Category: Parsha Related

Rav Sa’adiyah Gaon and the Taryag Mitzvos

Question #1: Most Important

What is the most important mitzvah of the Torah?

Question #2: Once, Twice, or Thrice?

The prohibition against mixing milk and meat is mentioned three times in the Torah. How many times is it counted in the 613 mitzvos?

Question #3: Counter Encounter

What are some practical halachic implications of different countings of the Taryag mitzvos?

Foreword:

Since this week includes the first mitzvos that Kelal Yisrael is commanded, we have an opportunity to return to a topic we have studied in the past – the counting of the Taryag Mitzvos.

Today, the most commonly used count of the 613 is that of the Rambam and the Sefer Hachinuch. However, there are numerous other counters of the Taryag Mitzvos — beginning from the era of the geonim, through the rishonim and until the current day who count the Taryag Mitzvos. At the time of the Rambam, most followed the approach of the Baal Halachos Gedolos (usually abbreviated as Behag) in counting the Taryag mitzvos. The Rambam, who strongly disputed this approach, provided a system with rules to determine what qualifies as one of the 613 mitzvos.

Subsequent to the Rambam writing his Sefer Hamitzvos, his major work on this topic, most other authorities followed the Rambam’s general approach to counting the mitzvos, although the major writers on the topic, such as the Ra’avad, the Semag, the Ramban, the Tashbeitz, the Sefer Hachinuch, the Semaq and the Maharam Shick, all disagree occasionally with the Rambam on the details. Some, like the Sefer Hachinuch accepted almost all the Rambam’s count (he disagrees with only one mitzvah), whereas others, such as the Ramban, disagreed with many dozens of mitzvos, in which the Rambam counted something as a mitzvah and the Ramban disagreed, and vice versa. For example, whereas the Rambam does not count settling and living in Eretz Yisrael as one of the 613 mitzvos, the Ramban does.

Introduction:

This article will not focus on the Rambam’s counting of the mitzvos, but on an earlier counting of the mitzvos done by Rav Sa’adiyah Gaon. Whereas the Rambam wrote an entire sefer explaining the rules for counting the 613 mitzvos and then enumerated them, Rav Sa’adiyah Gaon left us with a couple of poems, written at different times of his life, in which he enumerates the mitzvos in a brief, poetic style. To the best of my knowledge, Rav Sa’adiyah Gaon’s approach to the enumeration of the 613 mitzvos was left without serious study until Rav Yehudah Yeruchem Fishel Perla, one of the greatest gedolim of early 20th century Poland, made studying and explaining Rav Sa’adiyah Gaon’s work his life’s ambition. Rav Perla, who was born in Warsaw in 1846, devoted forty years to this study and writing up his conclusions, at times going for years without even leaving his home so that he could proceed undisturbed. During those years he relied on an opening between his home and a nearby shul through which he fulfilled the mitzvos of hearing kerias hatorah and shofar.

Many of the details of Rav Perla’s life are shrouded in secrecy, and the brief biographies I have seen about his life, including those in recognized encyclopedia, notoriously contain many obvious factual errors. For example, in some of these biographies it is claimed that Rav Perla was a disciple of Rav Chayim Soloveichek at the time that Rav Chayim was the rav of Brisk. This is obviously impossible for several reasons:

1. Rav Chayim was seven years younger than Rav Perla.

2. Rav Chayim did not move to Brisk until 1892. Until that time, he had been a rosh yeshiva in Volozhin and he moved to Brisk (where his father, the Beis Halevi, was rav) when the Volozhin yeshiva was closed. In 1892, Rav Perla was already 46 years old, and had returned to Warsaw, his birthplace, more than twenty years before. He was married and had a family.

It is reported, probably reliably, that Rav Perla studied under Rav Yehoshua Leib Diskin when the latter was the rav of Lomza. (This is before Rav Diskin assumed the positions as rav in Mezeritch, Kovno, Shklov, and Brisk, and eventually moved to Eretz Yisrael in 1877. It was then that the Beis Halevi, Rav Yosef Dov Soloveichek, was asked to assume the rabbonus of Brisk in Rav Diskin’s stead, a position that the Beis Halevi held for the last fourteen years of his life. When he passed on, he was succeeded by his son, Rav Chayim, who became known to history as Rav Chayim Brisker.)

Rav Perla, whose family name was also sometimes spelled “Perlow” or “Perlman,” was offered to be the rav of the best paying and most prestigious rabbinic positions in Poland of his era, but he refused them all to be completely devoted to learning and writing his seforim. His financial support was from the rental income of real estate that he had received from his father, a very righteous and wealthy Polish businessman. (It appears that Rav Perla’s rebbitzen managed his real estate investments and collected the rents.)

Rav Perla specialized in early authors whose works had never had thorough commentaries written on them. He wrote very extensive works on the Ra’avan and the Kaftor Vaferech, but his magnum opus is his work on the counting of the mitzvos done by Rav Sa’adiyah Gaon.

Rav Perla’s insights are brilliant and often very original. For example, in one place he resolves a dispute between the Ramban and the Rambam concerning an opinion of the Behag by demonstrating that they had in front of them two different and conflicting versions of what that gaon had written. In another instance, he unravels a baffling comment of the Ketzos Hachoshen by correcting the text printed in our editions.

Rav Perla’s work eludicidating the count of the mitzvos according to Rav Sa’adiyah Gaon and explaining in great depth the differences between the approaches of all the early counters of the Taryag Mitzvos was published in three volumes between the years 1913 and 1917. When we realize that the last volumes were published in the middle of what was then called “The Great War,” when many of the Jewish communities in Eastern Europe, and particularly those ruled by the Czar’s Empire, were destroyed, we can only begin to appreciate the monumental undertaking to which Rav Perla devoted himself. His commentary on Rav Sa’adiyah’s enumeration of the commandments totals 1600 pages. Rav Yeruchem Perla examines thoroughly Rav Sa’adiyah’s choice of words and deduces from this Rav Sa’adiyah’s understanding of each mitzvah and the halachic consequences that result. Rabbi Yosef Chaim Sonnenfeld, with whom Rav Perla had begun a correspondence before the war, is reputed to have said: “Without the hasmadah of forty years of devotion to Torah study, no human being would have been able to author such a work.”

Rav Perla owned a massive library and added thousands of comments to his personal copies of these seforim. Quite clearly, Rav Perla intended for the glosses in the seforim in his personal library to be printed at some future time to benefit Klal Yisrael. Many of these comments were eventually published in the annual Noam and numerous other rabbinic journals. Periodically, one of the auction houses specializing in Judaica sells a sefer that Rav Perla once owned. The seforim are rarely in top condition. They show wear from frequent and constant use; yet his copies still fetch high prices at auction. To quote one such auction announcement: “Dozens of important marginalia [some long], in the fine tiny handwriting of the renowned Torah scholar Rabbi Yerucham Fishel Perla. Signatures and various stamps: ‘Yerucham Fishel Perla,’ ‘Yerucham Fishel Perlman,’ and: ‘Juda Perla – Warschau.’” I have no idea why Rav Perla used different stamps, with different spellings of his name, or why he stamped his seforim multiple times.

In the 1920’s Rav Perla was widowed, and his children lived far from Warsaw. As an eighty-year-old veteran gadol, he moved to Eretz Yisrael, where he continued his studying and writing. At this point in his life, the rebbitzen of Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank brought meals to Rav Perla daily, while the octogenarian scholar continued his work, particularly an extensive commentary on the Kaftor Vaferech, a three-volume work on the mitzvos of Eretz Yisrael written by one of the rishonim. Rav Perla also contributed numerous profound essays to various rabbinic journals.

Having completed our lengthy introduction, I will now share several places where Rav Perla explains the brief poetic words of Rav Sa’adiyah Gaon to demonstrate that he disagreed with other mitzvah counters.

Most important

Let me begin by addressing our opening question: “What is the most important mitzvah of the Torah?”

While no one will say that the Torah has a specific mitzvah that is more important than any other, according to the Rambam, one of the most important of the 613 mitzvos is vehalachta bidrachav, to walk in the ways of Hashem. At great length and in several places, the Rambam explains that this involves evaluating one’s personality and adjusting it and behaving so that it develops in the direction that the Torah wants. This mitzvah forms the foundation of the Rambam’s work Shemoneh Perakim, a lengthy essay that is part of his commentary to the Mishnah as an introduction to Mesechta Avos. It also forms the basis of Hilchos Dei’os, which is the second section of the Rambam’s magnum opus, the Mishneh Torah.

Notwithstanding that many halachic authorities consider vehalachta bidrachav to be perhaps the most important of the 613 mitzvos, Rav Sa’adiyah Gaon does not even count this as one of the 613 mitzvos! This unusual fact is not ignored by Rav Perla, who has a lengthy essay explaining Rav Sa’adiyah Gaon’s opinion. Rav Perla demonstrates that Rav Sa’adiyah Gaon did not count this as one of the 613 mitzvos because, in his opinion, there is no specific commandment in the Torah to evaluate and adjust one’s personality. The sources that the Rambam cites as basis for this mitzvah were viewed by Rav Sa’adiyah Gaon to be asmachtos, meaning, in this context, concepts of which a person should always be conscious, but not part of the Torah’s structure of commandments. As far as the words vehalachta bidrachav, Rav Perla presumes that Rav Sa’adiyah Gaon understood this as a general commandment to follow Hashem’s instructions on how to live one’s life that is not counted as one of the 613 mitzvos. We can compare this to the road sign that instructs us to “Keep Right,” a message with both safety and ethical value, but should not be counted as one of the 613 mitzvos.

Thus, whereas many authorities contend that the most important mitzvah of the Torah may be developing one’s character, according to Rav Sa’adiyah, this is not even one of the Torah’s 613 mitzvos.

Basar bechalav

Here is another instance in which Rav Perla analyzes the words of Rav Sa’adiyah Gaon and the other mitzvah counters and reaches a fascinating conclusion. The Torah mentions the prohibition against mixing milk and meat in three different places, each time with the exact same five words, lo sevasheil gedi bachaleiv imo, “Do not cook a kid in the milk of its mother.” Chazal explain that the Torah repeats this mitzvah three times to teach that there are three prohibitions min haTorah:

(1) To cook meat and milk together.

(2) To eat the mixture of meat and milk cooked together.

(3) To benefit from such a mixture.

Rav Yeruchem Perla notes that there is a three-way machlokes among the rishonim whether this counts in the listing of Taryag Mitzvos as one mitzvah (Behag; Rav Sa’adiyah Gaon), two mitzvos (Rambam; Sefer Hachinuch) or three (Zohar Harakia of the Tashbeitz). Although most of the laws of basar bechalav will not be affected by this dispute, there are several ramifications that do result, particularly regarding the validity as a witness of someone who violates some of these laws intentionally, but observes the others. An example of this would be someone who benefits from a cooked mixture comprising meat and milk, such as by selling such a product as a salesman, but who does not eat or cook it. According to all opinions, he is violating a Torah prohibition. However, for reasons beyond the scope of this article, being invalidated as a witness is dependent on how many mitzvos are counted here.

Another counter encounter

Here is another example of a practical halachic dispute that results from two opinions whether a mitzvah is counted in the 613. The Gemara states that someone who frees a Canaanite slave violates a lo sa’aseh of the Torah, referred to as le’olam bahem ta’avodu. Among the rishonim, there is discussion about this law, since the Gemara notes instances when great Torah scholars did emancipate their Canaanite slaves. Rav Perla demonstrates that Rav Sa’adiyah Gaon never counts le’olam bahem ta’avodu as one of the Torah’s 613 prohibitions, and reasons that the gaon considered this to be a rabbinic prohibition. In a mammoth essay on the topic, he demonstrates numerous halachic ramifications that result from this dispute.

Mitzvas peru urvu

Rav Yeruchem Perla notes that there is a three-way dispute between Rav Sa’adiyah, the Rambam and the Rosh (Kesubos 1:12) whether kiddushin, getting married, and having children are one mitzvah (Rav Sa’adiyah), two separate mitzvos (Rambam) or whether the mitzvah is having children (Rosh). There are several very fundamental results of this dispute, but explaining them takes us very far afield from our topic.

Lo sikom

Here is an example of Rav Perla’s analyses that is not about whether a mitzvah is in the count of 613 but about the nature of a mitzvah. In parshas Kedoshim, the Torah teaches that we are not to take revenge nor are we to bear a grudge against a fellow Jew. To clarify the difference between the two prohibitions, Chazal explain that someone violates lo sikom, “Do not take revenge” when they ask a neighbor to borrow a tool and are turned down, and then subsequently refuse to lend their neighbor an item because they are angry and want to “get back” at him. (Should you have a valid reason not to lend him the item, such as, you think he will not take good care of it or he may not return it, you are not required to lend it.) The second prohibition, mentioned in the same pasuk, is lo sitor, “Do not bear a grudge!” Chazal explain that one violates this prohibition when, instead of refusing to lend the item to your neighbor, you lend it to him, but tell him, “See — I am not like you. I am lending you an item, even though you refused to lend me your item previously.”

With his skillful analysis, Rav Yeruchem Perla demonstrates that the rishonim dispute whether the prohibition is the action, or whether it is the emotion, and harboring a vengeful feeling or a grudge against someone violates the Torah’s prohibition. According to Rav Sa’adiyah Gaon and most rishonim, the violation is the action — refusing to lend him an item or reminding him that previously he did not lend you. However, Rav Perla proves that the Rambam and others contend that the violation is for the emotion, the mindset, not the action (Rav Perla’s commentary to the Sefer Hamitzvos of Rav Sa’adiyah Gaon, Aseih 19). In the Rambam’s opinion, if you are angry at the person who did not lend you to the extent that you are not prepared to lend him something, you have violated lo sikom. Alternatively, if you are prepared to lend it to him together with a piece of your mind about how nasty and selfish he is, you have already violated the prohibition of lo sitor.

Conclusion

In conclusion, we have seen that much halachic literature is devoted to counting and understanding the various counts of the 613 mitzvos. Some people have the practice of reviewing the mitzvos that are included in the week’s Torah reading at the Shabbos table, a praiseworthy minhag.

Eating Before Feeding Your Animals

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Question #1: Coffee and the concierge

“Was Noach permitted to have his morning coffee before he brought all the animals breakfast?”

Question #2: Dog’s best friend

“I would like to eat an apple. Must I first feed Fido?”

Question #3: Fish on Shabbos

“On Shabbos, may I make kiddush before I feed the fish?”

Introduction

Considering Moshe Rabbeinu’s responsibilities to his “flock” provides an opportunity to discuss the ruling of the Gemara (Berachos 40a; Gittin 62a) that one may not eat without first feeding his animals. This is based on the Torah’s statement in the second paragraph of Shema, And I will provide grass in your field for your animals,and only subsequently does the Torah say, and you will eat and be satisfied (Devarim 11:15).

Analyzing the mitzvah

There are numerous questions about this mitzvah:

Is this required min hatorah or miderabbanan?

Are we forbidden to eat only a full meal, or even just a snack?

May I quench my thirst before I provide water or feed my animal? In other words, does the prohibition apply only to eating or also to drinking?

Does this mitzvah apply on Shabbos and Yom Tov?

These and other questions will be addressed in the course of this article.

Torah or rabbinic?

Let us start with a basic question: Is the obligation to feed my animals before I eat min hatorah or miderabbanan?

A prominent early acharon, Rav Yaakov Reischer (Shu”t Shevus Yaakov 3:13), rules that, although the Gemara cites a pasuk as the source for this halachah, it is required only as a rabbinic mitzvah, and the pasuk is an allusion, what Chazal call an asmachta. Although I have seen authorities quoted as holding that the requirement is min hatorah (see, for example, Sedei Chemed Volume I, page 40), I have not yet found anyone who rules this way clearly. Quite the contrary, the Rambam (Hilchos Avodim 9:8) states that feeding your animals before you eat is an exemplary way to act, but is not required.

Of course, this leads to another question: How can the Rambam rule that feeding your animals before you eat is merely an exemplary act, when the Gemara prohibits eating before you feed your animals? The Nishmas Adam (5:11) raises this question, answering that the Rambam, presumably, had a variant text of the Gemara, and suggests what he thinks that text was.

A full meal or a snack?

Are we forbidden to eat only a full meal before feeding our animals, or are we prohibited to eat even a snack?

This question is subject to a dispute among early authorities, which appears to be based on how one reads and understands the pertinent passage of Gemara. The two times the Gemara cites this mitzvah in our published editions, it quotes varying and conflicting passages. In Berachos, the Gemara reads, It is prohibited to eat before you provide food for your animals, whereas in Gittin the passage reads, It is prohibited to taste [food] before you provide food for your animals. In Chazal’s lexicon, eatingusually implies a full meal, whereas te’imah, tasting, implies a snack. Thus, the text in Berachos (eat) implies that the prohibition is limited to eating a full meal, but that one may eat a snack even though he has not yet fed his animals. On the other hand, the version in Gittin (taste) implies that even a snack is prohibited. However, I found variations on the Gemara texts, including versions in both places that prohibit tasting, and versions in both places that only prohibit eating. Most significantly, both the Rif and the Rosh, two of the most preeminent authorities, state in their comments to the passage in Berachos that tasting is prohibited. It seems that they prohibit even snacking prior to feeding one’s animals, which is also implied by the Beis Yosef (Orach Chayim 167).

The two major commentaries on the Shulchan Aruch seem to dispute whether one may snack prior to feeding one’s animals — the Taz (167:7) expressly permits snacking before feeding your animal, whereas the Magen Avraham (167:18) implies that it is prohibited.

An in-between meals snack

Some authorities endeavor to resolve the inconsistency between the two Talmudic versions of the text. The Nishmas Adam suggests that the two versions are not contradictory. It is prohibited to eat a meal without feeding your animal first, and that one who is planning to sit down to a meal may not taste anything of the meal without first feeding his animals. However, it is permitted to eat only a small snack prior to feeding your animals, when that is all one intends to eat. This approach is how the Nishmas Adam concludes in his magnum opus, the Chayei Adam (5:11), where he implies that one may eat a snack before feeding one’s animals.

The Nahar Shalom (167:4) answers the contradiction  in the two texts in a similar fashion, ruling that when it is meal time, one may not eat even a snack, out of concern that he’ll forget to feed his animals. If he starts eating between meals, one may eat a snack without feeding his animals first. This approach is also quoted by the Kaf Hachayim (167:52) as definitive halachah. However, the Shevus Yaakov, the Kesav Sofer (Shu”t Orach Chayim #32) and the Mishnah Berurah (167:40) all prohibit eating even a snack before feeding one’s animals.

At this point, we can address one of our opening questions: “I would like to eat an apple. Must I first feed Fido?”

According to the Taz, the Chayei Adam, the Nahar Shalom and the Kaf Hachayim, one may eat an apple or some other snack before feeding his dog, although the Nahar Shalom and the Kaf Hachayim permit this only when it is not meal time. On the other hand, many other authorities prohibit eating even a snack without first feeding one’s animals.

Is instructing enough?

The Nahar Shalom and the Kaf Hachayim also contend that if the owner commanded his servants to feed the animals, he may begin his meal. Since his instructions will be obeyed, he does not need to worry that his animals will go hungry. However, other authorities do not record this lenient ruling (see Mishnah Berurah).

Drinking before feeding

Is it permitted to drink before one feeds the animals, or is the prohibition limited to eating?

Based on the Torah’s description of how Rivkah greeted Eliezer, the Sefer Chassidim (#531) makes a distinction between eating and drinking. The Torah teaches that Eliezer asked her for a little bit of water, and she answered him, I will serve you water and also your camels. The Sefer Chassidim asks how Eliezer could drink without first providing the camels with water. He concludes that although one may not eatwithout first feeding one’s animals, it is permitted to drink. This conclusion is quoted by many later authorities (Magen Avraham 167:18; Birkei Yosef 167:6; Mishnah Berurah 167:40; Shu”t Har Tzvi 1:90), although several others (Pri Megadim, Mishbetzos Zahav 167:7; Shu”t Kesav Sofer, Orach Chayim #32) dispute it. The Pri Megadim rules that when the animals are thirsty, one is required to water them before one may drink. He contends that Rivkah offered the men to drink first, because the camels were not as thirsty. This was because the camels had been drinking roadside water that people would consider too dirty to drink. I will share with you that I also do not know how the Pri Megadim knows to make these assumptions.

Another approach is that of the Chasam Sofer, who contends that when someone is offered food by a host, he may eat without first feeding his animals, since the host has no obligation to feed the guest’s animals. This explains why Eliezer drank before watering his camels.

Yet another approach to explain Rivkah’s actions is that she assessed that it was dangerous for Eliezer and his men not to hydrate themselves immediately, and that pikuach nefesh certainly supersedes the requirement to feed or water the animals first (Or Hachayim, quoted by Yad Efrayim on Magen Avraham 167:18).

A drinking problem

Why should drinking be permitted before one feeds one’s animals when it is forbidden to eat, and, according to many authorities, even have a small snack? Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank (Shu”t Har Tzvi, Orach Chayim 1:90) provides two reasons for this distinction. First, suffering from thirst is far more uncomfortable than suffering from hunger, so the Torah did not require one to remain thirsty in order to make sure that the animals are fed. Second, the Torah forbade eating before feeding one’s animals out of concern that once one gets involved in eating, he may forget to feed his animals. Drinking does not create this concern, since it takes less time and is not as involved as eating.

Is Shabbos different?

May one eat on Shabbos and Yom Tov before feeding one’s animals? The Kesav Sofer rules that the prohibition of eating before one feeds one’s animals applies only to eating a meal that does not fulfill a mitzvah, but that one may eat on Shabbos and Yom Tov before one has fed one’s animals, since this eatingfulfills a mitzvah. Not all authorities appear to accept this ruling.

Dog’s best friend

Let us return to one of the questions we discussed above: “I would like to eat an apple. Must I first feed Fido?”

An anonymous questioner asked the great eighteenth-century halachic authority, Rav Yaakov Emden, whether one may eat before feeding his dog or cat. He responded that he does not know why his questioner thought that dogs and cats should be treated differently from any other of G-d’s creatures. He suggests two reasons that might explain why the questioner thought that one may eat before feeding one’s dog or cat. Each of these reasons requires an introduction.

Beheimah versus chayah

For certain laws, the Torah divides animals into two categories, beheimos and chayos. These two categories defy a clear translation in English, although often beheimos are called domesticated animal species and chayos are called wild species. Rav Yaakov Emden suggested that perhaps the questioner thought that the requirement to feed your animals before you eat applies only to species of animal that qualify as beheimah and not to those that are chayah, and that the questioner thought that both dogs and cats are categorized as chayos, thereby exempting the owner from the obligation of feeding his animals before eating. The Yaavetz does agree that both dogs and cats are categorized as chayos — the Mishnah (Kelayim 8:6) quotes a dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Sages regarding whether a dog is considered a chayah or a beheimah. According to the Sages, the halachic conclusion, dogs are chayos, and the Yaavetz endeavors to demonstrate that cats also qualify as chayos.

However, the Yaavetz notes that the prohibition to eat before feeding your animals applies equally to beheimos and chayos. Although there are several areas of halachah in which there is a difference between kosher beheimos and kosher chayos, there is only one Talmudic source that discusses what halachic difference it makes whether a non-kosher animal is categorized as a chayah or as a beheimah. This source is a Tosefta (Kelayim 5:5) that discusses the above-mentioned dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Sages whether a dog qualifies as a chayah or as a beheimah. The Tosefta’sasks, what difference does it make whether a dog is a chayah or a beheimah? The Tosefta explains that the difference applies to someone who gives all his chayos to his son, and we now need to know whether his dogs are included. According to the Sages, the dogs have now been given to the son, whereas, according to Rabbi Meir, they remain property of the father.

The Rash, one of the early Baalei Tosafos, adds another similar halachic difference that will result from the question as to whether a creature is a beheimah or a chayah.The case is where someone declared all his chayos to be kodesh, which means that they have all become property of the Beis Hamikdash. According to Rabbi Meir, since dogs are beheimos, in this situation his dogs will remain his property, whereas, according to the Sages, Fido and his buddies are now property of the Beis Hamikdash and require redemption.

Both the Tosefta and the Rash imply that the mitzvah of feeding your animals before you eat applies equally to beheimos and to chayos.

This Tosefta answers another question, which arises from a Mishnah(Kelayim 8:6) that states that a pig qualifies as a beheimah, whereas the elephant, the monkey and the arod, a type of wildass (very possibly the onager) are chayos. Since these are all non-kosher species, what difference does it make in halachah whether these species qualify as beheimah or as chayah? The answer is, what happens if Mr. Goldberg gave all the chayos in his personal zoo and petting farm to his son as a gift.  Who owns the pigs, the elephants, the monkeys and the onagers? The halachah is that Mr. Goldberg still owns the pigs but he has given the elephants, the monkeys and the onagers to his son. (I will not delve into the question as to why Mr. Goldberg owned a pig, when this is forbidden. Perhaps a non-Jewish business contact gave him a present and he had not yet had the opportunity to sell it.)

Feed your workers!

Having established that the prohibition of eating before feeding one’s animals applies equally to beheimos and chayos, the Yaavetz suggests another possibility why the questioner thought that dogs and cats might be excluded from the requirements of this mitzvah. Perhaps the requirement to feed your animal before you eat is because it is working for you, and the questioner thought that dogs and cats are not considered workers. According to this approach, one would be permitted to eat before feeding fish or canaries, since they are basically pension receivers, whereas one would be required to feed his carrier pigeons, cattle, sheep, goats, horses, donkeys and gaming falcons before eating.

However, the Yaavetz rejects both suppositions of this approach.

First, he contends that both dogs and cats qualify as workers, dogs because they serve as loyal watchmen and cats because they clear the house of mice.

Second, the requirement to feed your animal has nothing to do with whether the animal works for you; once you are responsible for the animal, the rules of tzaar baalei chayim, not to cause an animal to suffer, require you to provide it with food. Thus, even pension-receiving animals are entitled to be fed, and the owner must attend to them before he is permitted to eat.

Man’s best friend

So, is there any reason to treat dogs and cats differently from other animals?

Notwithstanding the Yaavetz‘s rejection of both of his suggestions why dogs and cats might be treated differently from other animals, he concludes that, although one is required to make sure that one’s dogs and cats are fed, one is not required to feed them prior to his own eating. He presents the following novel suggestion: Since both of these species do not have difficulty finding food on their own, the responsibility to feed them does not lie so heavily on the owner to feed them before eating. The prohibition to eat before feeding your animals is restricted to animals that, once domesticated, would not be able to find food without the owner feeding them. The Yaavetz contends that only animals that have difficulty finding their own meals create an onus to the extent that their owner must go hungry until he provides them with victuals.

By the way, I found very few later poskim who quote this position of the Yaavetz as the accepted halacha.

Conclusion

Why are we required to feed one’s animals before we eat? The Yad Efrayim (on Orach Chayim, Magen Avraham 167:18) suggests the following: One should always look at himself as unworthy to receive Hashem’s bounty. Perhaps one’s only merit to be fed is that we feed the animals that are dependent upon us. Thus, this mitzvah has a secondary goal – not only to teach us to be concerned about Hashem’s creatures, but also to teach us humility.

Seeing Is Not Always Believing

Question #1: Exporting grain

Who authorized Yosef to export grain, the most important commodity in a famine year?

Question #2: Head of State

When is the first time in history that we see that the two positions, that of “head of state” and “head of government,” were separated?

Question #3: Bris Milah

Why did Yosef command the Egyptians to perform bris milah? After all, Jews do not proselytize.

Question #4: Retail

Why did Yosef only sell retail?

Question #5: Yosef’s Brothers

When did Yosef’s brothers realize how great he was?

Last week, we saw how Yosef presented an absolutely brilliant agricultural and financial plan for Egypt. We are going to continue from the point that we left off —

Let us look at three statements in the following pasuk (Bereishis 41:40).

Pharaoh continues talking to Yosef: “You shall be over my household, and by your orders will all my people be provided; only by my chair will I rise above you.”

What does “my household” refer to? It certainly doesn’t mean his domestic household.

In those days, a state, a country, ministries, cabinets – they were all one thing, run out of the household of the king. As I noted in last week’s article, Yosef had advised that they appoint someone who would have power over the entire country, including even the military and all construction projects. We explained why the economic overseer needed to be above all the other ministers of the land. Pharaoh now tells Yosef that he will be the highest officer of the entire government. “All of my ministers will be required to answer to you, either directly or indirectly. In addition, you will have a very specific responsibility in connection with this entire program: only according to your instructions will people be fed. You will be in complete control, the absolute ruler, the czar over the Egyptian economy. Your specific charge in that role is to make sure that everyone in the nation is fed, and, at the same time, no one will be fed without your approval.”

I would like to point out something curious: Pharoah authorizes Yosef to ensure that everyone in the country has food, but we do not see him authorizing Yosef to sell grain to foreigners. We are told later that Yosef does sell grain to foreigners. So, this must have been included in Yosef’s virtually absolute authority.

Let us dwell on this for a moment. If you are in a country where there is much grain or oil or the like, you only sell what is surplus and/or completely replaceable. You certainly do not sell what might be necessary for the country itself. Similarly, you only sell munitions that you can manufacture yourself, are unnecessary or are obsolete. You sell grain only when you know that have enough for this year and that next year you will be receiving more. Yosef’s fourteen-year economic plan that he presented to Pharaoh revolves around keeping enough grain to ensure that all the Egyptians are fed through the years of famine. Nevertheless, Yosef assumes control and sells grain to foreigners.

The explanation for Yosef’s actions is found in the pasuk which tells us that the Egyptians had stored more grain than they could count. Yosef realized that not only did they have enough grain for Egypt, but they had a significant surplus. Yosef may have been employed by Egypt, but he viewed himself as responsible for mankind. He did not see his obligation to ensure that only Egyptians survived. Of course, the basis of this was his realization that his “employer’ was not Pharaoh. It is G-d.

Moreover, his selling grain to other nations ensures that Pharaoh and Egypt became the most powerful nation in the world. Selling grain out of the country serves Egypt’s interests. Thus, we have successfully addressed our opening question.

The pasuk continues: “I will continue to have the royal throne over you.” This is reiterated to Yosef by Pharaoh.

My five-year-old grandson climbed up a stack of plastic chairs, and he said that “I am above everyone!” I told him that he was doing what Pharaoh did: “Only my chair I will keep above you.” Another peek into a complex personality of an absolute ruler…

However, let us note something significant. Pharaoh literally says: “only by the throne am I greater than you.” This implies that Pharaoh has limited himself to being only the Head of State, and given Yosef full powers as the Head of Government. Presumably, this is the first time in history where these two roles were separated.

Let us return to the Chumash:

Pharaoh continues to speak to Yosef and says: “Behold, I have placed you above the entire land of Egypt.” And the next pasuk: “Pharaoh gave his ring to Yosef.” We know from here and elsewhere that Yosef now has total authority to legislate anything that he wants in Egypt. Pharaoh has ceded to him absolute legal authority and control. All that is withheld from Yosef is the throne.

Pharaoh dresses Yosef in fine clothes and places him in the second chariot… and says to him: “I am Pharaoh,” Although you have complete authority, do not forget that I am Pharaoh and I am above you.  “I am Pharaoh, and, without your permission, no one in the land of Egypt will move even their hand or foot.”

Aside from the homiletic midrashic passage on the words “the second chariot,” the rishonim and other early commentaries have two differing ways to explain what is meant by “the second chariot.” I had always assumed this to mean that there was a chariot reserved for the prime minister of Egypt and that Pharaoh gave that chariot now for Yosef’s use. Aside from some curious political problems that this creates (would not the previous user of this chariot now begin plotting against Yosef for taking away his position and honor), it does not fit particularly well into a literal reading of the pasuk. Literally, the pasuk states that “Pharaoh had Yosef ride in the second chariot that was his,” or more accurately rendered into English as “Pharaoh had Yosef ride in his (Pharaoh’s) second chariot. In other words, precisely because of concerns that the current chief minister would be jealous of Yosef, Pharaoh gave Yosef his own second chariot – the one that was used for when Pharaoh’s main chariot needed servicing. Pharaoh will have a new chariot manufactured for himself, but Yosef will use the chariot that no one ever used before – except Pharaoh.

Pharaoh gives Yosef a new name and a wife, and we are told that Yosef was thirty years old when all this happens.

Note that Yosef does not choose his wife — Pharaoh assigns Yosef a wife. Apparently, becoming head of government in Egypt means that you can rule over everyone else, but your own most intimate decisions are rendered by Pharaoh. We see this again in next week’s parsha, when Yosef needs to ask Pharaoh for permission to leave the country to bury his father.

Also note (as already noted by Ibn Ezra) that Yosef’s father-in-law is a priest – and therefore not from the ruling elite of Egypt. I presume that Pharaoh did not want any noble to be able to claim that he was Yosef’s father-in-law or brother-in-law. Pharaoh wanted Yosef’s personal life to be completely outside the view of Egyptian society. He would be above the social dynamics of the higher echelons of Egypt, as, no doubt, Pharaoh was.

It is not written in the text, but how many wives should we assume that Pharaoh, a king in an ancient Oriental monarchy, had? We can presumably assume that he had a large harem, possibly hundreds of wives.

How many wives did Yosef have? Only one. Yosef did not treat himself as an Oriental ruler. He acted as a typical Jewish husband, and this was the household he created. Even with all the power and control that he was given, he remained Yosef. This is why he could influence his sons to remain in his unique place in the world and not assimilate into Egyptian society. The chances of them not assimilating were almost nil, and yet we see that they did not.

Returning to the pasuk. The entire seven years of the tremendous bounty is mentioned in one single, small pasuk (v. 47). When something is well planned out, even in its minor details, carrying it out can be so smooth that there is nothing to report.

But this is not what normally happens. What usually occurs is what we see in Putin’s war in Ukraine. Everything was planned out, but nothing goes according to plan.

With Yosef, however, all went according to plan. “The seven years of plenty that were in the land of Egypt ended.” We are told what was happening in Yosef’s household (vv. 50-52) and that the plans that were put in place beforehand were happening. All the local cities were storing their grain but were doing so in national silos. Because Yosef had nationalized the entire economy, the local governments had smoothly become arms of the national government. Yosef had used his powers to take complete control of the country’s grain storage.

“And the seven years of famine started as Yosef had predicted, and all the surrounding lands were struck with famine.”

We see that the famine affected the lands surrounding Egypt. But did these lands have the seven years of bounty? It seems not. If we look back at Pharaoh’s dreams and Yosef’s interpretations, the seven years of bounty applied only to the land of Egypt, while the famine included the surrounding lands. The surrounding lands did not stockpile in advance, while Egypt did.

Now the famine has begun, but there is still bread in Egypt. The next pasuk states: “The whole people of Egypt became hungry, and they cried to Pharaoh.” Note that they went to Pharaoh, not Yosef. To them, Yosef was an outsider, even though, and perhaps specifically because, he had so much power and control. “And Pharaoh said to them: ‘Go to Yosef and do what he commands.’” After all, Pharaoh was no longer the head of government. Yosef was.

This is slightly off-topic, but the midrash, quoted by Rashi here, says that Yosef commanded them to perform bris milah. Why did Yosef make them circumcise themselves? It is a commandment for Jews, not gentiles, and we do not try and proselytize. I saw a sefer that had nine answers to this question, the vast majority based on kabbalah. I do not have the background to address those answers, but there is a beautiful answer from Rav Yonasan Eibeschutz in his Ye’aros Devash. Yosef knew that Bnei Yisrael would end up in Egypt for a significant period of time, for over two hundred years. He knew that they would assimilate to some degree with Egyptian culture, and he wanted to make sure that they would not lose the most basic mitzvah of bris milah. By having everyone surrounding them circumcised, he ensured that no matter how assimilated they became, Bnei Yisrael would continue to practice bris milah, just like everyone around them.

Continuing with the Chumash: “The famine was across the whole land. Yosef opened storage areas across the land, vayishbor to Egypt.” This word vayishbor is a very unusual word. Usually, vayimkorwould be used for “and he sold.” The word vayishbor means specifically, “and he sold retail.”

No one was permitted to purchase more than was needed for his family. Yosef absolutely would not permit it, and this prevented hoarding. No one could hoard if it was impossible to purchase more than was needed for their family’s immediate needs. It was a brilliant plan of Yosef’s, not only to ensure that there was enough not only for the Egyptians to survive, but also for the rest of the world. Yosef knew how much food there was, where it all was, and where it all went.

“The famine was very strong in Egypt.” And the next pasuk tells us, “All the lands came to Egypt to buy grain from Yosef.”

“And Yaakov saw that there was shever in Egypt.” Throughout this story we have been talking about grain, bread, and the like. We said about Yosef that vayishbor, that he sold retail. What does Yaakov now see? That one can buy retail in Egypt. One would not be able to go to the Egyptians and make a deal about becoming their agent in Canaan; one would only be able to buy retail in Egypt. This was how Yosef ensured that there would be no hoarding or racketeering. One would have to go in person and present himself; this would prevent even the most determined of racketeers.

“Yaakov said to his sons, lamah tisra’u?” There are many interpretations regarding what this means. One interpretation is that he told his sons, “Why are you looking at one another as if to see who will be the one to go down to Egypt? They will only sell each person enough for himself and his immediate family. For us to receive enough food, you all need to go.”

Here is an interesting question: The first pasuk says that Yaakov sawthat there is retail food in Egypt, while the second pasuk has Yaakov tell his sons that he heard that there is retail food in Egypt. Why the difference?

Rashi explains that Yaakov knew what was happening in Egypt through a prophetic vision. He saw via prophecy that there was food to be purchased in Egypt. But he tells his sons that he heard about this. Yaakov does not tell his sons that he had a prophetic vision — he is a humble man, even hiding his greatness from his sons. Instead, he tells them that he “heard” that there is food for sale.

The pasuk continues: “Go down, buy us a little food so that we can live and not die.” And so the brothers go down to Egypt.

I would like to share an idea with you about the next part of the story.

The story continues with the brothers descending to Egypt and their meeting Yosef. They do not recognize Yosef and Yosef recognizes them. Rashi famously says that this was because the brothers last saw Yosef when he was still a young man, without a beard. I believe there could be a simpler explanation as well.

The midrash says that, when the brothers descended to Egypt, they were searching for Yosef. They went through ten entrances so that they could search all over for him. Where did they expect to find him? Where you would find slaves. They searched in the work camps, the press gangs and other lowly slave workers. We see that even when they have their entire dialogue with Yosef, they keep saying, “Oh, we were too harsh on the kid.” But they do not at any point think that Yosef had been right, that one day he would be their ruler and they would bow down to him. Not for an instant. This is where the big shocker in Parshas Vayigash comes in.

The midrash on Yosef’s revealing himself is incredible. The pasuk says that Yosef sent everyone out of the room. According to the midrash, Yosef turns to his brothers and says: “You lied. You said that your brother is dead, but he is not dead.”

“He’s not dead? How do you know?” The brothers ask, surprised.

“He is alive. I know him. He is in this very room.”

The brothers, says the midrash, begin to search the room, looking for any place where someone could hide. Even with all the hints in front of them, they could not believe that this person in front of them, this person who has saved the world, is their kid brother Yosef. This is like the Gemara eloquently says: We can stare at the truth for our entire life and never see it — because we do not want to see it.

Seeing is not always believing…

We have now answered most of our opening questions. I recommend that you check back and see if you feel that they have all been answered to your satisfaction!

Yosef, Planner of the Egyptian Economy

Question #1: Wise

Why does Yosef mention “Understanding” before “Wise?”

Question #2: Power!

Why does the Economic Minister need to control the Army?

Question #3: Bureaucracy

Are Bureaucracies Ever Good?

Parshas Mikeitz devotes a considerable discussion to Yosef’s plans to save Egypt, and indeed, to save all of mankind in their part of the Fertile Crescent. Our goal will be to see how a careful reading of the words of the Torah reading demonstrates Yosef’s financial brilliance and his unbelievable care and concern for all of humanity. We will begin at the beginning of the parsha.

Pharaoh has two dreams that not one of his advisers has been able to interpret to Pharaoh’s satisfaction. As a result, Yosef is hauled from the pit, brought before Pharaoh, and interprets the dreams: There will be seven years of plenty followed by seven years of famine. Reading Chapter 41, pasuk 32, “Regarding the repetition of the dream to Pharaoh, this is because the plan is already prepared as far as G-d is concerned; He will be bringing it to fruition very soon.”

At this point, Yosef has done everything he was “hired” to do. He was brought out of the pit in order to interpret the dream, and he has done so. However, he now goes on to provide unsolicited advice.

Personally, I have a policy not to provide advice unless asked for it. My experience is that when you provide advice that someone has not asked for, you are doing them a disservice. Advice that is not sought is usually rejected, and the dismissal of this option or mode of operation becomes entrenched into the individual’s psyche. Even if later on someone else suggests this approach or they might realize on some level that this is the best option, they may still reject it due to their emphatic initial dismissal of the advice. Thus, it is better for them if I not suggest what they should do.

Yosef does not follow this approach. I assume that Yosef trumps Kaganoff, and he has a far better idea of how to take care of matters. Bottom line, Yosef now gives Pharaoh unsolicited advice.

“Pharaoh should identify a man of deep understanding and wise.” There are two different terms in Hebrew for wisdom: binah and chachmah. They are not the same thing; they are complementary. Navon, the word used in the pasuk for a man of deep understanding, has become an English word as the noun, a maven.

A chacham is one who has a wide variety of information. A mavin or a navon, on the other hand, is one who can take that information, analyze it, and use it.

Yosef emphasizes to Pharaoh that what is needed is a man who is both a navon and a chacham, placing navon first. This is quite odd, since chachmah is usually placed first. After all, in order to analyze information and make plans based on it, one first needs to acquire the information. However, here, Yosef prioritizes navon before chacham.

The reason for the inverted order is that they are faced here with an unprecedented situation. We know that this part of the world is prone to droughts and famines. Both Avraham and Yitzchak experienced them. However, this case is unusual. Yosef is telling Pharaoh: We have been told in advance that there will be a number of years of unusual plenty, and they will be followed by a number of years of famine. We need to tighten our belts during the years of plenty so that we can provide our own solution for the coming difficulty. This unusual situation requires an unusual man, one who is more navon than chacham. He needs to imagine what to do and plan for an unprecedented circumstance. Chachmah, knowledge of facts, is necessary, but less so than binah, imagination how to plan and implement a program for a world that no one has ever seen or experienced.

And Pharaoh repeats Yosef’s terminology, placing navon before chacham: “There is none so discerning and wise as you.”

We see many unusual qualities in this Pharaoh. He is willing to listen to unsolicited advice, which itself is a rare quality. We will soon see other unusual characteristics about this man.

“And he should be appointed over the Land of Mitzrayim.” Why does this man need to be appointed over the entire land of Egypt? We can certainly understand the need to appoint a wise economic minister, but why does this man need to have power over the entire nation, including over the military which, at that point in history, was the most powerful in the world. This economic minister needs to create a plan that would enable Egypt to survive the famine. Why does Yosef insist that he have absolute authority over the entire country?

I have several suggestions for an answer, and they are not mutually exclusive.

Egypt was a regimented society. Everyone was born into a caste system, one that controlled everything in their lives including their profession, whether or not they had skill in that area. However, economic leaders, economists, chairmen of banks, secretaries of commerce and such are generally not accorded meaningful respect or esteem, especially by the military. The military generally makes the country’s decisions or has a large say in the decision making.

This is my first suggestion: Yosef realized that for the man in command to have the respect he needed to make decisions, he would need to be placed above everyone else, except Pharaoh. He could not be put in a position where he would have to fight for power with the military or the like.

Another reason why the economic planner must be provided virtually total control is that some of his decisions will not be popular. This could lead to rioting in the streets, and the economic minister would need to command the military authoritatively.

The pasuk continues: “Pharaoh should appoint many middle-managers, vechimeish the land of Mitzrayim.” The word “vechimeish” is a military term, to arm. Of course, when talking about a famine, we do not mean that he is providing the population with bows and spears to fight a famine. In this context, it means that the middle management must organize the bureaucracy in an expedient way on the same level that they would if they were planning a military campaign.

Once this is completed, what is done then?

“They shall gather all the food from the good years and place it into storage for the bad years.”
Obviously, this cannot mean literally “all” of the food from the good years — people need to eat during the good years also. Rather, the lion’s share of the food from the good years would be placed in storage. This is not how matters are usually handled. When people have extra disposable income, they spend it. In this case, they would have eaten or disposed of the extra food.

“Gather all the good grain under Pharaoh’s hand.”
I would assume that, under normal circumstances, Pharaoh was not involved in the production and storage of grain in Mitzrayim. He did not need it for himself, as he certainly had a large personal store. We also know that Egypt’s economy was based on the Nile’s annual flooding cycle. In ancient times, Egypt was a major producer of cotton, a notoriously thirsty crop. In general, Egypt had enough flooding water to be a major producer and exporter of cotton. This would mean that they certainly had ample grain production – you don’t produce cotton when you have no food.

Continues the pasuk: “Gather together all the food in the cities, and have it protected there.”

It is interesting to note that Yosef utilizes the local governments — each province or county of Egypt will be in charge of storing their own grain. They will be in charge of whatever grows in their area. In those days, there was not much shipping of foodstuff. Each city was supplied by the fields around the city. Yosef’s advice the locals in each city should ensure that whatever is not necessary for immediate use is stored. Note that in the advice given here and when Yosef later follows up, there is no mention of the construction of storage houses. This should be quite surprising, as it would be odd if Egypt had a massive amount of storage houses in advance, and not having sufficient storage space would be a problem for the plan that Yosef is proposing.

Although it is not mentioned in the Torah anywhere, I would suggest that these storage silos had to be constructed, and that this is another reason why Yosef needed to be second in command to the king. He needed to be able to redirect all resources away from other construction projects, such as roads and canals, and direct them toward constructing grain storage silos. This is just a suggestion; it is not supported — or negated — by anything in the text.

“The food shall be kept for the land so that it will be there for the seven years of want – thereby the country will not collapse in its era of shortage.”
This is now the end of Yosef’s suggestion, his unsolicited advice. He has finished his interpretation of the dream, including that the events will take place soon – therefore swift action is required. He suggests his program, and Pharaoh immediately accepts it in all its details. There is no indication here that Yosef was interrupted at any point during the advice-giving session, while Pharaoh, and the rest of the advisors, all listen. The pasuk (ibid. v. 37) closes: “The plan was good in the eyes of Pharaoh and in the eyes of his servants.”

Pharaoh has seen that Yosef is a man who knows how to think and who knows how to plan. However, we are all aware that the man with the great idea is often not the person best qualified to carry it out. The “ideas guy” is not necessarily the best at actualizing that idea. The reason why, nevertheless, Yosef is chosen to be in command is found in the next pasuk.

They all liked Yosef’s plan. Pharaoh now says to his advisors (ibid. v. 38): “Have we found any man like him who contains the spirit of G-d?”

This is a fascinating insight on Pharaoh’s part. He recognizes in Yosef something exceptional, something metaphysical, something beyond what we deal with in the regular world. This characteristic is one that Yosef has and no one else has. This characteristic turns Yosef from being simply an “ideas guy” to something much more.

Pharaoh says to Yosef (ibid. v. 39): “After G-d has told you all this, there is no navon and chacham like you in the whole land of Egypt.” Note again the order of the words. We noted that the unprecedented circumstances called for a person with an unprecedented source of wisdom. Because “G-d has told you all this,” no other factors need to be considered. Pharaoh sees that Yosef has an ability that he, Pharaoh, cannot measure, but certainly has the best chance to be successful in the uncharted territory that he foresees…

We will continue this topic next week. In the interim, please check our opening questions to see whether we have answered them to your satisfaction.

Motherhood, Rivkah and Amalek

Question #1:

Who was Amalek’s mother?

Question #2:

Why was she not accepted into the Jewish people?

Answers

This article will be discussing several observations germane to motherhood based on ideas that surface in the parshiyos of Tolados, Vayeitzei and Vayishlach. This will be combined with the concept of Amalek, even though it sounds strange to mix such seemingly dissimilar themes.

We will begin at the end of parshas Tolados: Yaakov has received the berachos, Yitzchak recognizes that he had mistakenly intended to give the berachos to the wrong person, Eisav begged for berachos and receives a generous beracha. As Yaakov is about to leave, Yitzchak gives him another beracha — the birkas Avraham.

Eisav is planning to murder his brother, Yaakov. We can legitimately ask why Eisav is so enraged about Yaakov receiving the berachos. He had already sold Yaakov the rights of the firstborn, and, anyway, does not appear very interested in fulfilling anything to do with the family business.  Although it is true that Yaakov got the berachos instead of him, but what would Eisav have done with those berachos? However, as we all know, anger and hate are irrational.

Rivkah knows about Eisav’s plans, but does not tell them to Yitzchak – whether because she is afraid of the damage it will do to his health or some other reason, we are never told. She considers knowledge of Eisav’s plans to be information placed on a need-to-know basis, and Yitzchak does not need to know Eisav’s murderous intent. Instead, she tells Yitzchak that Yaakov should not marry a local girl, but one of her nieces – notwithstanding that this means making a shidduch with Lavan, far from an exemplary mechutan. Yitzchak, having seen what Eisav’s two wives are like, heartily approves of the idea.

Yitzchak sends Yaakov on his way, and that is where parshas Tolados ends. “Yitzchak sends Yaakov to Padan Aram.” Padan Aram, also known as Aram Naharayim, is in Mesopotamia. The word Mesopotamia means “between the rivers,” just as the word naharayim means “the pair of rivers.” (There is another Aram, Aram Tzova, in Syria, identified with the northern and northwestern parts of Syria, Aleppo and its environs. These two areas, Aram Naharayim and Aram Tzova, together are the origins of the Aramite area and of the “Aramaic” language. Aramaic later becomes the lingua franca of the Middle East for several hundred years, when it replaces Greek, and before Arabic replaces it. By the way, it is still a spoken language among some populations in this region.)

Let us return to the pasuk. “Yitzchak sent Yaakov to Padan Aram — to Lavan the son of Besuel the Aramean, the brother of Rivkah, the mother of Yaakov and Eisav.”

In reference to these words, “The mother of Yaakov and Eisav,” Rashi leaves a four-word Hebrew comment: Eini yodei’a mah melamdeinu, “I do not know what this is teaching us.”

This itself is not a strange comment by Rashi. Dozens of times, throughout the Chumash and the Gemara, Rashi informs us that he is unaware of the answer to a question. Rashi has no ego to protect. He is the ultimate, exceptional pedagogue; without question, he is the greatest pedagogue of all history.

However, here it seems that there are very satisfying answer to his question. Several of the commentaries — Ohr Hachayim, Seforno, Ramban and others — provide very nice answers to explain these three extra words in the pasuk, “the mother of Yaakov and Eisav,” and so could have Rashi. Why does Rashi not suggest one of their approaches?

I believe that Rashi is bothered by a different issue: When we have an expression like this — a few words that seem to be extra — it makes it appear as if Tanach is literature in which words are added only to smooth out the writing style. However, Rashi tells us each time (see, for example, his comments to Bereishis 3:8), that his goal is to explain the pshat of the pasuk, and/or he will examine the various midrashei Chazal and pick from them one or two statements that he feels the pasuk is emphasizing.

What is bothering Rashi here? The words, “the mother of Yaakov and Eisav” are not needed for the pshat, since we know who Rivkah is. A simple explanation of what these words are adding is also not difficult. We know that she is the mother of both Yaakov and Eisav and that she loves Yaakov, her younger son, more than Eisav, the elder. The reason she loves Yaakov more than Eisav is also not difficult; Yaakov will be her spiritual heir, and Eisav, be a source of grief. Throughout the story of the berachos, she goes out of her way to care for Yaakov. However, she still loves Eisav as her son. As a wayward son, perhaps, but she still loves him. No matter how far he distances himself from everything she cherishes, she still loves him. As, in fact, she told Yaakov: “Go to Aram; why should I lose both of you?” That is her big concern. She doesn’t want to lose both, or either, of them.

Thus, making the words, “the mother of Yaakov and Eisav,” read nicely in the pasuk is not difficult; that is not what is bothering Rashi. What Rashi is saying is that there should be a midrashic interpretation that would satisfy his audience on a deeper level. As Rashi himself describes the process of his commentary, he explains a pasuk according to its simplest pshat, or according to a midrash aggadah that fits the pasuk smoothly. However, here there are few midrashim, and none which Rashi feels fits the pshat of the pasuk.

 Yaakov leaves empty-handed

Below, we will discuss Timna, the mother of Amalek. Eisav has a son named Elifaz, and Elifaz has a son named Amalek. We learn a lot about Elifaz from a comment of Rashi in parshas Vayeitzei.

As an introduction to understand Elifaz, we will begin with a puzzling fact at the beginning of parshas Vayeitzei. Why is Yaakov empty-handed when he heads toward Charan? To make Yitzchak’s shidduch, Eliezer took ten camels laden with the most valuable items of the time. Sure, Yaakov was in a rush because Eisav wanted to kill him, but Yitzchak is very wealthy and Yaakov could have taken some precious stones, which are light. Take a bag of them, or sew them into your clothes. It is very doable. It seems deliberate that he has no valuables with him. Why?

Midrashei Chazal provide two approaches to answer this question.

One: Indeed, Yitzchak sent him away empty handed. This approach sounds pretty strange to me, but this is the opinion of a midrash. Rav Hirsch provides an approach that is similar to this midrash, which I can understand a bit better. Yaakov chose not to take anything with him, hoping that this would mitigate Eisav’s anger. He wanted to show Eisav that the latter had lost nothing when the berachos went to Yaakov instead. What has Yaakov earned by winning the berachos or by purchasing the right of the firstborn from Eisav? Absolutely nothing of value to Eisav. Yaakov has left Eisav all the property from the household — far more than Eisav could ever have imagined he would receive in inheritance if he divided it with Yaakov. So, why should Eisav be upset at him?

Two: The better known approach, quoted by Rashi (to 29:10). Yaakov indeed left with much wealth. Eisav sent his eldest son Elifaz to kill Yaakov. (Incidentally, why didn’t Eisav go himself? Maybe because if he disappeared for a bit and then Yaakov was found murdered, it would be clear that Eisav had killed Yaakov; this would anger Yitzchak. So he sent Elifaz. Perhaps…) Now, the midrash tells us that Elifaz approached Yaakov and told him of his predicament. His father had commanded him to kill Yaakov, but he did not want to. Yaakov told Elifaz: “Take all of my possessions.” As we know from the Gemara, a poor person is considered as dead. And now Yaakov is empty handed.

 Elifaz

I would like to point out that the name Elifaz appears in Tanach in only two contexts. Elifaz is the name of Eisav’s son, who takes a woman named Timna as a pilegesh, and there is an Elifaz who shows up as one of Iyov’s friends.

Is that a coincidence? Are there two men named Elifaz? Or is it the same Elifaz?

This is a discussion in midrashei Chazal. There are many midrashei Chazal that assume that they are the same Elifaz, that Iyov’s buddy Elifaz is Eisav’s son. This will tell us much about the proper placement of Iyov in history. There is a large discussion in the Gemara regarding when Iyov lived, whether he was Jewish or not, whether he even lived or was simply a mashal, a fable, if you pardon the expression. Iyov is one of the most difficult books in Tanach for many reasons, but regardless, Iyov’s friend Elifaz is a respected individual.

Timna

Now, let us discuss Elifaz’s pilegesh, Timna. Pilegesh is usually translated as concubine; it can also be translated as mistress. In parshas Vayishlach, we have a discussion about the chieftains of Eisav, of Edom. There, we see the name Timna appearing twice. She became a pilegesh to Elifaz and bore him Amalek. Amalek appears to be the only issue from their relationship.

Later on, it discusses the royalty of Edom, using the word “aluf,” which in Modern Hebrew has come to mean “general” or “champion.” Chazal tell us that aluf is someone who is right below a king, a member of the royal family who does not wear the crown and does not have primary power. We usually call such a person a prince. One of those princes or princesses, is Timna; the verses refer to “Aluf Timna” and to “Aluf Elifaz.” Timna was from a royal family. She had a brother, Lotan, who is described as an aluf, and that she too was called aluf, a princess.

We need to examine a very baffling passage of Gemara: Timna wanted to convert and join the Jewish people. While this was before the giving of the Torah, we know that Avraham had a significant following of people who were attracted by his ethics, morals, sense of purpose, sense of G-d and his monotheism.

Timna wanted to join. The midrash says that she came to Avraham, Yitzchak, and Yaakov, requesting to join the Jewish people, but they refused to accept her. Why not? That’s a good question, to which we do not know the definitive answer.

Since Timna was refused entry to the people of Avraham, Yitzchak, and Yaakov, she said: “OK. Eisav is a grandson of Avraham, and Elifaz is a great-grandson of Avraham. I know that Elifaz is a good guy; he was Iyov’s friend and he did not obey Eisav’s bad commandments. If I cannot join Avraham’s group, I will join Elifaz. She goes to Elifaz, who tells her that he already has a wife. So, she says, “OK, I’ll be a pilegesh, a concubine.” Concubine has a connotation of a second-class citizen. The origin of the Hebrew word pilegesh means “half a wife.” Timna said: “I would rather be a pilegesh to this nation than a princess among my own.”

The pasuk teaches that the union of Elifaz and Timna produced Amalek, and the Gemara notes that he was the founder of the nation that gives the Jews non-stop difficulty. Why, asks the Gemara, was that the result? The Gemara answers that they should not have pushed Timna away from joining the Jewish people. At this point, the Gemara closes its discussion on this topic, leaving us without any explanation as to what it means.

This sounds like we are blaming the victim – that is, we are blaming the Jewish people for anti-Semitic atrocities!

I was troubled by this question: why are we blaming Avraham, Yitzchak, and Yaakov for not accepting Timna? I went looking, and I found several approaches that did not speak to me. I finally found an approach in the Maharal of Prague.

The Maharal explains that accepting Timna to join the Jewish people would not have worked. She was from a royal family. She wanted to marry into the family of Avraham, Yitzchak, and Yaakov, but her nature was still royalty. Even if she became a concubine to Elifaz, she still viewed herself as royalty, whereas Avraham, Yitzchak, and Yaakov were not royalty. She would not have gained what she needed to grow from them, because she still viewed herself as superior. Avraham, Yitzchak, and Yaakov all saw this and said that they could not take her, because she would not have become a proper student or disciple of theirs.

If so, what did Avraham, Yitzchak, and Yaakov do wrong?

The Maharal explains that although they had a reason not to accept her, it still wasn’t the correct thing to do. She sincerely wanted to join. We do not find the fact of someone’s royalty among the reasons mentioned to refuse people from joining the Jewish people. We reject conversion to the Jewish people if the candidate is insincere in his reason to join the Jews – such as, he is joining for the sake of marriage, or to obtain citizenship or benefits in the State of Israel. In an era like those of King David and Shelomoh, or after Mordechai and Esther’s victory over Haman, we decline conversions out of concern that its motivation is that it is beneficial to be a Jew. Those are reasons to reject someone, but not because someone comes from royalty and may not be able to fully accept our teachings. For this reason, notwithstanding that Timna and Elifaz were both sincere, the result of their union was Amalek!

But what about Hagar? According to the midrash, she was a daughter of the Egyptian pharaoh, the greatest power on the face of the earth at the time. And she was accepted to join Avraham’s people. Why did they not reject Hagar for the same reason that they rejected Timna?

The answer is that Hagar was accepted as a slave. She and her father knew that she was only going to be a slave in Avraham’s household. She was to be Sarah’s personal maidservant. Once they accepted this, she could absorb as much of Avraham’s and Sarah’s teaching as she was capable. And, when Sarah chose her from all the other female slaves of the household to become Avraham’s concubine, it was a tremendous vote of confidence that Hagar had largely succeeded in accepting their leadership and instruction. So much so, that when Hagar was apprised of the suggestion, she demurred, not feeling herself appropriate to the task.

These discussions leave us with a lot of food for thought…

Lentil Soup

Question #1: Lentil Soup?

What beracha should Eisav have recited on his lentil soup?

Question #2: Apple Sauce?

I am sitting down to a snack of apple sauce and coffee. Does it make any difference how I recite the beracha?

Question #3: Candied Ginger?

What is the correct beracha to recite on candied ginger?

Introduction:

The Torah teaches us that Yaakov gave Eisav bread and lentil soup, and, according to the old Jewish tradition, Eisav did not recite a beracha when he ate his meal. If Eisav had skipped the bread and made a beracha on the soup, what beracha should he have made? It might depend on the recipe that Yaakov used when he made the soup, and it might also depend on the consistency of the soup. So, although I know that some people assume that the beracha on all soups is shehakol, this is certainly not an accurate rule. As always, the goal of our column is not to provide definitve halachic ruling; that is the role of each individual’s rav or posek. The goal of our article is to educate about the halachic principle.

Let us begin with the Gemara, where it states that “the water of beets is treated like beets, and the water of turnips is treated like turnips, and the water of all cooked items is like the cooked item” (Berachos 39a). This means that if someone cooked beets, and then drank the liquid without the vegetable, he should recite the beracha of ha’adamah on the liquid, notwithstanding that he is not even eating the vegetable itself. This Gemara is teaching us an interesting application of the Mishnah, which states, “This is the rule: Whatever is primary, ikar, and is accompanied by something secondary, tafeil, one recites the beracha on the primary and absolves the secondary item” (Berachos 44a). According to the rule in this Mishnah, someone eating cooked beets does not recite a beracha on the liquid in which they were cooked, even should he drink some of the liquid by itself. A similar case is someone eating breakfast cereal and has some milk left in his bowl; he does not recite a beracha on the milk that is left. However, the Gemara extends the Mishnah’s ruling, teaching that even without eating any beets, the beracha on the water in which the beets were cooked is the same beracha as that of the beets, because the beets are still considered the ikar.

The Rambam (Hilchos Berachos 8:4) qualifies the ruling of the Gemara: “For vegetables that are commonly cooked, the beracha on the liquid is borei pri ha’adamah, provided that he cooked them in order to drink the liquid, because, when it is common to drink the water of cooked vegetables, the liquid has the same law as the vegetables.” The Shulchan Aruch quotes this ruling of the Gemara, although he omits the stipulation of the Rambam: “On the water in which vegetables were cooked, one should recite the same beracha that one would recite on the vegetables themselves, notwithstanding that you are consuming only the flavor of the vegetables” (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 205:2). Then he adds a different stipulation: “This is true only if the vegetables were cooked without any meat; if some meat was added, the beracha on the liquid is shehakol.”

Ikar and tafeil

To explain this ruling of the Shulchan Aruch, we need to examine the laws of ikar and tafeil.

There are two general categories of situations included in the halachos of ikar and tafeil; (1) enhancers and (2) mixtures.

(1) Enhancers: This category includes food items where the tafeil food makes the ikar food tastier. Some common examples include: Cereal with fruit and milk; eating latkes with apple sauce; stirring herbal tea with a cinnamon stick; breading fish or meat (schnitzel). In all of these cases, one recites the beracha for the ikar; that is, the cereal, latkes, tea, or meat; and the tafeil is included.

(2) Mixtures: This category includes cases where one food is not specifically enhancing the other, but both foods are important. For example, someone eating macaroni and cheese, blintzes (they always contain a filling), cholent, kugel, or stew is interested in eating all the different foods that comprise the dish. The same halacha applies when eating soups, which may contain vegetables, meat, noodles or barley. In these cases, all the food items eaten are important and none of these ingredients serve only to enhance the rest. Although these are mixtures, they are considered one complete food item and therefore have only one beracha. Thus, the concept of ikar and tafeil is very different here — it determines which beracha we recite on this food. The beracha of the ikar, usually the majority item, is the beracha on the entire item.

We will return to the concept of mixtures, but first I want to explain the concept of enhancers and how it affects the halacha regarding the water in which vegetables were cooked. The reason that the beracha prior to drinking the “water” of beets or turnips is ha’adamah, is because this is considered the enhancer of the water. In other words, the beet water (also known as borscht) is being drunk primarily because of its beet flavor. Therefore, if someone added meat to the borscht, the beracha becomes shehakol, since the meat flavor is now considered the ikar and the beracha on meat is, of course, shehakol.

Having noted how the Rambam understood the Gemara that taught that the beracha on “beet water” is ha’adamah, I will note a question on this passage of Gemara raised by other rishonim. An earlier passage of Gemara rules that the correct beracha to recite on the liquid squeezed out of dates, called date honey or silan, is shehakol. That passage then explains that this ruling is dependent on a dispute between the tanna’im Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua, whether or not date honey is still considered “fruit” germane to the laws of terumah. The Gemara concludes, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, that the honey squeezed out of dates has lost the status of fruit and is shehakol. This leads the rishonim to question what is the difference between date honey, on which the beracha is shehakol, and beet or turnip soup, on which the beracha is ha’adamah. The Ba’al Halachos Gedolos (usually abbreviated Bahag), who predated the rishonim, writes that when the Gemara rules that the beracha on date honey is shehakol, it refers to date honey that was watered down, but the beracha on pure date honey is ha’etz. The rishonim explain that since the =posuk that praises Eretz Yisrael as the land of the seven special fruits refers to dates as devash, , the Bahag assumes that pure date honey must have the prominence of dates, presumably for the berachos both before and after eating it.

Nevertheless, most rishonim reject the Bahag’s approach and rule that the beracha before eating date honey is shehakol. There is also another opinion that the beracha before eating date honey is ha’adamah (see Hagahos Ashri, Berachos 6:12).

This returns us to our question: What is the difference between honey and beet soup? The rishonim and poskim suggest several possible distinctions, each of which results in a different halachic conclusion. Some understand that there is a difference between the flavor cooked out of a fruit or vegetable and that which is squeezed out. When cooking, a greater degree of the flavor is removed, and in the case of a fruit or vegetable that is eaten cooked, the beracha on the liquid extract is ha’eitz or ha’adamah (Rosh, Berachos 6:18, as explained by the Tur and the Bach, Orach Chayim 202).

Another approach is that the beracha ha’eitz or ha’adamah is recited on the liquid extract or soup of the fruit or vegetable only when the fruit or vegetable is usually eaten this way (Chiddushei Harashba, Berachos 38a s.v. Devash). There are fruits that are commonly eaten cooked, such as apples, quince, peaches and prunes, but few of these are eaten most of the time in the cooked state together with their liquid. Although the Bach (Orach Chayim 202 s.v. Ve’im bisheil) concludes that the beracha on the cooked liquid extract of any of these fruits is ha’eitz, this is not the conclusion of most acharonim. Based on their understanding of the Rashba, they conclude that the beracha of ha’adamah was recited on the liquid of the beets and turnips only because these vegetables were usually served cooked with their liquid. However, for vegetables that are often served cooked without the liquid, the beracha on the liquid is shehakol. According to this approach, the correct beracha on the lentil soup that Yaakov served would be ha’adamah if (1) there were pieces of lentil still in the soup or (2) lentils were usually served with the liquid in which they were cooked. However, if the lentils were removed from the soup (or already eaten) and it was unusual to serve lentils with the liquid in which they were cooked, the beracha on the lentil soup would be shehakol. In either case, if there were still significant quantities of lentils in the soup (enough to say that the person was eating lentils and not just their liquid), the beracha would be ha’adamah.

Mixture Berachos

Above, I mentioned that there are two rules governing the laws of ikar and tafeil, types of mixtures, one governing the laws of ikar that are enhancers and another governing foods that are true mixtures. I have already explained the rules of the enhancers germane to vegetable soups. Now I will explain the rules that determine the beracha of a mixture.

There are three rules to establish which beracha to recite on a mixture:

1. If one of the items is clearly the most important, it determines the beracha (Pri Megadim, Orach Chayim, Pesicha Koleles, Hilchos Berachos s.v. Hatenai; Mishnah Berurah 212:1). For example, the beracha on chicken or meat soup with vegetables is shehakol, since the chicken or the meat is the most important flavor component in the soup.

2. When there is no most important ingredient, the beracha is usually determined by the majority item in the product. Thus, the beracha on a peanut bar containing peanuts, honey, and sugar is ha’adamah,since peanuts are the major ingredient. The beracha on a tzimmes consisting of prunes and sweet potatoes depends on which item is the major ingredient.

3. However, when the mixture contains one of the five grains, the beracha is usually mezonos, unless the flour or grain is included only to provide texture (Shulchan Aruch 204:12; 208:2, 3). For example, flour added to thicken soup is tafeil.

Because grains are important, they are the ikar of the mixture even if they are a minority ingredient. For this reason, the beracha on vegetable-barley soup is usually mezonos. However, if the barley is completely dissolved, the beracha on the soup will be ha’adamah. Also, if you do not want the barley but a few pieces ended up in your bowl anyway, the beracha is ha’adamah, and the barley will be considered tafeil (Mishnah Berurah 212:1).

Similarly, the beracha on a trifle containing cake and ice cream is mezonos even if there is more ice cream than cake, since the cake is a grain product. However, the beracha on potato kugel that contains flour, bread crumbs, and/or matzoh meal to provide texture is ha’adamah (when there are visible pieces of potato). Since the grain product here functions only to hold the kugel together, it is tafeil and does not affect the beracha.

These rules are only for the five grains whose beracha is hamotzi when they are made into bread. The beracha regarding other grains and starches, such as millet, sorghum, tapioca, arrowroot, manioc and quinoa, is that if they are cooked or ground until there are no pieces left, the beracha is shehakol, even if they are the ikar. The same rule is true if these starches are tastier eaten raw rather than when they are cooked (Rema, Orach Chayim 208:8). Thus, a porridge or hot cereal made of kasha or millet will be shehakol if there are no pieces of the grain left, and ha’adamah if there are. The beracha on quinoa is, in most cases, ha’adamah, because it is usually not ground or cooked until the pieces completely dissolve.

Purees

What is the correct beracha to recite prior to eating fruit and vegetable products that no longer have their original consistency, such as apple sauce, jam, fruit puree, mashed potatoes, tomato paste and peanut butter? Is the correct beracha on these items borei pri ha’eitz/ha’adamah or shehakol?

The rishonim dispute this question, many contending that even a completely pureed fruit is still borei pri ha’eitz; a minority rule that the beracha on a fruit or vegetable that no longer has its original consistency is shehakol.

What do we conclude?

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 202:7) rules that the beracha is ha’eitz, and this is the ruling followed by most Sefardim. Ashkenazim follow the ruling of the Rema, who contends that one should recite shehakol, because of the safek as to which opinion we should follow. In practice, Ashkenazim usually recite borei pri ha’eitz when eating a product that has some of the consistency of the original product, as is the case of jam with recognizable fruit pieces in it or “chunky” or “natural” apple sauce, but recite shehakol before eating a completely smooth apple sauce or a smooth jam, where the fruit has completely lost its consistency (Mishnah Berurah 202:42).

However, since the reason we recite shehakol is because it is a safek, several halachic differences result. For example, someone having a snack of apple sauce and a beverage should make sure to recite the shehakol on the apple sauce rather than on the beverage. If they recite the shehakol on the beverage without specifically including the apple sauce, they have created a safek whether the obligation to make a beracha on the apple sauce has been fulfilled. This is because, according to the opinions that the beracha should be ha’eitz, they did not fulfill the beracha by reciting shehakol on something else.

Similarly, someone eating a fruit and apple sauce at the same time who recited ha’eitz on the fruit should not recite shehakol (and certainly not ha’eitz)on the apple sauce. This is because the poskim who contend that apple sauce is ha’eitz rule that he has already fulfilled his duty by reciting ha’eitz on the other fruit. In this situation, he should first recite shehakol on the apple sauce and then ha’eitz on the other fruit (Ben Ish Chai, Parshas Pinchas 1:16).

Some authorities rule more strictly, contending that you should not eat an item that is definitely borei pri ha’eitz together with an item that is questionably borei pri ha’eitz, such as apple sauce. This is because there isn’t any way to fulfill the need for reciting a beracha on both items without creating an unnecessary beracha. If one recites the beracha on the fruit first, then one has a safek as to whether he can recite a beracha on the safek item. However, if you recite the shehakol on the safek item first, then, according to the opinions that the beracha is ha’eitz, you have now recited an unnecessary beracha (Maamar Mordechai 203:3).

Candied ginger?

At this point, we will discuss the third of our opening questions: What is the correct beracha to recite on candied ginger?

The Mishnah Berurah (202:44) rules that if you dry and grind up ginger until it is not identifiable and mix it with sugar, the beracha is ha’adamah. Based on several earlier authorities (Terumas Hadeshen #29; Shulchan Aruch Harav; Chayei Adam), he explains that since this is the usual way that ginger is eaten, it requires the same beracha it would receive were it eaten as a fresh spice. Since ginger is a root, that makes its beracha ha’adamah.

This ruling is even more obvious relative to the candied ginger that is commonly made today, which is usually dried pieces of ginger topped with a sugary glaze.

Conclusion

The Gemara (Bava Kamma 30a) quotes three approaches for someone to follow should he want to develop into a true chassid, meaning someone who acts exemplarily beyond the requirements of the halacha. The first approach recommends that he become expert in the rules of damages and torts; the second approach recommends that he become expert in the themes of Mesechta Avos; and the third that he study carefully the laws of Berachos. The Maharsha (ad loc.) explains that there are three aspects essential to growing as a mensch – one must be good to Hashem, good to others and good to yourself. Becoming expert in the rules of damages influences someone to focus on being good to others; becoming expert in the study of Avos results in the individual understanding himself well; and becoming an expert in the laws of Berachos is a way to train himself to appreciate what Hashem does for us. Our attempts to observe the halachos of Berachos correctly demonstrate a small expression on our part to praise Hashem for even His seemingly small kindnesses to us.

Wedding Arrangements

Question #1: Wedding Arrangements

“Which sheva brochos custom is based on this week’s parsha?”

Question #2: Indoor Chupah

“My cousin is making his chupah completely indoors. May I attend the wedding?”

Question #3: Maaser Money

“I agreed to support my married children for five years. May I set aside all my maaser money for this?”

Introduction:

Most of this week’s parsha is devoted to the trip that Eliezer takes to find a wife for Yitzchok. This provides an opportunity to discuss some of the laws and customs about weddings and sheva brachos arrangements that we have not covered in previous articles.

In his commentary on the Torah (Bereishis 24:3), Rabbeinu Bachya cites a custom that, on the day of a chosson’s wedding, the part of the Torah in which Avraham gives Eliezer his instructions is read in the chosson’s honor. This is to remind the chosson that he should choose his mate with the right considerations – so that they can grow in yiras shamayim and build a proper Torah family together – and not pick a wife for other reasons that will not ultimately lead to proper goals.

Many Sefardic communities continue this practice of reading the words of our parsha in honor of the chosson, although there are different variations of the custom. Some read this parsha when a chosson receives his aliyah to the Torah on the Shabbos of sheva brachos week, which is called the Shabbat chatan (Abudraham). On this occasion, some authorities cite a practice of reciting these pesukim accompanied by songs that praise the chosson (Sedei Chemed, Maareches Choson Vekallah paragraph 14 [Volume 7 page 33]). I have been in Sefardic batei knesset in which the custom is that, immediately after the chosson’s aliyah, two members of the congregation, alternatively, read the pesukim in parshas Chayei Sarah from a chumash.

Other reasons are quoted for the practice of reading this part of the Torah on the occasion of a Shabbat chatan. According to one approach, the reason is so that the chosson can read the Torah himself, as this is a reading that even a not-so-scholarly chosson would be familiar with and could easily learn. Yet another reason is that not every parsha has a pleasant and appropriate reading, so it became standardized to have a chosson read this (Tashbeitz 2:39).

From a Sefer Torah or from a chumash?

There are different customs regarding whether these pesukim are read from a Sefer Torah. The custom of reading this from the Sefer Torah is already mentioned by rishonim (Tashbeitz). Others mention the practice of reading it from a chumash, rather than a Sefer Torah. In the days before the printing press, this meant one of the five books of the Torah that had been hand-written onto parchment and bound like a book to be used for study.

Special Sefer Torah?

The Tashbeitz quotes the practice of taking out a Sefer Torah from the aron kodesh just for the purpose of this special reading. The chosson would be called up to read the story of Eliezer from the second Sefer Torah. Others cite a custom of rolling the Sefer Torah to the story of Eliezer after the regular Shabbos reading is complete. Others say that this special reading should be from a Sefer Torah, but whether a Sefer Torah was taken out just for this purpose depends on whether the Shabbat chatan falls on a week in which one or two sifrei Torah would otherwise be used. According to this opinion, if only one Sefer Torah would otherwise be used, then a second Sefer Torah should be taken out for this purpose. If the Shabbat chatan falls on a week that there is a need to read from two sifrei Torah, the special reading in honor of the chosson is read by rolling the second Sefer Torah to parshas Chayei Sarah after the maftir has been read (Kaf Hachayim, Orach Chayim 144:10, quoting Keneses Hagedolah).

Is a brocha recited prior to reading these pesukim?

In places where the custom is to read the pesukim from a Sefer Torah, does the chosson recite a brocha before reading from the second Torah? Some rishonim rule that a brocha is recited before and after this reading, just as for any other aliyah (Tashbeitz).

With the Targum or without?

In communities in which the Torah was read together with the Targum, different customs are quoted whether the Targum translation for the story of Eliezer wass also recited, or whether only the Targum for the weekly Torah reading was recited (Sedei Chemed, paragraph 14 [Volume 7 page 33]). This practice goes back to the days in which every community read the Targum after each posuk in order to translate the Torah for the benefit of the common people, who spoke and understood Aramaic, but not Hebrew. In few places today is the Targum recited together with the Torah reading, since most people do not understand the Aramaic in which the Targum is written, although it is still performed by many Yemenite kehillos.

Customs from the parsha

Thus, we can now address the first of our opening questions: “Which sheva brochos custom is based on this week’s parsha?”

Actually, many of the customs of our weddings and sheva brochos have a basis somewhere in this week’s parsha. The one we have discussed here is an ancient and still common Sefardic practice to read the pesukim of this week’s parsha in which Avraham instructs Eliezer how he is to find a wife for Yitzchok.

Indoor Chupah

Having mentioned a custom that is practiced by Sefardim, let us discuss a custom that is practiced by Ashkenazim. The early authorities cite several practices that are used to herald good signs that the marriage should be successful, happy and fruitful. Among these practices is a custom of conducting the chupah under the open heavens, as a sign that the couple being married should merit a large family, as many as the stars of the heavens (Rema, Even Ha’ezer 61:1). This last practice has become fairly universal among Ashkenazim, although it is virtually unheard of among Sefardim, who usually make the chupah indoors. Among Ashkenazim who follow this practice, the most common practice in Eastern Europe was to conduct the chupah in the open-air courtyard in front of the shul. In some places in Germany, the custom was to make the chupah in the shul itself, rather than under the heavens (not following the custom mentioned by the Rema).

In nineteenth-century Hungary, with the persuasion of the Reform-influenced Neologue movement, it became a practice among assimilated Jews to conduct the weddings indoors, in the Neologue temples. In a responsum, the Chasam Sofer strongly disapproves of performing weddings indoors(Shu”t Chasam Sofer, Even Ha’ezer 1:98).

At this point, let us examine the second of our opening questions: “My cousin is making his chupah completely indoors. May I attend the wedding?”

There may be many very valid reasons why your cousin is making the chupah indoors. It could be that he is Sefardic, or descended from an area of Germany where chupos were traditionally made indoors. It also might be that this is a second wedding, or that the bride is beyond the age at which one would expect her to have children. In both of the latter instances, many authorities rule that there is no reason to make the chupah under the heavens.

However, even should they be Ashkenazim, young, and marrying for the first time, and yet they insist on making the chupah indoors, there is no halachic reason why you cannot attend the wedding. Having the chupah under the heavens is a nice segulah, but not a mandatory halachic requirement.

In this context, allow me to quote a responsum on this topic from Rav Moshe Feinstein (Shu”t Igros Moshe, Even Ha’ezer, 1:93). The questioner was a rav in a community in which the common practice was not to conduct the chupah under the heavens, unlike the practice recommended by the Rema. The rav asked whether he was permitted to perform the wedding ceremony, concerned that, if he did not, he would lose his position and his source of livelihood. Rav Moshe ruled that not only may he perform the ceremony, he is required to do so, and that this is included within his responsibilities as a hired rav – to make sure that matters such as marriages are conducted in halachically correct fashion. Performing the wedding under the heavens is not a requirement instituted by the Sages, nor does it qualify as a custom that we must observe; it is simply a good omen and good advice – but the individuals involved are not required to follow this advice if they choose not to.

Rav Moshe writes that this ruling is true even according to the Chasam Sofer, notwithstanding his opposition to those who got married indoors. Rav Moshe infers from the words of the Chasam Sofer that, although he frowned on the practice of conducting a wedding indoors, he did not prohibit it; he simply felt that it was improper. Furthermore, Rav Moshe contends that the Chasam Sofer’s strong disapproval of making a wedding ceremony indoors was only in his day, when this approach was advocated by the Reform, whose goal was to uproot all of the practices of the Torah. These weddings, conducted in synagogues, were intended to mimic the practices of the non-Jewish world, which held its weddings in churches. However, in today’s world, when people schedule wedding ceremonies indoors for practical and personal reasons, not because they want to mimic non-Jewish practices, the Chasam Sofer would not have such strident opposition. Therefore, Rav Moshe contends that even the Chasam Sofer would have ruled that a rav who is requested to be mesader kiddushin at a wedding where the chupah is indoors should accept.

Early part of the month

Early authorities cite other practices that are used to herald that the marriage should be successful, happy and fruitful. Another practice common both to Ashkenazim and Sefardim is that of scheduling a wedding at the beginning of the month, which is mentioned by both the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 179:2) and the Rema (Even Ha’ezer 64:3). In the same responsum quoted above, Rav Moshe notes that this practice is not halachically required. Therefore, someone who chooses not to observe this practice is not violating any halacha and there is no reason not to perform the wedding.

In this context, it is interesting to quote an earlier teshuvah from the Noda Biyehudah, regarding people who are exceedingly careful not to set up a shidduch in which the father of the bride and the chosson have the same name, and similar concerns based on the writings of Rabbi Yehudah Hachassid. The Noda Biyehudah writes, “I am astonished that most people have no concern about marrying their daughter to a halachic ignoramus, notwithstanding the words of Chazal about the importance of marrying her to a Talmudic scholar …yet they are concerned about having her marry someone whose name is the same as her father’s which has no Talmudic basis or source” (Shu”t Noda Biyehudah, Even Ha’ezer 2:79). Thus, we see that the Noda Biyehudah does not consider the segulos that people attach to some of these practices as important. The significant factors are those mentioned by the Gemara. The chosson should be a Torah scholar, and his bride a ye’re’ah Shamayim.

Maaser Money

At this point, let us examine the third and last of our opening questions, this one a very universal issue for both Ashkenazim and Sefardim: “I agreed to support my married children for five years. May I use maaser money for this?”

The Chasam Sofer authored a responsum (Shu”t Chasam Sofer, Yoreh Deah #231) on this subject, which is fascinating for the many different halachic issues that he clarifies. Someone had arranged the marriage of his scholarly son to the daughter of a talmid chacham with the following understanding: The father of the son accepted that he would pay every week a certain amount to his mechutan, the bride’s father, who would sustain the young growing family in his home, thus enabling the son-in-law to continue his studies under his father-in-law’s direction. The father of the chosson is now finding it difficult to fulfill his weekly obligation, and wants to know if he can use the maaser money from his business endeavors to provide the support for which he is responsible.

The Chasam Sofer opens his discussion by quoting two opinions that seem to dispute whether it is acceptable to use maaser money for such an expenditure. The Rema, quoting the Maharil, contends that it is not permitted to use maaser money to pay for a mitzvah, such as donating lamps and candles to the shul, whereas the Shach states, in the name of the Maharam, that it is permitted to use maaser money for mitzvos. Thus, whether one may pay for mitzvos,other than supporting the poor, from maaser money appears to be a dispute among early authorities.

The Chasam Sofer then quotes the Be’er Hagolah, who explains that the two above-quoted opinions are not in dispute. All authorities prohibit using maaser money to fulfill a mitzvah that someone is already obligated to observe. The Maharam, who permitted using maaser money for mitzvah purposes, was discussing a case in which the donor intended to use maaser money for this mitzvah from the outset, whereas the Maharil is discussing a situation in which the donor has been using his maaser money to support the poor, in which case he cannot now divert it for other mitzvos that do not qualify as tzedakah for the poor. Thus, according to the Be’er Hagolah, whether the father can begin meeting his obligations to his son and mechutan with his maaser money will depend on whether he has already accepted the obligation on himself to pay this from other funds, in which case he cannotuse maaser money for it, or if it is an obligation that he is now accepting upon himself, in which case he can specify that he wants to use maaser money to fulfill it.

The Chasam Sofer does not consider the approach of the Be’er Hagolah to be fully correct. He (the Chasam Sofer) notes that the Maharil wrote that maaser moneys are meant to support the poor and not for the acquisition of mitzvos. Therefore, use of maaser money for any type of personal mitzvah is inappropriate, whether he is already obligated to fulfill the mitzvah or not.

The Chasam Sofer concludes that when someone begins donating maaser money, he may stipulate that, sometimes, the money will be used for a mitzvah donation, such as the lighting in shul. However, once he has begun donating his maaser money regularly to the poor, he must continue using it for tzedakah.

Family first

Having determined that there are definitely situations in which maaser money must be given to the poor, the Chasam Sofer then discusses when and whether money designated for the poor can be used to support an individual’s extended family. There is a general rule that one is obligated to the poor to whom one is closest – close family first, more distant family next, neighbors third, members of one’s city next and the out-of-town poor next.

Greater needs

Notwithstanding that family should be supported first, the Chasam Sofer quotes from his rebbi, the author of the Haflaah, that the rules of “closest first” or “family first” are only when the funds are necessary for the same level of need, for example, all have enough to eat but not enough for clothing. However, if some are short of food, and others have enough to eat but are short on clothing or other needs, the responsibility to make sure that someone has enough to eat comes first, even for someone out of town, regardless of whether there are neighbors or locals who are needy, as long as they have sufficient food.

Yet, concludes the Chasam Sofer, this prioritization is not absolute. All needs of someone’s family are considered his responsibility before the basic needs of others. In other words, the priorities should be as follows:

(1) Family needs.

(2) Most basic needs – food – regardless of location of the needy.

(3) People of one’s city.

(4) The out-of-town poor.

Chasam Sofer’s conclusion

If the father had stipulated at the time of obligating himself to support his son that he would use maaser money for this obligation, he would be able to use it. Even then, the Chasam Sofer recommends that he use only up to half of his available maaser money to support his son. His reasoning is based on a Mishnah (Peah 8:6) which says that someone is permitted to save his maaser ani to support those that he chooses to, but he should not set aside more than half of his maaser ani for this purpose; the rest should be given to the local poor.

However, this is only when he had originally planned to use maaser money for this purpose. Otherwise, once he created an obligation upon himself to support his son, it is similar to any other obligation that he has, and he may not use his maaser money for this purpose.

The First Jewish War

The first Jewish war, if we want to call it that, shows up in Parshas Lech Lecha. We will begin our study from the beginning of Chapter 14, but first we need a little background to understand the storyline.

Avraham has done a lot of traveling, starting in Haran and ending up Eretz Yisrael. If you look at a map of the Middle East, Avraham started his life journeys from an area near the delta where the Euphrates River joins the Tigris and they collectively empty into the Persian Gulf. He then traveled northwestward into Aram Naharayim; the term “Mesopotamia” is the same as Naharayim, both meaning “between the rivers.” All of these areas are in today’s Iraq, but they are quite a distance from each other. Avraham started near the Persian Gulf, traveled northwestward along the Euphrates River until he arrived somewhere near the point where contemporary Iraq, Syria, and Turkey border. Although Iraq is almost due east of Eretz Yisrael, one never went from Israel due east to Iraq or due west the other way, because that route crosses a large desert. People from Bavel (Babylonia, which is in contemporary Iraq) traveled up the Euphrates River, which actually starts with the snowmelt of the mountains of eastern Turkey.

One would walk up the banks of the Euphrates; then, one would travel roughly westward through what is called today Syria, and then go either down the Mediterranean coast or through the Lebanese mountains and forests. Since you can’t have a forest without sufficient rainfall, there would be consistent water and food in that area. You would come southward through Lebanon and enter Eretz Yisrael from the north. So, even though one would be coming from Bavel which is east of Eretz Yisrael, one would arrive from the north.

Avraham arrives in Eretz Yisrael and there is a famine. The closest place to go for food is Egypt, so Avraham travels to Egypt accompanied by his nephew Lot, who had escorted him since his earliest journeys. When Avraham is chased out of Egypt, he has become a wealthy man. Lotis also wealthy, and they return to Eretz Yisrael. Both of them now have large flocks, and the shepherds of Lot quarrel with those of Avraham. Avraham suggests that they travel in opposite directions.

If Lot were concerned for his spirituality, he would tell Avraham that he, Lot, will keep his shepherds in line, and he would stay with Avraham. The shepherds are either his employees or his slaves, and he can insist that they do his bidding.

Lot does not take that approach. Instead, he relocates to Sodom, an affluent neighborhood, which allows him to advance his business prospects and also to live the easy life — hedonism. Sodom is easy to identify today; it is where the Dead Sea is. Before the raining of sulfur and salt that landed on Sodom and its sister cities, this was a very productive region. So Lot decides to graze his flock in this area, and Avraham sets off in the other direction.

That is the story line up until the point where we are beginning, with the start of Chapter 14:

“And it was in the days of the following kings: Amrafel, king of Shinar….” Shinar is Sumer, one of the cradles of civilization, which is located in the northern part of the Tigris River valley. Then we have Aryoch, king of Elasar. It is not exactly clear where Elasaris. In his book, The Living Torah, Rabbi Aryeh Kaplan assumes that Elasaris Larsa, a city about 100 miles south of Babylon, in the lower Euphrates River valley. Eilam, the next kingdom mentioned,was a major power at this point, and is further to the east, in the mountainous areas of what is today western Iran. The fourth power is called Goyim, which is not the name of a place, but means that its king ruled over an area where many different nations had gathered.

Notice that these nations were very distant from one another; many hundreds of miles separated them. Also note that the order and prioritization of the four powers varies from pasuk to pasuk. In the first pasuk, the list is: Shinar, Elasar, Eilam, and Goyim. The second time they are mentioned, Eilam is alluded to first. The next time, the order is Eilam, Goyim, Shinar and Elasar. If the order is based on significance, this implies that which kingdom was most powerful changed in the course of events.

Ancient empire building

At this point, I need to digress to explain how ancient civilizations built empires. An empire was created by first amassing a strong army. When the king or emperor wanted to acquire significant money, he would march his army to a city and demand tribute of gold, silver, precious jewels and the like, as well as people, whom they needed for their army and as slaves.

The king of the city, who amassed all its power and wealth, was the state and ultimate authority, and he would negotiate with the invading army. If they reached an agreement, he would provide whatever had been agreed as tribute and his city would be free from this threat for some period of time. Then the imperial army would march on the next city-state.

If the local king refused the tribute, his city would prepare for an extensive siege. If it did not succeed in repelling the attack, the imperials would sack the city. Whoever they did not kill would be sold as slaves, and they would haul away all the wealth of the city, some for the imperial treasury and some to reward the members of the imperial army for their valiant courage. This is how empires were built.

Now, these four nations came to attack Sodom. Why four of them? This was unusual for the time. Usually, you had one strong nation going to collect tribute, or perhaps two, such as Persia and Media. Having four was extremely unusual. It seems that the four kings felt that they could develop an empire together.

They went to war against Sodom. Here’s where the interesting question is. Sodomis over a thousand miles away, and bear in mind that the airport connections where not very good in those days. There were no trains. The highways were not meant for busses or tanks. They had to march their troops all the way there — up the Euphrates, cut across Syria, and down to Sodom. Aside from the time this took, you also had to feed your troops this entire time and that required a great deal of bread. The prize must have been worth the investment!

Now, obviously the reason they came to Sodomwas the same reason that motivated Lot to relocate there and also why Willie Sutton robbed banks. Because that’s where the money is!

They came to Sodom because Sodom was a wealthy city and they could get a lot of tribute from it. They passed many cities on the way, yet they appear to have ignored most of them. They came to threaten Sodom, Amora, Adma, Tzevo’im, and Tzo’ar, all of them in the same general area, Sodomand its sister cities.

Continues the pasuk: “They all gathered at the Valley of the Field.” Today, this is the Yam Hamelach, the Dead Sea. We see in parshas Vayeira how it became the Dead Sea, but in parshas Lech Lecha it was not yet the Dead Sea.

“Twelve years they served Kedarla’omer.” What does “they served him” mean? It means that they paid him tribute. Kedarla’omerwas the king of Eilam. He and his three cohorts launched an invasion of Sodom and its sister cities and demanded tribute on a regular basis. We don’t know if the tribute included manpower for their armies or slaves, but they certainly were demanding much tribute, enough that the pasuk describes it as service.

“Ushelosh esrai shana maradu.” Rashi understands this to mean that, for thirteen years, they did not pay tribute, i.e., they stopped paying tribute and managed to avoid it for thirteen complete years. This pasuk can also be read that in the thirteenth year they stopped paying tribute, meaning that they paid tribute for twelve consecutive years and then stopped in the thirteenth year. This was considered an act of rebellion.

Now, if Sodom was in such an economic downturn because of the tribute, Lotshould have left. If he was afraid that Kedorla’omerwould attack, he should have left. He should have read the handwriting on the wall and seen that all of the options, paying the tribute and being poorer, or fighting a war against Kedorla’omer, were all bad options and he should have moved onward to greener pastures.

“In the fourteenth year…” According to Rashi, this is the fourteenth year of them not having paid tribute. According to the other approach, this is year fourteen since the entire saga began. Now, what does Lotdo while all this is brewing? He stays in Sodom!This is idiotic! Why not get out while the going is good?

But, of course, Lot has been moving up the totem pole in prominence in Sodom, so this may have blinded him to the seemingly obvious option. He identified as a Sodomite.

“In the fourteenth year, comes Kedorla’omer, the king of Eilam, Vehamelachim asher ito.” Note that the other three kings have now been reduced to being his cohorts. Vayaku es Refa’im be’Ashteros Karnayim — on their way, the four empires wipe out six other towns (see below). Presumably they asked for tribute and were denied, and simply erased these cities from the map: this gives a demonstration of the power of these kings.

“They smote the Refa’im in Ashteros Karnayim, the Zuzim in Hom, the Eimim in Shavei Kiryasayim, and the Chori in the mountains of Sei’ir.”

After wiping out these four cities, instead of going straight to Sodom, they attacked the fields of Amalek. Now, Amalek was in the south, in what is today considered the Negev. If you look at the map, you will see that they traveled past Sodom on the way.

Who else did they attack? Amori, which was a strong power.

Having done all this, what would you imagine the kings of Sodom and its neighboring cities would do?

Either they would pay tribute or, alternatively, they could stock up for a long siege within their towns and strengthen their fortifications enough to protect their towns and withstand a siege.

Remember, warfare in those times was very barbaric. If the attackers had no means with which to destroy the walls, they would place ladders against the walls, while the people within the city would pour boiling oil down on the attackers, all while arrows and other projectiles were flying from both sides. Civilians? Collective punishment? These were never concerns.

From the inside, however, if the walls and defenses had been strengthened enough, you could even defeat Napoleon. Napoleon lost the battle of Akko because the fortress built two sets of walls. When Napoleon finally succeeded to breach the first set of walls, he discovered the inner wall. By then, he had lost so many soldiers that he simply turned around and left. This is how Akko was saved in Napoleon’s Ottoman campaign.

What did the kings of Sodom do instead? The five kings decided to fight an open battle against Kedorla’omerin the Valley of the Fields.

Open warfare in the fields. They are going up against very successful, experienced soldiers who had just won at least six military campaigns to the north and south of them — and they chose to fight in the open fields? That is suicidal. It is completely asinine and stupid.

If Lot didn’t have a good enough reason to leave Sodom before then, he should have left at this point.

The five kings go and wage war against the four kings, and we know what happens.

The pasuk tells us that the kings of Sodomand Amora were the first to flee, and they fell there. Presumably, they fell in battle, as we use the term today — and the “king of Sodom,”to whom we will soon be introduced, is a successor. (You could also understand it that the kings of Sodom and Amora were captured and did not die in battle.)

The survivors flee and hide in the mountains. The mountains are full of hiding places, particularly if the enemy isn’t interested in pursuing, which they aren’t. All the imperial armies want is to loot the city, take all the valuables, and seize whoever is there, either as their own slaves or to sell as slaves.

They seize all the valuables of Sodom and Amora, all the food that had been stored to survive an extensive siege and — who else — Lot, Avraham’s nephew, and all his flock. The pasuk emphasizes that “Vehu yosheiv biSedom, and he was living in Sodom.” We know Lot was in Sodom, so why is there a need to emphasize this? To tell us that he had so many chances to leave, but he did not.

Vayavo hapalit, “and the survivor came” — someone who survived and escaped the battle came to Avraham Avinu, who was living in the valley of Mamrei.

Vayishma Avraham ki nishba achiv. “And Avrahamheard that his brother was captured.” Lot was not his brother, he was his nephew. Why does the Torah call Lot “his brother?” Because that’s how Avraham looked at it. “Mishpacha zeinen mishpacha.” Family is family.

Even though Lot had literally turned away from Avraham and had made errors in many areas — spiritually, financially, and politically — he did not leave Sodom when he could have and should have. Nevertheless, Avraham still said: “He’s my brother.” There was no requirement for Avraham to do anything here, halachically. Hashem doesn’t tell him to do anything. He doesn’t ask anyone. There is no question for him, no issue. Family is family.

The first thing Avraham does is: Vayarek es chanichav, yelidei baiso, shemonei esrei ushelosh mei’os, “He militarizes those whom he has educated, those who were raised in his house, three hundred and eighteen.” Now, none of these people have any experience in warfare whatsoever. He is taking roughly three hundred people, inexperienced individuals, straight out of yeshiva to wage war against a seasoned army of tens of thousands of hardened veterans who have wiped out eight civilizations in the last few weeks.

We have a word for that: suicide.

We know the famous Medrash Chazal, quoted by Rashi, that three hundred and eighteen is the gematria of Eliezer.

There are two reasons Chazal say this — one implied by the pasuk and one conceptual.

The one implied by the pasuk is a missing word. It says, “He gathered and armed the members of his household, three hundred and eighteen.” Three hundred and eighteen what? The Torah does not give us a number without saying what the number is made up of. It doesn’t say who these three hundred and eighteen were? Students? Soldiers? Light cavalry? Heavy artillery? It doesn’t say!

So what is three hundred and eighteen to Chazal? It is Eliezer.

But let us realize: Who waged war, Avraham’s contingency and the huge armies against him? Avraham and Eliezer against tens of thousands of trained combatants?

None of the above. If this was a conventional war, Avraham and his followers — whether it was just Eliezer or three hundred and eighteen — would be toast. It is beyond impossible odds. So Chazal are noting: It doesn’t matter whether it was three hundred and eighteen soldiers or just Eliezer accompanying Avraham. It didn’t matter, because it was not a conventional war. It was the ish milchamah, the “Man of war” waging war.

I’m not going to go through the rest of the pesukim, but if you look at Rabbi Aryeh Kaplan’s chumash, he has an intricate map of the battle, and you can see that it was not a simple overnight mission. Avraham chased the tens of thousands of soldiers of the four armies up and down Eretz Yisrael until he could get back what he wanted, i.e., Lot and his property, which Avraham eventually succeeded in reclaiming.

In other words, Lot was a captive, and Avraham did not know where he was. Does this sound familiar?

Avraham was pursuing his enemy, tens of thousands of them, with his three hundred or so soldiers, until he could locate his captive nephew and rescue him.

Eventually, he finds Lot and frees him. To accomplish this, he ended up releasing the entire city of Sodom.

King of Sodom II

At the beginning of the story, the king of Sodom had been the crown prince who succeeded when his father was killed in the original battle with Kedorla’omer. He comes to Avraham and does not express his gratitude in any way. What does he say? “Give me the people, and you can take the booty.” He assumes that Avraham would sell all the Sodomites into slavery and he demands them for himself. Chutzpah +.

Avraham turns to him and says, “Listen, I don’t want you telling anyone that Avraham got wealthy because of you. I’m not going to take a thread or shoelace from you. I will take my expenses, the reimbursement of business expenses. And I can’t speak for Aneir, Eshkol, and Mamrei, who, even though they did not join the battles, they protected my camp for me.”

So, let Aneir, Eshkol, and Mamrei take their share, and I will take my reimbursements, and you keep the rest — is what Avraham says to the king of Sodom.

And after all this, where does Lot go? He goes back to Sodom. Oh, how hard it is to teach a fool!

Conclusion

This is the first Jewish war, and it should serve as a model lesson for every Jewish interaction.

Whether you have an army with tens of thousands of hardened veterans with the most modern armaments, you have an army of three hundred and eighteen, or all you have is two old men. If G-d is fighting for you, it doesn’t matter.

Ben Soreir Umoreh

Question #1: Same Voice

Can a man have a voice no deeper than his wife’s?

Question #2: Same Vice

Is an adolescent alcoholic automatically a ben soreir umoreh?

Introduction:

One of the most unusual parts of the Torah, both written and oral, is the passage concerning the ben soreir umoreh, the stubborn and rebellious son. The Torah teaches that this spoiled brat is beaten, which means that he receive malkus, up to 39 lashes, and if he still continues in his nefarious ways, he is executed via sekilah, stoning. Although many of us have considered even crueler ways to remove the presence of an unruly neighbor’s progeny, we probably did not entertain the idea seriously, even if the kid endowed the concept “teenager” or “adolescent” with a new level of meaning.

Let us understand how our Sages analyze the verses of this mitzvah (Devarim 22:18-21): When a man will have a wayward and rebellious son, who does not listen either to the voice of his father or to the voice of his mother. Subsequently, he was chastised and he still refuses to hearken to their admonishment. His father and his mother seize him and bring him to the elders of his city, whose local beis din is near the city gates. The parents declare to the judges of the beis din, “this son of ours is wayward and rebellious and does not listen to us. He eats an abundance of quality meat and drinks wine to excess.” All the people of the city shall stone him until he dies; you shall destroy the evil from your midst, and all Israel shall hear and be awestruck!

As Chazal and Rashi question: For what reason do we execute him? Because we see where his life is heading. Now, he finds it easy to steal from his parents, to find a good price on quality meat and wine and an undisturbed place to enjoy his ill-gained lifestyle. As he grows older, he will find it more difficult to maintain this, and once he is experienced at taking other people’s property to sustain his bad habits, he will hold people up for their valuables. Then, it is only a question of time until he murders. The Torah ruled: Let him die while he is still relatively innocent, rather than die a completely guilty scoundrel (Mishnah, Sanhedrin 71b). We will see much more on this repeated theme shortly.

Wayward daughters

What about a rebellious girl? Note that the Torah states that the mitzvah applies only to a wayward and rebellious son, but not to a daughter. As a menace to proper societal standards, Chazal recognize that a rebellious young lass is a much greater concern (Yerushalmi, Sanhedrin). Yet the Torah exempts all females from the status of ben soreir umoreh. As the Talmud Yerushalmi questions: “Who is more likely to become a communal liability of which we need to be concerned, a wayward son or a wayward daughter? A daughter! Yet the Torah exempts a daughter and obliges the son!”

Meat and wine

Let us review the basics of the case. The Mishnah (Sanhedrin 70a) mentions a dispute between tana’im. According to the Tanna Kamma, the youth is not obligated unless he consumes a tartimar of meat and half a log of Italian wine at one sitting. Rabbi Yosi says a maneh of meat and a full log of wine. (Please be aware that there are three different tanna’im named Rabbi Yosi whose opinions are mentioned in the relevant passage of Gemara Sanhedrin and in the course of this article. This one is Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Chalafta.)

The Gemara mentions that he drank Italian wine, which was apparently a boutique product. (However, the Rambam omits mention of this, and the Ramah understands the passage of Gemara differently.) The Mishnah mentions a peculiar rule: If he ate non-kosher meat of any type, he is not ruled to be a ben soreir umoreh, notwithstanding that he consumed the quantities and in the manner that we will soon describe.

The  opposite is also true: He is not punished as a ben soreir umoreh when his eating was at a seudas mitzvah, even though all the other requirements of ben soreir umoreh are met.

If he eats meat that was salted to preserve it, he is exempt. How much time must the meat have been salted to exempt our lad from gruesome results? If the meat remained salted for at least a day and a half, it is no longer considered quality meat whose consumption leads to conviction of the ben soreir umoreh. This means that if a lad performs all the misdeeds of a ben soreir umoreh, but prefers huge amounts of pickled tongue, corned beef, pastrami, hot dogs, bologna or aufschnit to rare barbecue, he is exempted from the law of ben soreir umoreh, since his habit is to consume preserved meats.

Rav Huna adds that he must buy the meat inexpensively.

Where in the posuk does Rav Huna see that the ben soreir umoreh purchased meat at a good price? Although we learned this halacha via an oral tradition from Moshe Rabbeinu, the posuk contains a hint: The word זולל, which means glutton, also implies זול, inexpensive.

The Talmud Yerushalmi asks: “Who is more likely to become a communal problem, he who buys at a discount, or he who is a big spender? The big spender! Yet, the Torah exempted the big spender and obliged the lad who purchased his meat at a discount!” The Bavli explains that acquiring top quality meat at a reduced price will more likely trap the ben soreir umoreh into bad habits. He will figure out how to fund these vices by purchasing the meat inexpensively and stealing the small amounts that he needs from his father. Initially, he will be able to sustain his habits this way. However, ultimately, he will exhaust his parents’ resources and need to find other means with which to fund his vices. This will lead him to a life of serious crime.

Other rules

The Mishnah (Sanhedrin 71a) teaches that if he stole from his father and ate in his father’s domain, or stole from others and ate in other people’s domain, he is exempt from the ruling of ben soreir umoreh. Only if he stole from his father and ate in other people’s domain is he categorized as a ben soreir umoreh.

Why are these conditions necessary for the wayward youth to be ruled a ben soreir umoreh? What difference does it make from whom he stole or where he ate and drank? To quote the Talmud Yerushalmi: “Logically, who should be more guilty? He who steals from others or he who steals from his parents? I would say, he who steals from others. Yet the Torah exempts from ben soreir umoreh he who steals from others and punishes only he who steals from his parents.”

The Talmud Bavli explains that a child who steals only from others does not qualify as a ben soreir umoreh because it will not prove easy for a youth to steal to support his vices. And, if he eats his repast in his father’s domain, there remains a possibility that he might still be disciplined, since his father may catch him and successfully bring him under control. Once he has developed the habit of stealing from his father and eating on other people’s premises, the Torah considers him incorrigible.

The Mishnah continues that he is not punished as a ben soreir umoreh when his eating was at a seudas mitzvah, even if he used money that he stole from his father to pay for his food. Something about the atmosphere of a seudas mitzvah might influence him in a positive way.

Returning to our Mishnah, Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Yehudah ruled that there is yet one more condition for him to fulfill before he qualifies legally as a ben soreir umoreh – he must steal from both his father and his mother. This leads the Gemara (Sanhedrin 71a) to a discussion as to how is it possible for him to steal from his mother? After all, if she is still married to his father, the earnings of a married woman are the property of her husband, since he is responsible to support her. The Gemara provides two approaches how this could happen, but explaining them is beyond the scope of our article.

If he develops other expensive tastes — drinks strong alcoholic beverages, uses psychodelic drugs, gambles or engages in other addictive or destructive behavior — he does not qualify as a ben soreir umoreh. Only for eating meat and drinking wine does he qualify as a ben soreir umoreh. All these laws are already taught in the Mishnah (Sanhedrin 70a).

Thirteen and a quarter

There is another condition to the law of ben soreir umoreh that I have not yet discussed. The ben soreir umoreh must be at least thirteen years old, the age of maturity and responsibility for all mitzvos, at the time that he steals from his father and purchases the meat and wine. The entire saga, including condemning him to execution, must occur before he turns the age of thirteen years and three months (Mishnah Sanhedrin 68b, 71b). In other words, everything we have described above must occur in three months or less. In today’s court system in which it takes years for a criminal case to come to trial, ben soreir umoreh could never happen.

The Talmud Yerushalmi asks: Who is more dangerous to society, a young child aged barely thirteen who commits these acts, or someone older? Unquestionably, someone older is more of a menace! Yet the Torah exempted anyone older than thirteen years and three months. The Yerushalmi explains that this mitzvah is a gezeiras hamelech, a decree of G-d, and we will have difficulty explaining the rationales of its details.

Diabled parents

Here is another unusual condition: The Mishnah (Sanhedrin 71a) rules that both parents must be without any disabilities. To quote the Mishnah, “If either parent is missing part of a hand, or is lame, mute, blind or deaf, (the son) does not become a ben soreir umoreh.”

What difference does it make whether his parents have disabilities? Rav Shamshon Raphael Hirsch wrote extensively on the subject of ben soreir umoreh in his commentary on the Chumash and in essays that are published in his Collected Writings, Volume VII. Throughout this article there are hashkafic questions that I have left unanswered in order to encourage our readers to invest the time to read Rav Hirsch’s extensive and beautiful explanation.

Same voice

According to Rabbi Yehuda (Sanhedrin 71a), there are yet other conditions that must be met to rule that he is a ben soreir umoreh. His two parents must be similar to each other in voice, appearance and height. The Bach understands the Gemara very literally, that it means that either his father has an extremely high-pitched voice, or his mother has an unusual low-pitched voice. Rav Hirsch explains this to mean that “they are in the same place” educationally – they have been giving their son the exact same educational message, which he has been ignoring. However, if one parent is more lenient than the other (as is often the case), he cannot be ruled a ben soreir umoreh.

The Gemara notes that Rabbi Yehudah contends that there never was an actual case of ben soreir umoreh. The Bach explains that since a healthy man’s voice will always be deeper than his wife’s, Rabbi Yehudah’s statement that his two parents must be similar to each other in voice makes the incidence of ben soreir umoreh impossible. Thus, in his opinion, we have a negative answer to our opening question: Can a man have a voice no deeper than his wife’s?

The Gemara teaches that another tanna, Rabbi Shimon, also holds that the mitzvah of ben soreir umoreh never happened and never will happen, yet the Torah presents this mitzvah so that we should study the case and receive reward for understanding what the Torah teaches. However, Rabbi Yonasan retorted, “I saw a ben soreir umoreh, and I sat on his grave.”

Similarly, Rabbi Yosi Hagalili (this is a third tanna named Yosi, who was earlier than the others mentioned) asks: “Because he ate a tartimar of meat and drank half a log of Italian wine, the Torah states that he should be stoned to death? Rather, the Torah understands what will be the later decisions of the ben soreir umoreh. Eventually, he will exhaust his father’s property, and supporting his expensive habits without resources will become difficult. At that point, he will become a bandit who murders people in order to take their possessions. The Torah said let him die while he is still relatively innocent (Sanhedrin 72a).

There is an interesting explanation of the Chasam Sofer in which he understands that there is no dispute among the tanna’im whether a ben soreir umoreh situation was ever ruled on. He contends that even Rabbi Yonasan agrees that no ben soreir umoreh ruling was ever issued. What Rabbi Yonasan means is that there once was a youth who qualified as a ben soreir umoreh and should have been executed when he was young, but his parents had mercy on him. As a result, they caused great calamities to themselves and to the Jewish People, and the wayward son ultimately suffered a violent death. It was on this child’s grave that Rabbi Yonasan sat, explains the Chasam Sofer.

Procedure

Shortly after reaching his thirteenth birthday (Mishnah Sanhedrin 68b), this lad, whose parents note that he never obeys them, steals money from his father. He used the stolen money or property to purchase kosher, quality meat and wine, which he is able to buy at a good price. He eats a large quantity of this meat cooked very rare, and at the same sitting drinks large quantity of the wine, while not on his parents’ premises. Both parents warn him that his actions are completely unacceptable, and this has no obvious effect. In addition, two kosher witnesses see him, admonish him and warn him that beis din will punish him for his actions (Sifrei).

Who presses charges?

Who raises and presses the charges against the ben soreir umoreh? The Mishnah teaches that it is his own parents! Furthermore, he is ruled a ben soreir umoreh only if both of his parents “press charges” against him. To quote the Mishnah, “If his father wants, but his mother does not; if his mother wants, but his father does not, he is not ruled a ben soreir umoreh (Sanhedrin 71a).

According to the Sifrei, he must violate not only what his parents teach him, but also what the Torah, the prophets and the judges warn him.

Both parents must present to the beis din that their son is wayward, a thief, and eats the quantities and type of meat and wine that we have described in the style mentioned. Beis din then gives him malkus, 39 lashes with a strap made of calf leather — a stern blow to the muscles on his back and shoulders to motivate some change in his behavior patterns. If, after receiving the malkus, he continues to steal from his parents and enjoy himself in the way we have described, it is the parents’ responsibility to bring him back to beis din for his final judgment. Small wonder that some tanna’im rule that the situation never happened.

After being lashed for his intolerant behavior and ignoring all warnings to correct his lifestyle, we make sure that he can never continue his activities. Rather than break or amputate just his arms and his legs, he is executed by the beis din.

Conclusion

We see that there are many perplexing specific criteria that categorize a ben soreir umoreh. We mentioned above that the purpose of the Torah’s parsha of ben soreir umoreh is to teach many of the rules of education. In this context, I encourage our readers to read Rav Hirsch’s comments on the parsha and his essays on education in Volume VII of the Collected Writings. There, he analyzes many of the halachos of ben soreir umoreh, and, in his typical style, develops brilliant insights into proper Torah education.

The mitzvah of ben soreir umoreh teaches a very deep lesson in education: “These words hold the key to the secret of proper child-raising. A father and a mother united as one in their love for their child and in complete agreement on the principles by which he should be raised – herein lies the strength and the hope of all education…But such unity can be achieved only if the child’s father and mother are united also in their own subordination to the Will of G-d; if they view the sacred function of child-rearing as their most sacred task, to be performed for Hashem and in keeping with His holy Will; and if His judgments will, as a matter of course, serve to resolve any disagreements in their views and attitudes” (Collected Writings of Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch, Volume VII, Page 348).

Is Gelatin Kosher?

Introduction

Parshas Re’eih discusses at length many of the laws of kashrus. In the contemporary world, many kashrus issues concern gelatin, a product unfamiliar to those of us who are not chemists, food technologists or kashrus professionals.

To the biochemist, gelatin is studied in organic chemistry. To the food technologist, it is an ingredient with a wide range of applications. To the nutritionist, gelatin is an incomplete protein. To a manufacturer, it spells tremendous profit. To the kashrus supervisor, it can present a potential nightmare. It is available in a kosher variety, but another form might be treif min haTorah.

Whether the gelatin that is available in kosher form is considered fleishig or pareve will depend on which posek you ask. And then there is gelatin that is certainly kosher and pareve.

Let us begin with a bit of an explanation of what gelatin is.

What is gelatin?

Gelatin, which is usually odorless, translucent, and almost colorless is derived from collagen extracted and processed from the connective tissue and skins of animal body parts, particularly the bones and hide of pigs, cattle and fish. Collagen is an incomplete protein containing most of the essential amino acids, but missing the amino acid tryptophan and with insufficient quantities of several of the others to be a complete protein. In other words, no one can rely exclusively on gelatin for their protein source.

In today’s world, the most common sources for gelatin are pigskin and beef hides, although it is also manufactured from fish scales and skins.

Gelatin includes many similar compounds with specific qualities and characteristics. Sometimes, the source of gelatin can be determined by chemical testing.

The raw materials from which gelatin is derived are prepared by various curing, acid, and alkali processes employed to extract the collagen. The different processes may have great effect on the properties of the final gelatin products, as does the original source of the collagen. In other words, gelatin is not a specific chemical compound but a raw material.

Gelatin is usually stored and shipped as a powder. When it is used, significant amounts of water are added. Gelatin absorbs five to ten times its weight in water and forms a gel.

Gelatin is probably the most popularly used gelling agent in food, beverages, candies, capsules, etc. Among the many food products that often use gelatin are puddings, candies, ice cream, sour cream, yogurt, soups, broths, sauces, flavors, vitamins and marshmallows. It is also used to remove the pulp or sediment from wines and juices.

P’tcha

Boiling animal feet or fish bones also extracts collagen. This is what produces the gelatinous, fatty layer when making p’tcha.

“Vegetable gelatin”

There is no such thing as vegetarian or vegan gelatin, although there are vegan gelatinous substances, such as carrageen, agar, pectin, arrowroot, guar gum, and xanthan gum. The latter are all derived or processed from vegetable sources, but their use, in general, is more limited than that of gelatin.

Although there are literally hundreds of varieties of gelatin, from a kashrus perspective, there are five different categories. I will list them from the most kosher to the least.

I. Fish gelatin

Gelatin can be manufactured from a wide variety of fish sources, some of them kosher but many of them non-kosher.

Contrary to popular opinion, this gelatin was known hundreds of years ago and is discussed in teshuvos from early acharonim. However, since modern gelatin manufacture used other, non-fish sources that produce a more versatile product, the modern gelatin industry did not produce gelatin from fish until a few decades ago. This gelatin does require proper kosher supervision and certification for a variety of reasons, including guaranteeing that it is derived exclusively from kosher fishes, that only kosher equipment and raw materials are used, etc. Today fish gelatin is readily available and is used, although it is a tiny percentage of the gelatin market.

II. Beef gelatin from kosher slaughtered animals

Gelatin produced from beef bones and hides of animals that were properly shechted and kashered. As mentioned above for fish gelatin, these products require kosher certification. There is a question whether this product is fleishig or can be considered pareve. The primary reason why this beef-based product might be considered pareve is because it is not produced from the meat of the animal, but from parts that are not usually considered edible. There is also the possibility that, once the gelatin is used in the finished product, it is bateil, and that therefore the finished product is ruled pareve. Those who are interested in researching the details of the halachic rulings on this subject are referred to Shu’t Igros Moshe, Yoreh Deah 1:37; Shu’t Mishnas Rabbi Aharon 1:16.

III. Beef gelatin but not kosher salted

A third, interesting product is a gelatin made from shechted animals, as described above, but that was not kashered, meaning the bones were not soaked and salted to remove the blood. Instead, the blood was removed chemically during the processing of the gelatin. To the best of my knowledge beef gelatin from shechted animals that are soaked and salted is currently not an available product.

IV Beef bone gelatin

Of course, gelatin is produced from non-kosher-slaughtered beef bone and hide. This variety of gelatin generated the most halachic literature, since several major halachic authorities ruled that this product is kosher, notwithstanding its origin from a treif animal. Many products labeled as “kosher gelatin” products, which are not treated today as kosher by most kashrus organizations, are based on this heter.

The halachic reasoning in this case can be simplified, without going through all the sources and literature on the topic, thanks to a brilliant analysis of Rav Aharon Kotler (Shu’t Mishnas Rabbi Aharon, 1:17). Some sources in Chazal indicate that there is no Torah prohibition in consuming non-edible parts of an animal that was not shechted. Why is this permitted?

A. Is it because these parts of the animal are not included in the Torah’s prohibition of eating meat from a treif animal?

B. Or is it because, althoughthe Torah prohibits eating such animal parts, consumption of inedible items is not considered eating?

Although this might seem like doubletalk, it is not. Rav Aharon notes the halacha of an inedible product subsequently processed into an edible one depends on these two ways of understanding this issue. And this is exactly what happens in the processing of gelatin. If argument A is correct, inedible collagen sources were never included in the Torah’s prohibition. Thus, if indeed it is true that the gelatin was manufactured exclusively from parts of the animal that are usually not considered food, the finished, now edible, product is indeed kosher.

However, if the Torah’s heter is that consuming items that are not normally treated as food is not considered eating, once the collagen is rendered into an edible product, consuming the resultant gelatin is prohibited.

After a lengthy analysis of the halachic sources, Rav Aharon Kotler himself concludes that rule B is the correct conclusion, although he recognizes that many prominent authorities did not understand the topic the way he did. Upon this basis, we can understand why many prominent authorities permitted the consumption of gelatin from non-kosher bovine animals, but why this heter is no longer commonly accepted.

V. Porcine gelatin

A common source of gelatin in contemporary manufacture is from pork skin, bone and other offal. Most halachic authorities did not consider this product to be kosher for a variety of reasons, including that the most common source material, pigskin, is considered edible food according to halacha. (In fact, it is fried into a high-cholesterol snack food often marketed as a tastier alternative to potato chips.) Nevertheless, there have been several prominent rabbonim who ruled that this gelatin is kosher based on the following reasons:

–          In the process of removing the collagen from its source, the skins and other offal are subjected to strong acid and other treatments that render them inedible.

–          Gelatin itself has no taste, and therefore it is not included in the Torah’s prohibition. This argument is a bit specious, because industry experts and consumers will tell you that gelatin does have a mild taste.

–          In today’s world, the source material for gelatin is not usually considered food on its own.

The majority of accepted halachic authorities do not accept these arguments and consider porcine gelatin to be non-kosher. Nevertheless, one still finds today some products that are labeled as “kosher gelatin” based on these analyses. The official position of the Israeli Chief Rabbinate to this day is to allow products with porcine gelatin, but they must be carefully labeled that they are kosher only by those who have accepted the heter to consume gelatin.

In other words, when purchasing “kosher gelatin,” a consumer may have no way of knowing which type of gelatin he is purchasing. The consumer is relying on the hechsher’s standard. If the hechsher accepts only types I or II, the gelatin will be accepted by all rabbinic authorities.

Conclusion

In the “good old days” of the European shtetl, kashrus was completely the province of the local rav, who oversaw the local shochatim and was available to answer any questions that occurred regarding kashering meat, accidental mixing of dairy and meat products, production of local wines, etc. Most raw materials were readily identifiable and, if any kashrus issues surfaced, the local rav was the source of the answer.

How different is today’s world in which raw materials can be sourced from literally any place on the planet, processed in numerous other locations, and the final product manufactured in a different continent. For example, gelatin is manufactured literally anywhere around the world. As a result, we need to have access to a rav who is an impressive talmid chacham, and, in addition, either he or we need access to a highly knowledgeable kashrus expert or agency.

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