Question #1: A CANDID QUESTION!

Chayim calls me on the phone:

“Prior to our marriage, I was taught that one may open cans on Shabbos, provided one does not reuse the can, whereas my wife was taught that this is strictly forbidden. Since I was taught by someone very knowledgeable and observant, there is something inconsistent here that I would like to understand.”

Question #2: DON’T PULL THE RING!

“I was eating at someone’s house for Shabbos where they served soda in cans and opened them. I thought that this desecrates Shabbos, and was uncertain whether I could trust their kashrus. Could I?”

Answer:

Analyzing the laws of Shabbos properly is a very enriching experience. In this article, I will touch on some aspects of the following melachos germane to the issues involved:

(1) Boneh, Construction

(2) Soseir, Destruction

(3) Makeh Bepatish, literally, striking with a hammer

We also need to explain an important principle of the Shabbos laws called mekalkeil – literally, ruining. In general, a melachah activity is prohibited min haTorah only when the direct results are beneficial. An act whose direct result is destructive is not prohibited min haTorah but only miderabbanan. For example, digging a hole in the ground when one needs the earth but is not interested in the hole is considered a destructive activity and therefore prohibited only miderabbanan.  The need to acquire dirt notwithstanding, the dug hole that results is not a positive development, but a negative one. This renders the burrowing mekalkeil and relegates it to a rabbinically prohibited activity. However, digging a hole to plant or to create a posthole is a positive benefit and therefore prohibited min haTorah.

In a similar vein, smashing a barrel to obtain its contents is prohibited only miderabbanan, regardless of the need to obtain the food inside, since the smashed barrel is a negative result.

Boneh

The Torah violation of Boneh includes performing any type of home repair or enhancement, even only a minor repair (Shabbos 102b). Thus, it is prohibited min haTorah to hammer a nail into a wall in order to hang a picture (Rashi, Eruvin 102a s.v. Halachah). Similarly, one may not smooth the dirt floor of a house, because this enhances the “structure” (Shabbos 73b).

Constructing Movable Items

Does the melachah of Boneh apply only to items connected to the ground, or does it also apply to the construction of implements and other movable items?

My desktop dictionary defines “construct” as “to build or form by putting together parts.” Clearly, in English “construct” includes manufacturing implements, just as it includes building on the ground. Do the laws of Shabbos similarly recognize that assembling implements violates this melachah?

The Gemara (Beitzah 10a) cites a debate regarding this question. In halachic conclusion, we find the following basic approaches:

(1) The melachah of Boneh includes only building on the ground and does not include movable items (Rashi, Shabbos 47a s.v. Chayov; Beitzah 11b s.v. De’ein).

(2) Major construction of small movable items is prohibited min haTorah, but minor improvement is not (Tosafos, Shabbos 74b and 102b). What is considered “major construction”? Assembling something in a way that involves strength and skill constitutes Boneh. Therefore, manufacturing implements is prohibited min haTorah, since it involves both strength and skill to do the job properly, whereas making a minor repair to an implement is not included under Boneh.

Large = Connected

According to many authorities, there is another factor to consider: the size of the movable item (Rashi, Eruvin 35a s.v. Umasnisin). In their opinion, one may not perform even a minor repair or enhancement to a utensil so large that one does not usually move it when it is full to capacity. Thus, even a small repair to a refrigerator or a bookcase is prohibited min haTorah according to this opinion, since an item this large is halachically equivalent to something attached to the ground.

Soseir

Soseir, demolishing or razing, is also one of the 39 melachos, since the Jewish people disassembled the Mishkan whenever they moved it from place to place (Shabbos 31b).

Thus, removing something from a structure, such as removing a nail from a wall, or lifting a window or door off its hinges, is prohibited on Shabbos.

Destructive is Constructive?

Many acts of Soseir ruin something, and according to the rule of mekalkeil mentioned above, are prohibited only miderabbanan. Of course, this leads us to ask:

How can Soseir be prohibited min haTorah as one of the 39 melachos; is not demolishing always a destructive act? The answer is that Soseir is prohibited min haTorah when the destruction is constructive, despite the apparent contradiction in terms. The disassembly of the Mishkan was an act of demolition, yet it was constructive, since Hashem wanted the Mishkan (and the Jewish people) to move to a new location. Similarly, demolition of a building is prohibited min haTorah, if the ultimate results are beneficial, such as razing part of a building in order to renovate it, or razing a building in order to build anew on the site. In such cases, the demolition provides an immediate benefit, since it clears the site for the new construction.

In cases where there are no immediate benefits from the demolition, it is still prohibited miderabbanan. Thus, wrecking a house to save someone trapped inside does not involve a Torah prohibition of Soseir, since the act is itself destructive. (The activity is, of course, permitted in any case, because of the life-threatening situation involved.)

The authorities dispute whether someone who destroys something out of anger violates Shabbos min haTorah or only miderabbanan. According to most Rishonim, this incurs only a rabbinic desecration of Shabbos, since there is no positive benefit from the destruction (Pri Megadim 314:11 in Eishel Avraham). Of course, this act is prohibited for a variety of reasons, including bal tashchis (unnecessary destruction) and damaging one’s character development (Shabbos 105b). There is a minority opinion of the Rambam, who holds that wrecking something out of anger incurs a Shabbos violation min haTorah. He rules that performing an act that makes its perpetrator feel better incurs a Torah violation and is not considered mekalkeil, even though the act is extremely damaging both to the object of his wrath and to himself.

Does Soseir apply to Portable Implements?

Having established that Soseir is prohibited min haTorah only when it creates a direct positive result, we now want to understand whether destroying a vessel is included under the melachah of Soseir. Note that I discussed earlier whether the melachah of Boneh applies only to items connected to the ground, or whether it also applies to the construction of movable items. I noted that the Gemara debates this issue, and that the Rishonim provide the following conclusions:

1. Some contend that the melachah of Boneh includes only building on the ground.

2. Others contend that major construction of small movable items is prohibited min haTorah, but a minor improvement is not.

3. Many authorities contend that this previous dispute refers only to small, easy to move implements, but that a large implement is definitely included min haTorah within the melachah of Boneh, even to perform a minor repair or enhancement.

Since Soseir is the opposite of Boneh, if constructing an item constitutes Boneh, according to the opinions above, then destroying it is Soseir.

Makeh Bepatish

Before we analyze the Gemara texts that impact on our original questions, we still need to discuss one other prohibition: the melachah of Makeh Bepatish, which includes a general prohibition of completing items, such as smoothing a surface to finish an item. One aspect of this melachah is that it prohibits making a nice opening in a vessel, such as boring an outlet hole in a storage drum (Shabbos 146a; Rambam, Hilchos Shabbos 10:16). The Gemara teaches that it is prohibited min haTorah to make an opening that is to be used in both directions, whereas making an opening to be used only in one direction is prohibited miderabbanan. As an example of the first type of opening, the Gemara mentions an opening made in a chicken coop, which allows ventilation of its fumes and also allows light and/or air into the coop. Boring an outlet hole in a storage drum, the case I just mentioned above, is a classic example of something prohibited only miderabbanan, since the opening is intended only to remove the product, but not to return it to the vessel. However, creating a new opening that is meant both to remove and return product incurs a Torah prohibition.

The Can Opener

With the principles we have learned, we can now examine the Talmudic sources that directly affect our original questions: May one open a can or other package on Shabbos to obtain its contents?

The Mishnah (Shabbos 146a) permits smashing open a barrel of figs on Shabbos to reach the food inside, provided one does not try to make a proper opening. As I noted earlier, attempting to make a proper opening certainly desecrates Shabbos. The question is whether one can simply break the barrel to reach its figs without attempting to make a nice opening. This Mishnah states that this is permitted.

However, in another discussion (Eruvin 34b) the Gemara rules that one cannot break open a container to obtain the food inside. Since manufacturing a proper vessel, even a small one, is prohibited min haTorah, smashing it remains prohibited even when one is smashing the vessel to obtain food. Although I explained above that this act is mekalkeil and therefore not prohibited min haTorah, it is still prohibited miderabbanan.

If so, how can the Mishnah permit smashing a barrel to obtain its contents?

There are two major approaches to answer this question. Tosafos explains that the Mishnah that permits smashing to obtain food is not referring to a proper vessel, but to one that was previously smashed and then feebly repaired by use of resin as glue. Reconstructing this type of container, known in Aramaic as a mustaki, would not violate a Torah violation of Boneh since it is not considered a proper vessel. As a result, smashing this barrel does not really violate Soseir, and therefore, one may do so in order to obtain the figs. However, the Gemara in Eruvin is dealing with a regular vessel and therefore forbids smashing the vessel to obtain the food inside. This approach of Tosafos is followed by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 314:1), who concludes that one may smash open a mustaki to obtain food on Shabbos, but not a proper vessel.

Other authorities distinguish between the two cases in a different way and therefore reach a different halachic conclusion. In their opinion, the Mishnah in Shabbos is describing a small vessel (as defined above) and the Gemara in Eruvin a large one. They conclude that in order to enhance the pleasures of Shabbos, Chazal permitted smashing a small vessel to obtain food, but they prohibited smashing a large vessel. According to this approach, one may smash open any “small” container on Shabbos in order to obtain its contents.

How do we Rule?

The Mishnah Berurah concludes that it is prohibited to smash open even a small vessel to obtain food on Shabbos, following the conclusion of the Shulchan Aruch (Bi’ur Halachah 314:1). Other authorities rule that one should not admonish those who smash vessels to obtain their contents, since this common practice is based on a bona fide opinion (Aruch Hashulchan 314:8). All agree that one may not open the container in a way that creates a nice opening.

However, this approach does not satisfactorily explain those who permit opening cans on Shabbos, since neither of these opinions permits being mekalkeil to obtain food on Shabbos. They only dispute whether one should correct those who do smash small vessels. Is there any basis for those who allow the opening of cans on Shabbos?

Enter Chosalos

There is another basis to permit opening packaging on Shabbos. The Gemara mentions a halachah of chosalos, which are a type of basket made of palm branches (also known as lulavim) in which one places unripe dates to ripen or where one stores dried figs. The Gemara rules that one may rip these chosalos open on Shabbos. The question is why this is not considered destroying a vessel, which we concluded before is prohibited, at least lechatchilah.

The Kolbo explains that chosalos are considered an artificial peel or shell around the dates or figs. The rationale is that the chosal is tafeil, secondary, to the food it contains and therefore it is not considered to be a vessel. Just as one may remove the natural peel or shell of a fruit on Shabbos and it is certainly not making or destroying a vessel, so one may remove an artificial “peel” or “shell” on Shabbos. Thus, anything included under the heading of chosalos may be opened on Shabbos. The Magen Avraham states that the permission to open chosalos does not permit the breaking of a regular vessel.

Can our contemporary packaging be compared to the law of chosalos? To answer this we need to have a clear definition of what defines a regular vessel and what defines chosalos.

Opening Cans

In a lengthy teshuvah on the subject, Rav Moshe Feinstein defines a chosal as any item that is not reused for any other product; everyone disposes of the chosal once its product is used up. A “regular” vessel is one that people reuse for another product. According to this definition of a chosal, even a tin can is a chosal, if everyone disposes of the can after finishing the original contents, and certainly if everyone disposes of the can immediately after opening it. Following this analysis, opening cans on Shabbos does not violate the melachos of Shabbos, since tin cans are not reused for other products. (In Rav Moshe’s teshuvah on the subject, he implies that this halachah is true, even if one returns the original product to the chosal.) Rav Moshe himself concludes at the end of his teshuvah that one should open these packages before Shabbos, explaining that people might misunderstand the laws and mistakenly open packaging that is prohibited. However, in the case of someone who made a sheva berachos or who invited guests and finds, to his embarrassment, that he does not have enough food to serve, he permits having a gentile open the cans and other containers on Shabbos (Shu’t Igros Moshe 1:122; for a similar approach, see Shu’t Chelkas Yaakov 3:8).

On the other hand, other authorities contend that any strong vessel is not considered a chosal.

We must note that in another responsum, Rav Moshe rules that one may not open a milk or juice carton on Shabbos, since this creates a spout (Shu’t Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 4:78). Why is this not similar to opening a chosal, which Rav Moshe permits? It seems that although he permits opening a chosal on Shabbos, he does not permit opening it in a way that forms a nice opening. (By the way, we should note that, according to what I have just explained, Rav Moshe would prohibit opening cans with pull up rings  since pulling the lid off forms a nice opening.)

Soda Cans

Rav Shelomoh Zalman Auerbach permits opening soda cans on Shabbos (Shulchan Shelomoh 314:7:4). He makes no mention of the concerns voiced in Rav Moshe’s closing paragraphs (that people might err and exceed the perimeters of his leniency) and therefore concludes that even Jews may open them on Shabbos.

On the other hand, the Chazon Ish (Orach Chayim 51:13) contends that opening any cans violates the Torah prohibition of making an opening. He explains two different reasons why opening cans is prohibited min haTorah:

1. The opening is meant to be used both ways: it allows air inside the can to break the vacuum and it allows the product out.

2. Opening a can is like creating a new vessel, since the closed can is useless, and opening it creates a serviceable vessel. Although he acknowledges that few people reuse cans, they can be reused, particularly by resourceful people (Orach Chayim 51:11).

Rav Shelomoh Zalman disputes the rationale that a soda can opening is considered “two-way”, since the entire purpose of allowing the air in is to enable the product to exit. Also, he does not consider the resultant opening a “nice opening”, since it is simply a means of removing the product from the container.

In conclusion, the intent of this article is not to provide a definitive pesak regarding these issues – every person should ask his posek. Our goal is to give people a better understanding of the issues involved and an appreciation of their rav’s ruling, whatever it may be.

A contemporary halachic question which relates to this issue is as follows: Can a person suffering from angina or other heart disease carry his medication on Shabbos through a public thoroughfare? In case of a sudden attack, there would indeed be a life threatening need that permits procurement of such medication through any necessary means. However, there is no medical reason that compels the patient to leave his home where his medicine is kept. Is there halachic basis to allow him to carry his medication, since the possible medical emergency can be completely avoided? Granted that this would result in a great hardship by making the patient housebound on Shabbos, yet this deprivation would not constitute a life-threatening emergency and would not be grounds for overriding a Torah-proscribed Shabbos prohibition.

The halachic question is two-fold: Can carrying the medicine be considered a rabbinic violation, as opposed to a Torah violation, thus making it more acceptable? Does there exist a halachic basis for permitting the overriding of a rabbinic prohibition because of hardships?

The same principles can be applied to other medical situations. For example, the diabetic who receives insulin injections is usually medically advised to carry with him some food items containing sugar, as a precaution against insulin shock; and certain asthmatics and other allergy sufferers are advised never to go anywhere without their medication available. Would these patients be allowed to carry their sugar or medicine on Shabbos in a way that involves violating only a rabbinic decree?

Most contemporary authorities who address this issue base their discussion on a responsum of Rav Shmuel Engel, dated 9 Tammuz 5679 (July 7, 1919).[1] At the time of this question, there was a government regulation in force, requiring the carrying of identification papers whenever one walked outside, with serious consequences for those apprehended in violation. Rav Engel was asked whether one could place his identification papers under one’s hat on Shabbos while walking to shul. Rav Engel’s analysis of the halachic issues involved will clarify many of the aspects of our question.

Shabbos violations fall under two broad headings: those activities that are forbidden min hatorah (Torah-mandated), and those that are forbidden by rabbinic injunction, but do not qualify as melacha (forbidden work) according to the Torah’s requirements.

Torah law is not violated unless the melacha is performed in a manner in which that activity is usually done. If the act is done in a peculiar way, such as an item being carried in a way that things are not normally carried, it constitutes a rabbinic violation, but is permitted under Torah law. This deviation is called a shinui.[2]

Rav Engel points out that carrying identification papers in one’s hat would constitute a shinui, thus allowing a possibility of leniency. He quotes two Talmudic sources that permit melacha with a shinui on Shabbos because of extenuating — but not life-threatening – circumstances.

Rabbi Marinus said, "One who is suffering is allowed to suck milk directly from a goat on Shabbos. Why? [Is not milking an animal on Shabbos a violation of a Torah prohibition?] Sucking is considered milking in an unusual way, and the rabbis permitted it because of the discomfort of the patient." [3]

Tosafos notes that the leniency is allowed only if the suffering is caused by illness and not simply by thirst. The Talmudic text and commentary of Tosafos are quoted as halachic decision by the Shulchan Aruch.[4]

There is another Talmudic text with a similar conclusion:

Nachum of Gaul said, "One is allowed on Shabbos to clean a spout that has become clogged by crushing [the clogged matter] with one’s foot. Why? [Is it not forbidden to perform repair work on Shabbos?]Since the repair work is done in an unusual manner, the Rabbis permitted it in a case of potential damage."

Based on these Talmudic sources, Rav Engel concludes that the rabbis permitted the performance of melacha with a shinui under extenuating circumstances, even though rabbinic prohibitions are not usually waived for these situations. Furthermore, he points out two other mitigating factors: according to most opinions, the prohibition of carrying on Shabbos in our cities (even in the usual fashion) is rabbinic because "our public areas do not constitute a public domain according to Torah law." And carrying identification papers would constitute a melacha done without any need for the result, which would also provide a reason to be lenient, as will be explained.

Melacha She’einah tzricha legufah

In several places, the Gemara[5] records a dispute between Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Shimon as to whether a melacha she’einah tzricha legufah, an action done intentionally and in the normal fashion, but without a need for the result of the action, is forbidden by the Torah or only rabbinically. For example, carrying a corpse from a private domain into a public domain would not constitute a Torah desecration of Shabbos according to Rabbi Shimon, since one’s purpose is to remove the corpse from the private domain, and not because he has a need for it in the public domain. Similarly, snaring or killing a predator insect or reptile would be a melacha she’einah tzricha legufah, since one has no need for the caught reptile, and therefore constitutes only a rabbinic violation, according to Rabbi Shimon. Both of these cases violate Torah prohibition according to Rabbi Yehudah, who opines that a melacha she’einah tzricha legufah is a Torah-mandated prohibition.

Although the Rambam[6] follows the opinion of Rabbi Yehudah, the majority of halachic authorities concur with Rabbi Shimon.[7]

Rav Engel considers carrying identification papers in one’s hat as a melacha she’einah tzricha legufah, because the carrier has no personal use for the papers and is carrying them merely to avoid injury or loss. He compares this to the killing of the snake, where the intent is to avoid injury. Although his point is arguable, as evidenced by a later responsum,[8] Rav Engel reiterates his position that this situation qualifies as a melacha she’einah tzricha legufah.

Placing identification papers in one’s hat and carrying them that way is permitted by Rav Engel because of the following mitigating reasons.

1. The Gemara permits performing a melacha she’einah tzricha legufah under extenuating circumstances (illness or financial loss).

2. In any case, the prohibition involved, even if performed in a regular manner, would involve only rabbinic prohibition, not a Torah law. This conclusion is justified, either because of the principle of melacha she’einah tzricha legufah, or because no Torah-mandated public domain exists today.

3. Carrying the identification papers is to be allowed only to attend the synagogue or to perform a different mitzvah.

This responsum provides us with strong halachic precedent, although certain aspects of our case differ from those of Rav Engel’s. Firstly, whereas in Rav Engel’s case, the identification papers had no intrinsic worth to the carrier, the nitroglycerin tablets do have intrinsic value to the patient. This would render them a melacha hatzricha legufah, a melacha performed with interest in the results being done, which constitutes a Torah- forbidden melacha. Thus, one of the reasons for being lenient is nullified.

Secondly, Rav Engel permitted the carrying of identification papers only for the performance of a mitzvah. Would he have allowed a greater leniency for someone who is ill? Bearing in mind the case of Rabbi Marinus, where permission is based on medical needs, could leniency be extended to allow carrying with a shinui, even for social or other reasons?

Several later halachic works discuss the question of a patient carrying medication with a shinui, as a precaution against sudden attack. Rav Yekutiel Y. Greenwald[9] suggests that a sugar cube be sewn into the pocket of a diabetic’s coat before Shabbos, so that he would not be carrying in the usual manner. Rav Greenwald bases his opinion on the Gemara[10] which allows the carrying of an amulet on Shabbos as a medicinal item, and the responsum of Rav Shmuel Engel quoted above. Unfortunately, the comparison to the law of kamayah (amulet) seems strained. The halacha clearly states that the kamayah must be worn in the way that it is normally worn, and that it can be worn only if it is a proven remedy; under these circumstances, the kamayah is considered to be like a garment. There does not seem to be a basis in these considerations to allow carrying for non-life threatening medical need. However, Rav Greenwald allows the diabetic to go outside even for non-mitzvah-related activities.

Rav Eliezer Yehuda Waldenberg[11] cites the responsum of Rav Greenwald, but disputes his conclusions sharply. In addition to the difficulty we have noted, he also disputes two assumptions of Rav Greenwald.

1. Whereas Rav Greenwald says that one could allow the sugar cube (or medicine tablet) to be sewn into the garment in order to carry it on Shabbos, Rav Waldenberg finds no halachic source to permit carrying an item in this fashion.

2. Rav Waldenberg writes that the only situation in which Rav Engel permitted the carrying with a shinui was when the activity would have constituted a melacha she’einah tzricha legufah. This applies to carrying identification papers, where the carrier has no personal need for the papers and is carrying them only to avoid being apprehended. It does not apply to the case of medication, where the patient wants the medicine available for his own use.

Rav Waldenberg concludes that the leniency proposed by Rav Engel is not applicable to our situation, and that this patient would not be allowed to carry his medication outside, even when using a shinui. A mediating position is taken by Rav Yehoshua Neuwirth.[12] Although he equates the situation of the person carrying identification papers to the one carrying medication, and does permit the carrying of medication with a shinui for the propose of performing a mitzvah, Rav Neuwirth recommends other specific guidelines, a discussion of which is beyond the scope of this article.

In a responsum on this topic by Rav Menashe Klein,[13] he concludes that a patient is allowed to carry nitroglycerin tablets with a shinui for the purpose of going to shul or for performing another mitzvah. Rav Klein also includes two other reasons to be lenient:

1. There is currently no public domain according to Torah definitions.

2. He considers this carrying to be a melacha she’einah tzricha legufah, a point which is certainly disputed by the other authorities quoted.

An interesting comment quoted in the name of the Chasam Sofer by the Levushei Mordechai[14] should also shed light on this issue. Levushei Mordechai reports that the Chasam Sofer was in the habit of carrying a handkerchief tied around his wrist outside of the eruv on Shabbos, because it is considered carrying with a shinui and is permitted, because of the need for the handkerchief. The prohibition of rabbinic origin is overridden by the need for personal dignity (kavod haberiyos). No stipulation is made by Levushei Mordechai that the walking is done exclusively for a mitzvah purpose.

One might think that the discomfort of staying home on Shabbos provides greater reason to be lenient than the concept of personal dignity, and that this responsum could therefore be utilized as a basis to allow carrying of nitroglycerin with a shinui. However, few later poskim refer to the comment of the Levushei Mordechai.[15]

The following conclusions can be reached:

1. There is halachic basis for permitting the performance of rabbinically–prohibited activities with a shinui, in certain extenuating circumstances.

2. Rav Engel allowed the carrying of identification papers in one’s hat to enable one to perform a mitzvah.

3. Several contemporary poskim discuss this question and reach divergent conclusions.

[1] Shu’t Maharash Engel, 3:43

[2] See Shabbos 92a, 104b

[3] Kesubos 60a

[4] Orach Chayim 328:33

[5] Shabbos 12a, 31b, 73b etc.

[6] Hilchos Shabbos 1:7

[7] I refer the reader to read my Hebrew Kuntrus on the topic, published at the end of Nimla Tal Volume I

[8] Shu’t Maharash Engel, 7:20

[9] Kol Bo on the laws of Aveilus, Volume 2, page 20

[10] Shabbos 60a, 67a

[11] Shu’t Tzitz Eliezer 13:34

[12] Shemiras Shabbos KeHilchasah, Chapter 40 #7

[13] Shu’t Meshaneh Halachos 7:56

[14] Shu’t Levushei Mordechai #133

[15] It is quoted by Shearim HaMetzuyanim BaHalacha 84:13 and by Lev Avraham Volume 1, Chapter 6.

When Noach offered his korbanos after the Mabul, Hashem promised that the days of the earth will never again be changed, and that day and night will never cease. But exactly when does day end and night begin?

Quiz Question #1:

Mrs. Yunger* gave birth to two healthy twin boys, each of whom had his bris on the first day that halacha mandates, yet the younger Yunger had his bris several days earlier than his older brother. How can this happen?

Question #2:

Moshe Litvag* asks me: "I have often wondered why my chassidishe brother-in-law davens mincha after sunset, when the Mishnah Berurah rules that one should not daven this late!"

Question #3:

"My sister and I live in the same yishuv (community), and the nearest hospital is Laniado in Netanya. She went into labor on Shabbos and left for the hospital. Immediately after Shabbos I phoned the hospital to find out how she was and whether she had a boy or a girl, and was told by the gentile receptionist that she could not put the call through until after ‘Rabbeinu Tam’ time arrives, which would not be for another half an hour. Why was the gentile receptionist so frum?"

Why Did the Younger Yunger have an Earlier Bris?

Although a bris that transpires on the eighth day of the child’s life supersedes Shabbos, when a baby is born during bein hashemashos, a halachic "twilight zone" which is uncertain whether it is part of the previous day or the next one, his bris cannot transpire on Shabbos. If the older Yunger was born during bein hashemashos on Friday evening – then we cannot perform his bris on either Friday or Shabbos, and his bris is postponed to Sunday. Moreover, if Yom Tov follows Shabbos, then his bris will be delayed even more. However, his younger brother was born at a time that was certainly Shabbos, and therefore, his bris took place on Shabbos. Thus, younger Yunger had his bris before older Yunger.

When is Twilight?

When is bein hashemashos?

We all are aware that the Jewish date begins at night. But at what exact moment does one day end and another begin? Do we know the precise instant when one day marches off into history, and its successor arrives with its banner unfurled?

A verse in the book of Nechemiah might help resolve this question. There it describes the unenviable circumstances in which the Jews were rebuilding the Second Beis Hamikdash while protecting themselves from the enemies who were determined to thwart its erection: And we were continuing the construction work from daybreak until the stars come out [tzeis hakochavim] while half our men were holding spears… and at night we were on guard, while in the day we could proceed with the work (Nechemiah 4: 15- 16). Nechemiah implies that "night" begins from when the stars emerge, and the time of dusk until they materialize is still considered the previous day (see Berachos 2b; Megillah 20b).

However, we still require more definition. Which stars? Can we pinpoint the moment that the stars come out, since the stars of the firmament do not all become visible at the same time?

Additional confusion is caused by a different verse that implies that the day ends when the sun sets, as the Torah (Vayikra 22:7) proclaims: And when the sun sets, he shall become pure, stating that the final stage of purification from some types of tumah is the sunset after immersion in a mikveh. However, at sunset no stars are yet visible. Thus, this verse implies that the changing of the day transpires at sunset, not when the stars appear (see Berachos 2b).

What a Phenomenal Dusk!

Is there any discussion in the Gemara that can "shed light" on our question? Indeed, there are several passages, and much literature is devoted to understanding them. One passage (Shabbos 34b) describes certain celestial phenomena that define when bein hashemashos begins and when it ends. The commentaries debate exactly what occurrences are being described, and, unfortunately, we derive little usable information from this passage.

When Three Stars Appear

Another passage indicates that the end of the day is determined by the appearance of stars. When one star appears, it is still day. When two appear, it is bein hashemashos, and when three appear, it is night. Not large stars that appear even in the day, and not small stars that first appear at night, but middle-sized stars (Shabbos 35b).

Now the job appears easy. Let us look at the darkening firmament this coming evening and count stars!

I am sure at times you have tried. Ever spent Shabbos on a camping trip and attempted to determine the end of Shabbos by stargazing? How did you decide which stars are considered "small," "large" and "middle-sized"? And this is assuming that one does not need to deal with light pollution!

Perhaps, locating a Gemara discussion that indicates more objective criteria, such as units of time, may be more helpful in our search to determine the end of day. Does such a discussion exist in the Gemara?

Yes it does — and not only one passage, but two. However, the two passages appear contradictory!

Conflicting Gemara Passages

The Gemara in Pesachim (94a) states that the time between shekiyah, a word usually translated as sunset, and tzeis hakochavim equals four mil, which, we will assume, is 72 minutes. (This concurs with the more obvious way of explaining the opinion of the Terumas Hadeshen [#123] and the Shulchan Aruch [Orach Chayim 459:2; Yoreh Deah 69:6 with Shach] that a mil used as a unit of time equals 18 minutes.) However, a different passage of Gemara, in Mesechta Shabbos (34b), quotes a dispute in which Rabbah states that nightfall occurs three-quarters of a mil, or 13 1/2 minutes, after shekiyah, and Rabbi Yosef rules that it transpires a bit earlier, two-thirds of a mil, or 12 minutes, after shekiyah. Obviously, we need to explain why one Gemara states that nightfall occurs 72 minutes after shekiyah, and another states that it occurs only 12 or 13 1/2 minutes after shekiyah!

Rabbeinu Tam’s Explanation

Among the many resolutions to this conundrum, the two most commonly quoted are those of Rabbeinu Tam and that of the Gr"a. Rabbeinu Tam contends that these two passages of Gemara are using the word "shekiyah" to refer to two different phenomena which occur about an hour apart. The Gemara in Pesachim uses the term shekiyah to mean sunset — when the sun vanishes beyond the western horizon. Rabbeinu Tam refers to sunset as techilas shekiyah, literally the beginning of shekiyah. However, when the Gemara in Shabbos refers to "shekiyah," it does not mean sunset, but a point in time about an hour later when virtually all light of the sun’s rays is dissipated from earth. Rabbeinu Tam refers to this later time as sof shekiyah, literally the end of shekiyah, and in his opinion, until sof shekiyah occurs, it is still halachically day, notwithstanding the setting of the sun and the appearance of hundreds of stars in the firmament. All these stars are considered "large stars" whose appearance does not demonstrate that the day has ended. Only at sof shekiyah does it become bein hashemashos, the time when we are uncertain whether it is day or night. At sof shekiyah, bein hashemashos has begun, meaning that now there are two, but not three, visible "middle-sized" stars, and we await the appearance of the third "middle-sized" star to know that it is now definitely night. (However, cf. Minchas Kohen for a variant understanding of Rabbeinu Tam’s position.)

Since according to Rabbeinu Tam it is definitely still day until about an hour after sunset, many authorities contend that there is no problem with davening mincha considerably after sunset (however, note that Rabbeinu Yonah ruled differently, even according to Rabbeinu Tam). Thus, there are communities who base themselves on this approach and daven mincha well after sunset.

Rabbeinu Tam and a Friday Night Birth

According to Rabbeinu Tam, a baby born 58 minutes after sunset on Friday evening, and certainly any time earlier, was born halachically on Friday and not on Shabbos. In Rabbeinu Tam’s opinion, this baby’s bris takes place the following Friday. A baby making his appearance a bit later is considered to be born during bein hashemashos and cannot have his bris on Shabbos because maybe bein hashemashos is still Friday — which makes Shabbos his ninth day of life. This bris will be postponed to Sunday. However, if he is born a bit later on Friday evening, at a time when it is definitely Shabbos, then the bris is performed on Shabbos

It goes without saying that according to Rabbeinu Tam, one may not perform any melacha on Saturday night until a considerable time has passed after sunset. There are various opinions exactly when Shabbos is definitely over according to Rabbeinu Tam, but most people assume that Shabbos is over by 72 minutes after sunset (Biur Halacha).

By the way, at this point we can answer our third question above: why the telephone lines at Laniado hospital are not open to non-pikuach nefesh related calls until more than a half hour later than the time Shabbos ends according to most calendars. The founder of the hospital, the Klausenberger Rebbe, insisted that Shabbos be observed at the hospital until it is over according to Rabbeinu Tam.

The opinion of the Gr"a

Since we know that many highly observant Jews do not wait this long for Shabbos to end, there must be another way of interpreting the two passages of Gemara that reaches a different halachic conclusion. Indeed, one such approach is presented by the Gr"a, who follows a completely different approach as to why the Gemara in Pesachim states that tzeis hakochavim does not occur until 72 minutes after sunset, whereas the Gemara in Shabbos has tzeis hakochavim occurring much earlier. The Gr"a contends that both passages use shekiyah to mean sunset, and this is the same sunset to which we customarily refer — however, they are not referring to the same tzeis hakochavim. The Gemara passage in Pesachim that refers to tzeis hakochavim being 72 minutes after sunset means that all visible stars of the firmament can now be seen, a time that the Gr"a calls tzeis kol hakochavim, literally, when all the stars have appeared, whereas the Gemara in Shabbos refers to the time at which three "middle-sized" stars are visible. The Gr"a concludes that sunset begins the time of bein hashemashos, the time when we are uncertain whether it is day or night, with tzeis hakochavim occurring when three "middle-sized" stars are visible. The Gemara in Pesachim that requires 72 minutes until the stars appear is not discussing when the day ends — the day ended much earlier — but is concerned about when all remnants of sunlight vanish.

According to the Gr"a’s opinion, once sunset arrives on Friday, it may already be Shabbos, and we therefore refrain from performing any melacha from this time, and consider this time to be already bein hashemashos. In the Gr"a’s opinion, a baby born after sunset Friday will have his bris performed on Sunday a week later unless he is born after three "middle-sized" stars appear, in which case (assuming that the baby is healthy) his bris will be performed on Shabbos. (In practice, since we are uncertain exactly which stars are called "middle-sized," we wait a bit longer, see Biur Halacha to 393.) According to Rabbeinu Tam, this same baby would have his bris performed on Friday unless he is born at least 58 1/2 minutes after sunset. If he is born between 58 1/2 minutes and 72 minutes after sunset Friday evening, according to the Gr"a his bris is on Shabbos, whereas according to Rabbeinu Tam his bris will be on Sunday. Both agree that a baby born later than this on Friday evening will have his bris performed on Shabbos.

The Gr"a rules that one should not daven mincha after sunset, since this is already a time at which the previous day may have already passed. Thus, it is already time to daven maariv.

How do we rule?

Although in the past there were Torah communities which did not follow the Gr"a at all, even regarding the onset of Shabbos, today, it is universally accepted to consider it Shabbos from sunset on Friday. Many communities follow the Gr"a’s opinion fully, and do not wait until 72 minutes after sunset on Saturday to end Shabbos. In a responsum on the subject, Rav Moshe Feinstein took great umbrage to this approach, contending that since a large number of Rishonim followed Rabbeinu Tam’s approach, one should act stringently and not end Shabbos until after "Rabbeinu Tam time" is over (Igros Moshe, Yoreh Deah 4:17:26).

*all names have been changed to protect privacy

I once received the following communication:

“As an active member of Hatzalah, but not speaking on behalf of any specific Hatzalah organization, I suggest that you cover a topic that would benefit many frum communities, especially those where, Boruch Hashem, new branches of Hatzalah have recently been established. In many instances of our responding to Shabbos emergencies, we discover that the patient, family, and bystanders do not know the basic halachos of pikuach nefesh; thus, they do not understand why we do certain things, such as using our radios or driving to and from an emergency. Although occasionally different branches follow different protocols (such as whether we drive back from a call) depending on different piskei halacha that each branch received, the basic rules are the same, and the differences in psak halacha among the different branches rarely affect what the patient does.

“Another phenomenon that I see is simply baffling. People call Hatzalah on Shabbos, with no intention of allowing us to transport the patient to a hospital if we deem it necessary. They tell us, ‘We can’t go to the hospital; it’s Shabbos.’ Guess what? You called us and it’s Shabbos for us too. People need to be taught that if Chas V’Shalom they need to call Hatzalah on Shabbos (or any other day), they MUST listen to our advice.

“We are trained to recognize problems that are not obvious to the untrained individual. If we say the patient needs to be transported to the hospital on Shabbos, please don’t argue with us!

“My understanding of the halacha is that it is the responsibility of the Rabbonim of a community to educate people what to do on Shabbos if someone is endangered.

“Thanking you in advance,”

The Hatzalah volunteer who addressed this letter requested that we withhold his name, and we are honoring his request.

Although I have never been involved in Hatzalah’s holy work, I would like to introduce my comments with the following tragic story: Yuddie, a hard working, mid-fifties, proud Jew, was feeling unwell on a Shabbos afternoon. His concerned children called the local ambulance service, who felt he should go to the hospital immediately. Yuddie refused to go on Shabbos. To bring the story to its abrupt end, Yuddie died a few hours later from coronary arrest.

This is only part of the tragedy. Imagine what probably happened when Yuddie arrived for final judgment in the court of the Olam HaEmes. Certainly the Satan charged him with manslaughter for bringing about his own demise by violating the halachos of pikuach nefesh. Maybe the Beis Din shel Maalah had rachmonus to mitigate his crime and judge him as a shogeg, someone negligent in his violation because he was unaware of the halachos. Certainly, Yuddie will receive some punishment for his serious breach of halacha since he should have studied the halacha.

To make sure such tragedies don’t reoccur, we will review the basics of these halachos.

The Gemara (Yerushalmi, Yoma 8:5) teaches: “Someone who was asked a shaylah (whether to desecrate Shabbos in the case of a life-threatening emergency) is disgraced and the one who asks is guilty of bloodshed.” We understand the second part of this statement — that someone busying himself with asking whether he can save someone’s life is wasting precious minutes that literally may be the difference between life and death, but why is the rav who was asked the shaylah considered disgraced?

The answer is because he is responsible to teach these halachos publicly so that people should always know these laws thoroughly. If people are asking what to do it this indicates that the rav has not adequately taught them, which is negligence on his part (Korban HaEidah ad loc.).

Let us quote the words of Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 328:2): “It is a mitzvah to desecrate Shabbos for a dangerous illness. He who does so swiftly is praised; the person who goes to ask what to do is a shedder of blood!” and again: “Whoever is swift in desecrating Shabbos in a matter that involves danger is praised!! (Shulchan Aruch Orach Chayim 328:13)

By the way, this rule obviously applies equally on weekdays! If someone is uncertain whether a particular situation is life threatening or not, he/she is required to immediately seek proper medical attention. Delaying might be shedding blood!

IS THIS AN EMERGENCY?

But what if I do not know whether this is a life threatening emergency? Am I required to be a doctor to know what is and what is not? After all, only a life-threatening emergency supersedes Shabbos!

No, there is no halacha requirement to be a physician. However, this is the rule that one should follow:

“One must desecrate Shabbos even if there is only a slight possibility that the situation is dangerous. One does not need a professional opinion or an expert physician. Whenever one is uncertain whether the situation is dangerous, he is required to desecrate Shabbos (Shu’t Tashbeitz 1:54).”

Thus, Yuddie’s children were absolutely correct in calling the emergency service and certainly could have driven him to the hospital themselves, even if it would have turned out to have been nothing but indigestion from too much cholent. Certainly, I have only praise for the Hatzalah volunteers who drive on Shabbos to attend emergencies.

The source for this halacha is the following statement: “An uncertainty whether the situation is life-threatening supersedes Shabbos. Not only if it is uncertain whether the situation is immediately dangerous, but even if there is no danger now and the situation may create a danger for the future (Gemara Yoma 84b).” The last clause teaches that we supersede Shabbos for someone when inferior care received now may affect his future health, such as a person suffering from an apnea condition which, left untreated, may eventually cause permanent heart damage. The same applies to kidney conditions or diabetes.

In short, the Torah demands that when you are uncertain whether a situation is dangerous or not, be mechaleil Shabbos first to get proper medical care, and ask questions later.

Years ago, I was visiting a physician friend of mine when a well respected member of the frum community, who lived quite a distance from the house, arrived on Shabbos afternoon to determine whether his child’s illness was life-threatening. They had just walked with the child forty minutes to have a frum physician evaluate whether the situation warranted chillul Shabbos! To this day I am astonished at how little this yeshiva-educated man knew about pikuach nefesh. When uncertain whether a situation is life threatening or not, assume that it is until someone knowledgeable informs you that it is not.

WHAT IS CONSIDERED MEDICALLY KNOWLEDGEABLE?

The halachic definition of a physician for these purposes certainly includes a trained Hatzalah emergency medical technician. I can prove this from an anecdote concerning Rav Yaakov Kaminetzky, zt”l. Rav Yaakov’s first rabbinic position was in a small Lithuanian village that had no physician. Thus, living there violated the psak of the Rambam (Hilchos Dayos 4:23) that a talmid chacham may live only in a town that has a physician. Rav Yaakov needed a solution to accept this position and move into the community. He resolved the problem by reading through medical books until he felt he met the halachic requirements of being a local doctor (Reb Yaakov, page 106). Thus we see that someone who knows enough to treat commonplace medical problems is halachically qualified as a physician.

One can conclude that a Hatzalah volunteer has sufficient training to be considered halachically a physician for the emergencies with which he deals. Therefore, a lay person who disobeys the instructions of a Hatzalah volunteer to desecrate Shabbos is a shofeich domim!

WHAT IF THE SITUATION IS NOT LIFE THREATENING?

If a medical authority, such as a Hatzalah volunteer, tells you that the situation is not life-threatening, a Jew may not perform any activity that involves violating a Torah prohibition, although depending on circumstances, rabbinic takanos may often be set aside.

It is beyond the scope of this article to detail what one may do under these circumstances, but I will supply two rules of thumb that one should usually follow under these circumstances:

1. If the person is ill (even not seriously) or uncomfortable, one may ask a gentile to do whatever is necessary (Shulchan Aruch Orach Chayim 307:5).

2. If the patient and his family do not include any talmidei chachamim, and the Hatzalah volunteer tells you that based on his experience of asking shaylos from Rabbonim, you should be able to do something yourself, you may rely on this information until one has the opportunity to ask a shaylah what to do.

May we always merit that to perform mitzvos in good health and in the way that Hashem wants us to.

Yankie’s older brother, Reuven returns from yeshivah and tells his mom that it is okay to tie the baby’s shoes with a double knot. Mom has never done this, always assuming that one cannot tie a double knot on Shabbos, even though baby Rivka’s shoes almost never stay tied on Shabbos as a result. Of course, Yankie does not miss the opportunity to disagree with Reuven and emphasize that one may not tie the shoes on Shabbos just as one may not tie the tichel.

What’s a mother to do?

She calls the Rav, who continues his explanation ….

Last time we learned that some knots are prohibited min haTorah, others are prohibited midirabbanan, while others are completely permitted. Any knot that may not be tied may not be untied either. If tying it involves a Torah prohibition, then untying it is forbidden min haTorah (Mishnah Shabbos 111b). If tying the knot is only midirabbanan, then untying it is midirabbanan. If one is allowed to tie a particular knot, one may also untie it (Rambam Hilchos Shabbos 10:7). We learned that according to Rashi and most Rishonim, it is prohibited min haTorah to tie a permanent knot, midirabbanan to tie a semi-permanent knot, and that it is permitted to tie a temporary knot. Everyone agrees that Rashi permits tying any knot that will be untied within 24 hours from when it is tied (Beis Yosef 317). On the other hand, everyone agrees that Rashi forbids tying a knot that is left untied for a week or more. Authorities dispute whether Rashi prohibits tying a knot meant to last more than 24 hours but less than a week, some viewing this knot as semi-permanent and others as temporary (Rama 317:1). One may follow the lenient opinion under extenuating circumstances (Biyur Halacha 317:4 s.v. she’einam kevuim).

According to Rambam, a knot that is permanent is prohibited min haTorah only when it is a type of knot that a craftsman would use, called a “kesher uman.” A permanent knot that would not be used by a craftsman is only midirabbanan. In addition, a knot that a craftsman would tie but is not permanent is also only midirabbanan, whereas a knot that is neither permanent nor used by a craftsman is totally permitted. There is some uncertainty as to what is considered a “craftsman’s knot.” Because of this question, some poskim rule that one should not tie any knot very tightly even though one intends to untie it shortly (Shiltei HaGibborim).

According to both Rashi and the Rambam, one may tie a knot that will be untied within 24 hours if it is not extremely tight. Thus according to all opinions, one may tie a gartel on Shabbos or the belt on a bathrobe or any other garment that is usually untied as it is removed and is not tied very tightly. Similarly, a woman may tie her tichel in place because a woman always unties this knot when she removes it so that she does not dishevel her hair.

TYING A KNOT IN A PIECE OF STRING

Tying a knot with a piece of string or length of rope around itself so that it does not slip through a hole or unravel is usually prohibited min haTorah according to all opinions (Gemara Shabbos 74b; Rama 317:1). This knot usually remains permanent and thus is certainly a Torah violation according to Rashi. Even according to the Rambam that only a craftsman’s knot incurs a Torah transgression, this is a very tight knot that a craftsman would use for this purpose. (It is interesting to note that some people call this “a stevedore’s knot,” implying that it is a craftsman’s knot.) Thus, tying a knot on a threaded needle to hold it in place is prohibited min haTorah.

For the same reason, making a knot on the end of one’s tzitzis to prevent them from unraveling is prohibited min haTorah. Similarly, it is prohibited min haTorah to tie a balloon on Shabbos. Therefore, some authorities prohibit blowing up a balloon on Shabbos because of the possibility that one may mistakenly tie it.

WHAT IS CONSIDERED A CRAFTSMAN’S KNOT?

The definition of a craftsman’s knot is difficult to ascertain. Obviously it has to be very tight, but are there other requirements? Because of this uncertainty, a custom developed not to tie any knot on Shabbos that involves tying one knot on top of another (Shiltei HaGibborim; Rama 317:1) which is how most knots are tied. Thus, one might assume that Mrs. Goldstein may not tie her tichel with a double knot as Yankie told her.

However, most poskim permit tying the tichel as Mrs. Goldstein has been doing and as her mother did before her. This is because of a combination of several reasons:

Several poskim contend that the custom not to tie a double knot is only when one ties a knot very tightly (L’vushei S’rad and Pri Megadim on Magen Avraham 317:4; also see

Chazon Ish 52:17) whereas a tichel is tied fairly loosely. Other poskim contend that the custom not to tie a double knot is only if one intends to leave it tied for more than a day (Aruch HaShulchan 317:10). Thus there is substantive reason to permit tying a tichel with a double knot (Shmiras Shabbos K’Hilchasah 15:ftn 167).

It should be noted that many poskim permit double knotting a child’s shoes for the same reason since the knot is not very tight. Others prohibit it because the reason for the upper knot is to make the lower knot and bow very tight and that is considered tying a double knot tightly (Shmiras Shabbos K’Hilchasah 15:53).

ANIVAH

The Gemara concludes that it is permitted to tie an “anivah” on Shabbos. What is an anivah?

Any knot that can be untied without undoing the original knot by pulling on one side of the knot is an anivah and is permitted. This includes tying bows (without additional knots, see below) and slipknots (Mordechai, Halachos Ketanos #940). A slipknot is so called because it slips easily along the cord on which it is made.

The poskim dispute whether one may tie a temporary knot and then a bow on Shabbos. Does the bow make the knot more permanent and therefore a problem? Most poskim prohibit tying a bow onto a temporary knot, considering the knot thus created a semi-permanent knot that is prohibited (Rama 317:5; Taz; Magen Avraham ad loc.).

TYING RIBBONS AND BOWS

According to what we have explained, one may not tie a ribbon around a package on Shabbos in the usual fashion because this involves tying a double knot. However, one may tie the ribbon without a knot by making two bows even if one ties the bows very tightly (Mishnah Berurah 317:29; Biyur Halacha 317:5 s.v. anivah).

If someone forgot to tie the aravos and hadasim to the lulav before Yom Tov, one cannot tie with a knot and bow on top of it unless it is a type of knot that one unties every day. One may tie it with a bow on top of a bow (Taz 317:7).

SUMMARY OF KNOTS

We have learned that one may not tie a permanent or semi-permanent knot or a craftsman’s knot, and also that one may not tie one tight knot on top of another. According to many poskim, one may tie a loose knot on top of another loose knot and therefore a woman may tie her tichel with two knots one on top of the other. Tying a bow or slip knot is permitted since the knot is taken apart without undoing it but by pulling it apart. Thus, Mrs. Goldstein may continue to tie her tichel and there are poskim who even permit double knotting baby Rivka’s shoes. (Although others prohibit double knotting shoes.)

PERMANENT BONDING

Tying knots in a permanent way not only affects halacha but also has hashkafic ramifications. When Moshe Rabbeinu asked to understand Hashem’s ways, Hashem told him that as long as he was alive he would only be able to recognize Hashem “from behind.” Chazal explain that Hashem showed Moshe the knot of His tefillin, which represents the permanent attachment that exists between Hashem and the Jewish people.

Just as tefillin are tied with a permanent knot, so too Hashem’s relationship with the Jewish people is a permanent bond. And just as the tefillin straps tie what is below to what is above, so too their knot connects our mundane world below to the Heavenly world above.

Yankie’s older brother, Reuven returns from yeshivah and tells his mom that it is okay to tie the baby’s shoes with a double knot. Mom has never done this, always assuming that one cannot tie a double knot on Shabbos, even though baby Rivka’s shoes almost never stay tied on Shabbos as a result. Of course, Yankie does not miss the opportunity to disagree with Reuven and emphasize that one may not tie the shoes on Shabbos just as one may not tie the tichel.

What’s a mother to do?

She calls the Rav, who begins to explain….

As we see, these and many other shailos in regards to knots affect our weekly observance of Shabbos. We must learn these halachos thoroughly to be certain that we are keeping Shabbos correctly.

Tying and untying knots are two of the 39 melachos prohibited on Shabbos. Several types of knots were tied in the course of constructing the mishkan, which is our source for what is forbidden on Shabbos. For example, it was necessary to tie and untie the nets used to catch the chilazon that provided the techeiles dye. Also, the weavers of the mishkan curtains had to tie knots whenever a thread tore (Gemara Shabbos 74b).

KNOTTING MIN HATORAH

The Mishnah and Gemara teach that some knots are prohibited min haTorah, others are prohibited midirabbanan, while others are completely permitted. They also state that any knot that may not be tied may not be untied either. If tying it involves a Torah prohibition, then untying it is forbidden min haTorah (Mishnah Shabbos 111b). If tying the knot is only midirabbanan, then untying it is midirabbanan. If one is allowed to tie a particular knot, one may also untie it (Rambam Hilchos Shabbos 10:7).

Although several examples of prohibited and permitted knots are mentioned in the Mishnah and Gemara, exactly what defines a “prohibited knot” is never discussed. This issue is left for the Rishonim to discuss, who have two approaches to define the issue, that of Rashi and that of the Rif.

RASHI’S DEFINITION

Rashi and most Rishonim contend that it is prohibited min haTorah to tie a permanent knot, it is prohibited midirabbanan to tie a semi-permanent knot, and that it is permitted to tie a temporary knot.

But where does one splice between a prohibited semi-permanent knot and a temporary knot that is permitted? Although there are different opinions concerning this, everyone agrees that Rashi permits tying any knot that will be untied within 24 hours from when it is tied (Beis Yosef 317). A knot of such short duration is considered temporary and is permitted (Mishnah Berurah 317:6, quoting Pri Megadim).

On the other hand, everyone agrees that Rashi forbids tying a knot that remains for a week or more. This is long enough to be considered semi-permanent and tying it on Shabbos was prohibited by Chazal.

What Poskim dispute is whether Rashi permits tying a knot meant to last more than 24 hours but less than a week, some viewing this knot as semi-permanent and others viewing it as temporary (Rama 317:1). One may follow the lenient opinion under extenuating circumstances (Biyur Halacha 317:4 s.v. she’einam kevuim).

JUMPROPES AND SHOELACES

Thus, according to Rashi, tying two lengths of jump rope together to make a longer jump rope may be prohibited min haTorah since one might leave the knot permanently. Tying a knot attaching a boat to a pier is prohibited midirabbanan since it may be left for a long period of time. It is not prohibited min haTorah since it will definitely be untied eventually (Gemara Shabbos 111b with Rashi). One may tie shoes since they will be untied later the same day. (It should be noted that one may not put a new shoelace into a shoe on Shabbos because it is considered completing a vessel, see Magen Avraham 317:7).

RIF’S DEFINITION

The Rif and Rambam present a different approach why one may tie some knots on Shabbos but not others. In their opinion, a knot that is permanent is prohibited min haTorah only when it is a type of knot that a craftsman would tie, called a “kesher uman.” A permanent knot that would not be used by a craftsman is only midirabbanan. In addition, a knot that a craftsman would tie but is not permanent is also only midirabbanan, whereas a knot that is neither permanent nor used by a craftsman is totally permitted.

In the Rif’s opinion, there is no intermediate category for semi-permanent knots. According to most interpretations, he considers any non-permanent knot as temporary even if it remains tied for a long time. Thus, tying a knot and leaving it for several months will be permitted so long as it is not a craftsman’s knot according to these interpretations of the Rif’s opinion (Pri Megadim; Aruch HaShulchan 317:3; Avnei Nezer #178; Mishnah Berurah 317:5; However, compare Taz 317:1 and Graz 317:2).

Furthermore, according to this approach, tying a craftsman’s knot with intent to untie it after several months will only be midirabbanan according to the Rif because it isn’t permanent.

WHAT NOT TO KNOT

Here are some examples of knots that are prohibited min haTorah. In the time of the Mishnah, boatmen would tie a knot at the prow of a boat or ship that was never removed. Such a knot is prohibited min haTorah on Shabbos. According to Rashi, this is because the knot is permanent while according to the Rif it is only forbidden min HaTorah because of the additional factor that it is tied by trained boatmen.

Similarly, knots tied by shoemakers or sandal makers of Talmudic times were prohibited min haTorah (Gemara Shabbos 112a), since they were tied permanently (and according to the Rif because they were also craftsmans’ knots).

Tying knots of tefillin and tzitzis is a Torah violation since these are craftsman’s knots and permanent (Gemara Eruvin 96b; Shabbos 131a). Tightening the knots of one’s tzitzis may also violate a Torah prohibition.

Suturing stitches is prohibited min HaTorah because the knot tied after each stitch is a permanent skilled knot (Nimla Tal Kosheir #16). Therefore, whenever possible, a non-Jew should perform this suturing on Shabbos (see Rama 328:12).

WHAT KNOT TO KNOT

According to both Rashi and the Rif, one may tie a knot that will be untied within 24 hours. Thus according to all opinions, one may tie a gartel on Shabbos or the belt on a bathrobe or any other garment that is usually untied when the garment is removed. Similarly, a woman may tie her tichel in place because a woman always unties this knot when she removes it so that she does not dishevel her hair.

MAY I KNOT THIS KNOT?

In conclusion, there are three disputes between Rashi and the Rif.

PERMANENT, BUT NOT CRAFTY

1. According to Rashi, a permanent knot is prohibited min HaTorah even if it isn’t a craftman’s knot, since permanence is the only criterion for the Torah’s prohibition. However, the Rif will consider such a knot to be prohibited only midirabbanan if it is not a craftsman’s knot.

We should note that a knot that will never be untied is considered permanent even if one does not need the knot anymore. Rashi explains that the knot used to bind the aravos and hadasim to the lulav is considered permanent since one never bothers to untie it. This is true even though this knot will not be needed for more than a few days and then the lulav will be discarded.

Thus, knotting a bag of garbage on Shabbos violates a Torah prohibition according to Rashi since the knot will never be untied (see Rashi Sukkah 33b), whereas according to the Rif it is only midirabbanan unless one used a craftsman’s knot.

SEMI-PERMANENT, BUT NOT CRAFTY

2. We mentioned that tying a semi-permanent non-craftsman’s knot is prohibited according to Rashi, but permitted according to the Rif. Therefore, Rashi would prohibit tying a plastic bag with a simple single knot that is meant to last for more than a week (and possibly even for more than a day) since this knot is semi-permanent although it is certainly not a craftsman’s knot. The Rif would permit this since it is neither a craftsman’s knot nor a permanent knot.

However, we should note that the exact definition of a “craftsman’s knot" is uncertain. Because of this question, some poskim rule that one should not tie any knot very tightly even though one intends to untie it shortly (Shiltei HaGibborim).

CRAFTY AND TEMPORARY

3. A temporary craftsman’s knot is prohibited according to the Rif, albeit only midirabbanan, but is permitted according to Rashi (who considers a craftsman’s knot no different from any other knot). Thus, securing a rope in order to rappel down a hill is prohibited midirabbanan according to the Rif since one would certainly use a craftsman’s knot for this purpose. Rashi permits tying this knot if one intends to untie it after a few hours.

HOW TO WE PASKIN?

Most poskim rule that we should be stringent like both opinions (Rama 317:1). Therefore, one may not tie a craftsman’s knot even if it is temporary (even though Rashi permits this), and it is also prohibited to tie a semi-permanent knot even if it is not a craftsman’s knot (and would be permitted according to the Rif). Therefore, one may not knot a bag closed with a semi-permanent knot, nor may one tie a craftsman’s knot even for a few hours’ use.

Under extenuating circumstances, one may tie or untie a temporary knot even though it qualifies as a craftsman’s knot and rely on Rashi, or tie a non-permanent knot that is not a craftsman’s knot and rely on the Rif (Maamar Mordechai; see Avnei Nezer #178:6). In both of these situations the dispute is only whether tying the knot involves an issur dirabbanan. Although we usually rule stringently, as explained above, in an extenuating situation one may rely on the lenient opinion.

INTERIM SUMMARY OF KNOTS

We have learned that one may not tie a permanent or semi-permanent knot or a craftsman’s knot, and also that one may not tie one tight knot on top of another.

PERMANENT BONDING

Tying knots in a permanent way not only affects halacha but also has hashkafic ramifications. When Moshe Rabbeinu asked to understand Hashem’s ways, Hashem told him that as long as he was alive he would only be able to recognize Hashem “from behind.” Chazal explain that Hashem showed Moshe the knot of His tefillin, which represents the permanent attachment that exists between Hashem and the Jewish people.

Just as tefillin are tied with a permanent knot, so too Hashem’s relationship with the Jewish people is a permanent bond. And just as the tefillin straps tie what is below to what is above, so too their knot connects our mundane world below to the Heavenly world above.

Question #1: A CANDID QUESTION!

Chayim calls me on the phone:

“Prior to our marriage, I was taught that one may open cans on Shabbos, provided one does not reuse the can, whereas my wife was taught that this is strictly forbidden. Since I was taught by someone very knowledgeable and observant, there is something inconsistent here that I would like to understand.”

Question #2: DON’T PULL THE RING!

“I was eating at someone’s house for Shabbos where they served soda in cans and opened them. I thought that this desecrates Shabbos, and was uncertain whether I could trust their kashrus. Could I?”

Answer:

Analyzing the laws of Shabbos properly is a very enriching experience. In this article, I will touch on some aspects of the following melachos germane to the issues involved:

(1) Boneh, Construction

(2) Soseir, Destruction

(3) Makeh Bepatish, literally, striking with a hammer

You just Ruined my Shabbos!

We also need to explain an important principle of the Shabbos laws called mekalkeil – literally, ruining. In general, a melachah activity is prohibited min haTorah only when the direct results are beneficial. An act whose direct result is destructive is not prohibited min haTorah but only miderabbanan. For example, digging a hole in the ground when one needs the earth but is not interested in the hole is a destructive activity and therefore prohibited only miderabbanan. Notwithstanding the need to acquire dirt, the dug hole that results is not a positive development but a negative one. This renders the burrowing mekalkeil and relegates it to a rabbinically prohibited activity. However, digging a hole to plant or to create a posthole is a positive benefit and therefore prohibited min haTorah.

In a similar vein, smashing a barrel to obtain its contents is prohibited only miderabbanan notwithstanding the need to obtain the food inside, since the smashed barrel is a negative result.

Boneh

The Torah violation of Boneh includes performing any type of home repair or enhancement, even only a minor repair (Shabbos 102b). Thus, it is prohibited min haTorah to hammer a nail into a wall in order to hang a picture (Rashi, Eruvin 102a s.v. Halachah). Similarly, one may not smooth the dirt floor of a house because this enhances the “structure” (Shabbos 73b).

Constructing Movable Items

Does the melachah of Boneh apply only to items connected to the ground or does it also apply to the construction of implements and other movable items?

My desktop dictionary defines “construct” as “to build or form by putting together parts.” Clearly, in English “construct” includes manufacturing implements just as it includes building on the ground. Do the laws of Shabbos similarly recognize that assembling implements violates this melachah?

The Gemara (Beitzah 10a) cites a debate regarding this question. In halachic conclusion, we find the following basic approaches:

(1) The melachah of Boneh includes only building on the ground and does not include movable items (Rashi, Shabbos 47a s.v. Chayov; Beitzah 11b s.v. De’ein).

(2) Major construction of small movable items is prohibited min haTorah, but minor improvement is not (Tosafos, Shabbos 74b and 102b). What is considered “major construction”? Assembling it in a way that involves strength and skill constitutes Boneh. Therefore, manufacturing implements is prohibited min haTorah since this involves both strength and skill to do the job properly, whereas making a minor repair to an implement is not included under Boneh.

Large = Connected

According to many authorities, there is another factor to consider: the size of the movable item (Rashi, Eruvin 35a s.v. Umasnisin). In their opinion, one may not perform even a minor repair or enhancement to a utensil so large that one does not usually move it when it is full to capacity. Thus, even a small repair to a refrigerator or a bookcase is prohibited min haTorah according to this opinion, since an item this large is halachically equivalent to something attached to the ground. For the balance of this article, I will refer to this sort of an appliance as a large utensil and to other items as a small utensil or implement.

Soseir

Soseir, demolishing or razing is also one of the 39 melachos, since the Jewish people disassembled the Mishkan whenever they moved it from place to place (Shabbos 31b).

Thus, removing something from a structure, such as removing a nail from a wall, or lifting a window or door off its hinges, is prohibited on Shabbos.

Destructive is Constructive?

Many acts of Soseir ruin something, and according to the rule of mekalkeil mentioned above, are prohibited only miderabbanan. Of course, this leads us to ask:

How can Soseir be prohibited min haTorah as one of the 39 melachos; is not demolishing always a destructive act? The answer is that Soseir is prohibited min haTorah when the destruction is constructive, despite the apparent contradiction in terms. The disassembly of the Mishkan was an act of demolition, yet it was constructive, since Hashem wanted the Mishkan (and the Jewish people) to move to a new location. Similarly, demolition of a building is prohibited min haTorah if the ultimate results are beneficial, such as razing part of a building in order to renovate it, or razing a building in order to build anew on the site. In such cases, the demolition provides an immediate benefit, since it clears the site for the new construction.

In cases where there are no immediate benefits to the demolition, it is still prohibited miderabbanan. Thus, wrecking a house to save someone trapped inside does not involve a Torah prohibition of Soseir since the act is itself destructive. (The activity is, of course, permitted in any case because of the life-threatening situation involved.)

The authorities dispute whether someone who destroys something out of anger violates Shabbos min haTorah or only miderabbanan. According to most Rishonim, this incurs only a rabbinic desecration of Shabbos since there is no positive benefit from the destruction (Pri Megadim 314:11 in Eishel Avraham). Of course, this act is prohibited for a variety of reasons, including bal tashchis (unnecessary destruction) and damaging one’s character development (Shabbos 105b). There is a minority opinion of the Rambam, who holds that wrecking something because you are angry incurs a Shabbos violation min haTorah. He rules that performing an act that makes its perpetrator feel better incurs a Torah violation and is not considered mekalkeil, notwithstanding that the act is extremely damaging both to the object of his wrath and to himself.

Does Soseir apply to Portable Implements?

Having established that Soseir is prohibited min haTorah only when it creates a direct positive result, we now want to understand whether destroying a vessel is included altogether under the melachah of Soseir. Note that I earlier discussed whether the melachah of Boneh applies only to items connected to the ground or whether it also applies to the construction of movable items. I noted that the Gemara debates this issue and that the Rishonim provide the following conclusions:

1. Some contend that the melachah of Boneh includes only building on the ground.

2. Others contend that major construction of small movable items is prohibited min haTorah, but a minor improvement is not.

3. Many authorities contend that this previous dispute refers only to small, easy to move implements, but that a large implement is definitely included min haTorah within the melachah of Boneh even to perform a minor repair or enhancement.

May I Destroy Movable Things?

How does this dispute affect the melachah of Soseir?

Soseir is the opposite of Boneh, meaning that if constructing an item constitutes Boneh, destroying it is Soseir. As a result, Soseir applies when one destroys an item whose construction would involve Boneh.

Makeh Bepatish

Before we analyze the Gemara texts that impact on our original questions, we still need to discuss one other prohibition: The melachah of Makeh Bepatish, which includes a general prohibition of completing items, such as smoothing a surface to finish an item. One aspect of this melachah is that it prohibits making a nice opening in a vessel, such as boring an outlet hole in a storage drum (Shabbos 146a; Rambam, Hilchos Shabbos 10:16). The Gemara teaches that it is prohibited min haTorah to make an opening that is to be used in both directions, whereas making an opening to be used only in one direction is prohibited miderabbanan. As an example of the first type of opening, the Gemara mentions an opening made in a chicken coop, which allows ventilation of its fumes and also allows light and\or air into the coop. Boring an outlet hole in a storage drum, the case I just mentioned above, is a classic example of something prohibited only miderabbanan, since the opening is intended only to remove the product but not to return it to the vessel. However, creating a new opening that is meant both to remove and return product incurs a Torah prohibition.

The Can Opener

With the principles we have learned, we can now examine the Talmudic sources that directly affect our original questions: May one open a can or other package on Shabbos to obtain its contents?

The Mishnah (Shabbos 146a) permits smashing open a barrel of figs on Shabbos to reach the food inside, provided one does not try to make a proper opening. As I noted earlier, attempting to make a proper opening certainly desecrates Shabbos. The question is whether one can simply break the barrel to reach its figs without attempting to make a nice opening. This Mishnah states that this is permitted.

However, in another discussion (Eruvin 34b) the Gemara rules that one cannot break open a container to obtain the food inside. How do we resolve this discrepancy between the two passages?

There are two major approaches to answer this question. Tosafos explains that the Mishnah that permits smashing to obtain food is not referring to a proper vessel. Since manufacturing a proper vessel, even a small one, is prohibited min haTorah, smashing it remains prohibited even when one is smashing the vessel to obtain food. Although I explained above that this act is mekalkeil and therefore not prohibited min haTorah, it is still prohibited miderabbanan. So how can the Mishnah permit smashing a barrel to obtain its contents?

Mustakis and Figs

Tosafos explains that the Mishnah is not referring to a regular barrel but one that was previously smashed and then feebly repaired by use of resin as glue. Reconstructing this type of container, known in Aramaic as a mustaki, would not violate a Torah violation of Boneh since it is not considered a proper vessel. As a result, smashing this barrel does not really violate Soseir and therefore one may do so in order to obtain the figs. However, the Gemara in Eruvin is dealing with a regular vessel and therefore forbids smashing the vessel to obtain the food inside. This approach of Tosafos is followed by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 314:1), who concludes that one may smash open a mustaki to obtain food on Shabbos, but not a proper vessel.

Other authorities made a different differentiation between the two cases and reach a different halachic conclusion. In their opinion, the Mishnah in Shabbos is describing a small vessel (as defined above) and the Gemara in Eruvin a large one. They conclude that in order to enhance the pleasures of Shabbos, Chazal permitted smashing a small vessel to obtain food, but they prohibited smashing a large vessel. According to this approach, one may smash open any “small” container on Shabbos in order to obtain its contents.

How do we Rule?

The Mishnah Berurah concludes that it is prohibited to smash open even a small vessel to obtain food on Shabbos, following the conclusion of the Shulchan Aruch (Biyur Halachah 314:1). However, other authorities rule that one should not admonish those who smash vessels to obtain their contents since this common practice is based on a bona fide opinion (Aruch Hashulchan 314:8). All agree that one may not open the container in a way that creates a nice opening.

However, this approach does not satisfactorily explain those who permit opening cans on Shabbos, since neither of these opinions permits being mekalkeil to obtain food on Shabbos. They only dispute whether one should correct those who do smash small vessels. Is there any basis for those who allow the opening of cans on Shabbos?

Enter Chosalos

There is another basis to permit opening packaging on Shabbos. The Gemara mentions a halachah of chosalos, which are a type of basket made of palm branches (also known as lulavim) in which one places unripe dates to ripen or where one stores dried figs. The Gemara rules that one may rip these chosalos open on Shabbos. The question is why this is not considered destroying a vessel, which we concluded before is prohibited at least lechatchilah.

The Kolbo explains that chosalos are considered an artificial peel or shell around the dates or figs. The rationale is that the chosal is tafeil, secondary, to the food it contains and therefore it is not considered to be a vessel. Just as one may remove the natural peel or shell of a fruit on Shabbos and it is certainly not making or destroying a vessel, so one may remove an artificial “peel” or “shell” on Shabbos. Thus, anything included under the heading of chosalos may be opened on Shabbos. Can our contemporary packaging be compared to the law of chosalos? To answer this we need to ask another question: What is included in the definition of chosalos?

The Magen Avraham states that the permission to open chosalos does not permit the breaking of a regular vessel. Of course, we still have no clear definition of what defines a regular vessel and what defines chosalos.

Opening Cans

In a lengthy teshuvah on the subject, Rav Moshe Feinstein defines a chosal as any item that is not reused for any other product; everyone disposes of the chosal once its product is used up. A “regular” vessel is one that people reuse for another product. According to this definition of a chosal, even a tin can is a chosal if everyone disposes of the can after one finishing the original contents, and certainly if everyone disposes of the can immediately after opening it. Following this analysis, opening cans on Shabbos does not violate the melachos of Shabbos, since tin cans are not reused. (In Rav Moshe’s teshuvah on the subject, he implies that this halachah is true even if one returns the original product to the chosal.) Rav Moshe himself concludes at the end of his teshuvah that one should open these packages before Shabbos, explaining that people might misunderstand the laws and mistakenly open packaging that is prohibited. However, in the case of someone who made a sheva berachos or who invited guests and finds, to his embarrassment, that he does not have enough food to serve, he permits having a gentile open the cans and other containers on Shabbos (Shu”t Igros Moshe 1:122; for a similar approach, see Shu”t Chelkas Yaakov 3:8).

On the other hand, other authorities contend that any strong vessel is not considered a chosal.

We must note, that in another responsum, Rav Moshe rules that one may not open a milk or juice carton on Shabbos since this creates a spout (Shu’t Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 4:78). Why is this not similar to opening a chosal, which Rav Moshe permits? It seems that although he permits opening a chosal on Shabbos, he does not permit opening it in a way that forms a nice opening. (By the way, we should note that according to what I have just explained, Rav Moshe would prohibit opening cans with pull up rings, which are now very common, since pulling the lid off now forms a nice opening.)

On the other hand…

However, the approach of other poskim to opening cans is totally different than Rav Moshe’s opinion. The Chazon Ish, for example, contends that opening a can is not considered smashing a vessel, but creating a vessel, and therefore violates a Torah prohibition of creating vessels (Orach Chayim 51:13).

Soda Cans

Rav Shelomoh Zalman Auerbach permits opening soda cans on Shabbos, applying the same basic logic as Rav Moshe (Shulchan Shelomoh 314:7:4). He makes no mention of the concerns voiced in Rav Moshe’s closing paragraphs (that people might err and exceed the perimeters of his leniency) and therefore concludes that even Jews may open them on Shabbos.

On the other hand, the Chazon Ish contends that opening any cans violates the Torah prohibition of making an opening. He explains two different reasons why opening cans is prohibited min haTorah:

1. The opening is meant to be used both ways: it allows air inside the can to break the vacuum and it allows the product out.

2. Opening a can is like creating a new vessel, since the closed can is useless, and opening it creates a serviceable vessel. Although he acknowledges that few people reuse cans, they can be reused, particularly by resourceful people (Orach Chayim 51:11).

Rav Shelomoh Zalman disputes the rationale that a soda can opening is considered “two-way”, since the entire purpose of allowing the air in is to enable the product to exit. He also does not consider the resultant opening a “nice opening” since it is simply a means of removing the product from the container.

In conclusion, the intent of this article is not to provide a definitive pesak regarding these issues – every person should ask their posek. Our goal is to give people a better understanding of the issues involved and an appreciation oftheir rav’s ruling, whatever it may be.

Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch (Shemos 20:10) notes that people mistakenly think that work is prohibited on Shabbos in order to provide a day of rest. This is incorrect, he points out, because the Torah does not prohibit doing avodah, which connotes hard work, but melachah, which implies purpose and accomplishment. On Shabbos, we refrain from constructing and altering the world for our own purposes. The goal of Shabbos is to emphasize Hashem’s rule as the focus of creation by refraining from our own creative acts (Shemos 20:11). By refraining from building for one day a week, we acknowledge the true Builder of the world and all that it contains.

Please note that this rule applies equally on weekdays! If someone is uncertain whether a particular situation is life threatening or not, he/she must immediately seek proper medical attention. Delaying might be bloodshed!

This is the basic reason for the creation of Hatzalah; experience has proven that those motivated to save lives because of their devotion to mitzvos act much swifter and more devotedly than official emergency squads. Those curious to research Rav Moshe Feinstein’s instructions to Hatzalah will enjoy reading Shu”t Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 4:80 and 5:25.

THE HATZALAH RADIO ON SHABBOS

As mentioned above, in every situation of pikuach nefesh one is required to act as swiftly as possible to save lives. Therefore someone responding to a call that might involve a life threatening situation must bring along his radio in case he needs to summon an ambulance or other assistance. The question that we are discussing here is whether one may carry or wear a Hatzalah radio when no emergency exists in order to be available should the need arise. This involves shaylos of muktzah and carrying on Shabbos.

IS A RADIO MUKTZAH? MAY ONE CARRY IT ON SHABBOS?

Of course, everyone’s immediate reaction is, “Of course, a radio is muktzah and may not be moved on Shabbos.” However, although it is definitely true that one may not move a radio on Shabbos for no purpose; carrying a Hatzalah radio may be permitted on Shabbos as I will explain. To understand this question, we first need an introduction to the basic laws of muktzah.

THE ORIGINS OF MUKTZAH

In the period of the construction of the second Beis HaMikdash, Nechemiah noticed that many Jews were extremely lax in Shabbos observance. In his own words, “In those days, I saw people in Judea operating their winepresses on Shabbos and loading their harvest on donkeys; and also their wine, grapes, and figs and all other burdens; and transporting them to Yerushalayim on Shabbos… the Tyrians would bring fish and other merchandize and sell them to the Jews” (Nechemiah 13:15-16). Nechemiah then describes how he succeeded in closing the city gates the entire Shabbos in order to keep the markets closed.

To strengthen Shabbos observance, Nechemiah established very strict rules concerning which utensils one may move on Shabbos. These rules form the foundation of the halachos of muktzah (Gemara Shabbos 123b). Initially, he prohibited using and moving virtually all utensils, excluding basic eating appliances such as table knives. We will call this Nechemiah’s “Original Takanah.” By prohibiting the moving of items even indoors he reinforced the strictness of not carrying outdoors on Shabbos (Gemara Shabbos 124b; Raavad, Hilchos Shabbos 24:13). Furthermore, the laws of muktzah shield people from mistakenly performing forbidden activities with these tools. In addition, these laws create a Shabbos atmosphere that is qualitatively different from the rest of the week even for an individual whose daily life includes no manual activity (Rambam, Hilchos Shabbos 24:12-13).

As the Jews upgraded their Shabbos observance, Nechemiah gradually relaxed the rules of muktzah, permitting limited use of some tools on Shabbos. These were Nechemiah’s Second Takanah, Third Takanah, and Fourth Takanah, the details of which the Gemara discusses (Shabbos 123b). Eventually, Nechemiah established rules whereby one may move and use most utensils on Shabbos when necessary, whereas objects that one would never utilize on Shabbos remained prohibited (except for unusual circumstances such as danger). When discussing the halachos of muktzah as they apply today, I will refer to Nechemiah’s “Final Takanah.”

THE CATEGORIES OF MUKTZAH

Nechemiah’s Final Takanah established four distinct categories:

1. Non-muktzah: Items that one may move without any reason whatsoever. This category includes food, sifrei kodesh and, according to many authorities, tableware (Mishna Berurah 308:23) and clothing (see Shitah La’Ran, Shabbos 123b s.v. Barishonah). Nechemiah never included these items even in his original, very strict Takanah, because they are in constant use.

2. Kli she’me’lachto l’heter is a utensil whose primary use is permitted on Shabbos, such as a chair or pillow. One may move this utensil if one needs to use it, if it may become damaged, or if it is in the way. (The Gemara calls this last case l’tzorech m’komo, literally, to use its place.) I may not move a kli she’me’lachto l’heter without any reason or even to help me perform a task I could perform without any tool (Gemara Shabbos 124a; Shaar HaTziyun 308:13). (I find that people are often surprised to discover this halacha.)

3. Kli she’me’lachto l’issur is a tool whose primary use is forbidden on Shabbos, such as a hammer, saw, or needle. One may move these items only if they are in the way or if one has a Shabbos-appropriate purpose for them, such as using a hammer to crack open a coconut or a needle to remove a splinter (Mishnah Shabbos 122b and Gemara Shabbos 124a). (However, one should be careful not to intentionally cause bleeding [Magen Avraham 328:32; see also Biur Halacha 308:11] and one may not sterilize the needle first [see Rambam, Hilchos Shabbos 12:1].) One may remove a kli she’me’lachto l’issur that was left on a table, counter, or chair, if one needs to put something else there. However, under normal circumstances, one may not move a kli she’me’lachto l’issur if one is concerned that it may become damaged where it was left. Nevertheless, if one knows that he will need to use a kli she’me’lachto l’issur later that day and is afraid that it will be stolen, broken or ruined and unusable by then, he may save it (Tehillah LeDavid 308:5). This is because making sure that it is available for later use is considered using it.

4. Completely Muktzah. These are items that one may not move at all under normal circumstances. For our purposes, we will subdivide this category into two general sub-categories:

4A: Items that do not qualify as utensils or food at all, such as money, living animals, sticks and stones.

4B: Utensils that one has no reason to move on Shabbos, such as merchandize that one intends to sell.

4C: A possible third category:

According to many authorities, another category of muktzah utensils includes utensils whose use is only for prohibited purposes on Shabbos. In other words, one may move a kli she’me’lachto l’issur only when this specific utensil has an occasional use that is permitted on Shabbos, such as a hammer, which someone might use to open a coconut, or a pot, which although primarily used to cook food, is also used to store food after it is cooked. However, some poskim prohibit moving a candle on Shabbos, although it is halachically considered a “utensil,” since it is not suitable for any permitted use on Shabbos at all. These poskim contend that this type of utensil is considered muktzah and may not be moved even if it is in the way (see Pri Megadim, Aishel Avraham 279:12; Aruch Hashulchan 279:1; based on Tosafos, Shabbos 36a s.v. Ha Rabbi Yehudah and Baal HaMaor, Shabbos 154b). However, other poskim consider a candle and any other utensil to not always be muktzah, contending it may be moved if it is in the way or it has a Shabbos purpose (Magen Avraham 308:18; based on Rashba, Shabbos 154b).

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN KLI SHE’ME’LACHTO L’HETER AND SHE’ME’LACHTO L’ISSUR

After Nechemiah’s later takanos, both kli she’me’lachto l’heter and kli she’me’lachto l’issur have an interesting status: sometimes they are muktzah and sometimes not, depending on why one wants to move them. Both a kli she’me’lachto l’issur and a kli she’me’lachto l’heter may be moved if one needs the use of the appliance.

There are several halachic differences between a kli she’me’lachto l’issur and a kli she’me’lachto l’heter, most of which are not germane to our discussion about Hatzalah radios. However, there is one halachic distinction that is germane, as we will see: One may carry a kli she’me’lachto l’heter early in the day even though he does not anticipate needing it until much later that day (Taz 308:2). This is considered as using the kli. On the other hand, a kli she’me’lachto l’issur may only be picked up when one actually needs to use it (with the exception of when one is concerned that it may be broken or stolen as I mentioned earlier).

WHAT IS A RADIO?

Having explained the different categories of muktzah, under which category does a Hatzalah radio fit?

Clearly it does not fit into the first category of items that are excluded from the laws of muktzah and may be moved without any reason.

One could conceivably categorize a Hatzalah radio under the category of items that have no purpose on Shabbos since a radio under normal non-pikuach nefesh circumstances is not used on Shabbos. One who holds this way would still permit carrying the radio when there is an emergency; the shaylah is only whether one may carry the radio when there is no emergency.

It is far more likely that we should consider a Hatzalah radio either kli she’me’lachto l’issur because its typical use is prohibited on Shabbos or as a kli she’me’lachto l’heter because realistically one may need it on Shabbos. (One might categorize a Hatzalah radio as similar to a bris milah knife, which is usually considered muktzah, yet many poskim rule that it is not muktzah if the mohel has a bris to perform on Shabbos.) I want to point out that according to both of these approaches, one may carry the Hatzalah radio when one may need to use it, and one may move it if it may become stolen or broken and he may need it later today.

Also, as all Hatzalah volunteers know, one may only use the radio on Shabbos when a potential pikuach nefesh emergency exists and only to the extent necessary for the emergency.

ANTICIPATING EMERGENCIES

Until this point I have been discussing to what extent the Hatzalah radio is muktzah. We have not yet discussed whether wearing the radio is considered carrying and therefore forbidden outside an eruv when no emergency exists. In a future article I hope to address the question of whether one may supersede violations of the Torah because of the possibility that a pikuach nefesh situation may develop. For now, we will simply analyze whether one may wear a Hatzalah radio in a place that is not enclosed by an eruv.

CARRYING THE RADIO ON SHABBOS WHERE THERE IS NO ERUV

The Mishnah (Shabbos 63a) records a dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Chachamim whether one may carry weapons on Shabbos when there is no pikuach nefesh to carry them. Rabbi Eliezer rules that a man may carry a weapon outside an eruv on Shabbos because he considers it a tachshit, decorative attire. Although weapons are not inherently nice looking, since men wear weapons as a sign of importance they are considered tachshitin. The Chachamim disagree, noting that in the days of Moshiach men will no longer ornament themselves with weapons; therefore, they are not inherently tachshitin (Gemara Shabbos 63a). The Chachamim rally support to their approach from a famous pasuk, “And they shall pound their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruning hooks (Yeshaya 2:4),” demonstrating that in the times of Moshiach weapons will be meaningless. If weapons were indeed tachshitin, men in the Moshiach era would not destroy them.

In a teshuvah addressed to Hatzalah, Rav Moshe Feinstein (Shu”t Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim 4:81), permits Hatzalah members to wear radios on Shabbos clipped to their belts. Rav Moshe contends that one sees from the above-quoted Gemara that an item might be a tachshit even though it is not a garment and has no real aesthetic function, but is worn to show prominence. Although the Chachamim disagreed with Rabbi Eliezer’s ruling that a weapon is a tachshit, this is because they proved from the pasuk that weapons do not show inherent importance since they will have no value after Moshiach. However, a different item that shows importance, or is an identification of one’s profession, is considered a tachshit and may be carried on Shabbos, even according to the Chachamim. Rav Moshe contends that the Hatzalah radio shows that the wearer is involved in this important mitzvah of saving lives and is a badge of honor; it therefore qualifies as a tachshit. Similarly, according to Rav Moshe, a physician or medical student may walk the streets with a stethoscope draped around his or her neck since it is a sign of that he/she is qualified to practice a well-respected profession.

Others disagree with Rav Moshe’s comparing the Hatzalah radio to a weapon, contending that a weapon is indeed sometimes worn as a tachshit, as in the wearing of a military dress uniform in which a sword is part of the attire. However, Hatzalah volunteers do not wear the radio as an ornament (Rav Shimon Schwab).

Some rabbonim suggested a different approach to transport the Hatzalah radio, by making it part of one’s functional garment. To fulfill this approach, a Shabbos belt was designed in which the radio actually held the belt together. When removed the belt would fall off; thus, these rabbonim hold that this is a permitted method of carrying the Hatzalah radio (Nishmas Avraham, 5:175).

Others feel that since the radio is not really usually part of the belt, but is a separate valuable piece of equipment, including it in a belt as described above does not make it part of the belt (Rav Yehoshua Neuwirth; see Shemiras Shabbos KeHilchasah 18:33). They would require a different means of transporting a radio on Shabbos, although they may agree to Rav Moshe’s psak that it may be clipped in the normal fashion to one’s belt.

Thus, the result is that one chapter of Hatzalah allows, or even insists, that its members wear radios clipped in the usual fashion on Shabbos, whereas others may insist that their members wear their radios in a “Shabbos belt.” All rabbonim and chapters agree that when following up an emergency the Hatzalah volunteer may carry his radio and must do so if it is necessary for the emergency.

Certainly each Hatzalah chapter should follow the instructions of its local rabbonim. As I mentioned earlier, the critical point to remember when faced with a Shabbos emergency that is beyond one’s expertise is to act first and ask questions later, and follow the instructions of those who are more medically knowledgeable.

The author thanks his brother, Rav Yehoshua Kaganoff of Passaic, NJ, as the source for many of the halachic opinions quoted in this article.

“Rabbi,” he begins, “I have heard that it is best to use red, non-pasteurized wine at the seder. However, my father-in-law likes Chablis, which is a white wine, and my mother-in-law never drinks any wine. The grape juice she likes is from concentrate, and someone told me that one cannot use it for kiddush. What should I do?”

Knowing that Yankel likes very complete explanations, I prepared myself for a lengthy conversation.

“Let us divide your shaylah into its four constituent parts: Color, cooked (mevushal), alcohol, and concentrate. We’ll discuss each part of the shaylah separately and then we’ll see what is preferable to use.”

RED OR WHITE

The Gemara (Bava Basra 97b) quotes the following discussion: Rav Kahana asked Rava “May one use chamar chivaryin, white wine.” Rava answered him by quoting a pasuk in Mishlei (23:31), “Do not pay attention to how red your wine becomes,” (meaning focus your life on permanent, spiritual values and not on the transient and physical). The pasuk implies that the redder the wine, the better its quality.

This Gemara, which is discussing the requirements of wine for kiddush and other mitzvos, implies that one may not use white wine for kiddush, and indeed this is the way the Ramban rules (ad loc.). However, Rashbam concludes that the Gemara is discussing only whether white wine is kosher for nisuch (libation) on the mizbeiach, but it may be used for kiddush. Others reach the same conclusion that our white wine is acceptable for kiddush, but for a different reason. They contend that the Gemara is not discussing quality white wine, but inferior wine that has no color at all (Tosafos). (White wine is always light-colored or yellowish.) According to this opinion, quality white wine is acceptable even for the mizbeiach.

The halacha is that one should preferably use a red wine unless the white wine is better quality (Rama 472:11; Mishnah Berurah 272:10). At the seder, there is an additional reason to use red wine, because it reminds us of Pharaoh’s slaughter of Bnei Yisroel (Mishnah Berurah 472:38). Therefore, if one chooses to use white wine, some suggest mixing red wine into the white wine to give it a little red color (Piskei Tshuvos 472:10). When mixing the wine, it is preferred to pour the red wine into the cup first and then add the white. If one adds red wine to white wine he will color the white wine, which is prohibited on Shabbos and Yom Tov according to some poskim because of the melacha of tzove’a, dyeing or coloring (see Mishnah Berurah 320:56).

MEVUSHAL (Cooked)

Cooking wine harms it, and cooking grape juice affects its ability to ferment naturally. Indeed, some winemakers never pasteurize the juice from which they produce their wines because heating compromises the taste. For these reasons, halacha views wine that is mevushal as inferior, and this has several ramifications. The prohibition not to use wine touched by a gentile, stam yeinam, does not exist if the wine was mevushal before the gentile handled it (Gemara Avodah Zarah 30a). This is because no self-respecting idolater would consecrate cooked wine to his deity (Rambam, Hilchos Maachalei Asuros 11:9; cf. Rosh, Avodah Zarah 2:12 who explains the halacha somewhat differently).

Similarly, one may not pour cooked wine as a libation for a korban. Some poskim contend that mevushal wine is so inferior that one does not recite hagafen on it but shehakol, and that it is invalid for kiddush and arba kosos (see Tosafos Bava Basra 97a s.v. ileima; Tur Orach Chayim, Chapter 272). Although we recite hagafen on mevushal wine and rule that it is kosher for kiddush and arba kosos (Shulchan Aruch 472:12), one should try to use uncooked wine unless the mevushal wine is superior (Rama 272:8; Mishnah Berurah 472:39).

There is one situation where one must use mevushal wine, and that is when gentiles might handle open bottles of wine. This is why most hechsherim insist that all wine served in restaurants and at catered events be mevushal.

Incidentally, almost all bottlers in North America pasteurize their juice before bottling. Commercial pasteurization of juice products is usually at about 180° Fahrenheit.

BUT I HEARD THAT PASTEURIZATION DOES NOT NECESSARILY EQUAL BISHUL?

The early poskim state that heating wine until it begins to evaporate makes it mevushal (Shach, Yoreh Deah 123:7, quoting Rashba and Ran). How hot is this temperature? Rav Moshe Feinstein ruled that 175° Fahrenheit is definitely hot enough to be considered mevushal (Igros Moshe, Yoreh Deah 2:52; see also 3:31), although some poskim contend that wine must be heated to a much higher temperature (see Darchei Teshuvah, Yoreh Deah 123:15; Minchas Shlomo 1:25). Because of this dispute, some hechsherim rule that only wine and grape juice that is heated until boiling is considered mevushal, whereas others consider all commercially available grape juice as mevushal.

However, some poskim contend that the laws of mevushal wine do not apply to contemporary pasteurized juice since the processing is made in a way that the wine does not taste inferior (Shu”t Minchas Shlomoh 1:25). Thus, one could use wine made from pasteurized juice or pasteurized juice without any concern, but one should not use wine that was cooked after fermentation which definitely tastes inferior. According to this opinion, a gentile touching pasteurized wine or grape juice will make it prohibited.

At this point in my monologue, Yankel interjected a question:

“I am not sure if I understood you correctly. If grape juice is usually pasteurized, then according to Rav Moshe’s psak, it is all mevushal. And, since one should preferably not use mevushal wine, one should not use grape juice for kiddush or arba kosos?”

“That is correct,” I responded. “Actually, there is also another reason why it is preferable to use wine for arba kosos.”

WINE VS. GRAPE JUICE

One may use freshly pressed grape juice for kiddush, even though it contains no alcohol (Gemara Bava Basra 97b). However, one should preferably not use grape juice for the seder as I will explain.

In the time of the Gemara, wine was so strong that people diluted it with three parts water (per one part wine) before using it for kiddush and other mitzvos. The Gemara teaches that someone who drank the wine without dilution fulfills the mitzvah of drinking four cups of wine, but does not fulfill the mitzvah of cheirus, freedom (Pesachim 108b). This is because the complete mitzvah of arba kosos requires drinking wine with a pleasurable amount of alcohol. This undiluted wine is too strong and not pleasurable. We derive from this Gemara that wine is better for the seder than grape juice, because the alcoholic content of the wine provides the element of cheirus.

However, someone who cannot drink wine may fulfill the mitzvah of arba kosos with grape juice.

Yankel interjected another question. “My mother-in-law never drinks wine the rest of the year. If I tell her that she should drink wine, she will do it because of the mitzvah. How much wine must she drink?”

“She can use a small cup that holds exactly a revi’is of wine with very low alcohol content or even mix wine and grape juice in the cup so that one can barely notice the alcohol and she will fulfill this mitzvah,” I replied. “The poskim dispute how much is a revi’is, with different opinions ranging from three ounces to five ounces. This the minimum amount of wine for each of the four cups. She is required to drink only a little more than half the cup, although it is better if she drinks the entire cup. She should drink the entire last cup in order to recite the bracha acharonah.”

RECONSTITUTED GRAPE JUICE

Reconstituting grape juice involves evaporating at least 80% of the water that is naturally part of the juice, and then later adding water back. (Juice is concentrated and then reconstituted because it saves tremendous amounts of shipping and storage costs, and because the concentrate has a longer shelf life.) It is important to note that the concentrate is not drinkable before adding water.

Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach has a lengthy tshuvah whether reconstituted grape juice may be used for kiddush and whether its correct bracha is shehakol or hagafen. The basis of his discussion follows:

The correct bracha on all beverages except wine is shehakol. Wine merits a unique bracha because it is special in that it “makes man and Hashem happy” (see Mishnah and Gemara Berachos 35a). Men appreciate the intoxicating properties of wine, and in addition, it is the only liquid that the Torah commands us to pour on the mizbeiach every day. (Water, the only other liquid ever poured on the mizbeiach, is only poured on the mizbeiach during Sukkos.)

Grape juice does not have all of these qualities since it does not contain any alcohol. However, since it can potentially become wine, it merits the special bracha of hagafen and may be used for kiddush.

Rav Shlomo Zalman posed the following question: Do we consider natural grape juice as a mixture of the tasty part of the grape and plain water, or do we make no distinctions and consider grape juice as a mixture of everything inside the grape?

Obviously, everyone will conclude that grape juice is what grows inside the grape. Although natural juice is over ninety percent water, the water that grows inside the grape is considered grape juice, not water. However, water added to concentrate does not metamorphose into juice but remains water. Thus, he rules that the finished product is concentrate mixed with water and not pure grape juice.

“I understand that the water in a cup of reconstituted grape juice should not be counted and therefore you should not use it for kiddush,” Yankel interjected. “But I don’t see why there is a shaylah what bracha to make since you are tasting and drinking natural grape juice?”

“Good question,” I responded. “However, Rav Shlomo Zalman points out that the concentrate may not be considered grape juice since during the processing it becomes undrinkable. Therefore, the juice is no longer a prize beverage that warrants its own unique bracha, nor can it potentially become wine. This is why Rav Shlomo Zalman conjectures that even after the juice is reconstituted, its bracha may be shehakol, not hagafen (Minchas Shlomoh #4). Although some poskim disagree with Rav Shlomo Zalman’s conclusions, it is advisable not to use reconstituted juice for kiddush and arba kosos (Shu”t Minchas Yitzchok 8:14; ViZos HaBeracha pg. 116; Piskei Tshuvos, 272:2).

Yankel had one more question. “I was told that one should not drink a new wine during the seder meal that was not on the table at the beginning of the seder. Is this true, and if so, why?”

“Answering this question requires an introduction,” I responded.

HATOV VEHAMEITIV

When there is one wine on the table and the host serves another variety of wine, Chazal instituted a special bracha called “Hatov vehameitiv.” This bracha demonstrates our appreciation of the increased joy brought about by having varieties of wine (Mishnah Berurah 175:2). (Some authorities explain that the reason for this bracha is the exact opposite. To make sure that the additional wine does not cause too much frivolity, we recite a bracha that reminds us of the destruction of Beitar when the Romans crushed the Bar Kochba rebellion [Kad HaKemach]. Chazal instituted the fourth bracha of bensching, which is also called “Hatov vehameitiv,” when the Jews finally received permission to bury the thousands of people killed. Thus, the bracha on the new wine reminds us of the bracha recited because of that tragedy.)

Someone who brings out a new bottle of wine in the middle of the seder should technically recite the bracha of hatov vehameitiv. However, many poskim contend that reciting an extra bracha on a cup of wine makes it appear that one is adding another cup to the four that Chazal instituted (Maharil, as explained by Mishnah Berurah 175:2). Therefore, they ruled that one should not bring out a new variety of wine during the seder meal.

Yankel prepared to leave. “So which wine is choicest?” I asked him.

“One should drink a red wine that has never been cooked. However, if a white or cooked wine is better, one should use the better wine. Someone who does not like wine may mix grape juice with wine as long as they can still taste the alcohol, but they should not use reconstituted grape juice.”

“May we all have a Yom Tov of freedom and celebration!”