Raiding the Pushka and Related Questions

In honor of Shabbos Shekalim, I present:

Raiding the Pushka and Related Questions

clip_image002Question #1: TREMENDOUSLY APPEALING!

Yehudah presents the following dilemma: “I often feel pressured to pledge to the tzedakah appeals in shul; however, I am afraid that I will forget to pay afterwards. Is there a simple way to avoid creating a problem?”

Question #2: BORROWERS ANONYMOUS

Susan asks: “I often borrow small change from the pushkas that I keep on my window sill, but I am meticulous to return what I borrowed. Am I, indeed, permitted to borrow from the pushka?”

Question #3: DIVERTING ACTIVITIES

Tamar calls: I have a pushka in the house from an organization with which I have no contact. Instead, I would like to donate the money to my son’s yeshiva, to demonstrate my hakaras hatov.

Answer:

In order to answer these questions, I first need to explain how a few general concepts affect the laws of tzedakah:

  1. NEDER – A VOW

The Torah requires us to fulfill our vows (Bamidbar 30:3), and the consequences for neglecting this obligation are very serious (see Kesubos 72a). To avoid violating this prohibition, it is better to simply fulfill the mitzvah involved without reciting a vow to commit oneself (Nedarim 9a). For this reason, concerned people say “bli neder” whenever stating something that may imply a commitment to perform a good deed. The words bli neder prevent the commitment from becoming a vow, although one is still obligated to fulfill what one has promised to keep (Shu’t Shevet HaLevi 10:156:1; see also Shla’h, Torah SheBe’kesav, Parshas Matos, Derech Chayim). (In this article, I am not going to distinguish between the technical differences that exist between a neder, a vow, and a shavua, an oath; but I will refer always to neder.)

TZEDAKAH PLEDGES

Pledging money to tzedakah is a vow that one must fulfill. To quote the Torah:

Motza sifasecha tishmor ve’asisa ka’asher nadarta LaHashem Elokecha nedava asher dibarta bificha. You must be careful and fulfill that which exits your mouth, according to the vow that one recited to Hashem your G-d – anything that you spoke with your mouth (Devarim 23:24).

The Gemara rules explicitly that tzedakah is included in the requirements of this verse (Rosh HaShanah 6a). Therefore, one is required min haTorah to redeem a pledge that one made to tzedakah. Because of this law, it is strongly advisable to make charitable commitments bli neder so that the pledge does not assume the severity of a vow (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 203:4 and 257:4).

  1. BAL TE’ACHEIR Do not delay paying

This mitzvah prohibits delaying the redemption of a pledge, such as a commitment to offer a korban in the Beis HaMikdash. Reciting a charitable pledge requires one to fulfill it as soon as possible; failure to do so violates the prohibition of bal te’acheir (Devarim 23:22; Rosh HaShanah 6a). The Gemara notes that the requirements of bal te’acheir for a tzedakah pledge are even more exacting than they are concerning other mitzvos, such as korbanos. One who (at the time of the Beis HaMikdash) pledges a korban may wait until the Festivals (Pesach, Shavuos, and Sukkos) to offer them, since he will then be traveling to Yerushalayim, anyway. (Technically, he is required because of a positive mitzvah to offer the korban the first Yom Tov, but does not violate the lo saaseh until all three Yomim Tovim pass.) However, since a pledge to tzedakah can easily be fulfilled as soon as one locates a poor person, one must disburse the funds quickly.

The mitzvah of bal te’acheir provides another reason why one’s pledges to tzedakah should be made bli neder. If someone pledged tzedakah without specifying bli neder, he/she is obligated to redeem the pledge immediately. However, if one specified that the obligation is bli neder, failing to redeem it immediately does not violate bal te’acheir.

We can now address Yehudah’s concern about responding to tzedakah appeals. His question was that he felt pressured to pledge donations and was concerned that he might forget to pay them. Ideally, he should donate without pledging, or alternatively, he can say that he is pledging with the understanding that he is not making any commitment whatsoever. (Essentially, this is disallowing his pledge.) A less preferable choice is to pledge bli neder, which accomplishes that, should he forget to redeem his pledge, he will not have violated either the prohibition of vows or of bal te’acheir.

THE APPEAL WAS SUCCESSFUL, BUT THE INSTITUTION DIED!

By the way, it appears that although the organizations making appeals in Yehudah’s shul are doing a good job, they could use logistic help in recording and collecting the pledges to their cause. Any reader interested in volunteering to help them out?

BORROWING FROM TZEDAKAH FUNDS

At this point, we will address Susan’s concerns about borrowing from the pushka. Her first question was: May one borrow tzedakah’s funds for one’s personal use? The following passage of Gemara discusses this issue:

Rabbah bar Avahu stated, “Someone who declares: ‘This sela coin shall go to tzedakah,’ may use it for his own purposes, and then later pay tzedakah a different coin” (Arachin 6a, as explained by Rashi).

Rabbah bar Avahu’s is teaching that although pledging a coin to tzedakah creates a charitable vow that one must redeem, one may still borrow that coin and replace it. The reason this is true is that tzedakah does not create sanctity that forbids its use (Rambam, Hilchos Matanos Aniyim 8:5). In essence, declaring “this coin shall go to tzedakah” is equivalent to saying, “I hereby commit myself to donate to tzedakah an amount of money equal to the value of this coin.” The coin remains the donor’s, and he may borrow it and later replace it (see Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 259:1).

The Gemara subsequently teaches that one may borrow the pledged coin only if it was not yet given to the gabbai, the tzedakah treasurer. Once the gabbai receives the money it is tzedakah’s property, and one may not borrow it. Under normal circumstances, a treasurer is not authorized to lend or exchange tzedakah funds (Bava Basra 8a; Rambam, Hilchos Matanos Aniyim 8:4). One exception is when the lending or exchanging benefits the recipient of the funds (Arachin 6b; see Pischei Teshuvah, Yoreh Deah 259:4 for another exception).

LIMITED LIABILITY

By the way, the sanction to borrow pledged money is also a liability, since it sometimes makes the person responsible to replace the money if it is stolen (see Choshen Mishpat 301:6). On the other hand, in a case when one may not use tzedakah money, he is not liable, unless he is negligent, such as forgetting where he put it.

WHO OWNS THE MONEY IN THE PUSHKA?

May Susan borrow from the pushka? According to what we have just learned, this depends on whether the money in the pushka already belongs to the organization or is still Susan’s property. Many authorities debated this question extensively about 150 years ago. The shaylah that spawned this literature is interesting.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

For the last few hundred years, many Jewish Diaspora households owned a pushka dedicated to Rabbi Meir Baal HaNes, a fund whose purpose was to succor the indigent Jews living in Eretz Yisrael. In a responsum dated Marcheshvan 18, 5626 (1865), Rav Mordechai Eitinga, then rav of Lvov (currently located in western Ukraine), was asked about someone who had accumulated a large sum of money in his Rabbi Meir Baal HaNes pushka and now felt that the local poor had a much greater need for these funds. Could he divert the money to local needs, instead of sending it to Eretz Yisrael? Rav Eitinga discusses two issues:

(1) May money pledged to one charitable cause be diverted to a different one?

(2) Do the poor of Eretz Yisrael already own the money in the pushka?

If the answer to the first question is “yes,” and to the second question is “no,” then the money may be diverted to the local indigent. Otherwise, it must be sent to Eretz Yisrael, because either the terms of the pledge must be absolutely fulfilled, or one is “stealing” money that already belongs to the poor of Eretz Yisroel (Shu’t Maamar Mordechai #15).

Let us follow his analysis.

DIVERTING OR A DIVERSION

Whether one may divert tzedakah money from one individual or organization to another is, indeed, a dispute among early poskim. Why should one be permitted to divert the funds? Explaining this approach requires that we note a new factor that the Gemara did not discuss. In Rabbah bar Avahu’s case, the donor simply declared, “This coin goes to tzedakah,” without specifying a specific individual or organization. However, what happens if someone holding a wad of hundred dollar bills declares, “I dedicate this money to the Asher Richman Hebrew Academy.” Must he contribute this amount of money to the Richman Academy, or may he afterwards decide to send them to the Pauper Yeshiva? Does halachah require him to honor a pledge to a specific organization or individual, or is he simply required to donate this amount of money to any tzedakah? If indeed the pledge is simply a generic requirement to donate this amount to tzedakah, then it should follow that one may actually contribute the funds to a charity different from what he originally intended.

13TH CENTURY CHUTZPAH

Early authorities discuss this question. A major posek of 13th century Germany reports a very unusual din Torah. A pauper claimed that a wealthy individual promised him a specific amount of money and had not paid it, whereas the rich man denied ever pledging any money. The poor man contended that the pledge obligated the donor to pay him and that the case is therefore no different from any plaintiff claiming money from a defendant who denies that he owes any. The halachah, in such instances, is that the defendant is required to swear an oath (shevuas heses) denying the claim. Similarly, the Mordechai (Bava Kamma #172) ruled that the affluent man is required to swear that he never pledged any money to the pauper! He does not report whether this pauper was subsequently offered any positions as a publicity director for any major Torah institution.

The poskim prove from this Mordechai that when one pledges money to an individual tzedakah, the particular tzedakah can demand payment. Otherwise, what claim does the pauper have on the rich man? Even assuming that the rich man pledged him money, this is merely an obligation to give tzedakah, which the affluent man may donate anywhere. If the pauper indeed has a claim, it must follow that a pledge automatically includes a debt to the specific individual. Following this line of reasoning, money pledged to one tzedakah cannot be subsequently rerouted to a different one, however legitimate the need (Shach, Choshen Mishpat 87:51; Machanei Efrayim, Hilchos Tzedakah #7).

LOCAL OR ISRAEL?

Although not all authorities accept this position of the Mordechai (cf. Shu’t Maharit #22 and #39), many later authorities do follow his ruling (Ketzos HaChoshen, 87:21). Based on this analysis, most later authorities contend that money placed in a Rabbi Meir Baal HaNes pushka may not be given instead to the local poor (Shu’t Maharya HaLevi #49; Shu’t Beis Yitzchak, Orach Chayim #21).

This allows us to answer our third question asked above: “I have a pushka in the house from an organization with which I have no contact. I would like to donate the money instead to my son’s yeshiva, to demonstrate my hakaras hatov.” The answer is that although supporting the Torah institutions that educate our children is vital, since this money is already designated for one organization, one may not transfer it to another.

PUSHKA BORROWERS ANONYMOUS

All of this does not answer Susan’s question whether she may borrow money from the pushka. Even if money pledged to one institution cannot be transferred to another, until the money becomes the property of the institution, one may borrow it, as we learned before. Thus, we need to determine whether money in the pushka is already the property of the institution or not.

Now we reach an interesting question: What is the status of money in the pushka? Do I still have some control over it, and may I, therefore, borrow it, subject to the above conditions? Or is it now the property of the tzedakah and I may not?

This halachah depends on the following: Who owns the pushka? If I own the pushka, then placing money in the pushka requires me to donate it to tzedakah, but it is not yet their property and I may borrow it. As I mentioned above, this situation may create liability for the funds, should they be stolen.

On the other hand, if the organization assumes that money placed in the pushka belongs to them, then I may not borrow any of that money. The reason for this is that since the pushka is their vessel, money placed inside is equivalent to being given to the gabbai, the tzedakah treasurer (based on Shulchan Aruch Choshen Mishpat 200:3). Most authorities follow this latter interpretation of the halachah.

HABITUAL BORROWERS

Some people are in the habit of borrowing money from the pushkas on a regular basis. Now, after reading my words, they may realize that this practice is sometimes forbidden. Nevertheless, there is a method whereby a person may put money into any pushka and yet still be able to borrow it afterwards

; he should make a condition in advance that when he puts money into the pushka, he is not donating it to the institution, but simply pledging it to them. This way, the money is not yet the property of the institution, and one may borrow it. Although this solution will not help for the money already in the pushka, it can be used to avoid this problem in the future.

Some contemporary authorities suggest that someone who usually borrows from the pushka might be considered as if he made this condition from the beginning, i.e., that he is not giving the money yet to the tzedakah cause, but only pledging it (Derech Emunah, Matanos Aniyim 7:note 121).

To answer Susan’s question, I would suggest that she make a condition, henceforth, that when she places money in the pushka, she is not donating it at this time. In so doing, she reserves the right to borrow from the pushka, although she also creates a responsibility for herself, should the money be stolen. She may decide that she is better off curbing her habit of borrowing from the pushka and make an appointment to join Borrowers Anonymous.

Making change from the pushka benefits the tzedakah which would rather not distribute, transport or deposit its money as small change, but rather in the form of bills (Tzedakah Umishpat Chapter 8, footnote 25, page 148).

Unfortunately, most people do not realize the complex shaylos that arise from shul appeals and pushkas – hopefully this article helps repair this breach. May we all always be showered with berachos for contributing generously to tzedakah!

 




Infidels and Judaism

Certainly parshas Ki Sisa provides opportunity to discuss:

Infidels and Judaism

Question #1: The Sin or the Sinner?

“Why did Chazal establish a brachah in the Shemoneh Esrei against those who reject Judaism? Aren’t we supposed to pray that sinners find their way back to Judaism?”

Question # 2: Various Infidels

“What are the differences between the Tzedukim, the Baitusim, the kara’im, and other deviant groups?”

Answer:

Antigonus ish Socho, one of our great Torah leaders, was the head of the Sanhedrin towards the beginning of the second Beis Hamikdash period, in the generation immediately following the passing of the last of the Anshei Kenesses Hagedolah. Two of his disciples, Tzadok and Baitus, misunderstood him to say that there is no reward for observing mitzvos (Avos Derabbi Nosson 5:2). In fact, what Antigonus had said was that one should not observe the Torah for the goal of receiving its reward, but because we want to serve and fear Hashem (see Avos 1:3).

Unfortunately, Tzadok and Baitus were cunning and charismatic individuals. Soon, each had amassed his own following of people who accepted them as their religious leaders in place of Chazal. Although both Tzadok and Baitus had, by now, rejected everything in the Torah, they understood that if their followers knew this, they would look for other leaders (Rambam, Commentary to Mishnah, Avos 1:3). As a result, both Tzadok and Baitus pretended to accept the Written Torah, but they rejected the Oral Torah, thus making them the deciders of what their new religions would observe. This created two splinter religious sects, called the Tzedukim and the Baitusim, each named for its founder, which became thorns in the sides of the Torah community throughout the rest of the period of the second Beis Hamikdash and the Tanna’im. At times, these groups even became violent in their attacks on halachah-observant Jewry (see Meiri, Rosh Hashanah 22a).

Although the origins of both groups were similar, they developed dissimilar practices and became two distinct groups (Tosafos Yom Tov, Menachos 10:3). Some early authorities note that there was also a divergence in style between the Tzedukim and the Baitusim. Whereas the Baitusim were brazen in disputing the halachic authorities, the Tzedukim were concerned about what the rabbonim held (Ritva, Eruvin 69b). The Gemara records instances where they followed rabbinic practice, even when it differed with what they theoretically held (Yoma 19b; Niddah 33b). The Baitusim, on the other hand, achieved notoriety for their troublemaking (see, for example, Rosh Hashanah 22a-b).

Baitusi bloopers

Notwithstanding the fact that the Baitusim behaved in a more brazen manner than did the Tzedukim, Chazal record only three instances where their official practices conflicted with halachah. They are:

  1. The Baitusim held that an individual could donate a korban tamid to be used by the community for the daily offering in the Beis Hamikdash (Megillas Taanis; Tosafos, Taanis 17b s.v. Meireish). The halachah is that these offerings, similar to all other required public offerings, must be purchased from the terumas halishkah, that is, from the half-shekel coins that each adult male Jew was required to donate annually to the Beis Hamikdash for this purpose.
  2. The Baitusim did not want the korban omer to be offered on any day of the week other than Sunday (Menachos 65a). The halachah is that it is offered on the day that we begin counting the omer, the second day of Pesach, regardless of which day of the week this transpires.
  3. The Baitusim were opposed to the observance of the mitzvah of aravah (Ritva, Sukkah 43b), a practice performed in the Beis Hamikdash every day of Sukkos (see Mishnah, Sukkah 42b and Gemara ad locum).

It is significant to note that all three of these divergent practices involved mitzvos performed in the Beis Hamikdash, and none of them impinges on how a person is required to observe his individual mitzvos. Thus, although, as we will soon see, the Tzedukim had many practices that differed from halachah, the more brazen Baitusim had fewer “official” practices that differed from halachah. I have attempted to find sources to explain the underlying reason for the Baitusim’s divergences, but I have not, as yet, found an approach I find satisfactory.

Baitusi slackness

This should not be interpreted to mean that the Baitusim were careful about the other laws. Quite the contrary, they observed all mitzvos that are not taught expressly by the written Torah in a haphazard way. For example, the Gemara states that one should presume that a Baitusi does not keep the laws of carrying on Shabbos properly (Eruvin 68b). Similarly, the rishonim state that it should be assumed that Baitusim do not observe the laws of shechitah (Meiri, Chullin 2a). This approach is codified in Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 2:9). But, it appears that these were not formal practices of the Baitusim; rather, this reflected their attitude towards Torah she’be’al peh, which they treated with disdain.

Sadducee sophistry

On the other hand, the Tzedukim seem to have followed their own code of deviant practices. For example, they practiced the laws of netilas yadayim differently from the way halachah requires (Yadayim 4:6). Similarly, they followed different rules germane to some of the laws of family purity (Niddah 33b), of inheritance (Yalkut Shimoni, Bereishis #140), of damages (Yadayim 4:7), and of jurisprudence (Sanhedrin 52b; Makkos 5b). They had occasional philosophic or religious debates with Chazal (Yadayim Chapter 4; Yalkut Shimoni, Devorim #824).

Similar to the Baitusim, the Tzedukim, also attempted to change specific practices of the Beis Hamikdash. They were opposed to the mitzvah of pouring water on the mizbei’ach on Sukkos (nissuch hamayim), since it has no explicit source in the written Torah. A more critical deviance was that they felt that the special offering of the ketores (incense) in the Kodesh Hakodoshim (the Holy of Holies) on Yom Kippur should be brought differently from the way that the halachah specifies. In their opinion, the kohein gadol should place the ketores onto the fire in the pan prior to his entering the Kodesh Hakodoshim, whereas the halachah is that he places it onto the fire after entering (Yoma 53a). This deviance of theirs was unusual, because, in this instance, the literal reading of the Torah is much closer to the halachah than it is to the Tzedukim’s practice (see Commentary of Rav Hirsch, Vayikra 16:13). To quote Rav Hirsch, “The tradition of the chachamim is in full accordance with the sense of Scripture; the Sadducean conception, however, entails a most forced reading of Scripture.” We will continue this discussion later.

Another practice in which the Tzedukim diverged from accepted practice concerned some of the preparations of the parah adumah. In this instance, Chazal went to great lengths to make it impossible for the Tzedukim’s approach to be observed. Why?

It is strictly forbidden to imply that the halachah is different from what it actually is. Since the Tzedukim denied the authenticity of Torah, we are required to emphasize the correct halachah. A great early authority, the Maharshal, proves that teaching a distortion of the Torah is forbidden to the extent that it is yeihareig ve’al ya’avor, one is required to avoid violating it to the extent that one is required to give up one’s life, if necessary to avoid such an eventuality (Yam shel Shelomoh, Bava Kama  4:9; see Shu’t Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim, II:51).

The Kara’im

Whereas the Tzedukim came into prominence during the period of the second Beis Hamikdash and the era of the Tanna’im, the Kara’im began in the period of the Geonim (the Middle Ages) in Bavel and the Fertile Crescent region. A prominent Jew named Anan ben David, descended from the royal family of Dovid Hamelech, was passed over in his bid to become the reish gelusa, or Exilarch, the political head of the Jewish community, because of concerns about his level of fear of G-d. He then proved that the concerns about him were valid, when he created a new religion that broke away from Judaism and denied the authenticity of the Torah she’be’al peh. As evidenced by the efforts expended by Rav Saadiah Gaon and others to combat it, Karaism, at one time, posed a serious threat to Jewish souls.

Kara’im versus Tzedukim

Both historically and religiously, there is no direct connection between the Tzedukim and the Kara’im. Both the Tzedukim and the Baitusim had died out centuries before the Kara’im showed up on the scene. Furthermore, the observances of the Kara’im vary tremendously from those of both the Tzedukim and the Baitusim. For example, the Tzedukim kept some form of the mitzvah of netilas yadayim, wore tefillin, and observed the laws of family purity, in a way similar to halachah. The Kara’im do not observe any of these mitzvos.

We see from the Gemara that someone could be a Tzeduki and yet observe halachah sufficiently to mislead a person to thinking that he was halachically abiding. Thus, it was necessary, at the time of the second Beis Hamikdash, to have the kohein gadol take an oath that he would follow halachah and not the Tzeduki practice, when he was in the Holy of Holies. Anyone familiar with Karaite practice quickly realizes that there is no way anyone can confuse them with halachically observant Jews.

Notwithstanding their vast dissimilarities, all three groups shared one common ground. Their primary motivation was to be free of the authority of the Torah; they decided that the only way to be one’s own boss was to reject the concept of Torah she’be’al peh. Ultimately, all three ceased to be factors of any significance for the Jewish people, the Tzedukim and the Baitusim because they disappeared, and the Kara’im because, with time, the small surviving remnants were not identified with Jews. Even Hitler did not consider the Kara’im to be Jews and excluded them from his nefarious final solution.

The Sin or the Sinner?

At this point, let us examine one of our opening questions:

“Why did Chazal establish a brachah in the Shemoneh Esrei against those who reject Judaism? Aren’t we supposed to pray that sinners find their way back to Judaism?”

Indeed, we seem to find two conflicting passages of Gemara. The first reads:

There were some biryonim, troublemakers, in Rabbi Meir’s neighborhood, who were causing him considerable distress. To end the situation, Rabbi Meir wanted to pray that they die! His wife, Beruryah, told him: “What do you think? That it is acceptable to do this, as we see from the verse: ‘Chata’im should cease from the world.’ Does the verse say that chot’im should cease from the world, which would mean that the sinners, themselves, should be destroyed? Furthermore, look at the end of the verse, which states u’resha’im od einam, and there will be no more wicked people. Instead, you should pray that they do teshuvah!” Rabbi Meir prayed that they do teshuvah, and, indeed, they did! (Brochos 10a).

According to the way Rashi explains this dispute, Rabbi Meir understood that the word chata’im should be translated as “the sinners.” However, the grammatical form of this word could be understood to mean “those who cause others to sin.” If one translates the verse this way, the way Beruryah understood the verse, it means that the evil inclination, the yetzer hora, which causes people to sin, should cease. This passage of Gemara implies that one should not pray that the evildoers cease to exist, but that they should no longer sin.

On the other hand, we find the following passage of Gemara:

Shimon Hapekoli organized the eighteen brachos (of the Shemoneh Esrei) in the correct order in the presence of Rabban Gamliel, in Yavneh. Rabban Gamliel then asked the Sages: “Is there anyone here who is able to establish a brachah against the heretics?” Shmuel Hakatan stood up and established what is now called the birchas haminim (Brochos 28b).

Here we have a passage of Gemara that teaches that Chazal added a brachah to the Shemoneh Esrei, specifically requesting that Hashem destroy the evildoers. So, do we rule according to Beruryah or not?

Two additional questions

We can actually add two other questions to this discussion. One is that the conversation between Rabbi Meir and Beruryah transpired after Rabban Gamliel and Shmuel Hakatan had added birchas haminim to the Shemoneh Esrei to destroy the evildoers, yet its existence and the related halachic discussion is not mentioned as part of the conversation between Rabbi Meir and Beruryah. Why didn’t Rabbi Meir rally birchas haminim as support for his approach that one may pray that evildoers die?

An additional question is that, historically, the Tzedukim and Baitusim began early in the period of the Beis Hamikdash, and both succeeded in annoying the gedolei Yisroel sufficiently that several takanos were instituted to combat them. For example, as mentioned above, the kohein gadol was required to recite an oath that he would follow what he had been instructed to do by the Torah leaders, because there were kohanim gedolim who were suspected of being closet Tzedukim. And during the preparation of the parah adumah, numerous extra precautions were instituted to combat a practice of the Tzedukim. Also, initially, any witness who claimed to see the new moon was accepted by Beis Din, until it was revealed that the Baitusim had hired witnesses to testify falsely about what they saw. Each of these matters required a change in procedures germane to how mitzvos were observed in the Beis Hamikdash. Obviously, both the Tzedukim and Baitusim were sources of major exasperation to Chazal.

Yet, we do not find any attempt of Chazal to add a brachah to the tefillah against either the Tzedukim or the Baitusim. The core prayer, which had been established by the Anshei Keneses Hagedolah at the beginning of the second Beis Hamikdash, remained. Only in Yavneh, approximately four hundred years after the tefillah had originally been structured, did Chazal add a new brachah against evildoers. Why did they wait until this time, rather than establish something similar to birchas haminim to combat the Tzedukim and the Baitusim?

It seems that, although Chazal needed to be concerned about the deviances of both the Tzedukim and the Baitusim, they understood that there was no need to make a permanent change in Klal Yisroel’s prayers. These deviant groups would never pose a long-term hazard to the Jewish people. And, we see how accurate Chazal were in their assessment, because both groups disappeared long ago. However, it seems that the concern of the birchas haminim was against the early Christians, who originally considered themselves part of the Jewish people, and it was based on a realization that this group would pose a long-term hazard. Remember that during its infancy, Christianity viewed itself as a branch of Judaism. To this day, Christians have tremendous difficulty explaining why Jews have so whole-heartedly rejected their religion. This is a tremendous blot on its reputation. Since Christianity was completely rejected by those who were around at the time this religion was invented, obviously, it is a forgery.

Against this backdrop, we can explain why Rabbi Meir made no reference to birchas haminim during his conversation with Beruryah. Rabbi Meir was being vexed by a local group of hooligans. The birchas haminim is not about such people, but was established to combat a permanent foe. Indeed, we see from this conversation that, under usual circumstances, one should not pray that an evil person die.

In conclusion

Above I mentioned the deviant practice espoused by the Tzedukim when they insisted that the ketores be burnt prior to the kohein gadol’s entering the Holy of Holies. In Rav Hirsch’s commentary to the Torah, he notes:

Toras Kohanim informs us of the motive of the Tzedukim to contradict the words of Scripture here. They openly put forward a plea of ‘etiquette.’ At human banquets, the incense is brought in already smoking, it is not put on the fire in the presence of the guests. How much more so should this same mannerly conduct be followed in the presence of G-d! Thus would the ancient Sadduccees bow to the idol of external etiquette – the same idol to which the modern ‘Sadduccees’ bow, and in whose name they break every law at the holiest moments of Divine worship.

“Further reflection reveals that the method of offering the ketores that was adopted by the Tzedukim had been employed, also, by Nadav and Avihu. They, too, brought their disastrous ketores offering in this manner…

“If this is correct, then we have here. again. what is so very characteristic: the Tzedukim, in their time, were the disciples of Nadav and Avihu, just as the Karaites later based themselves on all those whose opinions and teachings were rejected by the chachmei Yisroel.

“It appears further that this Sadduccean doctrine is emblematic of the whole principle of the Sadduccean deviation… for the true kohein gadol is nothing but a servant of the Will of G-d, a servant who subordinates his own subjective view. To him… only that which is pleasing to G-d is pleasing to him… The Sadduccean kohein, however, turns the altar fire into his fire and makes it an instrument for his own action… He lights the ketores in a manner that appeals to himself… and forces it on G-d’s will. That which fits his conception of rei’ach nichoach, G-d, too, will accept.

…Who knows whether this very contrast – which epitomizes the Sadduccean principle – is what led the Sadduccees to this doctrine, in blatant contradiction to the sense of Scripture!”

 




Do Clothes Make the Man?

Since this parsha discusses the special clothes worn by the kohanim, and all the melachos of Shabbos are derived from the building of the mishkan, what other week could be more appropriate to discuss the laws of wearing clothing on Shabbos?

Do Clothes Make the Man?

Question #1: The clown of town

clown“To entertain a chosson and kallah at their Shabbos sheva brachos, I want to dress in a clown suit, which includes wearing multiple hats, one atop the other. May I walk this way through an area that has no eruv?”

Question #2: Belts and braces

“May I wear a belt on Shabbos when I am already holding my pants up with suspenders?”

Question #3: Lehoniach muffler

“May I wear my talis as a scarf when I am outside an eruv?”

Question #4: Gallant garteling

“May I wear my gartel to shul on Shabbos the way I usually do?”

Introduction:

As we are aware, one of the 39 melachos of Shabbos is hotza’ah, which is transporting or, as we usually call it, carrying items through a reshus harabim, an unwalled public thoroughfare or marketplace. This melachah also prohibits moving items from a reshus harabim into a reshus hayachid, an enclosed area, or from a reshus hayachid into a reshus harabim. In other articles, I discussed how an eruv permits carrying. (These articles can be read or downloaded from RabbiKaganoff. Com under the titles An Eruv Primer and Carrying in Public and the Use of an Eruv.) This article will discuss the issues of wearing clothing and similar items on Shabbos, in a place that does not have an acceptable eruv.

Violating the melachah of carrying is not necessarily through one’s carrying the item in his hand. Walking through or into a public area with a needle pinned to one’s garment or a handkerchief in one’s pocket breaks the Torah’s proscription. It is also prohibited to have chewing gum or candy in one’s mouth while walking through a reshus harabim or between a reshus harabim and a reshus hayachid.

Although wearing clothing or jewelry is permitted, one may wear them only in a way that they are usually worn. In addition, at times Chazal prohibited wearing certain items to guarantee that a person would not mistakenly carry on Shabbos.

Permitted to carry

One may wear something that qualifies as a garment and is being worn in a normal way, even if you, yourself, do not usually wear it (Chayei Odom 56:4). For example, a rich man may wear something that he would not usually wear, because he considers it demeaning (Chayei Odom 56:4). Similarly, someone may wear earmuffs or an extra pair of socks or other garment, even when he usually does not. This is permitted even on a hot day and when the intention is to bring the extra garment for someone else (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 301:36).

Example: Some teenagers got involved in a very non-Shabbosdik water fight, with some of the contestants now completely drenched. Yitzie, who lives nearby, may make several trips home, each time donning several layers of clothing and a few pairs of socks, in order to supply his friends with dry clothing, even though there is no eruv.

The garment district

Wearing a handkerchief around one’s neck is permitted, since it can be used this way either to provide warmth or to absorb perspiration (Mishnah Berurah 301:133, quoting Chayei Odom).

In an early ruling that sends shivers up my spine, the Rema (Orach Chayim 301:23) permits wearing Jewish “yellow circles” on Shabbos, the forerunner of the Nazi’s “Jewish stars,” even if they are not sewn fully onto the garment.

Not normal

As I mentioned above, one may wear a garment outside an eruv only in a style that is considered “usual.” However, one may not wear a garment in an atypical manner. For example, the Gemara (Shabbos 58a; 147a) teaches that wearing a talis wrapped around one’s neck like a scarf in a reshus harabim is a Torah violation, since it is not the way this garment is meant to be worn. For the same reason, the Mishnah Berurah 301:133 prohibits wrapping a handkerchief around one’s leg and walking this way in a reshus harabim. (However, see Shu’t Levushei Mordechai #133.)

Only a garment

One may not “wear” something that is not a garment, such as a box (Chayei Odom 56:4), even if it is cut out to allow you to slide your head inside.

We do not all hang together

Sometimes two “wearings” may appear to be similar, but halachah treats them in completely different ways. For example, although a woman’s wearing a necklace is an appropriate mode of dress, hanging a key on a string that one wears around one’s neck is prohibited. This is true, even if the string is tied to the key in a way that it would fall off her neck without the key. Wearing a necklace around one’s neck is an accepted way to wear jewelry. A key on a string is neither jewelry nor a garment, and therefore, it is prohibited to use this as a method of transporting a key on Shabbos.

Lo yilbash

The Torah’s mitzvah prohibiting a man from wearing a woman’s clothes and vice versa has an interesting ramification germane to the laws of carrying on Shabbos. This mitzvah applies not only to clothing, but also to ornaments and jewelry – meaning, for example, that a man is forbidden to wear jewelry that would ordinarily be worn only by a woman.

The Shabbos ramification of this question is that someone wearing ornaments inappropriate for his or her gender on Shabbos in an area without an eruv desecrates Shabbos by transporting the ornaments (Chayei Odom 56:4). Since this is not an acceptable way to wear them, it is halachically equivalent to carrying them in a reshus harabim. For this reason, a woman may not wear a talis in a reshus harabim (Chayei Odom 56:4). Perhaps this is something we should draw to the attention of the “women of the wall.”

Finding tefillin

There is an interesting ramification of this law. Suppose that someone discovers several pairs of tefillin on Shabbos, outside of an eruv, in a place where they could become ruined or treated with disrespect. Does the kedushah of the tefillin supersede the violation of carrying on Shabbos? If it does not, what can one do to save the tefillin?

The halachah is that one may not do anything that would desecrate Shabbos to save the tefillin. Nevertheless, although it is usually forbidden to wear tefillin on Shabbos, they are still considered ornaments that men wear. And, since the halachah is that there is sufficient room on one’s head and arm to wear two pairs of tefillin simultaneously, it is permitted to wear two pairs of tefillin. Therefore, a man who finds these tefillin can put on two pairs at a time, two pairs of tefillin shel yad on his arm, and two pairs of tefillin shel rosh on his head, bring the tefillin to a secure place, and then return for more (Eruvin 95). (We should note that some authorities permit wearing two pairs at a time only when they are fairly small.) However, since women do not wear tefillin, they are not considered an ornament for them, and they may not wear even one (Chayei Odom 56:4).

Tafeil parts of a garment

When wearing a garment, one does not need to remove a part of the garment that is not being used at the moment, even when this can be done easily. For example, the Biur Halachah (s.v. Shedarko) permits walking through a reshus harabim while wearing a garment that has pockets, provided that they are empty. Although we are all familiar with this law (I am unaware of anyone who wears pocket-less shirts and slacks on Shabbos), we should stop and ask why it is true. After all, pockets provide no warmth or any other clothing-related benefit – why are they considered clothing, rather than small “backpacks” that happen to be attached to clothing?

The answer is that when wearing a garment in a way that it is usually worn, one need not be concerned about the tafeil, or secondary, parts of the garment. Halachah views the tafeil parts as having no consequence – any significance they have is lost to the garment. For the same reason, one does not need to remove the hood of a garment, even when it is attached by a zipper or buttons and can be easily removed (see Biur Halachah). Similarly, one may drape a coat over one’s shoulders, even though he is not “wearing” the sleeves (Shemiras Shabbos Kehilchasah). The pockets, hood and sleeves are all considered parts of the garment, even when they are not being used.

Tafeil parts of a garment also include such items as stray threads on a garment, whether partially attached or not. Since no one saves them, they are rendered insignificant.

Embellishments

Another type of tafeil part of a garment is something that enhances it aesthetically, such as decorations. For example, one may wear bells that have been woven onto one’s clothing as ornaments (Mishnah, Shabbos 66b, as understood by the Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 301:23).

Not tafeil

To sum up: something is considered part of a garment when it is either (1) insignificant on its own (2) it decorates the garment or (3) it is functionally part of the garment. However, there are items connected to the garment that are certainly not tafeil. Even sewing something onto one’s clothes permits carrying it only when it is an item that is usually worn on that garment (Rema, Orach Chayim 301:23). For example, shirts often have spare buttons attached to them to be used as replacements, should the originals get lost. Some authorities rule that these extra buttons are significant, because the intent is to save them, in case they are ever needed. At the same time, their attachment to the garment does not service the garment or the wearer, since they are not doing anything functional for the shirt, nor are they decorative. Therefore, some authorities require that one remove these buttons from the garment before wearing it in a reshus harabim. On the other hand, other authorities contend that these extra buttons are not considered important and that one does not need to remove them (Shu’t Rivevos Efrayim, 4:87).

Hanging your jacket

Should the cloth loop used for hanging one’s jacket become torn, this often creates a problem in wearing this garment outside of an eruv. Allow me to explain. As long as the loop is not torn, it is tafeil to the jacket, since it has a functional purpose — to hang the jacket on a hook. The halachic problem is when one side of the loop tears, yet the loop remains attached to the garment. This loop is still considered important, since one intends to sew it back into place, so that it can again be used. Yet, the loop is no longer functional, and it serves no aesthetic purpose. Thus, the loop is no longer included in any of the three categories whereby it could be tafeil to the jacket. As a result, wearing the jacket in an area without an eruv will be a problem, since the loop is now being carried (Chayei Odom).

Should the loop tear in a way that it cannot be resewn into the garment, one may wear the garment outside an eruv, since, in this situation, the remnants of the loop have no significance, and they are therefore tafeil to the garment. It is also permitted if one does not intend to use the loop, but to throw it away and use something else to replace it.

Not decorative

We learned above that one may wear a decorative item that lies upon or attaches to a garment. However, this is permitted only when the attached item is indeed decorative. One may not wear a pin in one’s clothes, unless it is either decorative or it is being used in a functional way, such as being used instead of a button (Chayei Odom 56:2). As I mentioned above, it is therefore forbidden to go outside an eruv with a house key attached to one’s clothes with a safety pin, since this does not enhance the garments aesthetically. I will soon discuss other possible options of what one may do.

Two belts

I mentioned earlier that one may wear two or more of the same garment, even though one usually does not. There is a dispute among authorities whether this is true regarding wearing two belts. Based on different ways of understanding a passage of Gemara (Shabbos 59b), the rishonim disagree as to whether one may wear two belts, one on top of the other. The dispute is whether it is considered normative for someone to wear two belts in this way. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 301:36) concludes that this is permitted, whereas the Rema prohibits it; the latter is the accepted practice of Ashkenazim. This is prohibited, even when the two belts are not placed one directly on top of the other, but one is placed somewhat higher than the other, as long as they are both holding tight the same garment (Minchas Shabbos 84:20).

Nevertheless, the Magen Avraham concludes that where the two belts are accomplishing different things, such as, where one is attached to a garment above and therefore functions more like suspenders than a belt, that it is permitted. Similarly, the Pri Megadim (Mishbetzos Zahav 301:25) permits two belts, one on top of the other, when there is a practical reason to wear them this way, such as the inside belt is not aesthetic but is functional, and the outer belt is attractive; or when the two belts are worn so that they lift up one’s garments to prevent them from getting dirty (Mishnah Berurah 301:134).

Gartels

Rav Moshe Feinstein forbids wearing a gartel in the street on Shabbos on top of one’s shirt or slacks, if one is already wearing a belt, since this is considered to be wearing two belts, one on top of the other. It is, similarly, forbidden to wear the gartel over a tie, since this is not a normal way of keeping a tie in place (Shu’t Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 2:76). It is permitted to wear the gartel on top of one’s jacket, so that it functions as a type of a belt holding the jacket in place.

Wearing two hats

May one wear two hats? Some early authorities prohibit wearing two hats on Shabbos, unless the hats are of a type that people occasionally wear one atop the other (Machatzis Hashekel 301:49). Similarly, we find those who forbid wearing two yarmulkas, one atop the other (Minchas Shabbos 84:19). So, although people say that “they wear two hats,” they should be careful how they do it on Shabbos.

A rain cover

May one wear a raincover on one’s hat on Shabbos? Many authorities prohibit this, since it is not to protect your body, but your hat (see Chayei Odom 56:4). Thus, it does not serve a clothing purpose, and it is also not an ornament. Some authorities draw a distinction between raincovers used by men to cover their hats, which they prohibit, and the rainbonnets worn by women, which, although they are also used to protect sheitelach, also protect the wearer. They rally evidence that this is so, since they are also used by single women, which demonstrates that its primary purpose is to protect the wearer, not the hat or sheitel (Kitzur Hilchos Shabbos).

Shabbos keys

Is there any permitted way to transport keys through a public area on Shabbos?

The basic question here is that the key is not a garment and one is permitted, on Shabbos, to wear only a garment or an ornament. Many authorities permit making the key into a proper ornament, but, to do this, it must be made of silver and have the appearance of something that one would wear as jewelry (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 301:11 and Mishnah Berurah 42; Chayei Odom 56:3. It should be noted that although the Shulchan Aruch cites the lenient opinion in this dispute, he rules that this last suggestion is prohibited.) The other option is to make the key a functional part of a garment, such as by using it as the prong of the belt, which is the part that one inserts into the holes when buckling (Mishnah Berurah 301:45; Shu’t Minchas Yitzchok 4:33).

Walking stick

One of the more difficult problems to resolve is that of an older person, who usually walks outdoors with a cane or walking stick, but can walk without it. The halachah is that someone who cannot walk at all unassisted may use a cane (Chayei Odom). However, if one can walk without the stick, even only at home, the Kitzur Shulchan Aruch (84:5) prohibits him from using a cane on Shabbos in an area without an eruv.

Conclusion

The Navi Yirmiyohu (17:19-27) was concerned about carrying on Shabbos; it is a melachah like any other, yet people mistakenly think that it is not important. Indeed, we would not usually define transporting something as changing something functionally, which is what most melachos accomplish.

Rav Hirsch (Shemos 35:2) explains that whereas other melachos demonstrate man’s mastery over the physical world, carrying demonstrates his mastery over the social sphere. The actions that show the responsibility of the individual to the community and vice versa are often acts of hotza’ah. Thus, the prohibition to carry on Shabbos is to demonstrate man’s subordination to Hashem regarding his role and position in his social and national life.

 




An Unusual Haftarah – That of Parshas Mishpatim

Question #1: A Rare Occurrence

Why is the haftarah for parshas Mishpatim read at such irregular intervals?

Question #2: Haftarah in Reverse

Why do we read the verses of this haftarah in a different order from how they appear in Tanach?

Question #3: Are We Ignoring Chazal?

How are we permitted to read this haftarah out of order, when Chazal prohibited this practice?

Introduction:

The section from sefer Yirmiyahu (34:8-22) beginning with the words Hadavar asher hayah leYirmiyahu discusses the laws of eved ivri, a Jewish slave. For this reason, it is an extremely appropriate haftarah for parshas Mishpatim. At the same time, as the questions above note, there are three unusual and curious aspects of this haftarah, which I will now explain.

Sporadic haftarah

The first question posed above is that, notwithstanding the appropriateness of Hadavar for parshas Mishpatim, in most years we read different haftaros this Shabbos. Furthermore, Hadavar is read in a fairly sporadic pattern. For example, we read it this year, and, under our current fixed calendar system, we will read it again in three years, in 5779 (2019), in 5782 (2022) and in 5785 (2025). This seems like a fairly regular schedule of every three years. However, this is followed by an interlude of ten years before we read it again — not until 5795 (2035). Why is the reading of Hadavar so erratic, when Mishpatim is read very predictably every year, the Shabbos after Yisro and before Terumah?

Driving in reverse

The second question raised above concerns the unusual structure of the haftarah. It consists of reading fifteen pesukim that begin with the words Hadavar from the book of Yirmiyahu (34:8-22) and then closes by reading two pesukim that are nine verses earlier in the sefer (Yirmiyahu 33:25-26). This is the only time that we close a haftarah by reading an earlier passage. Why do we read the passages in an order different from the order in which they appear in sefer Yirmiyahu?

Are we ignoring the Gemara?

The third question is a continuation of the previous one, although it necessitates an introduction. Chazal instituted several rules about reading the haftaros, one of which is called ein medalgim lemafrei’a, which prohibits going back to read an earlier section after we have read a later part. Thus, after reading Chapter 34 of Yirmiyahu, how are we permitted to return to Chapter 33?

Why so sporadic?

Having presented the three issues, allow me to answer these questions in the order in which they were asked. The first question was that the scheduling of this haftarah is both infrequent and sporadic. In most years, we read a different haftarah for Shabbos Mishpatim, and, occasionally, there is a gap of many years between one reading of Hadavar and the next. The reason for this is not as complicated is it sounds. Parshas Mishpatim almost always falls on the Shabbos before Rosh Chodesh Adar. In non-leap years, on that Shabbos we read parshas Shekalim for maftir and, therefore, we read the special haftarah for Shabbos Shekalim which is in sefer Melachim. As a result, almost the only time we read Hadavar is in a leap year, when Shekalim is read on or immediately before Rosh Chodesh of the second Adar – since it is the month immediately preceding Nissan – and Mishpatim falls before the first Adar. (There is a very occasional common year, such as 5785, when parshas Terumah falls on Rosh Chodesh Adar and is therefore the Shabbos on which we read Shekalim. In those years, we indeed read Hadavar on Mishpatim in a common year.)

Even in a leap year, when Shekalim never coincides with Mishpatim, there are years when Shabbos Mishpatim falls either on Rosh Chodesh or on Erev Rosh Chodesh. In these instances, we read the special haftaros for Rosh Chodesh or for Erev Rosh Chodesh. As a result, at times, many years go by until we again read Hadavar.

Haftarah in reverse

The second question concerned the unusual structure of the haftarah, in which we close by reading two pesukim that are a bit earlier in the sefer. Why do we read the haftarah in an order different from how it appears in sefer Yirmiyahu?

Happily ever after

The answer to this question requires our examining an accepted custom – not to end an aliyah, a haftarah or a megillah at a negative point. This concept is already mentioned by Rashi in his last comment on Eicha, where he notes that four seforim of Tanach Eicha, Yeshayahu, Trei Asar and Koheles – end on a negative tone, so we repeat the next to last pasuk afterwards to end on something positive. (The source for this idea is in Talmud Yerushalmi, Brachos, 5:1.)

In accordance with this approach, where the natural end of a haftarah closes on something negative, we often skip ahead a bit to find a more pleasant place to end the haftarah. The unusual aspect of Hadavar is that we do not skip ahead, but backwards, to find a pleasant ending. The reason we do this is because the next several chapters of Yirmiyahu do not include any pesukim that would be considered an appropriate ending for the haftarah. From a reader’s perspective, the most appropriate, pleasant place to stop is a few pesukim before Hadavar, which is why the custom developed of adding these two pesukim at the end.

Shuva versus Vayeitzei

An interesting related question: The haftarah for Shabbos Shuva begins towards the end of Hoshea, one of the twelve prophets whose writings comprise Trei Asar, with the words Shuva Yisroel. The final words of Hoshea are that Hashem’s ways are straight, yet sinners will stumble over them, u’poshe’im yikashlu bam. On Shabbos Shuva, we consider this to be a negative way to end the haftarah, and therefore we continue by reading elsewhere in Trei Asar in order to close with a pleasant ending. (There are many different customs how to accomplish this; I am aware of at least five.) However, the haftarah that most Ashkenazim read every year for Vayeitzei, which begins earlier in Hoshea, ends at the end of Hoshea with the words uposhe’im yikashlu bam. Why are these words considered positive enough to be an appropriate ending when we read this haftarah on Vayeitzei, but an inappropriate place to close on Shabbos Shuva? (It should be noted that the Mishnah Berurah [428:22] and many calendars published in Eretz Yisrael include reciting additional verses when this haftarah is read on Vayeitzei, in order to end more positively. However, most chumashim do not include these additional verses, and it is not the common practice in chutz la’aretz.)

I would like to suggest the following: The stumbling of the evil is not inherently a bad thing, and, for this reason, this is considered an appropriate place to end the haftarah on Vayeitzei. Nevertheless, on Shabbos Shuva, ending with u’poshe’im yikashlu bam, the sinners will stumble, is inappropriate, because the first Shabbos of the year should have a more encouraging conclusion. Alternatively, mention the sinning of the evil is an inappropriate closing during the aseres yemei teshuvah, when our entire theme is that everyone will do teshuvah.

Parshas Kedoshim

It should be noted that there are aliyos and readings that, indeed, do end in negative places, the most obvious example being the end of parshas Kedoshim, whose closing discusses a case of capital punishment. Why are we inconsistent – ending some aliyos in negative places, yet in others skipping or repeating verses to avoid this?

It seems that ending in a negative place is, in general, not forbidden but, rather, a custom that developed to try to find a pleasant ending, wherever this does not distort the reading. However, if finding a pleasant place to end an aliyah will complicate matters, we stop at a convenient place, even though it is negative. Alternatively, the division of the parshiyos predates the custom that we not end an aliyah at a negative point, and these divisions were left in place, even after the custom developed.

The tochachah

We can prove that ending an aliyah in a negative place is a custom that developed, but is not halachically required, from the Gemara and early halachic authorities, in their discussion concerning the public reading of the tochachah. In two different places, parshas Bechukosai at the end of sefer Vayikra and parshas Ki Savo in Devorim, the Torah describes in great detail the calamities that befall Klal Yisroel, should we fail to observe the Torah properly. This part of the Torah is customarily called the tochachah, literally, the admonition, although the Mishnah (Megillah 31a) calls it the curses. Chazal (Megillah 31b) discuss whether one may divide the tochachah into different aliyos. The Gemara concludes that the tochachah in Bechukosai, which is the harsher of the two, may not be divided into aliyos, whereas the tochachah of Ki Savo may be divided. Thus, we see that, other than the tochachah of Bechukosai, one may conclude an aliyah at an unpleasant point.

The Rambam (Hilchos Tefillah 13:7) and the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 428:6) already note that, although it is permitted to end aliyos in the middle of the tochachah of Ki Savo, the custom developed to avoid doing this. This custom was extended to include any place where an aliyah would end in an unpleasant place. However, where accommodating this practice would result in an unusual division of the parshiyos, such as at the end of parshas Kedoshim, we do end the parshah at its natural division, notwithstanding its being a negative place.

Are we ignoring Chazal?

At this point, we will discuss the third question I raised above. How are we permitted to read this haftarah out of order, when Chazal prohibited this practice? Let me explain the question.

Chazal established several rules regarding the reading of the haftarah. One beraisa provides the following directives:

One may not skip from one book of the prophets to another. However, one may skip from the reading of one prophet to another prophet within Trei Asar, provided that one does not skip from the end of the book to its beginning (Megillah 24a). I will refer to this last rule as the prohibition of ein medalgin lemafrei’a, literally, “not to skip backwards.”

Switching prophets midstream

The Gemara is ruling that although one may skip ahead within the same book of the prophets, one may not skip from the writings of one navi to another, such as from Yirmiyahu to Yeshayahu. Rashi explains that skipping from one navi to another confuses people, which is explained by the Aruch Hashulchan (Orach Chayim 144:2) in the following manner: When Hashem brings the presence of His Shechinah onto a prophet, the prophet perceives a vision and a message, which he will later describe. The way the prophet experiences his vision and how he expresses himself bear the mark of aspects of his personality. This is called ein shnei nevi’im misnabe’im besignon echad, literally, “no two prophets prophesy in the identical style” (Sanhedrin 89a). If the haftarah were to shift from one prophet to another, the audience listening would be required to adjust suddenly to the style and mindset of a different prophet, which is confusing. As a result, the listeners would not absorb the full impact of what is being taught, which is why Chazal forbade switching prophets in mid-haftarah.

The Gemara continues by explaining that within Trei Asar, a book composed of the writings of twelve different prophets, Chazal permitted skipping from the writings of one navi to another. Presumably, the reason is that people expect style changes within Trei Asar, so they are not confused.

Ein medalgin lemafrei’a

Returning to the original beraisa, which states: One may not skip from one book of the prophets to another. However, one may skip from the reading of one prophet to another prophet within Trei Asar, provided that one does not skip from the end of the book to its beginning. The question is whether the rule prohibiting medalgin lemafrei’a, reading verses of a book out of order, applies only to the book of Trei Asar, or is it prohibited in any sefer navi. If it refers only to Trei Asar, then reversing direction at the end of the haftarah of Hadavar, which is from the book of Yirmiyahu, does not present any problem.

The authorities dispute which interpretation of the beraisa is correct. The Kesef Mishneh, indeed, rules that ein medalgin lemafrei’a applies only to Trei Asar and nowhere else. However, the Magen Avraham disagrees and understands that ein medalgin lemafrei’a applies to the works of any of the prophets. It is possible that our custom of skipping backwards when reading Hadavar is based on the Kesef Mishneh’s understanding of the Gemara. However, since most late authorities follow the Magen Avraham’s approach, it is unusual that common custom should conflict with his ruling. Are there other approaches to justify the practice?

Foreign additions

Prior to presenting two other approaches to justify the practice of reading the end of the haftarah Hadavar out of order, we should examine a different controversial custom that dates back many hundreds of years. In the times of the rishonim, on the Shabbos after someone married, the haftarah was concluded by adding two or three verses from Yeshayahu (61:10) beginning with the words Sos Asis, because these verses refer to a chosson and kallah (Beis Yosef, Orach Chayim 144). The problem with this custom is that whenever the week’s haftarah is from a book other than Yeshayahu, reciting Sos Asis skips from one navi to another.

There was also another, similar practice that seems to violate Chazal’s dictates. When Rosh Chodesh begins on Sunday, a special haftarah from Shmuel is usually read that begins with the words Vayomer Yonasan mochor chodesh. A custom developed that, when Rosh Chodesh fell on Shabbos and Sunday, after reading the haftarah of Shabbos Rosh Chodesh, which is from the closing words of Yeshayahu, the first and last verses of the haftarah mochor Chodesh were read as a reminder that the next day is also Rosh Chodesh. Yet this practice runs counter to the Gemara’s prohibition of switching prophets in mid-haftarah!

The Terumas Hadeshen

One early authority, the Terumas Hadeshen, suggests why these customs do not violate the takkanah. He comments that there are two disputing reasons why one may not switch from one navi to another while reading the haftarah. As we noted above, Rashi explains that the reason is to avoid confusing the listeners. However, other rishonim provide a different reason why one may not skip from one navi to another: closing one navi scroll and opening a different one, while the congregation is waiting, constitutes tircha detzibura, literally, “inconveniencing the congregation.” According to the latter approach, the Terumas Hadeshen explains why the takkanah not to switch prophets in mid-haftarah no longer applied in his day.

Bound Bibles

Although the Terumas Hadeshen lived before the invention of the printing press, he notes that, in his day, they no longer wrote the works of the prophets as scrolls but, instead, they were written as manuscript pages and then bound into books. Among the practical advantages of the bound edition is that one can place a marker in the different places from which one intends to read and then simply turn the pages at the correct time to the appropriate marker. As a result, switching to the writings of a different prophet in mid-haftarah does not involve any tircha detzibura, as opposed to closing a scroll and opening a new one, which takes far more time. For this reason, the Terumas Hadeshen contends, those who explain that Chazal prohibited switching prophets in mid-haftarah because of tircha detzibura will conclude that this is permitted when the haftarah is in book form. He concludes that this is the rationale for those who add verses from Sos Asis or Mochor Chodesh on the appropriate occasions.

However, the Terumas Hadeshen notes that, according to those who prohibit changing prophets in mid-haftarah because the style-change is confusing, it will make no difference whether one is reading from a bound book or a scroll. In both instances, switching to a different author confuses people and may not be done.

Justified conclusion

Based on this approach of the Terumas Hadeshen, we may be able to permit going back to two earlier pesukim to conclude the haftarah of Hadavar, if we assume that the prohibition of ein medalgin lemafrei’a is because of tircha detzibura.

When more is less

However, the custom is not yet out of the woods. Another aspect that impacts on this ruling is the following: When people read the haftarah from a bound volume, the heter mentioned by the Terumas Hadeshen applies. However, today many yeshivos and yeshivah-type shullen have the mehudar custom of using handwritten scrolls of nevi’m for the reading the haftarah. (An explanation for this custom is a topic for a different article.) The Terumas Hadeshen’s rationale will not permit reading Sos Asis, Mochor Chodesh or the last verses for Hadavar from a scroll at the end of a haftarah. This would result in the rather anomalous situation in which the chumra of reading the haftarah from a scroll may ultimately lead to violating a takkanas Chazal!

Another answer

All is not lost, and we can still find justification, even for the scroll readers. Other authorities provide a different reason to permit reading Sos Asis after a haftarah from a different navi. They explain that these verses are not considered part of the haftarah but a concluding song after the haftarah (Beis Yosef, Orach Chayim 144, quoting Nemukei Yosef; Levush ad loc. 144:2). This is true, despite the fact that these pesukim are read before the brochos of the conclusion of the haftarah. Similarly, reading the verse Mochor Chodesh after the haftarah does not violate the takkanah of Chazal not to switch prophets in mid-haftarah because this is considered an announcement and not part of the haftarah.

Conclusion

According to this last approach, adding some verses for a pleasant conclusion is not considered part of the haftarah, and therefore does not violate the takkanas chachamim.

As an aside, I have been told that Rav Chayim Kanievsky, shlit”a, advises people who read the haftarah from a scroll to read the last two verses of this week’s haftarah from a regular, printed chumash. This emphasizes the fact that these are not considered part of the haftarah and therefore do not violate the takanas chachamim.

 




Make Our Mitzvos Count!

The Aseres Hadibros include allusions to all of the 613 mitzvos. What better week to…

Make Our Mitzvos Count!

The opening words of Rashi’s commentary on the Torah quote the following Midrash: Rabbi Yitzchak said, “There seems no need to begin the Torah before Hachodesh Hazeh Lochem, which is the first Mitzvah that the Jewish people were commanded.” I decided to use the parsha in which we read the Aseres Hadibros to discuss all 613 Mitzvos that we are commanded.

Most of us are unaware of the vast literature that debates, disputes and categorizes what exactly comprises these 613 Mitzvos, and the halachic ramifications resulting from these discussions. I will simply note that if one counts every time the Torah says to do or not to do something the result is thousands of Mitzvos. Aren’t we shortchanging ourselves by limiting our Mitzvah count to 613? Since the Mishnah (at the end of Makkos) states: Hashem wanted to provide Israel with much merit and, therefore, provided them with much Torah and many Mitzvos, why do we limit the count to 613?

Why 613?

What is the source for the count of 613 Mitzvos?

The Gemara teaches: Rav Simla’i explained: “Moshe Rabbeinu was taught 613 Mitzvos, 365 negative Mitzvos equal to the number of days of the solar year, and 248 positive Mitzvos, corresponding to a man’s number of ‘limbs.’Rav Hamnuna said: “What verse teaches this to us? ‘Torah tzivah lanu Moshe morashah kehillas Yaakov,’ Moshe taught us the Torah, which is an inheritance of the community descended from Yaakov. The Gematriya (numerical value) of the word Torah equals 611, and two Mitzvos of Anochi Hashem and Lo Yihyeh Lecha were taught to us directly by Hashem” (Makkos 23b).

Thus, we now know that we have 613 counted Mitzvos, and yet there are thousands of places that the Torah commands us what to do. Obviously, some of the Torah’s commandments are not counted, but which ones? This question led many early authorities to calculate what exactly is included in the 613 Mitzvos and thereby understand what the Gemara means. Several Geonim and Rishonim authored works that list the 613 Mitzvos of the Torah, and no two lists are exactly the same.

The Sefer Hachinuch

Most of us are familiar with the listing of the 613 Mitzvos of the Sefer Hachinuch. Actually, this author did not develop his own list of 613 Mitzvos, as he mentions several times in his work. He followed the calculation of the Rambam, who wrote a large work on the subject, called Sefer HaMitzvos, which includes both the rules of when to count something as a Mitzvah and a list of the 248 Mitzvos aseh and the 365 Mitzvos lo saaseh, organized in a logical pattern. (Actually, notwithstanding what the Sefer hachinuch himself writes, he counts one mitzvah that the Rambam does not, and omits one of the Rambam’s.)

Chronology versus Logic

The Sefer Hachinuch reorganized the Rambam’s list, numbering each Mitzvah according to its first appearance in the Torah. Thus, the first Mitzvah of the Torah, Pru Urvu, having children, which is mentioned in parshas Bereishis, is the first Mitzvah; Bris Milah, mentioned in parshas Lech Lecha is counted as the second Mitzvah, and Gid Hanasheh, taught in parshas Vayishlach, completes the three Mitzvos mentioned in Sefer Bereishis. Parshas Bo is the first that contains many Mitzvos, a total of twenty, reflecting its significance as the first parsha in which Hashem directly commanded Mitzvos to the Jewish people, as Rabbi Yitzchak noted in the above-quoted Midrash.

What Counts as a Mitzvah?

In the first section of the Sefer HaMitzvos, the Rambam details the rules that he used to determine what qualifies as a “Mitzvah” in the count of 613. He establishes 14 rules, which include:

I. No Rabbinics

Any Mitzvah that is only miderabbanan is not counted among the 613 Mitzvos. This rule may seem obvious, since the Gemara is calculating the 613 Mitzvos that Hashem commanded us, and not those later added by the Sages. However, one of the great Geonim, the author of the Baal Halachos Gedolos, counts many Mitzvos derabbanan in his list of the 613, including kindling Ner Chanukah, reading Megillah on Purim, and reciting Hallel. How could the Baal Halachos Gedolos include these in his list of Mitzvos that Hashem commanded us?

The Ramban, in his exhaustive commentary to the Rambam’s Sefer HaMitzvos, provides two answers:

  1. There is an alternative text to the Gemara in Makkos, which reads, “The Jewish people are commanded 613 Mitzvos.” According to this wording, the Gemara there cites a Biblical verse not to imply that we derive these 613 Mitzvos from the Torah, but merely as a mnemonic device (based on the Gematriya of the word Torah) to remind us that there are a total of 613 Mitzvos of both Torah and rabbinical sources.
  2. The Ramban contends that even the text of the Gemara that I quoted earlier, which states that Moshe Rabbeinu was commanded 611 Mitzvos, does not present an obstacle to the Behag’s approach, and could include Mitzvos introduced by Chazal. The Ramban cites many places where, even though the Gemara states that “The Torah required…” or “Hashem said…,” the statement refers to a rabbinic command, not a Torah requirement. In his opinion, Chazal used this terminology, even in the context of Rabbinic requirements, since the Torah requires us to observe the Mitzvos that Chazal commanded.

Thus, although the Rambam insists that there are 613 Mitzvos that Hashem commanded the Jewish people, and his opinion is accepted by most authorities, there are other Torah scholars who include Mitzvos introduced by the Sages among them.

Dispute the Rules

In addition to the above dispute, there are other authorities who disagree with many of the fourteen rules that the Rambam used to define the Mitzvos (listed below). Nevertheless, since the Jewish people have come to accept the Rambam’s and Chinuch’s count of the Mitzvos, it is important for us to know and understand these rules.

II. Only What the Torah Says

The Rambam’s second rule is to not count any Mitzvah that is derived hermeneutically, through a drasha, but only Mitzvos that are mentioned outright in the Torah. Therefore, says the Rambam, we do not list the requirements to treat one’s stepfather or stepmother with appropriate respect as separate Mitzvos, since these requirements are derived from the extra word es, rather than being mentioned outright. Instead, these responsibilities are included under the Mitzvah of respecting one’s parents. Similarly, the Rambam rules not to count Visiting the Sick (Bikkur Cholim) or Comforting Mourners (Nichum Aveilim), as separate Mitzvos, but includes them under the Torah’s Mitzvah of emulating Hashem by acting in ways that imitate His acts of kindness.

III. Mitzvos are Forever!

One counts only a Mitzvah that is everlasting, and not one that is temporary. For example, we do not count as one of the 613 commandments that a Levi may not serve in the Mishkan past his fiftieth birthday, since this rule applied only in the Desert and not afterwards.

The reason for not counting these commandments is that the 613 Mitzvos form an eternal relationship between Hashem and the Jewish people, and, as such, apply only to Mitzvos that apply forever. However, many Mitzvos that are not applicable today due to the absence of the Beis Hamikdash still count in the list of 613. This is because these Mitzvos are eternal commandments that are temporarily beyond our ability to observe.

IV. Torah, but Not the Whole Torah!

One should not count as part of the 613 any command that includes observing the entire Torah. For example, the Torah states: Be careful concerning all that I am telling you (Shemos 23:13) and Guard my decrees and observe my judgments (Vayikra 18:4). These and other similar statements are not counted among the 613 Mitzvos. The Rambam explains that each of the 613 Mitzvos involves a different mode of developing our relationship with Hashem, while a pasuk that instructs to keep all the Mitzvos is not indicating any specific way to grow.

V. No Reasons!

In the instances when the Torah provided a reason to observe a Mitzvah, we do not count the reason as a separate Mitzvah. Although these reasons are significant in understanding both our relationship with Hashem and why we observe His Mitzvos, they do not obligate any additional actions with which to deepen our relationship with Hashem.

VI. Yes and No

When there are two commands pursuant to an activity, one a positive command (mitzvas aseh) and the other a negative command (mitzvas lo saaseh), we count the Mitzvah twice, once among the 248 Mitzvos aseh and once among the 365 Mitzvos lo saaseh. There are numerous examples of this: For example, there is a positive Mitzvah, “to keep Shabbos,” and a negative Mitzvah, “not to perform melachah on Shabbos.” The situation is repeated concerning the observance of all the Yomim Tovim (seven times, or 14 more Mitzvos), afflicting ourselves on Yom Kippur (which has both a positive and a negative commandment), and regarding all korbanos being salted before placing them on the mizbeiach (which also has a lo saaseh, Do not place unsalted korbanos on the mizbeiach).

VII. Details, Details

Details about when a Mitzvah applies and how to fulfill it do not count as separate Mitzvos. For example, for certain sins the Torah requires an atoning korban that has a sliding scale: a wealthy person offers an animal, a pauper offers only a grain offering, and someone in-between offers a dove or pigeon. All this counts as only one Mitzvah, although there are many different ways of accomplishing it. Here again, there is one Mitzvah that develops our relationship with Hashem, although depending on one’s financial circumstances, there are different ways to perform it. Dividing this into several Mitzvos would send an erroneous message.

VIII. Not Every “No” means “No!”

There are instances where, even though a verse might seem to be forbidding something, a careful reading of the verse indicates that the Torah is merely stating that something will not happen or does not need to be performed. Obviously, these instances do not qualify as Mitzvos. For example, the Torah says that no prophet will arise who will be like Moshe. Although the wording of the Torah, Lo kam od navi kemoshe, might be read to mean, “No prophet should arise like Moshe,” which implies that we are commanded to make sure this does not happen, the translation of the verse is actually a prophetic Divine statement: “No prophet will arise like Moshe.” Thus, this verse is not a directive and does not count as a commandment.

IX. Five Times One Equals One.

When the Torah repeats a Mitzvah many times, we do not count each time as a separate Mitzvah, but we count it as one Mitzvah. Therefore, although the Torah prohibits eating blood on several occasions, it counts as only one of the 613 Mitzvos. As a result, in the Rambam’s opinion, someone who violates this prohibition is punished as if he violated only one lo saaseh, and not many.

According to this approach, when two similar Mitzvos lo saaseh or two similar Mitzvos aseh are both counted as Mitzvos, this must be because one Mitzvah is more comprehensive than the other. Otherwise, this Mitzvah would not be counted more than once.

Here is an example:

The Rambam counts two different Mitzvos against owning chometz on Pesach, bal yei’ra’eh, that chometz should not be seen, and bal yematzei, that chometz should not be found. Why does he count both of these Mitzvos, whereas he counts only one Mitzvah not to eat blood?

The answer is that these two Mitzvos are not identical: bal yematzei includes cases that are not included under bal ye’ra’eh. Specifically, someone who buried chometz does not violate bal yei’ra’eh, since the chometz cannot be seen. However, he does violate bal yematzei since the chometz can be found.

This distinction not only affects whether this Mitzvah is counted once or twice among the 613, but also has other halachic ramifications. Someone who purchased chometz or mixed dough and allowed it to rise on Pesach violates two different prohibitions, since these prohibitions count as two separate Mitzvos.

X. Preliminary Steps do not a Mitzvah Make

Preliminary steps involved in the performance of a Mitzvah are not counted as a Mitzvah on their own. For example, one does not count the statement that one should take flour to bring a korban mincha, a grain offering, as a Mitzvah on its own. It is simply one stage in the performance of the Mitzvah.

XI. Part of a Mitzvah is Equal to None

There are Mitzvos in which several items are involved in successfully performing one Mitzvah, such as taking the four species on Sukkos. The Rambam points out that one counts the taking of the four species as one Mitzvah, not as four separate Mitzvos, since taking each of them without the others, or even three without the fourth, does not fulfill a Mitzvah.

XII. Completing one Part of a Mitzvah

Some Mitzvos involve the successful completion of several other commandments, such as the Mitzvah to build the Mishkan/Beis Hamikdash, which involves the completion of many of the vessels, including the Menorah, the Shulchan, and the Altar. Each of these independent Mitzvos is not counted separately: Since the purpose of all of them is the creation of the Mishkan/Beis Hamikdash, they are all included under the one Mitzvah of building Hashem’s “house.”

XIII. Many Days are not Many Mitzvos

If a Mitzvah continues for several days, one counts the Mitzvah only once. It is interesting that the Rambam counts offering the Korban Musaf on Sukkos as only one Mitzvah, even though the number of its bulls changes daily.

Included in this rule is that a Mitzvah observed more than once a day is counted only once. Therefore, reciting Kerias Shma every morning and evening is counted as only one Mitzvah (Kinas Sofrim).

XIV. Punishments are not Mitzvos

When the Torah describes the punishment for violating a specific Mitzvah, we do not count that punishment as a separate Mitzvah in its own right.

Although almost every one of the Rambam’s rules has its disputants, this last rule is interesting because it entails a major dispute between the Geonim’s approach to counting Mitzvos and that of the Rambam. Several of the Geonim count each time the Torah mentions a punishment for violating a certain command as a separate Mitzvah. The individual’s command to observe this law counts as a Mitzvah, and the Beis Din’s instruction to mete out a specific punishment to those who violate the law is counted as a separate Mitzvah. This understanding of the Mitzvos creates a list of 71 Mitzvos of the Torah that apply to the Beis Din.

As mentioned above, the Rambam disputes this approach and counts simply five Mitzvos for the Beis Din to fulfill, one for each of the four types of capital punishment that Beis Din administers, and one for malkus, lashes.

Other Lists

Among those who did not follow the Rambam fully, the one that is probably closest to the Rambam’s count of the 613 Mitzvos was that of Rav Moshe of Coucy, one of the Baalei Tosafos, whose magnum opus, the Sefer HaMitzvos HaGadol (often abbreviated Smag) is a compendium of all the halachic conclusions of the Gemara, with a full analysis of the author’s decision, organized according to the list of the 613 Mitzvos. Although the book is not commonly studied today, and it is never used as the final halachic decision, at one time it was the major decisor of halachah for Ashkenazic Jewry.

What is interesting is that although he also organized the Mitzvos in a logical fashion, similar to the approach of the Rambam, his list is in a very different order from that of the Rambam. Nevertheless, his count is so similar to the Rambam that in his list of 248 positive Mitzvos, he agrees with the Rambam on 245 of them.

His extra three, which the Rambam does not count, include:

To accept Hashem’s judgment on anything that happens. Whereas the Smag counts this as one of the 613 Mitzvos, deriving it from a pasuk, the Rambam does not count this as one of the 613 Mitzvos.

Among the 613 Mitzvos, the Smag counts the Mitzvah to calculate seasons and the movement of heavenly bodies in order to know how to determine the Jewish calendar. The Rambam mentions in his second rule that one should not count this as a separate Mitzvah, because it is derived from a drasha. The Smag does not accept this rule.

The Third Smag Addition

The Smag counts as a positive Mitzvah: To distance oneself from falsehood. I admit to having no idea why the Rambam does not count this as a Mitzvah. He includes all the laws of distancing oneself from falsehood under the mitzvas lo saaseh of “Do not bear a false story,” a lo saaseh that includes the laws of speaking loshon hora. However, as we mentioned earlier, the Rambam contends that one counts overlapping Mitzvos aseh and lo saaseh separately, so why does he omit the count of this Mitzvah?

In conclusion, we have seen that much halachic literature is devoted to enumerating and understanding the various counts of the 613 Mitzvos. Some people have the practice of reviewing the Mitzvos that are included in the week’s Torah reading at the Shabbos table, a minhag that is not only praiseworthy, but has the additional benefit in that it familiarizes us with all the 613 Mitzvos.

 




Shabbos Shirah

By Rabbis Avraham Rosenthal and Yirmiyohu Kaganoff

Question #1: Shabbos Shirah

Why is this Shabbos called Shabbos Shirah?

Question #2: Shouldn’t I know where I stand?

Should I stand or sit while reciting Oz Yashir?

Question #3: Yom Layabashah

Why do some people recite Yom Layabashah at a bris?

Shabbos Parshas Beshalach is called Shabbos Shirah – the Shabbos of the Song. This refers to the Shiras HaYam, the song of thanks that the Jewish nation sang to Hashem after crossing through the Red Sea on dry land and seeing their enemies drown. The name Shabbos Shirah appears already in early authorities (Sefer HaMinhagim [Tyrnau], s.v. Shevat; Sefer Maharil, Hilchos Teves-Shevat-Adar, #7).

WHY SHABBOS SHIRAH?

It is interesting to note that Shabbos Shirah is the only Shabbos that has a unique name based on the parsha that is not taken from the opening words of the parsha. The Shabbosos of the four parshiyos, Shekalim, Zachor, Parah and HaChodesh and Shabbos Shuva receive their names from the maftir, not from the parsha. Shabbos Shuva, Shabbos Chazon, and Shabbos Nachamu receive their names from the haftarah. The Shabbosos on which we read other noteworthy events do not have a unique name; thus, Shabbos Parshas Yisro is not called Shabbos Aseres HaDibros and Shabbos Parshas Noach is not Shabbos HaMabul. Why does the Shabbos of Parshas Beshalach get this distinction? Additionally, the shirah is not the only seminal topic of the parsha. There is also Parshas HaMan and Parshas Marah, in which Hashem starts giving mitzvos to Klal Yisroel, one of which is Shabbos. Why is this Shabbos not referred to as Shabbos HaMan or Shabbos Shabbos?

The Shirah is unique. The Torah consists of what Hashem said to Klal Yisroel. Az Yashir, however, is what Klal Yisroel said to Hashem, and what they said became part of the Torah. This is because when they sang this shirah, they attained the highest levels of prophecy, as it says, “a maidservant saw at the sea more than what (the great prophets) Yeshayahu and Yechezkel saw” (Mechilta d’Rebbi Yishmael, Beshalach, Mesichta d’Shirah #3). Therefore, we call this Shabbos ‘Shabbos Shirah’, in order to remind ourselves of the great spiritual potential of Klal Yisroel (Sefer HaToda’ah, Shevat, s.v. Shabbos Shirah).

PIYUTIM: YOTZROS AND GEULAH

The authors quoted above discuss two minhagim in relation to this Shabbos. Sefer HaMinhagim writes that, “On Shabbos Shirah, we say Yom LaYabashah, and some places do not say it.” He is referring to the piyut that is often sung at the meal following a bris milah. This piyut was originally part of the davening in some communities and is referred to as a “Geulah.” Let us explain this term.

There was an old custom in Klal Yisroel to recite additional tefilos called Yotzros or Piyutim on Yomim Tovim and special Shabbosos. The most commonly still recited Yotzros are those added to the Shabbos morning davening in some communities, when reading the four parshiyos: Shekalim, Zachor, Parah and HaChodesh. They are incorporated into the first bracha of birchos Kri’as Shema, which starts with the words, “Yotzair or,” hence the term “yotzros.”

Another type of addition is called a “geulah.” While yotzros are added to the first bracha of birchos Kri’as Shema, the “geulah,” as implied by the name, is added to the last bracha, which ends with “Ga’al Yisroel.” The piyut of Yom LaYabashah was added to the davening on Shabbos Parshas Beshalach and on Shabbos and other Yomim Tovim whenever there was a bris. This is probably why it became customary to sing this piyut at the bris meal.

Although the minhag of reciting Yom LaYabasha as a piyut during davening has fallen into disuse in most communities, there are still many who are accustomed to sing it during the meals of Shabbos Shirah (Darchei Chaim v’Shalom #832; Siddur Beis Aharon [Karlin]; Sefer Mo’adim LeSimcha, pg. 74).

MINHAGEI HATEFILAH

In many communities there were and still are various minhagim regarding the davening on this Shabbos. In Frankfurt, there was a custom to sing Az Yashir during Pesukei d’Zimra and also to sing from “MiMitzrayim ge’altanu” until “Tzur Yisroel” in birchos kri’as Shema (Sefer Moadim LeSimcha, pg. 69, quoting seforim of minhagei Frankfurt).

In several kehilos, although the custom is not necessarily to sing Az Yashir, they recite it posuk by =posuk (Minhagei Mattersdorf; Darchei Chaim v’Shalom #832; Minhag Belz). It seems, however, that there are two minhagim as to how the Shirah is said. In some locations, the entire congregation, including the chazzan, recites each possuk in unison; while in other shuls, the chazzan recites a possuk and the tzibbur repeats it. It has been suggested that these two approaches of how to recite the shirah have their roots in a disagreement in the Gemara.

The Gemara (Sotah 30b) discusses how the Bnei Yisroel recited the shirah after Kri’as Yam Suf. One opinion maintains that Moshe said one posuk and the Bnei Yisroel repeated it; Moshe said the next posuk and they repeated that posuk as well, and so on. According to another opinion, Moshe initiated the shirah and the rest of Klal Yisroel attained prophecy and were able to join in with him, reciting it simultaneously (Sefer Nachalah LeYisroel 10:56, quoted in Sefer Mo’adim LeSimchah, pg. 70).

It is worthwhile to point out that the Mishnah Berurah (51:17) writes regarding the daily recital of Shiras HaYam in pesukei d’zimra: “One should recite shiras hayam joyfully, and he should imagine that he crossed the sea that day. One who recites it with joy will receive forgiveness for his sins.”

MINHAGIM DURING KRI’AS HATORAH

When leining from the Torah on fast days, most shuls have a custom that three pesukim are first recited aloud by the tzibbur and then by the ba’al kriah: 1) Shuv mei’charon apecha (Shemos 32:12), 2) Hashem, Hashem [the thirteen Divine attributes of mercy] (ibid. 34:6-7), and 3) veSalachta (ibid. 34:9). One of the sources of this minhag is the Avudraham (Seder HaParshiyos veHaHaftaros in the name of Rav Saadiah Gaon). However, he maintains that this custom of reciting pesukim out loud by the tzibbur was not limited to these three pesukim. Rather, he quotes that there are ten such pesukim where the custom is to do so, seven of which are in this week’s parsha: 1) Hashem yilachem lachem (ibid. 14:14), 2) Vaya’aminu baHashem (14:31), 3) Hashem Ish milchamah (15:3), 4) Mi chomocha ba’eilim (15:11), 5) Mikdash Hashem konanu yadecha (15:17), 6) Hashem yimloch l’olam va’ed (15:18), 7) Ki macho emcheh (17:14), 8-9). However, this custom has fallen into disuse, except for the pesukim of the fast day reading.

The generally accepted minhag is that when leining Az Yashir on Shabbos Shirah, a special, melodious tune is used instead of the regular trop (cantillations). However, different shuls have varying minhagim as to which pesukim are read with the special tune (Sefer Moadim LeSimcha, pg. 73).

It is also common practice to give honor to the Rav of the community by giving him the aliyah in which Shiras HaYam is read (Shu”t Radvaz #304; Magen Avraham 428:8).

In the event that there are many people who require an aliyah on Shabbos and it is customary to add aliyos beyond the mandatory seven, the minhag is that the Shirah is read in one aliyah and not divided (Avudraham ibid.; Sha’arei Efraim 7:25).

STANDING UP

In many kehilos, the minhag is to stand during the aliyah of Shiras HaYam from “Vayosha” until the end of the Shirah (Sefer Ketzos HaShulchan 84, Badei HaShulchan 22). One reason is based on the idea that the recital of the Shirah by Moshe and Bnei Yisroel was comparable to the recital of Hallel (Mishnah Sotah 27b). The halacha is that Hallel is to be said standing (Shulchan Aruch 422:7), because one is testifying to the fact that Hashem did miracles for us, and testimony must be said while standing. Therefore, the custom is to stand during the Shirah, and perhaps this is also the reason why many people have the practice of standing for Az Yashir, when reciting it during pesukei dezimra (Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 14:4; Badei HaShulchan ibid.).

Another reason for standing during the Shirah is based on the Zohar (Lech-Lecha 81b), which says that Dovid HaMelech merited to be the ancestor of Moshiach, because he stood up in order to say Shirah, as it says (Tehillim 119:62), “I will arise to praise You” (Siddur Tzelosa deAvraham, pg. 168).

On the other hand, there are those who do not have this minhag to stand during Krias HaTorah (Kaf HaChaim 494:30). It is reported that although Rav Yaakov Yisroel Kanievsky z”l stood during the leining of the Aseres HaDibros, he remained seated during Az Yashir (Sefer Orchos Rabbeinu, vol. I, pg. 120 #85).

Additionally, there are those who argue that if one is sitting during leining, he should not get up for the Shirah or the Aseres HaDibros. This is based on a Gemara (Brachos 11b-12a) that in the Beis HaMikdash the Aseres HaDibros were read together with Krias Shema on a daily basis, and it was suggested to institute this outside the Beis HaMikdash, as well. However, it became necessary to abandon this plan, due to the heretics who tried convincing the simple people that only the Aseres HaDibros are the truth, while the rest of the Torah is not, chas veshalom. They reasoned that since it is only the Aseres HaDibros that are being read, it must be the only thing that Hashem said at Har Sinai (Rashi ibid.). Based on this Gemara, some maintain that if we stand up, specifically, for the Aseres HaDibros or Az Yashir, this will lead people to claim that only these two parshiyos are Toras emes.

However, Rav Moshe Feinstein z”l (Shu”t Igros Moshe, Orach Chaim vol. IV, #22) maintains that this is not a reason to abandon the custom of standing while these parshiyos are read. The Gemara was speaking of a specific incident, and we cannot extrapolate a new prohibition from there. Rav Moshe Sternbuch, shlit”a, suggests that if one wishes to be stringent and is concerned about the above argument, he should stand up a few pessukim before the Shirah or Aseres HaDibros. In this way, he will not be standing up specifically for these two parshiyos, and there can no longer be a claim that only these are emes (Shu”t Teshuvos veHanhagos, vol. I, #144; see also Pischei She’arim to Sha’arei Efraim 7:37).

If one is accustomed to sit during Aseres HaDibros or the Shirah and he finds himself in a shul where the tzibbur stands, he must act in accordance with the local custom (Sha’arei Efraim ibid.; Shu”t Igros Moshe, ibid.).

* In this week’s article in Yated Neeman, Rabbi Kaganoff discusses the custom of feeding the birds on Shabbos Shirah.

EATING WHEAT

In addition to the custom of giving wheat or other food to birds on Shabbos Shirah, there is another fascinating minhag connected to wheat and Shabbos Shirah. There is a discussion among the poskim regarding the correct bracha acharonah to be recited after eating wheat. This topic is beyond the scope of our discussion. However, the Bach writes (Orach Chaim 208) that, “according to the custom of eating whole wheat grains on Shabbos Shirah, one should be careful… only to eat them during a meal.” In order to gain an appreciation of the age of this custom, one should keep in mind that the Bach lived over 350 years ago. This minhag was prevalent in Western Europe and is also cited in Minhagei Frankfurt and Minhagei Chasam Sofer.

One reason cited for the custom is because the manna looked like grains of wheat. Therefore, on Shabbos Shirah when the parshas =haman is read, we eat wheat, as a remembrance of the manna (Likutei Mahari’ach, Teves).

Rav Yehudah Michal Benga Segal, a trustee and a ba’al tekiah of the Frankfurt kehillah over 250 years ago, in his sefer Koach Yehudah, suggested another possible reason behind this custom. Although the primary time for commencing the Pesach preparations is Purim, as is indicated by the halacha that one begins studying Hilchos Pesach thirty days before the holiday (Shulchan Aruch Orach Chaim 429:1), some things required more time. One such item was wheat for matzos. The grains had to be checked, ground, sifted and stored in a chometz-free environment, all of which took much time and effort. Owing to the poor travel conditions of European winters, these preparations had to be started well before Purim.

Therefore, the Pesach wheat was bought for Shabbos Shirah, which is usually two months before Pesach, in order that it be ready for grinding to make the Pesach matzah flour. Once they had the Pesach wheat, they would eat some of it on Shabbos Shirah. This was based on another minhag, cited in the poskim (Magen Avraham 430:1, quoting Maharshal), to eat specifically Pesach wheat or flour before Pesach. The reason behind that minhag is beyond the scope of our discussion (see Sefer Mo’adim LeSimcha, vol. III, pg. 66). Interestingly, some have a custom of preparing a kugel from Pesach flour for Shabbos Hagadol (Luach Minhagei Belz).

THE TEN SONGS

According to the midrash (Mechilta d’Rebbi Yishmael, Beshalach, Mesichta d’Shira, #1), ten songs were sung to Hashem: 1) On the night of Yetzi’as Mitzrayim, 2) after Kri’as Yam Suf, 3) by the well in the desert (Bamidbar 21:17), 4) Moshe’s transcribing the Torah, which is referred to as a shirah (Devarim 31:24), 5) Yehoshua sang shirah when he stopped the sun in Givon and the moon in Emek Ayalon (Yehoshua 10:12), 6) Devorah and Barak ben Avinoam sang shirah after Sisra’s defeat (Shoftim 5:1), 7) Dovid sang shirah when he was saved from his enemies (Shmuel II 22:1), 8) Shlomo sang shirah when he inaugurated the Beis HaMikdash (Tehillim 30:1), 9) King Yehoshafat sang shirah and was saved from the enemy (Divrei HaYamim II 20), 10) the shirah that will be sung in the future when Moshiach comes (Yeshayahu 42:10).

The midrash points out that the first nine songs were referred to in the feminine form, shirah, while the last one, shir, is masculine. The reason for this is that, generally speaking, after a woman gives birth to a child, she will eventually repeat the entire process, thus subjecting herself again to the pains of childbirth. This cycle of childbirth, pain and childbirth represents our existence in this world. Hashem brings salvation, which prompts shirah. He again puts us through trial and tribulation, and again saves us. This is all true until Moshiach comes, when the shir that will be sung is “masculine.” A man cannot give birth. Once we experience the final geulah and sing that final shir, there will be no more pain and suffering. May we merit to see it very soon!

 




The Creation of the “Permanent” Calendar

calendar-1568148-639x424When the Torah commands us to create a calendar, it includes two different responsibilities: First, to have Rosh Chodesh and the length of each month determined on the basis of when the new moon appears, and, second, to have the holiday of Pesach fall in the spring and the holiday of Sukkos in the autumn (in the northern hemisphere). Thus, we have two separate and very different requirements, one of having the months determined by the moon, which is a little more than every 29½ days, and having years that coordinate with the seasons, which follow the solar year, which is a bit less than 365¼ days.

To accomplish that the dates and holidays should fall according to the seasons, the halacha is that some years have 12 months, or approximately 354 days, and others have 13 months, or approximately 384 days. This ensures that the holidays fall in their appropriate seasons. The mitzvah of the Torah is that the head of the Sanhedrin should be in charge, every month, to decide whether a month is 29 days long or 30, and of deciding whether a year should have an extra month. In the latter case, he appointed a special committee, comprised of members of the Sanhedrin, to review the relevant information and determine whether the year should be 13 months (a leap year) or only 12 (a common year).

By the way, after the destruction of the Beis HaMikdash, the main Beis Din was not located in Yerushalayim, but wherever the Nasi of the Jewish people resided, as long as it was in Eretz Yisrael. This included several communities at various times of Jewish history, including Teverya, Yavneh, and Shafraam.[i] Indeed, during this period, if the head of the Beis Din was in the Diaspora and there was no one of his stature remaining in Eretz Yisrael, the special Beis Din met outside the land of Israel.[ii]

Initially, all these decisions were made by the heads of the Sanhedrin, and, indeed, when Moshiach comes, we will again have this system. This was the system in place for thousands of years – from the time of Moshe Rabbeinu until about 250 years after the destruction of the second Beis Hamikdash. At that time, the head of the Sanhedrin, Hillel Hanasi (not to be confused with his ancestor, Hillel Hazakein), realized that, because of Roman persecution, the Sanhedrin’s days were numbered and it would be necessary to switch to a different system for determining the calendar. Hillel Hanasi implemented a temporary Jewish calendar, which is the one that we currently use. Although many people refer to it as a “permanent calendar,” it will be in use only until we again have a Sanhedrin, which will then be in charge of the calendar.

Hillel’s calendar kept the same basic structure of 29- and 30-day months and 12- and 13-month years, but it is based purely on calculation and not on observation. The two major changes in this new calendar are:

  • A Leap of Fate

The leap years now occur following a regular pattern of seven leap years and 12 non-leap (usually called “common”) years in a 19 year cycle. The third, sixth, eighth, eleventh, fourteenth, seventeenth and nineteenth years of the cycle are always leap years, and the rest are common years. This year is the nineteenth year of the cycle, and thus is a leap year.

  • The Haves versus the Have-nots

The length of most months is now predetermined. Tishrei, Shvat, Adar Rishon (which exists only in a leap year), Nissan, Sivan and Av always have 30 days; whereas Teiveis, regular Adar (in a common, non-leap year), Adar Sheini (in a leap year), Iyar, Tamuz and Elul are always only 29 days long. The two months of Cheshvan[iii] and Kislev are the only months whose length varies, sometimes 29 days and sometimes 30.[iv] A year in which both Cheshvan and Kislev have only 29 days is called chaseirah, lacking or defective; one in which Cheshvan has 29 days and Kislev has 30 is called kesidrah, as expected or regular; and one in which both Cheshvan and Kislev have 30 days is called sheleimah, full or excessive.

The terms chaseirah, kesidrah, and sheleimah apply in both common and leap years.[v] Thus, in the new calendar, all common years are either 353 days (if both Cheshvan and Kislev have 29 days), 354 days (if Cheshvan has 29 days and Kislev has 30) or 355 days (if both Cheshvan and Kislev have 30 days); all leap years are either 383 days (if both Cheshvan and Kislev have 29 days), 384 days (if Cheshvan has 29 days and Kislev has 30) or 385 days (if both Cheshvan and Kislev have 30 days). Since Adar in a common year always has 29 days, Adar Rishon always has 30 days, and Adar Sheini always has 29 days, like the regular Adar, the addition of an extra month of Adar in a leap year always adds exactly thirty days.

(Because the nineteen-year cycle synchronizes the lunar calendar with the solar year, the Hebrew and English dates of births, anniversaries and other occasions usually coincide on the nineteenth anniversary of the event. If yours does not, but is off by a day or two, do not fret. Your record keeping is accurate, but the cycle of nineteen years only relates to whether it is a leap year, not to whether the years are of the exact same length. The lengths of Cheshvan and Kislev are determined by other factors, and this will affect whether your 19th, 38th or 57th birthday or anniversary exactly coincides with its Hebrew/secular counterpart, or whether it is slightly off.)

The new calendar bases itself on an estimate, an average time that it takes the moon to revolve around the Earth. This molad calculation is that each new moon appears 29 days, 12 hours, and 793 chalakim (singular: chelek) or 793/1080 of an hour after the previous new moon. Once one knows when the new moon, called the molad, occurred on the previous Rosh Hashanah, one could now add either 12 or 13 times the above figure and determine the time of the molad in the next year, which is the most important factor in determining the date of the next Rosh Hashanah. (The term chelek, used on Shabbos Mevorchim when announcing when the molad is, equals 1/1080 of an hour, or 3 and 1/3 seconds.)

There is one other factor: Sometimes Rosh Hashanah takes place not on the day of the molad, but the next day, because the molad occurred on the afternoon of Rosh Hashanah and would not be visible in Eretz Yisrael until the next day. When Rosh Hashanah was determined by the observation of witnesses, this information was important not only in determining when Rosh Hashanah falls, but also for interrogating potential witnesses testifying to the appearance of the new moon. However, Hillel’s calendar is no longer dependent on witnesses, Rosh Hashanah is still not established on a day when the molad falls on its afternoon, but is postponed. Based on this information, one can determine which day should be Rosh Hashanah in the coming year.

Another major innovation

Did you ever notice that Yom Kippur never falls on Friday or Sunday? If it did, we would observe two consecutive days that both have the stringency of Shabbos. Indeed, when the calendar was based on observation, this could and did happen.[vi]

However, Hillel Hanasi’s calendar included some innovations that were not part of the earlier calendar. His calendar does not allow Yom Kippur to fall on either a Sunday or a Friday, thus avoiding the difficulty of having two Shabbos-like days fall consecutively. Hillel Hanasi’s calendar also does not allow Hoshana Rabbah to fall on Shabbos, which would cause the cancellation of the Hoshanos ceremony. As long as the calendar was determined on the basis of eyewitness testimony, it was halachically more important to have Rosh Chodesh fall on its correct day than to be concerned about difficulties created when certain holidays fall on or next to Shabbos.[vii] However, once we are fulfilling the mitzvah in a less-preferred way with Hillel’s “permanent” calendar, keeping Yom Kippur from falling on Friday or Sunday, and Hoshana Rabbah from falling on Shabbos, are factors to be included in establishing the calendar.

In order to accommodate these innovations, Rosh Hashanah could fall only on Monday, Tuesday, Thursday or Shabbos, since if it falls on Sunday, Hoshana Rabbah falls on Shabbos; if Rosh Hashanah falls on Wednesday, Yom Kippur falls on Friday; and if Rosh Hashanah falls on Friday, then Yom Kippur falls on Sunday. This would mean that when Rosh Hashanah in the coming year would naturally fall on Sunday, Wednesday or Friday, an extra day is added to the calendar to make sure that Rosh Hashanah falls on Monday, Thursday or Shabbos instead.[viii] This calendar concept of guaranteeing that Rosh Hashanah not fall on Sunday, Wednesday or Friday is called לא אד”ו ראש, lo adu rosh, meaning that the beginning of the year, Rosh Hashanah, does not fall on א, the first day of the week, Sunday; ד, Wednesday; or ו , Friday. It is predominantly for this reason that there was a need to have Cheshvan and Kislev sometimes 29 days and sometimes 30, in order to make the exact length of the years flexible.

Although the innovation of adding one day to the year so that Rosh Hashanah not fall on a Sunday, Wednesday or Friday seems relatively simple, it sometimes leads to more complex considerations. In some years, adjusting Rosh Hashanah to avoid Sunday, Wednesday and Friday creates a problem in the year before or the year after. Since Hillel Hanasi’s calendar did not allow a common year to be longer than 355 days and a leap year to be shorter than 383 days, the only way to avoid problems is to plan the calendar an additional year in advance and adjusting the calendar appropriately. In order to accomodate all these various calendar requirements, Hillel Hanasi established four rules, called dechiyos, which, together with the sod ha’ibur calculation and the 19 year leap year rotation, form the basis for determining our calendar.[ix]

To explain how this works, let us choose a sample year in which the molad calculation for Rosh Hashanah fell on Wednesday evening, and Rosh Hashanah therefore falls on Thursday, which is what we would expect. However, the next year’s molad for Rosh Hashanah falls on Tuesday less than two hours before the end of the day. Although the molad falls on Tuesday, it is too late in the day for this molad to be visible in Eretz Yisrael, and therefore, Rosh Hashanah cannot occur before Wednesday. However, since Rosh Hashanah cannot fall on a Wednesday because of the rule of lo adu rosh, it must be pushed off to Thursday, or two days after the molad. For this reason, that year must have an extra day. However, each year is limited how long it may be. In order to accommodate the proper dating of the second year, the year prior would have to have more days than the calendar allows. In order to resolve this, the year before is made longer than necessary. What is happening is that one Rosh Hashanah is postponed to allow that the next Rosh Hashanah should fall out in an acceptable way.

As I mentioned above, although the leap years follow an absolute nineteen-year cycle, whether the year is chaseirah, kesidrah, or sheleimah is determined by the other factors we have noted, and therefore does not follow the nineteen-year pattern. Rather, one first calculates when Rosh Hashanah should fall out based on the sod ha’ibur, checks the rules of the dechiyos to see what adjustments need to be made, and then determines on which day Rosh Hashanah should fall. As a result, whether the year in question needs to be chaseirah, kesidrah, or sheleimah requires calculating not only this year’s schedule, but also the coming year’s calendar requirements.

Based on all these calculations, there are seven prototype years for a common year and seven for a leap year that fulfill the calendar rules. Each of these fourteen prototype “years” is called by a three letter acronym in which the first letter identifies the day of the week of the first day of Rosh Hashanah, the second letter denotes whether the year is chaseirah, kesidrah, or sheleimah, and the third letter identifies the day of the week of the first day of Pesach. No letter is used to denote whether the year is common or leap, because this is understood by knowing how many days of the week Pesach follows Rosh Hashanah. In a common year that is kesidrah, Pesach falls two days later in the week than Rosh Hashanah, and in a leap year, it falls four days later, the two additional days being the extra two days that the extra month of Adar Rishon, thirty days long, adds to the day of the week count. Of course, these calculations must be adjusted one day in either direction, if the year is chaseirah or sheleimah. Either way, calculating how many days are between Rosh Hashanah and Pesach tells us whether it is a common or leap year, so there is no need to include this in the acronym.

Thus, this year 5776 is known as בשז because Rosh Hashanah fell on Monday (ב), it is a sheleimah (ש) year in which both Cheshvan and Kislev contain 30 days, and the first day of Pesach falls on Shabbos (ז).

At this point, we have the basic information to figure out how our calendar operates. Although we may not realize it, we actually already have enough information at our fingertips that we could already calculate the calendars for the coming years – indefinitely.

Conclusion

We understand well why our calendar involves use of the solar year – after all, our seasons, and the appropriate times for our holidays, are based on the sun. But why did the Torah insist that our months follow the moon? It seems that we could live fine without months that are dependent on the moon’s rotation around the earth!

One answer to this question is that the waxing and waning of the moon is symbolic of our own our relationship with Hashem – which is sometimes better and sometimes less so. However, we know that we can always improve that relationship, just as the moon after its waning and almost disappearing always renews itself.

 

[i] Rosh Hashanah 31b

[ii] Berachos 63a; Rambam, Hilchos Kiddush HaChodesh 1:8

[iii] Although the correct name of the month is Marcheshvan, we will follow the colloquial use of calling it Cheshvan.

[iv] Rambam, Hilchos Kiddush Hachodesh 8:5

[v] By the way, because Kislev is sometimes 29 days and sometimes 30, the last day of Chanukah is sometimes on the second day of Teiveis, and sometimes on the third.

[vi] She’iltos of Rav Acha’ei Geon, #67; Rambam, Hilchos Shabbos 5:21; Ha’emek She’eilah ad loc., Note 22.

[vii] Ha’emek She’ailah ibid; Gri”z, Hilchos Kiddush Hachodesh

[viii] Rambam, Hilchos Kiddush Hachodesh 7:1.

[ix] Because these dechiyos are extremely technical, I did not explain all of them.




The Contemporary Kosher Bakery and Its Halachic Issues

My wife and I are thrilled to announce the engagement of our daughter, Shalva, to Itzik (Avraham Yitzchak) Scarr, son of Dr. Tzvi and Mrs. Cindy Scarr of Har Nof, Yerushalayim. The chosson studies in Yeshivas Chevron in Yerushalayim.

Frogs jumping into Egyptian kneading bowls and ovens will create kashrus problems for the local bakeries. Thus, I present a revised version of part of an article I wrote originally over thirty years ago.

The Contemporary Kosher Bakery and Its Halachic Issues

bakeryQuestion #1: Labels

“May I rely on the label of a product that it contains no non-kosher ingredients?”

Question #2: Visiting Mom, but May I Eat?

“I will be visiting my mother, who lives in a small North American community. How can I find out if I can use the bread and other products made in the local ‘kosher-supervised’ bakery?”

Question #3: How Can They?

“How can a hechsher supervise as kosher a business that is open on Shabbos?”

Answer:

Since the twenty-first-century household does not bake its daily bread at home, a kosher bakery is a necessity for any sizable Jewish community. This often becomes one of the many challenges of a local rabbi: how to have a reliably kosher bakery in a town where there are not enough Jews who keep kosher to make it worthwhile?

Often, the situation is not ideal. In general, a food establishment should seek to be kosher supervised, rather than be solicited to become kosher. However, because of the need for a local kosher bakery, the local rabbi/rabbonim may not have that luxury, and they may have to convince a proprietor that it is worth his while to be kosher supervised.

Numerous kashrus and halachic issues must be clarified to enable this supervision. The rav hamachshir, or supervising rabbi, must assume many responsibilities, including ascertaining the kashrus of all incoming ingredients, the proper koshering of equipment, the maintenance of separate production facilities for dairy and pareve, assuring that no dairy products are added to the breads, and determining the practicality of the products being pas Yisrael (bread where a Jew participated in the baking). In other articles, I discussed at length the issues germane to making dairy bread.

To begin with, let me explain why one may not use baked goods on the basis of a scanning of the label to see that no obvious animal ingredients appear. There are several reasons that this is true, even if one knows that the label is accurate, which, I can tell you from personal experience, is not always the case. Even in an instance where the label meets legal requirements, and the government concerns itself with truth in labeling, government regulation does not usually require the listing of every ingredient on the label of a product. For example, release agents, which keep food products from sticking to machinery, may be produced from animal shortening. Legally, they are considered production aids, and not ingredients, and, as such, do not need to be listed on the label. Yet, they are sprayed or smeared directly on food, or on equipment immediately before food items are placed on them. Thus, the fact that they are legally not considered ingredients does not provide any halachic leniency. Thus, bread and other products must be certified kosher by a reliable rabbi or organization.

Ingredients

Even in a bakery where the owner is attempting to keep kosher, there are commonly problematic ingredients, such as the stabilizers, emulsifiers, and dough mixes since they frequently are animal-shortening based or include animal fats. Because these products often present a kashrus problem, it is fairly common to find that the same manufacturer produces two varieties of the product – one, a less expensive animal-oil based non-kosher version, and a replacement product, manufactured from vegetable oils and produced under responsible kosher supervision.

Tolayim

Of course, the hechsher also needs to make certain that the raw materials and the production facility itself are maintained in a way to resolve all kashrus concerns about insect contamination.

Raisin juice

Specifically in the case of pastry or some varieties of sweet bread or bagels, raisins can create a halachic problem that may go unnoticed by the hechsher. In addition to the hechsher’s requirement to ascertain that there are no tolayim concerns, raisins are often mixed or cooked with water to create a raisin juice, which functions both as a sweetener and as a natural, healthy preservative. However, this raisin juice now has a halachic status of wine, and when handled by a non-Jew becomes prohibited because of stam yeinam. Thus, one can have a very unusual situation where mixing two kosher ingredients, raisins and water, creates a non-kosher product.

Equipment

When the hechsher begins, the rabbi/rabbonim need to decide how to kasher the equipment of the bakery. This can sometimes be quite challenging, since the equipment may require libun gamur, burning in fire, which is not easy to do.

A bigger problem is keeping dairy and pareve equipment separated. Many years ago, I was asked to perform a kashrus review of a local vaad hakashrus. When I checked the shomer Shabbos bakery that the whole town was using, I discovered that the baking trays for milchig and pareve were not being kept separate. Nor was there any separation of production schedule. This meant that a tray may have been used to bake cheese Danishes, and then immediately used for challos for Shabbos without even  being cleaned in between.

I drew up a program to be followed to keep the breads pareve, but, to the best of my knowledge, the plan was not followed.

Jewish owned

If the local bakery is Jewish owned, additional questions must be dealt with, including Shabbos and Pesach production, ritual immersion of the equipment in a mikveh, and hafrashas challah — proper separation of the challah portion. (It is important to clarify that the commonly used word challah, meaning Shabbos bread [as I used it in the previous paragraph], is technically a misnomer. Here, I am using the word challah to mean the special portion removed from dough as mandated by Jewish law.) I will discuss the issues germane to challah taking in a different article.

Shabbos

Frequently, a local rabbinate, particularly in a community with a small Jewish population, is unable to arrange for a Jewish-owned bakery to be closed on Shabbos. This creates a strong moral dilemma for the rabbonim involved. By providing such a bakery with kosher certification, one is providing tacit approval to public desecration of Shabbos. In addition, one must deal with the halachic issues regarding whether the products made by a Jew on Shabbos are permitted to be used by a consumer after Shabbos. In practice, many communities allow the existence of these bakeries and provide them with kosher supervision, reasoning that this way the community at least has kosher product.

It has become more common today to have a kosher supervised bakery that is closed on Shabbos inside a supermarket that is open on Shabbos. In this instance, the supervising organization is not assuming any responsibility for the supermarket, which indeed sells non-kosher. The visiting consumer may still want to verify whether the standard maintained at the bakery is of a level similar to what he is accustomed.

Chometz and Pesach

A more serious problem is the instance of a bakery that is open on Pesach. Any chometz owned by the bakery during the festival is forbidden for use, even after Pesach. The rabbinate could remove supervision after Pesach, until all chometz items that were owned during the holiday have been consumed, thus permitting only items which were acquired after Yom Tov, but of course this leaves the community without “Kosher” bread for the duration. Based on a responsum from Rav Moshe Feinstein, some rabbis arrange a sale of all chometz items with a standard mechiras chometz document, but not all authorities agree that this sale has validity. The Maharam Schick, the Tevuos Shor, and others state that the sale of chometz is effective only for someone who does not want to own chometz during Pesach. According to this opinion, the mechiras chometz of a bakery that is open on Pesach would have no halachic validity. The bakery’s products may not be used until all chometz that it owned during Pesach has been used up or discarded.

Because of the potential chillul Hashem of having a “kosher supervised bakery” that operates on Shabbos, I know of hechsherim that supervise the “ingredients” of a bakery, but not the bakery itself. They contend, therefore, that it is not their responsibility to deal with the concerns about challah, chometz, or Shabbos desecration.

Personally, I do not see this as a solution to a problem, but as the cause of the problem. Even if we assume that the product produced on Shabbos is still kosher, and that it is not our concern to warn people about chometz she’avar alav hapesach, the average consumer does not realize that he is required to take challah. As someone once humorously put it, “this is a hechsher that everything was kosher before it got into the bakery, but what left might be treif.”

Pas Yisrael

The Mishnah in Avodah Zarah states:

The following items of a non-Jew are forbidden to be eaten, but are permitted for benefit: milk milked by a non-Jew without a Jew supervising; bread and oil of a non-Jew, although Rebbe and his rabbinic court permitted the oil of a non-Jew, and items cooked by a non-Jew [bishul akum, which, if certain conditions exist, would not be permitted.]

The latter items are prohibited because of the likelihood that increased social interaction would lead to intermarriage. Many of the rishonim note that there is evidence that the prohibition against pas akum, bread baked by a non-Jew, was not accepted in all places when introduced, because of the principle that a rabbinic injunction becomes universally binding only if the majority of people abides by it. Based on this approach, the Rema rules that one may use bread baked by gentiles for commercial sale, which is called pas paltar. Other opinions state that the permissibility of pas akum is dependent on whether there is comparable pas Yisrael (bread baked by a Jew) available. When pas Yisrael is available, one may not use pas akum. However, when suitable pas Yisrael is not available, one may use pas paltar. Bread baked for private use is still included under the rabbinic injunction of pas akum except for rare circumstances.

The Shulchan Aruch reaches the following conclusion: In a place where the custom is to use pas paltar, one is permitted to use bread prepared for commercial usage – provided that no comparable pas Yisrael is available. If pas Yisrael becomes available, then the pas paltar should not be used until the pas Yisrael is no longer available. The Rema disagrees and says that pas paltar can be used even when pas Yisrael is available in any place where the custom is to permit pas paltar. The Bach and the Gra follow the opinion of the Rema, whereas other opinions agree with Shulchan Aruch and permit pas paltar only when pas Yisrael is not available.

During the Ten Days of Repentance, even a place where the custom is to be lenient in the usage of pas paltar is required to be stringent. Most opinions also agree with the Magen Avraham that on Shabbos, one should use only pas Yisrael.

The entire issue of whether and under what circumstances a Jew may eat bread baked by a non-Jew is problematic, if the entire baking procedure is done without any participation of a Jew. However, if a Jew increases the heat of the fire being used for baking in any way, even by merely symbolically adding a splinter to the fire, the bread baked is considered pas Yisrael. The Rema furthermore states that if a Jew increased the fire once, and the oven was not turned off for twenty-four consecutive hours, then all the bread baked in that time is considered pas Yisrael. The Chachmas Adam concurs with the Rema, although the Aruch Hashulchan does not accept all these leniencies.

In conclusion, according to predominant opinion, if a Jew participated in heating the oven, then the bread is considered pas Yisrael. If no Jew participated in heating the oven, the bread baked by a non-Jew can be used wherever there is no suitable usage of pas paltar, except during the Ten Days of Repentance and Shabbos. According to the Rema, in a place where the custom is to be lenient, one can use pas paltar, even if pas Yisrael is available.

We have as yet not discussed the complicated topic of separating challah from a bakery that is owned and managed by a non-observant Jew. We will continue that part of this topic in a future issue. I am also planning articles that will discuss pas akum, the stam yeinam issues germane to the use of raisin juice, and the topic of dairy bread in more detail.

Conclusion

Based on the above information, we can gain a greater appreciation as to how hard it is to maintain a high kashrus standard. We certainly have a greater incentive to become better educated kosher consumers who better understand many aspects of the preparation of kosher food, and why it is important to ascertain that everything one consumes has a proper hechsher. We should always hope and pray that the food we eat fulfills all the halachos that the Torah commands us.

 




What Do I Do with My Sheimos?

American Friends of Nimla Tal Inc. is a tzedakah that distributes all of the money received to situations here in Eretz Yisroel. In addition, a special feature, good through the month of December, is that PayPal adds 1% to the amount donated. So, click on www.paypal.me/rabbikaganoff to donate, and you will be given the option to enter your amount. If you enter $100, for example, you get a US IRS tax deduction of $100, and $101 goes to help the poor in Israel. No money goes to pay salaries or other no expenses.

I know that the name of the parsha is Shemos, and not Sheimos, but…

What do I do with my Sheimos?

Question #1:

vintage-pagesOne of the shul’s baalei batim calls the rav with the following concern:

“The shul’s sheimos collection is a fire hazard – a catastrophe waiting to happen. Can we just burn everything before a dangerous fire breaks out?”

Question #2:

I receive the following question from Cheryl:

“Rabbi, this has got to be the most interesting e-mail question you receive today. I am on a cruise in the Mediterranean, courtesy of, and with, my not-yet-observant parents, and today I spent the day looking at Jewish sites and other tourist attractions at our port-of-call. At one of the places, an elderly gentile lady gave me a large bag of old, tattered siddurim – no value. I have no idea what to do with them, and they are with me now in my cabin on the ship. May I bury them at sea?”

Response:

Answering the above questions provides an excellent opportunity to understand the topic called either genizah or sheimos. The particular emphasis in this article will be: what is the proper way to dispose of worn-out seforim?

Should it be called sheimos or genizah?

Which is the “correct” term? The word used in Modern Hebrew for a religious item whose discarding must be handled in a special way is genizah, which literally means that they must be hidden. Indeed, this is the term used by the Gemara for the process of disposing of these items, and it is easy to understand how the term came to refer to items that require genizah, although technically genizah refers to the place where the item is placed.

The Yiddish word for these items is sheimos, whose source is the term sheimos she’einam nimchakim, meaning the names of G-d that the Torah prohibits erasing. In Parshas Re’eih, the Torah commands: Destroy all the places where the gentiles that you are driving out worshipped their gods, whether they are on high mountains, on hills, or beneath foliate trees. Raze their altars, smash their pillars, burn their worshipped trees, and demolish the images of their gods. Obliterate the names (of their deities) from that place (Devarim 12:2-4).

The Torah then closes this passage: Do not do this to Hashem your G-d!

When the Torah states: Obliterate the names from that place. Do not do this to Hashem your G-d, it is prohibiting obliterating Hashem’s Name (Shabbos 120b; Rambam, Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah 6:1). The Gemara (Shavuos 35a) calls the names of Hashem that we may not erase sheimos she’einam nimchakim, which later became the origin of the term sheimos as a generic term to describe religious items whose discarding must be handled in a special way. Thus, either word, genizah or sheimos, may be used.

That which we call Hashem

Although there are many expressions, such as the All-merciful One and the Creator, which refer to Hashem, halachah recognizes a major distinction between erasing the actual holy names of Hashem, and between erasing terms that describe Hashem, but are not actual names. Erasing the actual “names” of Hashem, the sheimos she’einam nimchakim, violates a lo saaseh of the Torah, one of the 613 mitzvos, and qualifies as a prohibition as serious as desecrating Yom Tov or eating non-kosher (see Makkos 22a). The names of Hashem, of which there are about ten, include, among others, Elokim, Elokeinu, Keil, Shakai, Tzevakos, Eloak, and, of course, the names I will call havayah and adnus. (Following the usual practice, I have substituted the “k” sound somewhere in the above names, so that readers do not err and recite these holy names in vain.) Erasing any of these names is prohibited min haTorah.

Erasing attributes

On the other hand, expressions that describe attributes of Hashem — such as Rachum, All-merciful one; Chanun, He Who bestows kindness — may be erased, even when they refer to Hashem (Shavuos 35a; Rambam, Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah, 6:5). The Torah’s prohibition, do not do this to Hashem your G-d, applies only to a name of Hashem, not to an attribute that describes Hashem.

Similarly, there is no prohibition to erase His names written in other languages, such as G-d, even when spelled with the “o” in the middle (Shach, Yoreh Deah 179:11), although one must exercise care that these names do not become treated disrespectfully (Urim, 27:2, quoted also by Nesivos HaMishpat and Aruch HaShulchan ad loc.). The reason we are accustomed to spelling the name G-d, rather than with the added “o,” is because of concern that the paper it is written on might end up in the garbage or treated in some other disrespectful way.

Does the prohibition include commentaries, Gemaros, et cetera?

Although the Torah violation, do not do this to Hashem your G-d, applies only to actual names of Hashem, Chazal prohibited destroying other holy writings, including commentaries, works of Mishnah, Gemara or halachah, and other Torah works (see Rambam, Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah 6:8; Shu’t Tashbeitz 1:2).

What happens when they wear out?

Granted that the Torah prohibited destroying works that include Hashem’s Name, eventually a sefer Torah becomes worn out and unusable. What does one do with it, then, if it is prohibited to destroy it? The precise details of how to dispose of these items is exactly the topic for today’s article.

Buried in earthenware

The Gemara teaches that worn out sifrei Torah should be placed in earthenware vessels and then buried next to a talmid chacham, or, minimally, next to someone who learned halachah, meaning someone who at least studied Mishnayos (Megillah 26b). Placing them inside these vessels forestalls the decomposition of the sifrei Torah for a very long time (Ran), and placing them together with someone who studied Torah is a more respectful way of treating sifrei Torah that can no longer be used. It is very unfortunate that Hashem’s Name becomes obliterated, even in an indirect way, and we must delay the decomposition for as long as possible.

Genizah of printed sefarim

From after the time of the Gemara until the invention of the printing press in the 1400’s, we find little discussion about how to dispose of holy works. Since everything was handwritten and therefore scarce and very expensive, we can presume that there were not a lot of worn out sifrei kodesh, and there was no difficulty in following the Gemara’s description for their retirement. However, after the invention of the printing press, the sheer volume of printed material increased geometrically, and we find halachic discussion concerning whether wornout printed sefarim must be disposed of in the same manner as the Gemara describes for sifrei Torah.

The teshuvah of the Be’er Sheva

The earliest responsum I have seen on the subject is printed in the sefer Be’er Sheva, authored by one of the great Torah leaders of the early seventeenth century, Rabbi Yissachar Dov Eilenburg. He was a talmid of the Levush, and his sefer includes a haskamah from the Maharal of Prague! The Be’er Sheva reports that in his day, it was not uncommon for people to burn the worn-out printed editions of sifrei kodesh. Those who burned the sifrei kodesh claimed that this was more respectful than burying them, because burial often resulted in the sifrei kodesh being unearthed and therefore becoming treated disrespectfully.

The Be’er Sheva takes strong issue with this approach, noting that it is prohibited to destroy any type of kisvei hakodesh, and that burning them certainly violates halachah. The claim that burying the sefarim leads to their desecration is unfounded, he states, because the desecration is a result of not burying the genizah correctly. As we mentioned above, the Gemara describes burying in earthenware vessels. If, indeed, all genizah were to be buried this way, argues the Be’er Sheva, then the kisvei hakodesh would never be strewn about after their burial. He concludes that worn-out, printed Torah material must be buried in earthenware vessels, just as one is required to bury sifrei Torah this way. This responsum of the Be’er Sheva is subsequently cited authoritatively by the Magen Avraham (154:9).

Not enough earthenware to go around

Notwithstanding the rulings of the Be’er Sheva and the Magen Avraham prohibiting the burning of wornout kisvei hakodesh, we find the issue of burning sheimos resurfacing a century later. It appears that burying the massive amounts of sheimos in earthenware vessels was not practical, presumably because appropriate earthenware vessels were not easily available in the quantities required. Since no other practical solution was acceptable to the Be’er Sheva and the Magen Avraham, accumulations of sheimos were doing just that — accumulating. Thus we read:

The shul’s sheimos collection is a fire hazard – a catastrophe waiting to happen. Can we just burn everything, before a dangerous fire breaks out?”

This is the exact question asked three hundred years ago by members of the Jewish community in Metz, Alsace-Lorraine, from their rav, Rav Yaakov Reischer, one of the great halachic authorities of his era, famed for his many classic Torah works, including Minchas Yaakov (on the laws of kashrus), Chok Yaakov (on Hilchos Pesach), Toras Hashelamim (on Hilchos Niddah), Iyun Yaakov (on Agadah of Shas), and his responsa, Shevus Yaakov.

In a responsum published in Shevus Yaakov, Rav Reischer reports that previous attempts to bury the amassed sheimos had resulted in gentiles unearthing the kisvei hakodesh and using them in a highly degrading way. For lack of any solution, the sheimos were accumulating and indeed were a fire hazard. Because of the life-threatening emergency that now resulted, the Shevus Yaakov ruled that it was preferable to burn the sheimos, which he felt was the most viable resolution of the problem, since burial in earthenware vessels was no longer feasible.

Corresponding mechutanim

In Nissan 5483 (1723), Rav Reischer sent his teshuvah permitting, under these circumstances, the burning of genizah, to his mechutan, Rav Yechezkel Katzenellenbogen, the rav of Hamburg, for review, presumably hoping that Rav Katzenellenbogen would agree. The correspondence between these gedolei Torah was subsequently published in two different places – in Rav Reischer’s Shu’t Shevus Yaakov, as Yoreh Deah, Volume 1, #10-12, and in Rav Katzenellenbogen’s Shu’t Keneses Yechezkel as responsum #37. The two versions of the correspondence are not absolutely identical, but comparing the two versions broadens one’s understanding of the dispute. In general, the Keneses Yechezkel account is somewhat truncated in places, but includes the dates of the letters. Apparently, when Rav Katzenellenbogen decided to print this correspondence, he abbreviated his own letters, although he published his mechutan’s letters in full.

A more important fact is that the account published in Keneses Yechezkel includes a final letter from Rav Katzenellenbogen that does not appear in Shevus Yaakov.

Family feud

Although both gedolim correspond to one another with great respect, they dispute strongly regarding what one should do with the accumulated sheimos material when burial in earthenware vessels is not a practical solution. In his response dated 17 Kislev, the Keneses Yechezkel rejects fully his mechutan’s proposal that the circumstances permit burning the sheimos, but instead rules that one should construct wooden boxes around the genizah, find an abandoned lot, and bury the wooden-entombed sheimos with three tefachim (about 9-11 inches) of earth above them.

The second volley

On the 23 of Teiveis, the Shevus Yaakov penned his retort to his mechutan, rejecting the idea that wooden boxes are as good as earthenware, and insisting that if all kisvei hakodesh must be buried in earthenware, burying in wood, which decays much more quickly, will not suffice. He contends that burying in wood is the equivalent of burying directly in the earth, which he prohibits as a tremendous bizayon to the kisvei hakodesh. He feels that burying in earth, either with or without a wooden protection, is a far greater bizayon to the kisvei hakodesh than burning them. Thus, unswayed by his mechutan’s rejection of his proposal, he remains with his original suggestion – that since burying all the genizah in earthenware containers is not practical, and burying them in wooden containers is not acceptable, the remaining option is to burn the sheimos.

The response from the Keneses Yechezkel was not long in coming. On the 17th of Shvat, the Keneses Yechezkel penned his retort, again reiterating his position that it is absolutely forbidden to burn sheimos, and that it is perfectly acceptable, and therefore required, to bury them in wooden boxes. (This last letter is the part of the correspondence that does not appear in Shu’t Shevus Yaakov, but only in Keneses Yechezkel.)

Packing the printed material

It is noteworthy that both of these authorities rule that printed sefarim must be packed properly before burial, which was also the position of the Be’er Sheva and the Magen Avraham that I quoted above. On the other hand, the Pri Megadim (commenting on the above-quoted Magen Avraham), who was born shortly before the passing of the Keneses Yechezkel and the Shevus Yaakov, notes that the custom is to bury worn-out printed sefarim without placing them inside vessels, and to require burial in earthenware vessels only when burying worn-out, hand-written nevi’im and kesuvim that are written on parchment. (The nevi’im he is describing are used contemporarily by many shullen for reading the haftaros.) The custom mentioned by the Pri Megadim disputes the above quoted authorities, the Be’er Sheva, the Magen Avraham, the Keneses Yechezkel, and the Shevus Yaakov, all of whom held that printed sefarim must be packed in earthenware or with other protective means before burial.

What is the accepted halachic practice?

The prevalent accepted practice follows the Pri Megadim’s observation — that is, although we insist that worn-out printed sefarim must be buried, they are not packed in either earthenware or even wood boxes before burial. The Mishnah Berurah (154:22, 24), when discussing this issue, quotes only the Pri Megadim; he does not even mention the disputing earlier opinions.

How can we permit this?

Granted that the minhag follows the Pri Megadim, but what is the halachic basis to permit this? Neither the Pri Megadim nor the Mishnah Berurah explains the rationale to permit burying these items, without first packing them appropriately. However, an authority contemporary to the Pri Megadim, the Zera Emes (Volume II #133), does discuss this issue.

The Zera Emes was asked the same question that was asked of the Be’er Sheva, the Keneses Yechezkel and the Shevus Yaakov — whether there is any basis to permit the burning of printed sheimos. In response, the Zera Emes first cites many early authorities who held that all printed sefarim require burial in earthenware vessels. He indeed concludes that all genizah items require burial. He then analyzes whether all genizah items require to first be packed in earthenware vessels. He notes that the Gemara, itself, implies that there are different levels of kedushah when burying holy items. Although the Gemara mentions several items that require genizah, such as the coverings of the sefer Torah (often called mantelach), mezuzos, tefillin, tefillin bags and straps, it requires only that these items have genizah and does not mention that they be first placed in earthenware. The requirements of placing the genizah item in an earthenware vessel and burying it near a talmid chacham are mentioned only regarding a sefer Torah. Other holy writings do not require this, and it is sufficient to provide them with what the Zera Emes calls “a minimal burial” — meaning burial in earth. Burial is a respectful way to allow for the decay of holy works, both because burial is halachically a respectful way of disposal, and because the deterioration is caused indirectly.

The Zera Emes adds one more requirement – that the sheimos must be placed into some type of bag or covering before it is buried. This covering is necessary, in his opinion, because placing directly into the ground is not considered a respectful way to treat kisvei hakodesh. We should note that, according to the contemporary sefer Ginzei HaKodesh, Rav Elyashiv held that, in a situation where it is difficult to wrap the genizah, one may bury it without wrapping. This means that, in his opinion, placing kisvei hakodesh directly in the ground is not disrespectful.

Burial at sea

At this point, we can answer Cheryl’s question:

I am on a cruise in the Mediterranean. At one port-of-call, a gentile lady gave me a large bag of old, tattered siddurim, which are now in my cabin on the ship. May I bury them at sea?

As you can by now imagine, I answered Cheryl that she is not permitted to bury the genizah at sea. According to all opinions quoted above, disposing worn-out kisvei hakodesh in water is considered destroying them directly. According to the Be’er Sheva and the Keneses Yechezkel, all kisvei hakodesh require burial in the earth, and in earthenware. According to the Pri Megadim and the Zera Emes, although burial is permitted in earth, this is only in earth, where the deterioration takes time, but “burial at sea” is a bizayon to the holy works. Even the Shevus Yaakov, who permitted burning kisvei hakodesh when one cannot bury them in earthenware vessels, expressly forbade burial in earth without packing them first, because the moisture of the earth is considered directly destroying them and forbidden, and certainly, disposal directly in water is forbidden.

Conclusion — contemporary practice

Common practice of those who bury genizah today is to pack all handwritten kisvei hakodesh, including sifrei Torah, mezuzos, and tefillin parshiyos, in earthenware or glass containers before burial; whereas worn-out, printed sefarim are simply placed in bags or cardboard boxes and buried. Thus, it appears that although we are following the distinction between sifrei Torah and other holy writings as explained by the Zera Emes, contemporary practice is to be slightly stricter than his ruling regarding how we wrap mezuzos and tefillin parshiyos prior to burial.

Thousands of pages of Torah rattle off presses and home and business printers every day, spreading Torah to every corner of the globe. By disposing of this material appropriately, we help ensure that this glory of Torah does not lead to its desecration.

 

 




How Many Should be Saying Kaddish?

American Friends of Nimla Tal Inc. is a tzedakah that distributes all of the money received to situations here in Eretz Yisroel of which I have personal knowledge. Usually, the money is used to pay for therapy. In addition, a special feature, good through the month of December, is that PayPal adds 1% to the amount donated. So, click on www.paypal.me/rabbikaganoff to donate, and you will be given the option to enter your amount. If you enter $100, for example, you get a US IRS tax deduction of $100, and $101 goes to help the poor in Israel. No money goes to pay salaries or other no expenses.

Since, in Parshas Vayechi, we read of Yaakov Avinu’s last instructions to his children, this is an appropriate week to discuss some of the laws of kaddish.

How Many Should be Saying Kaddish?

Question: Is it better that each mourner recite only one kaddish, or that all the mourners recite all the kaddeishim?

Answer: Most people are under the impression that whether the “mourner’s kaddish” (kaddish yasom) is recited by only one person or whether many recite it simultaneously is a dispute between the practices of Germany and those of Eastern Europe. However, we will soon see that this simplification is inaccurate. There were many communities in Eastern Europe where kaddish was said by only one person at a time, and this was the universal Ashkenazic practice until about 250 years ago.

The custom that many people recite the mourner’s kaddish simultaneously was accepted and standard Sefardic practice (meaning the Jews of North Africa and the Middle East), going back at least to the early 18th century (see Siddur Yaavetz, comments after Aleinu), although when this custom was instituted is uncertain. But before we explore the issue of whether more than one person may say kaddish simultaneously, let us first examine the origins of reciting the mourner’s kaddish altogether.

Origins of kaddish

Although the Gemara refers to kaddish in numerous places (Brachos 3a, 57a; Shabbos 119b; Sukkah 39a; Sotah 49a), it never mentions what we call kaddish yasom, the kaddish recited by mourners, nor does it recommend or even suggest, anywhere, that a mourner lead the services. The Gemara, also, makes no mention of when kaddish is recited, with the exception of a very cryptic reference to kaddish recited after studying aggadah (see Sotah 49a). A different early source, Masechta Sofrim, mentions recital of kaddish before borchu (10:7) and after musaf (19:12). The fact that the Gemara says nothing about a mourner reciting kaddish or leading services is especially unusual, since the most common source for these practices is an event that predates the Gemara. The Or Zarua, a rishon, records the following story:

Rabbi Akiva once saw a man covered head to toe with soot, carrying on his head the load that one would expect ten men to carry, and running like a horse. Rabbi Akiva stopped the man, and asked him: “Why are you working so hard? If you are a slave and your master works you this hard, I’ll redeem you. If you are so poor that you need to work this hard to support your family, I’ll find you better employment.”

The man replied, “Please do not detain me, lest those appointed over me get angry at me.”

Rabbi Akiva asked him: “Who are you, and what is your story?”

The man answered: “I died, and everyday they send me like this to chop and carry these amounts of wood. When I am finished, they burn me with the wood that I have gathered.”

Rabbi Akiva asked him what his profession was when he was alive, to which he answered that he had been a tax collector (which, in their day, meant someone who purchased from the government the contract to collect taxes) who favored the rich by overtaxing the poor, which the Or Zarua calls “killing the poor.”

Rabbi Akiva: “Have you heard from your overseers whether there is any way to release you from your judgment?”

The man responded: “Please do not detain me, lest my overseers become angry with me. I have heard that there is no solution for me, except for one thing that I cannot do. I was told that if I have a son who would lead the tzibur in the recital of borchu or would recite kaddish so that the tzibur would answer yehei shemei rabba mevorach…, they would release me immediately from this suffering. However, I did not leave any sons, but a pregnant wife, and I have no idea if she gave birth to a male child, and if she did, whether anyone is concerned about teaching him, since I have not a friend left in the world.”

At that moment, Rabbi Akiva accepted upon himself to find whether a son existed and, if indeed he did, to teach him Torah until he could fulfill what was required to save his father. Rabbi Akiva asked the man for his name, his wife’s name, and the name of the town where he had lived. “My name is Akiva, my wife’s name is Shoshniva and I come from Ludkia.”

Rabbi Akiva traveled to Ludkia and asked people if they knew of a former resident, Akiva, the husband of Shoshniva, to which he received the following answer: “Let the bones of that scoundrel be ground to pulp.” When Rabbi Akiva asked about Shoshniva, he was answered: “May any memory of her be erased from the world.” He then inquired about their child, and was answered: “He is uncircumcised — for we were not interested in involving ourselves even to provide him with a bris milah!” Rabbi Akiva immediately began his search for the son, whom he located — it turned out that he was already a young adult. Rabbi Akiva performed a bris milah on him and attempted to teach him Torah, but was unable to do so. For forty days, Rabbi Akiva fasted, praying that the child be able to study Torah, at which time a heavenly voice announced: “Rabbi Akiva, now go and teach him Torah!”

Rabbi Akiva taught him Torah, shma, shmoneh esrei, birchas hamazon, and then brought him to shul in order for him to lead the tzibur by reciting kaddish and borchu, to which the tzibur responded, yehei shemei rabba mevorach le’olam ule’olmei olemaya and “Baruch Hashem hamevorach le’olam va’ed.

At that moment, Akiva, the husband of Shoshniva, was released from his punishment. This Akiva immediately came to Rabbi Akiva in a dream and told him: “May it be Hashem’s will that you eventually reach your eternal rest in Gan Eden — for you have saved me from Gehennom.” (This story is also found, with some variation, in the second chapter of Masechta Kallah Rabasi.)

Other versions

When a different rishon, the Rivash, was asked about this story, he reported that it is not found in the Gemara, but perhaps its origin is in Midrash Rabbah or Midrash Tanchuma. He then quotes a story from the Orchos Chayim similar to that quoted by Or Zarua. In conclusion, the Orchos Chayim emphasizes that, for the twelve months of mourning, a mourner should recite the last kaddish of the davening and maftir on Shabbos and Yom Tov, and lead the services for ma’ariv every motza’ei Shabbos (Shu’t Harivash #115).

A similar story is recorded in an earlier midrashic source, the Tanna Devei Eliyahu, where the protagonist is not Rabbi Akiva, but his rebbe’s rebbe, Rabbi Yochanan ben Zakai (see Rambam, Peirush Hamishnayos, end of the fifth chapter of Sotah). In this version, the man was punished until his son turned five and the son was educated to the point that he could answer borchu in shul (Eliyahu Zuta, Chapter 17). No mention is made of the son reciting kaddish. However, the halachic sources all quote the version of the Or Zarua, in which the protagonist of the story is Rabbi Akiva.

Merits for the deceased

This story serves as the basis for the practice that a mourner lead the services and recite kaddish. Relatively little of this topic is discussed until the time of the Maharil, who was asked the following question:

“Should someone who is uncertain whether his father or mother is still alive recite kaddish?”

To this question, frequent in earlier times when cell phones were not so commonplace, the Maharil replied that he is not required to recite kaddish and he should assume that the person is still alive (Mishnah, Gittin 3:3). Once the parent reaches the age of eighty, one should view it as uncertain whether the parent is still alive. Upon this basis, I am aware of a gadol be’yisrael who had escaped Hitler’s Europe before the war, who began to recite kaddish for his parents once the Nazis invaded the part of Russia where his parents were living.

The Maharil continues that if there are two people in shul, one who is reciting kaddish for a deceased parent, whereas the other is uncertain whether his parents are still alive, that the second person should not recite kaddish. This is because of the halachic principle of ein safek motzi midei vadai, someone who has a questionable claim does not preempt someone who has a definite claim or right – in this instance, the person whose parents might still be alive should not recite kaddish, rather than someone whose parents are known to be deceased. We see from this ruling that the Maharil assumes that kaddish is recited by only one person at a time.

The Maharil explains that, for this reason, he himself did not say kaddish when he was uncertain whether his parents were still alive. He then explains that someone who is not sure whether his parents are still alive and is capable to lead the services properly should lead the services in honor of his parents (Teshuvos Maharil #36).

Conclusions based on the Maharil

We see from the Maharil’s discussion that:

Only one person recites kaddish at a time.

The reason that someone whose parents are alive should not recite mourner’s kaddish is because he is taking the kaddish away from people who are mourners.

If there is no mourner present to lead the services, then the person uncertain if he is a mourner should lead services, if he can do the job properly.

Obligatory versus voluntary kaddish

The Maharil (Shu’t Maharil Hachadoshos #28) was also asked how a minor can recite kaddish if it is a requirement, as only one obligated to fulfill a mitzvah may fulfill a mitzvah on behalf of others. The Maharil answered that the kaddeishim that are recited by the shaliach tzibur as part of davening cannot be recited by minors. These kaddeishim are obligatory and therefore must be recited by an adult, who thereby fulfills the mitzvah on behalf of the entire community. However, non-obligatory kaddeishim, such as kaddish derabbanan and the kaddeishim recited at the end of davening, may be recited by minors. As a curious aside, the Mesechta Sofrim (10:7) explains that these kaddeishim were established primarily as make-up for people who arrived late and missed the kaddeishim that are required.

It is interesting to note that, already in the time of the Maharil, people assumed that the mourner’s kaddeishim are more important than the kaddeishim recited by the chazzan. The Maharil points out that this is incorrect, since the kaddeishim recited by the chazzan are required, and it is greater to perform a mitzvah that one is required to observe than one that is not required (gadol ha’metzuveh ve’oseh mimi she’eino metzuveh ve’oseh). The main merit that one performs for his deceased parent is to recite the kaddeishim that are said by the chazzan as part of davening.

Since minors cannot serve as chazzan, the Maharil considers it a great merit that they receive maftir, which a minor may receive, since they thereby recite borchu in front of the tzibur.

Mourner’s kaddish on weekdays

It appears from the Maharil’s responsum that, prior to his era, kaddish yasom was recited only on Shabbos and Yom Tov. In his day, a new custom had just begun in some communities to recite mourner’s kaddish on weekdays. The reason for the new custom was to enable minors to recite kaddish on a daily basis and to accommodate adults whom the tzibur did not want to lead the services.

Which kaddeishim should be said?

The Maharil writes that although these kaddeishim are not required, but only customary, they should still be recited after a shiur is completed, after bameh madlikin is recited Friday evening, and after pesukim are recited, such as when we recite kaddish after aleinu and the shir shel yom. He rules that someone whose parents are still alive may recite these kaddeishim. However, if his parents do not want him to recite these kaddeishim, he should not.

One at a time

At this point, let us address our opening question: Is it better that each mourner recite only one kaddish, or that all the mourners recite all the kaddeishim?

It appears that, initially, whoever wanted to recite what we call today the mourner’s kaddeishim would do so. Knowing the story of Rabbi Akiva, it became an element of competition, different people trying to chap the mitzvah, which sometimes engendered machlokes and chillul Hashem. To resolve this problem, two approaches developed for dealing with the issue. Among Sefardim, the accepted approach was that anyone who wanted to say kaddish did so, and everyone recited kaddish in unison. This practice is noted and praised by Rav Yaakov Emden in his commentary on the siddur (at the end of Aleinu). Among the Ashkenazim, the approach used was to establish rules of prioritization, whereby one person at a time recited kaddish.

These lists of prioritization are discussed and amplified by many later Ashkenazi authorities, thus implying that, in the Ashkenazi world, the early custom was that only one person recited kaddish at a time. We do not know exactly when the custom began to change, but by the late eighteenth/early nineteenth century, several major Ashkenazi authorities, among them the Chayei Odom (30:7) and the Chasam Sofer (Shu’t Orach Chayim #159; Yoreh Deah #345), discuss a practice whereby kaddish was recited by more than one person simultaneously. About this time, we find another custom in some communities, in which the mourner’s kaddish was said by only one person, but where everyone who chose could join in the recital of a kaddish derabbanan that was recited at the end of the daily morning prayer (see Shu’t Binyan Tziyon #1:122), presumably after the rav taught a shiur in halachah.

Merged community

With this background, we can understand the following mid-nineteenth century responsum. A community had two shullen and several shteiblach. The main shul was in serious disrepair, so they made an agreement to close all the smaller shullen in order to pool resources and invest in one large, beautiful new shul and have no other minyanim. Included in this decision was a new takkanah that all mourners would now recite all the kaddeishim in unison. Subsequently, some individuals claimed that the community should follow the practice of the Rema and the Magen Avraham of prioritizing the recital of kaddish and have one person say it at a time. The community leaders retorted that this would create machlokes, since there was only one shul and many people would like to say more kaddeishim than they can under the proposed system. Apparently, the dispute even involved some fisticuffs. The community sent the shaylah to Rav Ber Oppenheim, the rav and av beis din of Eibenschutz. He felt that the community practice of having all the mourners recite kaddish together should be maintained, but first wrote an extensive letter clarifying his position, which he sent to Rav Yaakov Ettlinger, the premier halachic authority of central Europe at the time. I will refer to Rav Ettlinger by the name he is usually called in yeshiva circles, the Aruch Laneir, the name of his most famous work, the multi-volumed Aruch Laneir commentary on much of Shas. The Aruch Laneir’s reply was subsequently published in his work of responsa called Shu’t Binyan Tziyon.

The Aruch Laneir contended that one should not change the established minhag of Germany and Poland, in practice for more than three hundred years, in which only one person recites kaddish at a time. He further notes that although the Yaavetz had praised the practice that several people recite kaddish in unison, the Yaavetz himself had lived in Altoona, Germany, where the accepted practice was that only one person said kaddish at a time. (The Aruch Laneir notes that he himself was the current rav of Altoona and had been so already for several decades.)

Furthermore, the Aruch Laneir contends that one cannot compare Ashkenazic to Sefardic observance for a practical reason. The Sefardim are accustomed to praying in unison, and therefore, when they say kaddish, everyone exhibits great care to synchronize its recital. When Ashkenazim attempt to recite kaddish in unison, no one hears the kaddeishim. The Aruch Laneir notes that when the kaddish derabbanan is recited by all mourners, the result is a cacophony. He writes that he wishes he could abolish this custom, since, as a result, no one hears or responds appropriately to kaddish.

In conclusion, the Aruch Laneir is adamant that where the custom is that one person at a time recite kaddish, one may not change the practice. On the other hand, we have seen that other authorities cite a custom whereby all the mourners recite kaddish in unison.

Conclusion: How does kaddish work?

The Gemara (Yoma 86a) records that any sin that a person commits in this world, no matter how grievous, will be atoned if the person does teshuvah. This does not mean that the teshuvah accomplishes atonement without any suffering. Some sins are so serious that a person must undergo suffering in this world in addition to performing teshuvah, before he is forgiven.

The greatest sin a person can be guilty of is chillul Hashem. Only teshuvah, suffering, and the individual’s eventual demise will be sufficient to atone for this transgression. Thus, a person’s death may result from his having caused a chillul Hashem.

The Maharal of Prague had a brother, Rav Chayim, who authored a work entitled Sefer Hachayim, in which he writes that most people die because at some point in their life they made a chillul Hashem. The reason a mourner recites kaddish is to use the parent’s death as a reason to create kiddush Hashem – by reciting kaddish – thus, atoning for the original chillul Hashem (Sefer Hachayim, end of chapter 8). May we all merit to create kiddush Hashem in our lives.