Category: Bein Adam LeChaveiro

Advice Line #2

Question:

My husband keeps shooting himself in the leg at every job he gets. He comes in late, leaves exactly on time no matter how hectic things are in the office, and generally seems lazy when it comes to his jobs. Then he’s surprised when he’s the first to get laid off. He was recently fired from yet another job. Is there any way I can motivate him to change, or point out what’s going on, without destroying his fragile ego?

Rabbi Yirmiyohu Kaganoff:

Anything you try to do to change your husband will just lead to more frustration and cause shalom bayis difficulties. He undoubtedly knows the problem, but a person will only change if and when he wants to. Your nudging him will not motivate him. You are probably doing a reasonable amount of nudging without even realizing it and we can assume it’s taking its toll.

The one thing you can do is try to build your husband up with positive motivation and compliments. Help him feel better about himself. Find excuses to compliment him in a sincere way, specifically on the rare occasion when he shows initiative.

Although when he is unemployed one cannot compliment him for his bringing home income, I often find it surprising that women expect their husbands to compliment them for preparing supper, but a woman does not find it necessary to thank her husband for going to work. One cannot emphasize more how much it does for a man’s ego to be complimented for earning a living and going to work, particularly when it is a struggle for him to do so.

Question:

I’m almost twenty-one years old but have not yet started dating since I have an older sister who is still in shidduchim. My parents want me to start dating already, but I don’t want to. My sister also says I shouldn’t wait for her, but I disagree. I can’t picture myself as a kalla, getting married before her. I don’t want that to happen! And once I start dating it may happen. What should I do?

Rabbi Yirmiyohu Kaganoff:

I believe you should start dating. The bottom line is that, while it’s wonderful to care for your sister’s feelings, it is not easy for a girl to find a shidduch in today’s world, and there’s no need to make it any more difficult for yourself.

The harsh reality is that your sister is not yet married, but that’s no reason to prevent you from getting married. This is particularly the case when no one else in your family seems to mind; in fact, they are encouraging you to date. It’s misplaced to worry so much about your sister’s feelings that you put your own future in jeopardy.

However, I must point out that if you are very resistant to the idea of dating, it may make the process quite difficult. If you find that you continue to struggle with feelings of ambivalence and guilt, it would be best to seek out a rebbetzin, therapist, or life coach who can help you work through these feeling.

May you and your sister both find your zivugim b’karov.

Question:

I work in a large marketing company where nearly all the employees are frum. The staff meets once a week to discuss ideas and proposals. Once a month, that meeting includes the CEO, and all ideas are finalized. Numerous times, my immediate supervisor has presented my ideas as her own. This is very detrimental to me because the possibility of a promotion is to a certain extent based on the proposal of original ideas. Her stealing my ideas is hampering my growth in the company. It’s difficult for me to say anything to my supervisor because I will be risking her wrath, and she is the darling of the CEO precisely because he thinks she is very creative. When I once broached the subject, she said I was imagining things and that the ideas were really hers. What can I do?

R’ Yirmiyohu Kaganoff:

The specific situation you are presenting is a bit unusual, because it is uncommon for a frum person who is psychologically healthy to say an outright lie to a listener who knows he is lying. Thus, there is either a major misunderstanding, something difficult to explain when this has happened repeatedly, or, more likely, one of the two parties suffers from a psychological handicap. Since we do not know which party is having this difficulty, it is hard for me to advise you.

Assuming, however, that you are indeed the party being wronged here, and you’ve repeatedly discerned this type of unhealthy behavior in your immediate superior, you have an obligation to report this to the “big boss.” The reason here is simple: Halacha requires us to protect someone else’s money, and having either an unstable or dishonest employee could cause your boss long-term financial harm.

You should make a discreet appointment with the big boss and explain only what you have observed, without any added interpretation or exaggeration. It is a good idea to review the relevant parts of Sefer Chofetz Chaim before the meeting and think through carefully exactly what you may say and how you will say it. Make it clear to the big boss that you are only meeting because of concern for his interests. Indeed, it is strictly prohibited to talk to him because you are angry at your immediate supervisor and want to get even.

Question:

My mother-in-law and I have an excellent, warm relationship. However, there is one area of conflict, which, although it doesn’t damage the quality of our relationship, causes her anxiety and me irritation. The issue is chasunah attendance. My mother-in-law’s father is one of many siblings, and they are currently marrying off their grandchildren. I see no need to kill my precious nights – work time (I work at home), housework, and much needed sleep – to attend a stranger’s chasunah just because they are my mother-in-law’s uncle’s grandchild. To satisfy my mother-in-law’s feelings, and to show that I’m not rebelling against her family’s norms (as she claims I am), I go 2-3 times a year to a chassunah when it works out for me. When I do attend, I don’t know most people there, and don’t feel my presence appreciated enough for me to have killed a night. My mother-in-law feels that my attitude is wrong. She says if I would go to the chasunahs I would develop a relationship with her cousins and my second cousins, and they wouldn’t be strangers. I feel that I don’t have the emotional resources to have a relationship with so many people, to the extent that I’d attend their simchos. My mother-in-law agreed that I present this issue to you. Please advise.

Rabbi Yirmiyohu Kaganoff:

You seem to be asking whether you are obligated to acquiesce to your mother-in-law’s request. In response, I’d like to start by briefly reviewing the halachos of kibud av va’em. You do have an obligation of kibud av v’em towards your husband’s parents, although not on the same level as your obligation towards your own parents or your husband.

However, the mitzvah includes only two components – kibud and moreh. Kibud encompasses ensuring that your in-laws have their physical needs met. This involves providing them with food if needed, bringing them a drink if requested, taking care of their medical needs if relevant, and so on. Moreh requires you to show them respect by not contradicting them, not sitting in their set places, etc.

In the situation you describe, I don’t see how either kibud or moreh comes into play. One can claim that since your mother-in-law is insisting so strongly on this, there’s an element of moreh. However, that is only a result of her feeling so strongly that she insists on it, to the extent that your refusal is rude. Her position, even under these circumstances, is by no means obvious.

If you are like most frum women today, between caring for a large household, supplementing the family income, and taking care of all your other responsibilities, you are juggling the equivalent of two full-time jobs. It seems unfair for your mother-in-law to pile even more on your already overburdened shoulders. Women today are already far too stressed, and need to spend more, not less, time with their families. Encroaching on that time for the sake of fairly distant relatives is not a wise move.

I don’t know where you live. If you live in a city where it’s acceptable to merely show up, say mazel tov, and leave, and if your mother-in-law would be happy with that arrangement, perhaps you could do that on occasion. But I wouldn’t advocate any more than that.

Question:

I’m a sheitel macher, and recently opened up my own business. There’s a problem I keep running into – relatives and good friends often assume that I will either do their sheitels entirely for free, or give them a steep discount. In addition, they often expect priority, and that I should do their sheitels before others that came earlier. I’m trying hard to establish myself, and my prices are already on the low end. Every discount impacts my parnassah. And when I push one job before another, it can hurt my reputation with the woman who now has to wait longer. I’ve tried to explain all this, but from the cool responses I’ve received, I realize that friends and relatives perceive me as mercenary and callous. What can I do?

Rabbi Yirmiyohu Kaganoff:

As a rav, I’m going to approach this question from a halachic perspective, and leave the emotional issues involved to the other respondents.

It looks like your family members are unaware of the difficult predicament in which they are putting you. Their approach to utilizing your services is misguided. Just as we are told in hilchos tzedakah that relatives take precedence over someone not related, so, too, assuming that the quality of work is identical, we should bring our business to a relative before someone else. This is not for our personal benefit so that we can get a price break; it’s so we can perform the highest level of tzedaka – that of helping someone become self-sufficient.

It seems like your friends and relatives are acting in self-interest, not halachic interest. They are probably not aware that their actions can sabotage your nascent business. You’re trying to be responsible, build a client base, and earn a good reputation; giving their sheitels priority over those that came in earlier jeopardizes all that. In addition, as you may know, businesses that fail usually do so early. This is a critical period for you and cutting into your profits at this time is not wise.

I’m not saying that it’s wrong to give a break to a friend or a relative – but that’s a gesture you can only offer once you’ve established yourself and are on secure financial footing. Your primary responsibility is to your immediate family, and supporting them has to be your first objective. Iy”H, once you are well-established you can certainly offer your family and friends discounts, but it will be because you can afford to and wish to, not because you feel pressured to do so.

Until then, it may help to discuss the issue with your local rav. Assuming that he also feels that giving discounts is incorrect at this time, you can then tell your friends and relatives that you were given a psak not to give discounts until your business is established. This will hopefully deflect the negative feedback you’ve been receiving and will perhaps prompt your relatives and friends to examine their actions through the eye of halacha.

Question:

We are a young married couple with one child and living in Eretz Yisrael. Both of our parents live in the States but about a 3-4 hour drive apart. As Pesach approaches and we made our plans to visit the US, it became clear that only one set of parents was willing to pay towards our tickets to come home. After taking this into account, we decided that we still wanted to go and would pay the other half ourselves. However, when deciding where to be over Yom Tov we are expected to split it evenly, although we feel that we should only be going to the family that paid for us to come, or at least spend most of the time with them. Please help.

Rabbi Yirmiyohu Kaganoff:

There are no obvious halachic guidelines for such an issue; it falls into the category of the “fifth Shulchan Aruch.” I’m therefore offering you my personal thoughts and judgment. One family is paying for half of your tickets; the other side is not contributing. It does seem fair that you should spend some more time with the side that is putting up money. However, there are mitigating factors that must be kept in mind:

Firstly, I’m assuming that the side that isn’t paying is not doing so because they are stingy but rather because they simply don’t have the resources. This brings up an important question: Should a family be penalized for not having the financial wherewithal that another family has been blessed with?

Secondly, if one side has more resources than the other side, it’s probable that they come to visit in Eretz Yisrael on occasion, while the financially-strapped family probably comes rarely, if at all. This means that if you don’t go visit them, you may never see them.

These factors indicate that you and your spouse need to sit down and have an open, honest conversation about the issue and reach a decision together. Although such discussions are not easy, realize that the making of a strong marriage comes through discussing sticky situations and working out issues.

Try to depersonalize the discussion and really focus on the points that the other person is making. Sometimes, it’s helpful for each of you to “plead” the other side. Let the spouse whose parents are paying enumerate why the Yom Tov should be split, and let the one whose parents aren’t able to chip in list the reasons the lion’s share should be spent by the parents who are paying. Doing this will help you get out of your own headspace and see another perspective. Keep speaking until you reach a decision that you’re both comfortable with. I wish you much hatzlacha.

Advice Line

I am sharing responses to people who asked me for advice.

Question:

We are a young couple living in E”Y. Over the past few years my younger brother has been learning here and we’ve gotten to know him quite well. Now he’s back in Lakewood and my mother is pursuing shidduchim for him. She told me she thinks he’s the catch of the century. She’s only looking for the best, smartest, most serious girl, and has narrowed her list to very specific seminaries and standards. The problem is that my husband and I know my brother pretty well by now, and he’s not a very serious learner. He’s a lovely boy, a great uncle to my kids, and a fun person to have around, but he definitely does not keep to his sedarim and would much rather sit on my couch and shmooze than go to the beis medrash. Should I tell my mother what I know about my brother? I can’t imagine that she’d believe me. Is there anything else I can do?

Rabbi Yirmiyohu Kaganoff answered:

It seems from your description that your brother would not be servicing Klal Yisrael or himself well by being a long-term, full-time learner. He should ideally be directing his kochos towards harbatzos Torah. You mention his love of children. He’d very possibly shine in chinuch (and I mean chinuch in the broad sense of harbatzos Torah, be it teaching, kiruv, or rabbanus) but he’s being forced into a mold that isn’t a good fit.

The burning question is who can direct this bachur and help him make these crucial life decisions? To address this, I’d need to know more about your family dynamics. Are his future plans heavily influenced by your parents? If they understand fully who he is, will they be able to direct him properly?

Your mother seems to view the world in a very black and white way (I don’t know if this is coming from a great appreciation of learning or from the pressure to have her son in a frum “Ivy League” environment). How would she react if your brother would choose to be a third-grade rebbe or an out-of-town high school teacher (possibly the way he can serve Hashem best)?

It also sounds like your mother is not easily influenced. Does she not take direction from anyone or will she just have a hard time listening to you because you’re her child and she doesn’t take you seriously? You haven’t mentioned your father. Where does he stand in this situation?

The last element to consider is the girls being redt to your brother. Today, a girl often feels that she can only be a good, frum girl if she marries a boy who is a full-time learner, with either she or her parents supporting him. The Torah is actually that, while a woman should enable and assist her husband and children to learn and should keep the atmosphere in the home Torahdik, she should not be supporting the family. That is the husband’s halachic responsibility.

These beliefs, in my opinion, are contributing to both the shidduch crisis and to shalom bayis issues. The bottom line is that there are far fewer boys capable of long-term learning than there are girls who want to marry them, and this mismatch causes shidduch problems. The desire to marry only a person in full-time learning, or to have a son like that, sometimes stems not from a place of idealism, but from gaavah. A girl should want a boy who is serious about his Yiddishkeit, but that doesn’t mean that he needs to be rosh yeshiva material.

Because the shidduch market is what it is, your mother may find the type of girl she wants for your brother, despite his true colors. If the girl’s family does proper research, they will no doubt find out the truth. However, the girl may still choose to marry him.

If he does date a girl who thinks he is what he is not, it’s not your responsibility to open her eyes. It’s her family’s job to research the aspects that are important to them. If the couple does get married and the girl is disappointed, she won’t be alone. Many girls are disappointed in the Torah level of their husband; at least this girl will be getting a solid ben Torah, and hopefully they will build a Torah true home together, whatever your brother chooses to do.

It’s hard for me to give a final response, because I don’t have sufficient information. The answer is dependent upon a few subtle points which you haven’t included. I do think you should try to clue your mother in to your brother’s true nature. It would be good for him if your mother knows where his strengths do and don’t lie; she can then direct him in the right way both in shidduchim and in life.

This may best be accomplished by speaking with your father, who perhaps can hear the truth more easily. You know your parents best, and will know what approach will be most likely to yield results.

Question:

I have a friend to whom I feel very close but who does not live nearby. From our phone conversations I get the sense that her husband has very unrealistic expectations of her. For example, a few days after she gave birth, she was serving hot breakfast to her father-in-law. Her husband leaves the house at 6:30 a.m. and comes home close to midnight, leaving her to take care of a houseful of small children, errands, shopping, cooking, cleaning — totally on her own. Now he wants her to take a job since money is tight. On hectic Friday afternoons he expects her to serve him lunch.

I don’t want to, chas v’shalom, interfere in her shalom bayis or threaten her marriage. However, I see that she has a submissive personality and does not assert herself. When she was serving breakfast days after giving birth, it wasn’t because her husband demanded it, but because she knew that he expected it; she didn’t think of saying no. When she was cooking and cleaning on Erev Shabbos with 102-degree fever, kids jumping all over, and husband nowhere in sight, it wasn’t because he was trying to be evil, but rather because she didn’t tell him that she needed help or that he should buy takeout. Should I encourage her to say no more often and assert herself? Should I point out that husbands should be helping more? Or should I just empathize and provide a listening ear?

Rabbi Yirmiyohu Kaganoff answered: This is a difficult question to answer since there are several core elements we do not know.

First, is the man clueless how to relate to his wife and as a result acts in a way that is grossly inconsiderate, or is he malicious, or is he something in between? Some men are completely unaware of how to deal with marriage and a wife. Often, when someone enlightens them, they are willing, and sometimes even happy, to work on change. On the other hand, some men have tendencies towards emotional abuse, and will never see themselves as being in the wrong.

The second important factor is how does your friend feel about this? Are her stories of what’s going on in her home a cry for help, or simply a description of what’s going on during the course of the day? Is she at a breaking point, or basically managing? Last, what would be the price of involvement? If you open up her eyes and help her realize the unjustness of the situation she is in, you will be opening a Pandora’s box that may be best left closed. Bringing her to realize how insensitive her husband is can jeopardize a marriage that, while not joyous, may be quite bearable and far preferable to divorce (which can certainly happen if she becomes unhappy enough).

I once heard from a gadol of the previous generation that if a couple is not arguing, even if we don’t think their marriage is good, we should not get involved. The exception, as I see it, is if abuse is taking place, since in most cases of abuse, there is no arguing taking place. This situation, however, is very gray. While it sounds very much like abuse, without more details, it’s hard to say that’s what is going on here.

Rather than bring the difficulty of the situation to her attention, I’d recommend that you find a way to have someone speak to the husband. Find someone he respects — a rebbi figure, a rav, a family member — and appraise them of what is going on; see if they can carefully speak to him about the way a man is meant to treat his wife.

If he insists that he does nothing wrong and whatever is wrong is her fault, or if he gets angry at the interference and takes it out on his wife, then you would have a clear sign that you are dealing with an abusive personality. However, if he is as you describe him – clueless but not evil — it’s very possible that opening his eyes can help rehabilitate this marriage. In the latter situation, the possibility exists that he will willingly go to therapy. This is even more likely if he has Asperger’s, or as the professionals prefer to call it today, is “on the spectrum,” which may be a possibility here.

In addition, as her friend, you should give her whatever support you can, be it a listening ear or any physical help you can offer. If you feel that the situation is worsening, or if you think that there are already elements of emotional abuse, then you should definitely seek the advice of a rav as to how to proceed.

Seeing Is Not Always Believing

Question #1: Exporting grain

Who authorized Yosef to export grain, the most important commodity in a famine year?

Question #2: Head of State

When is the first time in history that we see that the two positions, that of “head of state” and “head of government,” were separated?

Question #3: Bris Milah

Why did Yosef command the Egyptians to perform bris milah? After all, Jews do not proselytize.

Question #4: Retail

Why did Yosef only sell retail?

Question #5: Yosef’s Brothers

When did Yosef’s brothers realize how great he was?

Last week, we saw how Yosef presented an absolutely brilliant agricultural and financial plan for Egypt. We are going to continue from the point that we left off —

Let us look at three statements in the following pasuk (Bereishis 41:40).

Pharaoh continues talking to Yosef: “You shall be over my household, and by your orders will all my people be provided; only by my chair will I rise above you.”

What does “my household” refer to? It certainly doesn’t mean his domestic household.

In those days, a state, a country, ministries, cabinets – they were all one thing, run out of the household of the king. As I noted in last week’s article, Yosef had advised that they appoint someone who would have power over the entire country, including even the military and all construction projects. We explained why the economic overseer needed to be above all the other ministers of the land. Pharaoh now tells Yosef that he will be the highest officer of the entire government. “All of my ministers will be required to answer to you, either directly or indirectly. In addition, you will have a very specific responsibility in connection with this entire program: only according to your instructions will people be fed. You will be in complete control, the absolute ruler, the czar over the Egyptian economy. Your specific charge in that role is to make sure that everyone in the nation is fed, and, at the same time, no one will be fed without your approval.”

I would like to point out something curious: Pharoah authorizes Yosef to ensure that everyone in the country has food, but we do not see him authorizing Yosef to sell grain to foreigners. We are told later that Yosef does sell grain to foreigners. So, this must have been included in Yosef’s virtually absolute authority.

Let us dwell on this for a moment. If you are in a country where there is much grain or oil or the like, you only sell what is surplus and/or completely replaceable. You certainly do not sell what might be necessary for the country itself. Similarly, you only sell munitions that you can manufacture yourself, are unnecessary or are obsolete. You sell grain only when you know that have enough for this year and that next year you will be receiving more. Yosef’s fourteen-year economic plan that he presented to Pharaoh revolves around keeping enough grain to ensure that all the Egyptians are fed through the years of famine. Nevertheless, Yosef assumes control and sells grain to foreigners.

The explanation for Yosef’s actions is found in the pasuk which tells us that the Egyptians had stored more grain than they could count. Yosef realized that not only did they have enough grain for Egypt, but they had a significant surplus. Yosef may have been employed by Egypt, but he viewed himself as responsible for mankind. He did not see his obligation to ensure that only Egyptians survived. Of course, the basis of this was his realization that his “employer’ was not Pharaoh. It is G-d.

Moreover, his selling grain to other nations ensures that Pharaoh and Egypt became the most powerful nation in the world. Selling grain out of the country serves Egypt’s interests. Thus, we have successfully addressed our opening question.

The pasuk continues: “I will continue to have the royal throne over you.” This is reiterated to Yosef by Pharaoh.

My five-year-old grandson climbed up a stack of plastic chairs, and he said that “I am above everyone!” I told him that he was doing what Pharaoh did: “Only my chair I will keep above you.” Another peek into a complex personality of an absolute ruler…

However, let us note something significant. Pharaoh literally says: “only by the throne am I greater than you.” This implies that Pharaoh has limited himself to being only the Head of State, and given Yosef full powers as the Head of Government. Presumably, this is the first time in history where these two roles were separated.

Let us return to the Chumash:

Pharaoh continues to speak to Yosef and says: “Behold, I have placed you above the entire land of Egypt.” And the next pasuk: “Pharaoh gave his ring to Yosef.” We know from here and elsewhere that Yosef now has total authority to legislate anything that he wants in Egypt. Pharaoh has ceded to him absolute legal authority and control. All that is withheld from Yosef is the throne.

Pharaoh dresses Yosef in fine clothes and places him in the second chariot… and says to him: “I am Pharaoh,” Although you have complete authority, do not forget that I am Pharaoh and I am above you.  “I am Pharaoh, and, without your permission, no one in the land of Egypt will move even their hand or foot.”

Aside from the homiletic midrashic passage on the words “the second chariot,” the rishonim and other early commentaries have two differing ways to explain what is meant by “the second chariot.” I had always assumed this to mean that there was a chariot reserved for the prime minister of Egypt and that Pharaoh gave that chariot now for Yosef’s use. Aside from some curious political problems that this creates (would not the previous user of this chariot now begin plotting against Yosef for taking away his position and honor), it does not fit particularly well into a literal reading of the pasuk. Literally, the pasuk states that “Pharaoh had Yosef ride in the second chariot that was his,” or more accurately rendered into English as “Pharaoh had Yosef ride in his (Pharaoh’s) second chariot. In other words, precisely because of concerns that the current chief minister would be jealous of Yosef, Pharaoh gave Yosef his own second chariot – the one that was used for when Pharaoh’s main chariot needed servicing. Pharaoh will have a new chariot manufactured for himself, but Yosef will use the chariot that no one ever used before – except Pharaoh.

Pharaoh gives Yosef a new name and a wife, and we are told that Yosef was thirty years old when all this happens.

Note that Yosef does not choose his wife — Pharaoh assigns Yosef a wife. Apparently, becoming head of government in Egypt means that you can rule over everyone else, but your own most intimate decisions are rendered by Pharaoh. We see this again in next week’s parsha, when Yosef needs to ask Pharaoh for permission to leave the country to bury his father.

Also note (as already noted by Ibn Ezra) that Yosef’s father-in-law is a priest – and therefore not from the ruling elite of Egypt. I presume that Pharaoh did not want any noble to be able to claim that he was Yosef’s father-in-law or brother-in-law. Pharaoh wanted Yosef’s personal life to be completely outside the view of Egyptian society. He would be above the social dynamics of the higher echelons of Egypt, as, no doubt, Pharaoh was.

It is not written in the text, but how many wives should we assume that Pharaoh, a king in an ancient Oriental monarchy, had? We can presumably assume that he had a large harem, possibly hundreds of wives.

How many wives did Yosef have? Only one. Yosef did not treat himself as an Oriental ruler. He acted as a typical Jewish husband, and this was the household he created. Even with all the power and control that he was given, he remained Yosef. This is why he could influence his sons to remain in his unique place in the world and not assimilate into Egyptian society. The chances of them not assimilating were almost nil, and yet we see that they did not.

Returning to the pasuk. The entire seven years of the tremendous bounty is mentioned in one single, small pasuk (v. 47). When something is well planned out, even in its minor details, carrying it out can be so smooth that there is nothing to report.

But this is not what normally happens. What usually occurs is what we see in Putin’s war in Ukraine. Everything was planned out, but nothing goes according to plan.

With Yosef, however, all went according to plan. “The seven years of plenty that were in the land of Egypt ended.” We are told what was happening in Yosef’s household (vv. 50-52) and that the plans that were put in place beforehand were happening. All the local cities were storing their grain but were doing so in national silos. Because Yosef had nationalized the entire economy, the local governments had smoothly become arms of the national government. Yosef had used his powers to take complete control of the country’s grain storage.

“And the seven years of famine started as Yosef had predicted, and all the surrounding lands were struck with famine.”

We see that the famine affected the lands surrounding Egypt. But did these lands have the seven years of bounty? It seems not. If we look back at Pharaoh’s dreams and Yosef’s interpretations, the seven years of bounty applied only to the land of Egypt, while the famine included the surrounding lands. The surrounding lands did not stockpile in advance, while Egypt did.

Now the famine has begun, but there is still bread in Egypt. The next pasuk states: “The whole people of Egypt became hungry, and they cried to Pharaoh.” Note that they went to Pharaoh, not Yosef. To them, Yosef was an outsider, even though, and perhaps specifically because, he had so much power and control. “And Pharaoh said to them: ‘Go to Yosef and do what he commands.’” After all, Pharaoh was no longer the head of government. Yosef was.

This is slightly off-topic, but the midrash, quoted by Rashi here, says that Yosef commanded them to perform bris milah. Why did Yosef make them circumcise themselves? It is a commandment for Jews, not gentiles, and we do not try and proselytize. I saw a sefer that had nine answers to this question, the vast majority based on kabbalah. I do not have the background to address those answers, but there is a beautiful answer from Rav Yonasan Eibeschutz in his Ye’aros Devash. Yosef knew that Bnei Yisrael would end up in Egypt for a significant period of time, for over two hundred years. He knew that they would assimilate to some degree with Egyptian culture, and he wanted to make sure that they would not lose the most basic mitzvah of bris milah. By having everyone surrounding them circumcised, he ensured that no matter how assimilated they became, Bnei Yisrael would continue to practice bris milah, just like everyone around them.

Continuing with the Chumash: “The famine was across the whole land. Yosef opened storage areas across the land, vayishbor to Egypt.” This word vayishbor is a very unusual word. Usually, vayimkorwould be used for “and he sold.” The word vayishbor means specifically, “and he sold retail.”

No one was permitted to purchase more than was needed for his family. Yosef absolutely would not permit it, and this prevented hoarding. No one could hoard if it was impossible to purchase more than was needed for their family’s immediate needs. It was a brilliant plan of Yosef’s, not only to ensure that there was enough not only for the Egyptians to survive, but also for the rest of the world. Yosef knew how much food there was, where it all was, and where it all went.

“The famine was very strong in Egypt.” And the next pasuk tells us, “All the lands came to Egypt to buy grain from Yosef.”

“And Yaakov saw that there was shever in Egypt.” Throughout this story we have been talking about grain, bread, and the like. We said about Yosef that vayishbor, that he sold retail. What does Yaakov now see? That one can buy retail in Egypt. One would not be able to go to the Egyptians and make a deal about becoming their agent in Canaan; one would only be able to buy retail in Egypt. This was how Yosef ensured that there would be no hoarding or racketeering. One would have to go in person and present himself; this would prevent even the most determined of racketeers.

“Yaakov said to his sons, lamah tisra’u?” There are many interpretations regarding what this means. One interpretation is that he told his sons, “Why are you looking at one another as if to see who will be the one to go down to Egypt? They will only sell each person enough for himself and his immediate family. For us to receive enough food, you all need to go.”

Here is an interesting question: The first pasuk says that Yaakov sawthat there is retail food in Egypt, while the second pasuk has Yaakov tell his sons that he heard that there is retail food in Egypt. Why the difference?

Rashi explains that Yaakov knew what was happening in Egypt through a prophetic vision. He saw via prophecy that there was food to be purchased in Egypt. But he tells his sons that he heard about this. Yaakov does not tell his sons that he had a prophetic vision — he is a humble man, even hiding his greatness from his sons. Instead, he tells them that he “heard” that there is food for sale.

The pasuk continues: “Go down, buy us a little food so that we can live and not die.” And so the brothers go down to Egypt.

I would like to share an idea with you about the next part of the story.

The story continues with the brothers descending to Egypt and their meeting Yosef. They do not recognize Yosef and Yosef recognizes them. Rashi famously says that this was because the brothers last saw Yosef when he was still a young man, without a beard. I believe there could be a simpler explanation as well.

The midrash says that, when the brothers descended to Egypt, they were searching for Yosef. They went through ten entrances so that they could search all over for him. Where did they expect to find him? Where you would find slaves. They searched in the work camps, the press gangs and other lowly slave workers. We see that even when they have their entire dialogue with Yosef, they keep saying, “Oh, we were too harsh on the kid.” But they do not at any point think that Yosef had been right, that one day he would be their ruler and they would bow down to him. Not for an instant. This is where the big shocker in Parshas Vayigash comes in.

The midrash on Yosef’s revealing himself is incredible. The pasuk says that Yosef sent everyone out of the room. According to the midrash, Yosef turns to his brothers and says: “You lied. You said that your brother is dead, but he is not dead.”

“He’s not dead? How do you know?” The brothers ask, surprised.

“He is alive. I know him. He is in this very room.”

The brothers, says the midrash, begin to search the room, looking for any place where someone could hide. Even with all the hints in front of them, they could not believe that this person in front of them, this person who has saved the world, is their kid brother Yosef. This is like the Gemara eloquently says: We can stare at the truth for our entire life and never see it — because we do not want to see it.

Seeing is not always believing…

We have now answered most of our opening questions. I recommend that you check back and see if you feel that they have all been answered to your satisfaction!

Geneivas Da’as

Question #1: “Stealing” Minds

How do you “steal someone’s mind”? Is that like borrowing his brains?

Question #2: Potential Guests

May I invite someone for a meal, knowing that he always declines invitations?

Question #3: Mistaken Identity

Someone donated money to our organization, but it is clear that she did not realize what we do. Must I bring this to her attention?

Question #4: Permission to Deceive

Am I ever permitted to be deceptive?

Introduction

When someone deceives his fellowman, he may violate two different prohibitions of the Torah. The first is called ona’ah, cheating or taking unfair advantage. Selling something that is definitely worth less than the money received qualifies as ona’ah that the Torah forbids. This includes selling merchandise that is defective in a non-obvious way, or engaging in a transaction on the basis of insider information. It also includes over-presenting a product or disguising its blemishes.

In most circumstances, if ona’ah was violated, the cheated party has a halachic right to get his money back or to be compensated the difference in value. There are many more details concerning the prohibition of ona’ah, which I discussed in a previous article, How Much May I Charge.

Geneivas da’as

This article will deal with a different form of deception called geneivas da’as, literally “stealing a mind.” This means that a person misleads someone else concerning a matter or item. This is prohibited, even when the deceived party does not lose money or value as a result. It applies even in non-financial matters; intentionally misleading someone is prohibited as geneivas da’as.

There are several halachic differences between ona’ah and geneivas da’as. As I mentioned above, if a situation violates ona’ah, the cheated party may be entitled to invalidate the entire sale, or to receive back the amount of the deception. (In some instances when the amount of deception is small relative to the value of the sale, halacha does not require restitution. I refer you to the above-referenced article.) On the other hand, geneivas da’as does not require restitution, since there was no direct financial benefit as a result of the deception that occurred.

Here are a few examples of geneivas da’as:

Deception without cheating

1. The deceiver convinces his customer that the item has a benefit that it does not have. This is forbidden, even though the feature does not increase the item’s sale value.

2. Misleading a customer to think that he is getting a bargain, when he is buying something at its correct price, is geneivas da’as. In other words, it is prohibited to tell someone that the item is being sold at a discount, when the purchaser is paying the actual worth of the merchandise. There is deception going on, even though there is no cheating. Notwithstanding that the buyer is not losing any money, he is still being deceived, and this is a violation of geneivas da’as.

A purchaser may also violate geneivas da’as, if he attempts to convince the seller that the item is worth less than it really is. Also, note that there might be a prohibition of ona’ah if your customer assumes the product to be higher quality than it is, and therefore, agrees to a price that is inappropriately high.

Donations

3. Here is another instance that involves geneivas da’as: someone donated money to tzedakah, specifically requesting that the money be used for a particular cause, but the money is instead diverted to a different purpose. For example, taking funds earmarked to help destitute Torah scholars and using the money for people who are not scholars or not even observant of mitzvos involves geneivas da’as (Orach Meisharim 24:7). Since this is a violation of geneivas da’as, it applies equally if the donor is non-Jewish.

However, if the use is included in the term the donor expressed when he made his donation, it is not geneivas da’as. For this reason, we can explain the famous, although possibly apocryphal, anecdote attributed to the Ponevitzer Rav. A person who was not observant made a large donation to theRav, specifying that the money be used for Torah study by students who would not be wearing yarmulkas. The Ravused the money to fund a Beis Yaakov, which certainly met the requirements as expressed by the donor, although it may not have been what he intended.

Similarly, it is said that the Klausenberger Rav, who did not accept donations for his Torah mosados from individuals who were not Shomrei Shabbos, accepted donations from non-observant individuals for his “institutions,” and used the funds for Laniado Hospital.

Mezuzah for a gentile

Rav Moshe Feinstein rules that the following case is an example of geneivas da’as: A gentile asked his Jewish landlord to place a mezuzah on the gentile’s door. Rav Moshe prohibits placing an invalid mezuzah on the door, because of geneivas da’as (Shu”t Igros Moshe, Yoreh Deah 1:184).

Giddin and gentiles

In parshas Vayishlach, the Torah teaches us the mitzvah of gid hanasheh, the prohibition of eating the sciatic nerve, which runs along and over the thigh bone. The Mishnah (Chullin 93b) states that it is permitted to send the leg portion of a shechted animal to a non-Jew with the gid hanasheh intact, because it is obvious that it is there. The Gemara is highly curious as to what the Mishnah is trying to teach. There is nothing wrong with a non-Jew eating gid hanasheh, since this is not one of the mitzvos which he is commanded. If the concern is that the non-Jew may sell the meat to a Jew who does not realize that the gid hanasheh is still there, why would a Jew be purchasing unmarked meat from a non-Jew?

After the Gemara presents several attempts to explain the Mishnah, the Gemara concludes that the Mishnah is teaching us about geneivas da’as. It is prohibited to mislead the non-Jew into thinking that you are selling him a portion of meat in which the gid hanasheh has already been removed, notwithstanding that this piece of information is basically irrelevant to him. Although the removal of the gid does not create any greater value to the non-Jew, he should not be given the impression that you sold him a product that had greater value to the Jewish seller than it really did.

Although this level of deception is not considered ona’ah (because it makes no financial difference to the purchaser), it is still prohibited as geneivas da’as, because the purchaser feels a small level of obligation, thinking that he received a product that had more value to the seller than to him, when indeed this was not true. In some future matter, he might decide to give you something to which you are not entitled, because he feels an unjustified sense of obligation to you.

Shemuel’s crossing

Once, the great amora, Shemuel, while traveling, crossed a river on a ferryboat. He asked his attendant to pay the ferry master for their fares. The attendant bartered with the ferry master, and gave him a slaughtered chicken as payment, implying that this chicken was kosher, when it was not. This act on the part of his attendant irked Shemuel, since this was an act of geneivas da’as. Notwithstanding that, to the non-Jewish ferry master, kosher and non-kosher chicken have the identical value, leading him to think that the chicken was properly kosher when it was not implies that you are giving the non-Jew something more valuable (from your perspective) than it was.

Thus, we see that giving someone an impression that you are doing him a bigger favor than you actually are violates geneivas da’as. However, we should note that most authorities contend that you violate geneivas da’as only when you say or do something that misleads the other person, but if you acted as you typically would, and there is no reason for him to think that you are misleading him, you are not in any violation.

Therefore, if the other person deceives himself, there is no violation of geneivas da’as. An example of this is when a person assumes that you attended an event specifically in his honor, but you work in that neighborhood where the event took place. Since younever said or implied that you made the trip especially for him, this is not geneivas da’as. Geneivas da’as is only if you say or do something that might lead him to such a self-deception. Therefore, it is forbidden to imply to someone that you made a special trip to attend his simcha, when, in fact, you had to be in that area anyway.

Two concerns

Geneivas da’as involves two concerns, one for the deceived party and the other for the deceiver.

It is also damaging to the individual who does the deceiving because he habituates himself to live with untruth. Of course, this affects his neshamah, and a person must train himself to live with truth.

This might be a reason why the Rambam discusses the laws of geneivas da’as in two different places: in Hilchos Dei’os (2:6), where he usually discusses how we are to develop our personalities in a Torah way, and in Hilchos Mechirah (18:1), where he discusses the laws of business honesty and ona’ah.

Non-business

The Gemara mentions several instances of geneivas da’as that have nothing to do with financial matters. An example of this is begging someone repeatedly to join you for a meal, when you do not really want him to come, and you are inviting him because you know that he will turn down the invitation (Chullin 94a). This is prohibited because the invited party feels some level of obligation to reciprocate this false invitation, and it also trains the inviter to act falsely, pretending that he wants to have this guest when he does not. Similarly, it is forbidden to send someone gifts repeatedly knowing that he does not accept them. The giver wants the intended recipient to feel indebted to him, without it costing the giver anything.

At this point, let us discuss the second of our opening questions: “May I invite someone for a meal, knowing that he always declines invitations?”

If I truly want him to visit me, there is no violation of geneivas da’as. If I don’t necessarily want him to visit, I may invite him a few times to show my respect for him. However, once he has made it clear that he does not want to accept the invitation, I should invite him only if I truly want him to come. We will also see, shortly, that if I feel that people are not showing him proper respect, I may continue to invite him (even if I don’t really want him to come), if I feel that this may influence others to respect him.

The charlatan

Here are a few more examples of geneivas da’as:

Someone who acts as a big tzadik in front of people, but is, in private, not halachically meticulous (Tosafos, Bechoros 31a s.v. vechulan and s.v. ika). This display of righteousness is a form of deception (see Sotah 21b; 22b).

Implying to someone that you did something special for him when you didn’t.

Acting as if you are someone’s best buddy, but your intention is for something else. You are misleading him to think that you are his friend. In other words, where someone is אחד בפה ואחד בלב, his actions or verbal statements imply one goal, but his heart has a different goal, he is in violation of geneivas da’as (Orach Meisharim).

Why is it called geneivas da’as?

Geneivas da’as, literally, “stealing a mind,” means creating a false impression – that is, deluding a person, i.e., giving him a false perception of reality. The Gemara (Chullin 94a) rules asur lignov da’as ha’beriyos, “it is prohibited to steal someone’s mind.”

At this point, we can address the opening question: How do you ‘steal someone’s mind?’ Is that like borrowing his brains?

No, it is not. Geneivas da’as, which can literally be translated as “stealing his mind,” means to mislead or deceive him, even when the misled party is not losing anything material as a result. Simply leaving him with a wrong impression violates the prohibition.

Mistaken identity

At this point, we can begin discussing the third of our opening questions: “Someone donated money to our organization, but it is clear that she did not realize what we do. Must I bring this to her attention?”

I was once faced with this type of situation. Let me present what happened: A school that I taught in asked me to visit a gentleman who had, a few years before, made a very generous donation. After a bit of work locating him and being able to schedule an appointment with him, it was quite clear to me that he was confusing me with someone else, and that he might have been confusing the school’s program with that of another institution. In other words, there seemed to be a case of mistaken identity. Was I required to call this to his attention?

Anyone who has this question should address it to his own rav or posek. I can tell you what I did under the circumstances, which was a split-second decision without any opportunity either to research the shaylah or to discuss it with anyone.

First of all, I had not tried to deceive the potential donor. I had been supplied with accurate information that he had made a few very large donations, and that the school had tried to be in touch with him several times, unsuccessfully, in recent years. None of this involved any deception.

I presented to him many of the special, and perhaps unique, features of our institution and emphasized aspects that I thought would attract him to make another substantive donation to our cause. None of this involved any deception.

At some point in the conversation, it became clear to me that he was confusing me with someone else whom he had met previously. To this day, I do not know with whom he was confusing me, but I certainly made no attempt to create any deception.

I neither denied nor sustained his assumption that we had met before. I simply noted that he had made very significant donations in the past, and that we were hoping he would be interested in continuing the relationship.

In short, I think I handled the situation in a way that was completely honorable from a halachic perspective.

I am sure that our readers want to know if the organization actually did receive the hoped-for donation. Unfortunately, it did not.

Permission to deceive

At this point, let us discuss the last of our opening questions: “Am I ever permitted to be deceptive?”

Notwithstanding that geneivas da’as is forbidden, and it appears that most rishonim prohibit it min haTorah, there are a few instances that may appear as if they are geneivas da’as, but are permitted halachically. In other words, although they appear to be geneivas da’as, they are not.

One situation is when you do something that otherwise would be geneivas da’as, such as, you tell people that a person is a greater Torah scholar than he really is, because your goal is that others will treat him with the respect that he deserves.

Dealing in kind

There is another instance in which halacha permits someone to overlook the geneivas da’as that will result. When dealing with someone dishonest, it is permitted to act deceitfully, if it is necessary to protect yourself. For this reason, it was permitted for Shimon and Levi to deal deceitfully with Shechem.

Conclusion

The Gemara tells us that the great tanna, Rabbi Yehoshua, the rebbe of Rabbi Akiva, was asked: “What is the best means to become wealthy?” Rabbi Yehoshua advised that, aside from being very careful in one’s business dealings, the most important factor is to daven to He Who owns all wealth (Niddah 70b). A Jew must realize that Hashem’s Torah and His awareness and supervision of our fate is all-encompassing. Making this realization an integral part of our thinking is the true benchmark of how His kedusha influences our lives.

The true believer in Hashem and His Torah understands that every aspect of his life is directed by Hashem, and that the only procedures we follow in any part of our lives are those that the Torah sanctions.

Medical Procedures on a Parent

The beginning of Parshas Tazria includes references to parent-child relationships…

Question #1: My Daughter, the Surgeon

“I specifically want my daughter to perform my upcoming operation. Is this permitted?”

Question #2: My Son, the Medic

“May my son, a trained medic, give me my daily shot?”

Foreword

One of the many mitzvos mentioned in parshas Mishpatim is capital punishment for someone, male or female, who strikes his or her parent. As we all know, the aseres hadibros include a mitzvah of kibud av ve’eim, honoring parents, and the Torah also has another mitzvah of yiras av ve’eim, treating parents with awe (Vayikra 19:3). Obviously, the opposite extreme is someone who curses or strikes his parent. Yet, there are situations in which the parent wants the child to “wound” him because of the resultant benefit. For example, if the parent needs open heart surgery, and the child is the most qualified thoracic surgeon available, he would probably want him or her to perform the operation. (We are assuming, of course, that the “child surgeon” in this instance feels that he can make objective medical decisions.) Another situation is that the parent requires an injection and it is more convenient or less expensive to have the child, who is a nurse, physician or medic, administer the injection. Yet a third, common situation is when the child is a dentist and will provide free dental care to the parent, but this involves either a painkilling shot or causing the gums to bleed.

Introduction

Although the Torah states that someone who strikes his parent shall be put to death, we know that capital punishment is meted out only when:

(a) a beis din of 23,specially-ordained dayanim rule this way,

(b) the crime is witnessed by two halachically valid witnesses,

(c)  the defendant receives a clear warning prior to performing his criminal act,

(d) he acknowledges to have understood the warning, including the ramifications of its punishment, and

(e) he commits the crime immediately (Rambam, Hilchos Mamrim 5:5).

The potential capital punishment meted out by the Torah for striking a parent establishes this as a major sin, a significant factor relating to our opening questions (see Sanhedrin 84b).

Our first discussion will be about the passages in the Mishnah and in the Gemara, located in Sanhedrin 84-85, that discuss the halachic details of this prohibition. The Mishnah (Sanhedrin 85b) states that someone who strikes his father or mother is deemed punishable by the death penalty only when he draws blood. The poskim provide three instances to explain what this means:

(1) We see blood from the injury (Bava Kama 86a). Bear in mind that bleeding can be tiny, painless and insignificant; yet, that would be included in the Torah’s prohibition. Examples of causing bleeding would include injecting something directly into a vein or pressing against sensitive gums.

(2) An injury in which it is noticeable that there is bleeding under the skin, called colloquially a “black and blue mark.”

(3) An ear injury that causes deafness, which is an indication that the blow caused internal bleeding (Bava Kama 86a, 98a).

The Gemara (84b) states that the punishment for striking a parent does not exist if the wound was for a medical purpose, such as using a needle to remove a thorn, lancing a boil, or bloodletting.

Having ruled that it is permitted to cause therapeutic bleeding on a parent, the Gemara tells us that Rav did not allow his son to remove a thorn from him, nor did Mar berei de Ravina allow his son to drain a boil. The Gemara questions: why should a son performing this procedure on his father be any different from anyone else performing this procedure on his fellowman? There is a lo sa’aseh min haTorah to injure another Jew, but this action is permitted when it is beneficial. Upon this basis, we have blood tests, perform surgery and donate blood. What difference does it make whether the practitioner performs this service for his parent or for anyone else?

The Gemara answers that the concern is that if the person performing the procedure cuts more than is necessary, this is a negligent (shogeig) violation of the prohibition. We are more concerned about a child performing this act on his parent, since this involves a more serious violation than injuring a fellow Jew. Thus, we view with greater concern something for which the Torah prescribes a high level of punishment – and there is a difference in practical halacha that results from the greater degree of culpability.

Prohibited or suggested?

The rishonim note that Rav and Mar brei deRavina seem to disagree with the previous passage of the Gemara, which permits a child to perform a medical treatment on a parent, even when it causes bleeding. Are these amora’im, Rav and Mar berei deRavina, disputing the previous conclusion of the Gemara, or, perhaps, is there another way to explain the differences between the rulings? In fact, there are numerous approaches to answer this question, two of which figure prominently among the (see Beis Yosef and Bach, Yoreh Deah 241):

(A) Rav and Mar berei deRavina conclude that, although a child may carry out these medical acts when no alternative exists, he may not do so when someone else is available to perform them (Rambam, Hilchos Mamrim 5:7). However, when no one who can perform the treatment is available, the child may do so, and we are not concerned about a potential mishap. This approach is followed as definitive halacha by the Rema and others (Bach, Gra).

(B) Others conclude that, indeed, Rav and Mar brei deRavina disagree with the position of the Gemara, cited earlier, and rule that a child may not perform therapeutic activity that will cause bleeding on a parent. Since this is the last opinion mentioned in the passage of Gemara, it is accepted by these rishonim (Beis Yosef,in his understanding of the position of the Rif and Rosh). The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 241:3) rules that this is the halachic conclusion.

So, at this point, we see that the Shulchan Aruch, usually followed by Sefardim, rules that a therapeutic treatment that causes bleeding cannot be performed by a child, even when no one else is available. The Rema and other early Ashkenazic authorities permit a child to perform these treatments when no one else is available.

When is it considered that someone else is available? What is the halacha if the procedure can be performed by someone else, but the parent prefers that the child does it. For example, the child is a well-known heart surgeon, but the surgery is considered routine and any competent thoracic surgeon should be able to perform it successfully.

Similarly, if the child will charge his parent less than someone else will, is this permitted? Notwithstanding that cost is not usually a factor when we deal with violating Torah prohibitions, here, it may be a factor, because the parent, who wants the child to perform the activity, is not violating any prohibition of the Torah. Thus, if the parent wants the child to perform the procedure because it will now be gratis, many authorities consider this as if there is no one available other than the child (Aruch Hashulchan, Yoreh Deah 241:6; Gesher Hachayim 2:1; Minchas Shelomoh 1:32)

My daughter, the surgeon

At this point, we can answer the first of our opening questions: “I specifically want my daughter to perform my upcoming operation. Is this permitted?”

The answer is that if your daughter is Ashkenazi, it is permitted, but if she is a Sefardiyah, it probably is not.

Mechilah

Does it make any halachic difference if the parent is mocheil the child in advance for any unintended injury? The Minchas Chinuch contends that had Rav and Mar berei deRavina stated that they were completely mocheil their sons, even if the result was an unintended injury, there would be no problem for the sons to perform the procedure. In the opinion of the Minchas Chinuch, the case of the Gemara is when Rav and Mar berei deRavina never declared that they were completely mocheil their sons, regardless of the result. Rav Shelomoh Zalman Auerbach rules that this approach of the Minchas Chinuch should be given credence, at least as a tziruf, which means that we may use this as a heter, combined with other reasons to be lenient.

The Minchas Chinuch proposes a further novel suggestion germane to this prohibition. He contends that if a father asks a son to injure him, there is no prohibition on the son to do so. He understands this to be included in the rule that a parent is permitted to be mocheil on his honor. However, as is noted in Minchas Shelomoh (page 184 note 2), this last opinion of the Minchas Chinuch runs contrary to a ruling of the She’iltos of Rav Achai Gaon (She’ilta #60) wherein it states that, whereas a parent may be mocheil on kavod, as is done whenever a mother prepares meals for adult children, this does not permit striking, cursing or treating a parent with disdain, which is prohibited even if the parents grant permission.

Injection

At this point, let us discuss the second of our opening questions: “May my son, a trained medic, give me my daily shot?”

Most people would not be that concerned whom they entrust with giving them a shot, provided the individual is a medical professional with proper training. According to what we have explained until this point, it would seem that, according to all poskim, this should not be performed by a child for a parent.

However, there are some differences between this case and the situations discussed by the Gemara. Inoculations and most other shots are injected into a muscle, and should not cause any bleeding. Does this permit this action, even when another professional is available, or is it no different from therapeutic bloodletting or boil lancing that is permitted, even according to the Rema, only when no one else is available? Furthermoroe, if a medical professional will charge to give the shot, but the child will do it gratis, does this permit the child to perform it?

These two questions were discussed by Rav Yechiel Michel Tukachinsky, a highly respected posek of old yishuv Yerushalayim, in his magnum opus, Gesher Hachayim (Volume II, Chapter 1). There, he mentions that he was asked a shaylah by an emergency medical technician whose mother required regular injections whether he could do them for her, something which would save both of them an appreciable amount of money. Since the Rema paskins that a physician should not perform bloodletting on his parent whenever there is another physician available who can, does that preclude a son from injecting his mother?

The Gesher Hachayim presents three reasons why he believes that it might be permitted:

(1) All the situations we have so far described involve causing bleeding for a therapeutic reason. The concern is the child might cause more bleeding than necessary. However, intramuscular shots do not usually cause any bleeding at all. Although they could cause bleeding, since, in most instances no bleeding occurs, we do not need to be concerned.

(2) To understand his second approach, I note the following: In the case of surgery, a surgeon decides where and how to make the incision. If the child surgeon uses a technique that causes more bleeding than is necessary, this might be considered a negligent violation of the Torah law.

Similarly, in the instances of bloodletting, the practitioner decides how much blood he needs to remove and, in the case of boil lancing, how he will lance the boil. There is ample room for a judgment error that will cause a greater amount of bleeding than the situation requires. On the other hand, the medic in our case of an injection is not deciding how much bleeding or cutting is necessary. Therefore, there are grounds to allow the son to provide this injection for his mother.

(3) The son’s willingness to work without charge is considered as if no one else is available. The logic is that Mom is not required to hire someone to give her the injection, when her son is willing to do so for free. After all, it is not her prohibition. Once she decides that she does not want to hire someone, no one is providing her with the necessary service, and the son is not required to hire someone to take his place.

Rav Tukachinsky then reports that after he thought of these three reasons to permit the son to inject his mom, he sent the shaylah to many rabbonim of Yerushalayim to see if they agreed with his conclusion. The three rabbonim who, indeed, answered him and agreed with him all dated their responsa, from which we see that this shaylah came up in the spring of 1944. The three rabbonim were:

(1)  Rav Yitzchak Halevi Herzog, a close, personal friend of Rav Tukachinsky, who was the Ashkenazi Chief Rabbi of Eretz Yisroel at the time.

(2) Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank, who was the rav of Yerushalayim.

(3) Rav Shelomoh Zalman Auerbach, at the time a very young, up-and-coming superstar in psak halacha. In addition to his reply published in Gesher Hachayim, a longer form of his reply is supplied in Minchas Shelomoh (#32).

Applying leaches

Rav Tukachinsky then discusses a similar, related question whether a child may apply leaches to a parent’s wound. Is this considered that the child is injuring the parent in a way that causes bleeding? Rav Tukachinsky was not convinced that this is permitted, but

Rav Shelomoh Zalman Auerbach permitted it for two reasons: When applying leaches, the leaches do not begin to draw blood immediately, and therefore this is not equivalent to striking and drawing blood from a parent. Instead, it is an indirect action that would be exonerated from capital punishment. Once this action is no longer included under the Torah’s punishment, the prohibition to perform it on one’s parent is the same as on anyone else, and is permitted when done for therapeutic reasons.

Secondly, since the parent has the ability to pull off the leaches before they begin to suck blood, the child has not inflicted any injury (Minchas Shelomoh #32:4).

Conclusion

In conclusion to this article on the concepts of kibud horim, I would like to share a comment that I once responded to in an advice column: “My mother-in-law and I have an excellent, warm relationship. However, one area of conflict causes her anxiety and me irritation. The issue is attending the weddings of extended family members, which is very large (sic.) and there are many weddings. She claims that not attending the weddings of these family members, whom I hardly know, rebels against the family norm. I attend about two or three of these weddings every year, when it works out for my schedule, and I forgo the others so that I have more time for professional work, housework, family time and much-needed sleep. On the rare occasions that I attend, I don’t know most of the people there, and I don’t feel my presence appreciated enough for me to have killed a night. My mother-in-law agreed that I present this issue to the rav. Please advise.”

I answered her: You seem to be asking whether you are obligated to acquiesce to your mother-in-law’s request. In response, I’d like to start by briefly reviewing the halachos of kibud av va’em. You do have an obligation of kibud av va’em towards your husband’s parents, although not on the same level as your obligation towards your own parents or your husband. However, the mitzvah includes only two components – kibud and morah.  Kibud encompasses ensuring that your in-laws have their physical needs met. This involves providing them with food if needed, bringing them a drink if requested, taking care of their medical needs if relevant, and so on. Morah requires you to show them respect by not contradicting them, not sitting in their set places etc.

In the situation you describe, I do not see how either kibud or morah come into play.   One can claim that, since your mother-in-law is insisting so strongly on this, there is an element of morah. However, that is only a result of her insisting so strongly that your refusal is rude.

If you are like most frum women today, between caring for a large household, supplementing the family income, and taking care of all your other responsibilities, you are juggling the equivalent of at least two full-time jobs.  It seems unfair for your mother-in-law to pile even more on your already overburdened shoulders. Women today are already far too stressed and need to spend more, not less, time with their nuclear families. Encroaching on that time for the sake of fairly distant relatives is not a wise move.

Is a Position Inherited?

Question #1: The inherited shofar

“Our shul’s longstanding shofar blower passed on. Are we required to appoint his son, when we would prefer to appoint a different master blaster?”

Question #2: I’d like a change!

“Is there a halachic reason why, in some communities, people hold their appointments on shul and school boards forever, whereas, in other communities, these positions are constantly rotated?”

Question #3: Long live the Rabbi!

“When a rav passes on, does his son have a claim to the position?”

Answer:

In several places, Chazal derive that a son qualified for a communal appointment held by his father inherits the position (Horiyos 11b; Kesubos 103b; Sifrei, Devorim 17:20). To quote the Rambam’s halachic ruling on the topic: When the king, the kohen gadol, or a different appointee dies, we appoint, in his stead, his son or someone else who would inherit from him. Whoever would be first to inherit from him comes first for the position of the deceased, provided he is a valid substitute… the same is true for any appointment in the Jewish people — one who receives it does so for himself and his descendants (Hilchos Klei Hamikdash 4:20).

The Rambam mentions this law a second time,in which he explains in more detail what is meant by saying that the son is a “valid substitute”: whoever has a prior right germane to receive inheritance has a prior right for inheriting the monarchy… not only the kingship, but any other position of authority and any other appointment in Israel is an inheritance for his son and his son’s son, forever, provided that the son fills the place of his father in wisdom and fear of G-d. If he meets the standard in fear of G-d, but not in wisdom, we appoint him and then teach him. However, anyone lacking in fear of G-d, even if he is very wise, is not appointed to any position in Israel (Hilchos Melachim 1:7).

Retiring chazzan

One of the earliest surviving responsa related to this question was penned hundreds of years ago, when the Rashba was asked about the following case (Shu”t HaRashba 1:300). A chazzan/baal keriyah had been serving a community faithfully for 38 years, a position that he inherited from his father, who had inherited the position from his father. The current chazzan’s vision is now somewhat impaired, making it difficult for him to be the baal keriyah, and he has been having his son function as baal keriyah and also as community secretary and scribe, which apparently were other responsibilities included in the position. Some members of the community are dissatisfied with the new arrangements — they feel that the son does not have as nice a voice as his father. They are requesting that either the chazzan fulfill all the requirements of his position, or that he retire and allow the community to hire a new chazzan, who can perform to their specifications. When the community hired this chazzan over a generation before, he was able to perform all his tasks admirably. They are still satisfied with his skills as a chazzan, and they would not request that he step down, as long as he can fulfill his job. However, they feel that they did not hire his replacement, and they are dissatisfied with the son’s voice, which is not as melodious as that of his father.

For his part, the chazzan notes that he has a life contract with the community, which states that no one can take his place at any of his tasks without his permission. Furthermore, he claims that most of the 150 members of the community are willing to have his son help him in the areas that are now difficult for him, whereas only about ten members voice disapproval of the new arrangement. Each of the two sides in the dispute presented its position to the Rashba to rule on the case via correspondence. We are highly grateful that they chose this specific method of dealing with their litigation, because it provides a written record of the case and the Rashba’s detailed decision. Based on what we have seen so far, how would you rule?

The ruling

The Rashba sided with the chazzan for three different reasons:

First, when you hire someone for a position as chazzan, it is self understood that he will occasionally need someone to substitute for him, either because he is ill or needs to be out of town. The Rashba rules that it is within the authority of the chazzan to choose who should serve as his substitute, assuming that he chooses someone who can do an adequate job. (A later authority, the Keneses Hagedolah, notes that there is another requirement – the substitute is G-d-fearing enough to fill the position [quoted by the Mishnah Berurah 53:84].)

Second reason of Rashba

A second reason why the Rashba rules in favor of the chazzan is that the contract states that the community cannot have someone else take his place without his agreement. This implies that the chazzan has the authority, at his option, to choose someone to assist him in carrying out his responsibilities.

The Rashba does not make any distinction between having someone substitute for the chazzan on an occasional basis and having someone assume some of his responsibilities permanently. In both instances, he considers it the right of the chazzan to assign part of this job to someone else, provided the assignee can perform the job adequately. It is not necessary that the substitute or replacement perform the job at the same level as the chazzan himself.

The son’s right

The third reason the Rashba cites is that, should the chazzan no longer be able to fulfill his responsibilities, his son has the right to the position as long as he can perform the job adequately. It is not necessary that the son have a voice as melodious as that of his father, as long as he is G-d fearing enough to fulfill the position. It is, therefore, certainly true that the son has the right to assist the current chazzan ahead of anyone else. Some later authorities rule that the son does not have a right to the position if his voice sounds strange (Magen Avraham 53:32).

To simplify: The Rashba’s first two reasons explain why the chazzan has a right to choose his own replacement, and the third reason explains why the son has the right to assume the chazzan’s responsibilities, ahead of any other candidate.

Choosing someone else

What would the Rashba hold if the different reasons are in conflict – meaning that the son would like to be his father’s replacement, but the father does not want him? The Rashba implies that, should the chazzan want to appoint someone other than his son to help him with his responsibilities, he may do so.

How do we rule?

The Rema (Orach Chayim 53:25) quotes this Rashba, but implies that he limits the right of the chazzan to appointing his son, and does not accept that the chazzan has the right to appoint someone else. The Mishnah Berurah explains as follows: There are indeed two different concepts that explain why the Rashba ruled according to the chazzan. One is that the chazzan has a right to appoint a substitute to assist him on an occasional basis, or to take over for him while he is away or ill. However, it may be that this right is his only when the substitute is temporarily fulfilling one of the chazzan’s responsibilities. It may not follow that the chazzan can appoint someone to replace him permanently in one of his roles. In this instance, that job would pass to the chazzan’s son. In the opinion of the Rema, when a permanent appointment is being made, the son has the right to the position, whereas the Rashba, himself, held that the chazzan has the right to appoint even someone other than his son on a permanent basis to assist him in his responsibilities. We will soon see a possible source for the Rema’s opinion.

Inherited his voice?

Why does the son of a chazzan have the right to inherit his father’s position? After all, when the chazzan died, he made his son into an orphan, not into a chazzan!

However, as we saw above, this halachah is in fact the case for any position in klal Yisroel: A son has the right to his father’s position, as long as he meets the basic requirements for the position.

Can the son sell the position?

To what extent does the son have the right to the position? Can he offer the position to someone else, and if so, can he do so even for payment?

An early authority, the Mordechai (Bava Kama 8:108), quoting a responsum from his rebbe, the Maharam Rottenberg, discusses this exact question. He rules that although a position of authority among the Jewish people is bequeathed to a son, the son does not have any right to give the position to someone else. He compares this to the rights of a kohen or a levi, which also are bequeathed to sons, but cannot be sold or transferred.

This is explained nicely by the Chasam Sofer (Shu”t Orach Chayim #12), who notes that a position, even of king of the Jewish people, is not inherited in the same way that one inherits property. According to the Torah, when a man dies, his sons automatically become the owners of his property. They do not require an authorization of a beis din, a court order, or a formal transfer of title – the property automatically becomes theirs. This is not the case regarding the inheriting of a position. The son does not automatically become king or kohen gadol – he must be appointed to the position. (Those interested in knowing how the kohen gadol is appointed should check the following sources: Tosafos, Zevachim 18a s.v. Hagah; Tosafos, Yoma 12b s.v. Kohein; Tosafos, Megillah 9b s.v. Velo; Aruch Hashulchan Ha’asid,Chapter 23.)

Source for the Rema

This Mordechai might be the source for the above-quoted Rema, who ruled that the chazzan may transfer some of his responsibilities to his son, but cannot appoint someone else instead of his son. The Rema accepted that it is understood that a position of chazzan will require that he occasionally needs someone to substitute, and that the choice of substitute may be left to the chazzan. But the chazzan does not own the position to the extent that he can transfer it to someone else permanently, either completely or partially.

Other reasons

Let us return to the original responsum of the Rashba, in which he ruled that the chazzan has the right to appoint his own substitute. The Rashba contends that, even without a contract, the community cannot replace the chazzan. In a different responsum (Shu”t Harashba 5:283), heprovides several reasons why a chazzan or anyone else in a community position has a right to keep his post. One reason is that halachah recognizes that, once someone has been fulfilling a communal role, he acquires a chazakah, the right of status quo, to keep the position, as long as there is no reason to disqualify him.

The Rashba presents a second reason why an appointee has the right to keep his position: because of darchei shalom. It reduces machlokes when people have an assumption that replacements are not made arbitrarily. Anyone who has lived in a community where this is not common practice can certainly attest to the strife created when a public servant’s contract is not renewed. (However, see Shu”t Maharalnach, quoted by Magen Avraham 53:32.)

A third reason why the person has the right to keep his position is because, if he is replaced, people may think that this was because of malfeasance. Maintaining him in the position protects his personal reputation.

Exceptions

Even the Rashba felt that there can be exceptions to his ruling – in other words, there are some instances in which one may be able to terminate a person’s tenure from a community position without that person having committed a malfeasance. The Rashba notes that there are places in which the recognized custom is that all positions are regularly rotated. In these communities, all appointments, whether salaried or voluntary, are temporary. He explains that since this is an accepted practice in these congregations, the reasons mentioned above why one may not remove someone from a position do not apply. Since everyone knows that his appointment is only temporary, no machlokes should result when a replacement is made. Similarly, no one will assume that an appointee was replaced because of malfeasance.

The later authorities note that this is true only when it is already an established custom in these places that appointments are always temporary and replacements are made at a specified time. However, when it is usual practice that people remain in their positions, one may not remove someone from his position, unless there was malfeasance (Shu”t Chemdas Shelomoh #7and Shu”t Chasam Sofer, Orach Chayim #206, both quoted by Mishnah Berurah 53:86). The Chasam Sofer allows another exception — when it was stipulated at the time of the original appointment that a new negotiation and appointment is necessary to renew the person’s appointment after his term is complete.

I’d like a change!

At this point, we can discuss one of our original questions:

“Is there a halachic reason why, in some communities, people hold their appointments on shul and school boards forever, whereas in other communities, these positions are constantly rotated?”

We now see that there is halachic basis both for the practice that in some communities that people remain in the position of shul or school president for long periods of time, whereas in other communities these positions are rotated on a regular basis.

A major exception?

Although we have noted that a son has a right to inherit his father’s position, several authorities contend that there is a major exception to this rule: a Torah position is not automatically inherited. One of the major advocates of this approach, the Chasam Sofer (Shu”t Chasam Sofer, Orach Chayim #12 and glosses to Orach Chayim end of 53), asked the following question: The Gemara (Yoma 72b) states that the position of kohen meshuach milchamah, the kohen anointed to provide encouragement and announce the halachos to the soldiers of the Jewish army, is not a hereditary position. Why is this position different from all the other appointments that we say are hereditary? The Chasam Sofer answers that there is a difference between positions of authority and religious positions. Positions of authority, such as king, do belong to the son, if he is qualified. However, there is no inheritance of religious positions, unless that is the accepted custom. (A similar view is stated by the Shu”t Maharashdam, Yoreh Deah #85.) The one exception to this rule is the position of kohen gadol, which the Torah says does go to the son, notwithstanding the fact that it is a religious position. Thus, the Rashba’s case in which the son inherits his father’s position as chazzan (a religious position) is only because that was the accepted custom.

The Chasam Sofer rallies support for his approach based on the fact that the positions of nasi and head of the Sanhedrin did not usually pass from father to son, but instead passed to the most qualified scholar. Only the nesi’im from Hillel and onward passed the position from father to son. The Chasam Sofer explains that from the time of Hillel until the Sanhedrin disbanded, the nasi of the Sanhedrin was also viewed as the “king” of the Jewish people, thus making it a position of authority and not merely religious. During this era, the position was bequeathed to the oldest son of the previous nasi, if he was G-d-fearing and enough of a scholar to fulfill his duties. However, prior to this era, the position was viewed only as a religious role and, therefore, it was assigned to the greatest scholar in the Jewish people.

Based on his analysis, the Chasam Sofer concludes that the son of a deceased rav does not automatically have the right to the position. If most of the tzibur does not want him, they have a right to pick any other qualified G-d-fearing Torah scholar who is qualified enough to rule on the community’s needs. They are not required to choose the most qualified talmid chacham for the position. For example, they may choose a person who is a stronger leader over a bigger talmid chacham who does not have the same leadership abilities.

The Chasam Sofer closes his responsum with the following proof to his position: The Midrash, quoted by Rashi, states that when Moshe Rabbeinu asked Hashem to appoint a leader to head the Bnei Yisroel, he wanted his sons to be his replacement. Obviously, his sons had all the qualities that Moshe felt were necessary for the position – otherwise, why would he have thought that they should qualify? Yet, Hashem chose Yehoshua for other reasons. Thus, we see that the position of Torah leader over the Jewish people is not an inherited one.

Conclusion

When the Mishnah Berurah (53:83) discusses this matter, he cites the opinions we have mentioned without ruling on the matter. Thus, an individual congregation will need to ask a shaylah whether a son has the right to father’s position, where there is no established minhag and the community would like to appoint someone else.

Gifts to the Poor

The Gemara tells us that the Torah reading of Sukkos includes references concerning gifts to the poor, to remind people of these mitzvos during harvest season.

Question #1: Leaving in Today’s World

“Is there a requirement to leave leket, shich’cha and pei’ah in your field today?”

Question #2: In Chutz La’Aretz

“I live in chutz la’aretz. Am I required to separate pei’ah on my backyard vegetable patch?”

Question #3: Cluster Alms

“Why do I need to know how a typical cluster of grapes looks?

Introduction

While harvesting grain and other produce, the Torah presents six different mitzvah opportunities to provide for the poor: leket, shich’cha, pei’ah, peret, oleilos, and maaser ani. I discussed several of these mitzvos in a recent article, but did not complete the topic. This article picks up where that one left off.

In parshas Kedoshim, the Torah mentions the mitzvos of pei’ah, leket, peret and oleilos: When you reap the harvest of your land, do not complete harvesting the corner of your field, and the “leket” of your harvest you should not collect. From your vineyard, do not remove the “oleilos,” and the “peret” of your vineyard you should not collect. Leave them for the poor and the stranger (Vayikra 19:9-10). I deliberately did not translate the words leket, oleilos and peret, since they will be explained shortly.

Shich’cha, peret and oleilos are all discussed at the end of parshas Ki Seitzei (Devarim 24:19-21).

Maaser ani is mentioned in parshas Ki Savo (Devarim 26:12)

Two of these mitzvos, pei’ah and leket, are also discussed in parshas Emor (Vayikra 23:22), in the midst of the Torah’s discussion about the festival cycle (parshas hamo’ados): When cutting the harvest of your land, do not complete the reaping of the corner of your field while you are harvesting, and the “leket” of your harvest you should not collect. Leave them for the poor and the stranger. This pasuk is the one included in our Sukkos reading.

Several halachos are quite clear from these pesukim, even without any commentary. The mitzvah is to leave behind these four items: pei’ah, leket, oleilos and peret, and allow the impoverished to help themselves. This implies that the owner may not choose or favor one pauper over another in the distribution of these gifts, and that neither he, nor anyone else, is even permitted to assist one poor person over another. To quote the Mishnah: He who does not allow the poor to collect, or allows one of them to collect but not another, or helps one of them, is stealing from the poor (Pei’ah 5:6).

Shich’cha

The mitzvah of shich’cha is discussed only at the end of parshas Ki Seitzei (Devarim 24:19): When you reap your harvest in your field, and you forget a sheaf in the field, you may not return to get it; it shall be for the stranger, the orphan and the widow, so that Hashem, your G-d, will bless you in all your undertakings. Shich’cha is different from the other four mitzvos we have previously mentioned in one significant way – it applies to produce only as it is brought in from the field, and not any earlier or later (Pei’ah 5:8).  Therefore, small bundles that were forgotten in the field, but where the intention, initially, was to combine them into larger bundles before bringing them in from the field, are not shich’cha (Pei’ah 5:8). This is different from the mitzvos of pei’ah, leket, peret and oleilos, which apply only at the time of the reaping, when the produce is being cut from the earth.

Shich’cha applies only when the owner or his workers forgot one or two bundles (Pei’ah 6:5). If they forgot three or more bundles, the law of shich’cha does not apply – the poor may not take it, and the owner may retrieve it.

Shich’cha applies only if we can assume that the sheaf or sheaves left behind are likely to be completely forgotten.  However, it does not apply if the owner or his worker will remember later that the bundle was left behind, for any of a variety of reasons, such as, it was left in a place that he will remember where it was, or it was much larger than the rest of his sheaves (Rambam, Hilchos Matanos Aniyim 5:17). Another example is when they forgot to harvest from a certain tree, but they will later remember about the tree because it is distinctive, either because it has its own nickname, or it is unusual in some other way or in its location (Pei’ah 7:1-2).

Shich’cha applies also to grapes, as well as to olives and the fruit of other trees (Pei’ah 6:9; 7:1).

What is leket?

To quote the Mishnah: What is leket? That which falls at the time of the cutting… If it is within [the reaper’s] hand or his sickle, it qualifies as leket and belongs to the poor. If it is beyond his hand or his sickle, it belongs to the owner and does not qualify as leket (Pei’ah 4:10). In other words, stalks of grain that were cut by swinging a sickle, but were beyond the hand or the sickle of the harvester, do not qualify as leket, because they were not severed from the ground in the way that grain is usually cut (Bartenura).

Three and over

The law of leket applies only when the reaper dropped one or two stalks at a time, but if he dropped three or more stalks, he may pick up the stalks and add them to his harvest, and the poor people are not permitted to take them (Pei’ah 6:5).

Piled on top of the leket

What is the halacha if the owner of the field or his employees collected the produce of his own harvest and then piled it in an area of the field where the poor people had not yet collected the leket. In this instance, we will no longer be able to ascertain how much leket grain in the field rightfully belongs to the poor, because the reapers’ pile creates a mixture of leket grain that belongs to the poor and non-leket grain that belongs to the owner.

To discourage this from happening, Chazal instituted that the entire bottom layer of the grain pile is considered the property of the poor (Pei’ah 5:1), even when it is impossible that so much grain fell as leket. This ruling is a penalty leveled upon the owner, to make sure that he does not allow such a practice. He should make sure that his workers pile their produce in an area that does not contain any leket.

What are peret and oleilos?

We have not yet explained the other two mitzvos that are taught in the pasuk that I quoted above, peret and oleilos. These two gifts to the poor exist only regarding grapes.

Peret is to a vineyard what leket is to grain. In other words, while picking the grapes, should a single grape or two fall from the hand of the harvester, they must be left for the poor (Pei’ah 6:5; 7:3). However, just as we explained before that three stalks of grain falling together while cutting are not leket, three of more grapes falling at one time are not peret and may be retrieved by the owner.

Oleilos

Oleilos are grapes that did not grow as part of a proper cluster. Ordinarily, a cluster of grapes includes many small bunches that grow off the main stem near the top of the cluster; when the grapes lie upon one another, they create a bulge, appearing a bit like a “shoulder,” near the top of the cluster. In addition, the central stem of typical cluster grows longer than the small bunches that branch off it, which causes some grapes to hang down at the bottom of the cluster. These two features provide a cluster of grapes with its traditional appearance of the widest part near, but not at, the very top, and the bottom being narrowest, where a few grapes hang lower than the rest of the cluster.

Oleilos are when a cluster of grapes grows without a “shoulder” at the top of the cluster and without any grapes of the main stem hanging lower than the rest of the cluster. A bunch of grapes growing without these features may not be harvested by the owner or his workers and is left for the poor (Pei’ah 7:4).

Maaser ani

Regarding maaser ani, the Torah states: When you complete all the tithes of your produce in the third year, the year of the special tithe, make certain to give it to the Levi, the stranger, the orphan and the widow, who will eat it within the gates of your cities and be satisfied (Devarim 26:12).

This pasuk alludes to at least two different tithes, and teaches that the third year has a tithe different from the previous years. In the third year, you must give one maaser, which we call maaser rishon, to the Levi, and a second maaser that is a maaser for the poor (the stranger, the orphan and the widow). This mitzvah, maaser ani, is mentioned also in parshas Re’eih (Devarim 14:28-29).

There is a fundamental difference between maaser ani and the other gifts to the poor. As mentioned above, gifts to the poor are left for them to help themselves. A more agile and industrious poor person can collect a great deal more leket, shich’cha, pei’ah, peret and oleilos than someone who has difficulty getting around. However, the pasuk in parshas Ki Savo states that the owner gives the maaser ani to the poor, meaning that he chooses which poor person will be the lucky recipient.

Answering questions

At this point, we have enough background that we can discuss one of our opening questions.  “I live in chutz la’aretz. Am I required to separate pei’ah on my backyard vegetable patch?” In other words, do any of these mitzvos of matanos la’aniyim apply outside Eretz Yisrael?

Matanos aniyim in chutz la’aretz

Although these mitzvos are halachically categorized as mitzvos hateluyos ba’aretz, agricultural mitzvos, and the general rule is that these mitzvos apply only in Eretz Yisrael (Mishnah Kiddushin 36b), the Gemara (Chullin 137b) mentions that the mitzvah of pei’ah applies in chutz la’aretz as a rabbinic injunction, and the Rambam explains that this includes all matanos aniyim (Hilchos Matanos Aniyim 1:14). We find this applies to several other of the mitzvos hateluyos ba’aretz, including challah, chodosh, terumos and maasros (because of space constraints, the details and definition of these different mitzvos will be discussed in other articles).

Regarding where in chutz la’aretz these mitzvos hateluyos ba’aretz are applied miderabbanan, there are two different sets of rules:

In the case of challah, the mitzvah applies anywhere in chutz la’aretz. Wherever you live, you are obligated to separate challah from a large enough dough.

Regarding terumos and maasros, the requirement to separate them applies only in lands near Eretz Yisrael – Mitzrayim, Amon, and Moav – corresponding to parts of contemporary Egypt, Jordan and the Sinai and Negev deserts. There is no requirement to separate terumos and maasros from produce grown in Europe, anywhere else in Africa, the vast majority of Asia, and certainly not from produce grown in the Americas or Australia.

The question at hand is whether the matanos aniyim have the same halacha that applies to terumos and maasros, and therefore they apply only in lands near Eretz Yisrael, or whether they are treated like challah and apply everywhere. Most authorities conclude that the obligation of matanos aniyim applies only in places near Eretz Yisrael.

At this point, let us focus on the first question that we posed: “Is there a requirement to leave leket, shich’cha and pei’ah in your field today?”

Answering this question correctly requires that we explain another principle. In the earlier article, I mentioned the Mishnah that states that if all of the poor people in a certain place want the pei’ah to be divided evenly among them, rather than being available for each to forage as he best can, the pei’ah is divided evenly among the local poor. We can ask a question: Granted that the local poor people all agree to divide the matanos aniyim equally, however, these gifts do not belong only to them. All poor people, no matter where they live, are entitled to these matanos. If so, how can the people here decide how to divide their local matanos aniyim, without taking into consideration the rights of poor people elsewhere, who are also potential owners of the matanos aniyim?

The answer is that the poor people who are outside this locale have clearly been me’ya’eish, implicitly given up their legal right to the local matanos aniyim (see Bava Metzia 21b). The poskim conclude that in any situation in which the owner can assume that the poor will not come to collect the matanos aniyim that are left in the field, he is permitted to collect and keep them (Derech Emunah, Hilchos Matanos Aniyim 1:62). Therefore, in today’s world where poor people are not traveling to fields to collect their matanos, there is no obligation to leave leket, shich’cha, pei’ah, peret and oleilos.

Conclusion

In our discussion of the mitzvah of shich’cha, we quoted the pasuk that states that someone who observes this mitzvah will have all his undertakings blessed by Hashem. Rashi (Vayikra 5:17) notes the extent of this blessing. After all, the person forgot only one sheaf, yet Hashem blesses all his undertakings. As Rashi expresses it: We see from here that if someone dropped a coin, and a poor person found it and supports himself with it, Hashem provides the loser of the coin with a beracha.

How Does a Heter Iska Work?

Andy Gross, a businessman who is proud that he is now observing mitzvos, is on time for his appointment. After a brief greeting, I ask him what brings him to my office on this beautiful morning.

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“I recently learned that even though the Torah prohibits paying or receiving interest, there is something called a heter iska that legalizes it. How can we legitimize something that the Torah expressly prohibits?”

Indeed, Andy’s question is both insightful and important, and deserves a thorough explanation. Why don’t you join us!

I note that this week’s parsha discusses the prohibition of interest:

Do not collect interest from him, for you shall fear Hashem and allow your brother to live. Therefore, do not provide him money with interest (Chapter 25:36-37).

This verse teaches three different mitzvos:

1. Do not collect interest from him. This entails a prohibition on the lender against collecting interest (Bava Metzia 75b).

2. Allow your brother to live. From the words allow your brother to live we derive a positive commandment that one who did collect interest is required to return it (Bava Metzia 62a).

3. Do not provide him money with interest. This prohibits creating a loan that involves interest, even if the lender never collects it (Bava Metzia 62a). A lender who later collects the interest also violates the first prohibition, and if he subsequently does not return it, he violates the positive commandment.

Not only does the lender violate the prohibition against ribbis, but also the borrower, the witnesses, the broker, the co-signer, the scribe who writes up the loan document (Mishnah Bava Metzia 75b), the notary public who notarizes it, and possibly even the attorney who drafts a document that includes provisions for ribbis,all violate the laws of ribbis (Bris Yehudah 1:6). Thus, anyone causing the loan to be either finalized or collected violates the Torah’s law.

“The halachos of ribbis are quite complex,” I told Andy. “From my experience, even seasoned Torah scholars sometimes mistakenly violate the prohibition of ribbis. For example, having a margin account at a Jewish-owned brokerage, charging a Jewish customer for late payment, or borrowing off someone else’s credit line usually entail violations of ribbis. I even know of Torah institutions that ‘borrow’ the use of someone’s credit card in order to meet their payroll, intending to gradually pay back the interest charges.”

“Why does the last case involve ribbis?” inquired an inquisitive Andy.

“Let me present a case where I was involved. A Torah institution was behind on payroll, and had no one available from whom to borrow. The director asked a backer if the institution could borrow money through his bank credit line.”

“I still do not see any ribbis problem here” replied Andy, “just a chesed that costs him nothing.”

“To whom did the bank lend money?” I asked Andy.

“As far as they are concerned, they are lending money to the backer, since it was his credit line.”

“So from whom did the institution borrow? The bank did not lend to them. Doesn’t this mean that really two loans have taken place: one from the bank to Mr. Chesed, and another from him to the institution? The loan from the bank incurs interest charges that Mr. Chesed is obligated to pay. Who is paying those charges?”

“It would only be fair for the institution to pay them,” responded Andy.

“However, if the institution pays those charges, they are in effect paying more money to Mr. Chesed than they borrowed from him, since they are also paying his debt to the bank. This violates ribbis. The fact that the institution pays the bank directly does not mitigate the problem (see Bava Metzia 71b).”

Andy was noticeably stunned. “I have always thought of interest as a prohibition against usury – or taking advantage of a desperate borrower. Here the ‘usurer’ did not even lend any money, and thought he was doing a tremendous chesed for tzedakah; he did not realize that his assistance caused both of them to violate a serious prohibition!”

“What is even more unfortunate,” I continued, “is that one can convert most of these prohibited transactions into a heter iska that is perfectly permitted.

WHAT IS A HETER ISKA?

“A heter iska is a halachically approved way of restructuring a loan or debt so that it becomes an investment instead of a loan. This presumes that the investor assumes some element of risk should the business fail, which is one basic difference between an investment and a loan. An investor could potentially lose money, whereas a lender does not lose because the borrower always remains responsible to pay.

“One is permitted to create a heter iska even when the goal of both parties is only to find a kosher way of creating a transaction that is very similar to an interest- bearing loan (Terumas Ha’deshen #302). The words heter iska mean exactly that: performing an allowable business deal that is similar to a prohibited transaction. As we will see, the structure must still allow for an element of risk and loss as accepted by halacha, otherwise it fails the test of being an investment.

“There are several ways of structuring a heter iska, and, indeed, different situations may call for different types of heter iska. In order to explain how a basic heter iska operates, I must first explain an investment that involve no ribbis, so that we can understand how a heter iska was developed. For the balance of this article, we will no longer refer to “borrowers” and “lenders.” Instead, I will refer to a “managing partner” or “manager” and an “investor.”

Andy interrupts my monologue. “Was heter iska used in earlier generations?”

THE EARLIEST HETER ISKA

“The concept of heter iska is many hundreds of years old. The earliest heter iska of which I am aware is suggested by the Terumas Ha’deshen (1390-1460). His case involves Reuven, who wishes to invest in interest-bearing loans to gentile customers, but does not want to take any risk. Shimon, who is an experienced broker of such loans, is willing to take the risk in return for some of the profit on Reuven’s money.

“Reuven wants a guarantee that he will receive back all his capital regardless of what actually happens in the business venture. Essentially, this means that Shimon is borrowing money from Reuven and lending it to gentiles; this would result in a straightforward Torah prohibition of ribbis, since Shimon is paying Reuven a return on the loan. Is there any way that Reuven and Shimon can structure the deal without violating the Torah’s prohibitions against paying and receiving interest?”

At this point, Andy exclaims: “Either this is a loan, and Reuven’s money is protected, or it is an investment, and it is not. How can Reuven have his cake and eat it too!”

“Actually, all the attempts at creating heter iska are attempts to find a balance whereby the investor is fairly secure that his assets are safe, and yet can generate profit. In your words, to try to have his cake and eat it.

PIKADON – INVESTING

“Let me explain how a heter iska accomplishes both these goals, by developing a case: Mr. Sweat has a business idea, but he lacks the capital to implement it. He approaches Mr. Bucks for investment capital. If Bucks has sufficient confidence in Sweat’s acumen to build a business, he might decide to invest even without knowing any details about it, since Sweat knows how to provide handsome profits. None of this involves any ribbis issues since there is no loan and no one is paying to use the other person’s capital. This business venture is called a pikadon.

GUARANTEEING THE INVESTMENT

“Your model is highly theoretical,” Andy points out, “since it assumes that Mr. Bucks invests without much assurance. Few people I know would entrust someone with their money without some type of guarantee.”

“You have hit on a key point – let us see how halacha deals with this. Whenever an investor entrusts someone with funds, the Torah permits him to demand an oath afterwards that the manager was not negligent. Therefore, Bucks may insist that Sweat swears an oath that he was not negligent with the money, and also that he reported accurately how much profit Bucks receives. An agreement may even require that Sweat swears this oath by using G-d’s name and while holding a Sefer Torah in front of the entire congregation.”

“That should certainly get Sweat to sweat,” quipped Andy. “But then again, assuming Mr. Sweat is a frum Jew, is he going to want to swear any oath at all?”

“That is exactly the point that secures Bucks’ bucks, since observant people would pay a substantial sum of money to avoid swearing an oath. The heter iska specifies that the manager has the option of swearing the oath and paying only what the investor is entitled. However, the manager also has the option of substituting an agreed-upon payment for the oath. Since observant Jews would rather pay the fixed return rather than swear an oath, we accomplish that the investor is reasonably secure, although no loan and no ribbis transpired. The result is not a loan, but a cleverly structured investment.”

After waiting a few seconds and absorbing what he just learned, Andy continued:

“Is there anything else I need to know about a heter iska before I use one?”

“I need to explain one other very important detail that, unfortunately, people often overlook. Most forms of heter iska state that the investor paid the manager a specific sum of money, say one dollar, for his time involved in the business venture. It is vitally important that this dollar be actually paid; otherwise there is a ribbis prohibition involved. Yet I know that many people overlook this requirement and do not understand its importance.”

“Why is this important?”

STANDARD ISKA – A SILENT PARTNERSHIP

“The standard heter iska assumes that the arrangement is half loan and half pikadon. This means that if Mr. Bucks invests $100,000 with Mr. Sweat to open a business, Mr. Bucks and Mr. Sweat become partners in the business because half of the amount is a $50,000 loan that Mr. Sweat must eventually repay, and the other half is a $50,000 outlay that Mr. Bucks has invested in a business that Mr. Sweat owns or intends to open. Bucks may receive no profit on the $50,000 loan he extended — if he does, it is prohibited ribbis. However, he may receive as much profit on the investment part of the portfolio as is generated by half the business. As a result, Mr. Bucks and Mr. Sweat are both 50% partners in the business.

RECEIVING PROFIT FROM THE LOAN

“However, there is an interesting problem that we must resolve. Bucks invested a sum with Sweat, for which he received a profit, and he also loaned Sweat money, for which he may not receive any profit. However, the return on the investment was realized only because Mr. Sweat is investing his know-how and labor to generate profit for the partnership – know-how and labor for which Bucks did not pay. Why is this not payment for Mr. Bucks’ loan, and therefore ribbis?

“This concern is raised by the Gemara, which presents two methods to resolve the problem.

“One approach is that the investor pays the manager a certain amount for his expertise and effort. As long as both parties agree in advance, we are unconcerned how little (or much) this amount is (Bava Metzia 68b). However, there must be an amount, and it must actually be paid. Even if they agree to a sum as paltry as one dollar, this is an acceptable arrangement, similar to Michael Bloomberg’s accepting one dollar as salary to be mayor of New York.”

“I now understand,” interjected Andy, “why it is so important that this amount be actually paid. If Mr. Sweat receives no compensation for his hard work on behalf of Mr. Bucks’ investment, it demonstrates that he was working because he received a loan, which is prohibited ribbis.”

“Precisely. However, there is another way to structure the heter iska to avoid the problem; have the profit and loss percentages vary. This means that if the business profits, the managing partner makes a larger part of the profit than he loses if there is a loss. For example, our silent and managing partners divide the profits evenly, but in case of loss, our manager is responsible to pay only 30% of the loss, which means that he owns only 30% of the business. The extra 20% of the profits he receives is his salary for managing the business. He is therefore being paid a percentage of Bucks’ profits for his efforts, similar to the way a money manager or financial consultant is often compensated by receiving a percentage of the profits on the funds he manages. Personally, I prefer this type of heter iska, but the type I described previously is perfectly acceptable as long as Mr. Sweat receives some compensation for his effort and know-how.

“The heter iska I have seen used by the Jewish owned banks in Israel includes this method. The bank invests 45% in a “business” managed by the mortgage borrower, but the borrower is entitled to 50% of the profits. Thus, he is ‘paid’ five per cent of the profits to manage the investment.”

“Can you explain to me how the Terumas Ha’deshen’s money lender would use a heter iska?” inquired Andy.

“Actually, his heter iska varied slightly from what we use today. Using today’s accepted heter iska, Shimon, the manager, accepts the money with the understanding that he is borrowing part and managing the balance for Reuven. He is compensated for his efforts according to one of the approaches mentioned above, and agrees in advance to divide the profits. He also agrees that he will swear an oath guaranteeing that he was not negligent in his responsibilities, and the two parties agree that if he subsequently chooses to pay Reuven a certain amount he is absolved of swearing the oath. Thus, Reuven’s return is not interest on a loan, but the amount Shimon had agreed to pay rather than swear how much he actually owes Reuven.

“This approach has been accepted by thousands of halachic authorities as a valid method of receiving a return on one’s investment that looks like interest but is not. The Chofetz Chayim notes that if someone can lend money without compensation, he should certainly do so and not utilize a heter iska, because he is performing chesed (Ahavas Chesed 2:15). Heter iska is meant for investment situations, and should ideally be limited to them.

“I would like to close by sharing with you a thought from Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch about the reason why the Torah prohibited interest. He notes that if the Torah considered charging interest to be inherently immoral, it would have banned charging interest from non-Jews, and also would have prohibited only the lender and not the borrower. Rather, Rav Hirsch notes, the Torah’s prohibition is so that the capital we receive from Hashem is used for tzedakah and loans, thereby building and maintaining a Torah community. The Torah’s goal in banning the use of capital for interest-paying loans is to direct excess funds to chesed and tzedakah.”

The Prohibition of Chanufah

According to some opinions, Yaakov may have been guilty of chanufah in his interactions with Eisav in this week’s parsha. What is chanufah and what did Yaakov do?

Question #1: Financial predicament

“Our yeshivah is in desperate financial shape. The father of one of our students is, himself, not observant, but he is extremely well-connected. If we make him Guest of Honor at our banquet, we can probably bring in many hundreds of thousands of dollars through his business and personal connections. Is there any halachic problem with our doing this?”

Question #2: Communal predicament

“There is an individual in our community who has been very helpful to the frum community but who is not observant. Are we permitted to honor him with an aliyah?”

Question #3: Kiruv predicament

Chani asks: “An old classmate of mine has fallen far from Yiddishkeit, unfortunately, and I believe that I am the only frum friend with whom she still keeps contact. Tragically, she recently became engaged to a non-Jew, and she desperately wants me to attend the engagement party. She knows that I do not approve of this relationship. May I attend, because I am concerned that, should I not show up, she will cut off her last contact with anything Jewish?”

Introduction:

All of the above questions require us to study the Torah’s prohibition against chanufah (sometimes pronounced “chanifah“), a word usually, but somewhat inaccurately, translated as “flattery.” Although the word chanufah in Modern Hebrew means “flattery,” and, indeed, is even occasionally used by Chazal in this sense, the prohibition against chanufah has a different meaning. Chanufah is the deception that occurs when someone encourages the performance of misdeeds, aveiros, or when someone fraudulently misrepresents something as Torah or as acceptable behavior when it is not.

The primary case of chanufah is when someone sees or knows that a person sinned and tells the sinner that he did nothing wrong or, worse still, tells the sinner that the sinful act was the correct thing to do. We can refer to this case as “first degree chanufah,” a sin that has very serious ramifications, as we will soon see. The person who violates the prohibition of chanufah is sometimes called a mechaneif, a chanaf, or a chanfan, all of which are different ways of saying the same thing. The Gemara states that chanafim are one of the four groups of people she’einam mekablei penei hashechinah, who will not be allowed to welcome the Shechinah, Hashem’s Divine Presence (Sotah 42a).

Which prohibition does one violate?

According to many Rishonim (Yerei’im; Ramban’s Torah Commentary to Bamidbar 35:33), there is a specific prohibition of the Torah, one of the 613 mitzvos, called chanufah, which is derived from the words of the Torah, velo sachanifu es ha’aretz (Bamidbar 35:33). Those authorities who do not count chanufah as one of the 613 mitzvos still agree with the prohibitions that we will describe, but categorize its violation under one of the other mitzvos of the Torah.

Why is chanufah prohibited?

Chanufah is prohibited for several reasons. Firstly, we are supposed to encourage people to do Hashem’s Will and to discourage them from violating His wishes and instructions. Chanufah does the opposite: it causes the offender to continue his malevolent ways and dissipates his interest and enthusiasm to do teshuvah. Thus, it harms the sinner even more than anyone else. In addition, chanufah encourages other people to respect and emulate the evildoer’s nefarious deeds. Furthermore, by providing inappropriate value to the misdeed, it also causes chillul Hashem, desecrating Hashem’s Holy Name. Someone who flatters an evildoer demonstrates that he is more concerned not to offend the sinner than he is about being disrespectful to Hashem, which is an even bigger chillul Hashem (Tosafos, Sotah 41b s.v. oso).

Distorting the Torah

There is yet another reason why chanufah is prohibited: because it falsifies the Torah (Shu’t Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 2:51). The mechanef has told the sinner that what is prohibited is permitted, which, in itself, is a very severe transgression. The Maharshal (Yam shel Shelomoh, Bava Kama 4:9) proves that to falsify or distort the Torah is a sin on the level of yeihareig ve’al ya’avor, for which one is required to give up his life rather than violate it – which means that it is more serious than transgressing almost any of the other mitzvos, and it is certainly more serious than desecrating Shabbos or consuming non-kosher food. Falsifying the Torah is equivalent to denying the entire Torah, which is why one is required to sacrifice one’s life, rather than misrepresent a Torah truth. Thus, the most extreme situation of chanufah, in which one tells a wrongdoer that it is permitted to violate the Torah, includes the serious prohibitions of chillul Hashem and denying the authenticity of the entire Torah.

While some authorities rule that one must endanger oneself rather than violate chanufah (Shaarei Teshuvah, 3:188), others contend that this is not required. According to the second approach, chanufah should not be treated more seriously than Shabbos, kashrus and most other Torah laws that are superseded in a situation of risk to one’s life (see Tosafos, Sotah 41b s.v. kol). Those that disagree understand that chanufah, which includes denying the authenticity of the entire Torah, merits this level of serious consideration (see Igros Moshe).

The story of Agrippas

To demonstrate how serious this prohibition is, the Gemara (Sotah 41b) shares with us the following narrative: King Agrippas (who reigned towards the end of the Second Beis Hamikdash) was an excellent ruler, highly respectful of the Gedolei Torah of his era and committed to the observance and spreading of Torah and mitzvos. Notwithstanding his many good qualities, calling himself “King” over the Jewish people violated halachah, since he was descended from gentile slaves, and the Torah states, lo suchal laseis alecha ish nachri asher lo achicha hu, “You may not place over yourselves a gentile who is not your brother” (Devarim 17:15). Agrippas realized that he was not permitted to be king. When Agrippas reached the words of the Torah where it prohibits appointing a king unless he is native Jewish, his eyes began to tear, for he realized that he, himself, was ruling in violation of this law. At that moment, the Sages present told him, “Don’t worry, Agrippas. You are our brother,” thus approving his reign, in violation of the Torah.

The Gemara says that the leaders of the Jews should have been destroyed for violating chanufah, and, at that moment, many catastrophic occurrences befell the Jewish people and many lives were lost. Granted that Agrippas was concerned about Torah and mitzvos, the halachah still forbade him from being king. Although the Sages were in no position to admonish him, it was forbidden to encourage his misdeed. Instead,they should have remained silent (Tosafos, Sotah 41b s.v. oso), which would have been understood as a respectful disapproval.

Levels of chanufah

Although the most obvious instance of chanufah is telling an evildoer that he has done nothing wrong, any action that encourages sinful deeds is included under the general heading of chanufah. Rabbeinu Yonah, in his monumental work Shaarei Teshuvah (3:187-199), explains that there are nine levels of chanufah. The highest level is, of course, telling an evildoer that his performing a sin is acceptable. The other categories are all instances where the mechanef does not praise the sin itself, but lessens the gravity of the sin in an indirect way. Let us see how this manifests itself.

Praising publicly

Honoring a malefactor violates chanufah, even when the mechanef says nothing to justify the wrongdoer’s misdeeds. Although, in this instance, the mechanef did not overtly encourage or condone the misdeed, praising a sinner as a “good person” implies that the sin is acceptable, which is chanufah.

For example, Shimon, president of the yeshivah, decides to make Mr. Wealthy, whose fortune was made in very scandalous ways, the Guest of Honor at its annual dinner, since Mr. Wealthy’s contacts can certainly help the yeshivah.

Some contemporary authors (Lerei’acha Kamocha, Volume 1, Page 102) contend that one violates the prohibition of chanufah even when the person who sinned is unaware that what he is doing is wrong, such as, he is uneducated about Judaism.

Complimenting a sinner

Another category is someone who praises an evildoer in private, although he is careful not to praise the offender in the presence of other people, so that they are not influenced by his wicked ways. For example, Levi knows that it is chanufah to introduce Mr. Scoundrel publicly as a superior individual, and therefore he is careful not to praise Scoundrel in front of others. However, in private, Levi tells Scoundrel what a great guy he is. This is also chanufah, because the sinner, hearing the flattery, feels no motivation to repent; after all, even Levi thinks he is righteous. The wrongdoer fails to comprehend that he needs to reevaluate his priorities and his deeds, and this error was encouraged by the mechanef.

Failure to protest

Rabbeinu Yonah lists several other categories of chanufah, most of which we will touch on briefly. One type of chanufah is when someone refrains from reprimanding evildoers when he has the opportunity to do so. Another, similar example is that someone who is in a position to protest a misdeed and fails to do so violates chanufah. These last examples of chanufah are all passive, rather than active, yet we see clearly why the lack of protest encourages sin.

Example: A group that calls itself Jewish is backing an initiative that is against what Torah stands for. Failing to protest that this is not Judaism constitutes chanufah.

The halachah requires us to rebuke people whom we see doing something wrong, which is the mitzvah called tochachah. This mitzvah applies only as long as it is possible that the wrongdoer may listen.

Rules of tochachah

The halachah is that a person who is reproving someone for sinful actions must do so in a way that shows that he truly cares about the offender. The Rambam (Hilchos Dei’os 6:7) writes that he should explain that he is helping the offender earn a greater share in olam haba. “One who sees his friend sinning or following a lifestyle that is not good has a mitzvah to influence him to return to the proper way and to inform him that he is harming himself… The one who rebukes must do so privately and in a pleasant manner and soft voice.”

Gad’s next-door neighbor is not observant. To bring the neighbor back to Yiddishkeit, Gad must show sincere care about his neighbor. Once the neighbor feels that Gad truly cares, the neighbor sees the beauty of a frum lifestyle. At this point, Gad can explain to his neighbor how beneficial it is to observe mitzvos.

Tochachah that will be ignored

However, the halachah is that when it is clear that a sinner will ignore reproof, one should not attempt to admonish him, as it says in Mishlei (9, 8): Do not rebuke a scoffer lest he come to hate you; rebuke a wise man and he will love you. To quote the Gemara, Just as it is a mitzvah to say something that will be heeded, it is a mitzvah to refrain from saying something that will be disregarded (Yevamos 65b).

Remaining present

Another type of chanufah is someone who remains present while evildoers sin. For example, Asher is sitting with a group of people who are spreading gossip, speaking loshon hora, using foul language; or, the group includes scoffers who deride Torah and mitzvos. Asher knows that this group will not listen to his admonition, so there is no mitzvah of tochachah. Asher wants to know whether he may remain sitting among them. The answer is that it is prohibited to remain in their presence, because this implies that he agrees with and accepts their behavior. Staying with them encourages the sinners to continue their nefarious activities; they rally support for their evil ways from his ongoing presence. Granted that it may be counterproductive to admonish them, Asher may not remain with them and must “express” his disapproval by removing himself.

Honoring when inappropriate

Still another category of chanufah is someone who is careful not to speak in a flattering way about a wrongdoer, but, in order to maintain peace, he treats the wicked person respectfully, the way one treats a wealthy individual because of his financial success. Although there is a halachic source that one should honor the wealthy (Eruvin 86a), one may not honor the wicked.

After mentioning this category of chanufah, Rabbeinu Yonah limits its application. When the wicked person is in a position of authority, one may demonstrate respect to him in the way that people honor powerful people, out of fear. However, although one may act respectfully, one may not praise the wicked person. Treating him with respect is permitted, since everyone realizes that the evildoer is being treated with honor only because circumstances require it. This is the meaning of the statement of the Gemara: it is permitted to flatter evildoers in this world (Sotah 41b).

Other authorities offer a different explanation of this Gemara, contending that one may flatter a malefactor because not doing so could be dangerous (Shu’t Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 2:51).

Therefore, if Yissachar finds himself in a position where he must lobby a highly influential Jew who has distanced himself from his people, Yissachar must be careful to know exactly what he may say and what he may not.

An inappropriate appointment

One of Rabbeinu Yonah’s categories requires some explanation, since it does not fit the use of the word flattery, but fits well our definition of chanufah as misrepresenting or falsifying Torah. Rabbeinu Yonah explains that, when a highly-respected personality acts out of self-interest and appoints someone to a rabbinic position for which the appointee is not competent, this appointment meets the criteria for chanufah. Rabbeinu Yonah says that this misrepresents a Torah value because the appointment causes people to trust the appointee in a way that is unwarranted or to rely on his ability to rule on halachah. The result is a hindrance to proper Torah observance and the judicial system. Therefore, if Rabbi Dan appoints his son to a rabbinic position for which the son is not qualified, this constitutes chanufah. All of these qualify as chanufah because the result is a misrepresentation of the real essence of Torah.

At this point, I would like to address the last of the questions asked above:

Chani asks: “An old classmate of mine has fallen far from Yiddishkeit, unfortunately, and I believe that I am the only frum friend with whom she still keeps contact. Tragically, she recently became engaged to a non-Jew, and she desperately wants me to attend the engagement party. She knows that I do not approve of this relationship. May I attend, because I am concerned that, should I not show up, she will cut off her last contact with anything Jewish?”

Chani may not attend the party, since this is clearly endorsing the engagement and allowing the classmate to delude herself into thinking that what she is doing is not that bad.

Rav Moshe’s teshuvah

Having explained the rules of chanufah as categorized by Rabbeinu Yonah, I will present a responsum of Rav Moshe Feinstein (Shu’t Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 2:51) on the topic. The question pertained to a Jewish community that had received much benefit, both communally and individually, from a Jewish physician who was married to a gentile woman. The community had never given the physician an aliyah to the Torah or any other honor, but the rabbi of the community felt that it would be beneficial to honor the physician with opening and closing the aron kodesh. Rav Moshe notes that, although there are halachic issues involved in giving an aliyah to someone who does not observe Torah, there is no inherent halachic problem with having him open or close the aron kodesh. However, there is a potential halachic issue with whether giving a sinner this honor violates the prohibition against chanufah. Since the individual involved is flagrantly and publicly violating a basic aspect of Torah, honoring him in any way might violate the Torah.

Rav Moshe contends that, from the Gemara’s cases of chanufah, we see that the prohibition of chanufah includes only stating that something is permitted when it indeed is forbidden or praising an evildoer excessively. However, to praise an evildoer for the chesed he performs for the community is permitted. Rav Moshe even permits exaggerating a bit what this individual does in order to assure his future help and cooperation.

As a result, he rules that one may honor the intermarried physician with opening the aron kodesh, since this does not imply that we are accepting his objectionable lifestyle.

Conclusion

Many people feel that complimenting someone for what they have done is polite. We now realize that praising people is not always permissible, and that honoring someone may also not be the correct thing to do. Obviously, questions as to specific applications of this halachah should be referred to a posek.

May I Keep the Skeletons in the Closet?

Or

What Personal Information Must I Divulge?

The Gemara (Zevachim 88b) teaches that the me’il of the kohein gadol atoned for saying loshon hora…

Two sample shaylos I have been asked:

Question #1:

Mrs. Weiss (for obvious reasons, not her real name) calls me to discuss the following sensitive matter:

“I was treated successfully for a serious disease that my grandmother also had. The doctors feel that my daughter is at risk for this same disease. She is now entering the shidduchim parsha. Am I required to reveal this family information to shadchanim and/or potential shidduch partners, and, if so, at what point am I required to reveal this information? I am truly concerned that this could seriously complicate her shidduchim possibilities.”

Question #2:

A prominent talmid chacham is not originally from a frum background. His son, who is well-respected in his yeshiva, was recently involved in a shidduch. At a certain point, the talmid chacham’s family felt responsible to reveal certain significant information: The talmid chacham was not originally Jewish, and he and his Jewish wife did not discover Torah until after this son was born. They disclosed this information to the family of the girl involved, and her family decided to discontinue the shidduch.

He is now inquiring: “Must we disclose this information to future potential shidduchim?”

Although these situations are somewhat atypical, we all have medical, personal, and/or genealogical issues that we want to keep private. What information must we reveal about ourselves while arranging shidduchim for our children (or for ourselves)? And at what point must we disclose it?

What halachic issues are involved?

Before we analyze these cases, we need to elucidate some halachic topics. We can divide the discussion into three subtopics:

I. Emes — Honesty

II. Geneivas daas – Misleading someone

III. Onaah – Fraud

I.  EMES — HONESTY

A person must maintain total integrity in all his dealings – after all, the Torah commands us to emulate Hashem in all our deeds, and His seal is truth (Shabbos 55a). Someone who is meticulously honest will merit receiving the presence of the Shechinah (see Sotah 42a).

One may not be untruthful without any reason, and certainly not when it deceives or causes someone personal or financial harm. For example, one may not deny damaging someone’s property. Similarly, one may not blame fictitious excess traffic for a tardy arrival at work, when it is simply because one left home too late. For the same reason, one may not deceive someone about a shidduch, by misinforming the other party. I will soon explain the details of this halacha.

HONESTY IS NOT ALWAYS THE BEST POLICY

Notwithstanding the responsibility to be straightforward, there are specific situations where the Torah advises one to be imprecise. For example, it is more important to avoid (1) creating machlokes, (2) embarrassing someone, or (3) hurting his feelings or reputation than it is to disclose the entire truth (Bava Metzia 23b with Rif and Tosafos). In situations where a full exposé may cause one of these negative results, one should omit the detrimental information, although it is preferable to avoid fabricating a story (see Chofetz Chayim, Hilchos Rechilus 1:8). If there is no choice, it is preferred even to fabricate a story, rather than embarrass someone or hurt his feelings or reputation. If a correct answer may cause machlokes, one must modify the truth, rather than create ill feeling (Yevamos 65b).

Similarly, if I am asked about someone’s personal habits, I may modify my answer, if the truth might reveal private information that the person may not want to divulge (Maharal, Bava Metzia 23b).

II. GENEIVAS DAAS – MISLEADING SOMEONE

Geneivas daas, literally, “stealing a mind,” means creating a false impression – that is, deluding another person’s perception of reality. The Gemara (Chullin 94a) rules asur lignov da’as habri’os, “it is prohibited to steal someone’s mind.” One example of this is someone who acts as a big tzaddik in front of people, but is less halachically meticulous in private (Tosafos, Bechoros 31a s.v. ika). This unwarranted display of righteousness is a form of deception. Another example is a gentile who asked his Jewish landlord to place a mezuzah on his door; Rav Moshe Feinstein prohibited placing an invalid mezuzah on the door, because of geneivas daas (Shu”t Igros Moshe, Yoreh Deah 1:184).

A different type of geneivas daas is misleading someone to feel indebted when this is unwarranted. An example of this is to beg someone to join you for a meal, when you know he will not accept (Chullin 94a, as explained by Orach Meisharim 24:5), and you do not really want to invite him. The invited party feels obligated to reciprocate this false invitation.

Geneivas daas can happen in shidduchim situations, such as by implying that one intends to provide financial support for a yeshiva scholar, when one has no intention or ability to do so, or by implying that one is a big masmid or talmid chacham, when one is not (see Shu”t Chasam Sofer, Even Ha’ezer #82).

III. ONA’AH — FRAUD

Misrepresenting a product or service in order to make a sale is a form of cheating, such as painting an item to hide a defect. A modern instance of ona’ah is insider trading, purchasing or selling a stock or commodity on the basis of information that is unavailable to the public. This is forbidden, unless one notifies the other party of this information.

In shidduchim, the same rule is true: subject to some exceptions that I will explain shortly, one must notify the other party of information that might be of concern, which I will refer to as “blemishes,” although they are not blemishes in the usual sense.

MEKACH TA’US – INVALIDATING THE MARRIAGE

The most serious ramification of withholding required information about shidduchim, or worse, of being deceptive, is that this can even result (in certain extreme cases) in a halachically invalid marriage. (The same applies to any contracted arrangement – an unrevealed, serious blemish effects a mekach ta’us, because the two parties never agreed to the arrangement, as it indeed exists.)

Here are a few interesting examples:

If someone specifies that his new wife should have no vows (nedarim), and finds that she is bound by a neder to abstain from meat, wine, or nice clothes, the kiddushin is annulled (Kesubos 72b)! A husband wants his wife to enjoy life, and refraining from these activities may disturb the happiness of their marriage.

OTHER SERIOUS BLEMISHES

To quote the words of the Sefer Chassidim (#507): “When arranging matches for your children or other family members, do not hide from the other party medical issues, that they would object to enough to decline the shidduch, lest they afterwards choose to annul the marriage. Similarly, you should tell them about deficiencies in halachic observance that are significant enough that the other party would have rejected the marriage.”

CAN’T SMELL

Another example of unrevealed information that invalidates a marriage is a woman who failed to notify her future husband that she has no sense of smell, since this flaw hampers her ability to prepare tasty meals. Similarly, a man whose profession causes his body to have a foul odor is sufficient reason to invalidate the marriage (Kesubos 76a).

Withholding information concerning inability to have children is certainly a mekach ta’us. In this last situation, a physician who is aware that his patient cannot have children is required to reveal this information to the other side, even though this violates patient confidentiality (Shu”t Tzitz Eliezer 16:4).

WHEN TO TELL?

In most instances, there is no requirement to notify the other party or a shadchan of any of these blemishes at the time that a shidduch is suggested. The Sefer Chassidim that I quoted above does not mention at what point one must notify the other party of the shortcoming. Contemporary poskim I spoke with feel that one should reveal this information after the couple has met a few times, about the time that the relationship is beginning to get serious. There is no requirement for the parties to tell a shadchan.

However, if one knows that the other party will reject the shidduch because of this blemish, I would recommend forgoing this shidduch to begin with. For example, if one knows that a particular family prides itself on a pure pedigree, don’t pursue a shidduch with them if you know that they will ultimately reject it when they discover that your great-uncle was not observant. A very serious blemish, such as the inability to have children, should be discussed in advance, since most people will invalidate a shidduch for this reason.

WHAT MAY ONE HIDE?

What type of information may one withhold?

KNOWN INFORMATION

It is halachically deceitful for a seller to withhold important information that the buyer cannot find out. However, the seller is not required to disclose a problem that the buyer could discover. Furthermore, as long as the buyer could have noticed something that may arouse attention, there is no geneivas daas and no ona’ah in making the sale (Shu”t Igros Moshe, Yoreh Deah 1:31). For example, if someone is selling a house with a drop ceiling, he is not required to notify the buyer that there was damage above the ceiling, since a drop ceiling in a residence arouses attention. Similarly, if the entire neighborhood is susceptible to flooded basements, the seller does not need to mention that his basement has a flooding problem. If the buyer asks directly, the seller must answer honestly (Shu”t Igros Moshe, Yoreh Deah 1:31).

A similar concept is true concerning shidduchim. For example, if the scandalous activities of a family member are well-known in one’s hometown, one need not tell the other party, since this information could be discovered by asking around (Shu”t Panim Meiros 1:35). Halachically, when the other party asks neighbors for information about this potential shidduch, the neighbors should share the requested details.

INSIGNIFICANT INFORMATION

A second category of information that need not be revealed includes factors that are insignificant to the buyer. One is not required to provide an in-depth list of every shortcoming that the merchandise has. Similarly, shidduchim do not require revealing every possible medical or yichus issue. The Chofetz Chayim distinguishes between a medical issue that one must reveal and a “weakness,” that one need not. Thus, someone need not reveal minor ailments that would not disturb the average person.

Although I know rabbonim who disagree with this position, I feel that juvenile diabetes is a malady that must be mentioned, whereas hay fever and similar allergies may be ignored. If one is uncertain whether a specific medical issue is significant enough to mention, ask a shaylah. My usual litmus test is: if the issue is significant enough that one might want to hide it, it is something that one should tell.

At this point, we can discuss Mrs. Weiss’s shaylah asked above:

“I was treated successfully for a serious disease that my grandmother also had. The doctors feel that my daughter is at risk for this same disease. She is now entering the shidduchim parsha. Am I required to reveal this family information to shadchanim and/or potential shidduch partners, and, if so, at what point am I required to reveal this information? I am truly concerned that this could seriously complicate her shidduchim possibilities.”

Most poskim with whom I discussed the shaylah contended that one should reveal this information to the other side, after the couple has gotten to know one another and is interested in pursuing the relationship. One rav I spoke to disagreed. He contended that since the problem can be caught early and treated successfully, one need not divulge this information at all. All opinions agree that one has absolutely no requirement to mention this information to a shadchan.

Now let us discuss the second case I mentioned earlier:

A prominent talmid chacham was not Jewish at the time that his son was born. Is he required to release this information to future potential shidduchim?

This question takes us into a different area of concern about shidduchim – yichus, a subject of much halachic discussion. Some poskim sometimes permit hiding this type of information, whereas others prohibit this under all circumstances.

This debate centers on the following story. The Gemara discusses whether someone who has a gentile father and a Jewish mother is considered a mamzer who may not marry a Jew or not. The Gemara concludes that he may marry a Jew, and most halachic authorities rule that he is fully Jewish.

Notwithstanding this ruling, the Gemara (Yevamos 45a) records two identical anecdotes where someone whose father was not Jewish was unable to find anyone in the Jewish community willing to marry him. Although it was halachically permitted for him to marry, people considered this yichus issue serious enough that they did not want him marrying their daughters.

He came to the local gadol — in one case, Rav Yehudah, and in the other, Rava — who advised him to find a wife by relocating to a community where no one knows his past.

The question is: If he is required to reveal that his father is not Jewish, what does he gain by relocating – once he reveals his blemish, people will, once again, be uninterested in his marrying into their family!

Several prominent poskim, therefore, conclude that he is not required to reveal his family blemish, since his lineage will not affect his ability to be a good husband (Shu”t Imrei Yosher 2:114:8; Kehillas Yaakov, Yevamos #38 or #44, depending on the edition). Others dispute this conclusion, contending that one must reveal information like this before a shidduch is formalized, and offering different explanations how he would find a match in the new community (Rav E. Y. Valdenberg, quoted by Nishmas Avraham,volume 3, page 26, 251- 252).

Whether the talmid chacham of our second question is required to reveal his family defect depends on this dispute. According to many authorities, there is no requirement to disclose that he was not born Jewish, whereas others disagree.

As I mentioned earlier, almost all of us have shaylos regarding what we are required or not required to disclose about shidduchim. May we all have only nachas from our children and their families!

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