine. Since he had no intent to eat at the Hirsch’s house, he could not fulfill the mitzvah of Kiddush there. Therefore, he also couldn’t drink the wine, since one cannot drink before fulfilling the mitzvah of Kiddush. (According to most, but not all, poskim, Mr. Goldberg has another option: he could drink the Kiddush and then another cup of wine. This would be considered Kiddush bimkom seudah.)

KIDDUSH IN SHUL

These two concepts (areivus and ein Kiddush ela bimkom seudah) are the basis of the custom that the chazzan recites Kiddush in shul Friday evening, without drinking the cup of wine.

Why is Kiddush recited in shul at the end of Friday evening davening?

The Gemara mentions that, in its time, guests often stayed and ate their Shabbos meals in rooms attached to the shul, and someone recited Kiddush in shul on their behalf. Since the guests were eating in the same building, it was considered Kiddush bimkom seudah and they fulfilled their mitzvah.

However, the chazzan who makes Kiddush does not fulfill his mitzvah, since he is eating his meal at his house, which is in a different building. Therefore, he should not drink the Kiddush wine. Instead, it should be drunk by a guest eating in the building, and, if there are no guests, the cup is drunk by children who are permitted to drink or eat before Kiddush. (Although, in general, children should be taught to keep mitzvos like adults, there is no requirement of chinuch in this case, a topic to discuss in a different article.)

ANOTHER INTERESTING SHAYLAH

I was once asked the following question by someone who was a guest at a Shabbos bar mitzvah:

“The baal simcha made Kiddush in the shul immediately after davening, but the reception was conducted in the shul’s social hall. Is this an acceptable way to fulfill the mitzvah?”

Based on the above discussion, we can answer this question. If the social hall was in a different building, they would need to recite Kiddush again in the social hall. Assuming the social hall where they would be eating was in the same building as the Kiddush, this was acceptable, under extenuating circumstances. It would be preferable that they follow a different procedure, such as having Kiddush made in the social hall.

WHAT IS CONSIDERED A MEAL?

Rabba’s words (“taste something”) imply that one fulfills Kiddush without necessarily eating a full meal, notwithstanding the Gemara’s statement that one must eat a meal where he recites Kiddush. The Geonim explain that one must begin his meal where he said Kiddush, either by eating some bread or drinking wine, and this is quoted in Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 273:5). The Geonim explicitly state that one does not fulfill Kiddush bimkom seudah by eating only fruit. Although some poskim disagree, arguing that one fulfills Kiddush bimkom seudah by eating fruit (Shiltei Hagiborim, Pesachim 20a:1, quoting Riaz, as explained by Magen Avraham 273:11), the accepted practice does not follow this opinion (Magen Avraham 273:11; Shu”t Ein Yitzchak #12).

Magen Avraham rules that one fulfills Kiddush bimkom seudah by eating a kezayis-sized piece of mezonos (the same size piece that requires an “al hamichyah” blessing afterwards), and this is the prevalent practice followed on Shabbos morning, when people often make Kiddush and then eat pastry or crackers. The poskim dispute whether drinking wine fulfills Kiddush bimkom seudah (see Rabbi Akiva Eiger to 273:5 and Mishnah Berurah 273:26).

Some people follow the practice of the Vilna Gaon to recite Kiddush only immediately before the meal they are eating for the Shabbos seudah (see Biur Halacha and Rabbi Akiva Eiger to 273:5). In his opinion, the concept of Vekarasa laShabbos oneg means that one should declare the Kiddush of Shabbos, specifically, at the time that one celebrates the Shabbos meal.

Conclusion

Kiddush sets the tone of the whole Shabbos meal. In the midst of remembering the details and requirements of this mitzvah, we should never forget to focus, also, on the beauty of Shabbos and the wonderful opportunity we are given to sanctify it verbally, day and night!

Staining Matters

Question #1: Stains

On Shabbos, must I try not to stain my clothes?

Question #2:  Lipstick

May I freshen my lipstick on Shabbos?

Question #3: Bleaching

Does bleaching out color violate the melacha of dyeing?

Introduction:

One of the 39 melachos listed in the Mishnah (Shabbos 73a) is tzovei’a, dyeing. This is derived from the fact that many of the textiles and hides used in the Mishkan required dyeing; for example, the ram skins used to cover the Mishkan were dyed red (Yerushalmi, Shabbos 7:2).

Painting metal or the walls of a house are other examples that violate the Torah prohibition of tzovei’a (Rambam, Hilchos Shabbos 9:13; Tiferes Yisroel, Kalkeles Shabbos; Minchas Chinuch).

Non-permanent dyeing

The prohibition of tzovei’a is violated min haTorah only when the dyeing is permanent (Rambam, Hilchos Shabbos 9:13). Non-permanent dyeing does not violate the law min haTorah, but was prohibited by Chazal.

There are several ways that dyeing or coloring something could be non-permanent. It could be that the colorant you used is not fast – meaning it does not absorb sufficiently into the cloth to remain (Tosefta, Shabbos 12:6). It also could be that the material to which you applied the dye will soon decompose (Tosefta, Shabbos 12:6). Yet another possibility is that the material you are dyeing is permanent, and so is the dye when used for coloring cloth, but the colorant will not set on this particular material. The Rambam picks such an example, when he rules that one does not violate tzovei’a min haTorah by smearing makeup onto metal, since the metal will not remain colored for very long (Hilchos Shabbos 9:13). Each of these non-permanent examples of dyeing is prohibited on Shabbos, but none involves a Torah prohibition.

The halachic authorities dispute concerning the length of time that a color must lastin order to qualify as permanent. According to the Rambam (Hilchos Shabbos 9:13), a dye that will remain for a day is long enough to be considered permanent — thus, someone using a colorant that will disappear a day after use desecrates Shabbos min haTorah (Shaar Hatziyun 303:68; see also Chayei Odom who appears to agree with this ruling). However, other authorities contend that violating the melacha of tzovei’a min haTorah requires a more permanent act of coloring, defined as something that lasts for a “long time” (Tiferes Yisroel in Kalkeles Shabbos).

Staining your clothes

The Shulchan Aruch rules that, because of the melacha of tzovei’a, when eating foods like beets and cherries, you should be careful not to stain your clothes (Orach Chayim 320:20). Notwithstanding that most of us are not interested in having our clothes stained by these foods, it is still prohibited miderabbanan to do so deliberately; for example, to wipe one’s hands on clothing after eating cherries. There are halachic authorities who rule that the laws of Shabbos do not require you to be concerned about staining your clothes, because doing so is considered dirtying your clothes, not dyeing them (Darchei Moshe 320:2, quoting Agur). However, the Shulchan Aruch rules strictly, and the consensus of later authorities accepts this opinion.

We can, therefore, now address our opening question: “On Shabbos, must I try not to stain my clothes?”

The answer is that it is forbidden to wipe my hands on my clothes if my hands have something that might be considered a dye, even though, from my perspective, I am dirtying the garment.

Two melachos

We see from the Gemara (see below) that a particular activity can be forbidden both because of tzovei’a and because of another melacha, at the same time (Shabbos 75a). Although in our day, there is no practical halachic difference whether an activity violates one melacha or two, when the Beis Hamikdash is rebuilt, speedily and in our days, there will be different halachic practices that result.

Lipstick on Shabbos

According to some authorities, applying lipstick is prohibited, both because of tzovei’a and because of memarei’ach, the melacha involved when one smoothes or files down a surface (Nimla Tal, Tzovei’a, note 31).

At this point, we can address the second of our opening questions: “May I freshen my lipstick on Shabbos?”

The answer is that applying lipstick may potentially involve two different melachos of Shabbos, tzovei’a and memarei’ach, and that both violations may be min haTorah.  There are possibilities why the violation of tzovei’a, in this instance, may be only rabbinic. One reason is because the lipstick may not remain on the lips for a full day, and the second reason, because the lips are already colored. However, notwithstanding these reasons, it is still, definitely prohibited miderabbanan as tzovei’a and is probably prohibited min haTorah as memarei’ach.

Is squeezing dyeing?

One rishon,the Ramban (Shabbos 111a), contends that squeezing liquid out of a soaked piece of cloth violates the melacha of dyeing, because the squeezing changes the current color of the cloth. (This is how his opinion is understood by the Magen Avraham,end of chapter 302, and Shu”t Avnei Neizer, Orach Chayim #159:20; however, the Lechem Mishneh [Hilchos Shabbos 9:11] understands that the Ramban agrees with the other rishonim that squeezing is prohibited because of melabein, laundering and not because of dyeing.)

Creating a dye

The rishonim dispute whether creating a dye violates dyeing. According to the Rambam, blending together ingredients that, together, create a dye is a toladah of the melacha of tzovei’a, meaning that this is a sub-category of dyeing that is prohibited min haTorah (Hilchos Shabbos 9:14). However, the Ra’avad disagrees, contending that someone who creates a vat dye, which means that he heats raw materials intending to dye cloth by submerging it in the heated liquid, violates the melacha of “cooking” when he creates the dye. According to the Ra’avad, the melacha of dyeing is not violated until the cloth is placed in the vat to absorb the dye, and creating a dye without use of heat is not a Torah violation at all. This is because tzovei’a is violated min haTorah only when the result is a finished product; since creating a dye is only a preliminary step, it does not constitute a Torah violation of the melacha.

It seems that this identical dispute is a contention between other early rishonim. The Mishnah explains that it is prohibited min haTorah to stir a pot of vat dye on Shabbos. The question is — which melacha does this act violate? Tosafos (Shabbos 18b s. v. dilma) explains that this stirring violates tzovei’a, whereas Rashi (ad loc.) implies that it violates bishul, cooking. It would appear that the Ra’avad and Rashi have a similar approach, both contending that preparing a vat dye violates cooking, but not dyeing, whereas the Rambam agrees with Tosafos that manufacturing the dye violates tzovei’a.

Intensifying color

If a cloth or another textile already has a shade of color, but it is not dyed as deeply as you want, is it prohibited min haTorah to dye it to a deeper hue? According to most authorities, intensifying the shade of a pigment that already exists violates tzovei’a min haTorah. If the additional dyeing does not make a significant difference in the color, the violation is rabbinic, not min haTorah (Mor Uketziyah, end of 328; cf., however, see Shu”t Avnei Neizer, Orach Chayim #172, who contends that once the fabric has been dyed a certain color, adding to that color does not involve a Torah prohibition. This is a minority opinion.).

Bleaching or dyeing?

At this point, we can ask whether dyeing is defined as changing the color of an item, or adding color to an item. A difference in practical halacha between the two approaches is whether bleaching an item, which changes the color by removing pigment, violates the melacha of tzovei’a.

According to most authorities, tzovei’a means applying pigment or colorant to the surface of an item that thereby changes its color. For example, the Rambam defines a different one of the 39 melachos, melabein, to be bleaching. He seems to understand that laundering is a sub-category of melabein. The question is why bleaching is not considered the same melacha as tzovei’a, dyeing, which is also concerned with changing the color of a fiber. The answer appears to be that, whereas tzovei’a adds color to the fiber, bleach removes color from the fiber. In the Rambam’s opinion, adding color to an item constitutes tzovei’a, whereas bleaching it and removing impurities that detract from the appearance of the cloth constitute melabein.

However, a minority opinion contends that any color change, including bleaching out the color, violates tzovei’a (see Tosafos, Bava Kama 93b, s. v. ha).

Painting white

“If someone whitewashes his wall or paints something white, what melacha has he performed?”

The answer is that he violated the melacha of tzovei’a,dyeing, not of melabein, even though the word melabein could be translated as “he makes something white.” This is true, even according to those who contend that bleaching does not qualify as tzovei’a. The reason is that bleaching removescolor, whereas in these cases a white color is added to the surface of the wall or other item.

The Rogatchover’s position

Rav Yosef Rosen — early 20th century rav of the Chassidishe community of Dvinsk, Latvia (for much of this period, part of the Russian empire), known colloquially as “the Rogatchover,” for his place of birth — was known for his original approaches to halachic issues. Often, these approaches produced interesting strict or lenient conclusions. In one of his essays, the Rogatchover concludes that mixing a dye into a liquid does not constitute the melacha of tzovei’a. His logic is that tzovei’a requires changing an item’s color. When mixing a dye base into a liquid, the liquid’s color is not changed. What has happened is that two colors are blending together to appear as one consistent color.

Regarding tzovei’a, the Rogatchover will permit several instances that are prohibited by other authorities. An example is if someone diluted a dye with water to create an art display. According to the Pri Megadim and the Tiferes Yisroel, this act is prohibited on Shabbos min haTorah. However, the Rogatchover will dispute their conclusion, since the color is created by mixing and not by coating an item with color.

Staining your hands

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 320:20) implies that there is no halachic problem with getting your hands or face stained while eating. The Mishnah Berurah (320:58) asks: since we prohibit women from applying makeup on Shabbos because of tzovei’a, applying color to human skin violates tzovei’a. If this is true, just as staining clothes violates tzovei’a, shouldn’t someone be required not to stain his hands and face? The Mishnah Berurah answers that since men do not usually apply makeup to their faces, it is permitted for them to eat foods that might stain their faces.

Conclusion

Shabbos is a day which is called “mei’ein olam haba” – a day that is a small taste of the World to Come; a day when we are given a neshamah yeseirah – a special Shabbosdik neshamah;  a day when Hashem’s Shechinah resides with us. The sefarim hakedoshim discuss these ideas and how much we need to prepare ourselves, every week, in order to properly relate to Shabbos Kodesh and to receive all of the benefit and bracha that Shabbos brings us.

Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch (Shemos 20:10) notes that people mistakenly think that work is prohibited on Shabbos, in order to provide a day of rest. This is incorrect, he points out, because the Torah does not prohibit doing avodah, which connotes hard work, but melacha, which implies work with purpose and accomplishment. On Shabbos, we refrain from altering the world with our own creative acts and, instead, emphasize Hashem’s role (Shemos 20:11). We thereby acknowledge the true Builder and Creator of the world and all that it contains, and focus on our relationship with Him.

Reviewing the Parsha

Question #1: When do I start?

When do I begin my weekly reading of the parsha?

Question #2: Which commentary?

Which Torah commentary is the most important to study every week?

Question #3: Which system?

Is it better to read each posuk of the Torah twice, followed by its translation, and then proceed to the next posuk? Or perhaps, it is preferable to follow the stops that are in the Torah itself, the sesumos and pesuchos, and read the pesukim as a group, repeat them, and then read their translation? Or, perhaps, it is even better to read the entire parsha from beginning to end, repeat it, and then read the translation of the entire parsha?

Introduction:

The Gemara (Brachos 8a) teaches that every man is required to read through the entire parsha every week, twice, and also to study its translation. This is called shenayim mikra ve’echad targum, whose abbreviation is the same four letters that spell the word Shemos, the name of this week’s parsha. Some authorities expand this into a longer mnemonic based on the roshei teivos, an abbreviation that is a play on the first two words of this week’s parsha, “ve’eileh shemos”, these are the names [of the Children of Israel who arrived in Egypt], as “Vechayov adam likros haparsha shenayim mikra ve’echad targum (Levush, Orach Chayim 285:1).

The original passage of this Gemara includes many innuendoes. “A person must always complete his parshi’os — twice the Scripture and once its translation — together with the community [im hatzibur], even Ataros and Divon [names of places in Eretz Yisrael, see Bamidbar 32:3], since whoever completes his parshi’os with the community has his days and years lengthened” (Brachos 8a-b).

There are numerous questions on this short passage of Gemara. Among them are:

Must always

Why emphasize that a person “must always” do this? Were we not told that he must “always” do this, would we think that sometimes you may ignore this mitzvah? Something dependent on our preference to perform it or not is, by definition, not an obligation. Perhaps the Gemara’s phrase,“must always,” is coming to exclude the idea that shenayim mikra ve’echad targum is not an absolute obligation, but dependent on circumstances, comparable to mitzvos such as mezuzah, which is required only if you live in a house with doors, but does not require living in a house with doors to observe the mitzvah. Someone who lives in a tent or an igloo is not obligated to build himself a house in order to fulfill the mitzvah of mezuzah.

Complete

The Gemara expresses the obligation of shenayim mikra ve’echad targum as le’olam yashlim adam parshi’osav. There are many words in Hebrew for reading or studying. Yet, the Gemara ignores all these choices and, instead, uses the Hebrew word yashlim, “he should complete.” What are Chazal emphasizing with this verb that we would not understand should it have written instead “yikra,” “yilmod,” “yeshanein” or any of several other choices?

With the community

The Gemara explains that the requirement is to complete parshi’osav im hatzibur, literally, “his passages (or Torah reading) together with the community.” This appears to be redundant – are not the weekly Torah readings what the community will be reading this week?

Rav Bibi

The passage of Gemara in which the mitzvah of shenayim mikra ve’echad targum is taught adds to its discussion. It continues by telling two anecdotes of Rav Bibi (this is a real name, not a nickname for Binyamin Netanyahu), the son of the famous Abaya (as in Abaya and Rava). The first story is that Rav Bibi had fallen behind in his weekly reading and wanted to catch up what he had missed on Erev Yom Kippur. He was stymied in his attempt to do so, upon discovering that there is a mitzvah min haTorah to celebrate Erev Yom Kippur with festive meals, thus taking away from the time he needed to finish up all his missing parshi’os.

The acharonim, the later commentators, suggest several reasons why Rav Bibi wanted to finish before Yom Kippur. Some suggest the following: Rav Bibi was Abaya’s son, and therefore he was of the descendants of Eili Hakohen, upon whom there is a curse that they not live long. Therefore, he wanted to accomplish the mitzvah of shenayim mikra ve’echad targum, which includes a special blessing that it lengthens one’s years, so that he would be granted on Yom Kippur many extra years (Iyun Yaakov; see also notes of Ya’avetz on this passage of Gemara).

Others demonstrate from Rav Bibi’s approach that it is perfectly acceptable to complete shenayim mikra ve’echad targum anytime before Simchas Torah, when the annual cycle of reading the Torah is completed (Hagahos Maimoniyos, Hilchos Tefillah, end of Chapter 13). We will soon see that this position is disputed.

Continuing the passage of Gemara: Having discovered that this solution of completing shenayim mikra ve’echad targum on Erev Yom Kippur was not practical, Rav Bibi decided that next year he would get ahead of the game and prepare the parshi’os a few weeks in advance. This approach was rejected when Rav Bibi was told that this is not an acceptable way to observe the mitzvah. An elderly scholar quoted Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, who commanded his own sons that the mitzvah requires “completing your parshi’os with the tzibur,” and “neither earlier nor later” (Brachos 8b).

Which commentary?

The Gemara states that one must recite “targum,” usually assumed to mean the specific Aramaic translation of the Torah authored by Onkelos. However, the word targum can also mean “translation,” and is occasionally used to mean what we would call a commentary. Even Targum Onkelos is, at times, closer to a commentary than a translation; this is certainly true regarding the other two Aramaic targumim to the Torah that have survived, Targum Yonasan and Targum Yerushalmi.

Tosafos (Brachos 8a, s.v. Shenayim) quotes, but disagrees with, those who understood that someone unfamiliar with Aramaic can fulfill this mitzvah by reading a translation of the Torah in a language with which he is familiar. Tosafos objects, because there are aspects of understanding the Torah that we would never know without the Targum’s commentary, and that fulfilling the mitzvah of shenayim mikra ve’echad Targum requires reading, specifically, the targum and not any translation of the Torah portion in a familiar vernacular.

This dispute is recorded among halachic authorities, regarding whether one fulfills the mitzvah of shenayim mikra ve’echad targum by reading the parsha twice and then studying it with Rashi, particularly if an individual does not understand the pesukim any better by reading an Aramaic translation. The Tur (Orach Chayim 185) rules that one fulfills the mitzvah by reading either Targum Onkelos or Rashi, since both explain the verses according to Chazal, and this approach is followed by the Shulchan Aruch. I once heard from Rav Shimon Schwab that reading the chumash translation of Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch, similarly, fulfills the “targum” part of the mitzvah, since it is a translation of the pesukim that follows Chazal.

The Shulchan Aruch and most later authorities conclude that it is preferable to read both the Targum Onkelos and Rashi. Other authorities rule that when Targum Onkelos does not translate a posuk, but only repeats the Torah’s words, the posuk should be studied with one of the other targumim (Yonasan or Yerushalmi) that do translate those pesukim (see Tosafos, Brachos 8b s.v. Va’afilu). When available targumim simply repeat the words of the Torah, the early authorities dispute whether one is required to repeat the posuk three times.

Goal

What is the goal of the mitzvah of shenayim mikra ve’echad targum? This appears to be a dispute between early halachic authorities.

Education

Is this a takanah whose purpose is to insure that every member of the Jewish people be fully familiar with the Torah she’biksav, the Written Torah? Some authorities contend that, indeed, the goal is for every Jew to be fully familiar with the parsha and know what it means.

An introduction is required to explain what appears to be a different reason for the mitzvahof shenayim mikra ve’echad targum. After the Jews had erred in Refidim (Shemos 15:22-25), Chazal deduced that the cause for this backsliding had been the lack of study of Torah for three consecutive days. To guarantee that this not recur, Moshe Rabbeinu required reading the Torah every Monday, Thursday and Shabbos, to insure that three days not go by without the Torah being read in public. Thus, our practice of reading the Torah constitutes the earliest takanas chachamim of Jewish leadership.

Chazal also established that the entire Torah be completed on a regular basis by reading consecutive portions on Shabbos. Initially, the readings of the Torah did not require, or even allow for, a baal keri’ah (often mistakenly called baal korei). Each individual was expected to be so well-versed in the written Torah that he would be able to read it, without any preparation. Thousands of years after the takanas chachamim of reading the Torah was instituted, in the era of the rishonim, the custom of having a prepared baal keri’ah developed. According to the Rosh, the problem was that the community was not fulfilling its mitzvah when people who were unprepared read the Torah in a completely unacceptable fashion. This forced the community to designate someone to prepare the Torah reading in advance.

Thus, many authorities maintain that the original takanah of Shabbos Torah reading included, or was later expanded to include, a requirement that everyone be prepared to read any part of the Torah that he might be called upon to read. This takanah is the mitzvah of shenayim mikra ve’echad targum, which included a requirement to review the targum of the weekly reading.

Are there any halachic differences between these two approaches? It appears that there are. According to the second approach, it is required to complete shenayim mikra ve’echad targum before the Torah is read, so that you are prepared, should you be called up for an aliyah.

However, we see that Tosafos disputes this ruling, since he states that it is preferable to complete shenayim mikra ve’echad targum before you begin your Shabbos meal, although, if not completed by that time, it can be completed afterward. Tosafos bases this opinion on a Midrash in which Rebbe (Rabbi Yehudah Hanasi) instructed his sons, prior to his passing, not to eat bread before completing shenayim mikra ve’echad targum. Obviously, Tosafos has no concerns that you must complete shenayim mikra ve’echad targum before the Torah reading begins. In his opinion, the mitzvah of shenayim mikra ve’echad targum is to encourage ongoing adult self-education, by requiring each individual to study the weekly Torah reading, on his own time.

Always complete

Perhaps this will explain why the Gemara writes that a person “must always” study shenayim mikra ve’echad targum during the week that the community is reading the parsha. Since the goal is Torah study, what difference does it make when an individual completes his annual study of the Torah? Perhaps he can study the entire year’s reading once a year, as Rav Bibi was initially planning? Or, perhaps, he can prepare the parsha well in advance, as Rav Bibi later thought to do? Therefore, the Gemara stresses that, notwithstanding that the goal of the mitzvah is to review the Written Torah annually, you must review it during the week that the community is reading it.

On the other hand, we find another approach tothe takanah of shenayim mikra ve’echad targum. The Hagahos Maimoniyos (Hilchos Tefillah, end of chapter 13) quotes from the Ra’avan (#88), an early rishon, that the entire mitzvah of shenayim mikra ve’echad targum applies onlyto someone who will not be able to hear the reading of the Torah on Shabbos. Obviously, the Ra’avan understands the words of Chazal,le’olam yashlim,” to mean “a person should always make sure to complete” the parsha, even when there are extenuating circumstances preventing him from completing it the way he usually does, by hearing the reading of the Torah.

The Hagahos Maimoniyos, the Beis Yosef and others (Rambam, Mahari Bruno, Mahari Weil, She’yarei Keneses Hagedolah) dispute the halachic conclusion of the Raavan, contending that the obligation of shenayim mikra ve’echad targum devolves upon everyone, even those who will be able to hear the weekly reading. Nevertheless, they may agree that the emphasis “a person should always make sure to complete” includes those who will not hear a Torah reading. This explains the peculiar wording that a person should complete his parshios together with the tzibur. I will present shortly yet another possible explanation of this wording.

With the community

The Gemara required that shenayim mikra ve’echad targum be performed “together with the community [im hatzibur].” We see from the story of Rav Bibi and the teaching of Rav Yehoshua ben Levi that this means during the week that the tzibur is reading this parsha, and we see further that, according to one opinion, it should be completed before the kerias haTorah of that week begins. But, exactly, when can we start? Tosafos rules that once the Torah of the next week’s parsha was read at mincha, on Shabbos, it is considered im hatzibur to begin the next parsha. The Radbaz agrees with Tosafos, and is inclined to rule that it is better to begin shenayim mikra ve’echad targum immediately after mincha on Shabbos. This demonstrates that, when one week’s parsha ends, we focus immediately on the next week’s reading, similar to what we do on Simchas Torah when we begin reading Bereishis immediately after completing Devarim (Shu’t Haradbaz #288). For the same reason, the custom at a siyum is to begin the next learning project immediately upon completion of the mesechta or other learning project that generates the siyum.

The Radbaz also quotes an opinion not to begin shenayim mikra ve’echad targum until Sunday morning. In his conclusion, he defers to this approach.

Other authorities prefer that shenayim mikra ve’echad targum be read on Erev Shabbos, after midday (Magen Avraham quoting Shelah). It is interesting to note that some authorities contend that the optimal way to fulfill shenayim mikra ve’echad targum is to read the two times of the parsha from a sefer Torah, on Friday morning (Arizal and Taz, see Sha’arei Teshuvah 285:1). These opinions may hold that the primary reason for the mitzvah is to prepare the leining, should you be called to the Torah.

Which system?

Is it better to read each posuk of the Torah twice, then its translation, and then proceed to the next posuk? Or, perhaps, it is better to follow the stops that are in the Torah itself, the sesumos and pesuchos, and read the pesukim as a group, repeat them, and then read their translation? Or perhaps it is preferable to read the entire parsha from beginning to end, repeat it, and then read the translation of the entire parsha?

Among the earlier authorities, we find each of these three approaches mentioned. The Vilna Gaon, who contends that you should read from one pesucha or sesumah to the next, also accepts stopping where the topic changes, even when it is not a pesucha or sesumah. Apparently, he divided the parsha and read parts of it each day after davening, completing it on Friday (Ma’aseh Rav #59).

The Arizal, apparently, followed the third opinion to read the entire parsha twice and then the entire targum.

The Mishnah Berurah concludes that you may follow any of the three opinions. However, it is unclear whether he holds that you may switch from one opinion to a different one. He may hold that you should always follow one opinion, consistently, although the Aruch Hashulchan (285:7) expressly rules that you may switch from one approach to another.

I want to note that I know of no opinion that holds that you should observe shenayim mikra ve’echad targum by reading the parsha aliyah by aliyah or by stopping at the chapter stops (unless it is a pesucha or sesumah or where the topic changes). The reasons why these are not considered proper stopping places are obvious. The chapter stops are not Jewish in origin. When the Christians appropriated our Tanach for their purposes, they instituted chapter breaks (and also devised many new divisions among the seforim), for their convenience. Although most poskim find no prohibition in using these chapter breaks as a convenient way to locate and refer to pesukim, many gedolei Yisroel were opposed to using them at all. They are often clearly in the wrong place and certainly have no halachic significance.

The breaks between aliyos, also, do not constitute halachic stops, for any purpose. Originally, there were few standardized stops (other than parshas Haazinu, the reading on Rosh Chodesh and some yomim tovim,and a few other places). There are halachic rules as to how long each aliyah must be, and where it is and is not permitted to stop. Other than those rules, the individual receiving an aliyah decided where he chose to stop, as long as he allowed enough parsha for the number of aliyos to be called up that day.

However, this system created a lot of havoc and machlokes. In response, a few hundred years ago, an individual printed chumashim in which he chose where each aliyah should end and distributed them for free; his goal being to curtail the machlokes that the previous system engendered. Most of our “commonly held” practices for aliyos start from this time, but they do not have halachic significance. As a matter of fact, the Vilna Gaon was opposed to using them (Maaseh Rav #132).

Conclusion

Germane to explaining why Chazal required a translation as part of shenayim mikra ve’echad targum, I want to share an insight that I discovered while preparing this article. Stopping to think through the correct translation of a posuk makes us focus on all the nuances of the original. Thus, not only does shenayim mikra ve’echad targum force us to review the Torah regularly, it expands our horizons, because we study it in a vernacular with which we are more familiar.

Food Coloring and Shabbos

Question #1: Mixing drinks

“May I mix red and white wines on Shabbos?”

Question #2: Cake decorating

“May I decorate a cake on Shabbos?”

Answer:

One of the 39 melachos, prohibited activities, of Shabbos is tzovei’a, dyeing. Tzovei’a was performed during the construction of the Mishkan when they dyed the rams’ hides red, as well as when they dyed the woolen threads used in the curtains and the clothing of the kohanim (Yerushalmi, Shabbos 7:2, referring to Shemos 25:5, 26:14, 35:7,23; 36:19, 39:34). Staining furniture, dyeing cloth or painting a rustproof finish on a metal trim (see Minchas Chinuch, Mitzvah 32:15) on Shabbos or Yom Tov all violate this melacha. Someone who paints a house on Shabbos is punishable for two different melachos, tzovei’a and boneh, construction (Tiferes Yisrael, Kalkeles Shabbos #15).

Dyeing food

The opening questions concern the following topic: May one color food on Shabbos or Yom Tov? As we will see shortly, many halachic authorities contend that the melacha of tzovei’a does not apply to edible items. Why should food be treated differently from furniture or clothing?

Egging on your mustard!

To begin, let us note a Talmudic passage that implies that tzovei’a does not apply to food. The Mishnah (Shabbos 139b) rules that one may add egg to mustard seeds on Shabbos, which the Gemara (140a) explains to mean even when the goal is for the yolk to color the mustard more yellow than it is naturally. Why is this not prohibited as dyeing on Shabbos?

An early authority, the Shibbolei Haleket (#86), explains that adding egg to mustard is permitted because of a halachic principle that he calls ein tzovei’a ba’ochlin, the melacha of dyeing does not apply to food. Because of this principle, he permits dipping bread into fruit juice on Shabbos in order to color it. Since the position of the Shibbolei Haleket is the only opinion on the subject quoted by the Beis Yosef (Orach Chayim 320), we are not surprised to find that Rav Yosef Karo, the author of the Beis Yosef, ruled in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 320:19) that ein tzovei’a ba’ochlin, without even mentioning that some authorities reject this ruling. Because of ein tzovei’a ba’ochlin, the Shulchan Aruch permits using saffron to color food on Shabbos.

Although we have now established a halachic precedent for ein tzovei’a ba’ochlin, we still do not know a rationale why this principle should be true. Among the later authorities, we find several approaches to explain why ein tzovei’a ba’ochlin.

Dyeing is forever!

The first approach requires a bit of an introduction, because we will be comparing dyeing to other melacha activities that do not apply to food. The Gemara cites a dispute whether salting meat heavily so that it will not spoil, as was done commonly in earlier generations, violates the melacha of tanning (me’abeid) on Shabbos (Shabbos 75b). Rabbah bar Rav Huna contends that salting meat on Shabbos to preserve it for a long trip is prohibited min hatorah, whereas Rava maintains that salting meat or any other food can never violate this melacha min hatorah, a position he explains as ein ibud ba’ochlin, the melacha of tanning does not apply to food.

Both Rabbah bar Rav Huna and Rava agree that the salting of meat to remove its blood, what we call kashering, does not violate the Torah prohibition of tanning (Shabbos 75b). According to Rava, even the heavy salting done to preserve meat for months is not comparable to the salting that preserves hides, which is prohibited min hatorah. The goal of tanning hides is to make leather that will last as long as wood does, which is not the goal when salting food, even for preservation purposes.

The Chasam Sofer explains that the reason for ein tzovei’a ba’ochlin is closely related to the principle of ein ibud ba’ochlinthe melacha of tanning does not apply to food. He contends that the melacha of dyeing applies only to items that one can dye permanently (Chasam Sofer, Shabbos 75a, s.v. Rav). The coloring on food is never meant to be forever, since one’s goal is that the food is eaten.

Following this approach, we find that some authorities understand ein tzovei’a ba’ochlin in a very broad way. The Chacham Tzvi (Shu”t Chacham Tzvi 2:92) implies that the principle of ein tzovei’a ba’ochlin permits using fruit juice or other edible dye to paint one’s hands on Shabbos. Since the source of the dye is edible, as long as one does not use it to color clothing and other items where the color may set in a permanent way, it is permitted to do so. We should note that later authorities reject this broad heter of the Chacham Tzvi (see, for example, Pri Megadim, Eishel Avraham 320:25).

Rabbinic limitations

Others note that the comparison of dyeing to tanning should have us conclude that dyeing food does not constitute a violation min hatorah, because it is not permanent, but it should still be prohibited on Shabbos and Yom Tov because of a rabbinic injunction. The same is true regarding kashering meat on Shabbos. Although it does not violate any Torah prohibition, it is prohibited because of a rabbinic injunction, as noted by Tosafos (Shabbos 75b). Yet, we see that it is permitted lechatchilah to color mustard seeds with yolk on Shabbos. According to what we have just said, this should be prohibited because of a rabbinic injunction.

The Chayei Adam answers that using an item that is commonly viewed as a colorant is prohibited because of rabbinic injunction, but coloring food with an item not usually considered a colorant, such as egg yolk, is permitted lechatchilah (Chayei Adam 24:5, Nishmas Adam 24:3).

A difference in practical halacha results between the two opinions we have quoted: the approach of the Chasam Sofer, that painting food is never considered tzovei’a, and that of his contemporary, the Chayei Adam. According to the Chasam Sofer’s approach, any food coloring may be added on Shabbos, even something commonly used to add color, such as saffron. According to the Chayei Adam’s approach, ein tzovei’a ba’ochlin is limited to items that are not usually considered colorants, such as fruit juice or egg yolk. The Chayei Adam expressly disputes the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch, quoted above, who permitted using saffron on Shabbos as a food color, contending that saffron may not be used, since it is a commonly used colorant (Nishmas Adam).

Color is like flavor

There is yet a third way to understand why ein tzovei’a ba’ochlin. The Kehillas Yaakov (Shabbos #40) explains that the melacha of dyeing is violated only when one intends to create a beautiful item. One adds color to food not so that the item should be more beautiful, but to make it more appetizing to eat. As any caterer or restaurateur will tell you, serving food in a colorful and eye-catching way is an important factor in making a repast a pleasant experience. According to this approach, coloring food on Shabbos is permitted, just as one may flavor food, even if one uses a colorant, such as saffron. Thus, we can explain why the Shulchan Aruch permitted using saffron on Shabbos, either according to the approach of the Chasam Sofer or according to the approach of the Kehillas Yaakov.

On the other hand, the approach of the Kehillas Yaakov permits tzovei’a ba’ochlin only when one’s goal is to make the food more palatablee. However, dyeing food to demonstrate that the colorant creates a permanent hue desecrates Shabbos. It is prohibited, perhaps min hatorah, to use food color when your goal is to create an exhibition, and not simply to encourage people to eat (Pri Megadim; Eishel Avraham 320:25). Similarly, one may not color water when one does not intend to serve it, since the purpose of the dyeing is not to make it more attractive as a food (Chayei Adam 24:4; Tiferes Yisrael, Kalkeles Shabbos #15).

We should note that one major authority rules that the last instance of tzovei’a, mixing food color and water, is not prohibited min hatorah, but for a totally unrelated reason. The Rogatchover Gaon explains that the definition of tzovei’a requires that pigment is placed on the surface of an item, such as is done when painting or dyeing (Commentary to Hilchos Shabbos, 9:14). However, in his opinion, mixing dye with water is not placing a color atop an item, but an act of diluting pigment, and, therefore, does not qualify as tzovei’a.

Cake decorating

May one decorate a celebratory cake with various food colors on Shabbos? On the one hand, this is food that will soon be consumed, so perhaps this should be included under the rubric of ein tzovei’a ba’ochlin. On the other hand, one can argue that, in this instance, the purpose of the coloring is not to attract people to eat the cake. Rather, the decorating is to use the cake as a means of conveying good wishes to the celebrant, and the color, therefore, does not serve a food purpose. Therefore, according to the Kehillos Yaakov, this is similar to coloring food on Shabbos as part of an exhibition, which is prohibited.

Adding red wine to white

Here is another case which might be affected by the dispute why ein tzovei’a ba’ochlin. Based on a pasuk in Mishlei (23:31) that implies that red wine is preferred, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 472:11) rules that it is preferred to use red wine for the four cups of wine at the Seder (based on Bava Basra 97b). The question is raised by early authorities: If one has reasons to use a white wine for the seder, but wants to provide a reddish tinge to fulfill this halachic preference, may he mix red and white wines together on Shabbos or Yom Tov? Is this permitted because of ein tzovei’a ba’ochlin?

The Darchei Moshe (end of Orach Chayim 320) quotes a dispute between the Agur and Rav Avraham Mintz. The Agur quotes that he heard from Rav Avraham Mintz that mixing the wines is prohibited because of tzovei’a, whereas the Agur himself permits it, because of ein tzovei’a ba’ochlin, just as one may add egg yolk to mustard seeds.

According to the first two approaches to explain ein tzovei’a ba’ochlin, it should be permitted to mix the wines. The blended wine will soon be consumed, and, therefore, this coloring is certainly not permanent. Furthermore, wine is not usually considered a colorant. So why did Rav Avraham Mintz prohibit it?

We can suggest the following: Perhaps he understood the halacha similar to the way the Kehillas Yaakov did – that the reason we permit coloring food on Shabbos is to make it attractive and this is considered equivalent to flavoring it. This halacha is true only when the coloring is to encourage people to eat the food. However, blending red and white wine because he wants the wine to fulfill those opinions that hold that red wine is halachically preferable is an act of coloring and forbidden. This, reasoned Rav Avraham Mintz, is not included under the heter of ein tzovei’a ba’ochlin (see Mishnah Berurah 320:56). (We should note that the Nishmas Adam 24:3 presents a different approach to explain the position of Rav Avraham Mintz.)

A challenge

Notwithstanding the extensive discussion I have presented of the concept ein tzovei’a ba’ochlin, many authorities challenge the conclusion that ein tzovei’a ba’ochlin, based on the following Talmudic passage:

The Gemara (Shabbos 75a) cites a dispute between Rav and Shmuel germane to the question of how many melachos of Shabbos someone violates if he slaughters (shechts) an animal on Shabbos. Shmuel rules that he has violated only one melacha, that of taking a life. Rav contends that he violates two, one for taking a life and a second for dyeing, since one desires that potential purchasers see that the meat is fresh (see Rashi ad locum). Since Rav contends that coloring the meat red with blood is prohibited min hatorah as an act of dyeing, he presumably disputes the ruling of ein tzovei’a ba’ochlin!

In terms of halacha lema’aseh, the question becomes even stronger, since the majority of authorities rule according to Rav (Semag; Yerei’im; Semak; Or Zarua; Meiri; Rashi, Bava Kama 34b s.v. betzarich). [We should note that several authorities, including the Chasam Sofer, the Nishmas Adam (24:1), and the Avnei Neizer, understand that the Rambam ruled according to Shmuel.] Indeed, we should be aware that, on the basis of this Gemara, one major rishon disputes the entire principle of ein tzovei’a ba’ochlin and rules that it is prohibited to color foods on Shabbos (Tosafos Rid, Shabbos 75b; see also Shu”t Avnei Neizer, Orach Chayim 1:173). It is possible that Rav Avraham of Mintz held this way also, and that this is the reason he prohibited mixing red and white wine on Shabbos. However, most authorities conclude that ein tzovei’a ba’ochlin, which means that we must have some way of explaining why Rav prohibited shechting an animal because it violates tzovei’a.

Meat or hide?

It is possible that Rav does not dispute the principle of ein tzovei’a ba’ochlin, and that he ruled that one violates tzovei’a when slaughtering an animal only when the hide is bloodied, but not for the bloodying of the meat. Hide is not food, and coloring it has the halachic status of dyeing leather, which is certainly forbidden min hatorah. Indeed, there are rishonim who explain that Rav contends that one violates tzovei’a only when he wants the hide to look red (Sefer Yerei’im; Or Zarua).

Although this approach has much merit, there must be another way to explain the difference between Rav’s case and the principle of ein tzovei’a ba’ochlin. This is because Rashi explains that Rav ruled that one violates tzovei’a even when he wanted only the meat to look red. According to Rashi, we must look further to find an answer why Rav ruled that providing fresh meat with a bloody surface violates tzovei’a min hatorah, notwithstanding that ein tzovei’a ba’ochlin.

Meat versus mustard!

Indeed, many authorities contend that there is a qualitative difference between coloring mustard seed with yolk and coloring meat with blood. In the meat case, one is not trying to make a ready-to-eat food more attractive, which is halachically equivalent to flavoring food and therefore permitted. Rather, the slaughterer’s interest is to sell the meat, and reddening the meat is to make it more attractive for purchase. This may be no different from painting a house that one is selling, which is done to make it more aesthetically pleasing and attractive to a potential buyer. Both activities are prohibited min hatorah on Shabbos (Nishmas Adam 24:3).

An alternative approach to explain why Rav considered bloodying meat an act of dyeing min hatorah is because ein tzovei’a ba’ochlin applies only to food that can be eaten immediately. However, the freshly slaughtered meat that Rav describes requires soaking and salting to make it kosher for the Jewish table (Shu”t Chacham Tzvi 2:92; Shu”t Avnei Neizer, Orach Chayim 1:173).

Food color to whiskey

Would adding colorant to hard liquor on Shabbos to make it more salable violate a Torah prohibition of dyeing? According to the last reason we have cited, it would, and, indeed, the Pri Megadim (Eishel Avraham 320:25) prohibits adding colorant on Shabbos to whiskey or mead that is for sale, contending that the heter of ein tzovei’a ba’ochlin does not apply in this instance.

In conclusion

Most, but not all, authorities rule that ein tzovei’a ba’ochlin, at least when one is using something that is usually not considered to be a pigment. For example, Rav Shelomoh Zalman Auerbach (Shulchan Shelomoh to 320:19) rules that one may add syrup (petel) to water on Shabbos, even if the syrup contains food coloring that adds no taste, since the purpose is to make the beverage attractive for people to drink. However, someone desiring a specific variety of petel, because of an affinity for its particular color, should not mix it on Shabbos. It seems that this is not adding color to encourage people to drink the beverage, but it is considered producing a particular shade for aesthetic reasons.

Hashkafah

Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch (Shemos 20:10) notes that people mistakenly assume that work is prohibited on Shabbos, in order to provide a day of rest. This is incorrect, he points out, because the Torah does not prohibit doing avodah, which connotes hard work, but melacha, which implies work with purpose and accomplishment. On Shabbos, we refrain from altering the world with our own creative acts and, instead, emphasize Hashem’s all-encompassing role (Rav Hirsch’s Commentary to Shemos 20:11).

Our current discussion provides an excellent example to prove this point. Whether someone violates the Shabbos melacha of dyeing is not at all dependent on how hard he worked, but on abstract principles that determine whether this act is considered a creative act of man or not. Thus, understanding the laws of tzovei’a on Shabbos provides greater insight into how the true Builder and Creator of the world wants us to understand the beauty of Shabbos.

How Not to Desecrate Shabbos

Question:

“I was once told that the mekosheish was a frum Jew who did not really desecrate Shabbos. What does this mean?”

Foreword:

The story of the mekosheish, the man caught gathering wood on Shabbos, in Parshas Shelach, contains a host of conflicting and unusual midrashim. The story also serves as a springboard for many halachic and hashkafic issues. In order to appreciate fully these issues and midrashim, we must first analyze what the Torah tells us about this story, what Chazal derive from the pesukim, and some more halachic detail that is germane to the story. Then we will be in a position to discuss the question raised above.

The words of the Chumash

“When the Bnei Yisroel were in the Desert, they discovered a man gathering wood on Shabbos. Those who found the woodgatherer brought him to Moshe, Aharon and the rest of the community, and he was placed in custody, because it had not been explained what to do with him” (Bamidbar 15:32-34). The posuk then describes the punishment meted out to the woodgatherer. This was the first instance in history of beis din, a Jewish court, carrying out a ruling because someone defiled Shabbos.

Desecration of Shabbos is punishable by beis din only when many requirements are met, including that the perpetrator acknowledges that he is violating one of the 39 melachos of Shabbos, and that he accepts the punishment that the Torah metes out. The Gemara (Sanhedrin 41a) notes that the words of the Torah they found him gathering implies that the woodgatherer was caught in the middle of his act of violating Shabbos, and he continued desecrating Shabbos even after being warned that his action was liable to punishment by beis din.

Which melacha?

When the Mishnah lists the 39 melachos (Shabbos 73a), it does not include “gathering wood.” Indeed, which of the 39 melachos of Shabbos did the woodgatherer violate? Since the halacha requires that the desecrator be warned which melacha he is violating (see Shabbos 138a), this is important information to ascertain.

The Gemara (Shabbos 96b) cites three opinions concerning which melacha the mekosheish performed. According to Rav Yehudah, he carried through a public area on Shabbos. According to a second opinion, he was chopping down trees, thus violating the melacha of kotzeir, reaping, or, more accurately, disconnecting growing items from the ground. According to a third opinion, he violated the melacha of me’ameir, gathering things from where they grow or fall. This third opinion is also cited in the ancient commentary on Chumash, usually, but inaccurately, called the Targum Yonasan. Each of these three approaches requires some explanation.

Hotza’ah

One violates carrying on Shabbos min haTorah by transporting an item from a reshus harabim, an area meant for public use, into a reshus hayachid, an enclosed area, or vice versa. Alternatively, one can violate carrying by transporting an item more than four amos (about seven feet) through a reshus harabim. There are other details that need to be met that we will not discuss in this article.

However, this presents us with a conundrum. Since a desert is not a public thoroughfare or marketplace, carrying there should not violate Shabbos min haTorah. Rather, it should have the halachic status called a karmelis, an open area not meant for public use, in which carrying on Shabbos is prohibited only because of rabbinic injunction, which would leave the mekosheish exempt from violating the Torah prohibition of carrying on Shabbos.

The explanation is found in the following passage of Gemara (Shabbos 6a-b):

What qualifies as a reshus harabim? A street, a large marketplace, or a side road that is open on both sides…. But why does the Tanna not include a desert, since a different beraisa states, “What qualifies as a reshus harabim? A street, a large marketplace, a side road or the desert.” Abaya explains that there is no contradiction between these two statements, the latter beraisa is discussing the era when the Jews were living in the desert, and the first statement is discussing today. In other words, although a desert is usually considered a karmelis, when a large population, such as the entire Jewish people, is living in a desert, it qualifies as a “public area” for Shabbos purposes. Once the desert path on which the Bnei Yisroel were traveling is considered a reshus harabim, every part of that desert is now considered a reshus harabim (Biur Halacha, 345:7). Therefore, when the mekosheish carried there, he was carrying in a reshus harabim and violating the laws of Shabbos min haTorah.

Kotzeir

A second opinion that we quoted above held that the mekosheish was chopping down trees and thereby performed the melacha of kotzeir, reaping. The Gemara explains that someone harvesting wood on Shabbos violates the melacha of kotzeir (Shabbos 73b). According to this approach, it is curious that the Torah describes the mekosheish as “gathering wood,” not as chopping down trees.

Me’ameir

The third opinion explained that the mekosheish violated me’ameir, the fourth of the 39 melachos, according to the order in the Mishnah. This melacha prohibits gathering together items from where they grow or fall naturally. The Rambam mentions cases of someone who gathered food, feed or kindling, and also mentions someone who created a figcake or strung together figs, as acts that violate me’ameir min haTorah. According to many early authorities, these last two cases refer only to someone who took figs from where they fell near the tree and pressed or strung them together (Kesef Mishneh, Hilchos Shabbos 8:6, quoting Remach; Semag). However, many authorities disagree (Ma’aseh Rokei’ach; Nishmas Adam 13:1; Graz 340:15; Mishnah Berurah 340:38, and Eglei Tal 2:3 ff.), contending that, in these instances, for reasons beyond the scope of this article, one can violate me’ameir even when the fruit is not in its original location.

By the way, since people are less familiar with the melacha of me’ameir, someone could violate the melacha without realizing. For example, someone who collects fallen fruit in an orchard on Shabbos and throws them into a basket violates the melacha min haTorah (Mishnah Berurah 340:37).

The Gemara quotes a dispute whether me’ameir applies min haTorah to someone who gathers sea salt from its evaporation pits. Rava (or Rabbah, depending on a variant text) contends that this violates Shabbos min haTorah, whereas Abaya disagrees, contending that me’ameir is limited to items that grow from the ground (Shabbos 73b). There is a dispute among rishonim concerning how we rule. The Rambam rules that me’ameir is limited to items that grow from the ground (Hilchos Shabbos 8:5), whereas the Remach rules that me’ameir applies even to items that do not grow from the ground. Most later authorities conclude like the Rambam (Kesef Mishneh; Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 340:9, Elya Rabbah, Graz and Mishnah Berurah; Chayei Adam 13:1; however, see Eglei Tal 2, who treats this matter as an unresolved dispute).

In conclusion, since lumber and kindling wood both grow from the ground, it is easy to understand that the mekosheish may have been violating the melacha of me’ameir by gathering fallen wood (Shabbos 96b).

We now understand the three opinions that the mekosheish may have been carrying in a reshus harabim, may have been cutting down trees, or may have been gathering fallen wood and violating the melacha of me’ameir. Now that we have discussed which melacha he violated, for a fuller understanding of the story we may want to attempt to identify who the mekosheish was!

Was he Tzelafchad?

The Torah (Bamidbar 27 1-7; 361-11) recounts the story of the daughters of Tzelafchad. Tzelafchad participated in the Exodus from Mitzrayim but did not make it to Eretz Yisroel. The posuk tells us that Tzelafchad left five daughters, but no sons. Rabbi Akiva, quoted in a passage of Gemara (Shabbos 99b), is of the opinion that the woodgatherer described above was Tzelafchad. To quote the passage of Gemara:

Our sages taught: The mekosheish was Tzelafchad, as the Torah says, And the Bnei Yisroel were in the Desert, and they found a man gathering wood on Shabbos,’ and later on it says, Our father died in the Desert. Just as the second verse refers to Tzelafchad, so does the first.’ This is the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Yehudah ben Beseira said to him, ‘Akiva, either way you will be punished for saying this. If you are correct, the Torah hid this information and you had the audacity to reveal it! And if you are incorrect, you are spreading lies about a tzadik!’”

Midrashim take sides

Our Gemara does not say explicitly whether Rabbi Yehudah ben Beseira agreed with Rabbi Akiva or not. His criticism of Rabbi Akiva was for recounting the information. However, there are many midrashim that weigh in on this issue, some agreeing with Rabbi Akiva, including the Zohar, whereas others dispute his claim. For example, we find the following statement in Sifrei Zuta (Bamidbar 15, 32): “Rabbi Shimon said, ‘It is impossible to say that the mekosheish was Tzelafchad.’

The Yalkut Shimoni, a collection of reliable early midrashim, many of them no longer extant anywhere else, quotes a different tanna who also disagrees with Rabbi Akiva (#749).

Response of Rabbi Akiva

Although the Gemara does not cite a response of Rabbi Akiva to Rabbi Yehudah ben Beseira’s criticism for revealing information that the Torah kept hidden, there is a Midrash that cites a very interesting approach, explaining more about Tzelafachad and what he wanted to accomplish. I will present this approach, as explained by the Maharsha — but first we need a rather extensive introduction.

Although Shabbos is a very strict mitzvah, the laws of Shabbos contain some very interesting rules. One of these rules is called melacha she’einah tzericha legufah, which translates literally as a work activity that is not necessary for itself, an expression that is almost meaningless in English. There are many different approaches how to explain this concept, variant ways to explain the words, and a dispute what the halachic status is, all of which combine to create a confusing discussion. I will endeavor to explain melacha she’einah tzericha legufah as it applies to our discussion.

To begin with, let us examine one of the approaches to explain the concept.

The 39 melachos of Shabbos are derived from the activities performed in the building of the Mishkan in the Desert. Notwithstanding the importance of constructing the Mishkan as quickly as possible, it was strictly prohibited to perform any aspect of its building on Shabbos. From this we see that whatever was necessary for building the Mishkan could not be done on Shabbos, and so we are being told, indirectly, what the Torah forbade on Shabbos.

Tosafos (Shabbos 94a s.v. Rabbi Shimon) explains melacha she’einah tzericha legufah that, not only do we derive the definitions of the 39 melachos from the construction of the Mishkan, but that the prohibition min haTorah includes only activities whose purpose is similar to the purpose for which this melacha activity was performed in the Mishkan. Here are some examples to clarify what Tosafos means.

One of the 39 melachos of Shabbos is gozeiz, shearing, which includes any act that removes something from a living creature. The construction of the Mishkan required obtaining wool, which requires shearing it off sheep; this is a classic example of gozeiz. In this instance, the purpose of the shearing is to obtain usable material that is removed from the creature.

The question we will now ask is whether the melacha is violated min haTorah when gozeiz is performed not for the purpose of using the material that is removed. For example, when someone receives a haircut or clips his nails, he is removing something from a living creature, but he is not interested in the hair (with the exception of someone harvesting hair to sell for wig manufacture) or the nails. Is having a haircut or trimming nails prohibited min haTorah on Shabbos under the heading of gozeiz, or is it prohibited only miderabbanan, and the Torah prohibition of gozeiz is violated only when someone “shears” something that is usable, such as wool or hair suitable for wig manufacture?

According to Tosafos, this is the question of melacha she’einah tzericha legufah, which, the Gemara teaches, is the subject of a dispute among tanna’im. According to Rabbi Shimon, trimming hair or cutting nails is prohibited only as a rabbinic prohibition, since we do not use the trimmed items (Tosafos, Shabbos 94b s.v. aval). The disputing tanna, Rabbi Yehudah, rules that someone who performs a melacha she’einah tzericha legufah on Shabbos is culpable min haTorah. In his opinion, the fact that we do not use the trimmed nails or hair is irrelevant in defining the act as a melacha, as long as the results of the melacha are positive. In this instance, because of asthetic reasons the trimmed nails or hair is a desired outcome. Therefore, these acts violate Shabbos min haTorah, notwithstanding that one’s purpose was qualitatively different from the goal of this melacha in the construction of the Mishkan.

Here is another example of melacha she’einah tzericha legufah: Digging a hole in the ground only because someone needs the earth, but he has no need for the hole. The plowing performed in the building of the Mishkan was in order to plant, whereas digging a hole to obtain earth is qualitatively different from why this melacha was performed for the purpose of building the Mishkan. Therefore, this act qualifies as a melacha she’einah tzericha legufah, and it is exempt from desecrating Shabbos min haTorah according to Rabbi Shimon.

Among the rishonim, we find many other approaches to explain the concept of melacha she’einah tzericha legufah, but for clarity’s sake, we will limit our discussion to the approach of Tosafos.

Returning to the mekosheish

What does the purpose for which we do a melacha have to do with the mekosheish?

Based on his analysis of a midrash, the Maharsha (Commentary to Bava Basra 119a) explains that the mekosheish’s goal was not to perform the melacha, but to become an educational tool.The punishment he would receive for violating Shabbos would teach the Bnei Yisroel the stringency of observing Shabbos. Since he was not interested in the results of his melacha activities, they had the halachic category of melacha she’einah tzericha legufah. According to the authorities who rule that melacha she’einah tzericha legufah is not a Torah violation, the mekosheish never desecrated Shabbos, but instead was creating greater respect for Shabbos. Thus, the answer to the question posed to Rabbi Akiva — how could you reveal negative information about a tzadik — is that the mekosheish was not doing an aveirah, but a mitzvah!

We should note that, even if Tzelafchad was permitted to perform the specific melacha activity that he did, we would not be permitted to perform this activity because it is now prohibited by a rabbinic injunction. This prohibition had not yet been created in the days of Tzelafchad.

Why was he punished?

If, according to the Maharsha, Tzelafchad had technically not violated Shabbos, why was he punished by the beis din as if he had?

The Maharsha explains that since his thoughts of educating Bnei Yisroel were not known, the witnesses and the beis din dealt only with his actions, which is exactly what Tzelafchad wanted.

Thus, we can answer our opening question: “I was once told that the mekosheish was a frum Jew who did not really desecrate Shabbos. What does this mean?”

The answer is that, according to the approach suggested by the Maharsha, the mekosheish was a good guy, whose goal was to strengthen the commitment of Klal Yisroel to the observance of Shabbos, a mission that he accomplished. According to this suggestion, we can readily understand how he fathered such exemplary daughters.

Conclusion

Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch (Shemos 20:10) notes that people mistakenly think that work is prohibited on Shabbos in order to provide a day of rest. This is incorrect, he points out, because the Torah does not prohibit doing avodah, which connotes hard work, but melacha, which implies purpose and accomplishment. On Shabbos, we refrain from constructing and altering the world for our own purposes. The goal of Shabbos is to emphasize Hashem’s rule as the focus of creation by refraining from our own creative acts (Shemos 20:11). Understanding that the goal of our actions affects whether a melacha activity has been performed demonstrates even more so the concepts of purpose and accomplishment.

Like Pulling Teeth

In honor of the Aseres Hadibros:

Question #1: Pulling Teeth

May I pull teeth on Shabbos?

Question #2: Clipping Fingernails

Does clipping fingernails on Shabbos involve a Torah prohibition?

Question #3: Digging Up

On Yom Tov, may I dig up earth to perform the mitzvah of kisuy hadam?

Introduction:

Each of our opening questions involves a complicated and often misunderstood concept of the laws of Shabbos, called melacha she’einah tzericha legufah. This topic is the subject of a machlokes between the tanna’im Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Shimon, as to whether it is forbidden min haTorah or miderabbanan: Rabbi Yehudah contends that it is prohibited min haTorah, and Rabbi Shimon rules that it is prohibited only as a rabbinic decree. I deliberately did not yet translate the term melacha she’einah tzericha legufah, since this might bias the reader toward one interpretation over another.

What we do need to understand is that the laws of Shabbos and Yom Tov are qualitatively different from most other mitzvos and prohibitions of the Torah; regarding these laws the motive is a factor as to whether an action is prohibited.

At this stage, the basic questions we must resolve include:

  • What is the definition of melacha she’einah tzericha legufah?
  • Since all opinions agree that melacha she’einah tzericha legufah is prohibited, what difference does it make whether the prohibition is min haTorah or miderabbanan?

Some examples

As is typical, the Gemara does not define melacha she’einah tzericha legufah, but does provide numerous instances of the principle. This article will present some of the cases and endeavor to illustrate how some rishonim explain the concept. I will then explain some of the halachic differences that result.

Here are some cases that the Gemara cites of melacha she’einah tzericha legufah. In all of them, Rabbi Yehudah ruled that they are prohibited min haTorah, whereas Rabbi Shimon prohibited them only miderabbanan.

  • Carrying a corpse out of a building so that a kohen may enter (see Mishnah Shabbos 93b).
  • Extinguishing a fire to help someone fall asleep (Mishnah Shabbos 29b and Gemara Shabbos 30a). In modern times, we would talk about turning off a light for the same purpose.

There are also some cases that most, but not all, authorities consider to be cases of melacha she’einah tzericha legufah:

  • Lancing an infection to allow the pus to drain (Shabbos 107a).
  • Catching a snake to prevent it from biting someone (Shabbos 107a). All agree that this is permitted if it is a life-threatening emergency. The case in question is where the snake bite cannot kill, but may be very painful.

In the last two cases, some contend that these are permitted only in a life- threatening emergency, whereas others contend that the prohibition is only rabbinic, and therefore permit it. This is because, when the prohibition is only a rabbinic injunction, Chazal permit these measures for safety or medical reasons, even when the situation poses no threat to life.

Tosafos’ definition

At this point, I will provide three approaches to explain melacha she’einah tzericha legufah. Tosafos (Shabbos 94a s.v. Rabbi Shimon; Chagigah 10b s.v. meleches) explains that melacha she’einah tzericha legufah means that the activity was performed for a purpose that is different from the purpose of this melacha when the Mishkan was built. For example, in the Mishkan, all carried items were transported because they were needed in the place to which they were brought. Thus, carrying an item in order to remove it from its current place, and not because you want it in its new location, qualifies as a melacha she’einah tzericha legufah. Therefore, when you want a kohen to be able to enter a building and, to allow this, you carry the meis outdoors, that is a melacha she’einah tzericha legufah. Your reason for moving the meis is not so that it will be outdoors, but rather so that it will not be in the house.

Clipping fingernails

Clipping fingernails and all other cases of removing something from a living thing are prohibited on Shabbos because of the melacha of gozeiz, shearing sheep; building the Mishkan required wool. In the Mishkan, sheep were shorn in order to use the wool. Therefore, removing the horn of a rhinoceros or the tusks from an elephant, in order to use them, is prohibited min haTorah as a form of gozeiz. (There is discussion among halachic authorities whether gozeiz applies if the animal is dead. According to those who contend that it does not, you would be in violation of gozeiz only by removing horns or tusks from living rhinos or elephants — probably not such a good idea, even on a weekday.)

In the case of clipping nails, the melacha “benefits” the body, not the nails, which is different from the melacha of gozeiz as performed in the Mishkan. Therefore, Tosafos explains that, according to Rabbi Shimon, clipping fingernails on Shabbos is prohibited only miderabbanan,but not min haTorah. (We should note that another rishon,the Rivosh, agrees with Tosafos’ definition of melacha she’einah tzericha legufah, but disagrees with this application. He contends that clipping fingernails is prohibited min haTorah, even according to Rabbi Shimon, because some cases of gozeiz in the Mishkan involved benefit to what is being shorn and not exclusively to the item being removed – Shu”t Harivosh #394.)

According to Tosafos, the words melacha she’einah tzericha legufah mean a melacha that was not for the purposes of the Mishkan.

Ramban’s approach

Although some rishonim understand melacha she’einah tzericha legufah the way Tosafos does, most do not. The Ramban (Shabbos 94b) explains melacha she’einah tzericha legufah as: you are not interested in the specific result. In the case of carrying the meis out of the house, although you are carrying it from an enclosed area (a reshus hayachid) to an open area meant for public use (a reshus harabim), your goal is to remove the meis from the house. If you could have it disappear completely, your immediate needs would be addressed. You are carrying the meis into a reshus harabim only because this is the simplest way to resolve the issue, not because you have any interest in performing an act of carrying into a reshus harabim on Shabbos.

The subtle difference between Tosafos and the Ramban can perhaps best be explained by providing an example: According to the Ramban, clipping fingernails is prohibited min haTorah, even according to Rabbi Shimon, because your goal is to remove the nails from your fingers, and that is what you are doing. The fact that, in the Mishkan, this melacha was performed to use the item clipped off is not relevant. According to the Ramban, the words melacha she’einah tzericha legufah mean that the person doing the melacha she’einah tzericha legufah gains nothing from the result of the melacha activity. He is doing the act of the melacha to remove a problem, not because he has any need for the result.

Here is another case in which Tosafos and the Ramban would disagree: Let’s say someone picks a fight with an enemy on Shabbos and mauls him with a mean uppercut, drawing blood. According to the Ramban, this is prohibited min haTorah, according to all opinions. The reason is that his goal when he punched was to draw blood, and he successfully accomplished his purpose. However, according to Tosafos, this is a melacha she’einah tzericha legufah, since in the Mishkan the purpose of drawing blood was to make the animal into a useful “implement,” which is a different intent from that of the puncher.

Here is a case where both Tosafos and the Ramban agree on the halacha, but disagree as to why this is a melacha she’einah tzericha legufah. Building a fire or burning wood, according to both of them, does not qualify as a melacha she’einah tzericha legufah; it is prohibited min haTorah, even according to Rabbi Shimon. The reasons Tosafos and the Ramban conclude this are slightly different. According to Tosafos, the reason is because kindling and burning were performed in the Mishkan in order to process the vat dyes that were used: techeiles, argaman, and tolaas shani. Therefore, burning wood to cook is a similar activity to what was performed in building the Mishkan. According to the Ramban, Rabbi Shimon considers this a melacha min haTorah because the goal when performing the melacha is to burn the wood, and that is the forbidden outcome.

Opinion of the Baal Hama’or

A third opinion, that of the Baal Hama’or (Shabbos 106a), is that melacha she’einah tzericha legufah means a melacha performed when the improvement occurs not to the item on which the melacha is performed, but to a different item. In his opinion, the words melacha she’einah tzericha legufah mean an act in which the item upon which the melacha is performed does not improve because of the action.

Thus, clipping one’s nails is a melacha she’einah tzericha legufah and, according to Rabbi Shimon, is not prohibited min haTorah, since the nails are not improved by the clipping. Thus, in this particular case, the Baal Hama’or agrees with Tosafos and disagrees with the Ramban.

On the other hand, here is a case that the Baal Hama’or and the Ramban agree that even Rabbi Shimon considers a violation of Shabbos min haTorah, whereas Tosafos disagrees. Among some populations, livestock are used for an interesting harvesting operation. The owners draw blood, which is a highly nourishing beverage, from their livestock, in a way similar to the method in which we humans donate blood. They then drink the blood, either straight or mixed with milk. (By the way, it is permitted for a non-Jew to harvest and drink blood this way, which is a topic for a different time.) Our question is whether this action would violate melacha on Shabbos min haTorah or only miderabbanan.

According to Tosafos, since blood was not drawn for this purpose in the Mishkan, it is prohibited miderabbanan, according to Rabbi Shimon. However, according to both the Baal Hama’or and the Ramban, this is prohibited min haTorah even according to Rabbi Shimon, although there is a subtle difference as to why. According to the Baal Hama’or, this is prohibited min haTorah because the melacha is performed on the blood, and this is a positive result (from a human perspective) because you now have access to the blood. According to the Ramban, this is also prohibited min haTorah, because the perpetrator’s goal is to have blood at his disposal, and he has accomplished this.

Bad odor

Here is an example where all the opinions quoted agree that it is a melacha she’einah tzericha legufah: Moving an item that has a bad odor from a reshus hayachid, an enclosed area, into a reshus harabim, an open area meant for public use. Although moving something from a reshus hayachid into a reshus harabim constitutes the melacha of carrying, moving the foul-smelling item from a house to a reshus harabim does not constitute a melacha min haTorah, according to Rabbi Shimon, because the purpose of the carrying for the Mishkan was to move the item to an accessible location. However, when removing a foul-smelling item, there is no significance attached to the place to which the item is moved; one’s goal is only to distance it from its current location. The public area does not constitute the goal of one’s act, but rather a convenient place to deposit unwanted material. I note that although all three rishonim that I have quoted are in agreement regarding this ruling, there is at least one early authority, Rav Nissim Gaon (Shabbos 12a), who disagrees and considers this action to be a Torah prohibition even according to Rabbi Shimon.

Clipping fingernails

At this point, we can address one of our opening questions: Does clipping fingernails involve a Torah prohibition on Shabbos?

According to Tosafos’ understanding of Rabbi Shimon’s opinion, and also according to the Baal Hama’or,this is prohibited only miderabbanan. However, according to the other opinions we have mentioned, this is prohibited min haTorah, even according to Rabbi Shimon.

In practical halacha, the question is: When there is a pressing but not life-threatening need to clip or trim nails on Shabbos, is it permitted to have a non-Jew do so? (See Nekudos Hakesef, Yoreh Deah 198:21; Biur Halacha 340:1 s.v. vechayov.)

I am limiting this discussion about melacha she’einah tzericha legufah to these three approaches, notwithstanding that there are many opinions how to explain the concept, with many differences in halacha (see, for example, Rav Nissim Gaon, Shabbos 12a; Tosafos Rid, Shabbos 107b and 121b; Meginei Shelomoh, Shabbos 94a; Mirkeves Hamishneh, beginning of Hilchos Shabbos; Yeshu’os Yaakov, Orach Chayim 319:1).

How do we rule?

Does the halachic conclusion follow Rabbi Yehudah or Rabbi Shimon? This, itself, is a major dispute among the rishonim. The Rambam and others rule that melacha she’einah tzericha legufah is prohibited min haTorah, following Rabbi Yehudah, while others rule that melacha she’einah tzericha legufah is prohibited only miderabbanan, following Rabbi Shimon. It is even unclear which way the Shulchan Aruch and the later poskim rule.

What difference does it make?

We find that Chazal were lenient in several halachic issues that involve melacha she’einah tzericha legufah. For example, under certain circumstances, because of pain or illness, they permitted performing a melacha she’einah tzericha legufah. (Those who rule that melacha she’einah tzericha legufah violates a Torah law permit this only when the situation is life threatening, or because of a different halachic reason).

Here is another situation in which many halachic authorities are lenient. As we are aware, most food preparation activities are permitted on Yom Tov, at least min haTorah. We may find it strange, but it is permitted to shecht on Yom Tov. Prior to the discovery of refrigeration, this was the easiest way to supply fresh meat for Yom Tov. (Although this may sound a bit pessimistic, life is the world’s best preservative.)

The halachic question we will address is the following: When shechting fowl or deer (or any other species of chayah), the halacha requires that we perform a mitzvah called kisuy hadam, which means covering the blood of the shechitah, both below and above, with earth or something similar, such as sawdust. The question is whether it is permitted to dig up earth, under certain circumstances, in order to perform kisuy hadam on Yom Tov.

If melacha she’einah tzericha legufah is prohibited min haTorah, as is the opinion of Rabbi Yehudah, or if the act does not qualify as a melacha she’einah tzericha legufah but is a regular melacha activity, it is prohibited to dig up earth in order to perform the mitzvah of kisuy hadam. However, if we rule according to Rabbi Shimon, one would be allowed to dig up earth (which is a melacha she’einah tzericha legufah) to perform the mitzvah of kisuy hadam, at least under certain circumstances (Maharsha, Beitzah 8a s.v. Tosafos ve’eino; Machatzis Hashekel 498:25; Nesiv Chayim ad loc.).

At this point, we can return to our opening question:

Pulling Teeth

May I pull teeth on Shabbos?

Let us first analyze whether this is a melacha she’einah tzericha legufah. According to Tosafos’ opinion, the melacha in the Mishkan this would fall under is gozeiz, and gozeiz was performed only to use the item being shorn. In my experience, a tooth is never pulled in order to use it. Therefore, this is a melacha she’einah tzericha legufah and prohibited only miderabbanan according to Rabbi Shimon. However, should the market price on tooth enamel go through the roof, and someone choose to remove his tooth for his huge resale value, pulling the tooth would be prohibited min haTorah.

According to the Ramban, the tooth is being pulled because it is painful, not because I want the tooth itself. If I could get the tooth to disappear, that would be even more helpful, since I would avoid the pain and risk of infection that pulling it entails. Thus, the Ramban also categorizes this as a melacha she’einah tzericha legufah.

According to the Baal Hama’or, no benefit is gained from the tooth, and so, just as we explained according to the Ramban, this is a melacha she’einah tzericha legufah. As mentioned above, should circumstances change such that the removal of the tooth is performed for fnanical benefit, the act would become Torah prohibited also according to the Ramban and the Baal Hama’or.

Thus, all three rishonim we quoted do not consider pulling a tooth on Shabbos to be a Torah violation. Therefore, in a situation where a dentist wants to pull a tooth and the patient is in intense pain, all three of these rishonim would agree that this is permitted, according to Rabbi Shimon, even if the dentist is Jewish.

We also need to deal with the bleeding that will, undoubtedly, result when pulling a tooth. Again, according to Tosafos, this bleeding is not comparable to the reason that this melacha was performed in the Mishkan. According to both the Baal Hama’or and the Ramban, this would also qualify as a melacha she’einah tzericha legufah.

Thus, it would seem that according to those rishonim who rule that melacha she’einah tzericha legufah is prohibited only miderabbanan, this should be permitted (Mishnah Berurah 316:30; Biur Halacha ad loc.; Nimla Tal, Shocheit #53; however, cf. Magen Avraham 328:3).

In conclusion

Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch (Shemos 20:10) notes that people mistakenly think that work is prohibited on Shabbos, in order for it to be a day of rest. He points out that the Torah does not prohibit doing avodah, which connotes hard work, but melacha, activities or actions that achieve purpose and accomplishment. The concept of melacha she’einah tzericha legufah bears this out. It is no harder to perform a melacha hatzericha legufah, which is prohibited min haTorah according to all opinions, than to perform a melacha she’einah tzericha legufah. Yet, according to Rabbi Shimon, the latter is prohibited only because of a rabbinic injunction. This is because this action is not considered to provide “purpose,” as explained above.

Shabbos is a day when we refrain from altering the world for our own purposes, and the melacha she’einah tzericha legufah type of activity is not considered our own purpose. The goal of Shabbos is to allow Hashem’s rule to be the focus of creation, by refraining from our own creative acts.

Carrying Nitroglycerin on Shabbos

The Torah’s concern for the protection of life and health is axiomatic. In virtually all instances, Torah restrictions are superseded when a life-threatening emergency exists. If the situation is extenuating, but not life-threatening, then the rule of thumb is that the Torah restriction remains in force. Sometimes, however, mitigating factors allow the overriding of a rabbinic injunction because of extenuating circumstances.

A contemporary halachic question that relates to this issue is as follows: Is there a way whereby a person suffering from angina or other heart disease may carry his medication on Shabbos through a public thoroughfare? In case of a sudden attack, there would indeed be a life-threatening need that permits procurement of such medication through any necessary means. However, there is no medical reason that compels the patient to leave his home where his medicine is kept. Is there halachic basis to allow him to leave his house with his medication, since the possible medical emergency can be completely avoided by staying home? Granted that this would result in a great hardship by making the patient housebound on Shabbos, yet this deprivation would not constitute a life-threatening emergency and would not be grounds for overriding a Torah-proscribed Shabbos prohibition.

The halachic question is two-fold: Can carrying the medicine be considered a rabbinic violation, as opposed to a Torah violation, thus making it more acceptable? Does halachic basis exist to permit overriding a rabbinic prohibition because of hardships?

The same principles can be applied to other medical situations. For example, the diabetic who receives insulin injection is usually medically advised to carry with him some food items containing sugar as a precaution against insulin shock; and certain asthmatics and other allergy sufferers are advised never to go anywhere without their medication available. Would these patients be allowed to carry their sugar or medicine on Shabbos in a way that involves violating only a rabbinic decree?

Most contemporary authorities who address this issue base their discussion on a responsum of Rav Shmuel Engel, dated 9 Tammuz 5679 (July 7, 1919).[1] At the time of this question, there was a government regulation in force requiring the carrying of identification papers whenever one walked outside, with serious consequences for those apprehended in violation. Rav Engel was asked if a person could place his identification papers under his hat on Shabbos while walking to shul. Rav Engel’s analysis of the halachic issues involved will clarify many aspects of our question.

Shabbos violations fall under two broad headings: those activities that are forbidden

min hatorah (Torah-mandated), and those that are forbidden by rabbinic injunction, but do not qualify as melacha (forbidden work) according to the Torah’s definition.

Torah law is not violated unless the melacha is performed in a manner in which that activity is usually done. An act performed in a peculiar way, such as carrying something in a way that such an item is not normally carried, constitutes a rabbinic violation, but is permitted under Torah law. This deviation from the norm is called a shinui.[2]

Rav Engel points out that carrying identification papers in one’s hat would constitute a shinui, thus allowing a possibility of leniency. He quotes two Talmudic sources that permit melacha with a shinui on Shabbos due to extenuating, but not life-threatening, circumstances.

Rabbi Marinus said, “One who is suffering is allowed to suck milk directly from a goat on Shabbos. Why? [Is not milking an animal on Shabbos a violation of a Torah prohibition?] Sucking is considered milking in an unusual way, and the rabbis permitted it because of the discomfort of the patient.[3]

Tosafos notes that the leniency is allowed only if the suffering is caused by illness and not simply by thirst. The Talmudic text and commentary of Tosafos are quoted as halachic decision by the Shulchan Aruch.[4]

The above-quoted Talmudic text includes another case:

Nachum of Gaul said, “One is allowed on Shabbos to clean a spout that has become clogged by crushing [the clogged matter] with one’s foot. Why? [Is it not forbidden to perform repair work on Shabbos?] Since the repair work is done in an unusual manner, the rabbis permitted it in a case of potential damage.”

Based on these Talmudic sources, Rav Engel concludes that the rabbis permitted the performance of melacha with a shinui under extenuating circumstances, even though rabbinic prohibitions are not usually waived in these situations. Furthermore, he points out two other mitigating factors to permit carrying identification papers: According to most opinions, the prohibition to carry on Shabbos in our cities (even in the usual fashion) is rabbinic, because “our public areas do not constitute a public domain according to Torah law.” And, carrying identification papers would constitute a melacha done without any need for the result, which would also provide a reason to be lenient, as will be explained.

Melacha She’einah Tzericha Legufah

In several places,[5] the Gemara records a dispute between Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Shimon as to whether a melacha she’einah tzericha legufah, an action done intentionally and in the normal fashion, but without a need for the result of the action, is forbidden by the Torah or if it is a rabbinic injunction. (Note: an article that I will be issuing in a few weeks discusses this topic in greater detail.) For example, carrying a corpse from a private domain into a public domain would not constitute a Torah desecration of Shabbos according to Rabbi Shimon, since one’s purpose is to remove the corpse from the private domain and not because he has a need for it in the public domain.  Similarly, snaring or killing a predator insect or reptile when one’s concern is only to avoid damage is a melacha she’einah tzericha legufah, and therefore constitutes only a rabbinic violation according to Rabbi Shimon. Since one has no need for the caught reptile, Rabbi Shimon considers the violation rabbinic.

Both of these cases violate Torah prohibition according to Rabbi Yehudah, who opines that a melacha she’einah tzericha legufah is a Torah prohibition.

Although the Rambam[6] follows the opinion of Rabbi Yehudah, the majority of halachic authorities follow the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.

Rabbi Engel considers carrying identification papers in one’s hat to be a melacha she’einah tzericha legufah, because the carrier has no personal use for the papers and is carrying them merely to avoid injury or loss. He compares this to the killing of a snake, where the intent is to avoid injury. Although his point is arguable, as evidenced by a later responsum,[7] Rabbi Engel reiterates his position that this situation qualifies as a melacha she’einah tzericha legufah.

Furthermore, there is a basis to consider carrying only a rabbinic prohibition, because no public domain according to the Torah definition – reshus harabim – exists today. (It should be noted that notwithstanding Rav Engel’s statement on this subject, this position is strongly disputed by many authorities who contend that there is a reshus harabim today.) Because of these two mitigating reasons, Rabbi Engel permitted carrying the identification papers in one’s hat, which is an indirect method of carrying, in order to attend synagogue or to perform a different mitzvah.

As we will see shortly, some later authorities quote this responsum as a basis to permit our original question, although certain aspects of our case differ significantly from those of Rav Engel’s. Firstly, whereas in Rav Engel’s case, the identification papers had no inherent worth to the carrier, the nitroglycerin tablets do have intrinsic value to the patient. This would render them a melacha hatzericha legufah, a melacha performed with interest in the results being done, which constitutes a Torah-forbidden melacha. Thus, one of the reasons for being lenient is nullified.

Secondly, whereas our question includes carrying medication for social or other reasons, Rav Engel permitted the carrying of the identification papers only for the performance of a mitzvah. Would he have allowed a greater leniency for someone who is ill and permitted it even for social reasons? Bearing in mind the case of Rabbi Marinus, where permission is based on medical needs, could leniency be extended to allow carrying with a shinui, even for social or other reasons?

Several later halachic works discuss the question of a patient carrying medication with a shinui as a precaution against a sudden attack. Rav Yekusiel Y. Greenwald[8] suggests that a sugar cube be sewn into the pocket of a diabetic’s coat before Shabbos, so that he would not be carrying in the usual manner on Shabbos. Rav Greenwald bases his opinion on the Gemara[9] that allows the carrying of an amulet on Shabbos as a medicinal item, and the responsum of Rav Shmuel Engel quoted above. Unfortunately, the comparison to the law of kemeiya (amulet) seems strained. The halacha clearly states that the kemeiya must be worn in the way that it is normally worn, and that it can be worn only if it is a proven remedy. Under these circumstances, the kemeiya is considered to be like a garment. There does not seem to be a basis in these considerations to allow carrying an item. Furthermore, Rav Greenwald allows the diabetic to go outside with a sugar cube sewn into his garment, even for non-mitzvah-related activities, whereas Rav Engel permitted the carrying of identification papers only when going outside for mitzvah purposes.

Rav Eliezer Yehuda Waldenberg[10] cites the responsum of Rav Greenwald, but disputes his conclusions sharply. In addition to the difficulty we have noted, he also disputes two of Rav Greenwald’s assumptions.

1. Whereas Rav Greenwald assumes that these circumstances permit sewing a sugar cube or medicine tablet into a garment in order to carry it, Rav Waldenberg does not feel that the circumstances justify carrying an item in this fashion.

2. Rav Waldenberg writes that the only situation in which Rav Engel permitted carrying with a shinui was when the activity would have constituted a melacha she’einah tzericha legufah. This applies to carrying identification papers, where the carrier has no personal need for the papers and is carrying them only to avoid being apprehended. It does not apply to the case for medication, where the patient wants the medicine available for his own use.

Rav Waldenberg concludes that the leniency proposed by Rav Engel does not apply to the situation at hand, and that this patient would not be allowed to carry his medication outside, even when using a shinui. A mediating position is taken by Rav Yehoshua Neuwirth.[11] Although he equates the situation of the person carrying identification papers to the one carrying medication, and does permit the carrying of medication  with a shinui for the propose of performing a mitzvah, Rav recommends other specific guidelines that would reduce the violations. The reader is encouraged to see Rav Neuwirth’s entire ruling, and also see Igros Moshe, Yoreh Deah, Volume 1 #248, who understands the Gemara’s discussion in Kesubos in a way that preempts the basis for Rav Engel’s lenient ruling.

A responsum by Rav Menashe Klein[12] concludes that a patient is allowed to carry nitroglycerin tablets with a shinui for the purpose of going to shul or a different mitzvah. He bases himself on the following two rationales:

1. There is currently no public domain according to Torah definitions.

2. He considers this carrying to be a melacha she’einah tzericha legufah, a point that is certainly disputed by the other authorities quoted.

An interesting comment quoted in the name of the Chasam Sofer by the Levushei Mordechai[13]should also shed light on this issue. Levushei Mordechai reports that the Chasam Sofer was in the habit of carrying a handkerchief tied around his wrist outside of the eruv on Shabbos, because he considered this to be carrying with a shinui that is permitted because of the need for the handkerchief. The prohibition of rabbinic origin is overridden by the need for personal dignity (kavod haberiyos). No stipulation is made by Levushei Mordechai that the walking is done exclusively for the purpose of performing a mitzvah.

One would think that the discomfort of staying home on Shabbos provides greater reason to be lenient than the concept of personal dignity, and that this responsum could therefore be utilized as a basis to allow carrying of nitroglycerin with a shinui. However, few later poskim refer to the comment of the Levushei Mordechai.[14]

Having presented the background and references on this issue, I leave it to an individual who finds himself in these circumstances to discuss the question with his or her individual posek.

Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch (Shemos 20:10) notes that people mistakenly think that work is prohibited on Shabbos in order to provide a day of rest. This is incorrect, he points out, because the Torah does not prohibit doing avodah, which connotes hard work, but melachah, which implies purpose and accomplishment. On Shabbos, we refrain from constructing and altering the world for our own purposes. The goal of Shabbos is to emphasize Hashem’s rule as the focus of creation by refraining from our own creative acts (Shemos 20:11).


[1] Shu’t Maharash Engel, 3:43

[2] See Shabbos 92a, 104b

[3] Kesubos 60a

[4] Orach Chayim 328:33

[5] Shabbos 12a, 31b, 73b, etc.

[6] Hilchos Shabbos 1:7

[7] Shu’t Maharash Engel, 7:20

[8] Kol Bo on the laws of Aveilus, Volume 2, page 20

[9] Shabbos 60a, 67a

[10] Shu’t Tzitz Eliezer 13:34

[11] Shemiras Shabbos Kehilchasah, Chapter 40 #7

[12] Shu’t Meshaneh Halachos 7:56

[13] Shu’t Levushei Mordechai #133

[14] It is quoted by Shearim Hametzuyanim Bahalacha 84:13 and by Lev Avraham Volume 1, Chapter 6.

Carding, Combing and Disentangling

Question #1: Shabbos Prohibitions

“Does every av melacha of Shabbos have tolados?”

Question #2: Sinews

“How are sinews like wool?”

Question #3: Dog Grooming

“Is it prohibited min haTorah to comb out my dog’s hair on Shabbos?”

Introduction:

The Mishnah in the seventh chapter of Mesechta Shabbos lists the 39 avos melachos, or major categories of work, prohibited on Shabbos. These melachos were all involved in the building of the Mishkan, which is a major factor in determining whether something is prohibited on Shabbos min haTorah.

There is another rule that each av melacha has at least one toladah (see Bava Kama 2a). A toladah is an activity that is prohibited min haTorah, and is derived from one of the avos melachos.

The Talmud Yerushalmi (Shabbos 7:2) tells us a fascinating story how the great amora’im,Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakeish, studied diligently this one chapter of Mishnah, the seventh chapter of Mesechta Shabbos, for three and a half years! As a result of their studies, they discovered 39 tolados for each av melacha. We find this incredible, since, for some of the avos melacha, finding more than one or two tolados is difficult. Several of the rishonim, particularly the Rambam, the Sefer Yerei’im and the Semag, endeavor to find tolados for the melachos. Yet, even with all their considerable efforts, we often find no more than one or two tolados for a particular av melacha.

There are a few reasons why it is important to know how many melachos there are and how to categorize them. One reason is because a person who negligently violated one of the melacha categories on Shabbos is required to offer a korban chatos as atonement. Of course, we have no way of fulfilling this today, but, soon, when the Beis Hamikdash is rebuilt, this mitzvah will again become incumbent upon us.

This requirement to offer a korban chatos is only if the violation was min haTorah. There are many conditions that need to be met for a melacha activity to be a Torah prohibition. For example, someone who performed a melacha activity, but did so in an unusual way, does not violate Torah law. This is sometimes referred to as ein darko bekach, not the usual way of performing the particular activity. At other times the Gemara calls this, batlah da’atan eitzel kol odom, since most people do not consider this the normal way (Shabbos 92b).

Here is an example of this rule. Rabbah bar bar Channah, quoting Rabbi Yochanan, said, “One who twists wool into thread on Shabbos while it is still on the back of an animal is in violation of three melachos, one for shearing, one for menapeitz (I will explain this melacha shortly), and one for spinning thread.” Rav Kahana disagreed with Rabbah bar bar Channah, explaining that performing these activities while the wool is still attached to the animal is an atypical way of performing them. The Gemara then questioned Rav Kahana on the basis of a statement of an earlier authority, the tanna Rabbi Nechemyah, who noted that the women who spun the goat hair used for the Mishkan indeed spun the hair while it was still attached to the goats. Thus, if this was the way the melacha was performed when the Mishkan was built, it should automatically qualify as a melacha min haTorah! The Gemara retorts that, notwithstanding that the Mishkan was indeed constructed this way, Rav Kahana is correct that this is an atypical way to spin thread and therefore exempt from being a Torah violation of melacha. Since this method involves an unusually high level of skill, and, other than for the Mishkan, was certainly not the typical manner in which the melacha was performed, the way it was done in the Mishkan does not define what is a Torah violation of performing this melacha (Shabbos 74b).

Disentangling

The rest of this article will discuss the melacha called menapeitz, often translated as disentangling, combing or carding, but none of these terms explains the melachah adequately. When the Mishnah inventories the 39 melachos, it lists menapeitz in between melabein, which means either laundering or bleaching, and toveh, which is spinning fiber into thread.

As we see from several places in the Gemara, after wool and similar fibers were shorn from the animal and cleaned, they were combed or untangled in order to be able to continue processing them into cloth. The wool shorn from a sheep cannot be used immediately because it is filthy and very tangled. Cleaning it involves the melacha of melabein, which we will not discuss in this article. Menapeitz includes untangling the wool. Yet, as we will soon see, some authorities describe menapeitz in other ways, and, certainly, not all disentangling is menapeitz.

Tzadi or samach?

There is even a question as to whether the correct name for the melacha is menapeitz, with a tzadi at the end, or menafeis, with a samach, which is the way it is spelled by the Aruch. Rav Nosson ben Yechiel ben Avraham, was an early rishon who lived in Rome in the eleventh century. He was the head of a yeshivah located there, and authored a work called the Aruch, which is probably the earliest dictionary of Aramaic. In it, he quotes, at times extensively, various sources in the Gemara in which a term is used, translates the word into Hebrew and often explains the Gemara and other halachic concepts. The work, which is quoted by his contemporary, Rashi (see Shabbos 13b), and many times by Tosafos, had several addenda added to it in the centuries following, by such prominent poskim as the sixteenth-century Yerushalayim gadol Rav Menachem di Lunzano, and the nineteenth-century German dayan Rav Aharon Fuld. At times, only a seasoned reader can figure out which comments are from the original Aruch and which are additions from these latter figures. Other additions are from the seventeenth-century physician and philologist Binyomin Musafia, whose work was called originally Musaf Ha’Aruch, and from the renowned eighteenth-century Talmud chacham and editor Rav Yeshayah Pik.

Menapeitz in Tanach

Let us examine the root meaning of the word menapeitz in Tanach, and then see how the word is used in the context of the laws of Shabbos. The earliest use of the word is in parshas Noach (Bereishis 9:19), where the posuk says, “sheloshah eileh bnei Noach, umei’eileh noftzah chol ha’aretz, These are the three sons of Noach, and from them spread (the population) of the world.” We also find the word meaning to shatter, such as in the pasuk, “ki’chli yotzeir tenapetzeim, You will shatter them like a potter’s vessel” (Tehillim 2:9). The word conveys the same idea in Shoftim (7:19), “venafotz hakadim asher biyadam, They smashed the jugs that were in their hands,” and in Yirmiyohu (48:12) “venivleihem yenapeitzu, They will smash their barrels.” We find it used in a more figurative sense in Yeshayohu (33:3), “mei’romemusecha noftzu goyim, From Your loftiness, nations have dispersed.”

Furthermore, the Aruch provides three Talmudic references for the root nofatz: Shabbos 140, Avodah Zarah 7, and Chullin 72.

We now have a question on the Aruch. If the melacha on Shabbos is spelled with a samach, and there is clearly a word, both in Tanach and in Chazal, spelled with a tzadi,. why does the Aruch spell it with a samach? Are the letters samach and tzadi interchangeable, as we find occasionally? One could explain the variant spellings this way, although it is clear from the Talmudic references above that the Aruch himself understood that there are two roots with similar meanings. The root with a tzadi means to shatter, smash or disperse, whereas that with a samach means to disentangle.

Rishonim on the melacha

In his commentary to the Mishnah discussing the melacha of menapeitz, the Rambam (Shabbos 7:2) describes the melacha as beating wool with a stick. In the monumental recent work, Ma’aseh Oreg, which elucidates the various processes used in the days of Chazal to make cloth, Dayan Yisroel Gukovitski explains that after wool was washed and bleached, it was placed on a table and beaten with rods, which loosened the fibers and crushed any matter that prevented the wool from disentangling. This was an important stage in preparing the wool to be spun into thread or pressed into felt.

Rishonim other than the Rambam explain menapeitz in other ways. For example, in the context of the law of a nazir combing his hair, Rashi explains the word menapeitz to mean disentangling hair (see Rashi, Shabbos 50b; see Mishnah, Nazir 42a). In the context of the melacha menapeitz, Rashi understands this to mean picking apart and separating the clumped wool into fibers that can be properly spun.

Other authorities explain the melacha to mean combing the wool out with an iron comb (Meiri, Shabbos 73b; Chayei Odom 23:1). This is a later step in the processing of the fibers to make them ready for spinning into thread. By the way, Rashi (Bava Basra 19a s.v. Tzipei) also describes the act of menapeitz as combing, although that context is not discussing the laws of Shabbos.

It is unclear that there is any halachic dispute among these different approaches. They may simply be describing different stages in the melacha, and that the melacha includes any or all of these processes.

Carding

Some late commentators translate menapeitz as carding,because the word card as a verb

means to disentangle fibers. (The word card can also mean the specific brush used to disentangle fibers prior to spinning them.) This seems to fit Rashi’s old French word, carpir (Shabbos 73a, see Avnei Neizer 170:8 and Targum Hala’az #1618).

However, at this stage we are faced with a question asked by one of the great late acharonim, the Avnei Neizer (170:9). There are two steps involved in preparing clean fibers so that they can be spun into thread. First, one disentangles the wool; then, one combs the fibers together evenly so that they can be spun. Since we now know that menapeitz means disentangling, why isn’t the second step, combing it into a form that can be spun, a separate melacha? In other words, there should be two melachos – one called menapeitz and another called soreik, combing – between the melacha of melabein, which is laundering or bleaching, and the next melacha, toveh, spinning.

The Avnei Neizer (170:9) answers that since this is all one process, it is all included as one melacha, notwithstanding that it can be subdivided into two steps. He then asks why the melacha is called menapeitz and not soreik, combing, which is the final stage? To this he answers that combing is performed with an implement, whereas the disentangling can be performed either with an implement or by hand. The Mishnah called the melacha menapeitz so that we would realize that disentangling by hand is also considered the primary melacha.

Menapeitz times two

Now that we understand the basics of this melacha, we will discuss some of its details.

According to some authorities, one can violate the melacha of menapeitz twice on the same material. Certain methods of processing wool involve combing out the material and then soaking it in a special solution, so that it will absorb dye better. This soaking causes the wool to clump again, and one needs to comb it out a second time. According to the Maasei Rokei’ach, if both of these actions were performed on Shabbos, this second combing would be another Torah violation of the melacha of menapeitz (Hilchos Shabbos 9:12).

Sheep and other animals

Although the prohibition of shatnez applies min haTorah exclusively to the wool of sheep and not to the hair or wool of other animals, such as goats, camels, llamas and rabbits (see Kel’ayim 9:1), all opinions agree that menapeitz applies to the wool of all animals that may be used for clothing. By the way, the difference between wool and hair, the two English words that describe what grows on an animal, is that wool is hair that is soft and therefore suitable for clothing. Some goats, such as cashmere and angora varieties, produce soft wool, whereas others produce coarser hair, suitable for making into burlap sacks but not into clothing.

Carding coarser material unsuitable for cloth manufacture, but usable as burlap, also violates menapeitz.

Linen and cotton

There appears to be a dispute among rishonim whether the melacha of menapeitz applies min haTorah to textile materials that grow from the ground (plant-based), such as cotton, jute, or flax (which is processed into linen). Rashi seems to hold that menapeitz applies only to materials that do not grow from the ground (Rashi, Shabbos 73b; see also Meiri ad locum), whereas the Rambam (Hilchos Shabbos 9:12) and the Semag rule expressly that menapeitz applies to all materials. The Chayei Odom rules that menapeitz applies also to plant-based textiles.

Even according to those who accept the Rambam’s opinion that menapeitz applies to plant-based textiles, there is a further dispute whether beating a flax plant to soften and loosen its fibers violates menapeitz or tochein, grinding. In his commentary on the Semag, the fifteenth-century posek, Rav Isaac Stein, rules that beating flax violates the melacha of menapeitz. On the other hand, the Maharshal, in his comments on the Semag, disagrees, contending that menapeitz must involve disentangling and not simply beating.

Cottonseed

According to several rishonim, combing out cotton, which removes the seeds, violates a different melacha, dosh, threshing, because it separates the usable textile material from the seeds, which are unusable as clothing (Rashi, Shabbos 73b, Ran and Meiri ad locum). (Cottonseed is crushed for its oil. At the time of the Gemara, cottonseed oil was used as inferior kindling oil [see Rashi, Shabbos 21a s.v. Mish’cha]. Today, it is a source of cooking oil, used, for example, in the production of potato chips.) The melacha of dosh is violated when one breaks the natural, physical connection between two items that are dissimilar in their use, thus creating a product that can be used easily. For example, threshing breaks the connection between the kernels and the chaff, thus making the kernels usable; squeezing separates the juice or oil from the fruit. Since the Chayei Odom ruled like the Rambam that menapeitz is applicable to plant-based textiles, he concludes that combing out cotton or similar textiles, thereby removing the seeds while preparing the fibers for spinning into cloth, violates two melachos, dosh and menapeitz. However, the Bris Moshe disagrees (Commentary to Semag 65:134). It is beyond the topic of this article to explain the significance of an action violating two different melachos.

Sinews

Let us return to our second question, “How are sinews like wool?”

The halacha requires that Sifrei Torah and tefillin be sewn by a strong, very special type of “thread” made of sinew. The processing of these sinews so that they can be used as thread is also considered an act of menapeitz (Rambam, Hilchos Shabbos 9:15). The way these “threads” are processed is as follows: The thick sinews of an animal are dried and then smashed with a hammer, which makes them form a mushy mass, somewhat similar to the way wool appears after it has been carded. The beaten sinew can then be spun into thread, which constitutes the melacha of toveh.

The Avnei Neizer (170:6) asks why the hammering process that precedes the spinning of the giddin (sinews) is not a violation of a different melacha, tochein, grinding, since one is thereby pulverizing the dried sinew. He concludes that, indeed, both melachos are violated, tochein and menapeitz. The Rambam simply told us that the spinning is a toladah of menapeitz, but did not discuss the fact that one violated Shabbos already when hammering the sinew.

Combing hair

While showering, many people use hair conditioner to facilitate combing the tangles and knots out of their hair. Realize how much more difficult this is for a sheep, whose hair is much curlier, and it has been quite a while since it last brushed its hair! And it certainly didn’t use conditioner!

The halachic authorities discuss whether a woman can disentangle her hair on Shabbos, all ruling that this is permitted provided she does not do it in a way that will be a psik reisha whereby she definitely pulls out hair (end of Orach Chayim, 303). Pulling out hair is forbidden because of a different melacha, gozeiz, shearing. However, if, as we explained, any type of disentangling involves the melacha of menapeitz, why is disentangling hair not forbidden as menapeitz?

The answer is that the melacha of menapeitz is preparing material so that it can be spun into thread or made into cloth (Avnei Neizer, Orach Chayim 170:2, 171; Chayei Odom). Unless a woman is planning to spin her hair into cloth, it will not be prohibited as menapeitz.

Dog grooming

Thus, we can now address the third of our opening questions: “Is it prohibited min haTorah to comb out my dog’s hair on Shabbos?”

Unless one intends to use its hair as a textile, there is no melacha of menapeitz involved. It is presumably still prohibited because of muktzah,and because of a concern that someone will likely pull out hairs while combing.

In conclusion

Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch (Shemos 20:10) notes that people mistakenly think that work is prohibited min Hatorah on Shabbos so that it be a day of rest. He points out that the Torah does not prohibit doing avodah, which connotes hard work, but melacha, activities or actions which bring purpose and accomplishment. Shabbos is a day that we refrain from constructing and altering the world for our own purposes. By refraining from our own creative acts on Shabbos, we allow Hashem’s rule to be the focus of creation (Shemos 20:11).

Pouring While It’s Hot

Photo by Adam Davis from FreeImages

The end of the article answers the question: “Why are we discussing this topic the week of Parshas Matos?”

Question #1: Warming bottles

“On Shabbos, may I pour hot water onto a baby bottle containing milk or formula?”

Question #2: Sinks

“May I use my sink for both milchig and fleishig?”

Question #3: Iruy into liquids

“Does iruy cook when it falls into a liquid?”

Question #4:

“Why are we discussing this topic the week of Parshas Matos?”

Introduction:

Although our opening questions may appear unconnected, they all relate to a halachic topic called iruy kli rishon. This term refers to the halachic status of food or vessels that were heated by having hot liquid poured on them. For example, preparing a cup of tea by pouring hot water from a kettle or urn into a cup containing a tea bag is a typical case of cooking by use of iruy. Pouring hot chicken soup directly from the pot into a milchig bowl is another situation of iruy kli rishon. The word iruy means pouring,and the term iruy kli rishon means that the liquid was poured from a pot or pan that was heated directly by the heat of a fire. This article will discuss the background and the basic rules of iruy kli rishon and some halachic ramifications. As usual, our purpose is not to paskin everyone’s halachic queries. That is the role of each individual’s rav or posek.

Iruy kli rishon affects many common situations, including, for example:

The status of milchig and fleishig items in your kitchen.

How one may warm food on Shabbos.

Whether a food or utensil became non-kosher.

How to kasher utensils that became non-kosher.

Kashrus Jargon

To make this presentation clearer, let us clarify four relevant terms:

Yad soledes bo

Whenever in this article we mention something is hot, it means that it is at least yad soledes bo, meaning that it is hot enough that a person pulls his hand back, instinctively, when he touches it. There is much dispute among halachic authorities how we measure this in degrees, which is a subtopic that we will leave for a different time.

Kdei kelipah

At times, we will refer to something being cooked or absorbed kdei kelipah. For the purposes of this article, this means that, at the point of contact of the heat, some cooking or flavor absorption transpires, but does not extend further.

Kli rishon

A kli rishon is a pot, pan or other vessel that was heated directly from a source of heat, such as on a stove, inside an oven, or any other way.

Kli sheini

A kli sheini is the platter or bowl into which food is poured from a kli rishon.

An anecdote from the Gemara will clarify the status of a kli sheini.

Although most forms of hot bathing are prohibited on Shabbos, it is permitted to bathe in hot natural springs, such as those found in Iceland, Teverya, and Hot Springs, Arkansas. The Gemara (Shabbos 40b) records that Rabbi Yehudah Hanasi, also known as Rebbe, was bathing in the hotsprings of Teverya on Shabbos and was being waited on by his disciple, Rav Yitzchak bar Avdimi. Rav Yitzchak bar Avdimi had a flask of oil for Rebbe to use for anointing after he finished bathing, and Rav Yitzchak wanted to warm the flask so that the oil would be more comfortable. Rav Yitzchak asked Rebbe whether he could warm the oil in the hot spring; Rebbe replied that he may not. Then Rebbe suggested a different approach: Rav Yitzchak bar Avdimi could fill a container with hot spring water, then place the container of oil inside the larger container of hot water.

Tosafos (ad loc.) asks why the latter procedure is permitted, whereas placing the flask of oil directly in the hot spring is prohibited. In both instances, the oil is heated by water from a natural hot spring. Tosafos answers that when the vessel itself is on the fire or inside the oven, the heat of the liquid is maintained by the hot walls of the vessel, and that is why bishul occurs. However, when the container itself was never directly warmed – what we call a kli sheini – the walls of the vessel diminish the heat. As a result, the oil will not cook from the heat of the water. In other words, cooking in a vessel requires not only sufficient heat, but that the walls of the pot or vessel maintain the heat. Therefore, cooking can occur in a kli rishon but not in a kli sheini.

The Mishnah

Here is another distinction between kli rishon and kli sheini: The Mishnah (Shabbos 42a) teaches that if a pot was removed from the fire on Shabbos, one may not add spices, because this constitutes bishul. However, one may add spices to a platter containing food that was poured out of the original pot. The second case is a kli sheini, meaning that the platter itself was never on the fire. Again, the indication is that cooking requires the walls themselves to have been heated.

Iruy kli rishon

We see that whereas a kli rishon is capable of cooking, a kli sheini is not. What about pouring from a kli rishon, which is an in-between level? The hot stream coming from iruy kli rishon has no vessel walls to maintain its heat – but it also has no walls cooling down the heated product.  Do the heated walls of the kli rishon cause the cooking, in which case iruy kli rishon would not be considered cooking, or is it the cooling kli sheini’s walls that prevents cooking from transpiring, in which case iruy kli rishon would be considered cooking? This question is debated extensively by the rishonim and early poskim.

Sibling rivalry

Among the main players who weigh in on the discussion are two of Rashi’s illustrious grandsons, the Rashbam and Rabbeinu Tam (Tosafos, Zevachim 95b). The Rashbam maintained that iruy does not cook, just as a kli sheini does not. His younger brother, Rabbeinu Tam, disputed this, and contended that iruy kli rishon can cook, at least to a certain extent.

Among the Baalei Tosafos, we find a further dispute regarding whether Rabbeinu Tam held that iruy kli rishon cooks and causes absorption of flavor through the entire product or only kdei kelipah. We will be assuming the second of these approaches, which is held by the majority of authorities.

The background behind this discussion takes us to a different passage of Gemara.

Who wins?

Within the context of a hot substance falling on a cold one, or vice versa, we find a dispute in the Gemara (Pesachim 75b-76a) between the great amora’im, Rav and Shmuel, as to who “wins” – the one on top or the one on the bottom. As explained by Rashi, the Gemara teaches:

If hot food fell into hot food, such as hot meat fell into hot milk, or when one item was kosher and the other not, everyone agrees that the resultant mixture is non-kosher. The flavors of the two products became mixed because of the heat, and the result is no longer kosher.

If both food items were cold, and one can separate the two products, that which was originally permitted remains so.

The dispute between Rav and Shmuel is when one food is hot and the other cold. Rav contends that when the upper one is hot, the flavor of one food mixes into the other, rendering them both non-kosher; however, when the lower one is hot and the upper is cold, the flavors do not mix. Therefore, if the foods did not become mixed, the kosher one remains kosher. This is referred to as ila’ah gavar, literally, the upper one is stronger.

Shmuel rules that when the lower item is hot, we rule that the flavors mix, and everything becomes non-kosher. However, when only the upper one is hot, it cools off when it mixes into the lower one. This is referred to as tata’ah gavar, meaning, “the lower one is stronger.” The Gemara concludes that, according to Shmuel, when a hot substance falls into a cold substance, there is a mixing of flavors on a thin layer of the food, which is called kdei kelipah. Therefore, a thin layer is sliced off the food at the point of contact, since that layer absorbed non-kosher flavor. The rest of the food remains kosher. This ruling will be a major factor in our discussion.

Rashi notes that, although in matters of kashrus and other laws called issur veheter we usually rule according to Rav and against Shmuel, in this particular debate we rule according to Shmuel. The reason is because the Gemara notes that two different beraisos, teachings from the tanna’im, ruled like Shmuel. Thus, most of the rest of our discussions assume that tata’ah gavar.

Let us now return to the dispute between Rabbeinu Tam and his older brother, the Rashbam, concerning whether iruy is considered to have cooked something. Some authorities, following the approach of Rabbeinu Tam, contend that just as Shmuel ruled that when one pours a hot food onto a cold one, we assume that kdei kelipah became absorbed, when pouring hot water onto a cold food (such as a teabag) on Shabbos; we must assume that a kdei kelipah becomes cooked. Thus, it is forbidden, according to Rabbeinu Tam, to pour hot water onto cold, uncooked food on Shabbos. The consensus of halachic authority is to accept this ruling and to prohibit pouring hot water from a kli rishon onto cold, uncooked food on Shabbos.

Kdei kelipah

Above, we noted that when a hot substance falls into something cold, the hot substance is absorbed into the cold one to a depth of a thin layer of food. One question to resolve is whether this ruling is min haTorah oronly miderabbanan. A prominent early acharon, the Magen Avraham (467:33), contends that this ruling (that a layer of the cold food becomes prohibited) is only a chumra be’alma, meaning that min haTorah no absorption takes place, but that Chazal prohibited kdei kelipah.

Despite the Magen Avraham’s position, it is evident from many rishonim that they understood that kdei kelipah is prohibited min haTorah.

Baby bottle

At this point, let us examine our opening question:

“On Shabbos, may I pour hot water onto a baby bottle full of milk?”

We have learned that when pouring hot water from a kli rishon, the outer surface of the food may become cooked.

However, let us think for a moment about our question. Iruy potentially can cook only the outer surface, which, in this case, is the bottle itself. Observation tells us that, even assuming that vessels can become “cooked,” bottles do not become cooked by pouring boiling water on them, since they are too hard to become changed, either physically or chemically, by this amount of heat. Furthermore, the milk inside the bottle is not in the surface kdei kelipah, and, therefore, although the milk inside the bottle will become warm or even hot, it is not being cooked. Consequently, it is permitted to warm baby’s bottle on Shabbos by pouring hot water onto the outside of the bottle.

Iruy into liquids

Let us move on to the next of our opening questions: “Does iruy cook when it falls into a liquid?”

We learned that iruy kli rishon causes a small degree of absorption, and, according to Rabbeinu Tam, it also cooks. At this point, I raise a question: Perhaps this is true only when the hot water is poured onto a solid food or a vessel? Could one argue that no cooking takes place when one pours from a kli rishon into a bowl of liquid?

Why should there be a difference between a solid and a liquid? When one pours directly into a liquid, what one pours immediately disperses into the liquid into which it falls. Perhaps all the heat that would cause absorption kdei kelipah dissipates throughout the liquid and, consequently, no cooking takes place. Indeed, we find rishonim who espouse this position (Tosafos, Pesachim 40b s.v. Ha’ilpeis). Nevertheless, this is not a universally held position, and the consensus of later authorities is that we do not differentiate between liquids and solids: In all instances, we conclude that iruy kli rishon does cause some cooking (Pri Megadim, Mishbetzos Zahav, Yoreh Deah 68:9 s.v. Hadin Hashelishi).

Hot potato

At this point, we can explain a different halachic question: A hot potato is on my plate, which is a kli sheini since it was not on the fire. May I place uncooked seasoning onto the potato on Shabbos?

We learned above that I am permitted to put uncooked spices into a kli sheini. It would appear, then, that I am permitted to add raw spices to my hot potato, which is sitting in a kli sheini. Indeed, we find major authorities who seem to agree that this is considered a case of a kli sheini (see, for example, Rema, Yoreh Deah 94:7).

Nevertheless, many authorities disagree with this conclusion (Maharshal, Yam shel Shelomoh, Chullin 8:71). They note the following: Tosafos explained that the difference between a kli rishon and a kli sheini is that the cooler walls of the kli sheini are reducing the heat; this prevents cooking from taking place.

However, a hot potato on a plate is not being cooled down by the plate. Since it touches the plate on only a minimal amount of its area, perhaps the potato itself retains the halachic status of a kli rishon. This is referred to as davar gush, a solid food not having the halachic advantages of a kli sheini. Most of the commentaries on the Shulchan Aruch rule that, generally, we should be concerned about both approaches: that of the Rema,who considers this a kli sheini; and that of the Maharshal, who considers this a kli rishon. As a practical matter, this means that one usually treats a davar gush not as a kli sheini but as a kli rishon (Shach, Yoreh Deah 105:8; Taz, Yoreh Deah105:4; Magen Avrohom, Orach Chayim 318:45).

Sinks

At this point, let us examine another of our opening questions:

“May I use my sink for both milchig and fleishig?”

The question here is as follows: A sink does not have its own heating element. As such, it is never a kli rishon, but qualifies either as an iruy situation or as a kli sheini. We learned above that iruy can cause cooking and absorption, at least kdei kelipah. For these reasons, many authorities contend that someone who has only one sink in the kitchen should treat it as treif and use either dishpans or something similar and avoid putting dishes directly onto the sink surface (see, for example, Shu”t Minchas Yitzchok 2:100). On the other hand, based on an extensive analysis of the halachic sources, one major authority concludes that using a sink for both milchig and fleishig does not meet the characteristics of iruy kli rishon and is permitted (Shu”t Igros Moshe, Yoreh Deah 1:42). I refer our readers to their own halachic authority for a practical ruling.

Koshering

At this point, let us examine the last of our opening questions:

Why are we discussing this topic the week of Parshas Matos?

After the Bnei Yisroel’s miraculous victory over the nation of Midyan, they were commanded regarding the spoils that they had now acquired: Concerning the gold and the silver; the copper, the iron, the tin and the lead: any item that was used in fire needs to be placed in fire to become pure – yet, it must also be purified in mikveh water. And that which was not used in fire must pass through water (Bamidbar 31:22-23). Here the Torah introduces the concept of kashering vessels that have absorbed non-kosher foods. In this instance, the vessels of Midyan had been used for non-kosher; could the Jews use them? The answer is that they could kasher each item in a way that expunges the non-kosher absorption, and the vessel would become kosher. As Rashi explains the posuk, any item that was used directly in fire needs to be placed directly in fire to become kosher. And that which was not used in fire directly, but was used to cook with hot water on top of the fire must pass through water that was heated directly by a fire, to kasher it.

Does something that absorbed non-kosher via iruy require kashering? According to the conclusion above, it does – since we assume that iruy kli rishon causes some absorption into the walls of the vessel. But it can be kashered through iruy kli rishon (Tosafos, Shabbos 42b s.v. Aval).

Conclusion

We now have some understanding of a complicated halachic issue with all sorts of ramifications. It provides an appreciation how much one’s rav or posek must keep in mind every time he answers one of our questions. Certainly, this is a time to value his scholarship and his making himself available when we need him.

Erasing on Shabbos

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Question: Erasing off my hand

On Friday, I wrote a short reminder on my hand. May I rub it off on Shabbos?

Introduction:

In a previous article, we analyzed the prohibition of writing on Shabbos. We discovered that this melacha was performed in the process of building the mishkan – either when they marked the boards, to make sure that they were placed in the proper location, or, according to another opinion, when they kept records. This does not explain why the activity of erasing, mocheik, is a melacha. Rashi (73a) explains that erasing is a melacha because sometimes the person doing the marking made an error that required correction. Thus, the erasing was in order to write the correct numbering. This leads directly to our next point:

Erasing in order to write

When the Mishnah lists the various melachos of Shabbos, it states, “There are 39 categories of melacha: Someone who plants, or plows, or reaps, or gathers, or threshes, or winnows, or selects, or grinds, or sifts, or kneads, or bakes. Someone who shears wools, or launders it, or cards it, or dyes it, or spins… someone who traps a deer, or slaughters it, or skins it… or tans the hide, or smooths it, or cuts it to size, or writes two letters, or erases with the intent of writing two letters, or builds, or razes, or extinguishes, or someone who kindles.” The amount of detail for the melacha of erasing, relative to the other melachos, stands out; most of the melachos are described in Hebrew by one word, without referencing another melacha or a quantity. Yet, when mentioning the melacha of mocheik, erasing, the Mishnah limits the melacha to someone who “erases with the intent of writing two letters.” To explain why the Mishnah uses this unusual way of describing mocheik requires some introduction:

1. When discussing the laws of Shabbos, Chazal were careful to use two terms: chayov, culpable, and patur, exempt. Chayov means that, when the Sanhedrin was fully functional, these acts were punishable, and, when performed negligently, require the offering of a korban chatos.

2. A principle germane to all the laws of Shabbos is that someone violates Shabbos min haTorah only when the action has a direct, positive result. If the act appears to be unconstructive, it is prohibited only because of a rabbinic injunction and not min haTorah. For example, digging a hole because of a need for fill dirt to cover a spill or the exposed roots of a plant is exempt min haTorah from violating the melacha of choreish, plowing. This is because creating this hole in the ground is not a positive act. Digging a holeis a Torah violationonly when it is either part of an act of plowing – in order to plant or otherwise benefit a plant –  in which case it constitutes the melacha of choreish;or when it is part of a construction, in which case it constitutes the melacha of boneh, building. In both of these instances, the hole is itself beneficial.

Erasing does not, in and of itself, provide benefit. It is considered beneficial when (1) you are interested in writing on the paper and to do so you need to erase something, or (2) when there is a mistake on the paper that you need to correct by erasure. When the erasing itself does not provide benefit, the act violates Shabbos only because of a rabbinic injunction. This is why the Mishnah states that erasing is chayov when it is performed in order to write. This type of erasing is a positive act and, therefore, a Torah violation.

–When the erasure is “positive,” but you do not intend to write anything – as in the second case mentioned above – is that chayov for the melacha of erasing? That is a dispute among poskim that we will discuss shortly.

Why two letters?

The Mishnah states that violating the melacha of erasing requires the intention to write two letters on the erasure. As the Mishnah states, someone is chayov for violating the melacha of koseiv only when he writes two letters. Writing less than two letters is not substantive enough for a person to be culpable. Since erasing alone is not considered a constructive act, the person is liable only when the erasure clears enough area to write two letters.

Note that it does not state in the Mishnah how many letters must be erased to violate the melacha. It states how much space must be erased – enough space to write two letters.

What is the halacha if someone erased just one letter, but it was large enough to write two letters in its place? Is the person who performed this act guilty of violating the melacha? The Mishnah implies that this act would be chayov.

This question is raised by the Tosefta, which states that, indeed, someone who erased a letter large enough to write two letters, is culpable for violating the melacha when his intention is to write two letters in its place. The Tosefta (Shabbos 12:7, quoted by the Gemara) notes that this results in an anomalous conclusion: “Someone who writes one large letter, even though it is as big as two letters, is exempt from having committed a transgression on Shabbos, whereas someone who erases one letter that is as big as two letters desecrates Shabbos. Rabbi Menachem berabbi Yosi said: This is a stringency of erasing that does not exist with writing.”

Erasing stricter than writing?!

The Tosefta is emphasizing that although, in general, there are more ways of violating the melacha of writing than there are of violating the melacha of erasing, this is an instance in which someone could be chayov for erasing, whereas a parallel act of writing would not be chayov.

Erasing scribble

Actually, there are at least two other instances when erasing is treated more strictly than writing. One situation is that of someone who erased scribble in order to write in its place. Since the goal of the melacha of erasing is to write, it makes no difference whether someone erased letters or scribble – in both instances he is chayov for violating the Torah’s melacha (Rosh, Shabbos 7:9; Tur, Orach Chayim 340). On the other hand, someone who scribbles does not violate the melacha of writing min haTorah, since he did not write any form of communication.

Left-handed erasing

Here is yet another case in which erasing is treated more strictly than writing. Although we learned in a previous article that someone who writes with his non-dominant hand has not violated the Torah prohibition of writing, since this is not the usual way to write, this rule applies only to melacha activities that require dexterity. According to most authorities, erasing is not considered a melacha that requires such dexterity, and, therefore, someone who erases with his non-dominant hand violates the melacha min haTorah, assuming that he is erasing for the purpose of writing two letters (Chayei Odom 9:2; Mishnah Berurah 340:22; Shu”t Avnei Neizer, Orach Chayim 209:9). We should note that one early acharon, the Elyah Rabbah (340:11), appears to disagree, suggesting that there is no difference between writing and erasing in this regard.

Permanence

Germane to writing, the Mishnah (Shabbos 104b) teaches: “Someone who writes two letters… is chayov, whether he writes with ink, with a paint pigment, with sikra [a red dye], with tree-exudate gum, with ferrous sulfate, or with anything else that makes a permanent impression.”

This requirement – that one is chayov for the melacha only if performed with, or on, an item that results in permanent writing – holds true both for the melacha of writing and for the melacha of erasing. In other words, someone who erased writing that is temporary, or that was written on material that is not lasting, does not violate the melacha of erasing min haTorah. For example, if someone erases writing on a leaf that soon will dry up, he violates a rabbinic injunction but is not chayov (see Tosefta, Shabbos 12:7).

There is a halachic curiosity here: Since the melacha of erasing is for the purpose of writing, or alternatively, when the erasing itself creates something positive, why is this melacha violated only when erasing permanent writing? Erasing temporary writing is also necessary, sometimes, to accomplish a positive result, whether it is to write in its place or for a different positive purpose.

I have not found this question asked by the traditional authorities. It seems to me that the answer is that erasing something temporary is not significant enough to constitute a violation of a Torah law.

Erasing one letter

I mentioned above that the Mishnah implies, and the Tosefta states explicitly, that someone who erases one letter that is large enough to write two letters in its place, with the intent of writing two letters there, is liable for erasing on Shabbos. The Sefas Emes (Shabbos 75b) queries whether someone who erased a space large enough to write two letters, but his intention is to write only one letter, is chayov or not. He does not reach a definite conclusion.

Correction fluid

Using correction fluid (often called “Wite-Out,” which is the brand name of one such product), when done to enable rewriting, is prohibited min haTorah.

Coating white

The Pri Megadim (Mishbetzos Zahav 340:1) rules that if someone takes a dark piece of wood or other material and whitewashes its surface so that he can write on it, he violates mocheik min haTorah – because this act is equivalent halachically to erasing a dark surface for the purpose of writing on it.

Erasing a tattoo

One acharon discusses whether erasing a tattoo on Shabbos violates the melacha of mocheik. He rules that to do this on a Jew is a violation of Shabbos min haTorah – according to the authorities who hold that an erasure for a positive benefit other than writing is chayov. However, erasing a non-Jew’s tattoo is not a violation of mocheik, according to the Minchas Chinuch. (I am unsure how a tattoo can be erased. I have been told that there are several methods, such as using lasers to break down the ink, or rubbing salt or lemon juice and then applying some ointment.)

Ink on sikra

The Gemara (Gittin 19a) teaches that someone who writes with dark ink on top of writing that was red violates two melachos: erasing and writing. His act is considered to have erased the original red writing and then to have written in dark ink on top of the erasure.

Ches and two zayins

In the Ashkenazi script used for sifrei Torah, the letter ches is written as two zayins with a tiny cap (similar to an upside-down “v”) connecting them. The Gemara rules that someone who removes this “cap,” thereby creating two zayins, is chayov. The Bavli (104b) rules that he violated one melacha, whereas the Yerushalmi (7:2) rules that he violated both koseiv and mocheik in doing this. Similarly, the Yerushalmi holds that someone who scraped off the corner of a dalet, thereby making it into a reish, violated both melachos, koseiv and mocheik.

Crying over spilled ink

Someone spilled ink intentionally onto a written passage so that it can no longer be read. Does this constitute the melacha of erasing min haTorah? It would appear that it violates the melacha only as a rabbinic injunction, since no improvement resulted from his action (Shu”t Maharshag 2:41).

Erasing wet ink

The authorities disagree as to whether erasing ink or other pigment that has not yet dried violates the melacha of erasing min haTorah. Some contend that this is not chayov, because the writing is not yet permanent; at this stage, it can easily smear and become illegible (Minchas Chinuch, Koseiv #10; Shu”t Har Tzvi, Orach Chayim 1:65).

Erasing on Yom Tov

Writing and erasing are both prohibited on Yom Tov, although kindling a fire for warmth or cooking is permitted. This has an interesting application: Is it permitted to use newspaper to kindle a fire on Yom Tov? Is burning the writing on the paper considered erasing? Certainly, this does not constitute erasing min haTorah, since you will not have any paper to write on when you are finished, and therefore the results are not considered positive, as explained above. Despite that fact, the Pri Megadim (Mishbetzos Zahav 511:2) prohibits burning paper that has lettering on it on Yom Tov, because it is considered mocheik miderabbanan.Although cooking and related food preparatory melachos are permitted on Yom Tov, erasing for a non-food purpose is not.

Only in order to write?

Above, I quoted a statement of the Tosefta that erasing a large letter so that you can write two letters in its place is chayov. As a rule, erasing violates Shabbos min haTorah because it is a preparatory melacha to writing. Is this a concept unique to the melacha of erasing, or is it part of the general rule that a melacha must have a positive result to be chayov, and erasing does not usually have, in and of itself, a positive result?

This question appears to be the subject of a dispute between major authorities.

Here is an example of a case that is affected by this dispute. Someone has a mezuzah, sefer Torah or Tefillin in which an extra letter is written. As is, it cannot be used until the extra letter is erased, but once the letter is removed, it is perfectly kosher. Thus, erasing the letter is not for the purpose of writing, but renders a tikun, a positive result. The Pri Megadim (Eishel Avraham 340:7), suggests that erasing the letter is prohibited min haTorah, whereas, according to Tosafos, as explained by Rabbi Akiva Eiger (Gilyon Hashas, Shabbos 73b s.v. Vetzarich), it is not. Tosafos appears to understand that since the melacha of mocheik in the mishkan was in order to rewrite, that is the only category of erasing that is prohibited min haTorah; the Pri Megadim assumes that any erasing that produces a positive result is included in the Torah violation.

Evidence to the Pri Megadim’s position can be rallied from a passage of Gemara (Shabbos 149a) which prohibits reading a list of guests that you intend to invite on Shabbos or a list of courses that you intend to serve. This prohibition is because of a rabbinic concern that the host may realize that he invited too many guests (or have too many courses) and decide to erase a name from the list, so that the butler does not go to invite that guest. (Apparently, invitations were neither printed nor delivered before Shabbos, but were delivered orally via courier on Shabbos itself.)

The Gemara’s statement implies that the erasing would be prohibited min haTorah because it produces a positive result. If not, and the erasing is prohibited only miderabbanan, we would not make a gezeirah in this instance since the concern is only that someone will violate a rabbinic prohibition (Chazon Yechezkel 12:7; see there that he endeavors to answer the question).

Wiping ink off your hands

Is wiping ink off your hands prohibited because of mocheik?

There is a dispute among late poskim whether wiping writing or even smudges off your hands is prohibited because of mocheik. The Chayei Odom (Hilchos Netilas Yadayim 40:8) rules that if your hands are smudged on Shabbos, say, from pots, and there is a concern that washing netilas yadayim upon arising in the morning or prior to eating bread might remove the stains, it is still permitted to wash them since you are not trying to remove the smudges and it is not definite that they will be erased. (This is referred to in halachic parlance as eino miskavein without a pesik reisha.) The Chayei Odom forbids scrubbing your hands clean, because this constitutes mocheik – although he agrees that this does not violate mocheik min haTorah, but only miderabbanan, because you are not wiping off the smudge in order to write on your hands. (Indeed, if you were wiping your hands clean in order to write on them, this scrubbing would be prohibited min haTorah as mocheik.)

In a similar vein, the Minchas Shabbos (80:199) rules that on Friday you should be careful not to use ink or dyes that will remain on your hands on Shabbos. If you did use such ink or dye, and it is still on your hand on Shabbos, and you are embarrassed by it, he permits you to remove it on Shabbos because of kavod haberiyos, the basic dignity to which human beings are entitled. He quotes other authorities who prohibit removing the ink from your hands and even prohibit washing the stained parts of your hands under these circumstances, ruling that you should wrap the writing in cloth or bandages. (From a netilas yadayim perspective, this is permitted when you have an injury that you want to keep clean. It is a chiddush to apply that law to this case.)

However, the Maharsham (Kuntrus Ahavas Shalom, end of Minchas Shabbos #4) disagrees with both the Chayei Odom and the Minchas Shabbos, contending that although it is prohibited miderabbanan to erase any ink or smudges, even when you have no intent to write on that place, the rabbinic prohibition applies only to removing ink or dye, but not to removing dirt, which would usually be considered cleaning and not erasing.

Conclusion

The Torah commanded us concerning the halachos of Shabbos by giving us the basic categories that are prohibited. Shabbos is a day on which we refrain from altering the world for our own purposes; instead, the rule of Hashem becomes the focus of all of creation. We contribute to this by refraining from any activity that implies that we have control over the universe (Rav Shamshon Raphael Hirsch’s Commentary to Shemos 20:10).

By demonstrating Hashem’s rule even over non-exertive activities, such as erasing, we demonstrate and acknowledge the true Creator of the world and all it contains.

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