Category: Mitzvahs

The Last Parsha of Shema

Parshas Va’eschanan contains the mitzvah of reciting the Shema morning and evening.

Question #1: Parshas Tzitzis and Shema

“Why is parshas tzitzis included in our daily recital of kerias Shema?”

Question #2: Mitzvos in Parshas Tzitzis

“How does parshas tzitzis remind us of all the mitzvos?”

Question #3: Women and Parshas Tzitzis

“Must women say parshas tzitzis daily?”

Answer

The very end of parshas Shelach, the maftir reading of the parsha, is usually called parshas tzitzis, which constitutes the last of the three paragraphs of the Shema. This section discusses the mitzvah of tzitzis; while doing so, the Torah notes that the mitzvah of tzitzis reminds us to keep all of Hashem’s mitzvos, and not to be swayed by “our hearts” and “our eyes” from fulfilling Hashem’s Will. The Gemara, itself, records an instance when someone was dissuaded from violating a serious prohibition of the Torah by his tzitzis (Menachos 44a). In this context, it is interesting to note a custom attributed to the Ariza”l of kissing the tzitzis when one recites the words acharei levav’chem ve’acharei eineichem.

(Some authorities raise an interesting question: Assuming that our forefathers observed the mitzvos before the Jewish people were commanded, how could Yehudah have been successfully tempted by Tamar – was he not wearing tzitzis? Rav Shelomoh Kluger, who raises this question, answers that Yehudah was indeed not doing anything sinful, since this act fulfilled the concept of yibum [Shu”t Ha’elef Lecha Shlomo, Even Ha’ezer #82].)

Tzitzis when not davening or not in shul

The Semag (Rav Moshe of Coucy, one of the baalei Tosafos, who wrote an extensive halachic work based on the 613 mitzvos) notes that the importance of remembering the message of the tzitzis is not primarily when davening, but during the workday, when we are exposed to all sorts of foreign influences – then, we need to remember our special relationship with Hashem.

Why is this part of the Shema?

What is special about parshas tzitzis that merited its inclusion in our daily recital of Shema? We easily see from the words of the first chapter of the Shema why this paragraph became part of a daily mitzvah. The first chapter of the Shema includes not only the most important credo of the Jew, the pasuk that begins Shema Yisroel, but also includes many important messages. One of them is that the words of the Torah are to be performed and studied when we wake up and when we go to sleep, thus teaching that there is a daily mitzvah to recite the Shema.

The second paragraph of the Shema, Vehayah im shamo’a, also includes most of the important themes that are in the first paragraph, so we can readily understand why this was made part of the daily recital of Shema. However, this does not explain why we should also recite the parshas tzitzis every morning and evening.

The Rambam (Hilchos Kerias Shema 1:2) explains that the reason we include parshas tzitzis in our daily reading of Shema is because it includes a commandment to observe all the mitzvos. A slightly variant approach predates the Rambam: The Talmud Yerushalmi (Berachos 1:5) explains that the three paragraphs of the Shema, together, include allusions to the entire aseres hadibros. Thus, all three paragraphs are necessary for us to be reminded daily of the Jewish people’s relationship and responsibility to Hashem.

All the mitzvos

The Torah teaches that looking at the tzitzis reminds us to keep all of Hashem’s mitzvos. How does looking at the tzitzis accomplish this? Rashi explains that the gematria of the word tzitzis is six hundred, and each of the tzitzis has eight threads and five knots, thus totaling the 613 mitzvos.

However, the Ramban takes issue with Rashi’s counting, noting that the word tzitzis is always spelled in the Torah tzadi, yud, tzadi, saf — without the second yud — which is a gematria of only 590, not 600, and therefore Rashi’s calculation comes up short. The Ramban also notes that not all tanna’im conclude that there must be eight strings in our tzitzis, and, furthermore, the requirement for five knots is not min haTorah. He concludes that the reminder of all the mitzvos is because of the techeiles thread, whose color reminds us of Heaven and our responsibilities to Hashem.

To resolve Rashi’s approach, the Semag explains that although the gematria of the word tzitzis is only 590, there is a midrash that states that although in the three iterations of the word tzitzis the second yud is not present, there is an extra lamid (whose numerical value is thirty) when the Torah states vehayah lachem letzitzis (it could have said simply vehayah lachem tzitzis); this lamid replaces the missing ten of each of the times the Torah records the word tzitzis. The midrash concludes with Rashi’s statement that there are eight threads and five knots to complete the number 613. Thus, Rashi’s source for his statement is a midrash of Chazal.

Order of Shema

Why do we recite the three paragraphs of Shema in the order that we do, first the passage beginning with the words Shema Yisroel, then the passage beginning with Vehayah im shamo’a and, finally, parshas tzitzis? The Mishnah (Berachos 13a) and Gemara (Berachos 14b) provide us with two explanations for our practice. The first reason is that the parsha of Shema Yisroel emphasizes that we are to accept the rule of Hashem, whereas the parsha of Vehaya im shamo’a mentions only the observance of mitzvos. Obviously, we must first recognize our connection to Hashem in order for us to realize the basis of our requirement to observe mitzvos. The parsha of Vehayah im shamo’a is recited prior to parshas tzitzis, because the mitzvos the second parsha emphasizes apply both by day and at night, whereas the third parsha emphasizes tzitzis, which is a mitzvah that applies only in the daytime. Nevertheless, we recite the parsha third also at night because it includes remembering the Exodus from Egypt. Including parshas tzitzis in the Shema recited at night fulfills the mitzvah of remembering the Exodus from Egypt also at night. Therefore, someone who davens maariv before nightfall should be careful to recite all three paragraphs of Shema after it gets dark.

A second reason why we recite these three sections in this order is because the first parsha emphasizes three different aspects of our relationship to Torah — to study, to teach and to perform mitzvos. The second emphasizes teaching and performing mitzvos, but does not stress studying.The third parsha discusses observing mitzvos but does not mention either studying Torah or teaching it.

How many themes?

How many different themes are mentioned in parshas tzitzis? The Gemara (Berachos 12b) notes that it includes six different themes:

1. The mitzvah of tzitzis.

2. Remembering the Exodus from Egypt.

3. The responsibility to observe all the mitzvos.

4. To withstand the temptation to be led astray by thoughts.

5. To withstand the temptation to be led astray by pleasure.

6. To avoid the temptation of idol worship.

(We should note that some texts of the Gemara state “five” themes, apparently combining the temptation of idol worship with one of the previous two themes.)

The Exodus from Egypt

The Torah requires that we mention the Exodus from Egypt every day. We are all familiar with the dispute among tanna’im discussed in the Seder whether there is a requirement to mention this every night, also. Our reciting the third parsha of Shema at night reflects the accepted opinion that requires us to mention yetzi’as Mitzrayim also at night.

Not to stray after your heart

What is included under the heading of lo sosuru acharei levavchem, “not to stray after your heart”?

The Gemara (Berachos 12b) states that “after your heart” refers to heretical ideas (minus), which the Semag (mitzvas lo saaseh #15) explains to mean that we are required not to focus our thoughts in ways that might cause us to have or accept wrong beliefs about Hashem and the Torah. For example, someone questioning whether Hashem is One, or what is above, below, in front or behind Him are all examples of obviously wrong ideas. Similarly, it is prohibited to deliberate concerning whether the Oral Torah is from Heaven. Through these methods, the Satan influences a person to deny proper beliefs. The Semaq, a later rishon, also includes in this prohibition someone who doubts the words of Chazal and someone who attempts to analyze deeply the pesukim in the Book of Yechezkel that Chazal forbade us from analyzing because of the high risk of error (Semaq, mitzvas lo saaseh #12). The Sefer Hachinuch (Mitzvah #387) broadens the prohibition to include considering any ideas that are opposed to essential beliefs of the Torah, since these can direct a person to unacceptable beliefs (see also Biur Halacha 1:1 s.v. Hu).

What should someone if he feels himself inclined towards wrong ideas? The Sefer Hachinuch advises him to stop the trend of thought that he feels is going in the wrong direction and think about true and correct Torah beliefs. The author of the Ben Ish Chai composed a special prayer regarding the proper observance of this mitzvah, which is to be recited daily and is published in many editions of Sefardic siddurim.

We should note that the Rambam, based on the Sifrei, counts the mitzvah of lo sasuru as one of the 365 negative prohibitions of the Torah (lo saaseh #47). It is also important to note that this is one of only six mitzvos that one can fulfill at any time, the mitzvos temidios (see also Biur Halacha 1:1 s.v. Hu).

After your eyes

What is included under the heading of lo sosuru… acharei eineichem, “not to stray… after your eyes”?

This means not to allow ourselves to be led in the way of temptation, and to realize that this way is not going to lead to any long-term happiness. The Sefer Hachinuch notes that someone who follows such a path destroys himself, not only spiritually but also physically and emotionally. Furthermore, this leads his life in a very negative direction, and he will stray farther and farther from his life’s goals.

Among specific examples, Rabbeinu Yonah rules that someone looking at a married woman in a way that he enjoys her appearance violates this lo saaseh. This approach is codified by the Beis Yosef (Even Ha’ezer 21).

The Chofeitz Chayim broadens the prohibition of lo sosuru… acharei eineichem to include pursuing other pleasures and desires of this world. When a person experiences pleasure, he should have in mind that this is to enable him to stand in the King’s courtyard and not be too weak to serve Him. Thinking sinful thoughts and chasing after physical pleasures are sins that push a person out of this world and contaminate his entire body and spirituality (Sefer Hamitzvos Hakatzar, Mitzvah #31).

The temptation of idol worship

Among the topics mentioned in parshas tzitzis, the Gemara (Berachos 12b, quoted above) includes specifically a separate category, which is not to be tempted to worship idols. As the Sefer Hachinuch codifies this, “It is prohibited to direct your thoughts, conversations or even your glances toward idolatrous ideas, since these thoughts and acts can cause you to believe in idolatry…. Studying, because of curiosity, how they thought that this star accomplishes x, or this incense or this method of worship or this image is used to accomplish y, in order to understand how the idolaters worship their idols, is included under this prohibition (Sefer Hachinuch, Mitzvas lo saaseh #213). It is also interesting to note that the Gemara states that Hashem does not include a Jew’s evil thought to do something wrong as a deed, with the exception of someone who planned to worship idols, when the thought is combined with the deed and he receives punishment for both (Kiddushin 40a).

Women and Shema

Are women obligated to recite the Shema? After all, reciting Shema is a time-bound mitzvas aseih, and the general rule is that women are exempt from time-bound positive mitzvos.

The Mishnah (Berachos 20a) states that women are exempt from the mitzvah of reciting the Shema.

Notwithstanding that they are exempt from reciting the Shema, they are required to understand and accept all the concepts of the Shema, including that we constantly accept the responsibility of following Hashem’s instructions and rules. This is codified by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 70:1) in the following way: “Women… are exempt from reading the Shema, because it is a positive mitzvah that is time-bound. Yet, it is proper that they accept upon themselves the yoke of the Kingdom of Heaven.” To this the Rema adds, “And they should recite at least the first pasuk.”

The Bach rules that they are required to recite the first pasuk, but the Mishnah Berurah, citing the Gra, Levush, Olas Tamid and other authorities, notes the majority opinion that it is technically not a requirement for women to recite the Shema daily, but it is a proper thing for them to do.

The Magen Avraham, however, rules that women are obligated to mention the Exodus from Egypt, contending that since there is never a time that this mitzvah does not exist, it is not considered a time-bound mitzvah. The Sha’agas Aryeh disagrees with the Magen Avraham’s conclusion, contending that the daytime mitzvah of mentioning the Exodus and the nighttime mitzvah are both time-bound, and therefore women are exempt from this requirement. The Sha’agas Aryeh rallies support to his approach from the prevalent custom: in general, women do not have the practice of making sure that they mention yetzi’as Mitzrayim every day and every night. I leave it to each reader to discuss with her rav or posek to decide whether she is required to do so.

Do the six themes of parshas tzitzis fit together to explain one overall perspective? Indeed they do.

1. The mitzvah of tzitzis. A person’s goal in life is to serve Hashem and attain as close to perfection in this endeavor as he can. The message of tzitzis is to constantly remind ourselves of the Heavens and the Throne of Glory. We need to connect the outer manifestations of ourselves – our clothing – and the external expressions of our personality – our character traits, our actions and our emotions – to our inner spiritual goal, our purpose, in the same way that our clothes have special threads of tzitzis and techeiles.

2. Remembering the Exodus from Egypt. Yetzias Mitzrayim expands this theme. We are no longer slaves, subject to physical and moral repression. A slave cannot set goals for himself, since he is not under his own control. But liberation from slavery allows us to elevate ourselves and aspire toward our spiritual calling.

3. The responsibility to observe all the mitzvos. Practical mitzvos perpetuate the same message. All of our actions should connect with our overall objective. Thus, we attain completion in all aspects of our existence: our intellect, our conduct and our emotions.

The last three themes deal with avoiding three obstacles to this guideline

4. To withstand the temptation to be led astray by thoughts. This is the pitfall of heresy. The desire to avoid moral responsibility can lead to denial of Hashem or His Oneness.

5. To withstand the temptation to be led astray by pleasure. Without an objective and direction, the soul naturally seeks some other occupation, which leads it to the second pitfall: attraction to base and corrupt actions.

6. To avoid the temptation of idol worship. In the end, however, a self-indulgent lifestyle leaves the soul with feelings of insufferable emptiness. The soul recognizes that a life without meaning is a contradiction to its very essence. But since it has already lost its rational beacon by rejecting the light of truth, the soul seeks purpose and meaning in foreign cultures. It tries to find spiritual sustenance in broken cisterns, in idolatrous worship.

Thus, these three different obstacles each emphasize a different shortcoming. Heresy is against our intellectual honesty to Hashem; the temptation to be led astray by pleasure defies our proper conduct in Hashem’s ways; and the temptation of idol worship rules our emotions against Hashem’s will.

Conclusion

Thus, we see that this short passage includes the fundamental themes of Judaism. It describes that which gives our lives meaning and direction, and the major obstacles that can lead the soul astray. It is a fitting conclusion to our acceptance of Hashem’s Kingship in the Shema prayer.

The ABC’s of Yummy Bishul Akum Foods

Since there is an allusion to the prohibition of bishul akum in this week’s parsha:

Question #1: Artichokes

In most places, artichokes are eaten cooked, but Egyptians eat them raw. Do artichokes cooked in Egypt present a bishul akum concern in America?

Question #2: Bishul akum equipment

If a non-Jew cooked kosher products in my pots, do the pots now require kashering?

Question #3: Cooking for the ill

If a non-Jew cooked on Shabbos for someone who is ill, must I treat the food as non-kosher when Shabbos is over?

Historical Background

Based on a pasuk, the Gemara (Avodah Zarah 37b) suggests that the prohibition of bishul akum, banning food cooked by non-Jews, might be min haTorah. Subsequently, the Gemara rejects this assumption, concluding that bishul akum is a rabbinic injunction that was not yet prohibited when the Jews traversed the Desert. Nevertheless, Rabbeinu Tam infers that bishul akum was enacted very early in Jewish history; otherwise, how could the Gemara even consider that it might have a Biblical origin (Tosafos, Avodah Zarah 37b s.v. Vehashelakos)?

Chazal instituted the law of bishul akum to discourage social interaction, which might lead to intermarriage, and also to guarantee that kashrus is not compromised (Rashi, Avodah Zarah 35b s.v. Vehashelakos and38a s.v. Miderabbanan, and Tosafos ad loc.).

Introduction

Before we can address our opening questions, we need to understand some of the basic laws of bishul akum. Although Chazal enacted a prohibition on food cooked by non-Jews, they permitted three categories of food; in all three of these instances, the social interaction considerations are mitigated. Here is an easy acronym by which to remember these three rules:

YUM – Yisrael, Uncooked, Monarch

Yisrael:

An important rule is that even if a non-Jew performed most of the cooking, as long as a Jew participated in a significant way, the food is permitted as “bishul Yisrael.” The reason that Chazal were lenient is because the social interaction that they wanted to discourage is decreased when the cooking is dependent on a Jew’s involvement.

The level of Jewish participation required is a dispute among rishonim that manifests itself in practical differences between Ashkenazic and Sephardic practice.

In Ashkenazic practice, if a Jew ignites or adds to the fire used for cooking, the food qualifies as bishul Yisrael, even if a non-Jew added the ingredients and did all the actual cooking. On the other hand, Sephardic Jews require direct involvement of a Jew in the actual cooking. This means that a Jew must place the food on the fire or participate in some other significant way. Simply igniting the fire upon which a non-Jew places food is insufficient to make the food kosher (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 113:7).

These differences in interpretation are particularly relevant in situations involving restaurants, caterers and other food service, where the kitchen help is frequently non-Jewish. In some instances, Sephardic authorities permit the food, after the fact, based on a combination of leniencies (Shu”t Yechaveh Daas 5:54).

Uncooked:

Foods that are consumed raw are exempt from the prohibition of bishul akum. The reason for this exception is because the respect and social interaction is decreased when the food served is edible without cooking.

This exemption of “uncooked food,” which is called ne’echal chai, applies to items like applesauce or canned pineapple, as both apples and pineapples are eaten uncooked. However, in some cases there are disputes among halachic authorities as to whether a specific food is considered edible raw or not.

What is the halacha if a particular vegetable is commonly consumed uncooked in one country, but not in another? For example, artichokes are commonly eaten raw in Egypt, but not in Spain, although both countries grow them for export. Are artichokes cooked in Spain prohibited as bishul akum, but those grown in Egypt are not? Assuming that artichokes cooked in Egypt are not prohibited as bishul akum, do cooked Egyptian artichokes become prohibited upon being shipped to Spain or somewhere else where they are always eaten cooked? Indeed, this is the ruling of the Kaf Hachayim (Yoreh Deah 113:20). However, there are authorities who disagree with this ruling, contending that the prohibition of bishul akum must take effect at the time that the food is cooked. Since, in Egypt, artichokes are eaten raw, cooking them in Egypt does not prohibit them as bishul akum, the subsequent shipping cannot make them prohibited. Of course, this approach creates the rather anomalous ruling that cooked artichokes in Spain are prohibited as bishul akum if locally cooked, but permitted if imported from Egypt!?

Certainly, styles of food preparation also change. For example, until relatively recently, broccoli or cauliflower were always served cooked and would have involved bishul akum. Contemporarily, both are commonly served as a raw vegetable, with the result that even when cooked they are no longer prohibited as bishul akum.

Similarly, the popularity of sushi, sashimi and similar Japanese dishes outside Japan influences whether various types of fish that are now eaten raw will be prohibited if cooked by a non-Jew.

Another food that has changed are carrots. Our European grandparents and great-grandparents never ate raw carrots, which would have made them (the carrots, not the grandparents) subject to bishul akum considerations.

Monarch:

Bishul akum applies only to foods that one would serve on a king’s table. Less prominent dishes are exempt, since they are unlikely to lead to improper social interactions. The Gemara refers to this as oleh al shulchan melachim lelafeis bo es hapas, literally, served on a king’s table to be eaten together with bread. However, this definition, also, may depend on what form the particular food has and on what is considered appropriate to eat at a gourmet meal. At one point, potatoes were considered poor people’s food and would never be served at a respectable event. For this reason, some prominent authorities exempted them from the prohibition of bishul akum. Since, in today’s world, potatoes are served at weddings and other fancy events, they certainly can be forbidden as bishul akum.

There are other interesting issues regarding potatoes. Although nothing harmful will happen to those imbibing raw white potatoes or sweet potatoes, few people eat them that way. Thus, we may arrive at an interesting conclusion: expensive cuts of fish may be exempt from bishul akum regulations because they are now considered edible raw, whereas the far more humble potato is included in bishul akum regulations because it is not eaten raw.

Of course, this brings us to the question of whether potato chips are included in the prohibition of bishul akum. I find more acceptable the opinion of those who rule that, since potato chips are not served at state dinners and other upper-class events, they are exempt from bishul akum concerns, although I am aware that there are halachic authorities who insist that potato chips be bishul Yisrael.

Bishul akum equipment

At this point, let us examine the second of our opening questions: If a non-Jew cooks kosher ingredients in my pots, do the pots absorb non-kosher bishul akum? Must the pots be kashered before they are used again, or does bishul akum only ban food but not pots?

We find a dispute among rishonim, some contending that since bishul akum was limited to circumstances that encourage social interaction, the taste of bishul akum that is absorbed into pots was not included in the prohibition. Thus, equipment that cooked bishul akum does not require kashering (Bedek Habayis, Bayis 3, Shaar 7; Rosh, quoted by the Tur, Yoreh Deah, end of Chapter 113, and by Rabbeinu Yeruchem).

The detractors

Others contend that any time food becomes prohibited because of a rabbinic edict, the equipment used to cook it also becomes prohibited and requires kashering (Mishmeres Habayis, Bayis 3, Shaar 7). This is based on a general ruling, kol detikun rabbanan ke’ein de’oraysa tikun (Pesachim 30b, 39b et al), “whatever the Sages established, they followed a system similar to those governing Torah laws.” Many prohibit using equipment until they are kashered, even if non-Jewish servants or employees cooked for themselves in a Jew’s house. According to this approach, to avoid prohibiting the pots when non-Jewish workers cook for themselves in a Jewish house, you must make sure that someone Jewish participates in the cooking in a way that avoids the prohibition of bishul akum (Tur end of Yoreh Deah 113, quoting theRashba).

Earthenware pots

When the Ran discusses this dispute, he conceptually agrees with the lenient approach, but concludes that the equipment should be kashered (Shu”t Haran 5:11-12). This leads to a new question. Metal pots can be kashered by hag’alah, boiling them, but most pots in earlier generations were made from earthenware, a more available and less expensive material, which the Torah implies cannot be kashered. If bishul akum food was cooked in an earthenware pot, the Ran concludes that it should be broken, since it cannot be kashered (see Pesachim 30b; Avodah Zarah 33b-34a).

This last ruling of the Ran is curious, because the Rashba, who ruled that bishul akum does require kashering the equipment used to cook it, permitted kashering earthenware pots used for bishul akum by boiling them three times, called hag’alah shalosh pe’amim (quoted by Tur Yoreh Deah 123 and accepted by the Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 113:16). The basis for this heter is a passage of Talmud Yerushalmi (Terumos 11:4), which states that earthenware used to cook food prohibited only rabbinically may be kashered by boiling the vessel three times.

Halachic conclusion

The Beis Yosef and the Shulchan Aruch mention both opinions, whether bishul akum requires that the equipment be kashered. The Shulchan Aruch concludes it must be kashered.

Cooking for someone who is ill

Now, let us examine the third of our opening questions: “If a non-Jew cooked on Shabbos for someone who is ill, must I treat the food as non-kosher when Shabbos is over?”

Allow me to explain the issue. If someone is ill, we are permitted to have a non-Jew cook for the sick person. This may be done, even if no life-threatening emergency exists, as long as the person is ill enough to be choleh kol gufo, usually defined as someone ill enough to go to bed (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 328:17), or whose discomfort is intense enough that he feels that his entire body is affected (Rema ad locum).

With this halacha in mind, we need to address the following question: If a non-Jew cooks on Shabbos for someone who is ill, is the food he cooks prohibited because of bishul akum? As I will discuss shortly, the ill person may eat the food cooked on Shabbos by the non-Jew, but may someone who is healthy eat the food? For that matter, may the ill person, himself, continue to eat it after Shabbos, when now someone Jewish can cook for him? According to those who rule that bishul akum prohibits the pots and other equipment used, do we need to kasher the equipment used by the non-Jew to cook on Shabbos?

These shaylos have major ramifications for hospital and nursing home kitchens. In theory, they are permitted to have non-Jews cook on Shabbos for the benefit of their patients who qualify either as choleh she’yeish bo sakanah or as choleh kol gufo. (Visitors or those attending the cholim would not be permitted to eat the food cooked on Shabbos.) If the heter to cook on Shabbos for the ill is not included in the prohibition of bishul akum, the cooked food may be eaten after Shabbos, both by the ill and by visitors and staff. On the other hand, if the food is considered bishul akum, the food may not be consumed after Shabbos. Furthermore, the equipment in the kitchen has become non-kosher and now requires kashering, notwithstanding that it was permitted to have the non-Jew cook in it on Shabbos!

Exclusion or medical exemption?

To answer these questions, we should realize that there are different ways of looking at the heter that permits a sick person to consume food that would otherwise be prohibited as bishul akum.

Exclusion:

One approach understands that any food cooked on Shabbos for a person who is ill was excluded from the prohibition of bishul akum. If we understand the halacha this way, anyone may eat it after Shabbos, and the equipment does not need kashering.

Medical exemption:

A differing approach understands that Chazal permitted someone ill to consume food that would otherwise be prohibited as bishul akum. This is a temporary exemption created to allow those who are ill to have hot, freshly cooked food on Shabbos. When Shabbos is over and fresh food can now be cooked by someone Jewish, the prohibition of bishul akum starts again, even for those for whom it was originally cooked. According to this opinion, after Shabbos, the food already cooked becomes prohibited for anyone to eat, even those for whom it was originally cooked. In addition, the equipment used to cook the food on Shabbos needs to be kashered.

The rishonim debate this matter, some contending that since it was permitted to cook and eat this food on Shabbos, it remains permitted. Furthermore, the fact that a healthy person is not permitted to eat it is because of the laws of Shabbos – we are concerned that someone may ask the non-Jew to do something on Shabbos that is not permitted, but not because of the laws of kashrus. Since the cooking was not performed for social reasons, but to have fresh food for the ill, no prohibition of bishul akum was involved at the time that the food was cooked. Therefore, it does not become prohibited as bishul akum after Shabbos is over, even for a perfectly healthy person (Bedek Habayis, Bayis 3 Shaar 7).

Others disagree with every point that was just made. They compare the food cooked for an ill person on Shabbos to the situation of a person who is deathly ill and requires fresh meat which is unavailable. The halacha in this situation is that, if no shocheit is available, you are required to kill an animal, rendering its meat neveilah, and cook it for the sick person. As soon as a shocheit becomes available, you are no longer permitted to feed the sick person non-kosher food. Of course, the pot in which the neveilah was cooked must be kashered.

Similarly, although it is permitted to have a non-Jew cook for someone who is ill, the food may be eaten only by the ill and only until fresh food is cooked after Shabbos. Once that time arrives, the food cooked by the non-Jew becomes prohibited as bishul akum, even for a sick person, and it certainly was never permitted for someone well to eat it. In addition, the pot used by the non-Jew to cook for the ill on Shabbos is prohibited because of the bishul akum, and must be kashered.

Returning to our question about hospital and nursing home kitchens: If they were to permit non-Jews to cook on Shabbos, this last opinion requires that all food cooked on Shabbos must be disposed of on motza’ei Shabbos, and the entire kitchen might require kashering every week!

How do we pasken?

The Rema and the Shach conclude that the food is permitted after Shabbos, even for a healthy person to eat, whereas the Taz, Mishnah Berurah (328:63) and others rule that it is prohibited, even for the ill person to eat, once food cooked by a Jew becomes available.

Conclusion

The Gemara teaches that the rabbinic laws are dearer to Hashem than the Torah laws. In this context, we can explain the vast halachic literature devoted to understanding this particular prohibition, created by Chazal to protect the Jewish people from major sins.

Photo credit: Vectonauta on Freepik

When Must I Check for Shatnez?

In previous articles, I discussed many of the basic laws of shatnez. We learned at the time that the prohibition of shatnez exists only if the garment is made from a blend of sheep’s wool and linen, but that wool of other species does not make shatnez. Thus, wool made of camel, rabbit or goat hair mixed with linen is not shatnez (Mishnah, Kilayim 9:1; see Rambam, Hilchos Kilayim 10:2). (“Wool” means simply soft hair that is comfortable enough to use as cloth.) Therefore since mohair and cashmere are both varieties of goat’s wool and not made from sheep’s wool, the existence of linen in a garment containing them will not make it shatnez. At the time, a correspondent noted that in practice one should not rely on this, since manufacturers usually add less expensive sheep’s wool to mohair and cashmere.

We also learned in the earlier articles that when a thread is spun from a blend of fibers, the halachic status of the thread is determined by what composes most of the thread’s content and ignores the existence of other fibers inside the thread (Mishnah Kilayim 9:1). Therefore, a thread spun from goat hair fiber with a small amount of sheep’s wool fiber cannot become shatnez, whereas a thread spun with a majority of sheep’s wool fiber can. However, a thread of linen that is woven into or otherwise attached to a woolen garment renders the garment shatnez, and there is no bitul (Rosh, Hilchos Kilei Begadim #5 quoting Tosefta; Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 299:1). Even a single linen thread in a large woolen garment renders the entire garment shatnez.

How should one check for shatnez?

The first step in checking for shatnez is to read the label when looking at the garment. Although one cannot be certain from this that the garment is not shatnez, it may tell you that it is.

Years ago, I was present when a frum organization conducted a men’s fashion show as a fundraiser. A local mechaneich was modeling a suit for the show when the announcer read the garment description over the microphone for all to hear: “This suit contains 70% wool and 30% linen.” I will not describe the pandemonium that ensued.

Here is another example:

Following a lecture on shatnez, a woman came forward with a scarf for which the content label stated: 48% Linen 42% Wool 10% Cashmere.

However, one should never rely on labels, which are notoriously inaccurate. Here is an example: =

May one rely on the label?

Since neither storekeepers nor manufacturers take any responsibility for the content label on their garments, I see no halachic basis to rely on them. The concepts of uman lo marei umnaso, that an expert may be relied upon because he is careful and concerned not to damage his professional reputation, and mirtas, that a merchant is concerned about being caught lying because it will affect his business, are true only when being caught with a lie or an error that will disparage their professional reputation. In an environment where we see that clothing stores feel no responsibility, legally or commercially, for the accuracy of the content labels on the clothes that they sell, there is no halachic basis to rely on those labels.

Even when a label is accurate, it describes only the material itself, but not backings, linings, ornaments, loops, fillings, button thread, etc., all of which often contain shatnez. It is even common that garments contain remnants of wool or linen thread in seams and canvasses that accomplish no recognizable purpose. For example, a number of shatnez laboratories have reported woolen sweaters containing remnants of linen threads in their seams.

Here is another example: A sweater purchased in a store in Boro Park, was labeled as 70% acrylic and 30% wool. This appears to have correctly described the exterior of the sweater, but no mention was made of the materials’ of the lining – which was 100% linen – making it shatnez min haTorah.

So how does one know whether a garment must be checked for shatnez?

Although all types of garments might contain shatnez, the halachic question is: When is the possibility of shatnez frequent enough to require that this garment be checked.

The laws of checking are not unique to shatnez. Let us see if we can compare shatnez to other halachic issues. The most extensive discussion about checking for non-kosher items regards checking animals to see if they are tereifos, defects that render them non-kosher. This halacha is germane to all meat, eggs and dairy products that we consume, since the eggs produced by a tereifah chicken and milk from a tereifah cow are also non-kosher. So what can we do? If we were to check every chicken or cow for tereifos before we consumed any eggs or dairy products, this would drive up the price of eggs and milk considerably, since we would need to slaughter the chicken before we could consume its egg and the cow before we could drink its milk. Obviously, we all realize that halacha does not require this. So what does halacha require?

The general rule regarding checking these items is as follows:

When a problem exists in more than half of a species, one may not consume the product of that species without checking. When one cannot easily check for a problem, and it occurs less than half the time, there is no need to check for a problem, One may eat eggs or drink milk and rely that the majority of chickens and cows are not tereifah.

Regarding meat, the halachic authorities dispute when one is required to check for tereifos. How high a percentage of tereifos is needed to require examination? A dispute over this issue developed in the early nineteenth century between two great poskim, Rav Efrayim Zalman Margolies, the Rav of Brody (Shu”t Beis Efrayim, Yoreh Deah #6) and Rav Yaakov of Karlin (Shu”t Mishkenos Yaakov, Yoreh Deah #16 & 17). The Beis Efrayim contended that it is not necessary to check for a tereifah if we do not find that Chazal and early poskim required it, whereas the Mishkenos Yaakov contended that if a certain tereifah occurs in ten per cent of animals, one is required to check every animal for this tereifah. (The halachic source for this figure of ten per cent is beyond the scope of this article.) It appears that the accepted approach today is to follow the Mishkenos Yaakov’s ruling and check for tereifos that appear frequently (see Darkei Teshuvah 39:3), although some contemporary authorities feel that the percentage should be closer to seven per cent than ten per cent. This percentage is usually called mi’ut hamatzuy, literally, a commonly found minority.

Do we compare tereifos to shatnez?

Do we do a statistical survey of shatnez found in clothing and see if we find shatnez in 10% of men’s suits, ladies’ sweaters, etc.?

The halachic sources do not imply this. Based on a Mishnah (Kilayim 9:7), the Rambam rules “Someone who purchases wool garments must have them checked very well to determine that they are not sewn with linen thread” (Rambam, Hilchos Kilayim 9:28). He does not say that it depends on the percentage of shatnez that we find.

For example, one early authority contends that whether we need to be concerned about shatnez depends on local market conditions (Rash, Kilayim 9:7). When hemp is readily available and less expensive than linen, one need not be concerned that a tailor would use linen (see also Taz, Yoreh Deah 302:4). The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 302:2) concludes the following: “One purchasing wool garments from a gentile must remove all the stitching and replace them with hemp,” although he also rules like the Rash that one may be lenient when hemp is readily available and less expensive than linen. (We should note that there are authorities who disagree with the Rash and the Shulchan Aruch, contending that one may not be lenient even when hemp is readily available and less expensive than linen, because the tailor may prefer working with linen, which is stronger and easier to work than hemp.)

It appears that we do not use the rules of mi’ut hamatzuy – that we statistically use 10% to determine whether we must check, for the laws of shatnez – for the following reason. All the cases of mi’ut hamatzuy are when there is a natural situation that something happens – wine sours, animals develop diseases or injuries that render them tereifah, or insects dine on vegetables. One cannot apply mi’ut hamatzuy to something dependent on the whim of a manufacturer, who is, after all, a baal bechirah. Thus, we should compare the laws of shatnez to situations where we are concerned about whether a product was adulterated with a non-kosher substitute. There the logic is: Do we suspect that someone would adulterate the product with non-kosher? The answer is that we must be strict when we suspect that there might be a problem, and we are not required to be strict when there is no reason for suspicion. The same rules apply to shatnez.

With this background, we can understand that any garment that has a reasonable concern that there might be shatnez needs to be checked.

Cannot check in time

What if I cannot get it checked in time, and I need to wear it immediately? Reuvein arrives in Zurich the day that his brother is getting married, but his suitcase did not end up on his flight. He has nothing appropriate to wear to the wedding, and there is no time to have a new suit checked for shatnez. May he purchase a suit and wear it to the wedding, and only afterwards have it checked for shatnez?

My suggestion is that he call a local shatnez tester or one of the major shatnez testing laboratories, as they may be able to advise which brands have a lesser chance of being shatnez, or they may know that a particular brand is mostly shatnez and it would be assur to wear that brand without checking.

Here is an actual story. The night of bedikas chometz, about 6 years ago, a yeshiva man called the Har Nof Shatnez lab. He purchased a new suit in Geula and wanted a “heter” to wear it on Pesach, relying that “most suits in Geula” are probably not shatnez. Although the particular brand had been shatnez-free in previous years, the shatnez checker knew that 700 suits containing shatnez of that brand were recently brought into Israel and some had been distributed to local “frum” stores. Based on this information, the “checker” told the consumer to do bedikas chometz and then bring the suit for checking. The suit’s collar indeed contained shatnez, which was removed that night, and the suit was tailored the following morning. BH – he didn’t wear shatnez at his Pesach seder!

Contemporary Conversion Conundrums

Question #1: Who is a Jew?

Are Jews an ethnic group?

Question #2: What is a Jew?

Or is Judaism a religion?

Question #3: Teaching a Non-Jew?

May I teach Torah to someone who is interested in becoming Jewish?

Introduction

When our ancestors accepted collective responsibility to observe the Torah, they did so by performing bris milah, immersing in a mikveh and offering a korban. So, too, a non-Jew who is joining the Jewish people is entering the same covenant and follows a similar procedure (Kerisus 9a). When the bris milah is performed, a special form of the brocha is recited: lamul es hageir. Immediately after immersion in the mikveh, the new convert recites a brocha, al hatevilah.

Since, unfortunately, no korbanos can be offered today, an individual may join the Jewish people and become fully obligated to fulfill all the mitzvos without fulfilling this korban requirement. (We derive from a pasuk that geirim are accepted even in generations that do not have a Beis Hamikdash.) However, when the Beis Hamikdash is iy”H rebuilt, every geir will be required to offer a korban olah, which is completely burnt on the mizbei’ach (Rambam, Hilchos Issurei Bi’ah 13:5). Those who have already become geirim will be obligated to bring this korban at that time.

The privilege of becoming a geir tzedek comes with very exact and exacting guidelines. On a technical level, the geir is accepting responsibility to perform mitzvos. Through the geirus procedure, he creates an obligation upon himself to observe mitzvos (Birkas Shemuel, Kiddushin #15).

Who is a Jew?

To the non-Jewish or non-observant world, the definition of a Jew is based on ethno-sociological criteria. But to the Torah Jew, the definition of a Jew is someone who is a member of a people obligated to fulfill the Torah’s commandments. For this reason, it is axiomatic that joining the Jewish people means accepting the responsibility to observe mitzvos (kabbalas mitzvos). This concept, so obvious to the Torah Jew, is almost never appreciated by the non-observant. This is why a not-yet-observant Jew often finds the requirements for giyur to be “unrealistic” or “intolerant.” In reality, attempting to bend the Torah’s rules reflects a lack of understanding of the concept of “commandment” and the unique status of the Jewish people as a nation whose definition is: living according to the laws of Hashem.

In other words, the answer to our opening question — are Jews an ethnic group or is Judaism a religion? — is that the Jewish people are a divinely created religious community chartered with a specific relationship with our Creator. He who made the Rules instructed that others desiring to join the community may do so, but those who choose to leave it may not dispense with their obligation. Thus, we are not technically “an ethnic group,” because you cannot “join” one. On the other hand, we are not simply a “religion” either, because someone who does not believe in the tenets of Judaism may still be Jewish.

Desire to convert

Someone requesting to be converted to Judaism is discouraged from doing so. As the Gemara (Yevamos 47a) says, we ask him, “Why do you want to convert? Don’t you know that Jews are persecuted and dishonored? Constant suffering is their lot! Why do you want to join such a people?”

Why discourage a sincere person from joining Jewish ranks? Shouldn’t we promote this noble endeavor?

This is because even a sincerely motivated convert may not successfully persevere when encountering major adversity. We can never be certain what the future will bring, but placing obstacles in the path to conversion helps a potential geir who might later regret the decision. As the Gemara explains, we tell him, “Until now you received no punishment if you did not keep kosher. There was no punishment if you failed to observe Shabbos. If you become Jewish, you will receive very severe punishments for not keeping kosher or Shabbos!” (Yevamos 47a)

A different method of discouraging someone from converting is to explain that someone not Jewish who observes the seven mitzvos benei Noach properly merits olam haba, without becoming obligated to keep all the Torah’s mitzvos.

The beis din overseeing the conversion attempts to ascertain that the candidate wants to become Jewish for the correct reasons. If we suspect that there is an ulterior reason to convert, the potential convert is not accepted, even if they commit to full mitzvah observance. The Gemara and the Rambam note that a beis din should be aware that a man may seek conversion to allow him to marry a Jewish woman, or a woman because she wants to marry a Jewish man. The Gemara and the Rambam rule that we should reject these conversion candidates, because their motivation is not fully sincere.

If the potential convert states that he/she accepts responsibility to fulfill all the mitzvos, we usually assume that the geirus is valid. However, what is the halacha if the potential convert declared acceptance of all the mitzvos, but the individual’s conduct indicates that this was merely lip service? For example, what happens if the convert eats non-kosher food or desecrates Shabbos immediately following his conversion procedure? Is he considered Jewish? This question is disputed by Rav Avraham Yitzchak Kook, first Chief Rabbi of the new yishuv in pre-state Israel, and Rav Chayim Ozer Grodzenski, accepted posek hador and rav of Vilna until his passing in 1940, in which Rav Kook rules that the geirus is valid, as long as the beis din believes, at the time of the conversion, that the person is fully accepting observance of the mitzvos, whereas Rav Chayim Ozer rules that the geirus is invalid. Rav Moshe Feinstein rules that, when it is clear that the person never intended to observe mitzvos, the conversion is invalid. The person remains a non-Jew, since he never undertook kabbalas mitzvos, which is the most important component of geirus (Shu”t Igros Moshe, Yoreh Deah 1:157; 3:106).

Accepting mitzvos

As mentioned above, kabbalas mitzvos is a verbal acceptance to observe all the Torah’s mitzvos. We do not accept a convert who states that he is accepting all the mitzvos of the Torah, except for one (Bechoros 30b). Rav Moshe Feinstein discusses a woman who was interested in converting and was willing to fulfill all the mitzvos, except the requirement to dress in a halachically appropriate manner. Rav Moshe rules that it is questionable if her geirus is valid (Shu”t Igros Moshe, Yoreh Deah 3:106).

Sincerity

It is important to accept only converts who want to join the Jewish people and observe the mitzvos for sincere reasons. This is why converts are not accepted whenever there is political, financial, or social gain in being Jewish. For example, no converts were accepted by batei din in the days of Mordechai and Esther, nor in the times of Dovid and Shelomoh, nor will geirim be accepted in the era of the Moshiach. In these era, we assume that the interest in conversion is influenced by the financial or political advantages in being Jewish (Yevamos 24b). For this reason, Megillas Esther (8:17) refers to misyahadim, “those who made themselves into Jews,” without acceptance by the official batei din. Similarly, in an earlier era, unlearned Jews created ersatz “batei din” during the reign of Dovid Hamelech, converting people against the wishes of the beis din hagadol (Rambam, Hilchos Issurei Bi’ah 13:15).

The Rambam explains that the “non-Jewish” wives that Shelomoh married were really insincere converts. In his words, “In the days of Shelomoh, converts were not accepted by the official batei din…however, Shelomoh converted women and married them… and it was known that they converted for ulterior reasons and not through the official batei din. For this reason, the pasuk refers to them as non-Jews… furthermore, the end bears out – because they worshipped idols and built altars to them” (Rambam, Hilchos Issurei Bi’ah 13:15-16).

A successful spouse trap

In all of the above instances, where there is an ulterior motive to convert, should someone manage to become converted, the giyur is valid, provided that the individual, indeed, accepted full mitzvah observance.

Why is this valid bedei’evid?

Since they want to marry this particular spouse, and the only way to accomplish this is by accepting mitzvos and becoming Jewish, he or she has accepted keeping the mitzvos (Ritva and Nimukei Yosef, both to Yevamos 24a).

Because of this rule, we do not accept someone who is converting because he or she wants to marry someone who is Jewish, even if the convert is absolutely willing to observe all the mitzvos (Yevamos 24b; Menachos 44a). However, if the convert followed all the procedures, including full acceptance of all the mitzvos, the conversion is valid, even though we disapprove of what was done (Rambam, Hilchos Issurei Bi’ah 13:15-18).

Times have changed

This assumption was true at the time of the Gemara and the Rambam, when societal norms did not permit someone to marry Jewish without being part of a Jewish community that was halachically observant. In the contemporary world, a non-Jew can marry someone Jewish without any commitment to the Jewish people. Does this affect the status of someone who wants to convert to Judaism for the sake of marriage?

The two greatest Litvishe halachic authorities of pre-war Europe both contended that it does affect the geirus, but they reached diametrically opposite conclusions. Rav Chayim Ozer noted that, since in the contemporary world, any couple can get married regardless of their religious affiliation, someone wanting to convert and observe mitzvos for the sake of marriage may be accepted for conversion lechatchilah (Shu”t Achiezer 3:27).

At the same time, the rav of Kovna was the Devar Avraham, Rav Avraham Kahana-Shapiro, who, upon seeing Rav Chayim Ozer’s responsum, wrote him a letter disagreeing with his conclusion. The Devar Avraham contended the exact opposite: that since someone today may marry out of their religion, there is no longer anything to prove that the potential convert indeed accepted to observe mitzvos (Shu”t Devar Avraham 3:28). This is based on the approach, quoted above in the name of the Ritva and the Nimukei Yosef, that kabbalas mitzvos that is not completely sincere, but is somewhat compelled by the desire to marry this particular individual, is acceptable only when there is no other way for him or her to marry this particular spouse.

Hillel

We are all familiar with the famous stories of Hillel, which present a halachic conundrum with very differing resolutions. Let me review the situations as they are presented by the Gemara: Three different non-Jews approached Hillel, the first requesting that he convert him on condition that Hillel teach him only the Written Torah and stating that he rejects the authenticity of the Oral Torah. The second requested that Hillel convert him on condition that Hillel teach him the entire Torah while the convert would remain standing on one foot, and the third, on condition that he can become the kohein gadol. Hillel accepted all of them as righteous converts (Shabbos 31a), and then convinced them to study the rest of the Torah.

This Gemara presents a very great difficulty. In what way did any of these converts accept the Torah? The first one certainly did not – he only accepted the authenticity of the Written Torah; therefore, his conversion should be invalid.

Tosafos (to Yevamos 109b s.v. Ra’ah) answers that Hillel realized that all three of these gentlemen were sincere and would keep the entire Torah.

The Maharsha (Shabbos 31a) understands that Hillel did not convert these three men immediately, but accepted them as students to teach them Torah. In his opinion, it is permitted to teach Torah to an individual interested in converting, since its purpose is to enable him or her to observe mitzvos properly as a Jew.

On the other hand, Rabbi Akiva Eiger holds that Hillel converted the three of them immediately, and only after they were halachically Jewish was he permitted to teach them Torah, In his opinion, it is forbidden to teach Torah to a non-Jew simply because he is in the process of conversion.

Thus, our opening third question —  May I teach Torah to someone who is interested in becoming Jewish? – is a dispute among these acharonim.

Common practice is to follow the Maharsha’s approach. Therefore, if the beis din is convinced of the sincerity of a potential convert, they will usually recommend an appropriate program whereby he or she can learn about Judaism and become knowledgeable in mitzvah observance and proper Torah perspective, to prepare them for their eventual conversion to Judaism.

Typical anecdotes

I shall now present to our readers various situations thatI know of concerning potential converts.

Tom

Tom was converted by a non-Orthodox rabbi because his father wanted him to be of his own religion and not that of his mother. At one point in Hebrew school, he mentioned his Judaic origins to one of his teachers – who happened to be Orthodox. At a discreet time, the teacher told him that how to live his life was his own decision, but he should be aware that his conversion would not be recognized by an Orthodox Jew, or by the State of Israel, to allow him to marry someone Jewish. When he got older and began searching for authentic Yiddishkeit, he remembered being told that his status as a Jew was questionable, at best. He found a proper beis din for conversion and persuaded them that he was seriously interested in observing the Torah and becoming halachically Jewish. He then underwent a proper geirus. Subsequently, he was set up on a shidduch with a ba’alas teshuvah, and they have built a Torah family together. By the way, he no longer goes by the name of Tom.

Manny

Manny’s mother and younger siblings underwent conversion when his sibs were all under the age of twelve. Manny, who eventually became fully frum, was already a teenager at the time of the conversion and also went through the conversion process, although he later reported that he did not believe that he accepted mitzvos at the time of the conversion, but simply pretended to join the family. Now an adult and observant, he wonders whether he should perform a new geirus.

According to Rav Kook’s opinion that I presented above, he is certainly Jewish and has no need to undergo any further conversion procedure. According to Rav Chayim Ozer, it is unclear whether he is Jewish, since he attests to the possibility that his conversion was invalid, since he did not really accept mitzvos at the time of his conversion. For this reason, the conclusion was that he should undergo another geirus to remove any doubt as to his status. Manny underwent the second geirus procedure, without reciting a brocha upon his immersion.

Jennifer

Jennifer has two Jewish grandfathers, but both of her grandmothers are not Jewish. Raised to consider herself Jewish, she keeps a kosher home, no small undertaking in the community in which she lives. She scheduled an appointment with a rabbi about an Orthodox conversion. The rabbi, yours truly, told her what observing Torah entails, and also shared with her that it would be virtually impossible for her to observe Judaism all by herself. Realistically, she would need to relocate to a place where she can live an Orthodox lifestyle, within an Orthodox community. Not surprisingly, the rabbi never heard from her again. This is exactly what is meant when we say that we discourage potential converts.

Iliana

When Iliana became interested in joining the Jewish people, she went to the first rabbi she found, not realizing that not all rabbis are Orthodox, and not even knowing what is meant by Orthodox Judaism. After undergoing a non-Orthodox “conversion,” which did not require any acceptance of mitzvos, she realized that this was not the type of being Jewish she wanted. She found a rabbi who had her accept mitzvos and granted her a conversion certificate. However, once she became part of a Jewish community and became engaged, she and her chosson discovered that the rabbi who had issued her the “certificate” was completely unknown to all the rabbis they approached. At this point, she underwent a third conversion with a recognized rav to facilitate her marriage and the acceptance of her children as Jewish.

Conclusion

Throughout the years, I have met many sincere geirim and have been truly impressed by their dedication to Torah and mitzvos. Hearing about the journey to find truth that brought them to Judaism is truly fascinating. What would cause a gentile to join the Jewish people, risk confronting the brunt of anti-Semitism, while at the same time being uncertain that Jews will accept him? Sincere converts are drawn by the truth of Torah and a desire to be part of the Chosen People. They know that they can follow the will of Hashem by doing seven mitzvos, but they insist on choosing an all-encompassing Torah lifestyle. A geir tzedek should be treated with tremendous love and respect. Indeed, the Torah gives us a special mitzvah, repeated many times in the Torah, to “Love the Geir,” and we daven for them, daily, in our Shemoneh Esrei!

Passing the Taste Test

Question #1: Gentile Goulash

Can a non-Jew determine if the cholent or the goulash is kosher?

Question #2: Expert Witness

Does halacha recognize the concept of an “expert witness?”

Question #3: It Tastes Bad!

Does whether something tastes good or bad affect halacha?

Foreword:

This article will discuss what happens if a small amount of something non-kosher falls into kosher food. Because of the limitations inherent in writing articles, at times I will need to omit significant details. As a result, please do not use this as a source for any halachic ruling. Refer a personal question to a rav.

When non-kosher and kosher foods become mixed together, it is forbidden to eat the mixture. However, when the amount of the non-kosher item is so small that it cannot be tasted, the mixture is usually permitted, since the offending substance is considered nullified, bateil.

Note that I wrote “usually,” because there are exceptions to this rule, most of which will wait patiently for future articles. One instance in which the offending ingredient is not bateil is when someone deliberately attempted to nullify a forbidden product or mixture. In this instance, the resultant mixture is prohibited because of the principle of ein mevatlin issur lechatchila (Beitzah 4b), one may not deliberately nullify a prohibited substance.

Ta’am ke’ikur

Why is the ability to taste a prohibited substance the criterion to determine whether the mixture is permitted? This is because of a halachic principle called ta’am ke’ikur, the taste is like the actual substance.

Nosein ta’am lifgam

Even when the non-kosher ingredient can be tasted, at times the mixture is still permitted. This is when the non-kosher substance does not add positive taste into the food, but adds an unpleasant taste, even if it is only mildly unpleasant. The Gemara (Avodah Zarah 67b) quotes a dispute between tanna’im whether nosein ta’am lifgam, literally, that which provides a bad taste, is prohibited or permitted. According to the opinion that nosein ta’am lifgam is permitted, should a non-kosher substance provide an unpleasant taste when added to food, the food remains kosher. The halacha follows the opinion that nosein ta’am lifgam is permitted.

We can then reach this conclusion regarding a mixture of non-kosher and kosher food:

(1) When the non-kosher food is the minority of the mixture, and

(2) the non-kosher food can no longer be identified, and

(3) the non-kosher food does not improve the taste,

then the mixture may be eaten. And, as mentioned above, this is true only when the bitul, the nullifying, was not performed intentionally.

24 hours

The halachic assumption is that residual taste that is present in a vessel or utensil from a previous cooking usually spoils after 24 hours have elapsed. This means that the flavor imparted from such equipment is no longer beneficial and therefore food cooked in it is permitted. In addition, because of a more complicated halachic principle and reasoning, even when we do not know for certain whether equipment was used in the previous 24 hours, we are permitted to assume that the product cooked in non-kosher equipment is kosher (see Tosafos, Avodah Zarah 35b s.v. Miklal). On this basis, although it is prohibited to use a non-kosher pot, food cooked in it with kosher ingredients usually remains kosher.

How do we know?

When a small amount of issur (prohibited food) got mixed with heter (permitted food), we need to know whether the issur is bateil and the food is therefore permitted, or whether it is not bateil and the food is prohibited. In general, there are two methods to ascertain that the food is bateil.

The taste test

A non-Jew tastes the mixture to ascertain whether he can detect taste of the non-kosher food (or the tiny percentage of milk in meat, or vice versa). He may also tell us that, although he can detect the non-kosher substance, what it adds to the mixture is distasteful. In this instance, the food is permitted, as explained above.

Must the non-Jew swallow the food that he is tasting? There is a dispute among later halachic authorities whether a taste test requires that the taster actually swallow the food, or whether it is sufficient that he chew the food thoroughly. The Pri Megadim (Mishbetzos Zahav, Yoreh Deah 98:2) rules that when tasting to check for an issur, the person must chew the food and swallow some of it, whereas the Yad Yehudah (98:2) is satisfied that chewing well is enough and even that is necessary only if it is a solid food. If it is a liquid, even tasting the food in his mouth and spitting it out afterward suffices.

Most poskim contend that the non-Jew should not know that his answer is deciding whether a product is kosher or not. Why? Some explain that the non-Jew may want to help the Jew and tell him that he cannot taste any prohibited substance, even when he is uncertain (Badei Hashulchan 98:8).

Another possibility is that someone who does not understand that it is a violation of what Hashem wants may bias what he says because of other motivations. Thus, we cannot rely on information provided unless (a) the person is halachically concerned about the prohibition involved, or (b) there is a compelling reason why the person would tell the truth, such as an expert chef who would not want to jeopardize his professional reputation.

Ratio

If we know how much of a non-kosher substance fell in, we can try to determine (by measuring) whether the percentage is large enough to be discerned. That is, if what fell in is less than one sixtieth of the permitted substance, the mixture is permitted.

Some rishonim require that, when possible, we must use both methods. In other words, the prohibited substance must be one part in sixty or less, and even then, if a non-Jew is available, we should have him taste the mixture to determine that the prohibited food cannot be tasted (Rashi, Chullin 98a s.v. Beshishim). Others rule that it is better to have a non-Jew taste the food and tell us that he cannot taste the non-kosher substance. If no non-Jew is available, we may permit the food if we know that the kosher food is at least sixty times the volume of the non-kosher (Rambam).

The Shulchan Aruch concludes, like the Rambam, that we use one part in sixty as a determinant only when there is no non-Jew present to taste the meat. In such a case, we calculate if the heter is sixty times the issur, in which case it is mutar.

There are instances in which we cannot use the taste test and will only be able to use the ratio method. For example, what do we do if a small amount of non-kosher meat fell into a cholent or goulash in which there is more kosher meat than the non-kosher that fell in? What are we going to ask the non-Jew to taste? Of course, he is going to taste meat, because there is plenty of kosher meat in the mixture, and there is no way to know by taste whether the non-kosher meat can be tasted. In such situations, we will be forced to use the ratio method to determine whether the food is kosher (see Yorah Deah 98:2).

Chaticha na’asah neveilah

Here is another instance in which we will not be able to rely on taste to rule that something is permitted. A small amount of meat fell into a pot containing dairy. Afterward, another ingredient, that is neither meat nor dairy, was added to the pot. The problem in this instance is that, when the meat fell into the dairy, if the pot did not contain enough to make the meat bateil, all the milk and meat in that pot became prohibited as basar bechalav. Adding more to the pot will not help, nor will tasting the food afterward to discern that the meat cannot be tasted, since the dairy already became prohibited min haTorah. To permit the food (and the pot) we will need to determine how much was in the pot when the meat fell in originally; tasting it now will not help make that determination.

This concept is called chaticha na’asah neveilah, which means that once something absorbed a prohibited substance, we must treat the entirety as prohibited. This concept has ramifications for many other halachos, but space considerations will require us to leave the topic for a future article.

Why sixty to one?

Why is a prohibited substance usually bateil when there is sixty times its volume of heter in the mixture? The reason is because Chazal calculated that most prohibited foods will not be tasted when they are in the food at this small percentage. However, this calculation is not absolute. There are several prohibitions in which Chazal required a larger percentage, because they wanted us to be more stringent regarding these, more serious issurim. There is also the instance of a food that is avida leta’ama, meaning that it is a spice or other flavoring agent. Since these foods can be tasted even when in very tiny amounts, they remain prohibited even when there ar only very small amounts in the food.

Returning to the taste test

Exactly whose opinion do we need that the non-kosher cannot be tasted? Can we use any non-Jew to perform the taste test, or does it require an expert chef? Some contend that an expert chef is needed because we do not assume that the average person is so discerning (see Rashba). Others require an expert chef for a different reason: since he has his well-earned professional reputation at stake, he can be trusted to tell us the truth and not what he thinks we want to hear.

The Rambam and those who follow his approach do not require that the “taste tester” be an expert. They contend that we may rely on any non-Jew who tastes the food and tells us that he cannot discern the non-kosher ingredient in themixture. Among those who accept any non-Jewish taster, some contend that we can rely on him only when he does not know why we are asking him, whereas others are not concerned about this.

In general, halacha accepts that only someone affected by a situation pays attention to its details. For this reason, someone who witnessed something and did not realize the significance of what he was seeing cannot be relied upon for his opinion as to what happened. Thus, in general, it would seem that we should not rely on a non-Jew telling us whether he discerned the non-kosher product or not, if he is unaware of the reason we are asking.

There are some possible exceptions to this rule. One is when the individual has a professional reputation to protect. Someone in this situation is very concerned not to ruin his well-earned reputation, and will always be careful to render a correct answer to the best of his ability. Therefore, we accept his opinion to be true.

Others explain that we may ask a non-Jew whether he tastes the non-kosher when he knows that we are immediately going to see if he is right. Although it may not be his uppermost concern to provide us with accurate information, knowing that we will check immediately on his reliability will cause him to be more concerned to provide accurate information (Shach, Yorah Deah 98:2; Pri Chadash; based on Shu”t Harivash #433).

This approach is recommended by the Gemara and this is the approach followed by Sefardim as ruled in the Shulchan Aruch (Yorah Deah 98:1), who accepts any non-Jew’s opinion if he does not know that we are relying on him.

However, the custom developed among Ashkenazim not to rely on a non-Jew tasting the food. Why would Ashkenazim ignore the approach recommended by the Gemara? Did we decide to become frummer than the authors of the Gemara?

G-d forbid! There is much discussion among the later authorities why Ashkenazim follow this approach. One reason suggested is that, if we study the various explanations provided by the rishonim, we will realize that they are mutually exclusive. In other words, some hold that we can accept the non-Jew’s opinion only when he knows why we want the information, whereas others assume the exact opposite – that he is trusted only when he has no idea why we want the information. Since it is impossible to accommodate all the opinions, the custom is to be stringent and not use this approach. (This answer is provided by Rabbi Akiva Eiger in his glosses to Yorah Deah 98:1, but the Gra and Rav Shelomoh of Vilna, in their respective glosses, disagree.)

Avida leta’ama

Above, we noted that a non-kosher spice or seasoning is not usually bateil because it can still be tasted in the finished product. Thus, the ratio of sixty parts heter to one part issur will not permit this product. However, can you have a non-Jew try it to see if he can taste the issur? Certainly according to Sefardic practice, this is permitted. But can an Ashkenazi use a non-Jew to taste whether the avida leta’ama ingredient can still be tasted?

The Shach (Yorah Deah 98:29), an Ashkenazi who follows the Rema, rules that, when the question is whether you can taste an avida leta’ama, you may rely on a non-Jew. This ruling is accepted by Rav Shelomoh Eiger (in his notes on Rema, Yorah Deah 98:1); but there are those who disagree.

A Jewish taster

The Rema writes that “nowadays we do not rely on the tasting of a non-Jew” (Yorah Deah 98:1). This implies that if a Jew tastes a mixture and tells you that the “prohibited substance” cannot be discerned, you may rely on him (Shach). Most, but not all, authorities accept that we can rely on a Jewish taster (cf. Levush, who disagrees and concludes that Ashkenazim never rely on tasting).

Obviously, in the cases that we have been discussing, no halachically abiding Jew could taste the food, and a Jew who is not halachically abiding cannot be relied upon. Thus, when does this ruling apply?

There are numerous cases in which it might be relevant to have a Jewish person taste the mixture:

(1) If some terumah of one type of fruit or vegetable falls into a different species of non-terumah that is cooking, we may have a kohen taste it, since he is permitted to eat terumah. If he tells us that he cannot taste the species that is terumah, then a non-kohen may eat it. The same halacha is relevant to a case where the dough separated as challah became mixed into a product. (These cases are assuming that we are in a time and place when kohanim eat terumah and challah.)

(2) An individual made an oath or a vow prohibiting himself from eating a certain food. Subsequently, that food gets mixed into other food. Another Jew, who is not included in the oath or vow, may taste the mixture and ascertain that the prohibited food is not discernible.

(3) An onion was cut with a meat knife, and someone tasted the onion and contends that it has no fleishig taste. May someone now eat this onion with dairy? This application can be applied to any similar case where we want to verify if pareve food has a meat or dairy taste.

(4) A non-kosher substance fell into a kosher food and we do not know whether the kosher substance was sixty times the non-kosher. A non-Jew, who does not know why we are asking his opinion, tastes the food and tells us that the non-kosher substance cannot be discerned. At this point, a fully halachically observant Sefardi who heard the non-Jew’s ruling is permitted to rely on his pesak and taste the food. Upon tasting the food, the Sefardi notifies an Ashkenazi that indeed there is no taste of non-kosher in the food. According to the ruling of the Rema and the Shach, the Ashkenazi may now eat the food, relying on the tasting of a Jew.

All four of these cases are seemingly dependent on the dispute quoted above between the Levush and the Shach whether we rely on the tasting done by a Jew.

Conclusion

A well-known, non-Jewish criticism of Judaism is: “Does G-d care more about what goes into our mouths than He does about what comes out?” The criticism is, of course, both mistaken and conceited. Our development as avdei Hashem involves both what goes in and what comes out, and the height of vanity is to decide which is “more” important in His eyes. Being careful about what we eat and about what we say are vital steps in our growth as human beings.

The Confused Image of Glass

In common years, Parshas Tzav falls on Shabbos Hagadol, and the piyutim (and perhaps the drosha) of the day teach about kashering for Pesach. Although this year is a leap year and Shabbos Hagadol is a month from now…

Question #1: Tevilas keilim

Why is glass the only material other than metal for which Chazal required immersion?

Question #2: Non-Kosher

May I use a non-kosher drinking glass for a hot cup of tea?

Question #3: Chicken soup and milk

After serving chicken soup in a glass, may I pour hot milk into the same glass?

Question #4: Kashering for Pesach

How do I kasher my chometz-dik glasses for Pesach?

Introduction

Moshe Rabbeinu hid the Egyptian that he killed in the sand; for this reason, striking the earth to bring the makeh of kinnim needed to be performed by Aharon (Rashi, Shemos 8:12). Since the world has huge deposits of sand, mankind attempted to use it for useful items, eventually discovering that, by heating sand to a very high temperature, it can be made into glassware, which is the topic of this article.

There is no mention of glassware in the Torah, although there is one reference to glassware in Tanach, in the book of Iyov (28:17). Iyov declares, regarding wisdom, lo ya’archena zahav uzechuchis, “Gold and glass do not equal it,” meaning that the value of gold or glass comes nowhere near that of wisdom. From this passage we see that, at the time of Tanach, glass was considered an extremely expensive material. As we will see shortly, that glass became less costly with time has halachic ramifications.

Before discussing the halachos of glass, let us note some of its unique chemical and physical properties that affect its halachic status.

Recyclable

Glassware has many uses and can be very beautiful, but at the same time it is fragile and breakable. However, as opposed to pottery, which, when broken, is irreparable and virtually useless, broken glassware can be easily recycled. Glass can be melted down and reused over and over. In this respect, glass shares an important characteristic with metals, which are also recyclable by being melted down. For this reason, Chazal sometimes gave glassware the halachos of metals. For example, germane to the mitzvah of tevilas keilim, the Gemara rules that glass vessels must be toiveled before use, as indicated in the Gemara (Avodah Zarah 75b): Rav Ashi said, “Glass utensils, since when broken they can be repaired, are like metal utensils.”

Rav Ashi lived at the very end of the period of the Gemara. A much earlier statement of Chazal, in Avos deRabbi Nosson (Chapter 41), provides the following terse statement:

“Three things were said regarding glassware:

(1) It does not absorb; it does not impart.

(2) It shows whatever is inside.

(3) If you place it in a hot place, it becomes hot. If you place it in a cold place, it becomes cold.”

Avos deRabbi Nosson is not intended to be a scientific work, nor is it a handbook for manufacturers. It is similar to Pirkei Avos, although it contains much more aggaddic material, and so it would probably be best classified as an early midrash, similar to Midrash Tanchuma or Pirkei deRabbi Eliezer, or to the much later midrashic collections like Midrash Rabbah or Yalkut Shimoni. So, why is it concerned with categorizing the qualities of glassware?

The answer to this question is that, although Avos deRabbi Nosson is not usually treated as a halachic midrash, in this instance, that is exactly what it is — providing halachic categorization with which to define the unique qualities of glass. By so doing, it provides a background with which to explain the halachos of glassware.

Does not absorb

Laboratory experiments use glass equipment because it does not absorb, nor does it impart or leach into what is heated or stored inside it. Therefore, it should not affect whatever chemical reaction or research for which it is being used. We will soon discuss the kashrus ramifications of this quality of glass, about which the Avos deRabbi Nosson was presumably concerned.

May be clear or opaque

We are accustomed to most glass being clear, but this is really a function of what other chemicals are in the sand from which the glass is made when it is fired. Even glass that is colored is usually transparent, which is one of the common qualities of glass and is highly uncommon in other materials.

This observation about glassware has much halachic ramification, although this distinction does not affect any “kitchen kashrus” issues. It does, however, have ramifications for the laws of tumah and taharah, which we will not disuss in this article because of space considerations.

It is a conductor

The third statement of the Avos deRabbi Nosson is that if you place glass in a hot place, it becomes hot, and if you place it in a cold place, it becomes cold. In other words, glass is a conductor and not a good insulator. The best insulator used today in the kitchen and in carryout shops is Styrofoam. But on the relative scale of things, glass is closer to metal in its ability to conduct heat.

Having used the Avos deRabbi Nosson as a means of explaining the unique properties of glass, we can now discuss the halachic questions that I raised at the beginning of our article.

Tevilas keilim

Our first question was: Why is glass the only material other than metal for which Chazal required immersion?

Allow me to explain. The laws of tumah and taharah germane to tools, equipment and vessels include many different types of materials. Items manufactured from metal, wood, cloth, horn, glass, and plants are all susceptible to tumah, as is food, pottery and boneware. Nonetheless, germane to the mitzvah of immersing utensils prior to food use, the requirement min haTorah  applies only to metal utensils, and not to utensils, pots or pans made of pottery, wood, cloth, bone, horn or any other materials. Therefore, there is no requirement to toivel a wooden spoon, a ceramic dish, cheesecloth used for food (after all, it is called cheesecloth, and not laundry cloth, for a good reason), or flatware chiseled out of horn or bone. However, why is there a requirement to toivel glass bowls and cups?

Based on the Gemara that we quoted above, we can answer this question: Broken glass utensils can be recycled for new manufacture, just as you can recycle broken metal utensils. Since glass shares this quality with metal, Chazal instituted that glass be treated like metalware, germane to the mitzvah of toiveling food-preparatory vessels prior to using them.

Glass and kashrus

At this point, I am going to combine the next three of our opening questions into one discussion:

May I use a non-kosher drinking glass for a hot cup of tea?

After serving chicken soup in a glass, may I pour hot milk into the same glass?

How do I kasher my chometz-dik glasses for Pesach?

There is a tremendous diversity of opinion among the rishonim concerning the kashrus status of glassware. Do we assume, halachically, as does the chemist, that glass never imparts anything that it absorbs? If this is true, it should never require kashering and it may be used interchangeably from treif to kosher, from milchig to fleishig, and from chometz to Pesach without any kashering procedure at all. On the other hand, we have no Talmudic source that expressly permits using any utensil in any of these ways without a kashering procedure in between.

The different opinions that we find among the rishonim on this issue can be categorized loosely as three basic approaches:

1. No need to kasher

Several authorities contend that the nature of glass is that it does not absorb or impart any taste and that, therefore, it does not require any kashering at all (Rabbeinu Tam, quoted by Tosafos, Avodah Zarah 33b s.v. Kunya and Kesubos 107b s.v. Hani,and Rosh, Pesachim 2:8; Rashba, both in Shu”t Harashba 1:233 and in Toras Habayis 5:6; Ran, Pesachim 9a [in the Rif’s pages]; Ravyah,quoted by Mordechai, Pesachim #574). Many of these authorities quote the above mentioned Avos deRabbi Nosson as a proof for this ruling.

2. Does not help to kasher

Halacha treats glassware like pottery. Once pottery was used to cook chometz or non-kosher food, the flavor absorbed into its walls can never be fully removed. Rather than becoming completely extracted when one attempts to kasher pottery, some of the absorbed taste remains and leaches out afterwards with each use, potentially spreading prohibited flavor into all subsequent cooking (Tosafos, Chullin 8a s.v. Shelivna). In other words, once pottery becomes treif, it may be impossible to make kosher again. (There are some circumstances in which it can be kashered, but these unusual situations are beyond the scope of this article.)

Some early authorities contend that, since glassware is made from sand, it should be treated like sand, or, more accurately, like pottery and cannot be kashered (Mordechai, Pesachim #574, and Avodah Zarah #826; Terumas Hadeshen 1:132, 2:151). Most of these authorities quote the source for this approach as Rabbeinu Yechiel of Paris, one of the baalei Tosafos.

3. Glass is like metal

Some rishonim rule that just as Chazal gave glassware the same halachic status as metal regarding the mitzvah of tevilas keilim, it has the same halacha regarding the laws of kashrus (Bedek Habayis of the Re’ah, 5:6; Shibbolei Haleket #207).

However, once we rule that glassware is like metal, in practice, it might become stricter than metal. This is because of a rule that, when a particular method of kashering may break an appliance, Chazal prohibited using that method, out of concern that someone will be afraid to kasher it properly (Pesachim 30b). Thus, although metal can be kashered by boiling the appliance (hag’alah), it may not be allowed to kasher glassware this way, because the owner may be afraid that it will crack (Mor Uketzi’ah end of 451). On the other hand, other authorities permit kashering glassware by hag’alah for Pesach and are not concerned that someone might be afraid to kasher it properly (Shu”t Maharsham 1:53 at end).

A major halachic ramification results from the above. Glassware that is meant to be used in the oven, such as Pyrex, should, therefore, be kasherable for Pesach, since presumably the owner will not be afraid to kasher it properly. Although this is not common custom, there are prominent halachic authorities who permit this (She’arim Hametzuyanim Bahalacha 116:11).

Difference between treif and Pesach

There is a dispute among rishonim whether glass that was used for hot chometz may be used for Pesach. Some authorities are more stringent regarding using chometz-dik glassware for Pesach than using it interchangeably between milchig and fleishig. For example, the Hagahos Semaq, a late baal Tosafos, writes: “Universal custom is not to use for Pesach any used pottery vessels (even those coated with metal or glass). Rabbeinu Yechiel prohibited using even used drinking glasses, since the Gemara compares glass to pottery, and sometimes people place bread into drinking glasses, in which instance they absorb the way pottery does.” The way this statement is quoted, it implies that Rabbeinu Yechiel did not permit any form of glassware kashering for Pesach (Hagahos Semaq 222:5).

Similarly, the Issur Vaheter (58:50), an early Ashkenazic posek, quotes the Semaq as ruling that it is prohibited to kasher glass for Pesach and it should be treated lechumra as questionable whether it is considered metal or pottery.

How do we rule?

Among earlier halachic authorities, it appears that there was a big difference between Sefardic and Ashkenazic practice regarding the use of glassware. The Beis Yosef cites most of the halachic sources we quoted above, and concludes, both in Beis Yosef and in Shulchan Aruch, that glassware does not absorb and therefore may be used for Pesach without any kashering procedure at all (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 451:26). Following his approach, it would appear that someone could purchase or rent used glass equipment from a treif source, without any need to kasher it.

On the other hand, early Ashkenazic custom appears to have been closer to the approach of Rabbeinu Yechiel cited above. For example, the Rema rules that chometz-dik glassware should not be used for Pesach and that it is not kasherable for Pesach use, even when it was used only for serving cold beverages and not used ever to store them.

Although most Ashkenazic authorities subsequent to the Rema follow his approach, some rule that Ashkenazim could follow the Sefardic practice and use glassware for Pesach without kashering it first (Mor Uketzi’ah,end of 451).

Other authorities raise a different question regarding the Rema’s ruling that glassware may not be used for Pesach. The Rema prohibits using glassware for cold drinks on Pesach, even when the glass is used only for cold beverages the entire year. The reason the Rema is stringent is because of concern that chometz may have fallen into the glass and became kavush, which means that chometz flavor absorbed into the glass.

The difficulty with this ruling is that the Rema himself rules that a vessel, even made of pottery, that stored chometz for a lengthy period of time may be used on Pesach, even when this long-term storage would create kavush (Orach Chayim 451:21; see Mishnah Berurah 451:122). How could the Rema treat glassware more stringently than pottery? The only reason to be stringent regarding glassware is according to the minority opinion that treats glassware as pottery!

This question is raised by the commentary Beis Meir (Orach Chayim 451:26), who answers that the Ashkenazic minhag to be stringent not to kasher glass was only regarding drinking glasses, since buying new ones for Pesach is not a major expense. However, the Rema ruled leniently regarding large storage vessels that are expensive, even when they are made from pottery, and certainly when they were manufactured from glass. In other words, even the Rema holds that glassware is inherently kasherable; there is only a custom not to kasher drinking glasses for Pesach since this does not incur a great expense.

There are several ramifications of the Beis Meir’s ruling:

An individual who cannot afford to purchase glassware for Pesach may use his regular, chometz-dik glassware. In this situation, he should kasher his drinking glasses. This approach is followed by the Chayei Odom and the Mishnah Berurah (451:156) who rule that, in a place where glassware is relatively unavailable, glass items should be cleaned well and then kashered for Pesach, by a method called miluy ve’iruy. In this kashering method, glasses are submerged completely in a basin or tub full of cold water for at least 24 hours, the water is changed and glasses are submerged again for at least another 24 hours, and then a third time for at least another 24 hours.

The Mishnah Berurah rules that, if someone does not ordinarily use his glassware for hot chometz or to store chometz, and they used their glasses for Pesach without any kashering at all, the food or beverage placed in them remains kosher for Pesach. More so, in a case of major loss, the Mishnah Berurah permits Pesach-dik food, even when it was placed hot into glassware that was previously used for hot chometz. He permits this only if the glassware was not used for chometz within the previous 24 hours. There are other authorities who are even more lenient (Taz; Pri Chodosh; cf. Shaar Hatziyun 451:196).

According to the Beis Meir’s conclusion, it is permitted to drink a kosher beverage, even a hot tea or coffee, in a “non-kosher” drinking glass. This opinion is mentioned by many halachic authorities (Keneses Hagedolah, Yoreh Deah 121:25 in Hagahos Tur 25; Darkei Teshuvah 121:2; Aruch Hashulchan, Yoreh Deah 121:2). Thus, if you are in a non-kosher house or hotel, the hot tea or coffee you are served in a glass is still kosher. And, if we refer to one of our opening questions: “After serving chicken soup in a glass, may I pour hot milk into the same glass?” — the answer, according to these authorities, is that one may. I suggest that, prior to putting this into practice, our readers should ask this question from their own rav or posek.

Conclusion

The Chiddushei Harim notes that pottery vessels become tamei only from their inside and not when something touches their outside. He explains that this is because a pottery vessel, itself, is considered without inherent value – its value is determined by what it contains, whereas vessels made from other materials have inherent value. On this basis, the Sfas Emes, the grandson and successor of the Chiddushei Harim, notes that man’s value is also determined by what he contains on the inside, not on his outer projected image.

Image above by iprole on Freeimages.com

Jewish Judges and Police

Question #1: Beis din

What is the role of beis din in Jewish life?

Question #2: Police protection

In a community that is run completely according to halacha, who is in charge of appointing and overseeing the police force?

Introduction:

Parshas Mishpatim is the primary parsha regarding halachic civil law, and Parshas Shoftim begins with a mitzvah to appoint shoftim, judges, or as we usually call them dayanim (singular dayan), and shoterim (singular shoteir), enforcement officers, bailiffs or police. The Torah states that you must appoint judges and police in all your “gates,” meaning in all your cities.

Rashi quotes the passage of Gemara (Sanhedrin 16b) that there is a requirement min haTorah to appoint judges in every city and for every tribe. We need to clarify a point: If a beis din is appointed for every city, what is added by appointing a beis din for every sheivet?

The rishonim already address this issue. According to Tosafos (Sanhedrin 16b s.v. Shoftim), the Gemara is teaching that if the border separating two shevatim divides a city between them, the two sections should each have its own beis din. The Ramban (beginning of parshas Shoftim) mentions this approach, and then suggests a different way to understand the Gemara: Each sheivet has a beis din with jurisdiction over the entire sheivet, greater responsibility and authority than has a city’s beis din, whose authority is limited to the city’s borders. Thus, although a city’s beis din can force anyone who lives in its city to follow their directives or to appear before them for litigation, they cannot obligate someone who lives outside their city to appear before them or to follow their orders. A sheivet’s beis din has the ability to force any member of that sheivet to appear before them for litigation. It also has the ability to create a gezeirah that is binding on the entire sheivet.

23 Judges!

The Rambam (Hilchos Sanhedrin 1:1, 3) rules that each city and region in Eretz Yisroel has its own beis din of 23 judges, and that smaller towns and villages have a beis din of three dayanim (Hilchos Sanhedrin 1:4). The Lechem Mishneh (1:1) explains that the Rambam uses the word “region” to mean the same thing that we have been calling sheivet, and also explains why the Rambam changes the term.

The Rambam elaborates on all the different batei din that must be created. There was a chamber in the Beis Hamikdash called the lishkas hagazis, which was the meeting place of the main beis din of Klal Yisroel, the Sanhedrin, also called the Beis Din Hagadol, which consisted of 71 judges. There was a second, smaller beis din of 23 dayanim that was located near the entrance to the Beis Hamikdash, and a third beis din, also of 23 dayanim, that was located near the entrance to the Har Habayis.

The authority of the Sanhedrin

The Sanhedrin has much authority and many roles to play. It is the final court of halachic appeals, and the final decider of halacha. Its interpretation of Torah sheba’al peh is authoritative. Any halachic issue that is uncertain or disputed by a lower beis din could eventually be referred to the Beis Din HaGadol for a binding decision.

When the Sanhedrin exists, the Jewish calendar is determined by a small beis din appointed especially for this purpose by the nasi, the head of the Sanhedrin.

All the other batei din mentioned above — the smaller ones on the Har Habayis and at the entrance to the Beis Hamikdash, and the batei din of the shevatim and the cities – are appointed by the Sanhedrin.

The Sanhedrin also fulfills several political and administrative roles. It appoints the king of the Jewish people. Many other halachos require the participation or agreement of the Sanhedrin, including a decision whether to wage war and to expand the halachic boundaries of the Beis Hamikdash or of Yerushalayim (Mishnah Shevuos 14a; Rambam, Hilchos Sanhedrin 5:1). Thus, the Sanhedrin is not only the supreme halachic authority, but it is also quite literally the “power behind the throne,” “the power behind the courts,” and, at the same time, the court of final appeal. It has the final say in all matters, both temporal and spiritual.

Who can be a judge?

There are many technical requirements that all members must meet, among them that they must all be superior talmidei chachomim and yirei shamayim (G-d fearing individuals), wise, perceptive, analytic, humble, truth-loving, personable, of good reputation and possess a basic knowledge of many secular areas, such as medicine and astronomy (Rambam, Hilchos Sanhedrin 2:1, 7). The Rambam (Hilchos Sanhedrin 2:8) describes how the Sanhedrin would send representatives to locate qualified dayanim and appoint them to their local beis din. As places on the higher batei din opened, they would promote local dayanim up the chain to the next tier, and so on. The Rambam also emphasizes the importance of appointing appropriately qualified people to be dayanim, and the catastrophe that results from appointing those who are unqualified or inappropriate (Hilchos Sanhedrin 3:8).

Semicha

All members of the Sanhedrin and, indeed, of all the lower courts must also receive the special semicha that Moshe bestowed upon Yehoshua authorizing him to rule on all areas of Jewish law. This special semicha, which existed from the time of Moshe Rabbeinu until sometime during the era of the Gemara, authorized the recipient to rule on capital and corporal cases (chayavei misas beis din and malkus) and to judge cases involving kenasos, penalties that the Torah invoked. Only a beis din consisting exclusively of dayanim ordained with this semicha may judge these areas of halacha (Rambam, Hilchos Sanhedrin 4:1).

In today’s world, there are several levels of semicha, all of them of a lower level than that granted by Moshe Rabbeinu. The most basic semicha, yoreh yoreh, authorizes the recipient to rule on matters of kashrus and similar areas. A more advanced level of semicha called yodin yodin authorizes its recipient to rule as a dayan on financial matters. A higher level, no longer obtainable today, is called yatir bechoros and authorizes its recipient to rule on whether a first-born animal is blemished and no longer acceptable as a korban, which permits the animal to be shechted for its meat (see Sanhedrin 5a).

The role of a local beis din

The local beis din’s responsibility in a community is also quite multi-faceted. They are not only the judicial branch of the government, charged with ruling on local dinei Torah and interpreting the halachos for local practice, but they are also the executive, or administrative, branch of government, responsible to supervise that the community and its individuals observe halacha fully and correctly. In this capacity, they are responsible to make sure that the weights and measures in the marketplace are honest (Rambam, Hilchos Sanhedrin 1:1) and that the prices charged by stores do not exceed what halacha permits. The local beis din is responsible to make sure that no one overcharges for staple products (ibid.; Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 231:20).

Overseeing that the community observes halacha correctly is also a responsibility of the beis din. For example, the Rambam and Shulchan Aruch rule that beis din supervises that yomim tovim do not become the cause for inappropriate social activities. This includes assigning police to patrol parks and other relaxing areas to maintain proper standards of public conduct (Rambam, Hilchos Yom Tov 6:21, Shulchan Aruch Orach Chayim 529:4). Beis din is responsible to make sure that duchening was performed only by kosher kohanim (Kesubos 25a). It is their job to make sure that no one works on chol hamoed in violation of the halacha (Rambam, Hilchos Yom Tov 7:4), that people keep their pledges to tzedakah (Rosh Hashanah 6a), that graves and other tamei meis areas are properly marked, and that people do not plantor maintain kelayim (Rambam, Hilchos Yom Tov 7:11).

The beis din assumes responsibility to protect individuals who cannot oversee their businesses or properties, such as, someone who fled to avoid danger, was kidnapped or captured. Beis din will appoint someone to manage the individual’s properties and businesses (Shulchan Aruch Choshen Mishpat 285:2). They are also responsible to see that the properties of orphaned minors are properly managed (for example, see Shulchan Aruch Even Ha’ezer, 112:11).

Included in this responsibility is that, if a father cannot or does not give his son a bris milah, the beis din makes sure that the mitzvah is performed (Kiddushin 29a; Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 261:1).

Smaller batei din

In addition to the officially appointed batei din, in earlier generations there were local batei din, appointed by a community to oversee its own matters. For example, the kohanim had their own batei din, who were authorized to make rules and new takanos that applied only to the kohanim (see Pesachim 90b; Kesubos 12a).

Chutz la’aretz

The Ramban (beginning of Parshas Shoftim) notes that the posuk implies that there is no requirement min haTorah to establish a beis din outside of Eretz Yisroel. This is because the Torah requires appointing judges and bailiffs in your gates, which means the gates of Jewish cities in Eretz Yisroel. However, the Ramban notes that the Gemara (Makkos 7a) rules that once Klal Yisroel arrives in and settles Eretz Yisroel, there is an obligation min haTorah to have a beis din in chutz la’aretz also, although not in every city, but only in “districts.”

Min haTorah or not?

The Ramban concludes that establishing batei din outside Eretz Yisroel isrequired min haTorah only when there are dayanim who have achieved the highest level of semicha, that which is a continuation of what Moshe Rabbeinu conferred on Yehoshua. As I mentioned above, this semicha was discontinued during the era of the Gemara. There have been several attempts to reestablish this semicha, the most famous of which was when the Mahari Beirav was the rav of Tzfas, and Rav Yosef Karo was a member of his beis din. However, none of these attempts succeeded. The Ramban concludes that, although we no longer have a Torah obligation to establish batei din in chutz la’aretz, there is a rabbinic requirement to do so.

How do we litigate?

Over the years, I have been asked many questions about the way batei din operate. Most of these questions stem from a misunderstanding of legal procedures in general, or from a lack of knowledge about how a beis din functions.

Here is a typical example, lifted from my records. The din Torah was the result of a business partnership that had soured. I received the following e-mail communication: “I have asked Mr. F. to tell me what he is claiming. He has not responded, but has clammed up about his claim. He knows what I am claiming and he said that I have to sign an arbitration agreement in beis din and only then will he present what he is claiming from me. I am asking if this is just — he knows what I am claiming but what he is claiming will be a surprise.”

I answered: “Mr. F. is under no obligation to reveal to you what he feels you owe him, without an agreement that the two of you will go to binding arbitration in beis din. Telling him the basis of your claims does not require him to reveal any information. If you feel that you can disprove his claims, you should tell that to the beis din, and you have a right to postpone the proceedings to allow you the time to present your proofs.

In the interim, you can agree to go to beis din, or you can suggest that the two of you discuss the matter in the presence of a disinterested party in the hope of negotiating some type of settlement. However, he is under no obligation to agree to this. If you receive a summons to beis din, you are required to respond.”

By the way, when choosing to go to a beis din, the almost-universal tendency is to find a beis din where I will “win” my case. However, the mitzvah specifies that you should go to the beis din that is most expert (Sanhedrin 32a). The Gemara implies that this is a mitzvah min haTorah, derived from the words in Parshas Shoftim, tzedek tzedek tirdof, which the Gemara explains to mean haleich achar beis din yafeh, “find the most expert beis din” to litigate your case, so that it is resolved correctly.

Turf wars

What do you do if the other party insists that you go to their choice of beis din?

I mentioned earlier that the Ramban explains that the dayanim of a sheivet have greater jurisdiction than do those of a city, who cannot force someone from outside their city to come before them for litigation. A sheivet’s beis din has the ability to force anyone in their sheivet to come to them for litigation. The same authority applies to a city’s beis din relative to a city’s inhabitants. Therefore, if our beis din system were able to work the way the Torah designed it, the official dayanim of a city would be able to require litigants to appear before them.

Because the countries in which we live will not compel halachic observance, we cannot legally coerce someone to appear before an official city beis din. But an observant Jew knows that he must appear before beis din when summoned.

The person being sued (the defendant) is usually assumed to have the right to choose which beis din will hear the case, as long as it is in his city of residence. However, this is not ironclad. If the defendant chooses a beis din that will be more expensive for the claimant, or he is trying simply to inconvenience the claimant, there is no right to choose this option over a more-convenient, less-expensive choice. If the defendant visits or does business in the city where the claimant lives, and the claimant rarely travels to the defendant’s city, the beis din in the claimant’s city can demand to judge the case (Shu”t Maharshdam #103; Shu”t Igros Moshe, Choshen Mishpat 1:5; Shu”t Yabia Omer 7:Choshen Mishpat:4). Under these circumstances, a proper beis din will ignore the defendant’s request for choice of venue, and should he not respond to his summons, rule him a lo tzayis dina, someone who does not obey the laws of the Torah, which has many ramifications (Aruch Hashulchan, Choshen Mishpat 26:2, 5; Shu”t Imrei Yosher #38).

Conclusion

A Torah Jew must realize that Hashem’s Torah is all-encompassing, and that every aspect of his life is governed by Torah law. A Jew hopes to manage his business relationships without ever resorting to litigation. If there is an unfortunate “misunderstanding,” the two parties should discuss the matter and, if the matter remains unresolved, they should try discussing it with the guidance of a third party, possibly a rav. However, should all these approaches not succeed, the avenue of halachic litigation exists.

Only New Chometz Apply

Since parshas Bo includes the prohibitions about chometz on Pesach…

Question #1: First Fruits

Which korbanos are offered only from “first fruits”?

Question #2: New Grains

Which korbanos are offered only from the new grain?

Question #3: Wheat from Heaven!

May korbanos be offered from heavenly-dropped wheat?

Foreword

Virtually all grain korbanos, called menachos (singular: mincha), are wheat, mankind’s most common basic sustenance. However, on the second day of Pesach, the korban omer is offered in the Beis Hamikdash from the new crop of barley. Indeed, it is the only barley-flour korban offered by the tzibur, the community. In general, barley is viewed as animal feed, rather than “people food” (see Pesachim 3b). (The only other korban from barley was the minchas sotah, a privately offered korban for which there is an obvious reason why it is from a feed grain, as Rashi [Bamidbar 5:15] and the midrashim [Midrash Agadah and Yalkut Shimoni ad loc.] elaborate.) Presumably, the reason that the korban omer was from barley is because barley ripens earlier than wheat and the korban omer permits the consumption of the new grain crop; the Torah did not delay until the wheat is ready for harvest.

In honor of Shavuos

Seven weeks later, on Shavuos, special korbanos, called the shetei halechem, are offered from the new wheat crop. Although this korban is kosher if made from the previous year’s wheat crop, there is a mitzvah min haTorah to bring it from the new crop. The offering of the shetei halechem permits the new crop to be used for menachos.

Introduction

Immediately after describing the korban omer, the Torah teaches: “And you shall each count seven complete weeks, from the morrow after that day of rest [the first day of Pesach], beginning on the day of your bringing the omer, which is waved. You shall count fifty days, until the morrow after the seventh week, at which time you shall offer a new grain offering to Hashem. From your dwelling places (Hebrew: ‘mimoshevoseichem’) you shall bring two loaves of bread. They (the two loaves together) shall comprise two tenths of an omer of fine flour. They shall be baked leavened (Hebrew: ‘chometz’) and be the first fruits unto Hashem (Hebrew: ‘bikkurim’). Together with the bread, you shall bring a group of seven yearling sheep and, also, one young bull and two rams. These (ten animals) will be olah offerings for Hashem, offered together with their appropriate grain offerings and libations. This is a fire offering, to show Hashem the fragrance of compliance” (Vayikra 23, 15-18; the translation of the word ניחוח follows that of Rav Hirsch). The Torah then completes the description, including that three more korbanos accompanied the shetei halechem, a male goat as a chatas and two yearling sheep as publically-owned korbanos shelamim, for a total of thirteen animal korbanos.

The Torah passage that I just quoted includes several interesting observations:

Receiving the Torah?

(1) Although calculation demonstrates that the holiday of Shavuos coincides with the giving of the Torah, neither here nor any other place does the Torah make any association between the two. This article will not discuss this famous question, to which there are many answers.

Imported grain

(2) We are told that the shetei halechem must be brought “from your dwelling places.” But grain is never grown in dwellings, but open fields!

The Gemara (Menachos 83b) explains that “dwelling place” here means Eretz Yisrael, and that, whereas other mincha offerings may use grain imported from outside Eretz Yisrael, shetei halechem may use only grain that grew in Eretz Yisrael (Mishnah Menachos 83b; Keilim 1:6; Parah 2:1).

Alef emphasis

(3) The word immediately after mimoshevoseichem in the Torah is תביאו, “you shall bring,” but the letter alef in that word contains a dagesh. However, an alef never otherwise has a dagesh. Why this anomaly? Rav Hirsch suggests that this is to emphasize the uniqueness of the shetei halechem as the only mincha in which the animal offerings are brought only as an accompaniment to the grain offering.

Chometz

(4) The Torah reports that the shetei halechem “shall be baked leavened.” This is very unusual. All grain offerings in the Beis Hamikdash must be unleavened – they all halachically qualify as matzah. Even the “leftovers” from all mincha offerings may not be allowed to become chometz (Vayikra 6:9-10)! A kohein who violates this last instruction intentionally could receive malkus, lashes, and would no longer be accepted as a witness!

There are only two exceptions – two instances of a grain offering in the Beis Hamikdash which is made from chometz: one of the four types of “bread” that accompanied the korban todah was chometz (Vayikra 7:13) and the shetei halechem of Shavuos (Mishnah, Menachos 52b). In both of these instances, the Torah states that they must be chometz.

The shetei halechem are the only public korbanos that are chometz, since the korban todah is an individual’s thanksgiving offering for surviving travail (Tehillim 100, 107 and Berachos 54b). Since the Torah states that no mincha “offered to Hashem” may be chometz (Vayikra 2:11), the chometz parts of these menachos are never placed on the mizbeiach, but are eaten in Yerushalayim while completely tahor, either by the kohanim and their families or by the owners of the korban.

Who is first?

(5) Furthermore, the Torah states that the shetei halechem must be bikkurim. Yet bikkurim usually means the fruits that a farmer grows in his field and brings to the Beis Hamikdash as his own thanks offering (see Devarim 26:1-11 and Mishnah, Mesechta Bikkurim). The Gemara explains that the word bikkurim, here, means that this year’s grain crops cannot be used for menachos before the shetei halechem has been offered. In addition, the Mishnah teaches that, what we usually call the bikkurim, the special, first-ripening fruits for which Eretz Yisrael is renowned, are not brought to the Beis Hamikdash until the shetei halechem korban is offered (Menachos 68b; see also Bikkurim 1:10).

Meat with bread

(6) The Torah states: “Together with the bread, you shall bring a group of seven yearling sheep and, also, one young bull and two rams.” These are not the korbanos musaf offered on Shavuos, which are mentioned in parshas Pinchas and are offered on Shavuos, even if no shetei halechem mincha is brought.

Virtually all grain offerings in the Beis Hamikdash are brought either without any animal korbanos, or to accompany the animal offerings. It is unusual that the main korban is one made from flour, and the animal offerings accompany the grain offerings; but that is the law regarding the shetei halechem. This is truly unique in the instance of the shetei halechem, since it is the only mincha that causes thirteen animal korbanos to be brought as a result. If the shetei halechem is not offered, these korbanos cannot be brought, but if these korbanos are not brought, the shetei halechem is kosher by itself.

The only other mincha that is the cause of the bringing of a korban is the korban omer, but in that case, only one korban is offered, a sheep. Shetei halechem are completely unique in that it is the only instance in which a grain offering causes the offering of a large group of korbanos.

Details, details:

In addition to these observations that lie directly in the pesukim themselves, there are a host of other unusual features that apply to the shetei halechem, such as:

1. The Mishnah (Menachos 59a) notes that the mincha of the shetei halechem is not accompanied by either oil or frankincense, unlike most mincha offerings. Why not?

To answer this question, I refer you to read, in detail, the commentary of Rav Hirsch (Vayikra 23:17).

2. The shetei halechem must be brought from grain that had not yet taken root prior to this year’s crop season (Mishnah, Menachos 83b; Parah 2:1; we should note the Rambam does not rule according to this Mishnah, a position that engenders much discussion). The shetei halechem permitted use of new grain in the Beis Hamikdash (Mishnah Menachos 68b). Menachos offered from the new grain before the korban omer was offered were invalid, whereas those offered before the shetei halechem were brought were kosher, although a Torah violation was involved in bringing them (Menachos 68b). I will return to this halacha shortly.

3. Although you may bake bread, challah, cake or cookies on Yom Tov to serve on that day, and the korbanos to be brought on that day (such as korbanos musaf and korban pesach) are shechted, butchered and burnt on the mizbeiach on Shabbos and certainly on Yom Tov, the shetei halechem could not be baked on Shavuos (Menachos 95b and 100b). The reason they could not be baked on Yom Tov is because baking and cooking on Yom Tov are permitted only to benefit Jews who will be celebrating Yom Tov, but it is prohibited to bake a korban on Yom Tov. Although korbanos are brought on Yom Tov, this applies only to the processing of the korban necessary to be performed that day. The baking of the menachos, similar to the baking of the twelve loaves of the lechem hapanim (the showbread) for Shabbos, could be performed before Shabbos or Yom Tov, and therefore the two loaves of the shetei halechem must be baked before Yom Tov.

Many halachic authorities raise the following question: Why can’t you bake your own private bread on Yom Tov for Yom Tov use, and, while doing do, bake the shetei halechem? There is much discussion among acharonim regarding this question, without any specifically accepted answer.

4. The shetei halechem and the two shelamim sheep offered with it were held up by the kohein and waved in six directions – upwards and downwards and in four directions of the globe, similar to the way the lulav and esrog are waved on Sukkos (Mishnah Menachos 61a).

5. The Mishnah teaches that ten miracles occurred in the Beis Hamikdash, one of which was that the korban omer and the shetei halechem were never invalidated by a pesul in which something unplanned went wrong (Pirkei Avos 5:5).

Heavenly wheat!

In this context, we have the following unusual passage of Gemara: “What is the halacha regarding wheat that fell from the clouds? Can it be used for the shetei halechem offering?”

Rashi and his grandson, Rabbeinu Tam, disagreed regarding what case is being described here. Rabbeinu Tam understands that the Gemara is discussing wheat that miraculously fell from heaven, similar to the way the mann in the desert arrived every morning. As traditionally explained, the berocha recited before eating the mann was “Hamamtir lechem min hashamayim,” “Blessed are You, Hashem… Who rains bread from the sky” (quoted by Shu’t Torah Lishmah #63, in the name of the Rama MiFano).

The Radbaz (Hilchos Temidim Umusafim, 8:3) is dissatisfied with Rabbeinu Tam’s approach, noting that Hashem brings miracles only when a major reason exists for them.

Stormy wheat

For these and other reasons, most late authorities prefer Rashi’s approach that the Gemara is discussing wheat that was blown by gale-force winds off a ship in the Mediterranean, or perhaps were on an island in the Mediterranean Sea, and then landed in Eretz Yisrael. We do not necessarily know the origin of the wheat; just that it landed in Eretz Yisrael.

Following either Rashi’s approach or that of his grandson, the Torah states that the shetei halechem must be offered from grain that grew mimoshevoseichem, from your dwelling places, and we learned above that this requires that shetei halechem must use wheat that grew in Eretz Yisrael. The question is whether this wheat, either the miraculous variety of Rabbeinu Tam’s version, or the windswept variety of Rashi’s, qualifies as wheat that grew mimoshevoseichem. (Our intrepid readers are referred to the commentary of the Mahari Kurkus on the Rambam, Hilchos Temidim Umusafim, 8:3, who analyses this issue.)

Brought too early

Regarding the shetei halechem offering, the Gemara presents the following intriguing anecdote. As I mentioned above, the Mishnah states that both the korban omer and the shetei halechem must be offered from the new crop (the korban omer from the new barley crop, and shetei halechem from the new wheat crop). The Mishnah also states that it was forbidden to eat from the new grain crop before the korban omer was offered, which is the prohibition of chodosh, and it is forbidden to offer a grain korban from the new crop until after the shetei halechem are offered. But, regarding a mincha from the new grain crop that is brought before the shetei halechem, the Mishnah makes the following distinction: If the new grain mincha was brought before the korban omer was offered on the second day of Pesach, the mincha is invalid, whereas if such a korban was brought after the korban omer was offered but before the shetei halechem, the mincha is kosher, notwithstanding that it is prohibited min haTorah to offer such a korban mincha.

Rabbi Tarfon, an older contemporary of Rabbi Akiva and one of the greatest Torah scholars of all time, queried why the offering of the korban omer, whose purpose was to permit the new grain to be eaten, should affect whether a mincha offered in the Beis Hamikdash is kosher or not?

A budding young scholar named Yehudah bar Nechemiah (besides this passage of Gemara, his name appears in several midrashim, mostly Midrash Rabbah and Midrash Tanchuma) answered Rabbi Tarfon with a brilliant insight: Prior to the bringing of the korban omer, the new grain qualifies as ma’achalos asuros, foods that a Jew is prohibited from eating – and there is a halacha that one cannot offer korbanos from products that a Jew may not consume. On the other hand, once the korban omer is offered, it is permitted to eat the new grain. It cannot be used for menachos because of a different law — the Torah refers to the shetei halechem as mincha chadasha, meaning that they should be the first korbanos offered from the new wheat crop. Should a different mincha be brought first from the new wheat crop, the shetei halechem are no longer mincha chadasha.

Yehudah bar Nechemiah argued that prior to the offering of the korban omer, the new grain has the status of ma’achalos asuros, which are never acceptable as korbanos, even after the fact (be’dei’evid). However, once the korban omer is offered, although it is still prohibited to use the new grain for menachos, we find many instances in which it is not proper to offer a korban a certain way, but be’dei’evid, after the fact, the korban is still kosher. Rabbi Tarfon was silent, implying that he accepted Yehudah bar Nechemiah’s response.

Rabbi Akiva, who, among other great luminaries of the era, was in attendance during this discussion, noted that Yehudah bar Nechemiah was smiling – demonstrating that he was personally satisfied to have bested a gadol beYisrael in a Torah discussion. Rabbi Akiva realized that Yehudah bar Nechemiah was afflicted with a very bad shortcoming – misplaced personal pride. Rabbi Akiva then forecast, within Yehudah bar Nechemiah’s earshot.

“Yehudah, I will be surprised if you’ll live a long time!” This was not intended as a curse, but a prediction.

The Gemara then quotes from the famous tanna, Rabbi Yehudah (the son of Rav Ila’ii), who was also present during this exchange. Rabbi Yehudah shared that the discussion between Rabbi Tarfon and Yehudah bar Nechemiah took place two weeks before Pesach, and that when he, Rabbi Yehudah (who lived in the southern part of Eretz Yisrael) returned for Shavuos to the beis hamedrash of the Sanhedrin, he did not find Yehudah bar Nechemiah. When Rabbi Yehudah inquired about Yehudah bar Nechemiah’s wellbeing, he was told that Yehudah bar Nechemiah had passed away suddenly in the interim.

This very tragic turn of events brings to mind both the deaths of Rabbi Akiva’s 24,000 disciples (which occurred shortly after the sudden passing of Yehudah bar Nechemiah) and the much earlier tragedy of the sudden deaths of Nadav and Avihu, the two oldest sons of Aharon. In all of these instances, young, brilliant Torah scholars were suddenly taken because of personal character flaws. As implied by the midrash, had these young, great scholars become the leaders of the Jewish people, this would have caused irreparable damage to our mesorah. Klal Yisrael survives only when those who carry on the mesorah do so solely because of their obligation to Hashem, not because of personal interest.

Conclusion

Do we live with a burning desire to see the Beis Hamikdash rebuilt speedily in our days? Studying the halachos of the korbanos should help us develop our sensitivity and desire to see the Beis Hamikdash again in all its glory. May we soon merit seeing the kohanim offering all the korbanos in the Beis Hamikdash in purity and sanctity and Klal Yisrael in our rightful place in Eretz Yisrael, as a light unto the nations!

Maaser Kesafim

Since the first source of the obligation of maaser kesafim is in this week’s parsha…

Question #1: Paying for Your Kids in Kollel

“I agreed to support my married children for five years. May I use maaser money for this?”

Question #2: Chomesh

What is chomesh?

Question #3: Tuition

May I pay tuition out of maaser kesafim funds?

Question #4: Testing Hashem!

May I ask Hashem to pay me back for the tzedakah money that I give?

Which maaser?

We should first note that the term maaser, without specifying which one, is used sometimes in the Mishnah and Gemara to refer to maaser rishon, and sometimes to refer to maaser sheini, and, in later halachic works, sometimes also to maaser kesafim. These three types of maaser have vastly different laws from one another. Usually, one can understand from context which maaser is intended. If the context alludes to maaser owned by a Levi, or to the first maaser being separated, maaser rishon is intended. If it refers to something that has sanctity, usually maaser sheini is intended. If it refers to a percentage of one’s income that is donated to tzedakah, it refers to maaser kesafim.

The above questions all relate to shaylos about how much someone should donate to tzedakah and how he should prioritize his giving. It is well known that Rav Moshe Feinstein used to complain that these are areas of halacha about which he was asked too infrequently.

Maaser kesafim: giving ten percent of one’s moneys to tzedakah. The poskim dispute whether one subtracts household expenses from one’s income, before calculating maaser.

The concept of maaser is primarily in the case of ayn ani bifanav, when I fulfill the mitzvah by putting aside money for tzedakah. In a case of ani bifanav I do not fulfill my mitzvah by giving him only ten percent.

A person who distributes maaser kesafim to the poor is blessed with a special guarantee of wealth (Taanis 9a). This beracha happens only when someone is meticulous to calculate exactly a tenth of one’s income for tzedakah (Shu’t Avkas Rocheil #3). Furthermore, this beracha is fulfilled only if one gives this maaser money to the poor, but if one gives part of it to other causes, there is no guarantee that wealth will follow (see Shu’t Radbaz 3:441). Therefore, although one may use maaser kesafim to buy an aliyah, pay for a “mi’shebeirach,” purchase sefarim that will be used by the tzibur (Taz, Yoreh Deah 249:1) or similar communal needs, it is preferred to earmark maaser kesafim for the needs of the poor (Rema, Yoreh Deah 249:1). Donations to Torah institutions are considered distributions to the poor (Ahavas Chesed 2:19:2), as are hachnasas kallah expenses (to pay wedding and related expenses for a poor groom or bride).

Chomesh: giving twenty percent of one’s moneys to tzedakah. This is the optimal level of fulfilling mitzvas tzedakah, whereas setting aside ten percent is considered only “midah beinonis,” an average person’s conduct. Someone who gives a chomesh to tzedakah should first calculate and set aside one tenth, and then a second tenth.

Before starting to give regular amounts of tzedakah on an ongoing basis, one should declare that he is following this procedure bli neder, without accepting it as a vow.

Paying for Your Kids in Kollel from Maaser Money

“I agreed to support my married children for five years. May I use maaser money for this?”

The Chasam Sofer authored a responsum (Shu’t Chasam Sofer, Yoreh Deah #231) on this subject, which is fascinating for the many different halachic issues that he clarifies. Someone had arranged the marriage of his scholarly son to the daughter of a talmid chacham,with the following understanding: The father of the son accepted that he would pay every week a certain amount to his mechutan, the bride’s father, who would sustain the young growing family in his home, thus enabling the son-in-law to continue his studies under his father-in-law’s direction. The father of the chosson realized that it will be difficult for him to meet this commitment, and wants to know if he can use the maaser money from his business endeavors to provide the support for which he is responsible.

The Chasam Sofer opens his discussion by quoting two opinions that seem to dispute whether it is acceptable to use maaser money for such an expenditure. The Rema, quoting the Maharil, contends that it is not permitted to use maaser money to pay for a mitzvah, such as donating lamps and candles to the shul, whereas the Shach states, in the name of the Maharam, that it is permitted to use maaser money for mitzvos. Thus, whether one may pay for mitzvos, other than supporting the poor, from maaser money appears to be a dispute among early authorities.

The Chasam Sofer then quotes the Be’er Hagolah, who explains that the two above-quoted opinions are not in dispute. All authorities prohibit using maaser money to fulfill a mitzvah that someone is already obligated to observe. The Maharam, who permitted using maaser money for these purposes, was discussing a case in which the donor intended to use maaser money for this mitzvah from the outset, whereas the Maharil is discussing a situation in which he has been using his maaser money to support the poor, in which case he cannot now divert it for other mitzvos that do not qualify as tzedakah for the poor. Thus, according to the Be’er Hagolah, whether the father can begin meeting his obligations to his son and mechutan with his maaser money will depend on whether he has already accepted the obligation on himself to pay this from other funds, in which case he cannotuse maaser money for it, or if it is an obligation that he is now accepting upon himself, in which case he can specify that he wants to use maaser money to fulfill it.

The Chasam Sofer does not consider the approach of the Be’er Hagolah to be fully correct. He (the Chasam Sofer) notes that the Maharil wrote that maaser moneys are meant to support the poor and not for the acquisition of mitzvos. Therefore, use of maaser money for any type of personal mitzvah is inappropriate, whether he is already obligated to fulfill the mitzvah or not.

The Chasam Sofer concludes that when someone begins donating maaser money, he may stipulate that, sometimes, the money will be used for a mitzvah donation, such as the lighting in shul. However, once he has begun donating his maaser money regularly to the poor, he must continue using it for tzedakah.

Family first

Having determined that there are definitely situations in which maaser money must be given to the poor, the Chasam Sofer then discusses when and whether money designated for the poor can be used to support an individual’s extended family. There is a general rule that one is obligated to the poor to whom one is closest – close family first, more distant family next, neighbors third, members of one’s city next and the out-of-town poor next.

Greater needs

Notwithstanding that family should be supported first, the Chasam Sofer quotes from his rebbi, the author of the Haflaah, that the rules of “closest first” or “family first” are only when the funds are necessary for the same level of need, for example, all have enough to eat, but not enough for clothing. However, if some are short of food, and others have enough to eat but are short on clothing or other needs, the responsibility to make sure that someone has enough to eat comes first, even for someone out of town, regardless of whether there are neighbors or locals who are needy, as long as they have sufficient food.

Yet, concludes the Chasam Sofer, this prioritization is not absolute. All needs of someone’s family are considered his responsibility before the basic needs of others. In other words, the priorities should be as follows:

(1) Family needs.

(2) Most basic needs – food – regardless of location of needy.

(3) People of one’s city.

(4) The out-of-town poor.

Chasam Sofer’s conclusion

If the father had stipulated, at the time of obligating himself to support his son, that he would use maaser money for this obligation, he would be able to use it. Even then, the Chasam Sofer recommends that he use only up to half of his available maaser money to support his son. His reasoning is based on a Mishnah (Peah 8:6) which says that someone is permitted to save his maaser ani (the tithe one gives to the poor in the third and sixth year of the shemittah cycle) to support those that he chooses to, but he should not set aside more than half of his maaser ani for this purpose; the rest should be given to the local poor.

However, this is only when he had originally planned to use maaser money for this purpose. Otherwise, once he created an obligation upon himself to support his son, it is similar to any other obligation that he has, and he may not use his maaser money for this purpose.

Tuition

Rav Moshe Feinstein ruled that one should not pay tuition for sons and daughters in elementary school and high school from maaser funds, because this level of education is obligatory. However, someone eligible for a tuition reduction who elects to pay full tuition may pay the extra from maaser (Shu’t Igros Moshe, Yoreh Deah 2:113; also see Ahavas Chesed 2:19:2). If paying the expected amount of tuition without resorting to maaser funds creates hardship, one should ask a shaylah.

Yeshiva gedolah tuition and expenses may be paid from maaser, because a parent is not obligated to support a child at this age.

Testing Hashem!

At this point, let us discuss the last of our opening questions: “May I ask Hashem to pay me back for the tzedakah money that I give?”

It is generally prohibited to “test” Hashem, as the Torah states, “Lo senasu es Hashem,” “Do not test Hashem” (Devarim 6:16). One may not say, “I am performing this mitzvah so that Hashem will reward me by providing me with such-and-such (Sefer Yerei’im #361; Sefer Hachinuch, Mitzvah 395, 424; Shu’t Radbaz #882).

However, there is one exception to this rule – one may give maaser kesafim, expecting to be blessed with wealth as a reward (Taanis 9a, as explained by Shu’t Avkas Rocheil #3; Sefer Hassidim #144; Rema, Yoreh Deah 247:4; Ahavas Chesed 2:18. Cf. Shel”a and She’ei’las Ya’avetz #3, quoted in Pischei Teshuvah 247:2).

The Gemara (Taanis 9a) relates that, after Reish Lakeish’s passing, Rabbi Yochanan encountered his nephew (who was Reish Lakeish’s son). Rabbi Yochanan asked his nephew what he had learned in cheder that day. The nephew replied, “Te’aser kedei shetis’asher,” “Give maaser so that you get rich.”

“How do you know?” asked Rabbi Yochanan.

“Go test it,” answered the nephew, who then asked, “But is one permitted to test Hashem?”

Rabbi Yochanan replied, “I heard from my rebbe, Rabbi Hoshiyah, that this is an exception –because of the pasuk in Malachi (3:10), where Hashem begs us to test Him when giving maaser and see for yourself that He opens the windows of Heaven and grants blessings until our lips weary of saying ‘Enough!’”

We see from this that it is permitted to declare that I am giving the correct amount of tzedakah and expect that Hashem will reward me with wealth. I know several people who personally attest that this beracha was fulfilled!

Hybrid Halacha

Question #1: Grapes

Why is kilayim of grapes different from all the other kilayim prohibitions?

Question #2: Great Auks

Is it permitted to crossbreed auks and ducks?

Question #3: The Grand, Green Movers

I am green. Instead of trucks, may I use elephants, water buffalo and draft horses together to move my house?

Question #4: Accused of Graft!

Where does the Torah prohibit grafting trees?

Introduction:

In parshas Bereishis, the various species of animals and plants were instructed to reproduce lemi’neihem, according to their species, meaning that they were not to hybridize (crossbreed) with other species. These sources in parshas Bereishis bring to mind the several mitzvos taught later in the Torah not to mix species(Chullin 60a; Tosafos, Sanhedrin 60a; Ramban, Bereishis 1:26; Rashbam, Vayikra 19:19).

The word kilayim is translated by Onkelos and ibn Ezra (Vayikra 19:19) as “mixture,” although other commentaries understand that this word originates from the same Hebrew root as the word “prison,” beis ke’le (see Yeshayah, 42:22). This approach is quoted in the name of the Raavad (by the Rashas, in his commentary to the Yerushalmi, Kilayim 3:5) and by Rav Hirsch (Vayikra 19:19), who explains that the shoresh כ ל א means to keep or hold something back, and that the plural structure kilayim is similar to yadayim “hands” or raglayim “feet,” and means a pair. Therefore, the word kilayim means to treat as a pair two items (similar to our pair of hands) that are required to be kept separate.

Having explained the source of the word kilayim this way, there is no need to assume that Onkelos or ibn Ezra disagree. They are merely elucidating the word in the context of the posuk, where it means a forbidden mixture, whereas Rav Hirsch is explaining the etymological basis for this meaning.

Kilayim versus hybridization

It is important to clarify a common misconception. The prohibition of kilayim is not necessarily the creation of a new species — it is the appearance that one is mingling two species together. My desktop dictionary defines hybrid as “the offspring produced by breeding plants or animals of different varieties, species, or races.” Hybridization always involves making changes in the DNA of a species; most instances of kilayim do not. Planting seeds of different species in close proximity does not affect their genetic makeup – thus, technically, no hybridization transpires — yet it may be prohibited min haTorah. Similarly, wearing a garment manufactured from woolen and linen thread does not affect the two parent species or the DNA of the thread in the slightest.

Kilayim prohibitions

The Torah teaches about kilayim in two places, in parshas Kedoshim and in parshas Ki Seitzei. There the Torah mentions a total of six lo saaseh prohibitions, each of which is counted among the 365 lo saasehs that are included in the 613 mitzvos.

In parshas Kedoshim (Vayikra 19:19), the Torah teaches:

(1) Observe my laws! Do not mate your animal with a diverse species (kilayim).

(2) Do not plant your field with a diverse species.

(3) A garment containing diverse species called shatnez you shall not put upon yourself.

In parshas Ki Seitzei (Devorim 22:9-12), the Torah states:

(4) Do not plant diverse species in your vineyard

(5) lest what grows become sanctified (tukdash); the seed that was planted together with the growth of the vineyard.

(6) Do not plow with an ox and a donkey together.

(3, again) Do not wear shatnez, wool and linen together.

Of the six lo saaseh prohibitions counted here, the Torah calls four of them kilayim (which we translated as “diverse species”). The fifth, “lo sacharosh,” do not plow, prohibits different species of animals working together, such as plowing or pulling wagons, but is not called kilayim by the Torah.

The sixth is a prohibition against using what grew as kilayim in a vineyard. There is no prohibition in using any of the other mixtures, meaning that, although it is forbidden to hybridize different species of animals, crossbreed fruit, or plow with different species of animals, it is permitted to eat a crossbred fruit or what grew in a kilayim field other than a vineyard. Similarly, it is permitted to use a shatnez garment as long as I don’t wear it.

Grapes are different!

This leads us to our opening question: “Why is kilayim of grapes different from all the other kilayim prohibitions?” The product of kilayim of other species, including the fruit created by grafting and the mule created by mating a male donkey (jack) with a mare (female horse), are permitted to be used, even if a Jew created them in violation of the halacha. Only in the instance of kil’ei hakerem is there a prohibition to use what is produced.

This prohibition is derived from a careful reading of the pasuk, where the Torah states: Do not plant diverse species in your vineyard lest what grows become sanctified (tukdash); the seed that was planted together with the growth of the vineyard. None of the other kilayim prohibitions include an additional lo saaseh that applies to what grows afterward. The Torah’s method of conveying this law is the word tukdash. The Rashbam explains the word tukdash to mean sanctified — the produce becomes prohibited like kodashim are prohibited for personal use. Although other rishonim have different explanations of the word tukdash, all agree that the produce that grows there is prohibited for use min haTorah.

Why are vineyards different?

Why does the prohibition against benefitting exist only with regard to kilayim in a vineyard? The Chizkuni (Devorim 22:9) explains because otherwise this type of kilayim can slip by unnoticed; the wheat that grows in a vineyard does not look different from wheat grown in a wheat field, as opposed to shatnez and animal husbandry, where the item worn or produced is noticeable that it includes two different “species.” Note that the grafting of a tree is similarly highly noticeable, at least initially.

Animal Hybrids

Thousands of years ago, mankind crossbred horses and donkeys to create mules and hinnies. This hybrid, called a pered (female pirdah) is already mentioned many times in Tanach. As a pack animal, the mule, produced from a male donkey and a mare, may have advantages over either of its parents. It is usually as strong as a horse, yet sturdier and more sure-footed, and — notwithstanding its reputation for being “stubborn as a mule” — is often more reliable for hauling than draft horses. (A hinney, which has less commercial value, is produced from a female donkey [jenny] and a stallion.)

Not only is it prohibited to crossbreed a horse with a donkey, it is even forbidden to mate a mule or hinney with either a donkey or horse (Mishnah, Kilayim 1:6). In fact, it is rare that such an attempt will produce offspring, although it is claimed anecdotally that there are occasions in which a mule or hinney is fertile and reproduces.

Other crossbred animals

Artificial insemination has been used to crossbreed all sorts of species. Camels and llamas have been crossbred with the goal of producing a larger quantity of quality llama wool. Mankind has created such interesting creatures as ligers (crossbreeds of male lions and tigresses), tiglons (sometimes called tigons, from male tigers and lionesses), leopons (male leopards and lionesses), wholpins (whales and dolphins) and geeps (goats and sheep). Most of these have resulted in limited, if any, commercial value, although individuals unconcerned about the halachic ramifications thought that offspring of such crossbreeding might provide an economic advantage. Crossbreeding animal species is one of the prohibitions of the Torah, when it declares behemtecha lo sarbia kilayim (Vayikra 19:19).

Great auks

At this point, let us discuss the second of our opening questions: “Is it permitted to crossbreed auks and ducks?”

Although both varieties of birds spend much time in and over water, I presume that there would be a kilayim prohibition involved in attempting to crossbreed them. There is an additional problem in attempting to crossbreed great auks with ducks, since great auks have been assumed extinct for well over a century.

Pulling your weight

A similar question would be whether a circus show could use species of different animals to haul together. We know that the Torah prohibited this when it wrote lo sacharosh beshor vachamor yachdav, Do not plow with an ox and a donkey together. The juxtaposition of this mitzvah between other kilayim prohibitions implies that this is an extension of the laws of kilayim.

Some rishonim explain that the prohibition of having two different species haul a load together is a type of min haTorah gezeirah to avoid housing them together at night, which (they contend) would be prohibited as crossbreeding animals. We do find other instances of Torah prohibitions whose purpose is to prevent a more serious violation of the Torah. The classic example of this is the prohibition of bal yematzei, owning chometz on Pesach, which the Torah itself states is to avoid violating the more serious prohibition of eating chometz on Pesach (Shemos 12:19). A similar idea is yichud, which the Gemara (Kiddushin 80b) implies is a Torah violation, whose purpose is to discourage the more serious violation of arayos.

Unfair labor practices?

Notwithstanding that the Torah and the Mishnah both imply that the prohibition of lo sacharosh is because of kilayim, many early authorities explain this law because of other reasons. The ibn Ezra  explains that this is prohibited because, although a donkey is an excellent work animal, it is not “strong as an ox.” In other words, the “reason” for this mitzvah is to teach us to be concerned not to overburden the donkey.

I want to show a reverse case. During a tour I once took of a reconstructed nineteenth-century farm, the plow was being pulled by a draft horse together with a mule. The curators explained to me that they own both horses and mules, and teaming up to work together depends on the animal’s temperament, not necessarily its species. They can sometimes successfully team together a particular mule and a particular horse, and sometimes two horses or two mules will not pull their weight together. Apparently, in the animal world, your coworker is as important a factor in job satisfaction as it is in the human world.

However, from a halachic perspective, there are several unusual factors here. For one, mules are the offspring of male donkeys and mares (female horses). The halacha is that teaming a mule and a horse is prohibited min haTorah because they are different species, notwithstanding that their size and strength may be functionally equivalent. In other words, the reason that the ibn Ezra presents for the prohibition of lo sacharosh does not fit the halacha. Furthermore, the mitzvah of lo sacharosh permits matching a large mature draft horse with an undersized pony colt, notwithstanding that the young and small pony will have a very difficult time pulling its weight alongside its powerful coworker.

Nevertheless, we could still accept the ibn Ezra’s approach to analyzing the “reason” for this mitzvah. As noted by the Sefer Hachinuch, we can never, and should never, claim to understand the “reason” for a mitzvah. Why Hashem commanded us to perform a specific mitzvah is not something for us to try to prove or to rationalize. Unfortunately, such rationalizing has often led to individuals not complying with mitzvos. We know that this error was perpetrated even by the greatest of the great – for example, by Shelomo Hamelech when he accrued more wealth and wives than the Torah permits. The Sefer Hachinuch explains that taamei hamitzvah does not mean “reasons” for mitzvos, but that the word taam should be translated here as “taste,” meaning that these are ideas, messages, or tastes that we can apply to ourselves as lessons when we observe or study these mitzvos. The Rambam also agrees that “reasons” or “tastes” of mitzvos do not always reflect the halachic reality. (Those who oppose this approach to taamei hamitzvah rally around Rav Hirsch, who usually espouses reasons for mitzvos only after a highly detailed analysis of all its laws, and suggests taamei hamitzvah only when they fit the halachic details of the mitzvah.)

Graft

At this point, I am returning to the last question that I asked: “Where does the Torah prohibit grafting trees?” If we look carefully at the pesukim of kilayim prohibitions, quoted above, we will note that nowhere does the Torah explicitly prohibit the grafting of one species of fruit tree onto another, which is called in Hebrew harkavah. If, indeed, this prohibition is not mentioned in the Torah, how do we know that it is prohibited?

By means of a complicated homiletic derivation, based on the first words of the pasuk, Observe my laws, the Gemara  (Kiddushin 39a; Sanhedrin 60a) derives that harkavah, grafting a fruit tree onto a different species, is prohibited min haTorah. The Rambam (Hilchos Kilayim 1:5) concludes that it is included under the lo saaseh of sadecha lo sizra kilayim, the prohibition of planting different species of grains together.

Crossbreeding of plants

Crossbreeding of plants, or, as it is usually called, cross-fertilization or cross-pollination, is when one pollinates the flower of one species with pollen from a different species to produce offspring with some characteristics of each. Many fruits have been developed this way, although I want to share that a nectarine is not a crossbreed of a peach and a plum, as is often mistakenly thought. A nectarine is an ancient variety of peach (Prunus persica) that has a smooth skin. Botanists consider it to be the same species as peach. In their opinion, the difference between nectarines and peaches is the difference between two people who have different complexions or perhaps variant orientations of skin pigment, and certainly not a halachic consideration. I am unaware of anyone who has attempted to study this as a halachic issue. The practical difference is whether it is permitted to graft a nectarine scion onto a peach stalk or vice versa.

What is interesting is that, in the discussions about kilayim in the Torah, the Mishnah and the writings of Chazal, nowhere does it say that it is prohibited to cross-pollinate from one plant species to another. This does not mean to say that there is no prohibition of kilayim germane to trees or plants. Quite the contrary, there are three such prohibitions min haTorah. They are referred to as kil’ei zera’im (kilayim in plants), kil’ei hakerem (kilayim in vineyards), and harkavas ilan (kilayim in trees). But, as we will soon see, none of these three prohibitions has to do with crossbreeding.

The prohibition applies to herbaceous, as opposed to woody plants, meaning that it does not apply to trees and shrubs, but it does apply to vegetables and many herbs. Thus, one may plant seeds of different trees together, yet one is forbidden to plant a mix of vegetable seeds (Rambam, Hilchos Kilayim 1:6).

Kil’ei zera’im

Kil’ei zera’im is planting two or more different species of grains, vegetables or other edible herbaceous plants in close proximity. Exactly what defines “close proximity” is a very complicated halachic topic, and depends on factors such as the shape and size of the vegetable patch, and what variety of produce one is planting. We should note that from a botanical point of view, planting two species in close proximity will not cause hybridization because it does not affect the genetic makeup of the species.

The mitzvah of kil’ei zera’im applies only in Eretz Yisrael. Thus, someone in chutz la’aretz may plant his backyard garden with a wide variety of vegetables without any halachic concern, whereas in Eretz Yisrael someone planting a garden patch must be very careful to keep the different species separate.

Kilayim in a vineyard, kil’ei hakerem

Kil’ei hakerem is the prohibition against planting grains or vegetables in or near a vineyard. Again, this forbidden planting will not affect the genetic makeup of any of the plants involved. It is also quite clear that this was not the concern in halacha, as we see from many of the halachic details. For example: although it is prohibited to plant grains or vegetables near a vineyard, it is permitted to separate the vegetable patch from the vineyard by placing a halachic wall between them. For this, two poles and a wire at the top, a tzuras hapesach, between the vegetable patch and the vineyard suffices (Eruvin 11a), similar to what we do when we construct an eruv to permit carrying on Shabbos.

It is quite clear that, botanically, the tzuras hapesach does not prevent the mingling of the species. Yet, with the tzuras hapesach, it is permitted to plant the grain and, without it, there is a Torah prohibition to do so! This certainly cannot be explained on a scientific basis.

Conclusion

Observing and studying the laws of kilayim reminds us how all of Hashem’s creation always follows His instructions. This reminds the contemplative Jew that, if the plants heed Hashem’s word, how much more must we strive to obey His instructions.

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