Question #1: A Slatted Outing

“We planned a Chol Hamoed outing near a communally available sukkah. Now that we got there, we discover that the schach is some type of mat made of wooden slats held together with regular string. What do we do now?”

Question #2: Perplexing Polyester

“I have heard conflicting information whether I may use polyester thread to tie down my schach. One rav told me that it is preferred to use it, whereas others have told me that one may not. What is the basis for this dispute?”

Question #3: Venetian Sukkah

“Someone told me that Rav Moshe Feinstein permitted using venetian blinds for schach. Is this true?”

Answer:

Over the last fifty years, schach mats have changed from being used rarely to the most commonly used schach. Many brands and types of schach mats are available. Depending on the type used, several different halachic issues may be involved. Let us begin by defining the basic requirements for schach.

Schach must be of vegetative material that has been disconnected from the earth, is not food, and has not been made into what halacha considers a “vessel” or a “utensil.” Neither of these words is an accurate rendition of the word kli, but I will use them out of necessity – there is no precise translation in English of the word kli.

The criterion of whether something is considered a kli or not is whether it can be mekabeil tumah, susceptible to becoming tamei (spiritually impure). The exact rules defining when something is susceptible to tumah are fairly complicated and far more than can be discussed in a single article. As a result, I will touch on only a few issues. The halachic literature discusses whether such diverse items as arrow shafts, wooden ladders, thread, and mats made of reeds may be used as schach. Are these items processed sufficiently that they can become tamei? Are they considered “utensils” for halachic purposes, which renders them invalid for use as schach?

The original schach mats

Here is an early example that has direct impact on the issue of schach mats. The Mishnah (Sukkah 19b) discusses whether one may use mats made of reeds as schach. Mats of any material used for sleeping, sitting or lying upon are susceptible to becoming tamei and are not valid schach. A topic discussed by and debated in the Gemara is whether the reed mats commonly used in its era were unacceptable as schach because they were commonly used for sleeping, sitting or lying upon. The Gemara (ibid. 20a) concludes that one should assume that small reed mats are intended for sleeping, and, therefore, are not kosher schach unless they were made specifically for roofing. Large reed mats are less likely to be made for sleeping. Therefore, one may use them for schach, unless one knows that they were manufactured for sleeping, sitting or lying.

A more contemporary case

Many years ago, a distributor of schach mats asked me to provide a hechsher for his product. The design he showed me was for large mats made of split bamboo tied together with nylon thread. His planned design involved two different halachic complications:

1. Since the mats were manufactured in China, where bamboo mats are used for sleeping or sitting, they might be invalid as schach, even if his intention is to sell them in the United States, where they are not used for this purpose. The background behind this question is as follows: If someone manufactures a mat for sale, does the intent of the consumer decide whether the mat is kosher schach? For example, a mat could be used either for sleeping or for schach; whose intention determines whether it is kosher schach or not?

The rishonim dispute this matter. Rabbi Yeshayah of Trani ruled that the customer determines whether this mat is mekabeil tumah or not. According to his approach, the fact that the Chinese sleep on bamboo mats does not invalidate the custom-made mats, since they were ordered specifically to use for schach.

However, the Rosh (Sukkah 1:37 at end) rules that in a place where mats are made for sleeping, they are invalid schach, even for someone who ordered a mat to be made specifically for sukkah use. Even if the mat is manufactured specifically for schach, it is still invalid because of a rabbinic concern that people may begin using mats that were manufactured for sleeping as schach, which are invalid schach min haTorah. And, logically, once these mats were invalid where they were made, in China, they should remain invalid after they are transported elsewhere.

To avoid this problem, I instructed the distributor to have the Chinese factory weave into his specially-ordered mats at six-inch intervals a piece of bamboo too thick to lie upon comfortably. Because of this additional feature, these custom-made mats could never be used for sleeping, even by the Chinese, rendering their status indisputably kosher for schach.

2. The distributor’s sample had the mats tied together with nylon thread, which does not grow from the ground. Thus, the thread holding the mat together was not kosher schach. The halachic concern involved here requires some explanation.

Maamid bedavar hamekabeil tumah

The Mishnah records a dispute among the tanna’im regarding the kashrus of a sukkah whose schach rests on bedposts. The first opinion of the Mishnah, authored by an anonymous tanna kamma, rules that such a sukkah is kosher, whereas Rabbi Yehudah invalidates it. The Gemara cites a dispute between the amora’im,Rabbi Zeira and Rabbi Abba bar Mamel, as to why Rabbi Yehudah invalidates this sukkah. One of them contends that Rabbi Yehudah rules that a sukkah must be a permanent structure, which this is not. The other opines that Rabbi Yehudah invalidates this sukkah because not only must schach be material not susceptible to tumah, but whatever holds up the schach must also not be mekabel tumah. This is called the maamid, that which supports the weight of the schach and maintains it in place.

Why must the maamid be of material that is not mekabel tumah? Rashi explains that this is equivalent to using something that is mekabel tumah for the schach itself. Some authorities understand that, according to Rashi, this sukkah may be invalid (according to this understanding of Rabbi Yehudah) min haTorah (Bach). Most explain that using an invalid maamid is a rabbinic injunction, to make sure that people do not use invalid schach (Milchemes Hashem; Ran).

How do we rule?

While some early authorities take the more stringent approach, prohibiting supporting schach with material that is, itself, mekabel tumah (Milchemes Hashem; Ran; Bach), most major rishonim rule that it is permitted to support the schach with material that itself is not acceptable schach. The majority opinion contends that one may construct a metal framework, rest the schach on it, and the sukkah is perfectly kosher.

However, the consensus of later halachic authorities follows the understanding of the Magen Avraham (629:9) — that although a sukkah whose schach is supported by mekabelei tumah is kosher, one should not construct a sukkah this way. In other words, one should try to construct a sukkah that is kosher according to all opinions by supporting the schach with material that itself is valid for schach. Nevertheless, a sukkah constructed without taking this concern into consideration is kosher.

This has many ramifications. For example: you are invited to someone’s house or visit a restaurant or recreational area for a meal sometime during Sukkos and discover that the schach is held up by metal or other material that is invalid as schach. Assuming that the sukkah is acceptable in other ways, you may enjoy your meal there, since the sukkah is kosher, regardless of the fact that it should not have been constructed this way.

Does the pesul of maamid apply to any pasul schach?

Does this interpretation of Rabbi Yehudah invalidate schach only if it is supported by something that is mekabel tumah, or does he invalidate schach supported by anything that is itself not kosher for schach. In a responsum, Rav Vozner contends that this opinion invalidates any sukkah whose maamid is not kosher schach (Shu”t Shevet Halevi 6:74). We will see shortly how this information affects the answers to our opening questions.

Pulling the strings

Every schach mat requires some type of string or cord to hold it together. Is this string considered a maamid of the schach? Several authorities ruled that it is considered a maamid when the mat would fall off the sukkah were it not tied together (see Shu”t Shevet Halevi 6:74; Shu”t Yechaveh Daas 1:64), which is the situation regarding every type of schach mat that I have ever seen.

Having established that the string is maamid (supporting) the schach, we need to clarify whether string and thread are susceptible to tumah. As we will see shortly, the answer depends on the type of fiber and the extent of its processing.

The Torah states that linen and woolen thread are susceptible to the tumah of nega’im (Vayikra 13:48). Wool, which does not grow from the ground, is certainly not valid schach, and nor is linen thread, because it is susceptible to tumah. Furthermore, Chazal prohibited using flax —  the natural, raw material from which linen is made — even when it is processed only partially (Sukkah 12b). Why did Chazal prohibit using partially processed flax, even though it is not susceptible to tumah?

The early authorities cite several reasons to explain this halacha. Some contend that semi-processed flax is invalid because it no longer appears as if it had grown from the ground (Rambam, Hilchos Sukkah 5:4). Others explain that it is invalid because it is used to stuff pillows, and, therefore, it is already susceptible to tumah (Raavad ad loc.). Yet another opinion rules that since semi-processed flax is almost completed linen threads, Chazal ruled that it should already be treated as if it were complete (Tosafos, Sukkah 12b s.v. Ba’anitzei).

Is there any halachic difference among these opinions? Indeed, there is. According to the first two opinions, the prohibition of using thread for schach applies also to semi-processed cotton, hemp, jute or other fibers. However, according to the third opinion, the prohibition applies only to flax, but not to natural thread of other materials(Shu”t Yechaveh Daas 1:64).

According to which opinion do we rule? The Mishnah Berurah (629:12) concludes that one should follow the more stringent position and not use threads of any materials for schach.

Cotton cord

However, assuming that one should not use cotton string for schach does not necessarily mean that one may not use a schach mat that is tied together with cotton twine. In the latter case, the twine is serving as a maamid, but not as the schach itself, which provides a basis to be lenient. Even though we usually follow the approach that a maamid should, lechatchilah, be made of material that is kosher for schach, there are early sources who invalidate only a maamid that is not kosher schach min haTorah. However, they contend that material prohibited for schach because of a rabbinic prohibition may be used as maamid (Ritva, Sukkah 11b s.v. Vechulan). On the other hand, there are well-respected authorities who are more concerned about this (Pri Megadim, Eishel Avraham 629:11).

The question of whether a material that is invalid for schach only miderabbanan may be used as a maamid was debated several decades ago germane to schach made of thin wood slats that were tied together with thread. Are these mats kosher schach?

I am aware of the following responsa that discuss whether these mats are kosher.

Rav Ovadyah Yosef, who was asked concerning a variety that used cotton twine, ruled that they are kosher. He contended that, although, as I explained above, some authorities are of the opinion that cotton thread is not kosher because of a rabbinic injunction, these mats were acceptable to use lechatchilah since the pesul of the maamid is only miderabbanan.

Rav Vozner was asked about a similar product that used nylon, rather than cotton, thread to hold the slats together. He rules that the thread has the status of maamid, since, without it, the mats would not remain on top of the sukkah, and that since nylon, being synthetic and not vegetative, is not kosher schach, one may not use this schach lechatchilah. Nevertheless, a sukkah using this schach is kosher.

At this point, we can address one of our opening questions: “I have heard conflicting information concerning whether I may use polyester thread to tie down my schach. One rav told me that it is preferred to use it, whereas others have told me that one may not.

What is the basis for this dispute?

Assuming that the schach will fall off if it is not tied down, one should not use polyester thread to hold it in place. As we see from the responsum of Rav Vozner, using synthetic thread in a case where the schach would not remain in place has the same halachic status as using a maamid that is mekabel tumah, which we do not do lechatchilah. However, using cotton or other natural thread other than linen is certainly less problematic. According to Rav Ovadyah Yosef, it is kosher lechatchilah. Someone who disagrees with Rav Ovadyah would still agree that it is preferable to using synthetic thread.

By the way, the schach mats sold today bearing the hechsher of the Eidah Hachareidis are produced from very coarse bamboo that would not be used either for roofing material or for sleeping. The mats are tied together with coarse, natural twine that is not spun into proper thread. The result is a schach mat that is kosher lechatchilah according to all opinions.

Venetian Sukkah

At this point, I would like to discuss a different one of our opening questions: “Someone told me that Rav Moshe Feinstein permitted using venetian blinds for schach. Is this true?”

First, some historical background. At the time that Rav Moshe wrote his teshuvah on the subject, venetian blinds were made from slats of wood held together by pieces of cloth. Apparently, someone had asked Rav Shimshon Zelig Fortman, who had been the rav and av beis din of Asipovitz, Russia, whether one could use these blinds or the wooden slats from these blinds as schach. Rav Fortman was a childhood friend of Rav Moshe Feinstein; they both grew up in the Russian town of Starobin, where Rav Moshe’s father, Rav Dovid Feinstein, was the rav from when Rav Moshe was 5 years old until Rav Dovid Feinstein’s passing in 1927. (Rav Moshe was born in 1895.) I have seen family photos of weddings of Rav Moshe’s children in which Rav Fortman is featured as a member of the Feinstein family. Rav Fortman arrived in the United States in 1930, several years before Rav Moshe, and became the rav of the “White Shul” in Far Rockaway, a position he held until his sudden, premature passing at the age of 55. (By the way, two of Rav Fortman’s sons-in-law [he had no sons] became very prominent rabbinic askanim on the American Torah scene: Rabbi David Hollander and Rabbi Moshe Sherer.)

Rav Moshe, in his teshuvah, refers to a telephone conversation that had previously transpired between himself and Rav Fortman, regarding using wide wooden boards as schach. Rav Moshe rules that whether these boards may be used for schach is dependent on whether they were previously used as part of a building or not. However, the wooden venetian blinds are certainly mekabel tumah and invalid as schach min HaTorah. This would be true even if one removed the wooden slats from the blinds (Shu”t Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 1:177). Thus, the statement of the questioner is inaccurate: Rav Moshe does indeed discuss the use of venetian blinds as schach, but rules them as unquestionably invalid.

Who may invalidate?

The halachic literature contains another curious responsum regarding the use of schach mats. Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank reports that he was asked regarding someone who lived outside Eretz Yisroel who owned mats that had been manufactured specifically for schach. Upon his moving to Eretz Yisroel and shipping his possessions there, he instructed the movers not to use the mats for any purpose whatsoever, out of concern that should they use the mats, this would give them the status of vessels and they would no longer be valid schach. Sure enough, when his movers arrived with his furniture, he discovered that the mover had used the schach mats to pack glassware, despite his admonition to the contrary. His question was whether using the mats as packing material made them into vessels and invalidated them for schach.

Although until now we have discussed mats used for sleeping, authorities note that mats that are used for storage or similar purposes would also be invalid schach (Aruch Hashulchan, Orach Chayim 629:13). Notwithstanding these potential concerns, Rav Frank ruled that the mats were still kosher for schach. He contended that when the owner does not want his items to be used except in a particular way, someone using it against his wishes will not invalidate the owner’s intentions. Thus, the mats remain kosher schach.

Conclusion

A review of our discussion teaches that schach mats may have several different problems. All these issues should be resolved if the mat bears a reliable certification. Certainly, a layperson grasps that the laws of sukkah are far more complicated than he realizes. It makes sense that he should have someone who understands the laws of sukkah look over his sukkah sometime before Yom Tov to make sure that his sukkah is 100% kosher.

Question #1: Invitations

“I was told that I should not include quotations from pesukim on my daughter’s wedding invitation. Yet I see that ‘everyone’ does! Could you please explain the halacha?”

Question #2: Sukkah Decorations

“Someone told me that sukkah decorations should not include any pesukim. Is this true? My children bring home decorations like this from school.”

To answer these questions, we need to explain several halachic issues, including:

1. The original prohibition against writing Torah she’be’al peh, and the later “heter” to write and publish it.

2. The concern about producing divrei Torah that will not be treated appropriately.

The original prohibition against writing Torah she’be’al peh

Originally, it was prohibited to write down any Torah she’be’al peh (Gittin 60b), except for an individual’s personal notes recorded for one’s own review (Rambam, Introduction to Mishneh Torah; see also Rashi, Shabbos 6b s.v. Megilas). The Oral Torah was not permitted to be taught from a written format. Torah she’be’al peh was meant to be just that — Torah taught completely without any written text. Thus, Moshe Rabbeinu taught us the halachos of the Torah orally, and Klal Yisrael memorized them. Although each student wrote private notes for the sake of review, the Oral Torah was never taught from these notes.

The prohibition against writing Torah she’be’al peh included writing midrashim, prayers and the texts of berachos, as well as translations and commentaries of the Written Torah, since all these are considered Torah she’be’al peh. In those times, all these devarim she’be’kedusha were memorized, and the only parts of the Torah that were written were the pesukim themselves.

The Gemara (Gittin 60b) records this halacha as follows: Devarim she’be’al peh, iy atah resha’ie le’omram bichsav, “You are not permitted to transmit the Oral Torah in writing.” The Ritva (ad loc.) explains that this is because divrei Torah taught verbally are understood more precisely, whereas text learning is often misunderstood.

Another prohibition forbade writing the books of Tanach except when writing a complete sefer (Gittin 60a). Thus, one could not write out a parsha or a few pesukim for learning, although it was permitted to write an entire Chumash, such as Sefer Shemos. Similarly, one could not write out part of a sefer of Navi to study or to read the haftarah. In order to recite the haftarahs regularly, every shul needed to own a scroll of each of the eight Nevi’im (Yehoshua, Shoftim, Shemuel, Melachim, Yeshayahu, Yirmiyahu, Yechezkel, and Terei Asar) in order to read the haftarah from the appropriate sefer. Similarly, a person who wished to study Shiras Devorah or the prayer of Channah had to write the entire Sefer Shoftim or Sefer Shemuel.

Why do we no longer abide by this prohibition?

Chazal realized that it was becoming increasingly difficult for people to learn Torah and to observe certain other mitzvos, such as reading the haftarah. Therefore, they ruled that the prohibition against writing Torah must be superseded by the more vital need of keeping Torah alive in klal Yisrael. This takanah was based on the pasuk, Eis la’asos laShem heifeiru torasecha, which is understood to mean “It is the time to act for Hashem, since Your Torah is being uprooted” (Tehillim 119:126). In order to facilitate Torah study, they permitted writing individual verses and teaching Oral Torah from written texts. We will refer to this takanah, or heter, as “eis la’asos.”

The first part of the Oral Torah to be formally written for structured teaching was the Mishnah, edited by Rebbe (Rabbi Yehudah Hanasi) at the end of the period of the tanna’im (circa 3960/200 c.e.). To quote the Rambam, “Rebbe gathered all the laws and explanations that had been studied and interpreted by every beis din since the days of Moshe Rabbeinu and organized the Mishnah from them. He (Rebbe) proceeded to teach publicly the scholars of his generation from this text, so that the Oral Torah would not be forgotten from the Jewish people. Why did Rebbe change the method that had been used previously? Because he saw that the numbers of Torah students were decreasing, the difficulties facing the Jewish people were on the rise, the Roman Empire was becoming stronger, and the Jews were becoming increasingly scattered. He therefore authored one work that would be in the hands of all the students, to make it easier to study and remember the Oral Torah” (Introduction to Mishneh Torah).

We see that Rebbe instituted the first formalized use of a text to teach the Oral Torah, because of the new circumstances confronting klal Yisrael. After Rebbe’s days, Chazal gradually permitted writing down other texts, first Aggadah (ethical teachings of the Gemara), later the entire Gemara, and still later, the explanations and commentaries on the Gemara.

As a very important aside, we see from the end of the quoted Rambam, “to make it easier to study and remember the Oral Torah,” that even though it is now permitted to write down the Mishnah and Gemara, it is still important to know the entire Oral Torah by heart. The Rambam seems to explain that the Oral Torah that each individual is required to know includes all the accepted conclusions of the Torah she’be’al peh.

In the context of the rule of eis la’asos, the Gemara tells us the following story:

Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakeish (amora’im in Eretz Yisrael shortly after the time of Rebbe) were studying from a Talmudic anthology of ethical teachings, a “sefer Aggadah.”

The Gemara asks, “How could they study from such a book, since it is prohibited to learn Torah from a written text?” The Gemara replies, “Since it is now impossible (to retain all the knowledge of the Torah without a written text), ‘it is the time to act for Hashem, since Your Torah is being uprooted’” (Gittin 60a). We see that the Gemara initially assumed that it was still prohibited to study Torah from a written text, except for the study of Mishnah. The Gemara responded that the prohibition had been further relaxed because it had become even more difficult to learn Torah than it had been in the days of Rebbe.

The Gemara relates a similar episode concerning the recital of the haftarah. As mentioned above, it was originally forbidden to write part of a book of Tanach, and, therefore, every shul needed to own scrolls of all the Nevi’im in order to read the haftarahs. However, as communities became more scattered, making this increasingly difficult, the Gemara permitted the writing of special haftarah books that contained only the haftarah texts, but not the text of the entire Nevi’im. This, too, was permitted because of eis la’asos (Gittin 60a).

What else is permitted because of eis la’asos?

We see that in order to facilitate Torah learning, Chazal permitted the writing of the Oral Torah and parts of the books of the Written Torah. To what extent did they override the original prohibition?

This is a dispute among early poskim, some contending that it is permitted to write only as much as is necessary to prevent Torah from being forgotten. According to this opinion, it is prohibited to write or print even tefillos that include pesukim, when they are not intended for learning Torah (Rif and Milchemes Hashem, Shabbos Chapter 16). This opinion also prohibits writing or printing a translation of Tanach into any language other than the original Aramaic Targum, because a proper translation constitutes Torah she’be’al peh. In addition, this opinion prohibits the printing of a parsha of Chumash in order to teach Torah, since one could write or print the entire sefer (Rambam, Hilchos Sefer Torah 7:14; Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 283:2).

Other poskim permit the writing of any Torah that one uses to learn. Thus, they permit writing a single parsha in order to teach Torah (Taz, Yoreh Deah 283:1; Shach, Yoreh Deah 283:3) and the translating of Tanach into any language. These poskim rally support to their opinion from the fact that Rav Saadya Gaon wrote sefarim in Arabic, including commentaries on Tanach (Ran, Shabbos,Chapter 16).

Both opinions agree that it is prohibited to publish translations of Tanach that will not be used to spread Torah knowledge (Ran, Shabbos, Chapter 16).

How does this prohibition affect us?

All of the opinions quoted above prohibit writing disparate parts of the Written Torah and any of the Oral Torah in situations where there is no Torah benefit. For this reason, early poskim note that one may not embroider a pasuk or a beracha on a talis, since writing thisdoes not serve to teach Torah (Rabbeinu Yerucham, quoted by Beis Yosef, and Taz, Yoreh Deah 283:3. It should be noted that the Levush is more lenient, see Shach, Yoreh Deah 283:6.).

Another concern

There is an additional reason why one should not embroider pesukim on a talis. Since the talis could be brought into an unclean place, it is not proper to have a pasuk written on it.

A third concern – causing the words of Torah to be destroyed

To explain this concept, we must first introduce a surprising statement of the Gemara: Ko’sevei berachos kesorfei Torah, “Those who write berachos (to enable people to recite them) are considered as if they burnt the Torah” (Shabbos 115b). What does this Gemara mean? We would think that these individuals have performed a tremendous mitzvah, since they have enabled people to recite berachos correctly!

This statement was authored at the time when it was still prohibited to write down the Oral Torah. At that time, it was forbidden to teach any halachos in written form, even the correct text of a beracha. Everything had to be taught orally. Therefore, the Gemara states that by writing a beracha, even without the name of Hashem (Shu’t Tashbeitz #2), one is violating the halacha by teaching Torah she’be’al peh in writing.

But why is it considered like “burning the Torah”?

This Gemara introduces a new prohibition. Someone who writes prohibited Torah works is considered culpable afterwards, if those divrei Torah become consumed by a fire! Writing unnecessarily, which results in subsequent destruction, is akin to burning Torah.

We know that it is prohibited to erase or destroy the Name of Hashem (Shabbos 120b), and that this prohibition includes erasing or destroying words of Torah and all other holy writings, including notes of Torah classes, stories of Chazal, sefarim for learning, “benschers,” etc., even if they do not include Hashem’s Name (Shu’t Tashbeitz #2). Therefore, even small benschers, tefillos haderech and similar items published with abbreviated names of Hashem are still considered divrei Torah imbued with kedusha. For the above reason, one must treat these items with proper care and dignity and place them in sheimos when they become unusable.

It is also prohibited to cause destruction of words of the Torah indirectly by writing or publishing divrei Torah that might subsequently be destroyed. This prohibition exists whenever there is insufficient reason to write or publish the divrei Torah.This explains the Gemara’s statement, quoted above, that someone who wrote berachos when it was prohibited to do so is held responsible, if the words of Torah are subsequently destroyed.

Although, nowadays, we are permitted to write and print berachos and siddurim to enable people to recite them properly, it is forbidden to produce these items unnecessarily. It is certainly prohibited to put pesukim, parts of pesukim, or divrei Torah in places where it is likely that they will be treated improperly. Both of these reasons preclude writing pesukim on Sukkah decorations, unless one can assume that they will be properly cared for.

How much of a pasuk is considered to be divrei Torah?

Even three words in a row are considered a pasuk that may not be written without sufficient reason (see Gittin 6b). However, if the letters are improperly or incompletely formed or spelled, it is permitted (Shu’t Tashbeitz #2).

For this reason, some people print on invitations the following, Naaleh es Yerushalayim al rosh simchaseinu, “We will place our memories of Yerushalayim above our celebrations.” This is permitted, because it is not a quotation of a pasuk, although it is similar to the posuk in Tehillim 137:6.

There is another solution that may be used: rearranging the words of the pasuk so that they are not in the correct order. When doing this, one must be certain that one does not have three words in the proper order.

I once received an invitation which stated on the cover, Yom zeh asah Hashem nismecha venagila bo, “This day was made by Hashem. We shall rejoice and celebrate on it.” The person who prepared this quotation had done his halachic research. Although very similar to the pasuk, “Zeh hayom asah Hashem nagilah v’nismecha bo” (Tehillim 118:24), the words of the original pasuk were transposed in such a way that there were no longer three consecutive words together!

Some authorities permit printing pesukim if marks are placed between the words, or if the words are not in a straight line. They feel that these arrangements of words do not constitute pesukim (cf. Shu’t Tashbeitz #2 who disagrees).

Some producers of “lulav bags” are meticulous not to quote three words of the pasuk in order. Thus, they write, “Ul’kachtem lachem… kapos temarim…us’machtem” avoiding writing three consecutive words of a pasuk (Vayikra 23:40). This is permitted.

Invitations

Perhaps people who print pesukim on invitations rely on the fact that this is considered mere poetic writing style, or that the printer has no intent to produce divrei kedusha. However, recent authorities prohibit this practice. In Sivan 5750/June ’90, an open letter signed by the poskei hador warned that advertisements, invitations, receipts, signs, and raffle tickets should not include pesukim or parts of pesukim, except when the pasuk is written as part of literary style, with no connection to its context.

We live in an age of proliferation of written material. Many pamphlets have the positive value of spreading Torah. We must be careful to show our honor to Hashem by treating pesukim and divrei Torah with proper respect. May we always merit to demonstrate Hashem’s honor in the appropriate way!

Question #1: “Stupid myrtle”

Why is one type of myrtle considered less intelligent than others? Did this variety get a poorer SAT score?

Question #2: Seven at a Time!

“Why should a three-leafed plant suddenly sprout seven leaves?”

Question #3: “Grafted Hadas”

May a hadas be grafted?

Answer

In Parshas Emor, the Torah teaches: “And on the first day, you shall take for yourselves the fruit of a beautiful tree, branches of date palms, branches of a thickly leaved tree and river willows, and you shall rejoice before Hashem your G-d seven days” (Vayikra 23:40). Of the four species that we take on Sukkos, two, the lulav and the aravah, are described quite clearly in the Torah, whereas the other two are described in the Torah in an unclear way and require the Torah shebe’al peh to identify them. The Hebrew term used to describe the third of these species is anaf eitz avos, which I translated above as “branches of a thickly leaved tree,” although at times in this article I will call it a “twig” rather than a “branch.”

The Written Torah does not provide any more indication as to what we are to take, but the Oral Torah’s mesorah from Sinai is that it is what we call a hadas. As the Rambam teaches in the Introduction to his Commentary on the Mishnah, there is an oral tradition from teacher to disciple, going all the way back to Moshe at Har Sinai, to identify anaf eitz avos as hadas. In contemporary parlance, the species that we call hadas is the “common myrtle” or the “true myrtle,” scientifically identified as Myrtus commonis, as opposed to the “crape myrtle” and other shrubs that are called myrtle, but with a descriptive adjective.

Nevertheless, we are left with two questions:

(1) How do we know that anaf eitz avos of the Written Torah means a myrtle?

(2) Why doesn’t the Torah use the word hadas? Unlike the word esrog, which shows up nowhere in Tanach and is terminology used by Chazal (see Ramban, Vayikra, 23:40), the word hadas appears many times in Tanach (see, for example, Yeshayahu 41:19; 55:13; Zecharyah 1: 8, 10, 11; Nechemiah 8:15). The word hadas is much shorter than the description anaf eitz avos that the Torah uses. And, the Torah taught that we should use a shorter term to teach whenever possible (Pesachim 3b).

To quote the Gemara, “anaf eitz avos refers to a species whose leaves cover the wood of the branch,” which is an unusual feature. Look at the branches of most trees and shrubs and you will notice that this feature is atypical.

The Gemara (Sukkah 32b) asks how we know that anaf eitz avos is a hadas; perhaps it is a different species. The Gemara analyzes several options, including whether anaf eitz avos refer to the branches of an olive, or of either of two other types of trees, called in Aramaic dulba and hirduf. Based on careful analysis of the Torah, the Gemara eliminates all these options and concludes that anaf eitz avos is hadas.

Perpendicular leaf

Even some varieties of common myrtle grow with the leaves sticking out perpendicular to the branch, and, in these varieties, the wood of the branch can be easily seen. There is discussion among halachic authorities whether such myrtles may be used on Sukkos to fulfill the mitzvah, since they do not fulfill the Torah’s description of anaf eitz avos (see Mor Uketziah and Graz, Orach Chayim 646:1; Rashash, Sukkah 32b; Eimek Brocha, Lulav #11).

How long?

How long must a hadas be? The branch of the hadas must be at least three tefachim, not including leaves that extend beyond the wood of the branch. How long is three tefachim? We usually assume this to be about 9 and a half inches (according to Rav Chayim Na’eh) or about 11 and a half inches (according to the Chazon Ish).

“Stupid myrtle”

The Gemara discusses whether any branch of a hadas bush qualifies for fulfilling the mitzvah. Rav Yehudah says that a hadas is kosher only when three leaves grow alongside one another around the width of the twig, what we call meshulash. Rav Kahana disagrees, ruling that a hadas is kosher even if two leaves are at the same height and a third is a bit lower, but it overlaps the other two. Rav Acha deliberately chose those that Rav Kahana had ruled kosher, since he wanted to fulfill Rav Kahana’s words. However, Ameimar used to refer to those hadasim as “hadas shoteh,” which most authorities assume means that one does not fulfill the mitzvah with this variety.

The word “shoteh,” when referring to a person, means someone not legally responsible for his actions, the equivalent of an insanity defense. The term kelev shoteh (Shabbos 121b; Yoma 83a-84a), means a rabid dog. Does this mean that Ameimar called this type of myrtle branch a “stupid hadas,” an “insane hadas or a “rabid hadas?”

No. Although the word “shoteh” has a similar meaning in the expressions chassid shoteh (Sotah 20a; 21b), and bechor shoteh (midrashim in parshas Mikeitz), the word shoteh is also used in other contexts, such as “luf shoteh,” which does not mean a “stupid luf” or a “rabid luf,” but an uncultivated, usually not eaten, variety of the vegetable called “luf.” The Ritva (Sukkah 32b) explains that the word shoteh means “imperfect” or “not in proper order.” If you are familiar with the Modern Hebrew usage of something/someone being shelo beseider, it is easy to understand the term shoteh as used in every one of the above contexts.

The rishonim (Rambam, Hilchos Lulav 8:1; Tur and Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 646:3) conclude that a hadas shoteh is not kosher. Although some places had a custom to use them, as reported by the Terumas Hadeshen (2:259) and Rema (Orach Chayim 646:3), the halachic conclusion is not to, even when no other hadasim are available (Mishnah Berurah 646:15).

Two by two

The Rema (Orach Chayim 646:2) writes that if there are only two leaves at each point and no single leaves, the hadas is kosher for fulfilling the mitzvah. Evidently, he held that the term shoteh refers to a myrtle having one leaf sitting by itself (Yevakesh Torah). However, this approach is not accepted by other halachic authorities, who accept only a hadas with three leaves growing alongside one another.

How much?

How much of the hadas must be meshulash to be kosher? There are many opinions among the rishonim. Some contend that the entire twig must be meshulash, or at least the top three tefachim (Tur, Orach Chayim 646, quotingthe geonim; Ritva, quoting his rebbe, the Re’ah; Magid Mishnah, Hilchos Sukkah 7:2). The Ra’avad, in his work on the laws of lulav and esrog, and the Rosh conclude that it is best if the entire hadas is meshulash, but it is kosher if it is meshulash most of the way. Another approach rules that although the entire hadas must be three tefachim long, it is kosher if it contains three places where the leaves are meshulashim (Sefer Hamichtam, quoting Ba’al Ha’itur). And yet another opinion is much more lenient, contending that it is kosher for Sukkos-use even when it is meshulash in only one place (Tur, quoting Ba’al Ha’itur). The accepted halacha is that the majority of the twig must be meshulash, but it is preferred for it to be meshulash the entire length.

The Eimek Beracha (#11) explains the dispute among the rishonim as follows: The opinions that contend that it is sufficient if the hadas is meshulash in only one place, or in only three places, contend that this requirement identifies the hadas as the correct variety called anaf eitz avos. A minimal amount of meshulash suffices to identify it as such.

Those that require that the hadas be entirely meshulash, or at least most of its length, contend that anaf eitz avos is a gezeiras hakasuv defining what the Torah requires for the mitzvah, just as it requires that the hadas not be extremely dried out or that the esrog have proper color.

Leaves or stem?

Is meshulash determined by the leaves or by their stem? In other words, if three leaves begin and end at the same height, but the stems from which the leaves grow are not at the same height, or vice versa, is the hadas considered meshulash?

Numerous poskim describe meshulash as three leaves lying side by side, and I know of no authorities who state that the stems of the three must be at the same height.

Nechemiah

I once read that someone asked how anaf eitz avos of the Torah can be identified as hadas, when the same posuk in Nechemiah mentions both, implying that they are not the same. However, reading the verse carefully resolves any difficulty:

“On the second day, the heads of all the families, the kohanim, the levi’im and the rest of the people came to Ezra to learn the words of the Torah. They discovered that the Torah had written that Hashem commanded, via Moshe, that the Bnei Yisrael dwell in sukkos during the festival of the seventh month. They then sent an announcement through all the cities and Yerushalayim, instructing everyone to go to the mountain and bring olive branches, olive lumber, hadasim branches, date branches, and anaf eitz avos to make Sukkos, as written. The people went out and brought; they manufactured sukkos for themselves, each man on his rooftop and in his courtyard… and the entire community that had returned from captivity observed Sukkos and they dwelled in sukkos” (Nechemiah 8:13-17).

It is quite clear from the verse that the “olive branches, olive lumber, hadasim branches” were used as construction material to make the walls and schach of the sukkos, and not used for the four species. (Note that the word Sukkos referring to the festival was capitalized, whereas when referring to the huts, it is lower case.)

Seven at a time!

We asked above: “Why should a three-leafed plant suddenly sprout seven leaves?” The Gemara (Sukkah 33a) refers to a hadas mitzra’ah that grows seven leaves at one height, rather than just three (Sukkah 33a). In other ways, this looks like a regular hadas. Rashi mentions two opinions as to what the term hadas mitzra’ah means. His first approach is that mitzra’ah means “on the border;” a hadas mitzra’ah grew on the edge of a field and had no competition for nutrients. As a result, it grew with many extra leaves. Even if most of its leaves fell out at each point, as long as three leaves remain at every point, we have a hadas that lost most of its leaves and is still fully kosher.

Rashi’s second opinion is that the word mitzra’ah is from the word Mitzrayim, Egypt, and means a variety of hadas, common in Egypt, that usually grew seven leaves at each point. The hadas of either interpretation of the Gemara is kosher, notwithstanding that this variety was usually identified as a hadas mitzra’ah, and not simply “hadas” (see Tosafos and Ritva, Sukkah 33a).

Grafted hadas

Reference to grafted species on Sukkos usually calls to mind esrogim produced by grafting esrog branches onto rootstocks of other species. Most poskim prohibit using these esrogim to fulfill the mitzvah, because the fruit is considered to be partly esrog and partly the species of the rootstock (Shu’t Rema #117; Shu’t Alshich #110; Magen Avraham; Taz). Others prohibit their use because the Torah bans grafting different species together (Levush, Orach Chayim 649:4).

Later poskim discuss whether an esrog of unknown lineage may be used based on appearance: If it looks like an esrog (both inside and out), grows seeds like an esrog does, and has the shape of an esrog, the Beis Efrayim (Shu’t Orach Chayim #56) rules that it is a kosher esrog. Others contend that we may use the esrog only when we have a tradition that the growers in that area did not graft esrogim onto other species.

However, our discussion is about the use of a grafted myrtle as a hadas. In the early eighteenth century, a shaylah was raised in Prague whether a variety of myrtle growing locally was kosher as a hadas. At that time, hadasim were imported from warmer areas, and they often arrived very dried out. The question was asked of Rav Yaakov Breisch, the author of Shevus Yaakov, Chok Yaakov, Toras Hashelamim and many other classic halachic works, whether these Prague myrtles were kosher as hadasim. If they were kosher, they would be much more mehudar to use, since they were available fresh. If they were not, the dry, imported hadasim should be used.

The Shevus Yaakov first reviews the literature germane to the use of grafted esrogim. He notes that if the reason not to use grafted esrogim is because they were used for an aveirah, grafted hadasim will be kosher. This is because the prohibition of cross-grafting species exists only regarding trees bearing edible fruit, not for trees and shrubs that do not bear edible fruit. Although the hadas does produce a berry, it is never cultivated for its berry, and it is therefore excluded from the prohibition of grafting trees.

However, the Shevus Yaakov notes that this is not the primary reason cited to prohibit grafted esrogim. The main reason is that the fruit of a graft is considered a mixed species. Thus, if the Prague hadas is grafted onto a different species, it will not be considered a pure hadas, and cannot be used to fulfill the mitzvah.

The Shevus Yaakov notes that the Prague myrtle grows with three leaves at each point, like a hadas meshulash grows, and its leaves and twigs are indistinguishable from the traditional regular hadas in every way. However, the berry that grew on the new variety looked very different from the berry found on the traditional hadas, both in terms of its shape and its inside. He thereby surmises that this new myrtle is either a species different from the hadas, or, more likely, grew from a graft that caused its fruit to be different from a typical hadas.

The Shevus Yaakov then suggests that this new myrtle might be kosher anyway, based on the logic written by the Rema in answer to a question regarding the hadas that has seven leaves at each point, which is called by its own unique name, hadas mitzra’ah. The Rema questioned why this hadas is kosher for the mitzvah when it is called hadas mitzra’ah and not just hadas, implying that it is a variety. The Rema answered that the Torah never told us to use a hadas, but anaf eitz avos; therefore any species that is anaf eitz avos is kosher. Thus, the Prague hadas should be fine, notwithstanding its unusual berry. (However, note that the Kapos Temarim disagrees both with this assumption and the ruling.)

The Shevus Yaakov then wonders whether the Prague hadas might have been grown on a stock that was not a myrtle at all, and therefore it is not kosher for Sukkos use. He notes that he then discovered that he was not the first one to be asked about using this particular myrtle on Sukkos, but it had been asked of the great Maharash (the rebbe of the Shelah Hakadosh), who had been the posek of Prague in the 16^th century. A talmid chacham wanted to use these new myrtles as hadasim, contending that they were preferred, since they would be fresh. The Maharash, however, concluded that the new myrtles should not be used, unless there are no hadasim of the traditional variety available, and this is the way the Shevus Yaakov concludes (Shu’t Shevus Yaakov 1:36). The Shaarei Teshuvah (646:4) suggests that these myrtles are not kosher as hadasim for Sukkos, even according to the Levush, because the rootstock that they are grown from might be of a tree that produces edible fruit, unlike the assumption of the Shevus Yaakov.

Notwithstanding the conclusion of the Shevus Yaakov and the Shaarei Teshuvah not to use the Prague hadasim, several later authorities ruled that they are kosher (Shu’t Chacham Tzvi #161; Shu’t Panim Meiros, Orach Chayim #9; Bikkurei Yaakov, 646:12; Biur Halacha 646:3 s.v. ho’il).

Conclusion

Our halachic literature is replete with shaylos regarding howcommunities fulfilled the mitzvah of arba’ah minim, under less than ideal circumstances. Looking around shul on Sukkos and seeing everyoneholding his own set of arba’ah minim, we should praise Hashemfor making it so easy today to fulfill these mitzvos.

Question
#1: Where?

“Where
should I learn Torah during Sukkos?”

Question
#2: What?

“What
are the rules about having dirty plates and glasses in the sukkah?”

Question
#3: When?

“When it
is raining on the first night of Sukkos, why do we make kiddush
and hamotzi in the sukkah, but without reciting the brocha
on the mitzvah?”

Introduction:

The laws
of the mitzvah of sukkah are highly detailed and very unusual. In the course of answering
the opening questions, we will be studying an overview of the unique laws of
this beautiful mitzvah.

Home
sweet sukkah

The
proper observance of this mitzvah is to treat the sukkah as one’s
home for the entire seven days of Sukkos (Mishnah and Gemara
Sukkah 28b). This is derived from the Torah’s words: “You shall dwell (teishevu)
in the Sukkah for seven days.” This is the only mitzvah of the Torah that
is worded this way, and, as a result, there are many interesting and unique halachic
details, both lekulah and lechumrah. (Women are exempt from the
mitzvah of sukkah, and, therefore, the halachos that we describe
in this article apply only to men. However, a woman who eats or spends time in
the sukkah fulfills a mitzvah. According to Ashkenazic practice,
she recites a brocha prior to fulfilling the mitzvah; according to
Sephardic practice, she does not.)

The Gemara
explains that a person should not only eat all his meals in the sukkah,
but he should sleep and relax in the sukkah (Sukkah 28b;
Shulchan Aruch Orach Chayim 639:1). Although in many places in chutz
la’aretz, people are not accustomed to sleeping in the sukkah
because of safety, weather or personal concerns (see Rema and acharonim,
Orach Chayim 639:2), we should still spend most of the day in the sukkah,
and not simply use it as a place to eat our meals, and then leave it for the
rest of the day.

To quote
the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 639:1): “How does one fulfill
the mitzvah of living in the sukkah? One should eat, drink, sleep, relax,
and live in the sukkah all seven days, both in the daytime and at night,
just as he lives in his house the rest of the year. For these seven days, he
should make his house temporary and his sukkah into his regular
residence. What are some examples of this? His nicest vessels, tablecloths and
bedspreads should be in the sukkah. His drinking vessels, both the
serving vessels and the drinking glasses, should be in the sukkah.
However, utensils used to prepare food, such as pots and pans, should be outside
the sukkah. The lamp should be in the sukkah; however, if the sukkah
is small, it should be placed outside the sukkah.”

What
does the Shulchan Aruch mean when it makes a distinction between
drinking vessels, which are inside the sukkah, and utensils to prepare
food, which it says should be outside the sukkah?

Here,
the Shulchan Aruch introduces the following concept. Although we are
supposed to use and live in the sukkah as we do in our house, we are
required to treat the sukkah with a degree of respect, as it has some
level of kedusha. The Rema (639:1) notes that unbecoming things
should not be performed in the sukkah. The Beis Yosef chooses
washing dishes as an example of something inappropriate in the sukkah.
The Magen Avraham explains that washing drinking glasses is permitted in
the sukkah, because this is not considered something unaesthetic,
whereas washing pots and dirty dishes is.

Regarding
eating and cooking vessels, there are two aspects to this distinction.

According
to custom, pots and other cooking vessels that are not brought to the table
when there are guests should not be brought into the sukkah (Mishnah
Berurah 639:5). Similarly, other items that are not appropriate for public
view, such as a child’s potty, should never be brought into the sukkah.
However, presentable “oven-to-table” cookware may be brought into the sukkah.

The
second aspect is that plates and platters that are dirty must be removed from
the sukkah (Sukkah 29a). This is because, once they have been
used, they look unpleasant.

Both of
these laws do not apply to drinking vessels, which are usually not repulsive,
even when dirty (ibid.).

A rule
of thumb I have adopted is: Something that would be in the dining room, living room
or bedrooms when you are entertaining guests can be in the sukkah. Items
that you would ordinarily leave in the kitchen, bathroom or laundry area should
not be in the sukkah.

Lamp
in the sukkah?

The Shulchan
Aruch stated: “The lamp should be in the sukkah; however, if the sukkah
is small, it should placed outside the sukkah.” What does this mean?

In
today’s post-Edison world, lighting usually means electric lighting, which, if
properly installed, should not present any safety hazards. However, when lighting
was oil or other flammable material, placing a light inside a small sukkah
could pose a safety hazard. Therefore, the sukkah’s lighting would, of
necessity, be placed outside when the sukkah was small. Although this
situation is not ideal, it is, under the circumstances, an acceptable way to
observe the mitzvah, notwithstanding that your household lighting would be
indoors.

Studying
in the sukkah

The Gemara
(Sukkah 28b) discusses whether learning Torah should be in the sukkah
or outside. The conclusion is that learning requiring focus is usually best
accomplished outside the sukkah, where someone can learn with better
concentration. On the other hand, learning that will not suffer as a result of
heing outside home or a beis medrash should, indeed, be done in the sukkah.
However, if someone needs access to many seforim while learning, it may
not be practical to bring all of them to the sukkah. The Mishnah
Berurah (639:29) recommends bringing the seforim that he will need
to the sukkah for the entire Yom Tov, if he can create a place
there to keep them. I will add that, depending on the climate, he may need a
place where they will not get wet.

Thus, we
can answer our opening question: “Where should I learn Torah during Sukkos?”
The answer is: If someone can conveniently learn in the sukkah, he
should; but if he cannot, he should learn where he will be able to accomplish
the most.

Snacking
outside the sukkah?

Although
the Shulchan Aruch requires that all meals be eaten in the sukkah,
it does not require that snacks be eaten in the sukkah. This ruling is
also derived from the Torah’s wording of mitzvas sukkah: “You
shall dwell (teishevu) in the Sukkah for seven days,” which implies
that we should treat the sukkah as we treat our house the rest of the
year. In this instance, the result is lenient. Just as we do not eat all snacks
in the house, but eat them wherever we find ourselves, the same is true
regarding eating snacks on Sukkos – there is no requirement to
eat them in the sukkah.

In this
context, the Mishnah reports:

“It once
happened that someone brought Rabban Yochanan ben Zakai some food to taste, and
(in another anecdote) someone brought Rabban Gamliel two dates and a pitcher of
water. In both instances, the rabbonim asked that the food be brought to
the sukkah for them to eat it there. However, when someone brought Rabbi
Tzadok a small amount of bread, he ate a very small amount — less than the
size-equivalency of an egg — outside the sukkah” (Mishnah, Sukkah
26b).

The Gemara
explains: The halacha does not require eating any of these items in the sukkah,
but one is permitted to be more stringent. In other words, someone who desires
to be stringent and not eat anything or drink even water outside the sukkah
is praiseworthy. Ordinarily, it is prohibited to act more stringently than the halacha
requires, because of a concern called yohara, showing off that one is
more careful in halacha than other people. This concern does not exist
germane to being strict about eating snacks in the sukkah, and,
therefore, Rabban Yochanan ben Zakai and Rabban Gamliel ate in the sukkah,
even when it was not mandated. On the other hand, since this is a stringency
and not halachically required, Rabbi Tzadok ate his snack outside the sukkah.

How much
is still considered a snack that is permitted outside of the sukkah? If
you are eating bread, you may eat a piece that is equal to, but not greater
than, the size of an average-sized egg. Someone who wants to determine this size
exactly should discuss it with his rav or posek. Fruit, as much
as you want, may be eaten outside the sukkah. A cereal produced from the
five grains may not be eaten outside the sukkah, if it constitutes a
meal.

Stopping
for a drink

It is
permitted to drink water or any other beverage, even wine, outside the sukkah.
However, be aware that if a person is in the middle of a meal that requires
being in the sukkah, he may not eat or drink anything outside the sukkah
(see Ran). This is because every part of a meal must be eaten in the sukkah,
even while in the house getting the next course. (Of course, since women are
exempt from the mitzvah of sukkah, they may eat or help themselves to
something in the house during the meal.)

Kiddush,
hamotzi,
but not brocha?

At this
point, let us discuss the third of our opening questions: “When it is raining
on the first night of Sukkos, why do we make kiddush and hamotzi
in the sukkah, but without reciting the brocha on the
mitzvah?”

Leniencies
about sukkah

Answering
this question requires two introductions about different aspects of the laws of
sukkah. The first is:

As I
noted above, when the mitzvah of sukkah is discussed, the Torah writes “You
shall dwell (teishevu) in the Sukkah for seven days.” Seemingly, the
Torah could just as easily have instructed, “You shall be (tihyu) in
the sukkah for seven days.” Why did the Torah use the word teishevu,
dwell, rather than the word tihyu, be?Either term teishevu
(dwell) or tihyu (be)implies that a person should use his sukkah
as his primary residence through the Yom Tov!

The
answer is because  the word teishevu implies something that
tihyu does not: Teishevu implies that there is no requirement to use
the sukkah in circumstances that you would not use your house the rest
of the year (Tosafos Yom Tov, Sukkah 2:4). This is referred to as
teishevu ke’ein taduru, you should live in the sukkah similarly to
the way you normally live in your house. Since the mitzvah of the Torah is to
treat the sukkah as you ordinarily treat your house, there are
leniencies that do not apply to any other mitzvah. One case of these is
mitzta’er, someone for whom being in the sukkah causes discomfort. A
mitzta’er is exempt from being in the sukkah (Sukkah 26a).

For example,
a person whose house is very chilly will relocate temporarily to a warmer
dwelling; if bees infest your house, you will find alternative accommodations;
if the roof leaks, you will find a dry location until it is repaired. Just as
people evacuate their houses when uncomfortable and find more suitable
accommodations, so may they relocate from their sukkah when
uncomfortable and seek more pleasant arrangements. Therefore, if a bad smell
develops near the sukkah, one is exempt from staying in the sukkah.

The
first night of Sukkos

The
second introduction is to explain that there are two aspects to the mitzvah
of sukkah.

(1) The mitzvah
to dwell in a sukkah the entire Yom Tov. This is the aspect of
the mitzvah that we have been discussing until this point.

(2) The
requirement to eat in a sukkah onthe first night of the Yom
Tov. Chazal derive this requirement by way of a hermeneutic
comparison to the mitzvah of eating matzah on the first night of Pesach
(Sukkah 27a). Although there is no requirement to eat matzah all
of Pesach, on the first night there is a requirement, as
the Torah specifies, ba’erev to’chelu matzos, on the first night of Pesach
one is required to eat matzah.

This
means that Hashem taught Moshe at Har Sinai that there are two
aspects to the mitzvah of living in the sukkah. The first night one has
an obligation to eat in the sukkah. The rest of Sukkos, the
requirement is to treat the sukkah as you treat your house. Therefore,
should you spend all of Sukkos in a circumstance where you would usually
never be home – such as a meshulach on a fundraising trip – you could
potentially avoid being in the sukkah the entire Yom Tov without
violating the mitzvah. However, on the first night, there is an obligation to
eat in the sukkah. Even if someone chooses not to eat a meal all of Sukkos,
but to subsist completely on snacks, the first night, he is still required to
eat a kezayis of bread in the sukkah.

Mitzta’er
the first
night

Our next
question is whether a mitzta’er is required to eat in the sukkah
the first night of Sukkos. For example, when the weather is inclement,
and it is permitted to eat in the house, does this also exempt someone from
eating a kezayis of bread in the sukkah on the first night? This
question is the subject of a dispute among the rishonim. Some contend
that this exemption does not apply to the mitzvah to eat a kezayis in
the sukkah on the first night. Just as a mitzta’er is required to
eat a kezayis of matzoh the first night of Pesach, so too
a mitzta’er is required to eat a kezayis of bread in the sukkah
on the first night of Sukkos (Tur Orach Chayim 639).

Other rishonim
disagree, contending that the rules of teishevu ke’ein taduru apply on
the first night, just as they apply throughout the rest of the week (Shu”t
Rashba, quoted by Beis Yosef).

How
do we rule?

The Rema
(Orach Chayim 640:4) concludes that although a mitzta’er is
absolved from fulfilling mitzvas sukkah the rest of the week, he
must, nevertheless, eat a kezayis of bread in the sukkah the
first night of Sukkos (see also Meiri, Sukkah 26a; Rema, Orach
Chayim 639:5). Ashkenazim, who follow the Rema’s opinion the
vast majority of the time, consider this to be an unresolved halachic
issue. Therefore, if it rains on the first night of Sukkos, they eat at
least a kezayis of bread in the sukkah. However, since there are rishonim
who contend that a mitzta’er is exempt even from eating a kezayis
on the first night, they do not recite a brocha leisheiv basukah (consensus
of most acharonim, see Mishnah Berurah 639:35).

Sefardim should ask their rav what
to do, since there is a dispute among Sefardic poskim whether one
is obligated to eat in the sukkah on the first night of Yom Tov under
these circumstances.

Second
night in chutz la’aretz

The acharonim
dispute whether the practice of Ashkenazim to make kiddush and
eat a kezayis in the sukkah even when it is raining applies only
on the first night of Sukkos, or even on the second night of Sukkos
in chutz la’aretz. I refer our readers to their rav or posek
to discuss this question, should it become germane.

The
stars and the sukkah

The
halacha is that, lechatchilah, one should be able to see the
stars through the sukkah’s schach. What is the reason behind this
requirement?

The
following thought was suggested: The sukkah, a temporary dwelling with a
leaky thatched roof, represents the Jew in exile. Yet, there are a wide variety
of kosher Sukkos. Some sukkos are constructed with four complete
and sturdy walls that reach all the way to the schach. On the other
hand, there are Sukkos that are much less sturdy and yet they are still
kosher. For example a sukkah with just two fairly narrow walls
accompanied by a third “wall” that is a mere plank the width of one’s fist is
kosher. Such a shabby sukkah can be kosher, even if its walls are only
ten tefachim tall, which is less than forty inches, with open air
between the top of the short “walls” and the schach, notwithstanding
that such a sukkah provides virtually no privacy. Do you know anyone who
would live in such a house?

The
different types of sukkos represent different forms of exile. In some
times and places, we were welcomed and had a sense of security; in others, we
had to cringe in fear.

Yet,
there is one common factor in all the various exiles that we have been through
– the stars. The stars remind us that when Klal Yisrael merits it,
instead of being like the dust of the earth, we will be like the stars in the
sky! (This approach is cited in the contemporary work, Shalal Rav, Sukkos
volume, page 114.) Thus, regardless of the difficulties of the moment, we have
a Divine promise that one day we will be stars!

Conclusion

We all
hope to merit performing this beautiful mitzvah in the best way possible. 
After having davened for a good, sweet, new year, the logical
continuation is to observe mitzvas sukkah in a halachically
correct manner, getting our year off to a wonderful start!

Although this question may seem trivial, it is indeed a serious shaylah that requires explanation. Sometimes, one may smell an esrog, while at other times one may not. Why is this true? Also, when it is permitted to smell an esrog, do I recite a bracha beforehand? If I do, which bracha do I recite?

We may ask similar questions regarding the hadasim, although the answers are not always the same. May I smell my hadasim, and which bracha do I recite before smelling them?

In order to explain the background to these questions, I first need to explain two very different areas of halacha, one concerning the laws of muktzah, and the other concerning the laws of brachos on fragrances.

MUKTZAH

The Gemara teaches us the following: One may not smell (during Sukkos) the hadas that is set aside for the mitzvah, but one may smell the esrog. The Gemara asks, “Why is there a difference between the hadas and the esrog?” The Gemara replies that since the main use of a hadas is for fragrance, it becomes muktzah, and one may not smell it. But since the main “use” of an esrog is for food, one may not eat it, but one may smell it (Sukkah 37b). This is the explanation of what the Gemara means.

This Gemara teaches that an item used for a mitzvah becomes muktzah machmas mitzvah; that is, designated solely for its specific mitzvah and not for a different use. This category of muktzah is different from the more familiar types of muktzah in several ways:

1. As the Gemara teaches elsewhere (Sukkah 9a), this type of muktzah is prohibited min Hatorah, whereas other forms of muktzah are prohibited only miderabbanan.
2. These items are muktzah only to the extent that one may not use them, but one may move them. This is different from most types of muktzah, which one may not move on Shabbos or Yom Tov.
3. These items are muktzah only with regard to their primary, normal purpose: for example, one may not smell a hadas that is muktzah machmas mitzvah because the primary purpose of a hadas is for fragrance. However, one may use it (or them) for a secondary use, and that is why, according to the Gemara, one may smell the esrog. (A person who is interested in purchasing a fragrant item would consider buying hadasim, not an esrog.)
4. This type of muktzah is prohibited even on Chol Hamoed, whereas other types of muktzah are prohibited only on Shabbos and Yom Tov.

Thus, it would seem that we may answer the original question I asked: May I smell my esrog and hadas on Sukkos? And the answer is that I may smell my esrog, but I may not smell my hadas, because it is muktzah for its mitzvah.

However, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 653:1) rules that I should also avoid smelling my esrog on Sukkos. Why does the Shulchan Aruch prohibit something that the Gemara explicitly permits?

The answer to this question takes us to the other topic — when does one recite a bracha before smelling a fragrance? Although the Gemara explicitly permits smelling an esrog on Sukkos, the Gemara does not mention whether one recites a bracha before smelling it.

Indeed, the Rishonim dispute whether one is required to recite a bracha before smelling an esrog. Rabbeinu Simcha, one of the late baalei Tosafos, rules that one may not recite a bracha before smelling an esrog that is being used for the mitzvah on Sukkos, whereas the Ravyah, an early Ashkenazi posek, rules that one must recite a bracha. The later poskim conclude that this dispute is unresolved, and that, therefore, one may not smell an esrog during Sukkos, when reciting a bracha would be a question. This topic requires some explanation: Why should an esrog on Sukkos be different from an esrog any other time of the year?

FRAGRANCES THAT ARE NOT FOR THE PLEASURE OF SMELL

One recites a bracha only on a fragrance that is avida lereicha, literally, “made for fragrance” (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 217:2). In the words of the Chazon Ish (Orach Chayim 35:1), “Anything whose current purpose is not for aroma is not considered a fragrance” (regarding recitation of a bracha). Therefore, one does not recite a bracha before smelling a deodorizer, even if it has an extremely pleasant fragrance, since its purpose is not aroma, but to mask unpleasant odor. Similarly, smelling the tantalizing aroma of a food or food flavoring does not warrant a bracha, since its purpose is not enjoyment of their aroma, per se. (I have written several other articles germane to the brachos on fragrances, which are available on the RabbiKaganoff.com website; to find them, use the search word fragrance.) Furthermore, when the halacha rules that one is not required to recite a bracha, one is not permitted to recite the bracha, as doing so constitutes a bracha l’vatalah, a bracha recited in vain.

EXAMPLE:

When showing a house that is for sale, some people toast cinnamon in the oven or open essential oils and other fragrances around the house to make the house more appealing. Since the purpose of these fragrances is to give the house a pleasant aroma and not to entice people to smell or purchase the fragrance, one does not recite a bracha.

Based on the foregoing introduction, we can now explain the above-quoted dispute whether to recite a bracha before smelling an esrog on Sukkos. Rabbeinu Simcha contends that although one may smell an esrog on Sukkos, and it is not prohibited due to its being muktzah, this does not warrant making a bracha. The esrog on Sukkos is still primarily intended for the mitzvah, and not for fragrance; therefore, smelling it does not require a bracha. In Rabbeinu Simcha’s opinion, reciting a bracha in this case constitutes a bracha l’vatalah.

The Ravyah disagrees, maintaining that since it is permitted to smell an esrog, it is considered to be meant for fragrance, and requires one to recite a bracha before smelling it (Mordechai, Sukkah #751; Tur Orach Chayim 653).

This dispute places us in a predicament. The halacha is that one may not benefit from something in this world without first reciting a bracha, and if, indeed, one is required to recite a bracha before smelling an esrog, then one may not smell it without reciting a bracha (Brachos 35a; Hagahos Smaq 193:11). On the other hand, if one is not required to recite a bracha before smelling it, then one may not recite the bracha, and doing so involves reciting a bracha in vain, a bracha l’vatalah.

Since we are not in a position to resolve this dispute, the poskim contend that one should avoid smelling the esrog used for the mitzvah during Sukkos (Shulchan Aruch 653), even though there is no muktzah violation in smelling it. Furthermore, one may smell the esrog if he first recited a bracha on a different fragrant fruit.

ESROG ON SHABBOS

As I mentioned above, Rabbeinu Simcha contends that an esrog is not considered avida lereicha, meant for fragrance, and therefore one does not recite a bracha before smelling it. Does this halacha apply the entire week of Sukkos, or only when I pick up the esrog to fulfill the mitzvah? What if I smell the esrog on Shabbos, when there is no mitzvah to perform, or I pick it up on a day of Sukkos after I have already fulfilled the mitzvah? Do I recite a bracha before smelling it, according to his opinion?

Let us compare this shaylah to the following case:

Someone who enters a spice merchant’s store recites a bracha, because the owner wants customers to smell his wares so that they will purchase them (Berachos 53a). If these items are in his warehouse, where he is not soliciting customers, one does not recite a bracha (Magen Avraham 217:1).

Why does one recite a bracha on the spices in the store, but not on those that are in the warehouse? This is because the spices in the store are there to be smelled and enjoyed, and are therefore avida lereicha. However, the spices in the warehouse are not meant to be smelled – therefore, they are not avida lereicha. Note that we are discussing the same spices, and the only difference is where they are located.

PUTTING INTO YOUR HAND

Let’s assume you are back in the spice merchant’s warehouse or in a flavor factory, and you know that you do not make a bracha on the incredible fragrance that is wafting through the air. What happens if you approach some of the spices to take a pleasant whiff, or you pick up some of the spice in order to smell it? Do you recite a bracha?

The poskim dispute what to do in this case. The Mishnah Berurah (217:1) contends that whenever you do something to smell the fragrance, such as moving towards the source of the fragrance in order to smell it, picking it up, or putting some into your hand, you should recite a bracha. Any such act makes the fragrance avida lereicha.

However, the Chazon Ish disagrees, maintaining that if you will return the spice afterwards to the storage bin in the warehouse, it is not avida lereicha, and you do not recite a bracha (Chazon Ish, Orach Chayim 35:1). The Chazon Ish agrees that if the manufacturer has samples available that he wants people to smell and buy, one does recite a bracha on them, and he also agrees that if you remove some of the spices to smell and will not return them, you do recite a bracha.

SPICES IN THE KITCHEN

There is a common, practical difference in halacha between the approaches of these two Gedolim regarding kitchen spices. Suppose you want to enjoy the smell of the cinnamon or the oregano on your kitchen shelf. According to the Mishnah Berurah, if you remove a container from the shelf to smell it, you recite a bracha on the spice, even though you intend to return the spice to the shelf after smelling it, and it will eventually be added to food. (By the way, the poskim dispute which bracha one recites before smelling cinnamon. The accepted practice is to recite borei minei besamim.) However, according to the Chazon Ish, you do not recite a bracha on this spice, unless you no longer intend to cook with it. Someone who wants to avoid the dispute should sprinkle a little bit of spice into his hand and make a bracha on that. Since you are neither going to return this spice to the container nor cook with it, according to all opinions, one recites a bracha before smelling it.

Some poskim explain that this opinion of the Chazon Ish is the reason for the widespread minhag to set aside special besamim for havdalah on Motza’ei Shabbos (Shemiras Shabbos Kehilchasah, Vol. 2 pg. 262).

WHAT ABOUT MY ESROG ON SHABBOS?

A dispute similar to the one quoted above exists concerning smelling my esrog on Shabbos, or picking up the esrog to smell it after I have fulfilled the mitzvah for the day.

The Magen Avraham rules that I recite a bracha before smelling the esrog under these circumstances, even according to Rabbeinu Simcha. Therefore, in his opinion, one may pick up the esrog specifically to smell it, and one recites the bracha before smelling it.

However, the Taz implies that one may not smell the esrog anytime during Sukkos. According to the Chazon Ish’s analysis of the subject, one can explain the Taz’s approach as follows: Since the esrog is meant for the mitzvah, it is not considered avida lereicha that warrants a bracha, unless one permanently makes it into a fragrance. Thus, if an esrog became pasul, or for some other reason can no longer be used for the mitzvah, it will be called avida lereicha and warrant a bracha. Under any other circumstance, it remains a safek bracha, and one should not smell it until Yom Tov is over. One may recite a bracha and smell it on Shemini Atzeres or Simchas Torah, since it no longer serves any mitzvah purpose. Thus, it appears that the dispute between the Magen Avraham and the Taz is identical to the dispute between the Mishnah Berurah and the Chazon Ish.

WHICH BRACHA DO I RECITE ON AN ESROG?

Everyone agrees that one may smell an esrog that will no longer be used for the mitzvah, and that one must recite a bracha before smelling it. In such a case, which bracha do I recite?

Chazal established five different brachos that relate to scent, each for a different category of fragrance.

1. Borei shemen areiv, “The Creator of pleasant oil,” is recited only on the fragrant oil extracted from the balsam tree (Mishnah Berurah 216:22). Because this tree was important and grew in Eretz Yisroel, Chazal established for it a special bracha (Rabbeinu Yonah, Brachos 43a).
2. Hanosein rei’ach tov ba’peiros, “He who bestows pleasant fragrances in fruits” (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 216:2). We recite this bracha before smelling fragrant, edible fruits and other foods (Rama 216:14). Some poskim rule that the proper text for this bracha should be in past tense: Asher nasan rei’ach tov ba’peiros, “He who bestowed pleasant fragrances in fruits” (Mishnah Berurah 216:9). This is the bracha one recites before smelling an esrog.

Many poskim state that the custom today is to not make a bracha on smelling a fruit, unless it has a pronounced aroma (see Vezos Haberacha pg. 174). For this reason, one should be certain that the esrog one holds has a strong, pleasant fragrance before reciting a bracha. If one is uncertain, one may smell the esrog first to see that it is fragrant, and then, if it is fragrant, recite the bracha hanosein rei’ach tov ba’peiros and smell it again.

3. Borei atzei besamim, “The Creator of fragrant wood (or trees).” One recites this bracha before smelling fragrant, woody plants and trees, or their leaves, flowers, wood, or oils. Hadasim are certainly in this category. Although we mentioned above that it is prohibited to smell a hadas that is being used for the mitzvah on Sukkos, hadasim that one does not intend to use for the mitzvah may be smelled on Sukkos, and he should recite this bracha before smelling them.

Incidentally, the correct bracha to recite before smelling citrus blossoms or flowers is Borei atzei besamim, since the flower is not edible.

4. Borei isvei besamim, “The Creator of fragrant grasses.” We recite this bracha before smelling non-woody plants, their parts or extracts. Before smelling a fragrant hyacinth, narcissus, or lily one recites this bracha. The custom among Sefardim is to recite this bracha before smelling mint, although, for reasons beyond the scope of this article, Ashkenazim recite borei minei besamim before smelling mint.
5. Borei minei besamim, “The Creator of different types of fragrances.” This is the “catch-all” bracha for all fragrances, the equivalent of reciting a shehakol on food. Sometimes, it is the preferred bracha, and sometimes it is the bracha used to resolve uncertainties. Although I have not seen poskim discuss this case, it would seem to be permitted to recite a bracha on an item whose bracha is borei minei besamim and have in mind to include the esrog and then be able to smell the esrog. This would provide a method whereby one could smell one’s esrog on Yom Tov, according to all opinions.

Question: Why did Chazal create a unique bracha prior to smelling aromatic fruits?

Answer: Whenever one benefits from this world, one must recite a bracha. Thus, Chazal instituted brachos that are appropriate for fragrances. However, the other brachos on fragrance are not appropriate for smelling fragrant foods, since they praise Hashem for creating fragrances, whereas fruits are not usually described as fragrances, but as foods that are fragrant. Therefore, Chazal needed to establish a special bracha for aromatic fruits (see Beis Yosef, Orach Chayim end of Chapter 297).

Conclusion

The Gemara (Berachos 43b) teaches, “How do we know that one must recite a bracha on a fragrance? Because the pasuk (Tehillim 150:6) says, ‘Every neshamah praises Hashem,’ – What exists in the world that the soul benefits from, but not the body? Only fragrance.”

Because fragrance provides some physical pleasure, but no nutritional benefit, the sense of smell represents an interface between the spiritual and the physical. Similarly, we find that we offer korbanos as rei’ach nicho’ach, a fragrance demonstrating one’s desire to be close to Hashem. We should always take advantage of the opportunity to smell fragrant items as a steppingstone towards greater mitzvah observance and spirituality.

 

This website contains many articles on a wide range of Yom Tov related topics that can be found under the headings Sukkah, Esrog, Yom Tov, Hallel, Chol Hamoed, Eruv Tavshillin. The enclosed article discusses a different aspect of Yom Tov observance, that of…

Aliyah Laregel

Question #1: Yizkor on Simchas Torah?

“Is there a reason why Yizkor is recited in Eretz Yisroel in the middle of the Simchas Torah davening?”

Question #2: No Aliyah Laregel

“Someone once told me that when the Beis Hamikdash is rebuilt, the mitzvah of Aliyah Laregel will be optional. How can that be?”

Question #3: Women and Yaaleh Veyavo

“If a woman forgot Yaaleh Veyavo in bensching of Yom Tov, does she repeat the bensching?”

Introduction:

Although we cannot observe the beautiful mitzvah of Aliyah Laregel until the Beis Hamikdash is rebuilt, many halachic observances and customs result from the laws associated with this mitzvah. The questions above reflect some of those practices.

The mitzvah of Aliyah Laregel

The mitzvah of Aliyah Laregel is mentioned several places in the Torah. In parshas Ki Sissa (Shemos 34:23), the Torah states: Shalosh pe’amim bashanah yeira’eh kol zechurcha es penei Ha’adon Hashem, Elokei Yisroel, “Three times a year shall all your males appear in the Presence of the Lord, Hashem, the G-d of Israel,” and a similar posuk appears in parshas Mishpatim (Shemos 23:17). In parshas Re’eih (Devorim 16:16), the Torah specifies that the three times are Pesach, Shavuos, and Sukkos. In this last place, the Torah concludes with the following statement: “Three times a year, all your males shall appear before Hashem, your G-d, in the place that He will choose, and you should not appear before Hashem empty-handed. Each man should bring with him according to the bounty that Hashem your G-d has provided you.”

This last verse teaches that the mitzvah is not only to ascend to Yerushalayim and to the Har Habayis (the “Temple Mount”), but also to bring korbanos when we come. It also states that a wealthier individual is obligated to spend more on his korbanos than a pauper (Mishnah, Chagigah 8b).

Three mitzvos

When the Tosefta (Chagigah 1:5) and the Gemara (Chagigah 6b) discuss the details of Aliyah Laregel, they refer to it as three mitzvos: “The Jewish people were commanded three mitzvos when they were oleh regel,” that is, traveling to the Beis Hamikdash grounds on Yom Tov required three specific mitzvah actions:

1. From the words of the above-quoted posuk, “You should not appear before Hashem emptyhanded,” we derive that one is required to offer a korban olah when we appear in the Beis Hamikdash, called an olas re’iyah. This korban is completely consumed on the mizbeiach, except for its hide, which is given to the kohanim as one of the gifts that the Torah provides.
2. The mitzvah of offering special korbanos shelamim in honor of the festival, called Chagigah or shalmei chagigah. Some of the meat of this korban goes to the kohanim, but most of it goes to the owners who serve it as part of their Yom Tov meals while in Yerushalayim. Any tahor Jewish person is permitted to eat from this korban.
3. The mitzvah of simcha, which includes offering korbanos and eating their meat on each day of the festival, including chol hamoed. Since meat of korbanos may be eaten only in Yerushalayim, this means that, at the time of the Beis Hamikdash, the entire Jewish people spent the whole Yom Tov, including all the days of chol hamoed, in Yerushalayim.

One fulfills this latter mitzvah with any animal korban from which one is permitted to eat, including other korbanos that one must offer anyway (Mishnah, Chagigah 7b). In other words, one may wait to bring his other required korbanos, such as firstborn animals, maaser beheimah, donated shelamim offerings, and chata’os until Yom Tov, and offer them then, while one is in Yerushalayim anyway. When he offers them on Yom Tov, he may fulfill the requirement of consuming shalmei simcha with the meat of these korbanos. (In the case of chata’os and similar korbanos, this approach can be used only by kohanim, since no one else is permitted to consume them.)

Rules of Har Habayis

One is required to be completely tahor when ascending the Har Habayis and to do so with complete awe of the sanctity of the place, and to act appropriately. Among the specific laws that apply on Har Habayis is a prohibition against wearing shoes and of carrying one’s wallet or money belt.

Exempt from Aliyah Laregel

Notwithstanding the words of the Torah that all the males should ascend the Har Habayis three times a year, Chazal derive that there is a long list of men who are exempt from fulfilling the mitzvos of re’iyah. This list includes:

1. Difficulty in walking

Anyone who has difficulty walking is exempt from the mitzvah of Aliyah Laregel. This includes the elderly, the ill, someone with a lameness or injury in his legs, and even those who are unused to walking without shoes, since one is prohibited from wearing shoes on the Har Habayis (Chagigah 4a). Someone who can walk there only because he uses a prosthesis is also exempt from the mitzvah (Chagigah 3a; 4a). Similarly, someone who has discomfort in one leg, even if he has no discomfort in the other leg and can still walk, is also exempt (Chagigah 3a).

2. Vision impaired

Anyone whose vision is impaired is exempt from the mitzvah. This includes someone who can see out of only one eye (Chagigah 4b).

3. Hearing impaired

Someone who cannot hear, but can speak, or someone who can speak but not hear is exempt from the mitzvah of re’iyah, although they are obligated in simcha and indeed all other mitzvos of the Torah (Chagigah 2b). Also, someone who does not hear in one ear is exempt from re’iyah (Chagigah 3a).

All three of these categories of people who are exempt from the mitzvah of Aliyah Laregel and of offering the olas re’iyah and the shalmei chagigah are still obligated in the third mitzvah mentioned above, of partaking in korbanos simcha (Rambam, Hilchos Chagigah 2:4, based on Gemara Chagigah 4a). This is, of course, assuming that they went to Yerushalayim for Yom Tov, because one may eat these korbanos only there.

4. Tamei

People who are tamei are exempt from fulfilling the mitzvah of Aliyah Laregel (Gemara Chagigah 4b; Tosefta Chagigah 1:1). Someone who is tamei is required to make himself tahor in order to fulfill the mitzvah of Aliyah Laregel. However, if he did not purify himself or was unable to do so, he is now exempt from the mitzvah, since as long as he is tamei he may not enter the Beis Hamikdash grounds. Indeed, someone who is tamei cannot fulfill the mitzvah of Aliyah Laregel, since he is not allowed to enter the Beis Hamikdash grounds (Rambam, Hilchos Chagigah 2:1).

There is a major difference between the various categories of exemptions from Aliyah Laregel. People excused from the mitzvah for medical reasons may perform the mitzvah, and if they do so, they will be rewarded as einam metzuvim ve’osim, those who perform a mitzvah that they are not obligated to perform. However, someone who is tamei is forbidden to participate in Aliyah Laregel, since doing so would cause him to violate the sanctity of the Beis Hamikdash. He should try to make himself tahor as soon as possible.

5. Uncircumcised

There are specific situations in which someone is not obligated to have a bris milah performed, because of the danger that is involved. Although such a person is exempt from the mitzvah of bris milah, he is still not circumcised, and, as such, he is exempt from several of the Torah’s mitzvos, including the mitzvah of Aliyah Laregel. Similar to the person who is tamei, this individual is forbidden to observe the mitzvah.

Children

Although a child is not required to observe any mitzvah, Chazal required the father to see to it that he observe most mitzvos, in order to acquaint himself with keeping them. In this context, we find a dispute between Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel. Both schools hold that a father is required to have his minor son accompany him on the mitzvah of entering the Beis Hamikdash on Yom Tov. The question is: From what age is the father obligated to do so? According to Beis Shammai, the father is obligated to do so from when the child is old enough to ride his father’s shoulders, when the father walks from Yerushalayim to the Har Habayis.

We should be aware that the responsibility of a father to train his child to perform a mitzvah is only when the child will be obligated to fulfill that mitzvah when he becomes an adult. Thus, regarding the mitzvah of Aliyah Laregel, should the child fit any of categories 1-3 above that exempt an adult from this mitzvah, the father is not obligated to bring the child with him when he is oleh regel (Rambam, Hilchos Chagigah 2:3).

Smelly professions

There are certain professions that leave their artisans with a malodorous odor. Tanners and copper smelters, for example, are surrounded by substances whose ill fragrance sometimes permeates their clothing and hair. Are they obligated in the mitzvah of Aliyah Laregel, or do we say that since their attendance might adversely affect other people required to observe the mitzvah that they are exempt? This question is discussed by the Gemara (Chagigah 4a). The Rambam (Hilchos Chagigah 2:2) concludes that they are required to clean themselves and their clothes fully and fulfill the mitzvah of Aliyah Laregel.

Yizkor and Aliyah Laregel

I mentioned previously the posuk from parshas Re’eih (Devorim 16:16), in which the Torah specifies that each person is obligated to donate according to the bounty that Hashem has provided him. At this point, I want to address one of our opening questions:

“Is there a reason why Yizkor is recited in Eretz Yisroel in the middle of the Simchas Torah davening?”

To answer this question, we need to explore the history of this prayer. Yizkor is a custom that began among Ashkenazim in chutz la’aretz and is recited four times a year: on Yom Kippur, the eighth day of Pesach, the second day of Shavuos and on Shemini Atzeres. Why specifically on these four days?

On all of these days, there was a custom to make donations to tzedakah, and, at one point, there became established an idea of reciting a prayer that the tzedakah donated should serve for the benefit of one’s departed parents and other relatives. On Yom Kippur, it is obvious why special donations were made to tzedakah, but why specifically on the three days of Yom Tov mentioned above, as opposed to the other days of Yom Tov?

The answer is that in chutz la’aretz, the reading for these three yomim tovim — the eighth day of Pesach, the second day of Shavuos and Shemini Atzeres — is in parshas Re’eih, and the last posuk of the reading states: “Each man should bring with him according to the bounty that Hashem your G-d has provided you.” Although the literal meaning of the posuk refers to the amount one should spend on the korban olas re’iyah, it certainly can be understood to include gifts for tzedakah, and indeed that became an accepted practice. The people made donations to tzedakah, but decided to have them as an iluy neshamah, an elevation for the souls of their departed relatives. (By the way, in some German communities, there was no minhag of Yizkor and instead, they observed a different practice on those days, called matanas yad.)

When the Ashkenazim began returning to Eretz Yisroel in the nineteenth century, they realized that in Eretz Yisroel, there is no eighth day of Pesach or second day of Shavuos, and the day that is called Shemini Atzeres in chutz la’aretz is called and observed as Simchas Torah, when we read parshas Vezos Haberacha and the beginning of Bereishis. Thus, parshas Re’eih is never read on Yom Tov.

Because people did not want to lose this beautiful minhag of reciting Yizkor, they continued to observe the practice on the day of Yom Tov closest to those days, that is, on the seventh day of Pesach, Shavuos, and on Simchas Torah.

Beloved servants

We have discussed some of the laws of the mitzvah of Aliyah Laregel, a topic that we will continue to discuss in a future article, when we will iy”H answer the remaining of our opening questions. Contemplating this special mitzvah of Aliyah Laregel should give every one of us chizuk. Consider that Hashem Yisborach commanded us to come to the Beis Hamikdash “in order to be seen.” The message here is that we are His beloved servants and He desires to see us, as it says in the Gemara (Chagigah 4b), “A servant whom his master desires to see.” Furthermore, the Gemara describes Klal Yisroel as “the servant whom the master desires to eat at his table.”

May we soon merit fulfilling this mitzvah in the third Beis Hamikdash, may it be rebuilt speedily, and that Hashem should look upon us favorably! Wishing all of our readers, together with all of Klal Yisroel, a good Yom Tov!

 

On the website, one can find many other articles about various topics of Sukkos and Yom Tov, under the headings Sukkah, Esrog, Yom Tov.

Sukkah Walls Review

Question #1: A Strapping of a Sukkah

“I have noticed recently that prefab Sukkos come with straps or bars that run along the sides of the sukkah. Could you please explain to me why the manufacturers are now making a more complicated product?”

Question #2: Pergola or Sukkah?

“May a pergola or trellis be used to hold the schach of a sukkah?”

Question #3: Going out to a sukkah

“My aunt, who always takes the family out to eat when she visits, will be in town for Sukkos, and she knows that her favorite restaurant has a sukkah for Chol Hamoed. Can we rely on the restaurant’s sukkah?”

Answer: This is the second part of a revised version of an interview I provided to Mishpacha magazine a few years ago. This article covers some of the more common halachic issues and problems one finds regarding sukkah walls. Although I have edited the original article somewhat, I have left the interview structure. A pdf of the original article can be found here.

Mishpacha: Why should sukkah walls require a hechsher?

RYK: Let me first present the basic laws of sukkah walls, and then I will explain what a hechsher on a prefab sukkah should mean.

Many people have learned that since the word sukkah has three letters — the samech with four sides, the kof with three, and the heih with two and a small yud opposite it — a sukkah may be kosher with four, three or even two walls as long as there is a bit of a third wall on the third side. Unfortunately, the halacha is not as clear-cut as this vort makes it seem. Although there are situations in which a sukkah is kosher when it has three partial walls that do not run the length or width of the sukkah, the laws pertaining to such a sukkah are extremely complicated, and one should not build such a sukkah without conferring with a halachic authority.

Because of the concern that a partial wall often does not qualify as a proper sukkah wall, the Rama mentions that it is now customary not to build a sukkah with only partially constructed walls, but, instead, to make sure that it has three walls that are the full length or width of the sukkah.[i] Nevertheless, there are situations when this is not practical. I find this situation most common in Eretz Yisroel or in some parts of New York City, where people must assemble their sukkah in a courtyard or porch that has several entrances or is unevenly shaped, so that it is impossible to construct three full walls. I strongly recommend that someone in this situation consult with a competent halachic authority before building the sukkah to ascertain that their plans, indeed, meet the halachic requirements. Then have the rav see the actual sukkah after it is constructed, with enough time before Yom Tov to make any necessary changes. It is a shame to have invested the time and money for a sukkah and then not fulfill the mitzvah because someone was too proud or too busy to check that the sukkah was kosher. (In addition, eating in a sukkah whose kashrus is questionable could entail violating halacha and reciting brochos levatalah.)

Keep your roof near your walls

Furthermore, the law is that the walls of the sukkah must be fairly close to the schach. The horizontal distance between the schach and the three walls must be less than three tefachim (according to some opinions, 24 centimeters or 9.4 inches[ii]), or the sukkah is not kosher. Every year I see sukkahs that, unfortunately, are not kosher because of this problem. Sometimes people build a framework for their sukkah, including walls and schach, but do not realize that the schach must be near the walls. I have also often seen fancy, pergola-like frames built on patios and upon which the schach is placed, but the schach is at too great a distance from the patio walls for the sukkah to be kosher. These sukkahs can almost always be fixed so that they are kosher halachically, but one has to know how to do it properly.

With the wind to my sukkah’s back

Here is another common problem — sukkahs made with walls that are too flimsy. The Gemara teaches that “any partition that cannot withstand a typical wind does not qualify as a partition.”[iii] The Gemara then notes that this principle seems to be contradicted by a Mishnah that rules that a sukkah may be constructed using trees as its walls, yet trees move in the wind. The Gemara responds that the Mishnah refers to substantive, thick trees that will not move in the wind.  The Gemara then asks that even if the tree is strong, the canopy of the tree will certainly be blown by the wind. To this the Gemara responds that the Mishnah must be discussing a case where the tree’s canopy was reinforced so that the wind would not move it.

There are two ways of explaining this section of Gemara:

Some understand that the Gemara invalidates a sukkah only if the wind will blow down the wall or blow apart the materials that constitute the wall such that it now has gaps that invalidate it; but a wall that sways is valid.[iv] According to this approach, a cloth-walled sukkah assembled such that its walls are tied properly at the top and bottom is kosher, even though the middle of the “walls” sways considerably in the wind.

However, most authorities rule that the Gemara means that if a typical wind causes noticeable movement to the wall, it is invalid as a sukkah wall. The wording of Rambam and Shulchan Aruch seems to bear out this approach:

“Someone who makes his sukkah among the trees, using them as walls; if they were strong or he tied them until the point that a common wind would not constantly move them, and he filled in between the branches with straw tied in a way that the wind would not sway them, the sukkah is kosher.”[v]

According to this approach, most prefab sukkos pose a halachic concern, since they are usually made of cloth or plastic walls that blow in the wind. One finds some discussion among authorities as to how much swaying is called too much. Some authorities rule that if one makes the walls very taut, the sukkah is still valid.

Many years ago I was approached by a manufacturer of prefab sukkahs to provide him with a hechsher. His sukkah was indeed made of very thick cloth which, when assembled according to his instructions, was very taut.

Mishpacha: Did you give him a hechsher?

RYK: No, I did not. Some early authorities are concerned about the use of cloth walls for a sukkah, even when they are made very taut, because of concern that they will loosen and then sway in the wind.[vi] The same passage of Shulchan Aruch I just quoted cites this opinion. Allow me to quote the Shulchan Aruch’s conclusion:

“Therefore it is improper to make all the walls from linen curtains without sticks, even if one tied them well, because sometimes the ties loosen without anyone realizing it, and now the wall can no longer withstand a typical wind. Someone who wants to use sheets [for his sukkah walls] should weave sticks into his walls within every three tefachim.”[vii]

It seems to me that one should not build a sukkah with any type of cloth walls, unless one reinforces them with something that the wind cannot blow. I presume that the rav who did provide this manufacturer with a hechsher on the sukkah walls felt that one can draw a distinction between thick, strong cloth and the “curtains” and “sheets” mentioned by the Shulchan Aruch. However, I was (and remain) unwilling to provide a hechsher to something that runs counter to the Shulchan Aruch, according to my understanding.

Today, the halachically better quality cloth-walled sukkos come with straps or cords that create halachic walls. Let me explain how this works. There is a halachic principle called lavud, according to which a gap of less than three tefachim (24 centimeters or 9.4 inches) in a wall is treated as if it is actually closed. According to this principle, one can technically build sukkah walls with sticks placed either horizontally or vertically every 24 centimeters along its sides.

If one uses vertical sticks or wires, one needs only to construct “walls” through lavud until they reach a height of ten tefachim (80 centimeters or 31.5 inches), which is technically the minimum height requirement for the walls of a sukkah (see Shulchan Aruch Orach Chayim 630:9). For this reason, the prefab sukkos made with belts or crossbars have them only from the floor until they reach this height.

Mishpacha: Rav Kaganoff, could I ask you to address this actual case we were asked: My aunt, who always takes the family out to eat when she visits, will be in town for Sukkos, and she knows that her favorite restaurant has a sukkah for Chol Hamoed. Can we rely on the restaurant’s sukkah?

RYK: Even when the restaurant has a good hechsher, the sukkah assembled often is a cloth-walled type that most authorities invalidate. I have even seen restaurants with excellent hechsherim sporting sukkahs that were not kosher at all. For example, the cloth walls were not secured properly and they billowed upward in the wind, which is not kosher even according to the lenient position mentioned above. Yes, I also find it surprising that the hechsher is assuming responsibility only for the kashrus of the food, but does not get involved in whether the sukkah built by the restaurant is kosher.

Thus, if you want to accept Aunt Shprintzah’s wonderful invitation, check in advance how the restaurant sukkah is constructed. It has often happened that I received a phone call from a person at a restaurant trying to figure out what to do, and I have advised him to eat only items that one may eat outside the sukkah.

Conclusion

We all hope to merit performing this beautiful mitzvah in the best way possible.  After having davened for a good, sweet new year, the logical continuation is to observe mitzvas sukkah in a halachically correct manner, getting our year off to a wonderful start!

 

 

[i] Glosses to Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 630:5

[ii] There are several opinions how to measure or estimate the length of a tefach in contemporary measurements. I suggest that our readers confer with their rav or posek for direction as to what size to use.

[iii] Gemara Sukkah 24b

[iv] Chazon Ish, Orach Chayim 77:6

[v] Rambam, Hilchos Sukkah 4:5; Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 630:10

[vi] Rabbeinu Peretz in his notes to the Sma”k

[vii] Shulchan Aruch Orach Chayim 630:10. Other authorities who discuss this issue at length include Rabbi Ovadyah Yosef in his Shu”t Yechaveh Daas 3:46.

Question #1: “What are the potential halachic issues encountered with schach mats?”

Question #2: “My aunt, who always takes the family out to eat when she visits, will be in town for Sukkos, and knows that her favorite restaurant has a sukkah for Chol Hamoed. Can we rely on the restaurant’s sukkah?”

Answer: This article, which is a revised version of an interview I provided to Mishpacha magazine a few years ago, covers some of the more common halachic issues and problems one finds regarding Sukkos. Although I have edited the original article somewhat, I have left the interview structure. A pdf of the original article can be found on RabbiKaganoff.com

Mishpacha: Rav Kaganoff, I am very appreciative that you have been able to make time for us. Can you mention what types of halachic issues you have noticed concerning the validity of Sukkos?

RYK: The laws of sukkah are very complicated, and a rav should not assume that his members know how to construct a kosher sukkah, unless he himself has been certain to teach them thoroughly. If the rav has not (yet) taught them properly, then one can certainly assume that there will be many issues concerning the sukkah walls and the schach, and, potentially, questions even where they place the sukkah, since they may build it under trees or overhangs.

How frequent the problems occur will depend on how well a rav has succeeded in educating his membership to the basic requirements of sukkah. There are two obvious ways he can teach them. One is by mentioning aspects of the laws of sukkah whenever he has an opportunity during the weeks before Sukkos – a little bit before his drasha on Shabbos; a little after daily Shacharis and between Mincha and Maariv. Another method is to offer to make “sukkah calls,” just like doctors used to make house calls! The message eventually gets through, and I noticed how, with time, my shul members became very sensitized to the main issues.

Mishpacha: Could you point out the most frequent problems you have found and explain why there are concerns?

RYK: Certainly. Let me first introduce the fundamentals of sukkah construction. A sukkah consists of two basic components, its walls and its roof, which we call the schach; and each has very specific halachic requirements. The schach must be of vegetative material that once grew from the earth but is no longer connected to the earth, is not food, and has not been fashioned in a way that halacha considers it a “vessel” or a “utensil.”

The correct term for these items is that they are mekabeil tumah, susceptible to becoming tamei, should they be in contact with a tamei item. The exact rules defining what qualifies as a utensil are fairly complicated, and it is interesting how much halachic literature is devoted to defining whether such diverse items as arrow shafts, wooden ladders, thread, and straw or reed mats may be used as schach – meaning, are they processed enough to be considered “utensils” for halachic purposes or not. However, a full treatment of this topic is beyond the parameters of this article.

A “Venetian” Sukkah

There are many interesting discussions about the use of other common household items for schach. For example, in 1941 a rav asked Rav Moshe Feinstein whether one can use venetian blinds, at that time made of wood slats attached with cloth, as schach. The inquirer wanted to permit their use, since both the slats and the cloth are made from materials that grow from the ground. Rav Moshe demonstrates from the Talmudic sources that although the wood is basically unprocessed, once it has been attached to the cloth, it is halachically considered a utensil and may not be used as schach.[i]

Walking (under) the Plank

There are also categories of items that the Torah permitted as kosher schach, but were later prohibited by the Sages because of various concerns. For example, wide wooden planks are not utensils and do meet all the other requirements for schach and, therefore, should be acceptable. However, the Sages prohibited using them out of concern that someone might mistakenly assume that his regular wood roof would be satisfactory as a cover for his sukkah.[ii] Although today it is unusual to make a roof out of wood boards, in early generations these were standard roofing materials.

This developed into a halachic controversy not that long ago: May one use wooden slats or laths for schach? I remember seeing wooden slats used commonly as schach material by respected Torah scholars, whereas other, equally knowledgeable Torah scholars took strong exception to using this as schach, invalidating it because slats are used in construction. (Shu”t Yaskil Avdi Volume VI Orach Chayim #20 analyzes both sides of the question. He also quotes a very interesting reason why people prefer using slats to other types of schach. He contends that it is uncommon for them to be insect infested, whereas other forms of schach often have such a problem.)

Metal in the Schach

Many people assume that if one puts any metal into the schach, such as nailing together the schach, the sukkah cannot be used. This is not accurate, although they are correct that one should not use metal to assemble or support the schach, such as by resting the schach on a metal framework. However, the vast majority of halachic authorities conclude that if a sukkah was assembled in a way that its schach is held up by metal, the sukkah may be used. Let me explain.

Supporting the Schach – the Maamid

The Gemara discusses whether the schach must be “held up” — supported by material that could be used for the schach itself. The majority opinion contends that the rules I mentioned above apply only to the schach and not to what supports the schach, which is called the maamid.[iii] According to this opinion, one may use any material at all to support schach, and even having your schach rest directly on steel girders is perfectly fine.[iv]

There is a minority opinion that contends that the rules of schach material apply, also, to what supports the schach. Following this latter approach, one must be careful not to have the schach supported by metal or, for that matter, any other material that would not be kosher schach.

Usually the halacha follows the majority opinion, and following their view, as long as the schach itself is “kosher,” we need not be concerned about what supports the schach. Indeed, most early authorities follow the majority opinion, concluding that there is no halachic problem with supporting the schach with material that would, itself, be invalid schach.[v] Thus, according to them, one could construct a metal framework, rest the schach on it and the sukkah is perfectly kosher. However, there are some early authorities who take the more stringent approach and conclude that one may not support the schach with material that is itself not kosher for schach.[vi]

The conclusion of the later halachic authorities is that although we follow the majority opinion and permit the use of a sukkah whose schach is supported by metal or other invalid-for-schach material, one should not construct a sukkah this way. In other words, one should try to construct a sukkah that is kosher according to all opinions, by supporting the schach with material that itself is valid for schach, but a sukkah constructed ignoring this concern is nevertheless kosher.[vii]

This has many ramifications. For example, you are invited to someone’s house for a meal or Kiddush during Sukkos and discover that their schach is held up by metal or other material that is invalid as schach. Alternatively, you take the family to a recreational area on Chol Hamoed and discover that the sukkah there was erected with the schach held up by a metal frame. You may eat there and enjoy your meal, since the sukkah is kosher, notwithstanding that those in charge should not have assembled the sukkah this way.

The above section elicited the following subsequent inquiry: “It would seem that this halacha applies only regarding the beams that hold up the schach. Meaning, if the metal nails are making sure only that the schach doesn’t slip off the beams, metal may be used. However, if the schach would blow away with a ruach metzuyah, a typical wind, then nailing it down would be forbidden according to the opinion that you should not use metal or the like to hold up the schach.”

Rabbi Kaganoff responds:

“My answer was somewhat ambiguous, and I thank you for bringing it to my attention.

To clarify the matter: the schach should be placed in a way that it is held up and held in place by items which are themselves kosher for schach. If the schach would fall through, or be blown off by a commonly occurring wind, one should not secure it with something that, itself, is not kosher schach. However, if the schach is sufficiently heavy that a common wind would not blow it out of place, but one wants to secure it better so that it does not slip or move, one may secure it even with metal or a different item that is, itself, not kosher schach.”

“Threading” the Schach

I mentioned before that there are items that meet the Torah’s requirements as kosher schach, but were later prohibited by the Sages because of various concerns: The Sages prohibited using combed flax as schach, even though it meets all the Torah requirements[viii] — it grows from the ground and is now disconnected, is not edible and is not a utensil. The early authorities debate why combed flax was banned for schach use, some contending that it was prohibited because it no longer appears like it grew from the ground,[ix] whereas others prohibited its use because it is only one step away from spun flax which is mekabeil tumah,[x] as stated in the Torah, and is therefore invalid because of Torah law.[xi]

Does this dispute concerning why the Sages banned use of unspun flax have any halachic ramifications? Indeed it does, and this affects the kashrus of some varieties of schach mats. Is cotton or hemp thread kosher for schach use? This will depend on why combed but unspun flax was prohibited. If combed flax was prohibited because it no longer appears like it grew from the ground, then cotton or hemp thread or string would similarly be prohibited. On the other hand, if unspun flax was prohibited because someone may errantly use spun flax as schach, then there is no reason to invalidate the use of cotton, hemp or similar thread as schach. Now, it appears highly impractical that anyone would use thread as schach, but but the question whether thread can be used as schach impacts on whether thread can be used to tie together the schach, a topic that became an interesting issue with the development of “schach mats.”

Mishpacha:

How so?

Schach Mats

Let me mention that I may have been the first rabbi ever to provide a hechsher to schach mats. Before that time, different companies were producing these mats, but none of them had a hechsher, although a few responsa had been written concerning whether these mats were valid schach.

There was a very interesting curiosity with the schach mats. The fellow who met me and asked me for a hechsher was manufacturing and selling prefab sukkahs, complete with the schach. He came to me with his planned design for the schach, and I suggested improvements on the design, so that there would be no halachic issues involved, which he followed. I then provided him with a letter of certification on the mats. At the time, the idea of a hechsher on schach mats was very original, and I received inquiries from many rabbonim.

Mishpacha:

What design changes did you make?

RYK:

His sukkah design called for large mats made from split pieces of bamboo tied together with string. Assuming that these were to be made in China, I had a halachic concern. In China, bamboo mats are used as mattresses, which might invalidate a mat made there, even if it was intended for transport and sale elsewhere.[xii] To avoid this problem, I told him to have the factory weave every six inches a piece of bamboo too thick to lie upon comfortably. This way these mats could never be used for sleeping, even by the Chinese, and their status as kosher schach mats was uncompromised.

I also had him make another design correction. The sample had the mats tied together with nylon thread, which I did not want. The problem is that nylon does not grow from the ground, and it is therefore not kosher schach. Thus, the thread holding the mat together was not kosher schach, and this thread has the status of a maamid, that which “supports” the schach, since the mat would fall into the sukkah if it was not tied together.

There was another potential question about these mats, even if they were tied with cotton or hemp string. As I mentioned above, it appears to be dependent on a dispute among authorities whether these threads are valid for use as schach. If they are not valid, then they should not be used to be “maamid” the schach either, since we rule that one should build a sukkah in a way that it is kosher according to all opinions, including those who invalidate maamid that is not kosher for schach.

However, I permitted him to make the sukkah mats and tie them together with cotton thread. Since some authorities consider these strings to be valid schach, the ruling of the late authorities not to use invalid schach material to support the schach should only apply when the supporting material is certainly invalid.[xiii]

There is a second reason to permit cotton string to tie the schach mat. Even if we assume that cotton string is invalid for schach, it is invalid only as a rabbinic stringency, and there are early sources who rule that even those who invalidate maamid that is not kosher schach do so only with schach that the Torah prohibited using, not with schach that was prohibited only as a rabbinic prohibition. To explain:

The halachic authorities cite two reasons to invalidate maamid that is not kosher as schach. Rashi states that using an invalid maamid is equivalent to using invalid schach. According to this approach, the Bach contends that the Torah, itself, invalidated maamid that is not kosher schach. On the other hand, Milchemes Hashem and Ran both state that the use of invalid maamid is only a rabbinic injunction to avoid people erring and using invalid schach. According to the latter approach, one could argue strongly that Chazal only prohibited use of a maamid that would be invalid schach min haTorah, but banning something invalid only miderabbanan would constitute a gezeirah legezeirah, a rabbinic injunction created to avoid violating another rabbinic injunction, something that Chazal are not empowered to do.

Slatted Mats

When the first commercially-produced schach mats reached the market in Israel, there was debate among the halachic authorities whether they could be used. These mats were made from thin pieces of wood tied together with nylon or cotton string. For a variety of reasons, the authorities disagreed on whether these mats could be used as schach. Some were concerned that tying wood pieces together might make the entire piece into one big board and invalidate its use as schach, just as the Sages prohibited use of wide boards, out of concern that someone might think that his regular house roof is valid for a sukkah. The majority of authorities were not concerned about this problem, but were very concerned about mats that used nylon strings to hold them together, considering the string as a maamid.

Some authorities were even concerned with the use of schach mats that used cotton or hemp thread or string to tie them together, being more concerned than I had been when I gave a hechsher to the schach mats. They felt that, ideally, one should not manufacture mats with cotton thread since, according to some opinions, this might constitute a maamid that is not valid schach.[xiv] Others felt that it was perfectly fine to use schach mats tied together with cotton thread.[xv]

By the way, some of today’s schach mats are produced with a much rougher bamboo that could not possibly be used for roofing material, and they are then tied together with a rough natural twine that should avoid any concerns about the thread.

Must I Fumigate my Schach?

Mishpacha:

Talking about schach mats, there has been a large of discussion lately about the problem of insect infestation in schach mats, and people are being given very extensive instructions in how to fumigate their mats.

RYK:

There are some contemporary authorities who feel that people should check their schach carefully for insects, whether their schach is brand new or stored from last year.[xvi] One should note that the Aruch Laneir, in his addenda Tosafos Bikkurim to the end of Shulchan Aruch Orach Chayim Chapter 627, advises not to hang flowers from the schach for decorations, out of concern that the flowers are infested with small insects that, indeed, could fall unnoticed into one’s food.

Others note that since most people spread beautiful white tablecloths on their tables during Sukkos, they would readily notice if insects had fallen from the schach onto the white cloth.

I will continue this article next week, with a discussion about the manufacture of the sukkah walls.

 

[i] Shu”t Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 1:177

[ii] Gemara Sukkah 14a

[iii] Gemara Sukkah 21b

[iv] See Gemara Sukkah 2a

[v] Few Rishonim (other than those mentioned in the next footnote) quote the issue of maamid, and Terumas Hadeshen (1:91) and Shulchan Aruch in Orach Chayim 630:13 clearly rule that maamid is not a concern.

[vi] Milchemes Hashem and Ran, Sukkah 21b; Bach, Orach Chayim 629.

[vii] Magen Avraham 629:9, whose position is accepted by the majority of later authorities.

[viii] Gemara Sukkah 12b

[ix] Rambam, Hilchos Sukkah 5:4

[x] Tosafos, Sukkah 12b s.v. Ba’anitzei. There are other opinions to explain this Gemara, but they will not affect the halacha that we are discussing.

[xi] Linen thread, which is the same thing as spun flax, will become tamei if tzaraas appears on it, see Vayikra 13:48, and is therefore invalid schach since this qualifies it as a davar hamekabeil tumah.

[xii] See Gemara Sukkah 19b and the Rosh ad loc.

[xiv] Shu”t Shevet Halevi 6:74; Shu”t Yeshuas Moshe 3:52

[xv] Shu”t Yechaveh Daas 1:64

[xvi]Bedikas Hamazon Kahalacha by Rabbi Moshe Vaya, Volume III pages 784-786

As the shmittah year comes to a close, and the laws prohibiting agricultural work phase out, several halachos will still apply to the special produce that grew during shmittah. One issue that affects people living in chutz la’aretz is the status of the esrogim arriving for Sukkos. Before delving into some of the controversial issues involved, let us first discuss the basics:

The Torah imbues shmittah produce with a special sanctity called kedushas shvi’is. As a result produce that grew during shmittah:

1. IS OWNERLESS — HEFKER

The owner of a field or orchard must treat whatever grows on his land as ownerless, allowing others to pick, without charge, as much as their families can use. Furthermore, one may not harvest the produce in order to sell it commercially (Tosefta, Shvi’is 5:7).

2. CANNOT BE SOLD COMMERCIALLY

One may not sell shmittah produce in a business manner (Rambam, Hil. Shmittah 6:1). For example, shmittah produce may not be sold by weight or measure (Mishnah Shvi’is 8:3), nor sold in a regular store (Yerushalmi Shvi’is 7:1).

3. SANCTIFIES ITS EXCHANGE – TOFESES DAMAV

If one trades or sells shmittah produce, whatever one receives in exchange becomes imbued with kedushas shvi’is and must be treated with all the laws mentioned above. Even so, the original produce always maintains its kedushas shvi’is (Sukkah 40b).

4. MAY BE PROHIBITED IF THE HALACHOS ARE VIOLATED –– SHAMUR VENEEVAD

According to many (and perhaps most) Rishonim, if a farmer did not allow people to pick from his fields, the shmittah produce that grew there becomes prohibited (see, for example, Raavad and Baal HaMaor to Sukkah 39a). Similarly, many authorities prohibit consuming produce that was tended in a way that violated the agricultural laws of shmittah (Ramban, Yevamos 122a).

5. MUST EVENTUALLY BE “ELIMINATED” — BIUR

One has the right to consume shmittah produce as long as it is still available in the field. Once no more produce remains in the field, special laws called biur shvi’is apply, which I will explain later.

6. MAY NOT BE EXPORTED

One may not export shmittah produce outside Eretz Yisroel (Mishnah Shvi’is 6:5). I will discuss shortly this issue’s impact on the export of shmittah esrogim.

7. ARE ONLY FOR JEWISH CONSUMPTION

Shmittah produce is meant for Jewish consumption; one may not give or sell kedushas shvi’is produce to a gentile, although one may have the gentile join one’s meal (Rambam, Hil. Shmittah 5:13 as explained by Mahari Korkos).

8. ARE FOR FOOD AND NOT FOR WASTE

One may not ruin shmittah produce (Gemara Pesachim 52b). What types of “ruining” did the Torah prohibit? One may not cook foods that are usually eaten raw, such as cucumbers or oranges, nor may one eat raw any produce that is usually cooked, such as potatoes (Yerushalmi, Shvi’is 8:2; Rambam, Hil. Shvi’is 5:3). Similarly, one may feed shmittah produce to animals only if it is unfit for human consumption.

The prohibition is only to actively ruin shmittah produce; one is not required to prevent it from spoiling. For example, when one finishes using a shmittah esrog on Hoshanah Rabbah, one may not chop up the esrog so that it will rot faster, but one is not required to wrap it up so that it does not dry out. Once shmittah produce has become useless, there is no mitzvah to treat it in any special way, and it may be thrown away.

According to accepted opinion, there is no obligation to eat shmittah food – rather, the Torah permits eating it, if the rules are followed (Chazon Ish, Hil. Shvi’is 14:10).

BUYING A SHMITTAH ESROG

Since shmittah esrogim must be treated as ownerless, the grower may not harvest them for commercial sale or market them in the usual fashion. Furthermore, if someone sells the esrog, he must treat the money received in exchange with all the laws of shmittah sanctity. To remove this sanctity, he must use this money to purchase food that he will now eat according to the laws of shmittah food. When he does this, the kedusha on the money transfers onto the food.

This leads us to an interesting question. If no one may profit from the sale of a shmittah esrog, why are tens of thousands of esrogim being sold? Are people violating shmittah when they sell these esrogim?

WELCOME TO OTZAR BEIS DIN!

The answer is that when using an otzar beis din in the correct way, the esrogim are distributed and not sold. What is an otzar beis din?

In an article published here towards the beginning of shmittah year, I detailed the halachic and historical background of the otzar beis din. Allow me to briefly review the concept and then explain how this permits the distribution of esrogim.

WHAT IS AN OTZAR BEIS DIN?

Literally, otzar beis din means “a storehouse operated by beis din.”

As mentioned above, the owner of an orchard may not harvest his produce for sale, and he must allow individuals to help themselves to what their family may use. But, what about people who live far from the orchard and find it difficult to pick fruit for themselves? How will most people ever utilize their right to pick shmittah fruit?

Enter the otzar beis din to help out! Beis din, representing the public, hires people who know how to carefully pick and clean the esrogim, evaluate their kashrus, purchase the wrapping materials and boxes, and pack and ship the esrogim to the consumer. The beis din represents the public interest, supervises the hiring of necessary labor, the rental of equipment, and the delivery of the esrogim to a convenient distribution center near the consumer.

Obviously, no one expects the pickers, sorters, truckers, and other laborers to work as unpaid volunteers; they, also, are entitled to earn a living. Similarly, the managers who coordinate this project are also entitled to an appropriate wage for their efforts. Furthermore, there is no reason why beis din cannot hire the owner of the orchard to supervise this massive project, paying him a wage appropriate to his significant skills in knowing how to manage this operation.

WHO PAYS FOR OTZAR BEIS DIN SERVICES?

The otzar beis din divides these costs among the consumers. The charges to the esrog user should reflect the actual expenses incurred in bringing the esrogim to their consumers, and may not include any charge or profit for the finished product (Minchas Shelomoh, Shvi’is 9:8 pg. 250). Thus, otzar beis din products should cost less than regular retail prices for the same items. (See Yerushalmi 8:3 that shvi’is produce should be less expensive than regular produce.)

All the halachos of shmittah apply to otzar beis din produce, which therefore may not be sold for profit. Acquiring from an otzar beis din is not really “purchasing,” since you are not buying the fruit from anyone, but are receiving a distribution – your payment is exclusively for necessary operating costs. For this reason, if the otzar beis din is run correctly, the money paid for its products does not acquire kedushas shvi’is, because it is paid not in exchange for the shmittah fruit, but as compensation for expenses (Minchas Shelomoh, Shvi’is 9:8 pg. 250).

Although many otzarei batei din allow sellers to grade esrogim according to quality, a particularly beautiful esrog cannot command a price any higher than any other esrog in its general category, and the price of the entire category must reflect only the actual costs incurred. Selling an esrog at a higher price than this violates the rules of the otzar beis din and the laws of shmittah. In addition, the money received would be in exchange for a purchase and consequently have kedushas shvi’is that requires appropriate care. As a result, negotiating a particularly high price for a specifically beautiful esrog is certainly forbidden.

BIUR – ELIMINATION

At this point in our discussion, we need to explain the concept of biur shvi’is. One requirement of shmittah produce is that when it is no longer available in the field, it becomes subject to biur. The word biur literally means elimination, as in biur chometz, which refers to the destruction of chometz performed each year before Pesach. Biur shvi’is means that one removes shmittah produce from one’s possession when the biur date for this species arrives.

Although the Rishonim dispute exactly what biur shvi’is entails, we rule that it means declaring ownerless (hefker) any shmittah produce in one’s possession (Ramban, Vayikra 25:7; cf. Rashi, Pesachim 52b s.v. mishum and Rambam, Hil. Shmittah 7:3 for alternative approaches.) For example, let us say that I picked shmittah apricots and canned them as jam. When no more apricots are available in the field, I must take the remaining jam and declare it hefker in the presence of three people (Yerushalmi, Shvi’is 9:5). I may do this in front of three close friends who will probably not take the jam after my declaration; it is sufficient that they have the right to take possession. If someone fails to perform biur, the shmittah produce becomes prohibited for consumption.

Produce still in the possession of an otzar beis din at the time of biur is exempt from being declared hefker. The reason is that this product is still without an owner – the otzar beis din is a distribution center, not an owner. However, produce originally distributed through an otzar beis din and now in private possession must be declared hefker. We will discuss shortly how this impacts on our esrogim.

HAVLA’AH

At this point, we must discuss a very misunderstood concept called havla’ah, which means that one includes the price of one item with another. The Gemara (Sukkah 39a) describes using havla’ah to “purchase” an esrog that has shmittah sanctity without the money received becoming sanctified with kedushas shvi’is. For example, Reuven wants to buy an esrog from Shimon; however, Shimon does not want the money he receives to have kedushas shvi’is. Can he avoid this?

Yes, through a strategy Chazal called havla’ah, in which Shimon simultaneously sells a different item to Reuven that has no kedushas shvi’is, such as a lulav. The lulav is sold at a high price, and the esrog accompanies it as a gift. Although everyone realizes that this is a ruse to avoid imbuing the sales money with kedushas shvi’is, the ruse works and the money does not have kedushas shvi’is.

HAVLA’AH PROBLEMS UNIQUE TO OTZAR BEIS DIN

However, it is inconsistent to purchase an esrog with havla’ah and acquire it through otzar beis din at the same time. Otzar beis din means that I am not purchasing the esrog, but receiving it from those who picked it for me. I am paying, not for the fruit, which is rightfully mine, but for the expenses, just as I compensate a friend who ran an errand on my behalf. Since the money is for expenses and not for the fruit, how can the otzar beis din agent charge extra for the esrog by saying he is selling an expensive lulav? The moment I pay an unwarranted sum for the esrog, I have nullified his role as agent, and instead, he is engaging in commercial trade in violation of shmittah. Thus, most instances of havla’ah cannot be utilized when someone is selling shmittah produce through an otzar beis din (Maadanei Aretz 7:2; note to Minchas Shelomoh, Shvi’is 9:8 pg. 251; see also Sfas Emes to Sukkah 39a).

Although I am aware of esrogim dealers who sell expensive otzar beis din esrogim through havla’ah, I know of no halachically acceptable method to do this. Hopefully, some authority holds that one may use otzar beis din in this way. However, Rav Shelomoh Zalman Auerbach, z”tl, and Rav Elyashiv, z”tl, both prohibited this practice.

EXPORT

Having explained many of the issues of shmittah esrogim, we are still left with one major subject to discuss. At the beginning of this article, I mentioned that the Mishnah prohibits exporting shmittah produce to chutz la’aretz (Mishnah Shvi’is 6:5). If that is true, how are so many thousands of Israeli-grown esrogim arriving in chutz la’aretz? Are the shippers all violating shmittah?

This question has been the subject of much halachic debate within the last century. I am aware of several innovative approaches to permit the export.

A very prominent Eretz Yisroel talmid chacham, Rav Yehoshua Tzvi Michal Shapiro, passed away in the early twentieth century leaving behind extensive notes and correspondence on a wide range of halachic areas. These materials were edited and published in 5680 (1920) by the renowned gadol, Rav Yaakov Moshe Charlap, under the title Tzitz HaKodesh. In his responsum addressing the export of esrogim to chutz la’aretz, Rav Shapiro suggests three creative heterim to permit exporting esrogim to chutz la’aretz. The first approach assumes that Chazal prohibited exporting shmittah produce out of concern that the fruit would be eaten in chutz la’aretz, since shmittah produce may be eaten only in Eretz Yisroel. Indeed, there are early authorities, most notably the Raavad, who rule that shmittah produce may be eaten only in Eretz Yisroel, even though this position is by no means universally accepted. (Raavad commentary to Sifra, Behar 1:9; responsum of Rav Avraham Eizen published in Beis HaRidbaz 5:18; cf. Ridbaz, ad locum, who contends that this approach is not accepted halacha.)

Assuming that Chazal prohibited exporting shmittah produce to chutz la’aretz out of concern that it might be eaten there, the Tzitz HaKodesh reasons that it is permitted to export esrogim, since they are not usually eaten (Tzitz HaKodesh Volume 1 #15:4).

The Tzitz HaKodesh suggests two other ingenious methods whereby one could legitimately export esrogim, including a suggestion that a gentile ship them. The other option contends that one may ship shmittah produce to chutz la’aretz to fulfill the mitzvah, if one stipulates that they are returned to Eretz Yisroel afterwards. (By the way, several shmittos ago, the esrog I purchased contained such instructions inside the box, obviously based on this psak.)

Another authority suggests a different rationale to permit exporting shmittah esrogim. He cites sources that the prohibition to export shmittah produce is because the biur of all shmittah produce must be in Eretz Yisroel, and Chazal were concerned that the fruit may remain in chutz la’aretz until the time for biur arrives. He then contends that the law of biur does not apply to esrogim, since some esrogim always remain on the tree. Since esrogim are always available in the field, the law of biur does not apply to esrogim, and the prohibition to export is similarly inapplicable (Beis Ridbaz 5:18; however, cf. Minchas Shelomoh, Shvi’is 6:5).

IMPORTING ESROGIM FROM ERETZ YISROEL

Rav Moshe Feinstein accepted none of these rationales to permit export of shmittah esrogim. Nevertheless, he ruled that the importer does not violate halacha by ordering shmittah esrogim from Israel, since the exporter is acting on the basis of a lenient psak (Shu”t Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 1:186).

WHAT DO I DO WITH MY ESROG?

For the most part, those living in North America are concerned less about whether they may import esrogim from Eretz Yisroel, and more about what to do with such an esrog after Sukkos. The esrog keeps its kedushas shvi’is until it becomes inedible, and one may not actively facilitate its decay process nor ruin it in any way.

According to one approach suggested by the Tzitz HaKodesh, one may be required to ship the esrog back to Eretz Yisroel after Sukkos. However, most authorities do not require this.

Assuming that return shipping is not required, one still may not destroy the esrog after Sukkos, but one is not required to preserve it. Therefore, the simplest solution is to remember not to wrap up the esrog on Hoshanah Rabbah. Without wrapping or refrigeration, the esrog will soon dry out and become inedible. At that point, one may dispose of it.

When we look around the shul on Sukkos and see everyone holding his own set of arba’ah minim, we should sing praises to Hashem for helping us fulfill these mitzvos so easily in comparison to earlier times, when it was common for an entire community to share one set. At the same time, we should remember the modern farmer in Israel who observed shmittah with true mesiras nefesh, thereby attesting to the message of shmittah — that the Ribbono Shel Olam created the world in six days and rested on the seventh.

 

 

Hallel is our unique praise to Hashem that is reserved for special occasions. Whenever the Jews survived a crisis, they responded by singing Hallel. Thus we sang Hallel when we crossed the Yam Suf and again after the allied kings of Canaan were defeated in the days of Yehoshua. Hallel was sung when Devorah and Barak’s small force defeated the mighty army of Sisra and when the huge army of Sancheiriv fled from Yerushalayim. It was also sung when Chananyah, Mishoel, and Azaryah survived Nevuchadnetzar’s fiery furnace and when the Jews were saved from Haman’s evil decrees. After each of these events, Jews recited Hallel to thank Hashem for their miraculous salvation (Gemara Pesachim 117a, see Rashi; cf. Rashbam).

In the same vein, Chazal instituted the recital of Hallel to commemorate Yomim Tovim and days when miracles happened to the Jewish people. The Gemara teaches that we recite the full Hallel eighteen days every year in Eretz Yisrael and twenty-one days in Chutz La’Aretz. These days include: The eight days of Sukkos/Simchas Torah (nine days in Chutz La’Aretz), the eight days of Chanukah, the first day(s) of Pesach and Shevuos (Arachin 10a). Each of these days is either a Yom Tov or commemorates a miracle. Full Hallel is not recited on Rosh Chodesh because it is neither a full Yom Tov nor does it commemorate a miracle (Arachin 10b). (We will soon discuss the partial Hallel that we recite on Rosh Chodesh and the last days of Pesach.)

Hallel includes Chapters 113-118 of Tehillim, with some of the verses repeated.

WHY DO WE RECITE THESE SPECIFIC VERSES?

The Gemara says that these chapters of Tehillim were chosen for Hallel because they mention five unique events: (1) The Exodus from Mitzrayim, (2) The Splitting of the Yam Suf, (3) The Receiving of the Torah, (4) The Resurrection of the Dead, and (5) The Travails of the Coming of Moshiach.

(1)               The Exodus from Mitzrayim is explicitly mentioned in the pasuk, “B’tzeis Yisrael Mi’mitzrayim,” “when Yisrael left Egypt.”

(2)               The Splitting of the Yam Suf is implied in the pasuk, “Hayom ra’ah vayanos,” “The Sea saw and fled.”

(3)               Receiving the Torah is alluded to in the pasuk, “He’harim rakdu k’eilim,” “The mountains danced liked rams.” This refers to the mountains that danced in excitement when the Jewish people received the Torah.

(4)        The Resurrection of the Dead is implied by the pasuk, “Es’haleich lifnei Hashem b’artzos hachayim,” “I will walk before Hashem in the land of the living,” thus alluding to a future time when the deceased will return to life.

(5)        The Travails of the Coming of Moshiach is implied by the pasuk, “Lo lanu Hashem,” “Not for our sake, Hashem.” This pasuk alludes to several calamitous events that will transpire in the era preceding Moshiach’s arrival.

This is why Chazal included these specific chapters of Tehillim in Hallel (Pesachim 118a).

WHY ARE PARTS OF THE HALLEL REPEATED?

The practice of repeating some psukim of Hallel is already mentioned in the Mishnah (Sukkah 38a). Many interpretations are suggested for this custom. Rashi explains the reason for this custom as follows. From the words “Hodo Lashem ki tov” until “Pischu li shaarei tzedek” (Tehillim 118:1-18), every theme mentioned is repeated. After “Pischu li” this style ceases. However, in order to make the rest of the Hallel continue this poetic style, the custom is to repeat these last psukim.

WHY DO WE SPLIT A PASUK IN HALF?

During Hallel, we divide the pasuk “Ana Hashem Hoshia Na, Ana Hashem Hatzlicha Na” in half and recite it as two different psukim. This practice is already mentioned in the Gemara (Sukkah 38b). Normally, it is forbidden to divide a pasuk except to teach schoolchildren who may find it too difficult to learn the explanation of an entire pasuk at one time (Gemara Megillah 22a). Why are we permitted to divide this pasuk during Hallel?

Tosafos (Sukkah 38b) explains that this pasuk is different because it was originally recited as part of a conversation between Dovid HaMelech and his family. Dovid’s brothers declared “Ana Hashem Hoshia Na” and Dovid responded “Ana Hashem Hatzlicha Na” (Pesachim 119a). Therefore, even though it was subsequently written down as one pasuk, it is treated as two separate statements during Hallel.

WHY IS HALLEL RECITED STANDING THE WHOLE YEAR, BUT SITTING AT THE SEDER?

Most mitzvos are performed while standing and there are additional reasons why Hallel should be recited standing. Hallel testifies to Hashem’s miracles and wondrous deeds, and testimony must be made while standing (Mishnah Berurah 422:28). Furthermore, the pasuk in Tehillim (135:1-2)declares, “Sing praise, servants of Hashem who are standing,” implying that this is the proper way to give praise (Shibbolei Leket).

On the other hand, at the Seder Hallel is recited sitting because this demonstrates that we are freemen (Shibbolei Leket).

Someone who recited Hallel on a holiday while sitting does not need to repeat it (Mishnah Berurah 422:28, quoting Pri Megadim).

WHEN SHOULD ONE RECITE HALLEL?

Chazal derive from the verse of Hallel, “From when the sun rises in the east until it sets, shall Hashem’s name be praised,” that Hallel should be recited by day and not by night (Gemara Megillah 20b). Although the day begins when the eastern horizon lights up (amud hashachar), Chazal ruled that Hallel should not be said until after sunrise.

One should preferably recite Hallel immediately after Shacharis. However, if one failed to do so, one can recite Hallel the entire day.

The exception to this rule is when we recite Hallel on Pesach night as part of the Haggadah, since the miracle took place at night. Many communities have the custom to also recite Hallel in shul that night.

MAY ONE LEAN WHILE RECITING HALLEL?

Resting one’s weight on a table or shtender in such a way that one would fall if the support was removed is considered the same as sitting. Therefore many poskim contend that one may not lean while reciting Hallel (Magen Avraham 422:11). However, some poskim (Beis Mayer; Biur Halacha) maintain that it is acceptable to rest one’s weight on a stand or table while reciting Hallel.

WHY IS HALLEL ON SUKKOS DIFFERENT FROM HALLEL ON PESACH?

Why do we recite the full Hallel every day of Sukkos, but only on the first day of Pesach?

The Gemara gives a surprising answer. On Sukkos, we recite full Hallel daily since each day of Sukkos had a different korban in the Beis HaMikdash, while on Pesach, we do not recite full Hallel every day because the same korban was offered every day. Thus we see that to recite Hallel it is not sufficient that it is a Yom Tov; there must also be something novel about the day.

In a similar vein, we recite Hallel every day of Chanukah because the miracle became greater every day, as the oil miraculously continued burning. Therefore, each day is considered a new Yom Tov (Tosafos, Taanis 28b s.v. v’yom).

The Midrash provides a different reason why the full Hallel is not recited on Pesach — we should not recite Hallel at the time when our enemies suffered (quoted by Shibbolei Leket #174).

There is no Hallel on Rosh HaShanah and Yom Kippur because one should not sing on days when judgment is being rendered (Arachin 10b). Rambam explains that these are not days of total simcha, and that Hallel must only be recited on days of complete simcha (Hilchos Chanukah 3:6).

HALLEL ON PURIM?

Why we do not recite Hallel on Purim? After all, we do celebrate the tremendous miracle that transpired by saying the prayer Al HaNisim and doing many mitzvos. The Gemara gives three answers. (1) Because the miracle of Purim occurred outside Eretz Yisrael. (2) Because reading the Megillah is a form of Hallel. (3) Because in Hallel we say, “Praise Him, servants of Hashem,” and we are still servants of Achashveirosh (Arachin 10b).

There is a practical difference between these opinions. According to the second opinion, someone who has no Megillah to read on Purim would be required to recite Hallel! Indeed, Rambam appears to rule like this opinion (Hilchos Chanukah 3:6).

PARTIAL HALLEL

Why do we say only a partial Hallel on Rosh Chodesh and the latter days of Pesach. Reciting partial Hallel on these days originated as a minhag and not as a takanah of Chazal. Reciting partial Hallel on Rosh Chodesh as a custom is mentioned in a puzzling story.

The Gemara (Taanis 28b) relates that the Amora Rav went to Bavel. [It is unclear whether this meant the country of Bavel (Babylonia), in the environs of present day Iraq, or the city of Bavel (Babylon).] Rav was perturbed when the congregation began reciting Hallel after the repetition of Shemoneh Esrei on Rosh Chodesh. He was about to interrupt them. However, when he noticed that they were skipping parts of the Hallel (presumably similar to what we do), he chose not to interrupt them, saying, “I see that they are observing a custom of their fathers.”

Rav’s reactions seem very enigmatic. Why was he so concerned about their reciting Hallel that he was prepared to interrupt them in the middle? Furthermore, why did the fact that they omitted something make him change his mind? And, finally, why did he justify their practice on the basis that it was a custom of their fathers?

To understand what happened, we need to understand what is wrong with reciting Hallel on days not included in Chazal’s takanah.

The Gemara teaches us that someone who recites Hallel every day is a blasphemer (Shabbos 118b). What? A blasphemer! What’s so terrible about reciting Hallel daily?

The Maharal explains as follows: Non-believers sometimes ask that if Hashem is all-powerful, why does He allow evil to exist? Why aren’t all evildoers immediately destroyed? But to believers this is not a question at all, because they understand that Hashem allows the world to exist naturally without His interference. If Hashem destroyed evildoers, His existence would be so obvious that there would be no reward for those who do His will. Therefore, Hashem allows the world to function without His obvious involvement.

However, occasionally the need arises for Hashem to perform a miracle. When this happens, Hashem’s demonstrates his presence and the world temporarily switches to a miraculous mode. We commemorate these special occasions by reciting Hallel and celebrating the revelation of Hashem’s presence.

But reciting Hallel on an ordinary weekday implies that Hashem’s control over the world should always be obvious. This leads to blasphemy, because if Hashem’s control is obvious, non-believers can ask why evildoers exist and why Hashem doesn’t destroy them. Thus, the non-believer interprets saying Hallel every day as proof that Hashem is powerless to stop the forces of evil. This is, of course, terrible blasphemy (Gevuros Hashem #61). This is why Rav was so disturbed when he noticed the people of Bavel reciting Hallel on a day that is neither Yom Tov nor a day when a miracle occurred.

WHY DID RAV INDEED NOT STOP THE RECITAL OF HALLEL?

Why did Rav change his mind when he realized that the people were omitting parts of Hallel?

Although Rishonim record variant customs as to which parts of Hallel are omitted on Rosh Chodesh, every custom I have seen, as well as the usual practice today, omits the passages that include the words “Lo lanu” and “Ahavti” (see Rashi, Taanis 28b s.v. di’midalgi; Rambam, Hilchos Chanukah 3:7). These omissions delete two of the five essential components that make the Hallel a unique praise. By skipping these passages, what is left is indeed a beautiful praise, but not a fulfillment of the mitzvah of Hallel.

Only when one recites the full Hallel on a weekday is it considered blasphemy. Therefore, the custom of the community of Bavel was to recite a partial Hallel on Rosh Chodesh, thus praising Hashem for his wondrous deeds without performing an act that could, G-d forbid, imply blasphemy. This this is why Rav saw no reason to interrupt them.

DO WE RECITE A BERACHA ON “HALF-HALLEL”?

As we mentioned, Hallel on Rosh Chodesh is a custom and not a takanah of Chazal. Do we recite a beracha before reciting this partial Hallel, since reciting it is technically not a mitzvah but a custom? This question is disputed by the Rishonim. Rambam rules that one does not recite a beracha before doing a custom (Hilchos Chanukah 3:7). This approach is the prevalent custom among the Sefardim and Edot HaMizrach in Eretz Yisrael, who do not recite a beracha on Hallel on Rosh Chodesh (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 422:2). Tosafos (Taanis 28b), however, rules that one may recite a beracha on Hallel on Rosh Chodesh and the last days of Pesach, and this is the universal practice among Ashkenazim (Rema).

DOES ONE RECITE “HALF-HALLEL” WHEN DAVENING IN PRIVATE?

The Gemara rules that an individual need not recite partial Hallel on Rosh Chodesh, but that once he began reciting Hallel he should complete it (Taanis 28b). The custom among Ashkenazim is to recite partial Hallel with a beracha even when davening alone. However, one should make an effort to recite the Hallel together with the tzibur in order to avoid any shaylah. For this reason, if someone arrives late in shul, he should recite the Hallel with the tzibur and daven afterwards. If he is in the middle of Pesukei D’zimra when the tzibur begins Hallel, he should recite the Hallel with the tzibur as if it is part of Pesukei D’zimra (Mishnah Berurah 422:16).

ORDERLY HALLEL

Hallel, like Shemoneh Esrei, is one of the prayers that must be recited in order (Megillah 17a). If someone misses a word or sentence he must return to the place he omitted (Rema, Orach Chayim 422:6).

I was once in a shul on Chanukah when the chazzan inadvertently skipped Lo Lanu and recited the subsequent paragraph, Hashem Zacharanu. The chazzan, who was a talmid chacham, upon realizing his error he recited Lo Lanu and then repeated Hashem Zacharanu. Although the lay people in the shul did not understand why the chazzan repeated the paragraph, he indeed followed the correct procedure.

WOMEN AND HALLEL

Are women required to recite Hallel?

The Mishnah implies that women are not obligated to recite Hallel (Sukkah 38a). This is because Hallel is a time-bound mitzvah from which women are absolved.

However, some poskim rule that women are obligated to recite Hallel on Chanukah and Pesach since they are recited over miracles that benefited women. According to these poskim, women are absolved from Hallel on Sukkos and Shevuos since it is recited only because of Yom Tov and not because of a miracle (see Tosafos, Sukkah 38a s.v. Mi; Toras Refael, Orach Chayim#75).

The logical basis for this distinction is that women are required to keep mitzvos that are observed because of miracles that benefited them. This is why they they are required to kindle Chanukah lights, to hear Megillah on Purim and to drink the four cups of wine at the Seder (Megillah 4a, Shabbos 23a; Pesachim 108b). (For further discussion of this question, see Shu”t Beis Shearim #359; Sdei Chemed; Halichos Beisah pg. 56.)

To the Jew who yearns to make Hashem’s presence an integral part of his life, nothing is more distressing than when Hashem hides His presence. Yet, in today’s world, not only is Hashem’s presence hidden but much of modern society ignores His existence altogether. How can we safeguard ourselves from this influence?

Reciting Hallel with tremendous emotion and reliving Hashem’s miracles rekindles the cognizance of Hashem’s presence. The moments that we recite Hallel can encapsulate the most fervent experience of His closeness.

In the merit of joyously reciting Hallel, may we see the return of the Divine Presence to Yerushalayim and the rededication of the Beis HaMikdash, speedily in our days.